https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 70 Georgian Scientists Vol. 3 Issue 3, 2021 https://doi.org/10.52340/gs.2021.08.06 , , , , 1 .: 593 75 58 18 : www.cu.edu.ge – . , , , . . , , . , , , . : „ “, „ “, „ “, “, „ “ https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 71 1 . , . . . , (Meyer-Sahling 2004; Dimitrov et al. 2006, .225–29; Verheijen 2007; Oleinik 2009). 90– , (Shelley 1999; Handelman 1995, .281–93; Favarel-Garrigues 2003; Bebler 2001; Taylor 2011; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Kolennikova et al. 2008; Waller and Yasmann 1995; Volkov 2002, .126–54). ? ? - , (Max Weber 1978, .226–41), (traditional domination) . . , . „ “ , (Erdmann and Engel 2007). , . „ “, ( , ) . , . https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 72 , . , ( (Kitschelt et al. 1999, .39). 1.1 . . , (Hensell 2012). “ (‘Economy and Society’) (Weber 1978). „ “ ( . ‘patrimonium’ – , ) , , . . 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(Keiser and Baer 2005). : , ] [ ] “ (Weber 1978, 264). „ “ (Dahlstrom et al. 2011). , , , (Evans and Rauch 1999) „ “ (Weberian state hypothesis). , , – . – „ “ – , 1970–1990 . „ “ , , , , . , (Evans and Rauch 1999) ( ) (Dahlstrom et al. 2011), - , https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 81 , . , , , . , ( , „ “ (Hensell 2009, .49–70)). . . , , (semi-democratic) . . . 1.3 . „ “ XVIII- . 1745 . “, , , , , „ “ „ “ . , „ “ . 1918 . , . „ “ , , ( 2004). „ “ , . , . , „ ” , , – , , , , . , https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 82 ” 2005). , , . , , , . , . , „ “ , . , , , ( ) . ”. , , . : , ; – , ; , , . ; , , ; ; , ; . . (Michel Crozier) „ “ (1964). . , ( ) . . , . . . , . , , ( ) https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 83 , , , . ( ) , , . . , , , . “. , . : (…) … “ (Weber 1947). (Anthony Giddens) , , . , , „ ”, – – – , ” ( 1999, .270). 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(eds) (2007) Handbook of Public Administration (Los Angeles, CA, Sage Publications), pp. 311–19. 21. Weber, M. 1947. The theory of social and economic organization. New York: The Free Press. 22. Weber, M. 1958. The three types of legitimate rule. Berkeley Publications in Society and Instit utions, 4(1), 1-11. 23. Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology [edited by G. Roth & C. Wittich] (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press). 24. , . 1999. . . 25. , . 2010. : . - . – 4. – . 158-187. 26. , . 2002. : (I) // . 2. .72-73. https://journals.4science.ge/index.php/GS/index 87 Review and analysis of patrimonial and meritocratic governance concepts Tamar Charkviani Associated Professor, Caucasus School of Humanities and Social Sciences Caucasus University, 1 Paata Saakadze Str. 0102, Tbilisi, Georgia Web-site: www.cu.edu.ge Abstract A theoretical and methodological approach of the paper is the analysis of general neopatrimonial and social network theories – to understand both the dominant trend and variations in reform trajectories in Georgian civil service. This work introduces the concepts of neopatrimonialism, bureaucracy, meritocracy and informal networks examining their origins and defining characteristics. This is followed by consideration of the nature of the public sector in Georgia, exploring the implications of neopatrimonialism for public sector capacity and performance. In setting up the contrast between neopatrimonial and meritocratic bureaucracies, we have chosen to emphasize two points that lend themselves to relatively objective empirical assessment. The first is the importance of meritocratic recruitment, ideally based on some combination of education and examination, second is a predictable career ladder, which provides long term tangible and intangible rewards for those who have been recruited into the bureaucracy. Key words: ‘Civil Service’, ‘Bureaucracy’, ‘Meritocracy’, ‘Neopatrimonialism’,‘Informal Networks’