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Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency and Socio-

Economic Development in Nigeria 

By 

Livinus Nwaugha 

   

 

Abstract    

Peace and security are required for sustainable socio-economic development of 

any country; in some parts of Nigeria, these are disrupted by terrorist and 

insurgent activities, hence the Nigerian government’s long-drawn deployment of 

its military in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The military is 

saddled with the task of combating armed groups, such as the Boko Haram 

insurgents in the north-eastern part of the country and Niger Delta militants, 

among many others engaged in criminal activities that threaten the security of 

lives and properties and sabotage economic activities. Most of the previous 

studies conducted on the nature and operations of the terrorist groups and 

insurgencies in Nigeria have focused on their atrocities and their disruptive 

impact on society. This study reviews the various aspects of the crisis with a view 

to highlighting how the protracted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

offensives have resulted in diversion of public funds and gulped up huge 

resources that could have been used for the socio-economic development of the 

country. Based on available data, the study concludes that although fighting 

terrorism and insurgency is a necessary duty, the corruptive and ineffective 

manner in which it has been done in Nigeria has further aggravated the plight of 

the people and impeded socio-economic development. 

Keywords: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, Nigeria, threats, socio-economic 

development 

 

Introduction 

Socio-economic development and a peaceful and stable polity are 

prerequisites for the attainment of prosperity in any country, and these 

fundamental requirements are threatened in many countries by violence 

unleashed by terrorists and insurgents. This is why, wherever there is a 

prevalence of terrorism and insurgency, states have adopted several 

strategies to deal with the menace. As Nigeria’s experience has shown, 

attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups are generally unconventional in 

nature and are highly unpredictable. Diverse approaches are required to 

deal with the problem, particularly where the operations of the group spill 



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over national borders or form alliances with international terrorist 

organizations. Terrorism and insurgency appear to have assumed greater 

global dimension since the end of the Cold War in the late 1990s (William, 

S. Lind et al, 2008) but it was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack at 

New York’s World Trade Centre that reinforced the utmost importance of 

counterterrorist and counterinsurgent operations (Gingell, 2021). That 

attack, in which 2,996 people lost their lives (Washington Post, 2013), was 

preceded by the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing.  

In Nigeria, militant groups in the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram 

insurgency in the north-eastern part of the country, among others, currently 

pose serious security threats. According to a 2024 figure released by the 

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “more than 35,000 people 

are estimated to have been killed as a result of Boko Haram attacks 

between 2009 and 2020”. Thousands of people have also been killed by 

other insurgent groups operating in the northeast, such as ISIS-WA and 

Ansaru. All of these, and the fact that conventional military strategies are 

often ineffective in dealing with terrorists, have led to the formation of 

counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) joint taskforces in 

Nigeria and elsewhere in the world.  

The faceless, multi-faceted and international nature of many terrorist and 

insurgent operations makes inter-agency collaboration crucial and also 

necessitates international partnerships and cooperation. The cost 

implication of countering the atrocities of terrorist and insurgent groups, 

and of managing the human, economic and environmental emergencies 

caused by them is enormous, and has in no small measure affected the 

socio-economic development of not only the affected areas but of the 

country as a whole.   

Objective and Methodology of the Study 

Diverse studies have been conducted on the nature, operations, and 

negative impact of the terrorist groups and insurgencies in Nigeria. Each of 

these studies mostly focused on some dimension of the problems – such as 

disruption of communal life, violence, kidnapping, human rights violation, 

forced recruitment and banditry – caused by these gangs and the Nigerian 

military’s war against them. The current study reviews the various aspects 

of the crisis with a view to highlighting how the protracted 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency offensives against terrorist and 

dissident groups have gulped up huge resources that could have been used 

for the socio-economic development of the country and how failure by the 

Nigerian government to quickly and roundly win the war against terror 

could further stunt Nigeria’s stability and economic growth.   



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The methodology adopted for this study was secondary source of data 

collection, as it provided a convenient and broad-based access to the mass 

of information needed for a holistic view of terrorism and insurgency in 

Nigeria and the operations being conducted by the military to counter their 

massive disruption of social life and economic activities. Data-collection 

sources utilized in this study included news reports, books, previous 

research conducted on the topic, and authoritative websites that captured 

and recorded the activities of insurgents and terrorists in Nigeria. Data 

collected were subjected to qualitative analysis to arrive at the findings and 

conclusion of the study. 

Definition of Key Terms 

The key terms of this study that need to be defined in order to understand 

the issues discussed are terrorism, insurgency, counterterrorism, and 

counterinsurgency. Not all terror is terrorism and not all forms of militant 

agitation can be termed insurgency. Terrorism and insurgency have 

assumed global dimensions and so a generally-acceptable definition is 

required to aid our understanding of the nature of each of these terms and 

why both forms of militant oppression should be countered and censored 

by every orderly and democratic society as well as by the international 

community. Although there are different definitions of terrorism, some of 

them ideologically motivated, this study’s use of the term would be based 

on two standard definitions quoted by Gingell (2021) that defined 

terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 

against non-combatant targets” and as “the unlawful use of force and 

violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 

the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 

or social objectives”.  

While “insurgency” as a term may share all or some of these attributes, it 

is different from “terrorism” in the sense that it is targeted at gaining 

control of a territory and its resources. This is why the US Department of 

Homeland Security defined insurgency as a “protracted political-military 

struggle directed towards subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a 

constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially 

controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military 

forces and illegal political organizations” (Gingell, 2021). 

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, therefore, are approaches and 

operations geared towards opposing, responding to and counteracting 

terrorism and insurgency. These approaches may be enemy-centric, 

population-centric or authoritarian-centric (Bala & Tar, 2019). Scott 

(2007) described counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as the totality of 

political, economic, social and security measures put in place to end armed 



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violence while promoting political stability. Scott, however, like most 

commentators, offered no suggestion on how to end violent agitation 

where injustice, mounting unemployment and marginalization are the 

order of the day in a country so blessed in natural and human resources, 

such as Nigeria. 

Theoretical Framework 

The theoretical framework adopted by this study to explore the issue of 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and their impact on socio-

economic development in Nigeria consists of Maslow’s needs theory, and 

related peace-enhancing viewpoints, and Todaro’s development theory.   

Maslow’s Needs Theory and Related Concepts 

Maslow’s needs theory and similar viewpoints generally affirm that 

humans have certain needs and that when these needs are not met, they 

would create feelings of frustration and anger. However, as diverse as 

human needs are, there is no time they would all be met, as they are ever 

evolving. The endless nature of human needs makes it difficult to reach a 

point where human beings would cease to have needs. The insatiability of 

human needs make conflict inevitable. This is because human needs vary 

from basic or essential needs to complex personal or group desires that 

change as human beings and societies develop or evolve. Though human 

needs are not static but dynamic, there are certain basic things universally 

needed by all human beings for their survival and wellbeing. They are 

food, water, clothing, shelter, security and justice; when these are absent, 

they may trigger terrorist or insurgent activities. There are different needs 

theories but, generally, they make the following assumptions: 

(i) that because human needs are insatiable, competition is 

inevitable; 

(ii) that because there is competition, conflict will always arise. 

As Maslow’s hierarchy of needs extrapolates, human needs are highly 

insatiable: as soon as one need is met, another need arises. Maslow’s 

pyramid of needs categorises needs in terms of their order of importance, 

beginning with basic needs, such as food, shelter and clothing, to essential 

needs, such as the need for self-actualization and self-fulfillment (Maslow, 

1973). Danesh (2006) sees the issue of justice as a fundamental human 

need. For him, the matter of distributive justice is a primary human need 

for lack of it usually leads to series of agitations and conflicts, especially in 

countries and communities where social exclusion is the rule rather than 

the exception. Some people believe that unrealised justice and inclusion 

needs are the root causes of terrorism and insurgency, as inability to meet 

these needs lead to frustration and anger. Hertnon (2005), in his 



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categorization of needs, places survival and betterment needs as the most 

basic universal needs individuals and groups do not play with, as any 

action or inaction which tends to undermine these basic needs may lead to 

violence.  

Critics of these needs theories opine that since human needs change over 

time, it is difficult to ascertain which needs are so important that failure to 

meet them would lead to violent conflicts. They argue that it is only when 

needs are static that their evaluation and analysis can be carried out in 

relation to prevailing circumstances. These criticisms notwithstanding, the 

needs theories offer valuable insight into wide scale occurrence of 

terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria and, probably, elsewhere in the world. 

Todaro’s Development Theory 

Todaro’s development theory and similar theories are relevant frameworks 

in this study because some people are of the view that the root cause of 

terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria is lack of socio-economic 

development. Although the concept of development has evolved over time, 

it still constitutes a significant benchmark by which the progress of any 

country is measured. Due to its fluid nature and various usages over time, 

it is now rather difficult to come up with a concise meaning of 

development, more so because the concept appears virtually in all 

disciplines with different meanings. However, development on a general 

note connotes an elevation of people’s life towards a better condition 

(Egonmwan & Ibodje, 2001). The fact that the things that constitute better 

life vary in accordance with people’s needs and expectations means that 

there is no one-size-fits-all definition of development, as it is an on-going 

phenomenon (Adetula, 2013:308). However, according to Todaro (1981): 

Development must represent the entire gamut or change by which an 

entire social system tuned to the diverse needs and desire of 

individuals and social group within that system move away from a 

condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory and toward a 

situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually 

better (Todaro, 1981:70).  

Development, pertaining to self-esteem, refers to an individual’s degree of 

self-respect, accommodation and tolerance (Todaro, 1981:71). 

In the view of Goulet (1992), development is a multidimensional concept 

which can be seen in three areas. They are life sustenance, self-esteem and 

freedom. At these three levels what constitute development varies from 

food, shelter to protection. The extent to which these attributes are 

available in a society determines its level of development. Basically, what 



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causes some level of dissatisfaction is when people are uncertain about 

when the next meal would be available, and when their protection is 

uncertain or in abeyance. 

These values mark how advanced people are. Where there is incessant 

altercation and infighting development would be elusive, but at times these 

altercations drive development; this is why Goulet (1992) generalizes that 

development is a two-edged sword which can be used to build or to 

destroy.   

According to Egonmwan & Ibodje (2001), the whole essence of 

development is to eradicate poverty through the enhancement of the living 

condition of the people. At various times, since Nigeria’s independence in 

1960, several conscious steps have been taken to chart the nation’s 

development. Immediately after independence, a five-year development 

plan (1960-65) was drawn to drive the country’s development. From 1970 

to the 1980s, several developmental steps were taken; but towards the mid 

1980s onwards, due to maladministration and corruption, the nation was 

plunged into economic mess which culminated in its adoption of structural 

adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986. The period of the 1970s registered 

appreciable development indicators both in savings and purchasing power 

with the naira being stronger than the US dollar, but beyond this period a 

general distortion characterized the entire system.  

As Ayorinde and Uga (1999) captured succinctly, “the tapping of the 

country’s endowment of various resources has not culminated in improved 

living condition for the majority of the people”. By 2001, during the 

presentation of the appropriation bill to the National Assembly, President 

Olusegun Obasanjo was emphatic when he said publicly that Nigerians 

have not sufficiently improved since its hard-won democracy (Taiwo, 

2001). Improvement must be judged by the welfare of the people, not by 

mere statistics; the questions to be asked, according to Sear (1969), are: 

What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to 

unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three 

of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has 

been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or 

two of these central problems have been going worse, especially if 

all three exists, it would be strange to call the result development 

even if per-capita income doubled (Seer.1969:3). 

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: the Nigerian Experience 

Since the return of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, and its 

accompanying cry of marginalization, sectional politics, mounting 



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unemployment and increasing poverty in the midst of plenty, terrorism and 

insurgency and related activities have continued to hinder the provision of 

social goods to the citizenry. This necessitated the formation of civilian 

and military joint task forces (Hamza & Sawab, 2013; Bala & Tar, 2019) 

to deal with the problem. In Nigeria, counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency has borne different names – from Operation Restore 

Order (ORO) 1, 2, and 3, Operation Zaman Lafiya, Operation Python 

Dance, Operation Lafiya Dole, to Operation Thunder Strike,  to mention 

but a few. 

The combative nature of most of these names reflects the operatives’ 

awareness of the heavy arms and ammunitions at the disposal of the 

terrorists and insurgents and the danger they pose to the socio-economic 

development of the Nigerian state. In an atmosphere where life has 

become “short and brutish”, no visible and calculated development can 

thrive. Since it is their constitutional mandate to quell insurrection of any 

kind and restore socio-economic activity, the military swung into action to 

counter the terrorists and insurgents in collaboration with civilians in the 

affected communities. The local communities, using an assortment of local 

weapons such as knives, swords, dane-guns, bows and arrows (Olugbode, 

2013; Bala & Tar, 2019), formed vigilante groups to enhance their fight 

against violent-non-state actors (VNSAs). 

The use of vigilante groups is very old and predates Nigeria’s 

independence in 1960 (ICG, 2022:6). Before independence, vigilante 

groups constituted the vanguard of the communities that protected and 

secured lives and properties. Mainly able-bodied men, grouped according 

the age, constituted these groups. Most essentially, vigilante groups 

provided security for the local communities; in some cases, where there 

were conflicts amongst communities, the vigilante group mediated to 

enthrone peace. When there are conflicts of roles and functions amongst 

the vigilante groups, it is settled by the traditional authority of their 

community (Ogbezor, 2016:1). Arguably, the vigilante groups also played 

important roles in the provision of socio-economic goods, especially as 

they constituted the work groups that cleared, planted and harvested crops. 

Moreover, they ensued that justice was maintained in their communities. 

 In recent times, especially since 2000, vigilante groups have been 

integrated into the mainstream of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

operations in Nigeria, largely due to the overwhelming of the mainstream 

security architecture by the terrorists and insurgents who use their better 

understanding of their local terrain to inflict incalculable damage on the 

military operatives. By 2000, the number of vigilante groups in Nigeria has 

greatly increased; they bear different code names, such as Niger State 



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People Congress (NSPC) in Niger State, Neighborhood Security 

Committee (NSC) in Akwa Ibom State, Edo Vigilante Service (EVS) in 

Edo State, Hasbah Corps in Kano State, Yan-Sakai in Katsina State, Yan 

Komiti in Bauchi State, Amotikun in the southwestern zone, and 

Ebubeagu, which was formed by the State Governors of the southeastern 

zone of Nigeria.  

The synergy between the civilian taskforce and military force became 

necessary owing to the fact that members of vigilante groups are versed in 

the knowledge of their rural areas where the insurgents and terrorists 

operate. It is necessary to make this explanation or clarification here. 

Terrorism and insurgency are not limited to local or rural areas as their 

activities have equally been registered in major cities and towns in Nigeria, 

including Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, Owerri, the capital of Imo state, 

Makurdi in Benue state, Jos in Plateau state, Katsina in Katisna state, 

Maiduguri in Borno State, Minna and Suleja in Niger state, and Damaturu 

in Yobe State. 

There are misgivings in some quarters that the synergy between the 

civilian and military operatives is a mere marriage of convenience, and 

that the military has always treated the civilian populace with disdain 

whenever it suits them. Bala and Tar (2019) assert that for 

counterinsurgency operation to be effective and possible the local populace 

should be separated from the insurgents and terrorists. There are records of 

incidents where the military joint taskforce left the insurgents to attack the 

local communities, accusing them of shielding the insurgents and the 

terrorists. The military joint taskforce has also been accused of unlawful 

arrests, extra-judicial killings, rape, looting and destruction of properties 

belonging to some communities.  This is why some scholars assert that 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria are 

politically motivated and aimed at disintegrating the already disenchanted 

local communities. Amnesty International, in a report cited in Omilusi 

(2016), said the military were better trained and equipped to enforce 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and need not integrate the civilian 

populace so as to reduce the number of casualties. Transparency 

International has described Nigerian counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency military operatives as barbaric, especially after their 6th 

of January, 2019 activities at the offices of the Daily Trust Newspaper in 

Maiduguri and Abuja.  

Some people are of the opinion that terrorists and insurgents have 

infiltrated into the corridors of power, and some terrorists and insurgents 

have even openly named the Nigerian government as their major sponsors. 

In this regard, the late General Sani Abacha is reported to have said that 



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terrorism and insurgency cannot last 24 hours if the hands of government 

are not in it. The case of Boko Haram appears to support this claim. 

According to Shehu (2024), Boko Haram was formed in 2002 and 

assumed a terrorist dimension in 2009; but it took nearly five years (2014) 

for the government to proscribe it and to declare it a terrorist organization.  

All these agitate the minds of Nigerians who find it difficult to understand 

why the war against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, after so many 

years, is yet to be won.  

How Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Undermine Socio- 

Economic Development in Nigeria 

Bala and Tar (2019) see counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as 

veritable moves needed for the restoration of normalcy so that socio-

economic development can thrive. This study, however, considers many 

aspects of Nigeria’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency initiative as a 

drain on the country’s resources, especially given the fact that the nation 

has not seen the end of terrorism and insurgency after so much has been 

spent on countering them. Apparently, a lot of the money has been 

diverted. For instance, former National Security Adviser (NSO) to 

President Goodluck Jonathan, Col. Sambo Dasuki, was alleged to have 

embezzled 2 billion US dollars, money that would have been used to fight  

terrorism and insurgency. Till date, nothing more is heard about that case. 

According to Usman (2024), “The military is deployed virtually to every 

part of the country in order to bring respite at great cost to the country, 

including misappropriation of colossal amounts of funds voted for logistics 

and personnel welfare”. A table of Nigeria’s security budgetary allocation 

(2009 to 2019) is presented below, as it would help us to understand the 

“colossal” nature of spending on security in the country.   

Security Budgetary Allocation in Nigeria (2009-2019) 

YEAR BUDGETARY 

ALLOCATION 
 

2009 261 Billion Naira 

2010 264 Billion Naira 

2011 348 Billion Naira 

2012 921.91 Billion Naira 

2013 923 Billion Naira 

2014 937.8 Billion Naira 

2015 964.7 Billion Naira 

2016 1,005 Trillion Naira 

2017 1,117 Trillion Naira 

2018-2019 1,176 Trillion Naira 

      Source: Dan-Azumi (2018) as modified by the author 



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The statistics above buttress our argument that counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency operations in the country have depleted the nation’s 

resources, without overwhelming the militants and creating an atmosphere 

conducive for the socio-economic development of Nigeria. As at 2012 

when the security budgetary allocation was 921.91 billion naira, 

unemployment rate was 30.30% and in 2015, when the security budgetary 

allocation rose to 964.7 billion naira, the unemployment rate was 38.38% 

while the poverty rate was 76.3%. In 2017, when the security budgetary 

allocation was 1117 trillion naira, the rate of unemployment was 43.34% 

while poverty rate was 74.70% (Dan-Azumi, 2018). Life expectancy in 

Nigeria was 52.40 in 2014, 52.84 in 2015, 53.29 in 2016, 53.73 in 2017, 

54.18 in 2918, and 54.49 in 2019. As noted by UNICEF (2018), in 2015 

37% of Nigeria’s health facilities were closed down while 40% and 44% 

were closed down in 2017 and 2018 respectively.  

Conclusion 

Having examined counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the context of 

ending terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria to facilitate socio-economic 

development, the findings of this study indicate that both operations have, 

instead, hindered socio-economic development. While acknowledging the 

necessity of countering terrorism and insurgency, this paper notes that the 

corruptive and ineffective manner in which this has been done in Nigeria 

has further aggravated the plight of the people, as resources which could 

have been used to alleviate the sufferings of the masses were 

unaccountably poured into the operations while other critical areas of 

social and economic concern were starved of funds. 

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Author Information: Dr Livinus Nwaugha is a lecturer 

in the Department of Political Science and International 

Relations, Caleb University, Imota, Lagos State, Nigeria. 

Email: livinus.nwaugha@calebuniversity.edu.ng 

 

 

 

 
 

APA 

 

Nwaugha, L.. (2024). Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency 

and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. Global Online 

Journal of Academic Research (GOJAR), 3(2), 51-62. 

https://klamidas.com/gojar-v3n2-2024-03/. 

 

MLA 

 

Nwaugha, Livinus. “Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency and 

Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria”. Global Online Journal of 

Academic Research (GOJAR), vol. 3, no. 2, 2024, pp. 51-62. 

https://klamidas.com/gojar-v3n2-2024-03/. 

 

 

 

 


