







































 

Running head: NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      140 

 

 

 

 

 

Ninetieth Century Economic Change and the Crisis in the Southern Senegambia: 

Islamic Militancy and the British Intervention in the Lower Gambia Region of Jarra, Kiang and 

Foni 

1860-1888 

Ensa Touray 

University of Gambia, The Gambia 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author Note 

Ensa Touray, History Lecturer, University of Gambia. 

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ensa Touray, University 

of Gambia, Po Box 3530, Brikama Campus, The Gambia, 00220-7664805. 

Contact: etouray@utg.edu.gm 

 

 

 

mailto:etouray@utg.edu.gm


 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      141 

 

 

 

Abstract 

 The global economic realities in the middle of the 19th century was characterized by the intense 

search for viable areas of cost effective production to facilitate the expansion of the capitalist world 

economy and the rate of accumulation. This period of transformation coincided with the period of 

industrialization of Western European countries and the introduction of cash crops in the southern 

Senegambia region. In this paper, I critically examine how capitalist economic advancement and 

transformation led to the rise of socio-political crisis in the southern Senegambia region.  It is 

evident that the new emerging global capitalist economic expansion in the middle of the 19th 

century generated competition between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the entire southern 

Senegambia region. It explores the consequent large scale socio-political crisis resulting from the 

nineteenth century capitalist economic advancement that lead to the clash between the theocratic 

Muslim regime of Futa Jallon and non-Muslim Empire of Kabu. It further sets out to examine how 

global economic change and cash crop production in the middle of the nineteenth century created 

intense political consolidation and power struggle in Kiang, Jarra and Foni that necessitated the 

intervention of the British administration. 

Keywords: Capitalist, Change, militant, Crisis, Mediation, consolidation 

  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      142 

 

 

Introduction 

The introduction of cash crops in 1860 gave Muslims and peasants living on both banks of 

the Gambia River access to cash and material mobilization to fight against oppressive non-Muslim 

kings (Wright, 2004). To understand the context of the crisis in the entire southern Senegambia 

region, it is significant to rationalize the realities of a global system within the framework of a 

capitalist world economic system in the middle of the nineteenth century that marked the beginning 

of global enterprise (William, 2005). This new global economic and commercial phenomenon 

brought transformation in wider context. It generated new commitment for political consolidation 

among the traditional ruling aristocracies. In addition, it enabled peasants and Muslim 

communities under the non-Muslim ruling regimes to engage in peanut production and trade to 

gain material wealth. 

After the mid-19th century, a series of economic depressions experienced by industrial core 

nations as a result of overproduction enticed the European nations to compete for market and 

sources of raw material within non-industrial territories in West Africa. The competition among 

European nations for space and for the new economic and production system in the Senegambia, 

also correspondingly reproduced a new form of power consolidation and struggle for dominance 

(Barry, 1998).  

Understanding of key structures of the capitalist world-system is relevant to the 

contextualization of crises in the entire south bank of the Senegambia in the late 19th century. The 

key hierarchical categories identified in the capitalist world-system were geographical based 

economic relationship. It is rationalized as a core-periphery relationship that engendered 

competition and political crises as a consequence of change in the production system (William, 

2005).  The changes in the production system in the south bank region of the Senegambia could 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      143 

 

 

be linked to increasing outward expansion, industrialization, and commodification that did not only 

generate competition among core powers for hegemony over the whole system but reproduced 

struggle and competition among traditional rulers and Muslim clerics. This could be deemed as 

anti-systemic forces that required peaceful intervention of the British as an industrial core nation 

in the internal conflicts between the Muslims and traditional non-Muslim ruling dynasties in The 

Gambia. Significantly, the demand for vegetable oil and fat needed for industrial production in 

Europe also required the need for abolition of Atlantic slave trade in order to retain manpower for 

the new production system in Africa (Wright, 2004).  This gave rise to the growth of a legitimate 

trading system. Owing to new development in the new production system, communities in or near 

coastal zones began to specialize in the production of peanut and palm kernel. 

Conceptualizing the geo-political framework of the southern bank region of greater 

Senegambia is relevant in our understanding of transformation and change within the context of 

capitalist economic expansion. The south bank region was dominated by Kabu, a non-Muslim 

Mandinka empire, and Futa Imamate, dominated by Muslim Fulas. Both regimes played a central 

role in the Trans-Atlantic slave trading system from the period of the 17th to the early 19th century 

(Barry, 1998). The growth and the development of peanut production constituted labor migration 

and effective utilization of productive terrain along the strategic coastal zones in the entire south 

bank region of greater Senegambia (Web, 2004). Futa Jallon Imamate is situated on the mainland 

and was ecologically and geographically disadvantaged to monopolize the peanut production 

system because of the rocky nature of the soil. These conditions in the Futa Jallon plateau shape 

the basis of population migration into Kabu and Foria around River Grande and Geba (Barry, 

1998). Therefore, the discourse on the conceptualization of crisis in Futa and Kabu can be 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      144 

 

 

understood within the framework of a new emerging orientation towards export agriculture and 

relocation of productive terrain prior to colonial conquest (Webb, 2006). 

  Following the control of all the southern Rivers such as the Pongo, Nunez, Geba and 

Gambia Rivers as well as productive arable terrain strategic for European trading activities, Kabu 

continued to maintain an active position in the new production system.  This requires an in-depth 

analysis of the outcome of structural transformation and change in the new global economic system 

on the political atmosphere in the southern Senegambia region. The viable and strategic southern 

region of Benty, Bova and Boke in Futa Jallon could have maintained active global participation 

of Futa`s theocratic regime in the legitimate trading system (Barry, 1998). However, with 

European occupation in these strategic and viable zones within the southwest region of Futa Jallon, 

the theocratic regime of Futa was determined to embark on territorial expansion through the 

province of Labe to ensure effective control over legitimate commodity and contraband slave 

trading.  

It is also important to note that the introduction of a legitimate trading system through cash 

crop production led to relocation of labor and productive terrains within the jurisdiction under the 

political and administrative suzerainty of Kabu (Barry, 1918). Consequently, the strategic 

ecological and commercial conditions in the region of Kabu served as a pull factor for the incoming 

population. This caused the theocratic regime of Futa to experience drastic revenue shrinkage as a 

result of evacuation of a large number of Fulas to escape taxation and oppressive rule (Barry, 

1998). In this situation, the crisis between two regional powers needs to be understood within the 

context of quest for political legitimacy and hegemony over labor and productive terrain. As for 

Barry, effective pursuit for political legitimacy by Futa Imamate was explored in terms of 

mobilization in human and material form to surmount the regional power and consolidation of 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      145 

 

 

Kabu Empire. Accordingly, this was carried out within the framework of a triple military alliance. 

The Imam of the central regime of Futa raised a large number of armies, supported by combined 

forces Alfa of Labe and Almami of Bundu, Bbakar Saada attacked and exterminated the regional 

power of Kabu in 1868 (Gray, 1966). 

The downfall of Kabu led to withdrawal of political suzerainty of the central regime of 

Kabu over the control of the entire upper and lower Gambian basin. Consequently, the provincial 

Mandinka ruling dynasties in the jurisdiction of lower Gambian basin of Kiang and Jarra re-

asserted their territorial independence, and then consolidated their position to maintain their 

control over legitimate trading system. The Muslim clerics under the despotic non-Muslim regimes 

became ambitious for political change in the entire south bank region. The regional vulnerability 

and competition on the account of the crisis between the Muslims and the traditional ruling elites 

depicted the beginning of insecurity that would potentially disrupt agriculture and trade.  

 

Crisis in the South Bank of the Gambia: Islamic Militancy and Political Consolidation 

The ninetieth century capitalist advancement through legitimate trading system and 

political crisis in the entire Senegambia can be understood within the context of intense pursuit for 

socio-political reform.  Donald Wright identifies it as “intense desire for change and the militant 

approach to bringing about that change (Wright, 2004). In the south bank region, Muslim militancy 

for political change was explored through intense mobilization in human and material form.  The 

downfall of the Kabu empire created an opportunity for the growth of new Fulani kingdom known 

as Fulladu in the upper Gambia valley. The leading Mandinka Muslim clerics through ethnic 

alignment mobilized and hired the remaining Kabu warriors in the course of political change in 

the latter part of ninetieth century.  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      146 

 

 

The Islamic militancy in the middle of the 19th century can be conceptualized within the 

framework of broader context of capitalist economic expansion.  The Islamic uprising could be 

traced to Islamic brotherhood known as the Tijaniya Brotherhood. The brotherhood became 

appealing to the masses owing to its practical miracle mobilization within the context of ritual and 

mysticism. The leader of this brotherhood ideological sect was Ahaji Umar Tal, a Torobe Fulani 

from upper Senegal (Wright, 2004). According to Donald Wright, the reception of the Tijaniya 

doctrine through Shaykh Umar inspired a revolutionary spirit into Ma Bah to start a revolutionary 

campaign against the existing traditional authorities in the lower Gambia basin. “Shaykh Umar 

visited him, acquainted him with the Tijaniyya, and blew on the embers of Islamic revival that 

already may have been glowing within Maba.”    

It should be noted that the middle of the nineteenth century was characterized by the 

demand for reform and rebellion against Soninke hegemony. The cash crop production and 

legitimate trading system brought competition between the Muslim clerics and Soninke regimes 

in the entire lower Senegambia regionWright,2004). Soninke refers to non-Muslims who follow 

traditional African religion. 

 Maba led the successful Jihad in the north bank region of Baddibu in 1861. Though Maba 

could not complete his conquest, his success in laying the foundation of Islamic militant uprising 

in the Gambia has been clearly captured by J M Gray: “His earlier successes in Baddibu and Nuimi 

were the signals for Marabouts up and down the river to rise against their Soninke overlord”  

Kaba as a leading disciple of Maba, was motivated by the successes of his contemporaries 

like Alfa Molloh Baldeh in Fulladu and Foday Kombo Sillah in the south-west region of the 

Gambia. He mobilized prominent marauding warriors, who, according to oral traditions, were 

powerful. With the exception of “Franzwoi” and others based at Toniataba, the British records 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      147 

 

 

could not indicate the names of his warriors. However, Manding speaking tradition has been able 

to mention his Mandinka warriors like Maisa Fatty, Bintou Mori, Fena Turuma and Demba Ajara. 

He also mobilized and made a joint alliance with a large confederacy of marabout. Then he 

consolidated his position in Niamina, Jarra, Kiang and Foni, in the region to the south of those 

districts as far as the Bank of Casamance. Practically, he administered only three districts which 

were isolated from each other. The three districts include the south of the Bintang Creek, Eastern 

Kiang and Western Jarra as well as part of Eastern Jarra (Gray, 1966).  

With the emergence of regional dominance of Futa Imamate, viable kingdoms under the 

jurisdictions of Kabu in the upper Gambia were brought under the domination of Alfa Molloh. 

Fulladu initially became a periphery of Futa Imamate until 1878. Since Foday Kaba was 

constrained by the Fullani dominance in Fulladu, his determination to mobilize the remaining 

Kabu warriors to conquer viable lower Gambian kingdoms of Niamina, Jarra, Kiang and Foni pre-

occupied his major agenda. It should be understood that the jurisdictions such as Jarra, Niamina 

and Kiang were administered by powerful centralized Manding speaking people with well-

organized military structures for territorial defense and security. It is also very significant for us to 

understand that these kingdoms became viable for political consolidation as a result of peanut 

production, while robber and gum trade constituted the viability of Foni (Barry, 1996). 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      148 

 

 

 

 Fig. 1. Map of the Gambia 

Kaba`s conquest for territorial integration was negatively frustrated by intense political 

consolidation of centralized Manding speaking rulers of Jarra and Kiang. Geographically, his 

conquered districts were not territorially contiguous. In between his conquered districts, the 

Soninke kings of Japineh, Colley Dampha, king Mansa Kortoh of Batteling in the region of Kiang 

and Cory- Kunda, maintained their independence against Kaba (CSO, 1888).  The ruling houses 

in Jarra and Kiang re-affirmed their political consolidation to benefit from legitimate trading. 

Therefore, relinquishing their territorial sovereignty would constitute the end of their dominant 

control over state revenue accrued from taxation paid by farmers and European traders. Since the 

establishment of Fulani domination led by Musa Molloh in Fulladu prevented Kaba in Fulladu, 

the kings in Kiang and Jarra explored means of tactical alliance with Alpha Molloh and Musa 

Molloh to reinforce their territorial consolidation.    

 

Political Crisis and the Early Mediating Roles of the British 

The continuous political struggle and resistance created an atmosphere of trade disruption. 

Therefore, there required a need for intervention for peaceful mediation. This also necessitated the 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      149 

 

 

British government to assume a neutral stance in the management of crisis. In this situation, we 

need to contextualize the initial intervention of the British from the perspective of crisis 

management based on its recurrent and non-preventable nature. 

In the kingdom of Kiang, Kaba signed a peace treaty with the British at the town of 

“Toniataba. We need to understand that Jarra was strategic for the British because of ground nut 

trade. Any form of intervention to avert disruption of farming and trade was necessary. The 

presence of British technological sophistication in the south bank of the Gambia can be relevant 

in our understanding of the context of the discourse of "technological-structural perspective" in 

the management of crisis. In this situation, the collective consciousness of technological power of 

the British administration became a catalyst for the management of policies and practice. 

Consequently, this also led to conformity and restraints in the crisis period.  The British policy of 

a non-aggression pact, and the treaty signed to refer all the disputes of the conflicting parties to the 

British administration forced Kaba to remain calm. However, he continued to seek permission 

from the British administration to allow him to retaliate. He said, “I avoid the weakness of hasty 

impatience on your account. Give me a free road to the people of Cory-Kunda, Kabada and 

Jappineh (CSO, 1888).      

  In his message to the British administrator, Kaba illustrated clearly his main mission in the 

south bank region. He affirmed and disclosed his general outlook to the British administrator. 

“I beg to say I have nothing to do with the groundnuts, 

where I am, I am only a stranger. Ever since I knew 

myself to be a man, my occupation has been a warrior,  

and I make it upon my duty to fight the Soninkes, who  

profess no religion whatever. if the Soninke of the north  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      150 

 

 

bank had accepted the Muhammedan we could live in unity…”       

In his publication “Shaikh Amadu and Jihad in Jolof,” Eunice Charles shows the practical 

commitment of Amadu to Islamize the people of Jolof with less attention to the establishment of 

political base. It is confirmed that Amadu and Kaba were all influenced by the jihad of Maba. 

However, Amadu’s use of wisdom and persuasive approach to non-Muslims in Jolof prevented 

him and his disciples from causing destruction.  

  It is even confirmed in the British record in 1880 that he was capturing Jolas as slaves 

rather than converting them to Islam.  When the violence was intensified, the Jola captives who 

escaped from Foni rushed to Banjul to seek asylum.  In 1880, the British administrator agreed to 

protect and secure the freedom of any slave who managed to escape to Bathurst. They informed 

all the chiefs that the runaway slaves would not be delivered back (CSO, 1888). 

  Kabada and Cory-Kunda were settlements in Jarra under the leadership of Coley Dampha.  

We can trace Kaba’s constraints in Jarra and Kiang to the resistance and consolidation of well-

established centralized polities; the issue of alliance between Musa Molloh and the chiefs in Jarra 

and Kiang also undermined his success and the British treaty of non-aggression pact. It is 

confirmed that the Manding speaking Muslims settlement of Booyiba were ally to Kaba. The report 

sent to the British administrator confirmed that when the Fulas of Kabada attempted to capture one 

of Kaba’s children, named Nfali Dumbuya, but the Mandinkas and Alkali of Booyiba were able to 

rescue him. On the account of this, the Fulas of Kabada demonstrated their anger by capturing a 

woman, named Zeemi Sally, believed to be a sister of the Alkali of Booyiba.  

The political alliance of Musa Molloh of Fulladu with the reigning kings of Kiang and Jarra 

can be rationalized in the context of rational expectation within the framework of political alliance 

system.  According to Erik Gatzke the states` assumption of homogenous perception mimics 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      151 

 

 

interest and material variables. In this perspective history does not dictate inter-state alliance. This 

discourse is relevant in the context of the Fulladu-Kiang alliance against Foday Kaba in Kiang and 

Jarra. It should be understood that Musa and his father were the leaders of Fulani consolidation.  

Kaba`s nation building activities in Kiang and Jarra became serious concern for Musa Molloh and 

his father.  Therefore, establishing strategic military and political alliance for common security 

became paramount for the allied kingdoms. 

In 1888, the British endeavored to institute Formulative mediation technique in the internal 

political conflict between Kaba and the existing ruling houses in Kiang and Jarra. This   could be 

described as a period that marked the pacific response of the British in the internal political 

conflict.   Therefore, to avert war that might cause disruption to trade and agriculture, the British 

administrator deemed it prudent to engage in mediation. 

  In response to his complaints the acting British administrator described Kaba`s complaints 

as a demonstration of his genuine friendship and conformity.  The British administrator further 

assured him of his determination to resolve the disputes. He sent a messenger to the rival chiefs to 

surrender his belongings in question. However, none of the reigning chiefs responded to the 

request of the British administrator. Among these rival chiefs was Mansa Koto who openly refused 

to deliver the boy belonging to Foday Kaba. According to the British messenger, “He said that he 

is not going to give up the boy unless Foday Kaba delivered his grey mare before he will deliver 

the boy back” (CSO, 1888). 

The ruling dynasties in Kiang and Jarra were able to make use of tactical alliance and 

British protection as effective means to encumber Kaba’s influence. However, the correspondence 

further revealed Kaba`s tactical maneuver to provoke the British against the rival chiefs.  The 

British report notes:  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      152 

 

 

                   “After the departure of John, the British messenger from the  

                   King of Jappineh, the people of Jappineh and those of Musa Molloh 

                    attacked Masembeh for the purpose of stealing bullocks. 

                   The people of Kabada also laid an ambush on the road 

                   between Toniataba and Datore (CSO,1888).” 

  The British report further indicates that Kaba alleged the people of Kabada for killing two 

of his men: Faraba Ousman Fatty and Lamin Jatta. Another man also sustained an injury, and a 

woman called Hanna Cham, a trader from Banjul, was captured.  He therefore appealed to the 

acting British administrator to give him permission to attack the people of Cory-Kunda, Kabada 

and Jappineh.  It was clear to the British that the people of Jarra were taking advantage of the 

British protection to injure Foday Kaba. The people of Cory-Kunda even continued to collaborate 

with Musa Molloh to raid settlements under the British jurisdiction. They attacked Booloofoolah, 

and captured a boy belonging to Foday Kaba’s followers (CS0, 1888). 

 

The Wars in Foni and the Early Warning of the British 

Kaba perceived the British administration as a deterrent to his conquest in Jarra and Kiang. 

While the administration was engaged in putting logistics for mediation between him (Kaba) and 

the rival chiefs, Kaba and his warriors avoided Jarra and Kiang, whose kings and chiefs jealously 

guarded their independence against him. He then continued to raid places in Foni under the British 

protection. Foni was and still predominantly inhabited by Jolas who were socio-politically 

categorized as egalitarian and stateless communities, governed by village councils. 

Owing to the absence of well-established political and military organization compared to 

the kingdoms in Kiang and Jarra, Foni was opened to vulnerability during the 19th century crisis. 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      153 

 

 

The region of Foni situated on the south bank became geographically and ecologically viable for 

European and Manding speaking traders. The expansion of the wild rubber and palm produce also 

attracted migration into Foni for commodity trade.  Foday Kaba and his men seized the opportunity 

to avoid the entire Mandinka settlements of Jarra and Kiang. He intensified his mobilization to 

subjugate Jolas in his drive to attain his nation building aspiration. However, Kaba became 

disillusioned when he failed to subject the Jolas to be inclined to his authority. He eventually 

embarked on constant raiding as an alternative venture for resource mobilization to sustain the 

services of his marauding warriors.  According to the British accounts, Kaba and his men embarked 

on surprise attacks in the region of Foni. He returned to Sangajour to resume his raid upon the 

natives within British protectorate. On 11 November 1890, the people of Kansala and the kings 

recounted their trouble. According to the British report, “forty-seven horsemen attacked 

Burambang, the king’s town. They seized four women, two children and burnt some of the houses. 

They also continued to lay ambush and even captured a woman returning from her farm.” It was 

confirmed that all these people were sold as slaves (CSO, 1888).  

The situation report of nineteenth century crisis in the region of Foni can be conceptualized 

within the framework of a human security perspective. The intensification of violence and 

continuous raiding created a state of insecurity for Jolas and European traders in Foni. This alerted 

the British administration to institute another method of intervention and mediation. There was a 

need for stable socio-political atmosphere for trade continuity and security for Jolas and British 

traders in the region of Foni.  However, the British administration could not initially explore mean 

of military intervention as a mechanism to end conflict in the region. With the security focus on 

the threat level, the British administration in the Gambia adopted a model of manipulative 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      154 

 

 

mediation technique in the course of terminating violent conflicts in Foni. In this mediation model, 

Britain, as a third party, contributed substantively to the negotiation.  

Mr. Cater, the acting British administrator, warned him to be mindful of Foni in which the 

Jolas established friendship with the British. In his encounter with Kaba, the Governor clearly 

explained: ‘When two persons or people are friends like English with Jolas and other people who 

have signed treaties, do not expect you who say you wish to be friendly with English to go and 

fight our friends (CSO, 1888). However, Kaba continued to justify his attacks as a revenge of the 

offences done to him by the people. 

  The British report confirms Foday Kaba’s attack on the people of Kanfenda and Karoli. 

According to evidence Kaba justified the attack on the people of Kanfenda for carrying away his 

Jola maids. He also destroyed Karoli as revenge against the Jolas for killing his landlord’s son. In 

his reaction to Kaba`s response, the British governor justified the action of Kanfenda people as an 

act of liberating their own people from bondage (CSO, 1888).  

The region of Foni Kansala became strategic terrain for British commercial interest. 

However, the militant activities of Kaba`s marauding warriors increased the threat level.  The 

British mediation response for immediate restoration of calmness in Foni can be examined in the 

context of mediation dilemma. In this context, the intervention of the British as third-party 

mediator was to lay terms and condition for Kaba and his warring faction. This spurred the British 

administrator to go and meet Kaba personally to raise his concern over the state of security in 

Kansala. When the British realized that the disturbances within the neighborhoods could affect 

Kansala and their trade with the Jolas, the British administrator, Sir Samuel Rowe, made an attempt 

to put an end to the disturbances.  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      155 

 

 

In 1887, he proceeded to Foni and found that the Jolas were tired of constant ravages. On 

15 September, he met at Kansala the heads of sixteen Jola towns who appealed to Mr. Rowe to 

accept the sovereignty of their country and be co-opted under British protection (Archer, 1967). 

The treaty with the British signified that Jolas did not want to cede their region to any other power 

except Great Britain. Consequently, Sir Samuel Rowe was urgently requested to hoist the British 

flag. Two days later he entered into the same treaty with the chiefs and the Almami of Bintang. In 

1888, the British entered a similar treaty with the chiefs in central Kiang at Kwinella (Gray, 1966). 

  They also appealed to Mr. Rowe to hoist the British flag in their principal towns. This 

treaty was not only signed by Soninke chiefs but also by marabouts. Mansakoto, an independent 

king of Batteling, also signed the treaty accepting all the provisions enshrined in the central Kiang 

treaty. We can therefore infer that Kaba’s conquest in Kiang and Jarra forced both Mandinka non-

Muslim and Muslims to place themselves under the British protectorate for political security, while 

his raiding in vulnerable Foni also pushed the Jolas to recognize the British authority for defense 

and security.                 

   The British administrator conceived it prudent to illustrate specifically places under their 

protection. He read the list of the names of the people and the town identified. This included the 

chiefs and five treaties. The person mentioned was Alo Barje of Bwiam. According to the British 

sources the signing of this treaty took place in Kansala (CSO, 1888). In Kiang and Jarra, the people 

of Tancrowal and Fonkoi Kunda voluntarily put themselves under British protection. 

The British continued to reinforce the treaty of non-aggression pact as the only method to 

avert conflict.  However, Kaba agreed to conform to the terms on condition that the British would 

leave the interior for him.  The British governor turned down his request on the grounds that the 

request was meant purposely to carry out slave raid and plundering. This further revealed the real 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      156 

 

 

purpose of his wars. As for Kaba, putting those viable terrains under the protection of the British 

would limit his chance of raiding the Soninkes. He therefore put it to the British administrator that: 

“I am a Mandinka and he is a white man; he has got cash to live on. My cash is slavery (CSO, 

1888). I am grieved because they left me and joined somebody else.” 

   Kaba and his people took slavery as the only means of their survival. Therefore, the 

abolition of internal slavery would be a threat to his existence and the new emerging economic 

phenomenon could only thrive in a stable atmosphere. Since his militant activities had to clash 

with British commercial interests, the British had to stop the existing commercial slavery on which 

Kaba and his warriors’ existence entirely depended. The British administration recognized only 

domestic slavery which was prevalent in Gambian tradition. However, the British administrator 

condemned commercial slavery as a repugnant venture to legitimate trade. In the correspondence, 

the governor reports that: 

 “I   know two kinds of slavery: one was catching  

   of the people to sell to others which the English  

would never listen to for a moment and it was no 

   good talking about it, the other domestic servants 

   that they took into their family or that were 

born & lived amongst their people. 

   the two things were totally different.”  

The British further refused to recognize his control over the towns in the interior because 

he intended to carry out raiding. In his reaction, the British administrator affirmed that “with 

respect to taking the waterside and leaving him the land inside for the purpose of letting him fight 

and make slaves such a thing could not be thought of (CSO, 1888; Mark, 2002). 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      157 

 

 

With the lack of manpower base required for military intervention in Foni, yet the British 

administration continued to explore manipulative mediation technique as a mean of checking Kaba 

in Foni Kansala. Accordingly, the British administrator suggested to Kaba and his marauding 

warriors to engage in more legitimate economic ventures like farming as an alternative mean to 

raiding. Kaba then tasked the British administrator to advise the people of Bai to leave the road 

from Jappineh to Medina and from Koorong Koto to central Kiang (CSO, 1888; Gray, 1966).  

Foday Kaba and his warriors persisted in making trouble in the area. He returned to Sangajour to 

resume his raid upon the natives within British jurisdiction. On 11 November 1888, the people of 

Kansala and the king recounted their trouble with Foday Kaba and his warriors. According to the 

British incident report, forty-seven horsemen, attacked Burambang, the king’s town. They seized 

four women, two children and burnt some of the houses.  They also continued to lay ambush and 

even captured a woman returning from her farm. It was confirmed that all these people were sold 

as slaves. Thereafter the British military expedition against Kaba arrived at Warambang. The head 

of Burambang voluntarily offered some men to assist the British expeditionary force as carriers, 

orderlies, messengers and guides (CSO, 1888). 

  The trend of depredation persisted. CH Harley recommended to the British administration 

the need to station troops to avert the continual raiding of Kaba and his fighting men. The British 

military mission suggested further assistance before the departure of Her Majesty’s Ship of war 

from the Gambia. This necessitated the arrival of 50 West Indian Regiment in Bathurst before the 

departure of “alecto” and “Widgeon” (Gray, 1888).  

 

 

Conclusion 



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      158 

 

 

The ninetieth century capitalist advancement led to transformation and change in the 

production system in the southern Senegambia region. This led to introduction of legitimate 

trading system that attracted political struggle between Kabu and the theocratic state of Futa 

Imamate for effective control over strategic and viable geographical and ecological terrains. With 

the downfall of Kabu, new forms of power struggle and political consolidation emerged, leading 

to crisis that threatened the British economic interest in the entire upper and lower Gambia valley. 

The new phenomena necessitated the pacific and military intervention of the British 

administration. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      159 

 

 

References 

Archer, F. B. (1967). The Gambia colony and protectorate: An official handbook.  London: Frank 

CASS& CO. Ltd.  

Barry, B. (1998). Senegambia and the Atlantic slave trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press. 

Curtin, D. P. (1971). Jihad in West Africa: Early phases and inter-relationship with Mauritania and 

Senegal. The Journal of African History, 12(1), (11-24).  

Charles, E. A. (1975). Shaikh Amadu Ba and jihad in Jolof. The Journal of African Historical 

Studies, 8(3), 367-382.  

Clark, A. F. (1996). The Fulbe of Bundu (Senegambia): From theocracy to secularization. The 

International Journal of Historical Studies, 29(1), 1-23.  

Gatzke, E. (2002). Alliance, perception and international politics. University of Columbia. 

Gray, J. M. (1966) A history of The Gambia. London: Frank CASS. 

Klein, M. (1972). Social and economic factors in the Muslim revolution in Senegambia. The 

Journal of African History, 13(3), 419-441.  

Mark, P. (2002). Portuguese style and Luso-African identity. Indiana: Indiana University Press. 

Martin, B. G. (1976). Muslim brotherhoods in 19th-Century Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press.  

Nnoli, O. (1998). Ethnic conflict in Africa: A comparative analysis. Dakar: CODESRIA.  

Quinn, C. A. (1972). Mandinka kingdom of Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European 

expansion. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 

Quinn, C. A. (1971). A nineteenth century Fulbe State. Journal of African History, 12(3):427-440.  



 

NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC CHANGE AND  

THE CRISIS IN THE SOUTHERN SENEGAMBIA      160 

 

 

Wright, D. R. (2004).  The world and a very small place in Africa: A history of globalization in 

Nuimi, The Gambia (2nd ed.). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 

 

  

 

 

       


