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MISSIONARY DILEMMAS IN TIMES OF PERSECUTION 
CASE ETHIOPIA1 

 
 

Øyvind M. Eide 
(School of Mission and Theology [Misjonshøgskolen], Stavanger, Norway) 

 
 
 

 
Abstract: During the period of Communist rule in Ethiopia, from 1974 to 1991, the 
evangelical churches faced severe persecution. Over 3,000 church buildings were 
forcefully closed, and pastors were imprisoned, tortured, and even killed. In response to 
this dire situation, the leadership of the Lutheran church requested a group of missionaries 
to relay important information to the Lutheran World Federation. This request carried 
significant political implications and involved significant risks. Additionally, the 
harassment endured by the churches represented grave violations of human rights. This 
article delves into the moral dilemmas faced by the missionaries and their subsequent 
resolutions. Moreover, it sheds light on the ethical quandaries faced by mission 
organizations and churches, both locally and globally, when dealing with oppressive 
dictatorships. Ultimately, it illustrates how a church can be coerced into abandoning its 
critical role in society, embracing submission, and remaining silent. 

. 
 
During the Communist regime in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991, the evangelical churches faced significant 
persecution. Over 3,000 church buildings were closed, and pastors were imprisoned, tortured, and killed. 
In this challenging environment, the leadership of the Lutheran church requested a group of missionaries 
to convey information to the Lutheran World Federation. This request was politically sensitive and 
carried substantial risks. Simultaneously, the oppression of the churches violated fundamental human 
rights. This article delves into the moral dilemmas faced by the missionaries and how they resolved these 
dilemmas. Furthermore, it examines the challenges faced by missions and churches, both locally and 
internationally, when dealing with brutal dictatorships. The article also highlights the transition of a 
church from actively engaging with society to a state of submission and silence. 

In 1981, while under the communist regime, I worked as a visiting professor at the Mekane Yesus 
Theological Seminary (MYTS) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At the same time, I acted as a liaison between 
the Norwegian Missionary Society (NMS) and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus 
(EECMY). In my official capacity, I was approached by Reverend Tasgara Hirpo on behalf of EECMY 
President Emmanuel Abraham. They asked me if I would be willing to gather information on the difficult 
experiences faced by EECMY during that time and provide it to The Lutheran World Federation (LWF). 2  
It was evident that the president himself could not openly speak on the matter. 

The president had been a minister in the government of Haile Selassie I. Only by forceful 
intervention by LWF, documenting his faithful service for the Ethiopian people, did he avoid execution at 
the hands of the revolutionary government in 1974.3 Later on, working as president of the EECMY, his 

 
1 This article is a development of a lecture given at a conference in Sigtuna, Sweden, on the Nordic-Baltic churches and 

the Cold War, February 28, 2012. The article is based on Øyvind Eide, Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia: The Growth & 
Persecution of the Mekane Yesus Church, 1974-85, 2nd ed., Eastern African Studies (Oxford : Athens : Addis Ababa: J. Currey ; 
Ohio University Press ; Addis Ababa University Press, 2000). 

2 At the time Rev. Tasgara Hirpo was president of the Western Synod of the EECMY and at the same time my 
colleague at the Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary. 

3 In his autobiography, Emmanuel Abraham gives a detailed account of his time in detention. Emmanuel Abraham, 
Reminiscences of My Life (Oslo, Norway: Lunde forlag, 1995), 229-242. On November 23, 1974, the acting prime minister and 
fifty-nine members of the government of Haile Sellassie I, along with other top officials, were summarily executed. See Eide, 
Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia, 98. 



Eide, “Missionary Dilemmas in Times of Persecution Case Ethiopia” 
 

Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  4 
 

position was vulnerable. In the political climate of the time, with a Marxist-Leninist inspired dictatorship 
in power, the question of information was most sensitive. The request was therefore of great consequence 
and a risk to my well-being and the work of my mission. 

At the time, the general secretary of the EECMY, Gudina Tumsa, had been kidnapped. His 
location was unknown. 4 The freedom to practice one's religion, hold beliefs, and gather was at risk. 
Preaching was restricted, numerous church buildings were being shut down, colleagues were imprisoned, 
and congregation members were being subjected to hours of indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy. A serious crisis in the relationship between the church and the state was unfolding. 

According to my contract with the mission, I was explicitly prohibited from engaging in any form 
of political activity while being a guest in a church and country. The initial question was whether the 
government's harassment of the church had political motives. Would sharing information be perceived as 
an unfriendly act? This request presented a significant dilemma. This document aims to explain how this 
dilemma was resolved. It also sheds light on the challenges faced by missions and churches, both locally 
and internationally, during times of persecution. 

 
TWO BRANDS OF DICTATORSHIP 

 
I was sent to Ethiopia during Haile Selassie's regime. Neither I nor my mission were aware that the 
permission to work in Ethiopia was part of the Emperor's political ambition to modernize the empire. 5 
The Imperial Decree on Mission, issued in 1944, came about after a long struggle between the Patriarch 
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) and the Emperor. The Patriarch believed that it was a serious 
political mistake to divide the ideological foundation of Ethiopia through the existence of two different 
churches. In the context of Ethiopia, ecclesiology has a political dimension. 6 

The Emperor's feudal regime was autocratic and had a poor human rights record. Interestingly, it 
was the last country in the world to abolish slavery in 1933. 7  When my mission responded to a call from 
the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY), a debate arose in Norway about whether it 
was politically neutral to work in Ethiopia. The mission stated that our main task was to save souls and 
that the political situation at any given time was not relevant. 8 In making this statement, the mission drew 
on a long-standing Lutheran pietistic tradition to separate the duties of the church and the state. 9  This 
statement was soon put to the test.  

In 1974, the Ethiopian revolution began. The country descended into chaos and internal conflict. 
In February 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam orchestrated a coup d’état. One of his initial actions was the 
seizure of Radio Voice of the Gospel on March 12, 1977. In the aftermath of Mengistu's takeover, 
numerous youth lost their lives during the infamous Red Terror period. 10  As a result of the severe human 
rights violations, the United States withdrew its support. Mengistu then sought assistance from the Soviet 

 
4 Gudina Tumsa was abducted on 28 July 1979, and executed the same night. A detailed account of the imprisonment 

and abduction of Gudina Tumsa is found in Eide, Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia, 175–79. 
5 The very title of the autobiography of Haile Selassie I indicates the centrality of modernization by introducing into the 

country Western modes of education. My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress, 1892-1937: The Autobiography of Emperor Haile 
Sellassie I (Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press, 1976). 

6 The political consideration that religious unity was an important basis for national unity constitute the religio-political 
background for the opposition and persecution of evangelical Christianity by local authorities prior to the revolution in 1974. 
Eide, Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia, 25–39. 

7 Teshale Tibebu, The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974 (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995), 53–70, 
http://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9781569020012.pdf. 

8 Gudm. Gjeldsten, “Kritiske Spørsmål,” Norsk Misjonstidende 124, no. 13 (n.d.): 5. 
9 The main points of the debate are referred in Oeyvind Eide, “Politikk, misjon og menneskerettigheter i Etiopia,” in 

Misjon og kultur: festskrift til Jan-Martin Berentsen, ed. Thor Strandenæs (Stavanger: Misjonshøgskolens forl, 2006), 
https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2013090408004. 

10 The terror and cruelty of the time are unparalleled in Ethiopian history. Estimates of the numbers killed wary. 
Andargachew Tiruneh gives a careful number of 1500. Other sources give higher numbers. The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-
1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy, LSE Monographs in International Studies 
(Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 211. 



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Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  5 
 

Union. The ultimate outcome was a communist dictatorship, guerrilla warfare, and a battleground of the 
Cold War. 11 

In 1974, the Ethiopian revolution started. The country plunged into chaos and internal conflict. In 
February 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam led a coup d’état. One of his initial actions was to seize Radio 
Voice of the Gospel on March 12, 1977. Following Mengistu's takeover, numerous young people were 
killed during what became known as the Red Terror. Due to severe human rights violations, the United 
States withdrew its support. As a result, Mengistu sought assistance from the Soviet Union. The outcome 
was a communist dictatorship, guerrilla warfare, and a battleground for the Cold War. 

 
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSIONARIES 

 
The question at hand was whether the change in a dictatorial system had any impact on the missionary 
enterprise. The rapid and dramatic developments, along with the spread of propaganda, exerted significant 
pressure on all the supporting missions. 12 Consequently, the security of missionaries became crucial 
during the spring of 1977. The dilemma of whether they should leave or stay caused great conflicts of 
conscience for them. Eventually, the missions brought up this matter to their respective boards, and 
decisions were reached to withdraw personnel from the vulnerable regions. 

In May 1977, the missionaries from the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), who were collaborating 
with the Kale Hiwot Church, were evacuated from their positions in Ethiopia. 13  The number of 
missionaries was reduced from 200 to forty. By February 1978, the Norwegian Lutheran Mission (NLM) 
had decreased its staff in Ethiopia from 158 to fifty-eight. 14  The Norwegian embassy had advised the 
NLM four times to evacuate its missionaries. The mission only partially adhered to this advice, although 
all the stations in the southeast had already been evacuated. The Danish Lutheran Mission, working with 
the NLM in Bale, also evacuated all of their staff. The NMS, operating in remote areas in western 
Ethiopia, evacuated all but one of their sixteen staff members. They had faced severe hardships and an 
attack by a guerrilla movement. The Norwegian Lutheran Free Church, working in Ghion, also evacuated 
their staff. The Finnish Missionary Society did the same. The Swedish Evangelical Mission and the 
German Hermannsburg Mission withdrew their staff, some to Addis Ababa and others back to their home 
countries. All in all, 77 percent of Lutheran missionary personnel were withdrawn from Ethiopia. 15 

One point of particular interest is the different strategies chosen by the Norwegian missions. To 
fully comprehend the decision made by the NMS, it is crucial to consider the extremely painful 
experiences associated with the evacuation of China in 1949. 16 In China, one of the problems arose from 
disagreements among the missionaries regarding their approach towards the Communists. In order to 
avoid the possibility of a similar incident repeating itself, the board of the NMS heeded the advice of the 
Norwegian Embassy and officially decided to evacuate from Ethiopia. 17 When the security situation 
improved, a few colleagues and I were called back to service in 1980. The request from the president of 
the EECMY put the matter of missions and politics to the test. 

 

 
11 For an overview of the larger political framework, see Michael E. Latham, “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–

1975,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, vol. 2 (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2010), 258–80, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521837200.014; The shift of political alliances in Ethiopia during the 
Cold War is analyzed in detail by Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 191–212. 

12 Vinskei, Situasjonen I Etiopia i dag, 6. desember 1976. 
13 Peter Cotterell interview, 3 May 1990; Kay Bascom interview 12 March 1995; cfr. Eide, 169. 
14 Oswald Hindenes, “Årsmelding fra Etiopia ,” NLM Årbok (1978):78. 
15 The number of Western missionaries working in the EECMY was reduced from approximately 390 to 90. 
16 As the Red Army advanced in China, most of the missionaries of the NMS were evacuated, but some remained. This 

created turmoil in the mission. Cfr. E. Eggen, “Kina,” in T. Jørgensen, ed., I tro og tjeneste, Det Norske Misjonsselskap 1842-
1992 (Stavanger, 1992).   

17 Cf. Kjosavik, TD “Etiopia,” in T. Jørgensen, ed., (1992), I tro og tjeneste: Det norske misjonsselskap 1842-1992 
(Stavanger, Norway: Misjonshøgskolen, 1992), 140-146; Eide op. cit., 141. 



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Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  6 
 

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 

Human rights can be viewed from multiple perspectives. I will discuss three of them in the following 
sequence: (1) The right to life and preservation, (2) Economic, social, and cultural rights, (3) Individual 
human rights. 18 

 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND SURVIVAL 

 
During my theological training, human rights were not given much importance. Instead, the life and 
teachings of Jesus influenced the way missionaries worked. The fight for human dignity and against evil 
was thus motivated by the beliefs of Christ. In a traditional role, I served as a preacher and leader of 
literacy schools, a clinic, and an agricultural project. These activities were aimed at supporting life and 
ensuring survival, and they seemed to remain neutral in terms of politics. 

In-depth studies of why people shifted their affiliation to evangelical Christianity demonstrate 
that the church's involvement in healthcare and education played a crucial role. People who had only 
experienced harsh exploitation were taken aback when they encountered love and kindness. Whether they 
were landowners or slaves, they were treated with equal respect. As a result, the missionaries conveyed a 
new understanding of human worth and brought about a drastic change in values. Through their actions, 
they thus criticized the prevailing values and political systems of society. 19 

 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
The Oromo, with whom I worked, were subjected to imperial rule in the late nineteenth century. The 
Amhara, due to their social position, language, and Orthodox Christianity, dominated Ethiopia at the 
expense of other ethnic groups. Against this backdrop, American anthropologist Donald Donham 
provides a compelling interpretation of the evangelical movement: It re-established the people’s 
identity.”20 African theologian Lamin Sanneh further explains this interpretation by stating that 
missionary work, especially through Bible translations and educational efforts, provided the people with " 
cultural self-understanding, pride of their own language, social awakening, religious renewal." 21 

The initial phase of the revolution partially addressed these aspects, particularly cultural rights, 
with the introduction of the "First Charter" on December 20, 1974. This document envisioned Ethiopia as 
a nation free from "ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural differences." 22 However, unknowingly, the 
church's efforts to empower marginalized groups had an unintended ethnic dimension, which exacerbated 
the ethno-political tensions of the country. When a liberation movement emerged in areas associated with 
the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY), led in part by former EECMY students, the 
church found itself caught in a difficult situation. 
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS 

 
As a missionary, I gradually became aware of how the evangelical faith was being interpreted by the 
listeners. The reception showed how a message that appeared to be non-political was transformed into a 
political reality. Gudina Tumsa provides a clear example of what this means: In Gemo Gofa, a group of 
Christians took a landowner to court after he confiscated their land. They fought their case all the way to 

 
18 A. Tergel, Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala : S. Academiae 

Ubsaliensis, 1998), gives a broad presentation of the churches’ handling of issues related to human rights. In addition to the three 
areas mentioned here he also discusses ecological rights. 

19 Cfr. Eide, 29, 63, 82. 
20 D. Donham and W. James , The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1986), 45. 
21 L. Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1997), 

1-8. 
22 Eide, op.cit. 96. 



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Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  7 
 

the High Court of Ethiopia and emerged victorious. For them, justice was an integral part of their 
understanding of salvation. 23 

This interpretation of salvation was a key issue raised in the famous EECMY letter to LWF in 
1972. In this letter, the young church criticized the missions for not speaking out against colonial 
exploitation. The letter also highlighted the structural injustices that existed. By acknowledging the 
systems that oppressed and degraded humans, the church expanded its concept of sin. This letter became a 
defining moment in EECMY theology, which later became known as "holistic." 24 

The letter partly reflected the ongoing ecumenical debate of that time, including discussions at the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) meeting in Uppsala in 1968 and the LWF General Assembly in Evian 
in 1970, where human rights were a key topic. These conferences pushed the EECMY to focus on issues 
of social justice and human rights. These concerns continued to be prioritized at the WCC meeting in 
Nairobi in 1975 and the LWF assembly in Dar-es-Salam in 1977. As a missionary I only gradually 
became aware of how the evangelical faith was reinterpreted in the minds of the listeners. The reception 
illustrates how a seemingly non-political message was translated into political reality. Gudina Tumsa 
gives a vivid example of what this means: 

When the revolution occurred, the church could have chosen to disengage from politics and 
remain quiet. However, instead, the church actively participated in the political discussions of the time. 25 
The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) played a role in advising during this process. In a pastoral letter 
from 1975, the church expressed its support for the revolution, but only if the state adhered to the 
principles of law and human rights. 26 

As the revolution continued, it became evident that freedom of faith was a critical aspect. Gudina 
Tumsa, in an effort to counter the influence of atheist Marxism, organized the Council for Cooperation of 
Churches in Ethiopia (CCCE). At this point, the government approached Gudina Tumsa for cooperation, 
but he declined due to the continued persecution of evangelical Christians. As a result, he was denounced 
as an enemy of the state. The CCCE was seen as an effort to form an ideological opposition, leading to 
Gudina Tumsa's elimination and the government's intention to dismantle evangelical churches. 27 

 
TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK 

 
The first to speak up was the Swedish Ecumenical Council in a letter to the Ethiopian government.28 This 
was followed by a paper from a group under the British Council of Churches at the beginning of 1979.29 
The Ethiopian government gave an indignant reply calling the accusations “calculated malicious lies,” 
adding: “If there are impossible things, tampering with religion in Ethiopia is one of those impossible 
things”. The government at all times denied any persecution of evangelical Christians. This left the 
missions with a number of options. Let me indicate four of them:30 

 
OPTION 1: THE TRADITIONAL POSITION 
 
The government’s reaction and the abduction of Gudina Tumsa a short time after left no one in doubt of 
the government’s will to silence any opposition. The prevailing attitude among the missionaries was to do 

 
23 Gudina Tumsa, Witness and Discipleship: The Essential Writings of Gudina Tumsa (Addis Ababa: Gudina Tumsa 

Foundation, 2003), 131. 
24 The full text of the letter is published in Eide, op.cit.263-268.  For an analysis of the letter cfr. Eide, 68-70. 
25 Four seminars on Christianity and socialism were conducted at Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary in 1975-76. 
26 The full text of the pastoral letter is published in Eide, 269-70. 
27 Patriarch Tewoflos had been arrested and was killed 27 July 1979, the night before Gudina Tumsa was killed. Hadji 

Mohammed Sani Habib, a leading Muslim, was forced into submission when the government killed his son and threatened to kill 
his second son. Cfr. Eide, op.cit., 113, 127-8, 164-5, 175-6. 

28 Archbishop Sundby, Swedish Ecumenical Council to Ethiopian Government, Uppsala/Stockholm, 18 January 1979. 
29 M. Blair, “Christians in Ethiopia: A Background Paper on Recent Events,” 19 February 1979, unpublished, Lutheran 

World Information, 22 March 1979. 
30 Getahun Ijigu, Ambassador Extraordinary to Archbishop Sundby, 24 January 1979. 



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what was possible and not provoke the government by revealing its violations of human rights. One 
should be grateful for the opportunities still available in a Communist land and avoid provocation that 
would lead to expulsion and increased suffering for Ethiopian Christians. On the official level this was the 
position of NLM. The NLM worked in southern Ethiopia where conditions were easier than in the west. 
They were very cautious about aggravating the government and putting the whole flourishing work in 
jeopardy. The general secretary of the NLM, Egil Grandhagen, in an editorial in their mission magazine, 
Utsyn, put heavy emphasis on the missionary task “to win souls.” “Therefore one has to draw a clear line 
between our call as Christian citizens and our call as a missionary organization,” he wrote.31 Against this 
policy it is quite remarkable that the NLM board permitted their representative in Ethiopia to join the 
information group. 
 
OPTION 2: TRY TO FORCE THE STATE 
 
The alternative option was to pressure the government with a threat to withdraw all humanitarian support 
and, with it, much needed foreign currency. Both church and mission deemed it ethically impossible to 
use sick and hungry people’s right to life in a power struggle with the government.  
 
OPTION 3: SHOUT IT FROM THE ROOFTOPS 
 
A third option was to deem the violations of human rights as so grave that one’s conscience forbade 
silence, whatever the consequences. The Berliner Mission (BM) opted for this approach. BM publicly 
denounced the Ethiopian government, in particular for its oppression of the Oromo ethnic group.32 
Experiences from the Confessional Church’s struggle during the Nazi regime had taught them that silence 
was a dangerous path. When the Hermannsburg Mission (HM) made a protest against BM for linking the 
violations of human rights to the Oromo’s situation, the BM reiterated by accusing the HM “for once 
again keeping silent about concentration camps.” EECMY protested against BM, maintaining that their 
action increased the pressure on the church. BM was not willing to yield. This forced the EECMY to 
break off relations with BM.33 
 
OPTION 4: PUBLICIZE UNDENIABLE FACTS 
 
This was the context of Emmanuel Abraham’s request to me in 1981. Emmanuel Abraham gave one 
condition: In order to avoid any suspicion that information on the EECMY was linked to the Oromo 
ethnic cause, he demanded that only facts without interpretation be conveyed. Since the request came 
from the president of the church, it was seen as urgent to me as well as my mission. How did I reply? I 
could not carry responsibility for such an undertaking alone. The first move was therefore to invite the 
representative of the Swedish Evangelical Mission (SEM), Rev. Ingvar Nilsson, the Hermannsburg 
Mission (HM), Rev. Willy Kalmbach, and the Norwegian Lutheran Mission, Rev. Osvald Hindenes, for a 
meeting with the president’s liaison. We decided that each of us would pass the request on to our mission 
boards. All of them solved the dilemma by allowing us to convey information.  

The general secretary of the NMS, Odd Bondevik, tried to establish criteria for relating to the 
Ethiopia situation. In the mission’s magazine he wrote that “violations against basic human rights, 
whether they are against Christians or others, is our concern and we cannot pass by in silence.” Bondevik 
defined the criteria by reference to the Norwegian Church’s position during the Nazi regime. He quotes 
the Norwegian Church’s stand in Kirkens grunn:  

 
31 Egil Grandhagen, “Misjon og politikk,” Utsyn, 8 Februery 1981. 
32 The mission secretary of the BM, Gunnar Hasselblatt, published a number of articles mainly in German newspapers 

1982-86, cfr. Eide, 209-10. 
33 The debate and the documents are presented in Eide, 211-12. 



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Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  9 
 

It is a sin against God if the state starts to tyrannize the souls and claims the right to decide what a 
person shall believe, think and feel as his conscience. . . . Where the power of the state separates from 
justice, there the state is no longer a tool of God, but becomes a demonic power. Therefore there are limits 
to obedience against the state.34 

All missions were thankful for the accurate information given by the group. By letting an 
international organization coordinate the information process, a uniform policy was possible and the 
missions and churches could speak with one voice. It was left to LWF to decide whether to publicize 
information or not. 

 
THE CONFISCATION OF THE EECMY CENTRAL OFFICE 
 
On 10 December 1981, the group got a tip, via a leak in the government, that it was decided to confiscate 
the EECMY Central Office as a first step to nationalize all church institutions. The decision only waited 
for Mengistu Haile Mariam’s signature. When the order was given to evacuate the Central Office two 
days later, information was sent to LWF. Through their contacts with the WCC, all member churches 
were alarmed.35 The result was a storm of protest from all over the world. No other institution of the 
EECMY was touched until 25 January 1982, when the Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary was 
confiscated. The seminary was, however, returned later the same day. The most plausible reason was that 
the decision to confiscate was made at department level. Mengistu could simply not risk a second 
international storm, and so he ordered the return of the seminary.36 

It is obvious that the government was furious about the bad press Ethiopia got in the West. 
Thinking the BM was behind the information, the secret police sent two agents to East Berlin. There they 
were equipped with a bomb in order to blow up the BM headquarters and kill its mission secretary, 
Gunnar Hasselblatt. However, the bomb went off while they were arming it. One of the agents was killed 
and the other arrested by German police. 

At this point the LWF saw the situation as so serious that Oberkirchenrat Christian Krause, on 
behalf of the LWF, established contact with the Ethiopian Embassy in Bonn to inform them of the role of 
LWF. The ambassador rebuked him for intervening in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. Krause reiterated the 
LWF position, with a reference to human rights declarations, and told the ambassadors that the Christians 
in Ethiopia were our brothers and sisters. 

 
EPILOGUE 

 
In January 1985 Emmanuel Abraham was replaced by Francis Stephanos as president of the EECMY. At 
the time more than 3,000 churches (1,700 Kale Hiwot, 1,000 EECMY, 300 Pentecostal, Baptist, and 
Mennonite) were closed, and church life was brought to a standstill. Francis Stephanos was then invited 
to participate in the drafting of a new state constitution. The church officers saw that the church’s stand 
against the state had almost led it to destruction. They, therefore, stepped down and resolved that the 
president should accept the invitation. At the same time there was a shift in leadership of the LWF, with 
Gunnar Stålsett as the new general secretary. The LWF endorsed the EECMY decision according to the 
pattern of relationship to East European churches. The suffering of the Christians in Ethiopia was 
silenced! Two years later Francis Stephanos was elected as a member of the national congress. He took 
his seat together with leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community.37 

 
34 The public debate in Norway is presented in Eide, 213-4. Cfr. Austad, Kirkens grunn: Analyse av en kirkelig 

bekjennelse fra okkupasjonstiden 1940-45 (Oslo, 1977). 
35 The general.secretary.of LWF, Carl H. Mau, called upon all its member churches to “demonstrate solidarity with the 

Mekane Yesus Church in any way they deemed appropriate” (Eide, 214). 
36 Cf. J. Launhardt, Uns erschrecken die Trommeln nicht mehr: Stadtrandgemeinde in Addis Abeba (Erlangen, 

Germany: Evangelishe Mission Erlangen), 212. 
37 For this paragraph, cf. Eide, 235-48. 



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Global South Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2023):  10 
 

The EECMY had come full circle, from Emmanuel Abraham participating in Haile Sellassie’s 
autocratic government, through the EECMY letter of 1972 that criticized the missions for keeping silent 
on human rights abuses, through critical engagement during the revolution, to silent participation in a 
state with one of the worst records on human rights in recent history. The EECMY was domesticated, and 
has never since dared speak up on human rights issues in Ethiopia.  

Did international pressure have any effect on the Ethiopian government’s handling of the church? 
It seems that it merely aggravated the political authorities. The bomb in Berlin shows how far the 
government was willing to go in order to silence critics. However, in 1981 the proposed takeover of 
EECMY institutions never occurred, and in 1982 the Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary was handed 
back. If this came as a result of the LWF channel, something substantial was achieved. 

Let me finish with a reflection by Meseret Sebhat Leab, a scholar of the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church. At the time I did my research on the persecution of the EECMY, I asked how the church could 
cooperate with a government that had killed the Patriarch and appointed its own person against canonical 
law. He paused for a while before he answered, “Canonical law is one thing. Survival is another. What 
you are witnessing is a question of survival.”    

 


	Two Brands of Dictatorship
	The withdrawal of the missionaries

	POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
	The right to life and survival
	Economic, social and cultural rights
	Individual human rights

	TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK
	Option 1: The traditional position
	Option 2: Try to force the state
	Option 3: Shout it from the rooftops
	Option 4: Publicize undeniable facts

	The confiscation of the EECMY Central Office
	EPILOGUE

