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Graduate Student Journal of Psychology                                                                             Copyright 2005 by the Department of Counseling & Clinical Psychology
2005, Vol. 7                                                                                                                          Teachers College, Columbia University                          ISSN 1088-4661

Experiencing Michael: Sullivan’s Modes of Sentience

A. Jordan Wright
Teachers College, Columbia University

Harry Stack Sullivan proposed a developmental model of sentience, of “any…primary data of ex-
perience” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 28). This article uses theory and case study examples to explore Sulli-
van’s developmental model in two ways. First, the scope of applicability of the model is extended
to everyday experience. Second, using Sullivan’s other developmental theories as analogy, exten-
sion of his theory of sentience is drawn to a natural conclusion, incorporating the more contempo-
rary notion of intersubjectivity.

Harry Stack Sullivan proposed a developmental model
of sentience, of “any…primary data of experience” (Sulli-
van, 1953, p. 28). The experience of something is not sim-
ply the event that occurs or in which the person participates,
but the meaning that the individual attaches to that event.
Sentience itself is the data from which we come to have
information, to know experience. In his model, Sullivan
proposes three modes of experience which develop as a
function of both the quantity and quality of the elaboration
of which one has had contact with events in one’s life. His
model was proposed as a development that progresses over
time; in his model, infants operate primarily in the first
mode of sentience, and with experience over time, progress
through to the highest mode of sentience. The present paper
will illustrate and then elaborate on Sullivan’s theory of
sentience using case examples from the writer’s own work
of how an adult man named Michael is experienced.

Sarah looks up at Michael, who to her is
not quite a person, not anything but an
overwhelming feeling of warmth and re-
laxation. The calmness that overwhelms
Sarah is like sunlight, the calm soothing
warmth and safety of the sun’s light and
warmth enveloping her little body. She
experiences Michael in terms of nothing
but this overwhelming feeling he brings
over her.

Sullivan termed the first mode of sentience the protaxic
mode. The earliest and simplest of the modes of experience,
the experience of early infancy, the protaxic mode “may be
regarded as the discrete series of momentary states of the
sensitive organism” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 29), undifferentiated
and unintegrated feelings. All that Sarah knows when expe-

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to A.
Jordan Wright, Gouverneur Healthcare Services, Behavioral
Health Department, 227 Madison Street, 3rd Floor, New York,
NY 10002; 212-238-7335; e-mail: ajwright79@hotmail.com

riencing Michael are momentary states, with no integration
of time involved. Not an entity separate from the world,
Sarah is experiencing Michael only as a sense, only as the
global impact he has on her. Sarah’s “felt experience is all
of a piece, undifferentiated, without definite limits” (Mul-
lahy, 1948, p. 286). In general, Sarah’s experience of Mi-
chael is based solely on her sensitivity, that is, her capacity
for sensation in her body. This earliest phase of sentience
quickly gives way to the subsequent stages, however, by
which it is “overlaid” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 37).

Rachel sees Michael and experiences him
first and foremost as a male figure with
predominantly feminine qualities, a
seeming paradox to her. His ambiguous
gender and sexual nature impacts Rachel
in a way that makes her feel she can con-
nect to him, relate to him on a female
level. With jet-black hair, Michael looks
mixed-race, beautiful but small. His small
stature and demeanor strikes Rachel in his
overwhelming lack of aggression and
masculinity. She experiences Michael as
a man, small and feminine, not unlike her
own mother, with whom she can connect
deeply.

Sullivan’s second mode of experience, predominating
the child’s experience, is the parataxic mode. Also crude,
like the protaxic mode, the parataxic mode is the state
“about which something can be known, but which is some-
what harder to discuss” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 29). Based on
crude categorizations and broad stereotypy, Rachel’s expe-
rience of Michael is based on his categorization: his gender,
his stature, his appearance. As a man, he would most likely
be threatening, but his effeminate qualities liken him to
other females, with whom she has an easier and freer time
connecting. Still without a clear continuity, Rachel’s expe-
rience progresses in time but is unconnected and still poorly
formulated. The distinction of Michael as a man does not
encroach upon her experience of his feminine qualities. To
Rachel, Michael is wholly a woman, even though a moment



WRIGHT

6

passed when he was a man. These “‘parts,’ the diverse as-
pects, the various kinds of experience are not related or
connected in a logical fashion” (Mullahy, 1948, p. 288).
Her experience of Michael is based completely on how she
relates to others with whom Michael shares his categoriza-
tions of stature and quality, and to a lesser degree gender
and race.

Victoria relates to Michael as an individ-
ual. Beyond his race, gender, and stature,
she experiences his impact on her, his
talkative, “like a girl” nature, his interest
in her and her interests. Victoria feels he
is insightful, analytical, and extremely
friendly toward her. She feels that he is
“just like one of [her] girlfriends,” those
with whom she shares her most intimate
thoughts, who understand and will not
judge her. Victoria experiences Michael
as a friend, a distinct individual with in-
dividual characteristics in relation to her-
self.

Sullivan’s final mode of sentience, the syntaxic mode,
represents the point where the child can finally understand
the “‘consensually validated’ meaning of language—in the
widest sense of language” (Mullahy, 1948, p. 291). The
child begins to be able to discern the finer distinctions be-
tween people. Victoria experiences Michael truly as an in-
dividual, though always in relation to herself, how he re-
lates to her. Relating to him beyond crude categorizations
and assumptions, Victoria is able to symbolize Michael in
terms of more individualized language, able to describe him
beyond global feelings (i.e., protaxic) and gross associa-
tions (i.e., parataxic). Victoria’s characterization of Michael
is completely understandable by others and often consistent
with others’ understanding of him—“Consensually vali-
dated symbol activity involves an appeal to principles
which are accepted as true by the hearer” (Mullahy, 1948,
p. 291). Sullivan’s theory of sentience ends with this mode
of experience.

Maria knows Michael quite differently
than the other three; she experiences him
as a true subjective other, in terms of his
own experience, rather than just his im-
pact on her. A true friend to her, she is
also a true friend to him, listening to his
problems. Michael knows that Maria is
studying psychology, so he supports her
with mutually beneficial results, by of-
fering his problems for her to help him
understand. They have a friendship and a
bond that is understood only by the two
of them. Maria experiences Michael in
terms of not only what he means to her,
but also what she means to him and what
they mean together.

Although Sullivan never added a fourth phase to his
developmental theory of sentience, the experience of in-

tersubjectivity seems to describe a further development in
experience and sentience. Intersubjectivity, reflecting a
contemporary, postmodern view not addressed in Sullivan’s
time, incorporates the idea that two individuals in a rela-
tionship share more than just the two individuals bring to
the interaction; two subjects co-create a reality that is
shared only between them, in which they are both agents,
both subjects (Aron, 1991). Beyond experiencing Michael
as only an object, understood only in terms of what he
means to her, only experienced in globally consensually
validated language, Maria and Michael share an intersub-
jective bond, an experience in a language that cannot be
fully understood by anyone else. This language is intersub-
jectively consensually agreed upon (i.e., formulated), only
between the two of them. Their relationship (which is the
primary way Maria experiences Michael) is “continually
established and reestablished through ongoing mutual influ-
ence in which both…affect, and are affected by, each other”
(Aron, 1991, p. 33). Beyond Maria and Michael existing
only as individuals to whom the other is merely an object,
their relationship, the “intersubjective analytic third”
(Ogden, 1994, p. 4), has become an entity unto itself, with
its own language. Sullivan’s stages of sentience ended at
the ability to use and understand globally consensually
agreed upon language; this proposed fourth stage adds the
ability to integrate both global and interpersonal consensual
languages.

Non-Developmental Development

The above case studies of Michael and how girls of dif-
ferent ages and different developmental stages experience
him is actually not a collection of four different children at
different ages. In fact, the vignettes above were taken from
a single interview with an adult woman (I will call her Ju-
lie), who was asked to recall the process of meeting and
getting to know a single person, Michael. Although Sulli-
van intended his theory as a macro-level, stage theory of
development (the primacy of the earlier modes “tend[s] to
disappear” [Sullivan, 1972, p. 33] with the development of
the later modes), it seems that the “development” process
through these four modes occurs consistently throughout
life, on a micro-level. The process Julie went through with
Michael is typical of the process she (as well as most other
people) goes through when meeting and getting to know
anyone. Although the idea of sentience may not have been
intended toward the micro-level social and interpersonal
realms, its practical applicability is precisely to those
realms to which Sullivan was dedicated in the majority of
his work.

Extension of Theory

Sullivan proposed several developmental stage theories
in his writings. Because of the parallel nature of his theories
(he presented many of them as analogous), his theory of



SULLIVAN’S MODES OF SENTIENCE

7

sentience development can be placed in the context of his
other theories to be evaluated. Whereas his developmental
theory of sentience only had three stages (modes), each of
his other major developmental theories contained four dis-
tinct stages. The extension of sentience into the intersub-
jective realm is a logical extension when comparing his
theory of sentience to his other developmental theories.

Biological Development: Analogy

Biologically, Sullivan was interested in the character-
istic behaviors of organisms, developmentally enumerated.
The behaviors he equates with different organisms, though
they can be seen in higher organisms, are those behaviors
which are predominant in each organism’s existence. Lower
behaviors predominating in higher organisms are a sign of
pathology. Beginning with unicellular organisms, the low-
est form of biological behavior is associated with protista
(protophyta and protozoa). Protista maintain “functional
activity with and within a relatively very simple environ-
ment” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 29). All behavior is based on
biological needs, and energy is mostly expended in a con-
servative manner. In humans, pathological autism and psy-
chomotor slowing are evidence of the pathological nature of
this protista activity predominating higher organisms.

Sullivan was less clear and specific about the nature of
the behavior that predominates plant life, the second bio-
logical state of development. In humans, plant behavior can
be seen in “phenomena that occur in the borderline condi-
tions which we speak of variously as ‘light sleep,’ sleep
with dreams, panic states, night terrors, and the like” (Sulli-
van, 1972, p. 29). Seemingly, the behavior that predomi-
nates in plants is one of fantasy. The third phase of biologi-
cal development can be seen in animals, which have “rela-
tive freedom from spatial limitations” (Sullivan, 1972, p.
30). Vocalization is a predominant tool of use in animal
communication.

Sullivan’s final biological stage of development is hu-
man, characterized by both “‘consciousness’” and “‘self-
consciousness’” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 30). Able to think ab-
stractly, learn by representation, and understand their own
part within a system, humans have the capacity to be both
adjustive and creative. Sullivan wrote of humans’ ability to
perform “self-conscious acts” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 31) as
their overt characteristic activity. What he may also have
accounted for had he incorporated intersubjectivity (had he
been writing several decades after he was) is humans’ abil-
ity to perform intersubjectively-conscious acts, to consider
not only the consequences to oneself, but also to the other
and to the relationship between them.

Skill Development

Sullivan posited a theory of the evolution of humans’
“central integrative apparatus” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 20),
which basically consists of a development of cognitive

skills. Beginning with no skills except sensation, without a
sense of agency, and without the ability to attach meaning
to sensations, this first stage represents a point at which no
skills have been learned. A relatively short period (because,
as Sullivan asserts, even without the influence of culture
humans would most likely “be an exceedingly gifted mem-
ber of the biological series” [Sullivan, 1953, p. 20], able to
learn and adapt relatively quickly to the environment), this
first stage of skill development contributes significantly to
the second stage.

The second stage of skill development, entirely de-
pendent on the success of the first stage (i.e., without any
sensation, this second stage would not be able to form), is
the integration of sensation and motor skills in response to
that sensation. This second skill phase represents an acqui-
sition of agency, the ability to react to positive or negative
sensations. Specifically, Sullivan emphasizes the impor-
tance of a single relationship, “the interrelation of vision
and the prehensile hands” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 20). Because
of the communicative nature of the hands (in preverbal
children, the hands are one of “the greatest tools of interre-
lation” [Sullivan, 1953, p. 20]), as well as their distinctly
human nature, this relationship between hands and vision is
one of the most agentive acquisitions in children. This mo-
toric agency constitutes the second milestone in the devel-
opment of the central integrative apparatus.

The third stage of skill development is “the interrela-
tion of hearing and the voice-producing apparatus” (Sulli-
van, 1953, p. 20), which ultimately gives rise to the capac-
ity for language. A prerequisite for understanding consen-
sually agreed upon language, this integration of hearing and
vocalizing represents the next major milestone in agency
and communication. The final stage, “the interrelation of
these and all other receptor-effector systems in an exceed-
ingly complicated forebrain, which permits operating with
many kinds of abstracts of experience” (Sullivan, 1953, p.
20), is the point at which humans gain the capacity of ab-
straction and representation. The most complex cognitive
abilities constitute what Sullivan felt to be the most ad-
vanced, “human” activities possible. These include the
ability to anticipate outcomes, the cognitive “testing” of
situations before their actuation, and the application of
similar situations to others.

Internal Experience Development

Sullivan proposed a development of the predominant inter-
nal experience as another meaningful developmental theory.
Beginning with “primitive implicit processes” (Sullivan,
1972, p. 33), to which Sullivan refers as the exclusive con-
tent of thought in early infancy, the human child quickly
progresses to fantasy and fantastic mentation. This fantasy is
as difficult to define and even imagine as the primitive proc-
esses, because of both the lack of memory of very early
infancy and the relative infrequency of primitive processes
after infancy. Thus, Sullivan only defines fantasy (or “re-
very”) as “all those lying between the primitive and the



WRIGHT

8

highest type of implicit process, which [is] ‘externally con-
trolled’” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 34).

The third stage, which Sullivan defines as “reality con-
trolled” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 32), is the capacity for adjustive
thought. Sullivan proposes this stage as “a conscious educ-
tion of relations discriminated on multiple bases of experi-
ence with other people and things” (Sullivan, 1972, p. 35).
This capacity to adjust one’s associations from personal to
globally consensually validated is the essence of adjustive
mentation. The final stage, also consciously chosen and
influenced by reality, is the capacity for creative mentation.
A seeming merger between the fantastic and the reality-
controlled, creative thought is novel, individual thought that
“can be subjected to preparation for consensual validation”
(Sullivan, 1972, p. 36). This final stage of development is
not wholly dependent on reality and the environment, but is
productive toward that reality and environment.

External Action Development

A developmental theory that closely parallels his de-
velopment of internal mentation and experience is Sulli-
van’s developmental theory of external action, those skills
that predominate action in different developmental stages.
The first stage is purely reflexive, innate impulsive acts,
which Sullivan calls “total reflexes” (Sullivan, 1972, p.
33). Again, relatively quick to learn, humans acquire the
second stage rather quickly. This second stage is consti-
tuted of action that is impulsive. Highly “plastic” (Sulli-

van, 1972, p. 33), these impulses are modified by experi-
ence, unlike reflexes, which are innate and enacted with-
out association.

The third and fourth stages of external action devel-
opment are the capacity for consciously conditioned acts
and the capacity for self-conscious acts, respectively. The
latter much more reflective, both represent actions that are
consciously chosen. Consciously conditioned acts are as-
sociated with adjustive mentation; self-conscious acts rep-
resent an understanding of the role of the self within a
larger system, as well as the system on the self, associated
with creative thought. This last stage of action develop-
ment is indicative of the uniquely intersubjective nature of
humans.

Comparison and Extension

Table 1 shows a comparative schematic formulation
of Sullivan’s five developmental theories. Comparing
Sullivan’s developmental theory of sentience to each of
his other developmental theories reveals a significant
shortcoming in the elaboration of modes of experience.
The analogies of the biological stage of Man, the skill de-
velopment stage of abstraction and representation, the in-
ternal experience of creative thinking, and the predomi-
nance of self-conscious acts imply that experience devel-
ops beyond an understanding of the globally consensually
validated meaning of language, the syntaxic mode.

Table 1
Sullivan’s Developmental Stage Theories

Biologya Skillsb Internal Experiencea External Actiona Sentienceb

Protista Sensory Primitive processes Reflexive Protaxic

Plants
Integration of sensory
and motor—agency

Fantasy Impulsive Parataxic

Animals
Integration of hearing

and vocalization
Adjustive Thinking

Consciously
conditioned acts

Syntaxic

Man
Abstraction and
representation

Creative Thinking Self-conscious acts (Intersubjective)

a Taken and adapted from Sullivan, 1972.
b Taken and adapted from Sullivan, 1953.



SULLIVAN’S MODES OF SENTIENCE

9

The analogy of humans as a “step up” from animals
implies a “step up” from consensually agreed upon forms
of communications, which have been empirically shown
to be present in many species of animals. The augmenta-
tion would be not only to know, understand, and use
communication that can be globally understood, but to be
able to convey thoughts and feelings that cannot be under-
stood fully via the use of conventional language (“unfor-
mulated experiences” [Stern, 1997, p. 33]) to others. The
only “language” that would be effective is an intersubjec-
tively created (formulated) language, in which words have
a specific meaning to the dyad involved that would not
translate easily to the globally consensually agreed upon
form of language.

Similarly, the analogies of cognitive skill develop-
ment and internal experience seem to demand a mode be-
yond understanding consensually agreed upon language.
The third phase of skill development, the integration of
hearing and vocalization, is the prerequisite for this under-
standing. Adjustive thinking is defined in terms of adjust-
ing one’s understanding of language to fit the language of
the world. The final stages of each, the capacity for repre-
sentation and abstraction and the capacity for creative
thought, necessarily go beyond globally consensually
agreed upon language. The ability for the creation of in-
tersubjectively agreed upon meanings and language is ab-
solutely dependent on the capacity for creativity and ab-
straction by the dyad involved. Moreover, the develop-
ment of predominant external action supports an addi-
tional stage of sentience, progressing from consciously
conditioned acts, which are adjustive by nature (such as
altering one’s own language system to match “reality’s”

language), to self-conscious acts, which necessitate repre-
sentation and creative thought.

Because Sullivan’s theories of development are so
intertwined and dependent upon one another, his theory of
sentience needs slight revision to parallel his other theo-
ries. Had Sullivan theorized somewhat later in the century
than he did, it is likely that he would have taken into ac-
count the notion of intersubjectivity into his theory of ex-
perience. Julie’s experience of Michael went far beyond
what could be expressed with consensually agreed upon
language, beyond the syntaxic mode of sentience. In-
tersubjectivity seems to offer Sullivan’s theory a conven-
ient, congruent resolution in the context of his other theo-
ries of development.

References

Aron, L. (1991). The patient’s experience of the analyst’s
subjectivity. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 1, 29-51.

Mullahy, P. (1948). Oedipus, myth and complex. New
York: Hermitage Press, Inc.

Ogden, T. H. (1994). The analytic third: Working with in-
tersubjective clinical facts. International Journal of Psy-
choanalysis, 75, 3-19.

Stern, D. B. (1997). Unformulated experience: From dis-
sociation to imagination in psychoanalysis. Hillsdale:
Analytic Press.

Sullivan, H. S. (1972). Personal psychopathology. New
York: Norton.

Sullivan, H. S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psy-
chiatry. New York: Norton.


