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Graduate Student Journal of Psychology                                                                             Copyright 2005 by the Department of Counseling & Clinical Psychology
2005, Vol. 7                                                                                                                          Teachers College, Columbia University                          ISSN 1088-4661

The Development of Cognitive Vulnerability to Hopelessness Depression

Sabina Sarin John R. Z. Abela
Yale University   McGill University

While several studies have supported the hopelessness theory’s claim that depressogenic inferential
styles serve as vulnerability factors to depression, little research has examined how these styles de-
velop. The current study examined three theories of their development in children between the ages
of 7 and 13. Results supported two of these theories, indicating that children with pessimistic infer-
ential styles report experiencing higher levels of specific negative life events than children without
these styles. Furthermore, parents of children with a depressogenic inferential style about conse-
quences provided more pessimistic feedback about the consequences of negative events in their
child’s life than parents of children without this style. Results suggest that different pathways lead
to the development of the three pessimistic inferential styles.

While it was once believed that childhood depression
was a rare or transitory developmental phenomenon, evi-
dence has since accumulated depicting the high prevalence
rate, chronic course and debilitating consequences of de-
pression in children (Schwartz, Gladstone, & Kaslow,
1998). As prevalence rates of depression have soared to
epidemic proportions (Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Fisher,
1993), the average age of onset has decreased (Reich et al.,
1987). Epidemiological studies have recently reported that
by 14 years of age, as many as 9% of children have already
experienced at least one episode of severe depression
(Lewinsohn et al., 1993). Research further indicates that
childhood depression is a chronic disorder with up to 84%
of depressed children experiencing depressive episodes in
adulthood (Harrington, Rutter, & Frombonne, 1996).
Childhood depression has been shown to be associated with
a wide range of psychiatric and physical health problems in
adulthood, as well as impairment in multiple domains of
functioning (e.g., Fleming, Boyle, & Offord, 1993; Kandel
& Davis, 1986; Rao et al., 1995).

The research reported in this article was supported by a New
Scholar Award from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada awarded to John R. Z. Abela. We would like to
thank Nadia Castiel, David D’Alessandro, Melanie Ewing, Hugo
Gagnon, Nima Ghomeshi, Emily Haigh, Alexandra McIntyre-
Smith, Zohreen Murad, Anna Radzioch, Caroline Sullivan, and
Krystyna Zaluski for administering questionnaires to children and
their parents, as well as for scoring questionnaires.

Portions of this article were presented at the meeting of the
Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Philadel-
phia, PA, November, 2001.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed
to Sabina Sarin, Department of Psychology, Yale University,
P.O. Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205; e-mail:
sabina.sarin@yale.edu.

The Hopelessness Theory of Depression

In response to such alarming statistics, a vast amount
of research has been conducted examining the etiology of
depression. One cognitive theory that has obtained promising
results in both adult and child samples is the hopelessness
theory of depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989).
According to the hopelessness theory, certain individuals
possess depressogenic inferential styles that make them vul-
nerable to experiencing depressive episodes. The theory de-
lineates three such styles. The first is the tendency to attribute
negative events to global and stable causes. The second is the
tendency to perceive negative events as having many disas-
trous consequences. The third is the tendency to view the self
as flawed or deficient after negative events occur. Each of
these styles predisposes individuals to hopelessness depres-
sion by making it more likely that they will make depres-
sogenic inferences following the occurrence of negative
events. Making such inferences increases the likelihood that
hopelessness will develop. Hopelessness is defined as the
expectation that negative events will occur or that positive
events will not occur, coupled with the expectation that one
can do nothing to change this forecast. Once hopelessness
develops, hopelessness depression is inevitable, since hope-
lessness is viewed as a necessary and sufficient cause of this
subtype of depression.

Several studies have provided strong support for the
hopelessness theory’s claim that depressogenic inferential
styles serve as vulnerability factors to depression, in both
adult (Abela, 2002b; Abela & Seligman, 2000; Alloy &
Clements, 1998; Alloy et al., 2000; Metalsky & Joiner,
1992; Metalsky, Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987; Metalsky,
Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 1993) and child (Abela &
Sarin, 2002; Cole & Turner, 1993; Dixon & Ahrens, 1992;
Hilsman & Garber, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, &
Seligman, 1992; Panak & Garber, 1992; Robinson, Garber,
& Hilsman, 1995; Turner & Cole, 1994) samples. However,



HOPELESSNESS THEORY, ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY

11

relatively little research has examined the factors that lead
to the development of such negative cognitive styles. If
depressogenic inferential styles serve as vulnerability fac-
tors to depression, then it becomes important to understand
the developmental origins of these cognitive styles. Such an
understanding may lead to the development of early inter-
ventions to prevent the initial onset or future recurrences of
depression.

Theoretical Origins of the Depressogenic
Inferential Styles: The Modeling Hypothesis

To date, several theories have been proposed to explain
the origins of negative cognitive styles. One theory is that
children acquire depressogenic inferential styles in part by
observing and modeling the inferential styles of significant
others, such as their parents (Abramson et al., 1999; Alloy
et al., 1999; Garber & Flynn, 1998; Haines, Metalsky, Car-
damone, & Joiner, 1999). Most studies have attempted to
test this hypothesis by examining the covariation between
parents’ and children’s cognitive styles. The results of such
studies have, however, been mixed. On the one hand, sev-
eral studies have found support for the modeling hypothe-
sis. For example, in a sample of college students and their
parents, Alloy et al. (2001) found that the mothers of stu-
dents with pessimistic inferential styles had more negative
inferential styles themselves than did the mothers of opti-
mistic students, even after controlling for mothers’ levels of
depression. No differences were obtained, however, for
fathers’ cognitive styles. At the same time, however, other
studies have failed to provide support for the modeling hy-
pothesis. For example, in a sample of 240 sixth-grade chil-
dren and their mothers, Garber and Flynn (2001) found no
association between mothers’ and children’s general at-
tributional styles. Thus, results from studies examining the
modeling hypothesis (with respect to the similarity of par-
ents’ and children’s inferential styles) have been mixed.

Theoretical Origins of the Depressogenic
Inferential Styles: The Feedback Hypothesis

A second theory that has been proposed to explain the
origins of pessimistic inferential styles is that children
model the feedback that parents communicate to them about
the meaning of negative events in their children’s lives. In
other words, rather than modeling parents’ own inferential
styles, children model the inferential feedback communi-
cated to them about events in their own lives. Most studies
have tested this feedback hypothesis by examining whether
parents’ typical inferential communications to their children
are associated with their offspring’s cognitive styles. The
few studies that have examined the feedback hypothesis
have found consistent support (e.g., Alloy et al., 2001;
Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978; Fincham & Cain,

1986; Garber & Flynn, 2001; Turk & Bry, 1992). For ex-
ample, in a recent study, Alloy et al. (2001) found that the
parents of students with pessimistic inferential styles com-
municated more negative feedback about the causes and
consequences of stressful events in their child’s life than
did the parents of optimistic students. Moreover, they found
that parents’ pessimistic inferential feedback predicted the
onset of depressive episodes in their child’s life during a
2.5-year prospective follow-up, and this relationship was
partially mediated by the students’ pessimistic inferential
styles. In addition, although they did not find an association
between mothers’ and children’s general attributional
styles, Garber and Flynn (2001) did report a significant
association between mothers’ and children’s attributions for
the same child-focused events. Garber and Flynn argued
that although children may not copy what their parents say
in general, they might incorporate their parents’ cognitions
regarding things that are personally salient to the children,
such as their own behavior. The strong initial support gen-
erated for the feedback hypothesis suggests that this
mechanism may be a more powerful determinant of chil-
dren’s inferential styles than is observing and modeling
parents’ own inferential styles.

Theoretical Origins of the
Depressogenic Inferential Styles:
The Role of Negative Life Events

Another theory that has been proposed to explain the
origins of cognitive vulnerability to depression is that expe-
riencing certain types of negative events leads to the devel-
opment of depressogenic inferential styles (Beck, 1967,
1987; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Rose & Abramson, 1992).
While it is normative to be exposed to disappointments,
losses, failures, and other negative events over the course of
development, they nonetheless can affect an individual’s
outlook on life, particularly if they are pervasive and severe
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Theorists have speculated that ei-
ther (1) experiencing a large number of negative events that
occur in the context of multiple and likely interacting do-
mains (e.g., a highly dysfunctional family, divorce, high
levels of poverty, loss of a parent, problematic peer rela-
tionships), or (2) experiencing negative events that are
chronic (e.g., parental/marital discord) and/or extremely
traumatic (e.g., parental death, rape) are likely to generate
personal themes of helplessness, derogation and unworthi-
ness that become deeply encoded in self-structures (Abram-
son, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Janoff-Bulman, 1992;
Rose & Abramson, 1992). Such self-structures conse-
quently lead to the development of depressogenic inferen-
tial styles. Thus, stressful life experiences can provide the
foundation for the development of negative beliefs.

Several studies have provided support for the hypothe-
sized relationship between the occurrence of negative life
events and the development of depressogenic inferential



SARIN AND ABELA

12

styles. For example, Garber and Flynn (1998) found that
mothers’ reports of negative life events that had occurred in
their child’s life during the prior year predicted significant
increases in their child’s depressive attributional style one
year later, after controlling for baseline measures of at-
tributional style. These results were found when the chil-
dren were in seventh grade and were replicated one year
later. These findings suggest that exposure to stressors pre-
dicts unfavorable changes in explanatory style towards
more internal, global, and stable attributions for negative
events.

Interestingly, Rose and Abramson (1992) have recently
hypothesized that childhood maltreatment is likely to play a
particularly important role in the development of cognitive
vulnerability to depression. According to their model, when
a negative life event occurs, individuals are motivated to
understand its causes, meaning, and consequences, and to
take action to deal with it. Rose and Abramson speculate,
however, that a child’s single experience of maltreatment is
unlikely to contribute to the formation of a negative cogni-
tive style because inferences about first experiences of
maltreatment are more likely to be “hopefulness-inducing.”
In other words, the young child is more likely to attribute
first instances of maltreatment to external, unstable, and
specific causes, which, according to the hopelessness the-
ory, is an inferential pattern hypothesized to maintain hope
in the face of negative events. However, if the maltreatment
is more chronic and pervasive, recurring over time and
situations, it is much more likely to contribute to the for-
mation of a negative cognitive style. That is, children will
be more likely to make internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions for the maltreatment. Therefore, through the repetition
of the negative event-specific cognitive process, a more
general negative cognitive style will be formed.

Consistent with Rose and Abramson’s (1992) hypothe-
sis, several studies have provided support for the relation-
ship between a history of childhood maltreatment and the
presence of negative cognitive styles (Gibb et al., 2001;
Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1998; Rose, Abramson, Hodulik,
Halberstadt, & Leff, 1994; for an exception see Gross &
Keller, 1992). For example, in a sample of children and
adolescents with a documented history of sexual maltreat-
ment, Feiring et al. (1998) found that the number of mal-
treatment events experienced was positively related to the
negativity of the victims’ cognitive styles. Moreover, cog-
nitive style mediated the relation between number of mal-
treatment events and levels of depression. At the same time,
however, given that the majority of past studies testing the
relationship between maltreatment and the development of
negative inferential styles have examined sexual, rather
than emotional or physical maltreatment, it is unclear
whether the relation found between childhood sexual mal-
treatment and adult cognitive styles is due to the unique
influence of sexual maltreatment or to its overlap with ei-
ther or both of the other forms of abuse (Gibb et al., 2001).
Indeed, in the first study to examine the unique association
of all three forms of maltreatment with negative cognitive

styles, Gibb et al. (2001) found that reported levels of
childhood emotional, but not physical or sexual maltreat-
ment were related to levels of hopelessness, as well as to
episodes of nonendogenous major depression and hopeless-
ness depression. Moreover, these relationships were par-
tially or fully mediated by cognitive risk. These results sug-
gest that prior findings of significant relations for physical
and sexual maltreatment may have been due to the overlap
or third-variable effects of childhood emotional maltreat-
ment with the other two forms of maltreatment, given that
the occurrence of emotional maltreatment was not con-
trolled for in previous studies. If confirmed, these findings
would support Rose and Abramson’s (1992) hypothesis that
childhood emotional maltreatment is particularly likely to
lead to the development of negative cognitive styles. In
emotional maltreatment, the depressive cognitions are di-
rectly supplied to the child by the abuser, therefore teaching
the child to have a negative inferential style and eliminating
the chance for the child to make more benign inferences.

Goals of the Current Study

The goal of the current study was to further explore the
origins of cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness depres-
sion in children between the ages of 7 and 13, who were
selected to be at high- and low-risk for hopelessness de-
pression based on the presence or absence of depressogenic
inferential styles. In line with preliminary research, the cur-
rent study assessed whether the modeling of parents’ de-
pressogenic inferential styles, parental inferential feedback
regarding events in a child’s life, as well as the experience
of negative events, distinguished children with depres-
sogenic inferential styles from children without such styles.
Improving upon past research, the current study examined
the factors that are associated with each of the three depres-
sogenic inferential styles proposed by the hopelessness the-
ory, rather than just those associated with a pessimistic at-
tributional style, in order to ascertain whether similar path-
ways lead to the development of the three cognitive styles.
In order to test hypotheses, children and their parents com-
pleted a series of questionnaires assessing depressogenic
inferential styles about causes, consequences and the self,
as well as the occurrence of major negative life events,
daily hassles, and physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. In
line with past research, we hypothesized that the parents of
children with depressogenic inferential styles would exhibit
more depressogenic inferential styles themselves than
would the parents of children without these styles. Second,
we hypothesized that the parents of children with depres-
sogenic inferential styles would provide more negative in-
ferential feedback for stressful events in their child’s life
than would the parents of children without such styles. Last,
we hypothesized that children with depressogenic inferen-
tial styles would report experiencing higher levels of nega-
tive events in the past than would children without these
cognitive styles.



HOPELESSNESS THEORY, ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY

13

Method

Participants

Sixty-six children (30 girls and 36 boys) and one of
their parents (59 mothers and 7 fathers) participated in the
current study. Families were recruited by means of newspa-
per advertisements placed in several English-language
newspapers in the Montreal area. Families were compen-
sated $90 for their participation.

The children in the current study were between the
ages of 7 and 13. The mean age of the children was 10
years and 2 months. Parents’ ages ranged from 28 to 51
with a mean age of 42 years and 5 months. The sample was
70.8% Caucasian, 9.2% Hispanic, 4.6% Asian, 1.5% Afri-
can American, and 13.9% self-identified as another ethnic-
ity. Of the parents, 72.7% were married or living common
law, 15.2% were divorced, 10.6% were separated, and 1.5%
were single. The median annual family income was in the
range of $45,000 to $60,000. The highest levels of educa-
tion completed by the parents were a high school diploma
(16.9%), a community college diploma (20%), a bachelor
degree (36.9%), and a graduate degree (7.8%).

Procedure

Families who responded to the advertisements were
scheduled to come into the lab for an assessment. Upon
arrival, parents completed a consent form and a demo-
graphics form. Children were told that their participation
was voluntary and that they could choose not to participate.
Research assistants then verbally administered the follow-
ing questionnaires to the child alone: (1) Children’s At-
tributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ; Seligman et al.,
1984); (2) Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire,
(CCSQ; Abela, 2001); (3) Social Support Scale for Chil-
dren (SSSC: Harter, 1986); (4) The Children’s Life Events
Scale (CLES; Coddington, 1972); (5) Children’s Hassles
Scale (CHAS; Kanner, Feldman, Weinberger, & Ford,
1987); and (6) Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ;
Bernstein & Fink, 1998). At the same time, the parents
separately completed the following questionnaires: (1) Ex-
panded Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson &
Villanova, 1988); (2) Expanded Cognitive Style Question-
naire (CSQ; Abramson & Metalsky, 1986); and (3) Parental
Feedback Style Questionnaire (PFSQ; Abela, 2002a). Upon
completion of the assessment, the children and their parents
were debriefed.

Measures

Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ).
The CASQ contains 48 items. Each item is a hypothetical
event (24 negative and 24 positive) that respondents are
asked to imagine happened to them. Since the hypotheses of

the current study only involved participants’ attributional
styles for negative events, only the 24 negative event items
were used. Respondents are presented with two possible
causes of each event and are asked to choose which cause
best describes the way they would think about the event if it
happened to them. The two causes hold constant two at-
tributional dimensions (internal-external, global-specific,
and stable-unstable) while varying the third. The CASQ is
scored by assigning a value of 1 to each internal, global, or
stable response and a 0 to each external, unstable, specific
response. There are eight items assessing each dimension,
thus scores for each dimension range from 0-8. In line with
the hopelessness theory, we used the generality composite
score to measure attributional style. This score is equivalent
to the sum of all global and stable responses and can range
from 0-16, with higher scores indicating a more depres-
sogenic attributional style.

In a study examining the reliability and validity of the
CASQ in children (aged 8-13), Seligman et al. (1984) found
that CASQ scores were fairly consistent over a 6-month
interval, showing attributional style to be a stable individual
difference among children (r = .66, p < .001). Cronbach’s
alpha for the negative events composite score ranged from
.50 to .54 across administrations, indicating moderate inter-
nal consistency. Regarding validity, children exhibiting
depressive symptoms were more likely than nondepressed
children to endorse internal, global, and stable explanations
for negative events. Furthermore, a pessimistic attributional
style predicted depressive symptoms at the 6-month follow-
up above and beyond initial levels of depression in children.
Since this study, several other studies using the CASQ have
obtained similar findings (i.e., Abela, 2001; Hilsman &
Garber, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992). In the current
study, we obtained an alpha of .47 for the generality sub-
scale, indicating moderate internal consistency.

Children’s Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CCSQ). The
CCSQ is a two-part questionnaire. Part one assesses the
tendency to catastrophize the consequences of negative
events. Part two assesses the tendency to view oneself as
flawed or deficient following negative events. Each part
contains 12 items, each of which is a hypothetical negative
event involving the child. As with the CASQ, respondents
are instructed to imagine that the event happened to them
and then to choose the response that would best describe the
way they would think. In part one, the child is given the
following four choices: (a) This won’t cause other bad
things to happen to me; (b) This might cause other bad
things to happen to me; (c) This will cause other bad things
to happen to me; and (d) This will cause many terrible
things to happen to me. Each response is assigned a value
from 0-3, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency
to catastrophize the consequences of negative events.
Scores for the 12 items are added yielding a composite
score ranging from 0-36. In part two, the child is given the
following three choices: (a) This does not make me feel bad
about myself; (b) This makes me feel a little bad about my-
self; and (c) This makes me feel very bad about myself.



SARIN AND ABELA

14

Each response is assigned a value of 0-2, with higher scores
indicating a greater tendency to view oneself as flawed or
deficient following negative events. Scores for the 12 items
are added yielding a composite score ranging from 0-24.

In a study examining the reliability and validity of the
CCSQ in third and seventh grade children, Abela (2001)
administered the CCSQ twice with a 7-week interval be-
tween administrations. For the inferential style about con-
sequences subscale, Time 1 and Time 2 scores significantly
correlated with each other in both third (r = .41, p<.001)
and seventh grade students (r = .46, p<.001). Similarly, for
the inferential style about the self subscale, Time 1 and
Time 2 scores significantly correlated with each other in
both third (r=.31, p<.001) and seventh grade students
(r=.63, p<.001). These correlations indicate that the infe r-
ential styles about consequences and the self are relatively
stable individual differences in this age group. Cronbach’s
alphas for the CCSQ subscales ranged from .64 to .81
across administrations, indicating moderate internal con-
sistency. In the current study, we obtained an alpha of .80
for the inferential style about consequences subscale and
.72 for the inferential style about the self subscale, indicat-
ing moderate internal consistency.

Social Support Scale for Children (SSSC). The SSSC is
a 24-item questionnaire that was used to assess the child’s
perceived level of social support. The SSSC contains four
subscales, each with six items pertaining to the assessment
of perceived levels of social support from parents (e.g., my
parents really understand me), teachers (e.g., I have a
teacher who cares if I feel bad), classmates (e.g., my class-
mates pay attention to what I say), and friends (e.g., I have
a close friend I can tell my problems to). The child is asked
to indicate how true each of the statements is for him or her
by choosing from among three possible answers (i.e., not
true for me, sort of true for me, really true for me). Each
response is scored on a scale from 0 to 2. Scores on each
subscale range from 0 to 12. A summary score is created by
summing scores across all four subscales of the SSSC. To-
tal social support scores range from 0 to 48, with higher
scores indicating higher levels of perceived social support.
Previous research has indicated that the SSSC exhibits ade-
quate levels of reliability and validity for use in clinical
research (Harter, 1986). In the current study, we obtained
an alpha of .77 for the total social support score and alphas
of .69, .46, .72, and .85 for the parents, teachers, classmates,
and friends subscales respectively. These alphas indicate
moderate internal consistency.

The Children’s Life Events Scale – Lifetime Version
(CLES). The CLES consists of a list of 30 negative events
that children may experience (e.g., your mother or father
died; you failed a grade in school; a family member or close
friend went to jail). For each item, respondents are asked
whether or not they have ever experienced that event in the
past. If they have, they receive a score of 1. If they have
not, they receive a score of 0. Scores on the CLES range
from 0-30 with higher scores indicating a greater number of
lifetime stressful events.

Children’s Hassles Scale (CHAS). The CHAS is a
questionnaire that lists 39 hassles that children may experi-
ence (e.g., you had trouble learning something new; kids at
school teased you; your schoolwork was too hard). Children
are asked to rate how often each event happened to them in
the past year on a scale of 1 (i.e., it has never happened) to
5 (i.e., it has happened all the time). For each item, respon-
dents receive a score of 0 if they have never experienced
the event, a score of 1 if it has happened a few times, a
score of 2 if it has happened sometimes, a score of 3 if it
has happened many times, or a score of 4 if it has happened
all the time. Summary scores are created by summing the
scores across the 39 items. Scores range from 0 to 156, with
higher scores indicating a greater number and frequency of
hassles experienced in the past year.

The Children’s Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ). The
CTQ is a 27-item questionnaire that examines children’s
past histories of emotional, physical and sexual abuse, as
well emotional and physical neglect. Each of the 27 state-
ments refers to a possible occurrence in the child’s life,
using vocabulary that is geared towards school-age children
and adolescents. The child is asked to rate how often each
event has happened to them throughout their lifetime on a
scale of 1 (i.e., it has never happened) to 5 (i.e., it has hap-
pened all the time). For each item, respondents receive a
score of 0 if they have never experienced the event, a score
of 1 if it has happened a few times, a score of 2 if it has
happened sometimes, a score of 3 if it has happened many
times, or a score of 4 if it has happened all the time. In the
current study we utilized the following subscales, each of
which contains five items: emotional abuse (e.g., people in
your family called you things like “stupid,” “lazy,” or
“ugly”), physical abuse (e.g., people in your family hit you
so hard that you had bruises or marks), and sexual abuse
(e.g., someone tried to touch you in a way that made you
feel bad). Scores on each subscale range from 0 to 20, with
higher scores indicating greater levels of abuse experienced
by the child.

Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ).
The EASQ consists of a total of 24 hypothetical negative
events. Twelve of the events are of an interpersonal nature
(e.g., you and your family have a serious argument). The
other 12 events are of an achievement nature (e.g., you have
been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time). Sub-
jects are asked to write down one major cause of each
event. They are then asked to rate the cause on a 1-7 scale
for internality, globality, and stability. The higher the scores
are on these dimensions, the more internal, global, and sta-
ble the attributional style. Consistent with the hopelessness
theory (i.e., Abramson et al., 1989), we used the generality
subscale (average of globality and stability; EASQ-
GENERALITY) to test our predictions. Scores were aver-
aged across the 24 negative life events, yielding one score
ranging from 1 to 7, with higher scores corresponding to
more depressogenic attributional styles. In the current
study, we obtained an alpha of .85, indicating high internal
consistency.



HOPELESSNESS THEORY, ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY

15

Expanded Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ). The
CSQ assesses cognitive styles about consequences and the
self. To assess the cognitive style about consequences,
subjects are asked the following question for each of the 12
negative life events in the EASQ (Peterson & Villanova,
1988): “How likely is it that the [negative event] will lead
to other negative things happening to you?” They are asked
to respond on a 1-7 scale, with 1 meaning “It is not at all
likely that the [negative event] will lead to other negative
things happening to me” and 7 meaning “It is extremely
likely that the [negative event] will lead to other negative
things happening to me.” To assess the cognitive style
about the self, participants are asked the following question
for each of the 12 negative life events in the EASQ (Peter-
son & Villanova, 1988): “To what degree does the [nega-
tive event] mean that you are flawed in some way?” Par-
ticipants are asked to respond on a 1-7 scale, with 1 mean-
ing “The [negative event] definitely does not mean I am
flawed in some way” and 7 meaning “The [negative event]
definitely does mean I am flawed in some way.” Scores
were averaged across the 12 negative life events, yielding
subscale scores for consequences and the self. Scores on
each subscale can range from 1 to 7, with higher scores
indicating more depressogenic cognitive styles. In the cur-
rent study, we obtained alphas of .87 and .90 for the infer-
ential styles about consequences and the self subscales,
indicating high internal consistency.

The Parental Feedback Style Questionnaire (PFSQ).
The PFSQ is a self-report questionnaire that assesses pa-
rental inferential styles about the self, consequences, and
causes for events in their child’s life. It consists of a total of
12 hypothetical negative life events. The parents are asked
to imagine that each event happened to their child and then
to choose the response that would best describe the way
they would think in that particular situation (e.g., your child
gets into a fight with another kid). To assess parental infer-
ential feedback styles about the causes of negative events in
their child’s life, parents are asked to write to write down
one major cause of each event. They are then asked to rate
the cause on a 1-7 scale for internality, globality, and sta-
bility. The higher the scores are on these dimensions, the
more internal, global and stable the attributional feedback
style. Consistent with the hopelessness theory (i.e., Abram-
son et al., 1989), we used the generality subscale (average
of globality and stability; PFSQ-GENERALITY) to test our
predictions. Scores were averaged across the 12 negative
life events, yielding one score ranging from 1 to 7, with
higher scores corresponding to more depressogenic attribu-
tional feedback styles. In the current study, we obtained an
alpha of .79, indicating moderate internal consistency.

In order to assess the cognitive feedback style about
consequences, parents are asked the following question for
each of the 12 negative life events: “How likely is it that the
[negative event] will lead to other negative things happen-
ing to your child?” They are asked to respond on a 1-7
scale, with 1 meaning “It is not at all likely that the [nega-
tive event] will lead to other negative things happening to

them” and 7 meaning “It is extremely likely that the [nega-
tive event] will lead to other negative things happening to
them.” Scores were averaged across the 12 negative life
events, yielding one score ranging from 1 to 7, with higher
scores corresponding to more depressogenic feedback about
the consequences of negative events in their child’s life. In
the current study, we obtained an alpha of .89, indicating
high internal consistency. To assess parents’ cognitive
feedback style about the self for negative life events in the
child’s life, parents are asked the following question for
each of the 12 negative life events: “To what degree does
the [negative event] mean that your child is flawed in some
way?” Participants are asked to respond on a 1-7 scale, with
1 meaning “The [negative event] definitely does not mean
that they are flawed in some way” and 7 meaning “The
[negative event] definitely does mean they are flawed in
some way.” Scores were averaged across the 12 negative
life events, yielding one score ranging from 1 to 7, with
higher scores corresponding with more parental pessimistic
feedback about the “self” implications of negative events in
the child’s life. In the current study, we obtained an alpha
of .92, indicating high internal consistency.

Results

Overview of Statistical Analyses

T-tests were conducted in order to determine whether
children with depressogenic inferential styles differed sig-
nificantly from children with optimistic styles on the basis
of parental inferential styles, parental inferential feedback
for children’s stressful events, and past experiences with
negative life events. In order to test hypotheses, we identi-
fied children who exhibited optimistic and pessimistic lev-
els of each of the three inferential styles. For each of the
inferential styles, children who scored greater than one
standard deviation above the mean on the measure of inter-
est were considered to have a pessimistic inferential style,
whereas those who scored less than one standard deviation
below the mean were classified as having an optimistic in-
ferential style. Thus, the same child could be classified as
having one or more pessimistic and/or optimistic inferential
styles.

Results indicated that 9 out of 66 children had a pessi-
mistic inferential style about causes (i.e., scored more than
one standard deviation above the mean on the generality
composite index of the CASQ), and 9 out of the remaining
57 children had an optimistic inferential style about causes
(i.e., scored less than one standard deviation below the
mean on the generality composite index of the CASQ). Ten
out of 66 children were identified as having a pessimistic
inferential style about consequences (i.e., scored more than
one standard deviation above the mean on the consequences
subscale of the CCSQ), whereas 6 of the remaining 56 chil-
dren were identified as having an optimistic inferential style
about consequences (i.e., scored less than one standard de-



SARIN AND ABELA

16

viation below the mean on the consequences subscale of the
CCSQ). Finally, 12 out of 66 children were identified as
having a pessimistic inferential style about the self (i.e.,
scored more than one standard deviation above the mean on
the self subscale of the CCSQ), and 12 of the remaining 54
children had an optimistic inferential style about the self
(i.e., scored less than one standard deviation below the
mean on the self subscale of the CCSQ).

Attributional Style

Results pertaining to the inferential style about causes
are presented in Table 1. In support of our hypotheses, re-
sults indicated that children with a pessimistic inferential
style about causes reported lower levels of social support
(t(16) = 2.21, p < .05) than children with an optimistic in-
ferential style about causes. Exploratory analyses of the
subscales of the SSSC revealed that pessimistic children
reported lower levels of support from friends (t(16) = 2.07,
p < .06) and classmates (t(16) = 2.56, p < .06) but not from
parents (t(16) = 1.10, ns) and teachers (t(16) = 1.73, ns).

Analyses also revealed a nonsignificant trend in which chil-
dren with a pessimistic attributional style reported experi-
encing a greater number of hassles in the past year than
children with an optimistic inferential style about causes
(t(16) = 2.02, p < .07).

At the same time, contrary to hypotheses, the parents of
children with a pessimistic attributional style did not pos-
sess more depressogenic inferential styles about causes than
did the parents of children with an optimistic attributional
style (t(16) = .667, ns). In addition, children with a pessi-
mistic inferential style about causes did not receive more
negative parental inferential feedback about the causes of
negative events in the their child’s life than did children
with an optimistic attributional style (t(16) = 1.16, ns). Last,
contrary to our hypothesis, children with a pessimistic at-
tributional style did not report experiencing more negative
life events (t(16) = .798, ns), emotional abuse (t(16) = .537,
ns), physical abuse (t(16) = .161, ns), or sexual abuse (t(16)
= .290, ns) than did children with an optimistic attributional
style.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for all Measures for Children with Optimistic and Pessimistic Inferential
Styles about Causes

      Optimistic inferential style                          Pessimistic inferential style
                  about causes                    about causes

1. ASQ-GEN       3.23 (0.93)           3.52 (0.92)
2. PFSQ-GEN       3.09 (0.96)           3.60 (0.93)
3. SSSC                                  43.78 (2.17)         34.44 (12.50)
4. CHAS     86.89 (13.60)       101.78 (17.49)
5. CLES                     9.22 (3.27)         10.33 (2.60)
6. CTQ-EA       8.44 (2.19)           9.11 (3.02)
7. CTQ-PA       6.56 (1.13)           6.44 (1.74)
8. CTQ-SA       4.44 (2.00)           4.67 (1.12)

Note. ASQ-GEN = Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire, Generality Subscale. PFSQ-GEN = Parental
Feedback Style Questionnaire, Feedback about Causes Subscale. SSSC = Social Support Scale for Children.
HASC= Hassles Scale for Children. CLES = Children’s Life Events Scale. CTQ-EA = Childhood Trauma
Questionnaire, Emotional Abuse Subscale. CTQ-PA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Physical Abuse
Subscale. CTQ-SA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Sexual Abuse Subscale.

Inferential Style about Consequences

Results pertaining to the inferential style about conse-
quences are presented in Table 2. In support of our hy-
potheses, results revealed that children with a pessimistic
inferential style about consequences reported experiencing
a greater number of major negative life events than children
with an optimistic inferential style about consequences

(t(14) = 2.27, p < .05). Analyses also revealed a nonsignifi-
cant trend in which the parents of children with a pessimis-
tic inferential style about consequences exhibited a greater
tendency to give their child pessimistic feedback about the
consequences of negative events occurring in their child’s
life (t(14) = 2.05, p < .07) than parents of children with an
optimistic inferential style about consequences. However,
parents’ own inferential styles about consequences (t(14) =



HOPELESSNESS THEORY, ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY

17

.563, ns) were not related to their child’s inferential style
about consequences.

At the same time, contrary to hypotheses, children with
a pessimistic inferential style about consequences did not
report experiencing lower levels of social support (t(14) =
.345, ns) than children with optimistic inferential styles

about consequences. Furthermore, children with a pessi-
mistic inferential style about consequences did not differ
from optimistic children in terms of the number of hassles
reported in the last year (t(14) = .927, ns), nor in terms of
levels of emotional abuse (t(14) = .516, ns), physical abuse
(t(14) = .446, ns), or sexual abuse (t(14) = .677, ns.

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for all Measures for Children with Optimistic and Pessimistic Inferential
Styles about Consequences

        Optimistic inferential style                         Pessimistic inferential style
              about consequences    about consequences

1. CSQ-CONS       2.67 (0.90)           2.98 (1.15)
2. PFSQ-CONS       1.93 (0.86)           3.06 (1.22)
3. SSSC                                  40.00 (9.45)         38.40 (8.71)
4. CHAS     89.00 (15.61)         95.70 (13.01)
5. CLES                         7.00 (2.45)           9.70 (2.21)
6. CTQ-EA       9.17 (3.55)         10.30 (4.60)
7. CTQ-PA       6.33 (1.37)           6.70 (1.70)
8. CTQ-SA       5.00 (3.10)           5.90 (2.23)

Note. CSQ-CONS = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, Inferential Style about Consequences Subscale. PFSQ-
CONS = Parental Feedback Style Questionnaire, Feedback about Consequences Subscale. SSSC = Social
Support Scale for Children. HASC = Hassles Scale for Children. CLES = Children’s Life Events Scale. CTQ-
EA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Emotional Abuse Subscale. CTQ-PA = Childhood Trauma
Questionnaire, Physical Abuse Subscale. CTQ-SA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Sexual Abuse
Subscale.

Inferential Style about the Self

Results pertaining to the inferential style about the self
are presented in Table 3. In support of our hypotheses, chil-
dren with a depressogenic inferential style about the self
reported higher levels of emotional abuse (t(23) = 2.11, p
<.05) and sexual abuse (t(23) = 2.91, p < .01) than children
with an optimistic inferential style about the self. However,
children with a pessimistic inferential style about the self
did not report higher levels of physical abuse (t(23) = .894,
ns) than children with an optimistic inferential style about
the self.

At the same time, contrary to hypotheses, the parents of
children with a pessimistic inferential style about the self
did not themselves exhibit more pessimistic inferential

styles about the self than the parents of optimistic children
(t(23) = .099, ns). In addition, the parents of children with a
pessimistic inferential style about the self did not provide
their children with more pessimistic feedback about the
self-implications of negative events occurring in their
child’s life than did the parents of optimistic children (t(23)
= .951, ns). Furthermore, contrary to our hypothesis, chil-
dren with pessimistic inferential styles about the self did not
report experiencing lower levels of social support (t(23) =
.222, ns) than children with optimistic inferential styles
about the self. Children with pessimistic inferential styles
about the self also did not report a greater number of has-
sles in the past year (t(23) = 1.70, ns), or a greater number
of major negative life events (t(23) = .742, ns), than chil-
dren with optimistic inferential styles about the self.



SARIN AND ABELA

18

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for all Measures for Children with Optimistic and Pessimistic Inferential
Styles about the Self

                  Optimistic inferential style           Pessimistic inferential style
                   about the self        about the self

1. CSQ-SELF       2.51 (0.93)           2.47 (1.17)
2. PFSQ-SELF       2.04 (1.24)           1.66 (0.61)
3. SSSC                                  39.92 (7.82)         39.25 (7.34)
4. CHAS     86.10 (16.84)         97.66 (17.21)
5. CLES                      9.04 (3.73)         10.00 (2.59)
6. CTQ-EA       7.15 (2.61)           9.50 (2.94)
7. CTQ-PA       5.80 (1.96)           6.42 (1.62)
8. CTQ-SA       3.62 (1.71)           5.50 (1.51)

Note. CSQ-SELF = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, Inferential Style about the Self Subscale. PFSQ-SELF =
Parental Feedback Style Questionnaire, Feedback about Self Implications Subscale. SSSC = Social Support
Scale for Children. HASC= Hassles Scale for Children. CLES = Children’s Life Events Scale. CTQ-EA =
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Emotional Abuse Subscale. CTQ-PA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire,
Physical Abuse Subscale. CTQ-SA = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Sexual Abuse Subscale.

Discussion

The results of the current study indicate that different
pathways lead to the development of the three pessimistic
inferential styles. Specifically, the inferential style about
causes was associated with non-family related chronic has-
sles in the past year, as well as with low levels of social
support from classmates and peers. Interestingly, these are
all current stressors in the child’s life and all pertain to the
child’s peer environment. On the other hand, the inferential
style about consequences was associated with the occur-
rence of major negative life events, as well as with the in-
ferential feedback the children received from their parents
about the consequences of such negative life events. Fi-
nally, inferential style about the self was associated with
past histories of emotional and sexual abuse.

Congruence Between Current Findings and Past
Research

Although the results of the current study replicate sev-
eral findings in the literature examining the development of
cognitive vulnerability to depression, they also contradict
other findings. For example, in line with past research, the
results of the current study provide support for the feedback
hypothesis in that children’s inferential styles about conse-
quences were associated with the inferential feedback they
received from their parents about the consequences of
negative events in the child’s life. Moreover, in support of
recent speculations, findings from the current study suggest

that parental inferential feedback was a more powerful de-
terminant of children’s inferential style about consequences
than was the parents’ own inferential style about conse-
quences. In addition, also in line with past research, the
results of the current study suggest that certain types of
negative life events are associated with each of the three
inferential styles. That is, a pessimistic attributional style
was associated with chronic hassles and low levels of per-
ceived social support. An inferential style about conse-
quences was related to the experience of major negative life
events during childhood. Finally, the inferential style about
the self was associated with the occurrence of sexual and
emotional abuse. Thus, the results of the current study are
congruent with past research in that they suggest that both
the modeling of inferential feedback and the experience of
negative events play a role in the development of cognitive
vulnerability to hopelessness depression.

At the same time, however, the results of the current
study are inconsistent with other findings of past research in
that the pathways hypothesized to lead to the development
of cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness depression were
each associated with only one of the three inferential styles,
rather than predicting negative cognitive styles in general.
Thus, whereas past research has suggested that similar
pathways lead to the development of all three inferential
styles, the results of the current study suggest that distinct
pathways lead to the development of the pessimistic infer-
ential styles about causes, consequences, and the self.

Limitations of Past Research: The Use of Adult



HOPELESSNESS THEORY, ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY

19

Samples

In order to integrate the results of the current study
with those of past research, it is important to acknowledge
limitations of past research that could account for the ap-
parent inconsistencies between the current and past find-
ings. In particular, a substantial number of studies testing
theories of the origins of cognitive vulnerability to hope-
lessness depression have utilized adult samples (e.g., Alloy
et al., 2001; Gibb et al., 2001; Rose et al., 1994). These
studies have asked adults to retrospectively recall the occur-
rence of abuse or negative life events, or have examined the
association between the inferential styles of these adults and
their parents. The use of adult samples in this context is
problematic given that the relationships among the three
inferential styles proposed by the hopelessness theory ap-
pear to differ in child and adult populations. That is, al-
though research examining the depressogenic inferential
styles in adult populations has found these styles to be em-
pirically indistinguishable (e.g., Abela, 2002b; Abela &
Seligman, 2000; Abela, Brozina, & Seligman, 2002; Metal-
sky & Joiner, 1992), research with child populations has
not. For example, studies using adult populations consis-
tently report high degrees of interrelatedness among these
three styles, whereas studies using child populations often
find them to be virtually independent of one another (Abela,
2001; Abela & Sarin, 2002). In addition, although research
using adult populations has failed to find age or gender dif-
ferences with respect to the three inferential styles, child
research has suggested that the three styles may emerge as
vulnerability factors to depression at various stages of de-
velopment in different children (Abela, 2001). Furthermore,
in a study by Abela and Sarin (2002), children’s propensi-
ties towards depressogenic thinking were found to vary
tremendously depending on which inferential style was
examined. Specifically, 20.7% of children were classified
as extremely pessimistic on one inferential style but ex-
tremely optimistic on at least one other. Thus, it appears
that in contrast to adults, a significant portion of children
exhibit a dramatic range in their styles of thinking such that
their inferential styles about causes, consequences, and the
self are almost completely independent of each other.

Consequently, when researchers attempt to examine
theories of cognitive vulnerability to depression using adult
populations, they run the risk of two potential pitfalls. First,
they are likely to limit their ability to identify the specificity
of the etiological pathways leading to the development of
the three distinct inferential styles. Given that the inferential
styles are highly intercorrelated with one another in adults,
any developmental pathway elucidated by studies employ-
ing adult populations will appear to be an important deter-
minant of the development of all three styles, when in real-
ity, this factor may have only been crucial to the develop-
ment of one of the styles. Second, in light of the highly in-
distinguishable nature of the pessimistic inferential styles in
adults, the construct of interest in adult populations be-
comes broad pessimism rather than pessimism of specific

types. When examining broad pessimism, vulnerability
factors that are strongly associated with only one type of
pessimism become much less strongly associated with pes-
simism in general. Consequently, important effects may
become muted or washed out, and hence remain undetected.

Methodological Inconsistencies Between Past Re-
search and the Current Study

At the same time, the use of adult samples cannot en-
tirely account for discrepancies between the current find-
ings and those of past studies, as the findings of the current
study are also incongruent with past studies that have util-
ized child samples. Specifically, in contrast to the current
findings, past studies using child samples have found sup-
port for the role of parental inferential feedback (e.g., Fin-
cham & Cain, 1986; Garber & Flynn, 2001), the occurrence
of negative events (e.g., Garber & Flynn, 1998) and sexual
abuse (e.g., Feiring et al., 1998) in the development of a
pessimistic attributional style. Several factors may account
for these discrepancies. First, measurement differences
between studies are likely to account for inconsistencies in
findings. For example, although the majority of studies
have utilized the CASQ to assess attributional style, other
studies have used alternative measures such as the Per-
ceived Control Scale (Rudolph, Kurlakowsky, & Conley,
2001). In addition, in line with the hopelessness theory, the
current study used the generality composite score (i.e.,
global-specific and stable-unstable) of the CASQ to assess
attributional style for negative events. In contrast, the ma-
jority of past research has utilized the CASQ composite
scores that involve all three subscales of the CASQ (i.e.,
internal-external, global-specific, and stable-unstable), as
well as items from the CASQ for both positive and negative
events. Last, in order to assess parental inferential feedback,
the current study used the PFSQ. However, past research
examining this hypothesis has used various other measures
such as the CASQ-P (Garber & Flynn, 2001).

 A second factor that may account for inconsistencies
in results across child studies is the use of different age
groups. That is, while the current study employed a sample
of children between the ages of seven and thirteen, other
studies have utilized samples of pre-adolescents (e.g., Gar-
ber & Flynn, 2001; Rudolph et al., 2001). In addition, the
few studies that have utilized samples of younger children
focused on a very narrow age range (Fincham & Cain,
1986; Seligman & Peterson, 1986; for an exception see
Kaslow, Rehm, Pollack, & Siegel, 1988).

Finally, a third factor that may account for inconsisten-
cies in findings is variation in study designs. That is, both
cross-sectional (e.g., Fincham & Cain, 1986) and longitudi-
nal designs (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) have been
employed to test theories of the origins of cognitive vulner-
ability to depression. However, these designs may detect
different developmental pathways. Longitudinal designs, in
which the dependent variable is change in depressogenic



SARIN AND ABELA

20

inferential styles during the course of the study, will detect
factors that are responsible for change in these styles during
the participant’s current developmental period. In contrast,
cross-sectional studies, such as the present one, will detect
the factors that played the greatest role in the past in distin-
guishing optimists and pessimists, regardless of when these
factors occurred in the child’s developmental trajectory.
Thus, future research with children should continue to ex-
amine the development all three inferential styles using
similar measures of constructs, samples that encompass a
wide age range, as well as both longitudinal and cross-
sectional designs.

Limitations of the Current Study

Several limitations of the current study should be
noted. First, the current study utilized a cross-sectional de-
sign. As such, we were only able to demonstrate correla-
tions between hypothesized vulnerability factors to hope-
lessness depression and the three pessimistic inferential
styles, but could not establish causation. Future research
should continue to examine these hypotheses using both
longitudinal and cross-sectional designs. Second, the cur-
rent study used a small sample size, which may have lim-
ited our statistical power to detect significant relationships.
Third, self-report measures were used to assess all con-
structs. Such a format is inherently prone to informant bias.
Thus, future researchers examining these hypotheses should
utilize more sophisticated methods of analysis such as in-
terviewing procedures, observational techniques and peer
ratings. In addition, although the CASQ exhibits adequate
levels of internal consistency for use in empirical research,
a measure of attributional style with a higher level of inter-
nal consistency is needed in order to rule out the possibility
that inconsistent findings across studies are the result of the
poor psychometric properties of this measure. Fifth, the
current study assessed a few main theories of the develop-
ment of cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness depression.
Specifically, the current study examined whether parental
inferential styles, parental inferential feedback and the oc-
currence of negative events were associated with the pessi-
mistic inferential styles about causes, consequences, and the
self. Future research should continue to examine these theo-
ries, as well as additional theories of vulnerability to de-
pression, such as the role of past episodes of childhood de-
pression, attachment styles between children and caregiv-
ers, and communication patterns (i.e., expressed emotion),
in the development of pessimistic inferential styles. Future
research should also examine the interaction among the
etiological pathways addressed by such developmental
theories.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of the current study suggest
that both the modeling of inferential feedback and the expe-

rience of negative events play a role in the development of
cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness depression. In addi-
tion, results reveal that different pathways are likely to lead
to the development of depressogenic inferential styles about
the self, consequences, and causes. Future research using
longitudinal designs, larger sample sizes, and multiple
methods of assessment is likely to help us gain an even
deeper understanding of the factors that play a role in the
development of cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness de-
pression. Such research is also likely to benefit from ex-
amining a broader range of theories of the origins of de-
pressogenic inferential styles than those examined in the
current study. Discovering the factors that lead to the de-
velopment of depressogenic inferential styles provides cli-
nicians with a tool for identifying children at risk for devel-
oping cognitive vulnerability to depression. Identification
of such children is essential so that the development of such
vulnerability factors can be prevented and subsequent bouts
with depression avoided.

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