































Graduate Student Journal of Psychology          Copyright 2012 by the Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology 
2012, Vol. 14               Teachers College, Columbia University 

13 
 

 
Effects of Auditory Stimuli on Empathic Emotion 

 
Faylin Musson-Moyer 

Teachers College, Columbia University 
 

Individuals are exposed to a variety of stimuli that elicit empathy. However, it is unclear whether 
the sensory mode (i.e., auditory or visual) through which a stimulus is perceived influences 
empathic responses. The present study experimentally examined the differences between 
audiovisual communication channels in their ability to elicit empathic reactions from undergraduate 
students.  Participants completed the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES: Mehrabian, 
2000) in order to determine one’s emotional empathy trait prior to visually, aurally, or audio-
visually viewing a short video clip of an infant child in a state of distress.  Subsequently, the 
participants rated their emotional reactions to the video clip based on subjective level of distress, 
how upset participants felt, and participants’ desire to help the infant.  There were no statistically 
significant effects of the presentation style of the video on participants’ upset reactions or 
participants’ desire to help.  However, the effect of the stimuli presentation on participants’ level of 
distress was statistically significant, particularly among participants with “very below average” or 
“below average” empathy traits.  The findings of the present study suggest that empathic responses 
are greatest when an individual can see and hear another individual in distress, as he or she cannot 
misinterpret the incoming information.   
 

 
Empathy is an affective state that mirrors another 

person's affective state.  In other words, empathic responses 
are induced through the observation (imaginarily or in vivo) 
of the other person's affective state (De Vigemont & Singer, 
2006).  A last crucial part of the definition of empathy is that 
the person is aware that the other person is functioning as the 
source of his or her own affective state (Batson & Shaw, 
2001; De Vigemont & Singer, 2006; Van Lange, 2008; 
Westbury & Neumann, 2008). Though the 
neuropsychological processes of observation and imagination 
differ, both processes are capable of independently activating 
an empathic state (Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008; Staub & 
Vollhardt, 2008; Van Lange, 2008; Westbury & Neumann, 
2008) 

Researchers have long wondered why people empathize.  
Some researchers, for instance, have proposed that empathy 
functions as an intermediary between one’s cognitive and 
social domains during role-taking processes (Iannotti, 1978; 
Knafo, Van Hulle, Zahn-Waxler, & Robinson, 2008).  The 
suggested association between empathy and role-taking does 
not, however, connote inclusive similarities; rather, empathy 
drastically differs from role-taking (or emotional contagion) 
as it is capable of holding aspects of both cognition and 
emotion, resulting in a multidimensional construct (Massi-
Lindsey, Yun, & Hill, 2007; Seitz, Nickel, & Azari, 2006).  
The cognitive aspect of empathy brings about the capability 
to comprehend a distressing situation, distinguish another 
person’s emotions, and assume his or her perspective.  The 

                                                 
 Faylin Musson-Moyer, M.A., Department of Counseling and 

Clincial Psychology, Teachers College, Columbia University. 
 Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to 

Faylin Musson-Moyer, 85 South Main St., Manchester, NY 14504. 
Email: fmussonmoyer@gmail.com. 

affective aspect, on the other hand, requires an individual to 
“experience an indirect emotional response to others’ 
expressed emotions” (Knafo et al., 2008, p. 737). 

Recent evidence has emerged which suggests that during 
the observation of another person’s actions, specific regions 
within one’s own brain are affected (Seitz et al., 2006).  
Given that these specific regions have been shown to be 
involved in the preparation of one’s own actions, one can 
conclude that observing another’s pain involves brain activity 
similar to experiencing his or her own pain (Jackson, Brunet, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Seitz et al., 2006; Staub & 
Vollhardt, 2008; Van Lange, 2008).  It is believed that the 
neurological activity is due to a “large-scale cortical network 
of nodes of convergence” (Seitz et al., 2006, p. 743), linking 
information from various regions of the brain.  Through the 
use of fMRI, Jackson et al. (2005) confirmed this statement, 
demonstrating that the activation of the same pain-related 
neural network is indeed brought about when imagining 
oneself in a painful situation and when imagining another 
person in a painful situation.  Specific regions that are 
involved in this process include the temporal lobe (which 
provides knowledge of past experiences), superior temporal 
sulcus (which provides information about observed behavior), 
and medial prefrontal cortex (which links cognitive 
information to basic emotions).  Also, there is speculation 
related to the prefrontal cortex’s role in linking one’s actions 
with the emotional contexts associated with empathy because 
of the region’s condensed “spatially distinct activation 
clusters” (Seitz et al., 2006, p. 745) which are related to 
thoughts and emotions (Jackson et al., 2005; Seitz et al., 
2006).  Clusters similar to those found in the previously 
mentioned regions of the brain were also present in the 
superior frontal gyrus and on the border of the cingulate 
gyrus.  This finding suggests that one’s ability to generate 



MUSSON-MOYER  
 

14 

mental concepts and physical actions is integrally related to 
the prosocial behaviors that are associated with empathic 
emotion (Jackson et al., 2005; Seitz et al., 2006). 

The interconnected regions within the brain emphasize 
the various effects that empathy can have on the individual.  
Empathy-related emotional responses affect the activity 
within the nervous system as well as the cognitive accuracy 
and emotional intensity particular to one’s overt behavior 
(Jackson et al., 2005; Seitz et al., 2006; Westbury & 
Neumann, 2008).  For instance, empathy and prosociality are 
considered essential components in the expression of 
compassion (Batson et al., 1995; Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 
1994; Knafo et al., 2008), which can be defined as a 
“dimension of morality that emphasizes concern for the well-
being of others in distress, as well as an important aspect of 
interpersonal responsibility and ethical behavior” (Knafo et 
al., 2008, p. 737).  The tendency to help one individual over 
another, which is often generalized across species, has been 
found to lead to an increased helping behavior towards those 
who have a closer genetic relatedness or share more 
similarities with the individual (Allen et al., 2002; Batson, 
1990; Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004; Westbury & Neumann, 
2008).  Though prosocial acts result from empathic emotion, 
the manifestation of such acts as altruistic or egoistic 
behaviors remains in question (Batson, 1990; Batson & Shaw, 
1991; Jackson et al., 2005; Van Lange, 2008).  We present 
here several constructs which are closely related to empathy 
and which may be viewed as behavioral manifestations of 
empathy. 
 
Altruism 

Altruism is viewed as devotion to the welfare of others or 
an act in which an individual wants to help others at a 
significant cost to him or herself (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Van 
Lange, 2008).  The activation of empathy―a point at which 
the individual becomes less self-interested―leads to an 
increase in altruistic motivation, which ultimately leads to 
helping behavior (Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; Van Lange, 
2008).  Van Lange (2008) explained the occurrence of this 
phenomenon in terms of over-exposure.  When another 
person is in distress or in need, the primary attention of an 
individual is diverted from the self and captured by the 
distressed person.  Therefore, through repeated experiences, 
empathy can become associated with not only benefiting 
others but also with specific costs to the self.  With this in 
mind, it is important to note that empathy activates an 
increase in altruistic motivation, but does not significantly 
affect one’s selfishness/selflessness or egalitarian motives 
(Batson et al., 1995; Van Lange, 2008).  Empathy, therefore, 
is an emotional state that results in a unique desire to help 
others at a cost to the self but without necessarily affecting 
personal motives. 

 
Egoism 

Humans are social creatures in thought and in action.  
However, when motivated by internal or external desires, we 
can become capable of caring only for ourselves (Batson, 

1990).  In essence, the egoist theory assumes that humans are 
motivated by an ultimate goal of either maintaining or 
enhancing self-image, and are not interested in the welfare of 
others (Batson, 1990; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008).  Therefore, 
according to the theory, an individual’s ultimate goal is 
always a subtle form of self-benefit (Batson & Shaw, 1991).  
Maner and Gailliot (2007) explained that circumstances 
leading an onlooker to experience empathic concern for 
another also elicit emotional states that remain focused on the 
self.  After all, pain-processing areas within the brain have 
been found to be more widespread when an individual 
imagines himself or herself in a painful situation versus 
another person in the same painful situation.  This denotes a 
shift of focus away from another person’s needs and onto 
one’s own feelings of stress and discomfort, concentrating on 
reducing aversive empathic arousal (Batson, 1990; Jackson et 
al., 2005).  Also, a sense of perceived similarity could 
account for actions that appear to be driven by empathic 
concern.  The theory behind the idea of perceived similarity is 
that a self-focused emotional state arises from a feeling of 
shared-self with the individual in need.  Nevertheless, 
according to the egoist theory, one cannot be viewed as acting 
entirely selflessly (i.e., altruistically) when helping the 
individual because they would, in a psychological sense, also 
be helping themselves―therefore, acting egoistically (Batson, 
Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Maner & Gailliot, 2007).  
Overall, a person’s prosocial acts consist of definitive 
objectives that concern only the self and consequently are 
manifested through egotistic motives. 
 
The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 

The empathy-altruism hypothesis views empathic 
concern as a situation-specific response in which an affective 
focus remains on the person in distress instead of on oneself.  
Therefore, in contrast to the egoist theory, the desire to assist 
an individual through an attempt to diminish their suffering is 
viewed as a truly selfless motive as it increases or strengthens 
one’s drive to alleviate the other person’s need (Batson et al., 
1995; Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004; Maner & Gailliot, 2007).  
However, an individual can also deduce the value of another 
person’s wellbeing and respond accordingly (Batson et al., 
1995). 

Much like any other hypothesis, the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis has been disputed on the grounds of its origins and 
motivational foundation.  First, there remains a possibility 
that prosocial actions may be motivated by more egoistic/self-
centered concerns rather than altruistic intentions (Maner & 
Gailliot, 2007).  As previously mentioned, researchers have 
argued that a sense of shared-self can, in fact, account for 
actions that are outwardly driven by an empathic concern 
through the unconscious perception that another person is part 
of one’s own self (Batson et al., 1995; Maner & Gailliot, 
2007).  According to Batson (1990), the presence of helping 
behaviors when empathy is low indicates the presence of 
underlying egoistic motives. Bierhoff and Rohmann (2004) 
predicted that prosocial behavior would most likely occur 
within conditions where empathic concern overrode all other 



AUDITORY STIMULI AND EMPATHY 
 

15 

variables (free of situational constraints) or where personal 
distress predominated with difficulty to psychologically 
escape the condition.  When situational constraints were 
present and an opportunity to psychologically escape was 
deemed complex, an inclusive helping behavior was 
positively correlated with empathy, and a sense of 
accountability and fluctuating self-esteem were primarily 
dominated by one’s egoistic motivations (Bierhoff & 
Rohmann, 2004; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008).  Bierhoff and 
Rohmann (2004) had also predicted that those who 
experienced a great deal of personal distress but who had the 
opportunity to exit the situation would exert a minor degree 
of help because the ease of dismissing the situation from the 
mind would allow for one’s own distress to be alleviated.  
Nevertheless, if an individual is altruistically motivated, then 
the helping behavior would not decrease, signifying that 
empathy is a good indicator of altruistic motives (Bierhoff & 
Rohmann, 2004).  The primary concept behind the empathy-
altruism hypothesis is based upon situation-specific 
responses.  It is within these conditions that an observer who 
witnesses another person’s troubles may become motivated to 
behave in an altruistic manner with the sole intention of 
reducing the other person’s suffering (Bierhoff & Rohmann, 
2004). 

The significance of the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
tends to coincide with various theoretical explanations of 
helping behavior as well, including shared genetics (Allen et 
al., 2002; Batson, 1990; Thibodeau, Jorgensen, & Jonovich, 
2008; Westbury & Neumann, 2008), relationship status 
(Allen et al., 2002; Maner & Gailliot, 2007; Staub & 
Vollhardt, 2008; Westbury & Neumann, 2008), and 
preferential biases.  However, there is still uncertainty as to 
why people are empathic.  The answer to this may not be 
directly related to earlier renowned notions of human 
behavior, but rather, in one’s ability to interact and 
communicate with others. 
 
Whom We Choose to Help and Why 

Relationships and closeness.  In comparison to distant 
social relationships, relationships that are generally close are 
commonly characterized by elevated levels of empathic 
concern and sincere affection for another’s wellbeing.  These 
characterizations are evident in everyday conversations as 
people choose what type of personal information to discuss 
dependent on who they are talking to.  A conversation 
between two strangers, for example, will consist of fairly 
selfish objectives in order to maximize one’s benefits to their 
costs (Maner & Gailliot, 2007).  However, when an observer 
witnesses a person in distress who is similar to himself or 
herself, increased signs of physiological arousal and distress 
are displayed (Allen et al., 2002; Westbury & Neumann, 
2008). 

There are implications that helping in close personal 
relationships may possibly be stimulated by empathic concern 
and an actual desire to improve the welfare of another person, 
though these motives seem to dissipate as the relationship 
becomes more distant (Maner & Gailliot, 2007; O’Gorman, 

Wilson, & Miller, 2005).  An empirical study conducted by 
Maner and Gailliot (2007) assessed the relation between 
empathy and willingness to help a family member and a 
stranger; their findings revealed that the strength of the 
empathy-helping link was dependent on relationship context.  
Though, these findings can also be used to clarify the 
differences in egoistic and altruistic factors.  By showing that 
meaningful forms of prosocial acts are more likely to be 
directed by empathic concern when taking place within a 
close relationship―despite the lack of evidence regarding 
empathic concern as a predictor to the willingness to aid a 
stranger―it can be concluded that only egoistic factors can 
predict an individual’s inclination to help.  In other words, 
prosocial acts among strangers may look as if they are 
altruistically driven but they are in actuality driven by more 
self-centered concerns, while prosocial acts within a close 
relationship appear to be driven by genuine empathic regard 
(Maner & Gailliot, 2007; Staub & Vollhardt, 2008). 

 
Empathy/prosocial behaviors and genetic closeness.  

Empathic responding is extended from human to human, 
often varying in intensity, and can be generalized towards 
other species as well (Westbury & Neumann, 2008).  
However, individuals who have a lower empathy trait may 
not experience stimuli in the same manner as individuals who 
contain a moderate or high empathy trait (Westbury & 
Neumann, 2008).  This response is reflected in the empathy-
altruism hypothesis, in which behavior serves as a function of 
emotional responsiveness (Batson et al., 1995).  In this sense, 
the more empathy that an individual feels for another will 
largely predict the degree of altruistic motivation present 
within the given prosocial act.  However, it is important to 
note that one’s empathic concern does not denote a ‘help’ vs.  
‘not-help’ state of mind, but rather refers to the extent to 
which motivation is considered altruistic or egoistic (Bierhoff 
& Rohmann, 2004). 

Movement of the corrugator supercilii, a small muscle 
located near the middle of the eyebrow, is often regarded as 
the principal muscle in the expression of suffering and can be 
equated to one’s level of empathic emotion (Westbury & 
Neumann, 2008).  A distinguishing feature of this muscle is 
to lead observers to detect a direct relationship between 
acknowledgement of distress and genetic relatedness, such 
that we can correctly interpret the expressions of others who 
appear more similar to ourselves―solely based on another’s 
movement of their corrugator supercilii muscle (Maner & 
Gailliot, 2007; O’Gorman et al., 2005).   

Evolutionarily speaking, it is likely that species have 
either evolved to react empathically to distress calls or have 
evolved the distress calls that are effective at eliciting an 
empathetic response from others (Allen et al., 2002; Batson, 
1990; Westbury & Neumann, 2008).  Of all the 
communication channels that can be used to elicit an 
empathetic response, it would seem as if visual and auditory 
cues would be the most likely to be effective at a distance 
(Batson et al., 2005).  However, if the latter were more 
accurate, an evolutionary push to develop auditory distress 



MUSSON-MOYER  
 

16 

calls over visual cues would exist.  After all, those who are 
most likely to help and are in proximity of the individual in 
need would be more likely to hear a distress call than to see 
the distress cues.  Yet, most research regarding empathy has 
been based on still pictures or silent video.   

If an individual does experience an empathic response to 
non-verbal vocal communication with no corresponding 
visual stimuli, an indication toward one’s capacity to interpret 
signals that help is needed overrides the genetic variable.  In 
other words, the ability to interpret empathic emotion may be 
primarily due to another’s ability to effectively communicate 
their distress to other individuals.  It is hypothesized that the 
highest amount of empathy will be elicited when an 
individual can see and hear another individual in distress.  
However, when an individual can only hear the distress of 
another they will experience slightly less empathy, and when 
an individual can only see the distress of another they will 
experience the least amount of empathy.   

 
Method 

 
Participants 

Data was collected from 81 undergraduate students (25 
men, 56 women) attending the State University of New York 
(SUNY) at Potsdam.  The current sample was chosen through 
a sign-up sheet that ascribed three time periods, each on 
different days, for participation in the experiment.  
Participation in the experiment was voluntary.  All 
participants were students enrolled in a psychology course 
and were compensated for their participation through the 
award of extra credit in one psychology class.  Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 42 years (M = 21.20 years, SD = 
4.64), and two participants (2.5%) reported having children of 
their own.  It should be noted that a sample consisting of an 
equal number of parents and non-parents might be more 
likely to produce generalizable results because empathic 
reactions may be strongly related to one’s personal 
experiences and the situation-specific components of the 
applied stimuli.  According to the SUNY Potsdam class 
standings, the participants’ year in school varied from 
freshmen status to senior status.  Demographically, the 
sample was composed of 79 Caucasian students (97.5%) and 
two African American students (2.5%). 

 
Measures 

Each participant was given a demographic questionnaire 
that asked about age, gender, year in school, the major of the 
individual, and whether the participant had children of his or 
her own.  Trait empathy was measured by using the Balanced 
Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; Mehrabian, 2000).  The 
BEES consists of a 30-item self-report scale of empathy 
wherein each item is be rated on a 9-point scale, ranging from 
–4 (very strong disagreement) to +4 (very strong agreement).  
Sample items include, “I cannot feel much sorrow for those 
who are responsible for their own misery” and “I am deeply 
moved when I observe strangers who are struggling to 
survive.” The internal consistency of the BEES is .87 with a 

coefficient alpha value of .85 and a test-retest reliability 
coefficient of .79.  Furthermore, the high correlation (+.77) 
that the scale holds with the original Emotional Empathic 
Tendency Scale (EETS; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) 
suggests that the BEES is a valid measure of empathy.  
Further studies by Mehrabian, Young, and Sato (1988), as 
well as various literature reviews (e.g., Chlopan, McCain, 
Carbonell, & Hagen, 1985), have supported its validity and 
have identified various tendencies of high-empathy 
individuals compared to low-empathy individuals (e.g., 
Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002; Mehrabian, 2000; Singer et 
al., 2004). 

The empathy-eliciting stimuli consisted of one 28.6-
second video clip of an infant child in a distressing situation 
(crying in a crib, unattended).  Each group of participants 
viewed the same video clip.  However, one group of 
participants was presented with the original video format 
(audio and visual); a second group of participants was 
presented with a black screen (they only heard the audio of 
the clip); and a third group was presented with a soundless 
version of the video clip.  Likert scales, ranging from -4 (very 
strong disagreement) to +4 (very strong agreement), were 
used to measure the participants’ emotional states―degree of 
distress, participants upset response, and willingness to 
help―following the stimuli presentation. 
 
Procedure 

The participants met in a specified classroom on the 
SUNY Potsdam campus.  All participants completed a 
consent form and were provided with a packet of 
papers―they were instructed to complete the first three pages 
of the packet without going onto or looking at the fourth 
page.  The first page of the packet was a brief questionnaire 
that consisted of demographic information; the second and 
third pages of the packet included the 30 statements of the 
BEES scale.  Each participant’s responses to the BEES 
provided the data used to interpret one’s empathic trait level 
(see Mehrabian, 2000).   

Upon completion of the BEES, each group was presented 
with the stimulus-type that corresponded with their 
designated group.  The stimulus chosen for the present study 
was an infant child in distress.  The characteristics of the 
child (e.g., age and gender, intensity of crying, facial/body 
mannerisms, etc.) and the child’s immediate surroundings 
(e.g., no people, absence of aid/comfort, etc.) provided the 
assumption that he or she was upset and in a state of distress.  
However, a pilot study was not conducted to determine the 
accuracy of this statement. The first group of participants (n = 
29) was presented with the original clip of an infant child in a 
distressing situation (audio/visual), the second group (n = 28) 
was presented with the audio-version of the infant, and the 
third group (n = 24) was presented with the visual footage 
(absence of sound) of the infant.  Thus, the experiment 
utilized a between-group research design wherein participants 
were randomly assigned to different groups and exposed to 
different levels of audiovisual stimuli. Participants were 
exposed to the audiovisual stimuli in a group-setting format.  



AUDITORY STIMULI AND EMPATHY 
 

17 

Figure 1. Mean proportional response of subjective 
distress, upset, and helping response as a function of 
empathic trait level. Error bars show the mean plus or 
minus two standard deviations, indicating diversity in 
response. Empathic Trait Levels are based on the 
“Percentile Scores and Z-Score Equivalents” in the 
Manual for the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale 
(Mehrabian, 2000). 

After each stimulus presentation, the participants were asked 
to turn to the last page of the packet and use the 9-point 
Likert-type scales to rate their present emotional state.  
Participants were debriefed after they completed the Likert-
type scales. 

 
Statistical Analysis 

All statistical analyses were calculated using SPSS 20.0.  
The hypothesis tested whether participants’ emotional states 
are affected by the quantity and quality of sensory 
information received from a stimulus.  More precisely, the 
greatest emotional response was expected to come from the 
audiovisual presentation, followed by the audio presentation, 
and finally, the visual presentation.  Given that the present 
study included male and female participants, additional 
statistical tests were conducted in order to account for 
potential gender-based differences.  A chi-square test 
analyzed the relationship between gender and empathy level 
using a critical alpha value of .05.   

Comparisons among gender, empathy level, and stimuli 
presentation were examined using a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA).  The significant main effects were 
assessed using a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
each dependent variable (level of distress, upset response to 
the stimuli and willingness to help); alpha values were set at 
.016 so as to control for family-wise error (see Benjamin & 
Hochberg, 1995).  The simple main effects of empathy level 
and stimuli presentation were examined as well; alpha values 
were set at .010 and .016, respectively, to control for family-
wise error (Benjamin & Hochberg, 1995).  The analyses of 
simple main effects addressed the potential differences in 
response based on the empathic trait composition of each 
group as well as any differences based on the stimuli 
presentation for each empathy level.  Pairwise comparisons 
were examined, with alpha set at .003, when the simple main 
effects were significant. 

 
Results 

 
A chi-square (χ²) test was used to examine the 

relationship between gender and empathy level.  Empathy 
levels, as measured by the BEES, were examined as 
categorical variables throughout the experiment.  Results 
revealed an association between one’s gender and empathy 
level, χ²(4, N = 81) = 19.40, p = .001.  Specifically, 60% of 
the individuals who scored a “very below average” empathy 
level were male, while only 40% were female.  Furthermore, 
48% of the participants with “below average” empathy scores 
were male and 17.4% of the “above average” empathy scores 
were found in males.  The “average” and “very above 
average” empathy levels were 100% female.  The Cramer’s V 
calculated a moderate effect size of .489. 

A MANOVA was used to assess the effects of gender, 
stimuli presentation, and empathic trait level on participants’ 
behavior (distress, upset, and helping responses).  Using 
Wilks’ criterion (λ) as the omnibus test statistic, the combined 
dependent variables resulted in significant main effects for 

empathy level, F(12, 148) = 2.87, p = .001, partial η2 = .168.  
The main effects of stimuli presentation, F(6, 112) = 1.97, p = 
.076, partial η2 = .095, and gender, F(3, 56) = 0.26, p = .851, 
partial η2 = .014, were not significant.  Furthermore, neither 
the interaction between empathy level and stimuli 
presentation, F(24, 163) = 0.70, p = .848, partial η2 = .090; 
empathy level and gender, F(6, 112) = 1.30, p = .262, partial 
η2 = .065; nor stimuli presentation and gender, F(6, 112) = 
0.55, p = .768, partial η2 = .029 were statistically significant.  
MANOVA results also failed to indicate a significant 
Empathy Level x Stimuli Presentation x Gender interaction 
effect, F(9, 136) = 0.46, p = .898, partial η2 = .024. 

For each of the statistically significantly multivariate 
effects, follow-up ANOVAs were conducted so as to further 
examine the univariate effects.  Though the main effects of 
stimuli presentation were found to be nonsignificant, they are 
nevertheless important to the present study and therefore will 
be described in further detail.  The only ANOVA that was 
relevant to the analysis was that which corresponded to the 
significant main effect of empathy level.  The results 
indicated a significant main effect for empathy level on 
distress, F(4, 58) = 5.28, p = .001, partial η² = .267; upset 
response, F(4, 58) = 5.37, p = .001, partial η² = .270; and 
helping behaviors, F(4, 58) = 8.50, p = .000, partial η² = .370.  
The means and standard deviations of empathy level are 
shown in Table 1; the main effects of empathy level are 
shown in Figure 1.  ANOVA results failed to indicate a  
 
 
 



MUSSON-MOYER  
 

18 

significant main effect of stimuli presentation on participants’ 
distress, F(2, 78) = 2.21, p = .116, partial η² = .054; upset 
response, F(2, 78) = 0.32, p = .725, partial η² = .008; or 
helping reaction, F(2, 78) = 0.07 p = .935, partial η² = .270, 
partial η² = .002.  The differences in participants’ responses, 
based on stimuli presentation, are shown in Figure 2. 

In addition, the simple main effects of empathy level and 
the simple main effects of stimuli presentation were assessed 
for each of the responses.  An analysis of the differences 
among the five empathy levels at each level of stimuli 
presentation (audiovisual, audio, visual)―the simple main 
  
 
 

Figure 2. Mean proportional response of subjective distress, 
upset, and helping response as a function of stimuli 
presentation. Error bars represent +/- 2 SE. 

effects of empathy―resulted in significant empathy effects 
for the audio and visual participants’ distress reaction, F(4,  
66) = 2.86, p = .030 and F(4, 66) = 5.20, p = .001, 
respectively.  There were no empathy effects for the 
audiovisual group’s distress reaction, F(4, 66) = 0.96, p = 
.437.  There were also significant empathy effects for the 
participants in the audio and visual groups with regard to how 
upset they felt following the stimuli presentation, F(4, 66) =  
4.08, p = .005 and F(4, 66) = 3.54, p = .011, and their 
willingness to help the distressed individual, F(4, 66) = 5.60, 
p = .001 and F(4, 66) = 4.52, p = .003, respectively.  
However, empathy effects were insignificant for the 
audiovisual group’s upset response, F(4, 66) = 1.22, p = .354, 
and helping response, F(4, 66) = 1.38, p = .251.   

Statistical measures were taken so as to control for 
family-wise error (ɑ = .016), which altered the significance of 
the audio group’s distress levels.  An analysis of the simple 
main effects of stimuli presentation at each empathy level 
also revealed significant differences within the participants’ 
responses.  For one, participants with “very below average” 
and “below average” empathy levels experienced greater 
distress reactions following the stimuli presentation, F(2, 66) 
= 4.00, p = .023 and F(2, 66) = 3.83, p = .027, respectively.  
However, there were no stimuli presentation effects for the 
“average,” F(2, 66) = 0.44, p = .645, “very above average,” 
F(2, 66) = 0.93, p = .398, or “very above average,” F(2, 66) = 
0.27, p = .762, participants’ distress reaction.  There was also 
a significant presentation effect for “very above average” 
participants’ helping response, F(2, 66) = 3.38, p = .040; 
those rated as “below average,” “average,” “above average,” 
and “very above average” were not affected.  Lastly, 
regardless of one’s empathy level, the stimuli presentation 
had no effect on participants’ upset response.  However, no 
simple main effects of stimuli presentation remained after 
controlling for family-wise error (ɑ = .010). 

 
Table 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVA Results for Effects of Empathy Level on Behavior 

 Empathy Level   

 Very Below 
Average 

Below Average Average Above Average 
Very Above 

Average 
F(4, 76) 

Partial  
η² 

Distress 
-1.600a -0.360a 0.429a 0.826a 1.364a 5.116* .212 
(2.261) (2.215) (1.512) (1.586) (1.859) 

Upset 
-1.333a 0.080a 0.714a 1.391b 1.727b 7.040** .057 
(2.093) (2.216) (1.496) (1.158) (1.737) 

Helping 
-0.467a 1.640b 2.571b 2.826b 3.455b 8.940** .320 
(2.588) (2.099) (1.512) (1.749) (0.820) 

 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p 
< .05 based on Bonferroni’s post hoc paired comparisons. Empathic Trait Levels are based on the “Percentile Scores and z Score 
Equivalents” in the Manual for the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (Mehrabian, 2000). 
*p < .05** p < .001. 
 
 



AUDITORY STIMULI AND EMPATHY 
 

19 

Additional posteriori contrast analyses (i.e., pairwise 
comparisons) were used to further evaluate the differences in 
the response ratings based on the stimuli presentation and 
empathy levels.  While no significant comparisons were 
yielded in the audiovisual group, many significant 
associations did appear regarding participants’ empathy levels 
and their responses to the audio and visual presentations.  The 
results indicated a direct relationship between response and 
empathy level; as expected, the greatest responses were 
typically from participants with “very above average” 
empathy scores and the weakest responses generally came 
from participants with “very below average” empathy scores 
(see Figure 3).   

Empathic Trait Level 

Figure 3. Mean proportional response of subjective distress, 
upset, and helping response as a function of empathic trait 
level and stimuli presentation. Error bars represent +/- 2 SE. 
Empathic Trait Levels are based on the “Percentile Scores 
and z Score Equivalents” in the Manual for the Balanced 
Emotional Empathy Scale (Mehrabian, 2000). 

 
Discussion 

 
The present study examined the role that the presentation 

of stimuli plays in an individual’s empathic response and 
drew upon previous research (e.g., Batson, 2005; Van Lange, 
2008) in an attempt to provide a stimulus presentation that 
would elicit an appropriate empathic emotion.  Batson and 
colleagues (2005), for instance, acknowledged that only two 
conditions are crucial in evoking such concern: first, the 
target should be perceived as needing care and protection, and 
second, the empathizer should value the target’s well-being.  
Based on a situation-specific response, empathic concern is 
affiliated with an emotional focus on an individual who is in 
distress rather than on oneself, endorsing a truly unselfish 

desire to provide help (Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004; Maner & 
Gailliot, 2007).  According to Batson and colleagues (1995), 
the empathic response operates according to a ‘motivation 
function,’ either intensifying or amplifying one’s motivation 
to alleviate another person’s suffering.  However, the desire 
to alleviate suffering is also related to one’s perception of 
another’s well-being, or the degree to which one values 
another person’s welfare.  The perception of well-being is, 
after all, influenced by the information that is available to the 
individual (Batson et al., 1995).  However, Van Lange (2008) 
suggests that an individual’s empathy level also influences 
the likelihood that he or she will assist a distressed individual.  
In other words, regardless of situational components that may 
reduce one’s own stress and anxiety (i.e., exiting the 
situation), highly empathic people tend to report a greater 
need to help others who are in a state of distress.  The current 
study addressed Batson et al.’s (1995) concepts of motivation 
and information availability in the production of empathic 
responses as well as Van Lange’s (2008) notion wherein 
empathic level affects one’s willingness to help.   

As hypothesized, the greatest amount of empathy was 
elicited when an individual could see and hear another 
individual in distress, slightly less empathy was elicited when 
an individual could only hear another individual in distress, 
and the least amount of empathy was elicited when an 
individual could only see another individual in distress.  
Participant empathy was assessed through a composite of 
subjective levels of distress, how upset the participant felt, 
and the participant’s willingness to help following the 
stimulus presentation.  The compiled results suggest that the 
stimuli presentation significantly affected individuals’ level 
of distress, but did not significantly affect how upset they felt 
after the presentation or their willingness to help.  
Participants’ baseline empathy levels were, on the other hand, 
predictive of perceived distress, an upset response, and a 
willingness to help the distressed individual.  Nevertheless, 
the interaction between stimuli presentation and empathy 
level remained insignificant regarding participants’ reactions 
to the stimuli.  However, it should be noted that a significant 
reaction to the stimuli presentation was received from the 
least empathic participants (those with baseline empathy 
levels rated as “very below average”).   

The present study showed that empathic responses are 
most viable when an individual can see and hear the eliciting 
target.  When visual cues are the only source of information, 
an individual is left with an ambiguous and incomplete 
framework to interpret the situation; however, auditory cues 
contain a more definite and clear-cut outlook of the situation.  
However, individuals’ empathic traits will also elicit different 
responses to distressing stimuli, regardless of stimuli 
presentation.  Based on this line of reasoning, one would 
expect individuals with “very above average” and “very 
below average” empathy scores to have the strongest and 
weakest, respectively, reactions to stimuli.  However, the 
greatest difference in response ratings, based on stimuli 
presentation, came from participants with “very below 



MUSSON-MOYER  
 

20 

average” or “below average” empathy scores―an 
unanticipated, yet noteworthy, finding.   

There were a number of limitations to the current study.  
First and foremost, all of the participants were undergraduate 
college students at a public university.  Second, the study was 
primarily composed of psychology students or, more 
specifically, students enrolled in a psychology course.  These 
factors alone constrain the generalizability of results due to 
similarities in age, study, education level, and ethnic/cultural 
diversities.  In addition, nearly all of the participants in the 
current study reported that they did not have any children of 
their own.  The presence of children could have, in theory, 
altered an individual’s response to the audio-visual stimuli by 
enhancing or decreasing their general affect.  Based on these 
limitations, it is possible that the sample composition could 
have provided skewed results.  Therefore, one could 
hypothesize that the empathic traits of the aforementioned 
subjects are not representative of those in the general 
population.   

Lastly, neither the footage of the infant child used as 
empathy-eliciting stimuli nor the 7-point Likert scale used to 
measure the participants’ willingness to help were empirically 
validated instruments.  Pilot studies would have provided 
greater certainty in the stimuli’s ability to bring about 
empathic responses while an empirically-based scale, with 
internal and external validities, would have provided greater 
certainty and confidence in participants’ responses. 

The current study could be extended in a variety of ways.  
Though the current study addressed the functions that could 
influence one’s empathic response (see Allen et al., 2002; 
Batson et al., 2005; Westbury & Neumann, 2008), it did not 
test the differences in responses due to human-animal 
similarities.  The results of the present study could be further 
generalized if participants were also subjected to videos of 
animals with varying degrees of relatedness to humans (e.g., 
apes, bears, and goats).  This addition would help in 
concluding whether the genetic hypothesis plays a role in 
eliciting empathic emotions.  One may also be able to 
interpret a relationship between genetic similarity and 
effective communication styles by continuing to subject the 
participants to the different presentation styles (audiovisual, 
audio, and visual). 

Furthermore, studies have shown that some people will 
assist others in distress based on altruistic motivations while 
other people base their assistance on egoistic desires (Batson, 
1990; Batson et al., 1995; Jackson et al., 2005; Van Lange, 
2008).  In other words, people help others in one of two ways: 
with an unselfish regard for one’s own welfare, or with the 
intent to fulfill a self-beneficial goal.  It would be interesting 
to determine whether individuals with “very below average” 
or “below average” empathy levels are more likely to help a 
distressed individual, based on egoistic means, than their 
counterparts.  In relation, one wonders whether individuals 
with “very above average” or “above average” empathy 
levels would base their assistance on more altruistic motives.  
If this connection were made, evidence could be offered for 
both egoistic and altruistic motives, indicating differential 

processing of information and situations based on one’s 
empathic traits. 

The existing research on empathy lacks information 
detailing the effects of stimuli presentation, leaving future 
research open to incorporate the effects of presentation modes 
and methods, among other variables, on an individual’s 
reaction.  The results of this study have therefore provided a 
preliminary look into the association between empathy level, 
information availability (based on audiovisual presentations), 
and elicited empathic responses.  Scientific exploration into 
the unconscious motivators that significantly influence the 
individual will provide further insight into why and how 
humans react to particular situations. 

 
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