On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology Fortenbaugh, William W Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Fall 1970; 11, 3; ProQuest pg. 233

On the Antecedents of Aristotle's 
Bipartite Psychology 

William W. F ortenbaugh 

THIS ESSAY is concerned with the antecedents of Aristotle's 
bipartite or moral psychology.1 It considers two common 
theses: (1) Aristotle's bipartite psychology is in origin a popular 

psychology already present (though not clearly formulated) in 
Euripides' Medea and Hippolytus; (2) Aristotle's bipartite psychology 
developed our of tripartition by collapsing together the two lower 
elements of tripartition. Roughly, I shall be qualifying the first and 
rejecting the second thesis. In both cases I hope to develop and make 
more precise the origins of Aristotle's bipartite psychology. 

I 
It is generally recognized that Euripides' depiction of Medea in the 

tragedy bearing her name and of Phaedra in the Hippolytus involves 
some sort of distinction between passion and reasoned deliberation, 
and that this distinction is important for understanding the develop­
ment of Greek psychology and ethics.2 In particular the famous mono­
logues of Medea (Med. 1021-80) and Phaedra (Hipp. 373-430) are said 
to present a kind of psychic dichotomy that anticipates in some way 

1 This article is an expanded and corrected version of a paper distributed to the members 
of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy and subsequently discussed by members of 
the Society all 30 December 1969 in San Francisco. I wish to thank all those who participated 
in the discussion and offered criticisms. My thanks go also to Professors Bernard M. W. 
Knox, Charles P. Segal and S. Marc Cohen, who communicated to me privately their 
reactions to an earlier yersion of this paper, and to Drs Herwig Gorgemanns and Gustav 
Seeck who discussed with me ideas presented in this paper. Finally I want to acknowledge 
the helpful criticisms of an anonymous referee. 

2 See, for example, F. Dirlmeier, "Vom Monolog der Dichtung ZUlU 'inneren' Logos 
bei Platon und Aristotcles," GV11l11asiIW! 67 (1960) 31-32; M. Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life 
and Thought (Ne\v York 1966) 67; H. Gorgemanl1s, Beitriige zur Interpretation von P/atons 
N011loi (Zetemata 25, Mlinchen 1960) 159; J. J. Walsh, A ristotle's Conception of NIoral Weakness 
(New York 1963) 16-22, See also my n.31 in "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," 
A rethusa 2 (1969) 18-1. 

233 



234 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

the dichotomy of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology. In this 
section I want to clarify this thesis. First I shall try to make more 
precise the way in which Euripides' Medea may be said to anticipate 
and elucidate Aristotle's moral psychology. Then I shall point out 
that Euripides' characterization of Phaedra differs significantly from 
his characterization of Medea and that this characterization ofPhaedra 
cannot be used without considerable qualification to illustrate 
Aristotle's bipartite psychology. 

It is true, I think, that the Medea as a whole and the famous mono­
logue in particular are especially useful for illustrating and under­
standing Aristotle's moral psychology, because they distinguish 
implicitly spirit or emotion from both deliberation about means and 
also reasoned reflection about emotional response. Medea's mono­
logue implies two distinctions that have been present earlier in the 
play and that are essential for an understanding of Aristotle's bipar­
tite psychology. Bipartition is not a simple dichotomy between 
emotional response and means-end deliberation alone. Rather it is 
a dichotomy between emotional response on the one hand and 
means-end deliberation together with reasoned reflection about 
emotional response on the other.3 Let me develop this point by con­
sidering relevant portions of the Medea. 

At the beginning of the play we learn from the nurse that Medea 
is filled with hate and grief (16, 24-35), because she thinks herself dis­
honored by Jason (20, 26). Medea's emotional state is not in doubt. 
What is in doubt, and what especially troubles the nurse, is Medea's 
plans or deliberations CfjOVAE-UEtV 37). Here we have a partial expression 
of the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea's anger and grief, or more 
generally her emotions, are distinguished from the deliberations 
that follow upon and are given direction by her emotions. Con­
sidering herself outraged and so desiring revenge, Medea must de­
liberate about how to achieve revenge. Some way or means must 

3 A proper understanding of the dichotomy of bipartition is an essential prerequisite for 
an adequate understanding of Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue (~8'K~ ap€n]) 
and practical wisdom (cpp6VYJCtc). As the psychic dichotomy does not oppose emotional 
response to means-end deliberation alone, so the distinction between moral virtue and 
practical wisdom is not a simple distinction between perfection in regard to emotional 
response and perfection in regard to means-end deliberation alone. Practical wisdom has 
as its province both deliberation about means and reflection about emotional response, 
because the dichotomy of bipartition groups together both these performances and dis­
tinguishes them from emotional response. See infra n.11. 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 235 

be discovered (260) before her emotion and desire for revenge can be 
translated effectively into action. 

The same distinction between emotional response and means-end 
deliberation is implied later when Creon confronts Medea and orders 
her to leave Corinth. Creon acknowledges being frightened of Medea, 
and explains his fear by pointing out that Medea is clever (co¢~ 285) 

and pained at the loss of Jason's love (286). In other words, Medea is 
not only angered by Jason's behavior but is capable of following up 
her anger with successful deliberations about means to achieve re­
venge. This same distinction between emotion and cleverness occurs 
again when Creon says that he fears lest Medea be planning something 
(317) and then adds that a sharp-tempered (dg";BvfLoC 319) person is 
easier to guard against than a silent but clever (CO<pbC 320) person. A 
sharp-tempered person responds emotionally straightway and with­
out deliberation. The silent and clever person does not act without 
deliberation. In his case anger is the occasion for deliberation about 
means. 

Emotion is distinct from means-end deliberation, and this distinc­
tion is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. Emotion is also distin­
guished from reasoned reflection about emotional response, and this 
distinction, too, is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. We can gain 
a clearer understanding of this latter distinction if we consider 
Medea's first meeting with Jason. During this meeting Medea criti­
cizes herself for having followed and aided Jason, describing herself as 
eager (7rp6BvfLOC 485) rather than wise (Co<poT€pa 485). Medea does not, 
of course, mean that her actions on behalf of Jason were lacking in 
cleverness. On the contrary she makes clear that without her skills 
Jason would never have escaped danger. (She begins and ends her 
opening statement with the claim to have saved Jason [476, 515].) 
Her point is simply that reason was not controlling emotion when 
she aided Jason. Her actions were motivated by the particular emo­
tion of love.4 With this piece of self-analysis Jason is in full agreement. 
He credits Medea with a subtle mind (529) but restricts her clever 
deliberations to means-end reasoning. Love was dominant and deter­
mined the course of her deliberations (527-31). Medea's cleverness at 
finding the means to effect a desired goal is never in doubt. All 
Greece knows that Medea is clever (co¢~v 539). But if she is skilled in 

4 At the opening of the play the chorus made clear that in regard to Medea's emotional 
side (8vp,6v 8), love (;PWTL 8) was dominant. Cf 330 and 530. 



236 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

means-end deliberations following upon emotional response, she is 
not similarly effective in reflecting upon and altering her emotional 
response in accordance with reasoned consideration (cf 600). In con­
trast Jason's actions-or so Jason claims-are guided by reasoned 
reflection. He is not motivated by desire (556). He has considered 
(f3£{JovA£v/Lat 567) his actions and their consequences and so can claim 
to be wise (corPac 548).5 

A similar distinction between emotion and reasoned reflection 
appears during the second meeting of Medea and Jason (866-93). In 
the course of this meeting, the emotion of Medea is alleged to be 
under the control of reasoned reflection. Medea begins by asking 
Jason to pardon her anger (opyac 870) and by saying that she has 
engaged in discussion (Aoywv 872) with herself. Then she subjects her 
angry emotion to criticism (873-81) and indicates that she will give 
up her anger «(}V/LOU 879). Claiming to have considered (€vvO'l]cac' 882) 
her children and the impending exile without friends, Medea states 
t4at she has exhibited a lack of good sense (a{3ovA{av 882, acppwv 885) 
and that her anger has been foolish (883). She admits that her previous 
conduct was unreasonable but claims now to have considered 
(f3£{JovA£v/LaL 893) the matter and come to a better understanding. 
Jason is fooled by Medea's speech and replies sympathetically. He 
allows that Medea's anger (opyac 909) was after all quite natural and 
that now at last Medea has come to better reasoning ({3ovA~v 913). He 
credits Medea with having reflected reasonably and having altered 
her emotions in accordance with reason. 

Emotion, then, may be distinguished from reasoned reflection as 
well as from means-end deliberation. It is now time to look at Medea's 
monologue which, as I have suggested, implies both distinctions and 
so may be said to illustrate fully the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea 
begins the monologue by reflecting upon the evil consequences of 
her actions, by considering the personal loss involved in killing her 
children (1021-39). This reflection, together with the pathetic sight of 
her children,6 causes her to alter briefly her intentions. She abandons 

5 Jason would say, of course, that in some sense his actions, too, are guided by emotion. 
He would say that he is motivated by feelings of friendly affection, by a desire to aid and 
preserve Medea and her children (595, 620). But he would add that his emotional responses 
and subsequent plans can stand and have stood the test of reasoned reflection. While 
Medea's emotions motivate her to act in unreasonable ways, Jason's emotions do not. At 
least. Jason thinks he can defend and justify his own behavior. 

S It would be wrong to say that Medea's reasoned reflections alone effected a momentary 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 237 

her plans ((3ovAdfLa-rcx) and states that she will take her children away 
with her (1040-48). But her desire for full revenge returns swiftly. She 
chides herself for having listened to soft arguments v-wABcxKOVC AOYOVC) 
and sends the children indoors to await death (1049-55). Then for a 
second time she falters, addressing her spirit (8VflOC) and pointing out 
the joy that the children can bring in exile (1056-58). This time her 
hesitation is of even shorter duration. Once again she determines to 
kill the children. She is quite conscious of the terrible path that she 
has chosen for herself and the even more terrible path that she 
has chosen for the children (1067-68). But now she does not falter. She 
understands (jJ.cxv8avw) that her forthcoming deed is evil (1078), but 
she also realizes that her reasoned reflections are unable to alter her 
angry desire for full revenge. As she puts it, Bvf.LoC is stronger than 
{jOVAEVfLcx-rcx (1079). 

By means of this monologue Euripides has depicted a mother torn 
between an angry desire for total revenge and the realization that 
total revenge is in the long run an evil for herself and her children. 
From a dramatic point of view, the monologue does not set forth 
expliCitly the dichotomy of bipartition. For reasoned reflection and 
means-end deliberation are on different sides of Medea's dilemma. 
Her reflections enable her to see the horror of her planned revenge 
and so argue for abandoning the plans that bring total revenge. But 
if the dichotomy of bipartition is not dramatically set forth in this 
monologue, it is, I think, clearly implicit in the monologue. Medea's 
emotions are distinguished from her {30VAEVfLcx-rcx. And these {3ovAEvfLcx-ra 
include both the deliberate plans (1044, 1048) which follow upon and 
are given direction by emotion and also the reflections (1079) which 
consider the reasonableness of emotion and on occasion alter emotion. 
It would be, of course, overstatement to say that by using {3ovAEVf.La-ra 
in an inclusive sense, Euripides has captured (consciously) the dichot­
omy of bipartition : deliberation and reflection in contrast with emotion­
al response. But it can be said that this double usage of {30VAEVfLcx-rcx 
encourages the dichotomy of bipartition, that the dichotomy is im­
plicit or latent in Medea's monologue, so that the monologue can 
be used with caution to illustrate the dichotomy of bipartition.' 

change in her emotional response and planned revenge. Certainly the sight of her children 
contributed to her momentary change. But so did her reflections, and it is these reasoned 
reflections that are of especial interest. 

7 H. D. Voigtlander, "Spatere Oberarbeirungen im grossen l\1cdeamonolog," Phi/oJogus 



238 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

It is this dichotomy with which Aristotle works and which enables 
him at one time to treat reason as something that follows emotion and 
at another time to treat reason as something that controls emotion. 
When Aristotle says that the alogical soul is obedient to reason (EN 
1098a4, lOOlb31), he is thinking primarily of reasoned reflection and 
101 (1957) 228; A. Lesky, in Euripide, Sept exposes et discussions (Geneve 1960) 83; and E. 
Schlesinger, "Zu Euripides' Medea," Hermes 94 (1966) 29-30, point out correctly that 
POVAfEVlLaTa is not restricted to a single, well defined (technical) usage. Certainly it is wrong to 

think that Euripides is operating with some clearly formulated psychology (like Plato's 
tripartite psychology, SchleSinger 29). But we can say that the opposition between 8uILoe 

and POVAf.vp.am reflects an everyday distinction employed by ordinary men in deSCribing 
human action and subsequently formulated in the dichotomy of bipartition. H. Strohm, 
Euripides (Zetemata 15, Miinchen 1957) 103 n.1, seems to go too far when he says that 
POVAf.VlLaTa cannot be selected as a label to designate the opposite of 8uILoe because in 1079 
POVAf.vp.aTwv refers only to the preceding p.av8avw, while in 1048 {JoVAf.up.am is used for the 
murder plans. Instead of ruling out {3ovAf.vlLaTa, this double usage may be thought to 

qualify POVAfEVlLam as a technical label for one-half of the dichotomy of bipartition. Taking 
PovA"vlLaTa inclusively so as to include both deliberations about means (murder plans) and 
reflections about emotional response (whether this kind of angry response is an over­
response), we can see in the usage of {JoVAf.VlLaTa and its opposition to 8vp.oc a striking antici­
pation of Aristotle's logical soul and its opposition to Td aAo')'ov. 

H. Diller, "BvlLde o~ Kpdccwv TWV tlLwv {3ovA"vlLaTwv," Hermes 94 (1966) 273-75, followed by 
H. Rohdich, Die Euripideische Tragodie (Heidelberg 1968) 64, does not recognize in Euripides 
a wide usage of PovA"vlLaTa signifying deliberation and reflection in general. He interprets 
1079 so that anger rules or guides (KpfElccwv, cf Walsh [supra n.2] 19, who seems to have 
anticipated Diller) Medea's plans ({30VA"V~TWV having the same reference as (3oVAf.VlLaTa in 
1044 and 1048). This thesis seems to me unacceptable. In the first place it seems more 
natural to construe povAwlLaTwv (1079) closely with lLav8avw (1078). By reasoned reflection 
Medea has learned that she is about to do evil (1078). But her reflections are powerless to 
affect her emotion, so that she declares her angry emotion stronger than her reasoned 
reflections (1079). In the second place and more importantly, Diller's argument seems to 

focus too closely on the single word POVAfEUlLaTa and on the monologue itself. We should, I 
think, take note of Medea's second meeting with Jason (866-93). For in the course of this 
meeting the emotion of Medea is said to be controlled by reasoned reflection, and this 
reflection is twice (893, 913) referred to by words cognate with {3oVAf.vp.aTa. Perhaps similari­
ties in vocabulary should not be pressed. Still, it may be observed that this exchange between 
Medea and Jason agrees with the monologue in opposing (}vlLoe or a cognate form (879, 883, 
1056,1079) to {JOVAfEVf.£V or a cognate form (reflections: 882,893,913,1079; plans or delibera­
tions: 874,1044,1048) and in using the word Ao,),ocin reference to reasoned reflection about 
emotional response (872, 1052). More important, however, is an agreement in content. 
Both passages oppose emotional response to reasoned reflection. Both passages indicate 
one important respect in which emotion is commonly opposed to reason. Emotional re­
sponses are subject to rational criticism and in many cases can be altered by reasoned 
reflection. Indeed, Medea's words to Jason are able to deceive just because Jason assumes 
that reasonable consideration will guide emotional response. Of course Jason is deceived 
in this matter. But as a working hypotheSiS his assumption is not foolish. Much of the 
time reflection is able to guide emotional response. But not always. For in Medea's 
monologue it becomes clear that reason can fail, that emotion may be stronger than 
reasoned reflection (1079, cf 447,590). 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 239 

its ability to control and alter emotion. A virtuous man subjects his 
emotional responses to reasoned reflection.8 He contrasts with Medea 
in that he heeds reason, altering or abandoning his emotional re­
sponses according to the dictates of reasoned reflection.9 Still, the 
virtuous man is like Medea in regard to means-end deliberation. In 
this respect his reason may be said to follow his emotion. When 
Aristotle says that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical 
wisdom the means (EN 1144a7-9, 1145a5-6), he is thinking primarily 
of means-end deliberation in relation to emotional response. Means­
end deliberation follows upon and is given direction by emotional 
response.10 Since the latter is the province of moral virtue, and the 
former of practical wisdom, Aristotle can say that moral virtue makes 
correct the goal and practical wisdom the means without implying 
that practical wisdom is altogether restricted to means-end delibera­
tions.ll The distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is 

8 A qualification is necessary. A virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned 
reflection \vhen time permits. The virtuous man confronted with sudden danger does not 
have time to reflect. He must respond out of character and without reasoning (EN 1117a17-
22). To illustrate further emotional response in sudden situations we may take a hint from 
Plutarch (Moralia 475A) and refer to Odysseus' meeting with the dog Argos. When Odysseus 
and Eumaios reach the palace, they come upon the ancient and all but dead Argos. The 
dog recognizes his former master and struggles in vain to move off the dung heap where 
he lies. Odysseus is moved by the pathetic sight of Argos and turns aside to wipe away a 
tear, unnoticed by Eumaios (Od. 17.291-305). As Plutarch comments, Odysseus fell into this 
situation quite suddenly and unexpectedly (475A). His behavior is not the result of reasoning 
(v"hether reflection about how one should respond to the situation or deliberation about 
how to prepare for the situation). Rather it is an expression of emotion quite in keeping with 
Odysseus' character. He sheds a tear but also turns away and so escapes the notice of 
Eumaios. We can contrast this response with Odysseus' behavior a little earlier when 
reviled by the goatherd Melanthios. The words of Melanthios stir the heart of Odysseus 
(17.215-16). But after reflection Odysseus restrains himself (17.235-38). On this occasion 
Odysseus has tilne to reflect and to pennit reason to control his emotional response. 

9 We may add that the virtuous man heeds not only his own reasoned reflections but 
also those of other men. Unlike the sullen man who hides anger within himself, so that no 
one can persuade him to give up his anger (EN 1126a23-24), the virtuous man pays atten­
tion to the reasoned arguments of others. 

10 Cf Rhet. 1383a6-7, where Aristotle says that fear makes men deliberate. In other words, 
emotional response is often the occasion for means-end deliberation. 

11 I agree with D. J. Allen, The Philosophy of Aristotle (London 1952) 181-82, that Aristotle 
never wanted to restrict practical wisdOlTI to means-end deliberations. But I cannot agree 
with Allen insofar as he (following R. Loening, Die Zurechnungs/ehre des Aristoteles [Jena 
1903]) assumes an identity between the alogical soul of bipartition and the sensitive and 
motive faculties of the scientific psychology. Comparisons with the scientific psychology 
will not help and may impede an adequate understanding of why the logical soul of 
bipartition is not restricted to means-end deliberation. To understand Aristotle's dichotomy 



240 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

founded upon the dichotomy of bipartition, and this dichotomy is in 
a way complex. Reason is related to emotion not only as deliberation 
that follows emotion but also as reflection that can control emotion. 

The Medea can also help us to understand Aristotle's assertion in 
the Politics (1260a13) that women possess the deliberative faculty (TO 
{JOVA€VTLKOV), but lacking in authority (aKvpov). Aristotle does not 
mean that women cannot think straight. He is well aware that many 
women are like Medea in being able to deliberate and reflect. Aris­
totle's point is that their reasoning does not control their emotion. 
Just as Medea engaged in reflections concerning her response to 
Jason's betrayal but was not able to control her response, so for 
Aristotle women are able to reflect and in general to deliberate (they 
possess TO {JOVA€VTLKOV) but are unable to guide their emotions by 
reasoned reflection. In the case of women, reasoning is effective or 
authoritative only in the sphere of means-end deliberation. Within 
this area the deliberations of women can be most effective, and indeed 
disastrous. Women can be most clever contrivers of every kind of 
evil (409). But in the area of reasoned reflection about emotional 
response, a woman's reasoning is not authoritative. It cannot effec­
tively guide or alter emotional response. 

We may be tempted to go on and illustrate further Aristotle's 
view of women by reference to Euripides' Hippolytus. For in this 
play Phaedra is presented as a woman who knows that she is behaving 
improperly but is unable to control her behavior. Like Medea, 
Phaedra reflects upon her dilemma in an impressive monologue and 
describes her weakness as a common failing: "We know and appre­
hend the good but do not bring it to fulfillment" (380-81). Phaedra 
recognizes that women are generally despised (406, cf Med. 407-09, 
889-90), and may be thought to illustrate together with Medea 
Aristotle's view of women. Here caution is necessary, for the charac­
terization ofPhaedra differs considerably from the characterization of 
Medea. Phaedra's behavior is not a clear case of uncontrolled emo­
tional response. Unlike Medea, who perceives herself outraged,12 and 
so responds angrily, Phaedra is said to be afflicted by a disease (vococ 

and cognates, 40, 131, 176, 186, 205, 269, 279, 283, 293, 294, 393, 405, 
we should keep in mind that emotional response (which includes cognition as well as 
sensation and drive) is related to reasoning in two different ways. As the Medea illustrates, 
an enraged person may engage in reasoning either to realize a goal or to reflect upon his 
emotional state. 

12 See infra n.18. 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 241 

463, 477). Diseases are not open to reasoned reflection in the way that 
anger and other emotions are. Anger itwites reasoned criticism and 
is frequently abandoned, if shown to be unreasonable. A disease, 
however, is not an emotion and is not given up, if shown to be un­
reasonable. Indeed, diseases are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. 
They are afflictions that must be cured. While an emotion like anger 
is grounded upon evaluation or assessment (e.g. "Jason has treated me 
unjustly," Med. 26), a disease is not. It is caused by bodily disorder. So 
long as Phaedra is viewed as a victim of disease, her behavior is 
significantly different from that of Medea and cannot be used without 
considerable qualification to illustrate Aristotle's view of women and 
bipartite psychology in general. A disease may be the occasion for 
means-end deliberation (how to restore health), but it does not invite 
reasoned reflection in the way that an emotion like anger does. Anger 
or fear or any similar emotion is not only the occasion for means-end 
deliberation; it also admits reflection concerning the reasonableness 
of the emotion itself. 

Reasoning, then, is related to emotion in two distinguishable ways. 
This twofold relationship between reason and emotion is fundamen­
tal to Aristotle's moral psychology. It determines his account of moral 
virtue and practical ,,-isdom and also his view of women. Still, this 
twofold relationship is not an Aristotelian discovery. It was ready at 
hand in popular thought and more or less clearly implied in a tragedy 
like Euripides' Medea. Aristotle along with other members of the 
Academy gave the dichotomy formal recognition, but they did not 
invent it. 

II 
If Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of a popular 

distinction between reason and emotion as explained in the preceding 
section, can it also be said to have developed out of Plato's tripartite 
psychology? More precisely, did Aristotle's own moral psychology 
develop through bringing together the 8VJLO€tOEC and €.'m8VJL'Y}TtKOV of 
tripartition? Here I think we must say not only that Aristotle's bi­
partite psychology is significantly different from such a bipartite ver­
sion of tripartition13 but also that Aristotle himself was aware of the 

13 Elsewhere ("Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 52 
[1970] 40-70) I have argued that Aristotle's moral psychology is Significantly different from 
tripartition, because tripartition did not draw a clear distinction between emotional re­
sponses and bodily drives. Aristotle's moral psychology is a dichotomy benveen reasoning 



242 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

difference and prepared to criticize bipartition whenever it took the 
form of a simplified tripartition. Perhaps I can support this claim, 
and at the same time clear up a persistent misunderstanding, by 
focusing upon the criticism of bipartition advanced in the De Anima. 

Here (432a22-b7) at the beginning of his account of locomotion, 
Aristotle makes some prefatory remarks about psychic divisions and 
criticizes cursorily both those persons who offer a tripartite psychology 
and those who offer a bipartite psychology (432a24-26). It has been 
widely assumed and sometimes stated that this criticism of persons ad­
vancing bipartition is in part at least a self-criticism. Aristotle's re­
marks, we are told, are directed not only against members of the 
Academy who may have developed or advanced a bipartite psychology, 
but also against Aristotle himself, insofar as he employed bipartition 
both in earlier writings like the Protrepticus and De Justitia and in more 
mature treatises like the Ethics and Politics.14 This view seems to me 
unacceptable. I want to suggest that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition 
is not a self-criticism. His remarks are directed against members of the 
Academy who had simply altered tripartition by collapsing the 
spirited and appetitive elements into a single psychic part and thereby 
created a particular kind of bipartite psychology. Aristotle's own 
bipartite or moral psychology differs in important ways from this 
Academic version and so should not be confused with it. 

We may begin by considering two passages that create difficulties 
for anyone who tries to identify the bipartition criticized in the De 
Anima with Aristotle's own moral psychology. One of these passages 
occurs in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (1097b33-1098a5). Here 

and emotional response-those 7TaO'fJ that necessarily involve some assessment and so are 
amenable to reason. In contrast, bodily drives are caused by phYSiolOgical disturbance and 
are in general not remedied by reasoned reflection. 

14 That Aristotle's criticism of bipartition applies in some way to his own bipartite 
psychology either is stated explicitly or seems to be implied in the comments of the fol­
lowing scholars: Simpl. 289.7-19; Philop. 547.1; E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology (Cam­
bridge 1882) 284; R. Heinze, Xenokrates (Leipzig 1892) 142; R. D. Hicks, Aristotle, De Anima 
(Cambridge 1907) 550, cf 300; D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," 
]RS 77 (1957) 118; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, L'Ethique tl Nicomaque (Louvain 1959) 2.93; W. 
Theiler, Aristoteles, Ober die See Ie (Berlin 1959) 149-50; Sir David Ross, Aristotle, De Anima 
(Oxford 1961) 312; A. Jannone and E. Barbotin, Aristote, De L'Ame (Paris 1966) 109; D. W. 
Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford 1968) 150. CfH. v. Arnim, "Das Ethische in Aris­
toteles Topik," SB Wien 205.4 (1927) 7, 66; P. Moraux, Le Dialogue "Sur la Justice" (Louvain 
1957) 43-44; F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Nikomachische EthikS (Berlin 1964) 278; Aristoteies, 
Magna Moralia (Berlin 1958) 164. 

The comments of F. Trendelenburg, Aristoteles, De Anima Libri Tres (Berlin 1877) 441, 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 243 

Aristotle is trying to pin down the function of man. Toward this end 
he introduces first the nutritive life of plants, then the sensitive life 
of animals, and finally the practical life of the rational element. At 
this point he adds a note to the effect that the rational element is 
twofold: one part being obedient to reason and the other part possess­
ing it and being deliberative (1098a4-5).15 This note is important, for 
it clearly relates Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology to his 
scientific psychology. The division between the alogical and logical 
halves of the moral psychology occurs within the scientific faculty of 
intellect. The division does not coincide with the scientific division 
between sensation and intellect. The reason for this is clear enough.16 
Bipartition is a human psychology that is useful for explaining in­
telligent (human) actions.!' It is based upon a distinction between 
emotional response (which is intelligent in that it necessarily involves 
certain kinds of cognitions18) and reasoned deliberation. The alogical 

and of G. Rodier, Aristote, Traite de L' Ante (Paris 1900) 2.529-530, suggest that the De Anima's 
criticism does not apply to Aristotle's bipartite psychology because Aristotle does not 
commit himself to separate soul parts. Trendelenburg and Rodier are correct in ruling out 
Aristotle's own bipartite psychology as an object of criticism, but their reason does not 
get to the heart of the matter. The De Anima passage is concerned not only with whether 
or not there are spatially separate psychic parts (432a20), but also and primarily with how 
many parts or facuIties are to be recognized (432a23). The advocates of bipartition are 
being criticized especially for having failed to distinguish adequately between the several 
psychic parts or faculties (432a24-26). And in this regard the criticisms developed in the 
De Anima do not seem to attack Aristotle's own brand of bipartition. Even if Aristotle's 
bipartite psychology did involve a commitment to separable psychic parts (and it did not, 
EN l102a28-32), this particular bipartite psychology would not seem to be under attack. 
As we shall see, the attack of the De Anima is directed against an Academic version of 
bipartition that differs in fundamental ways from Aristotle's own bipartite or moral 
psychology. 

15 On the genuineness of this note see my article (supra n.2) 181-82 n.22. 
16 See my article (supra n.2) 173-77, in which I have tried to explain why the divisions of 

the moral and scientific psychologies do not coincide neatly. 
17 Cf Moraux (supra n.14) 44,47 and Simplicius In de An. 289.15-16. 
18 On the necessary involvement of cognition in emotional response, see my article 

referred to supra n.l3. Here again it may be useful to refer to Euripides' Medea. At the out­
set of the play the nurse tells us that Medea perceives herself dishonored (26, cf 20) and so 
is filled with hate and grief (16, 24-35). Her emotional condition is not in doubt. It is 
Medea's deliberations that are unknown and of especial concern to the nurse (37). We 
should note that the nurse's remarks do not suggest a dichotomy that locates all cognition 
on the side of deliberation. Part of being angry is perceiving or thinking oneself outraged 
(26). This evaluation, together with the desire for revenge, may be distinguished both from 
the means-end deliberations that follow upon emotional response and also from the 
reasoned reflections that consider the emotional response-that is, the reasoning that asks 



244 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

soul is primarily the capacity for emotional response, while the logical 
soul is primarily the capacity for reasoned deliberation. Both acts are 
intelligent, so that both capacities are cognitive. In contrast, the scien­
tific faculty of sensation is not cognitive and so can be possessed by 
animals that cannot act intelligently. 

It is, of course, possible to extend the alogical soul to include non­
cognitive functions like nutrition and sensation. Aristotle does this in 
respect to nutrition at EN l102a32-b12 (cf EE 1219b31-32). But neither 
nutrition nor sensation are essential components of the alogical sou1.19 

Bipartition is fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of in­
telligent action. Moreover, there can be no serious question about 
including either nutrition or sensation in the logical soul of Aristotle's 
moral psychology. Aristotle cannot seriously suggest that someone 
might try to house the scientific faculty of sensation within the logical 
soul of his own moral psychology. Such an attempt would be foolish. 
In regard to Aristotle's m:vn bipartite psychology the assignment of 
sensation is clear. It is properly located outside (or "below") the 
dichotomy, though the alogical soul can be extended ("downward") 
to include it. And if this is true, difficulties arise for anyone who will 
refer the criticisms of bipartition advanced in the De Anima to Aris­
totle's own moral psychology. For in terms of Aristotle's own bi­
partite psychology, there can be no question concerning the assignation 
of the aicOT)'TLKOV. If the De Anima passage (432a30-31) presents a 
serious puzzle, it must be directed against a different version of 
bipartition that suggests the possibility of locating sensation in the 
logical as well as in the alogical part. As we shall see, the Timaeus 
suggests such a version of bipartition.20 

whether the evaluation is correct and the desired goal appropriate, so that the emotional 
response may be deemed reasonable and justifiable. 

19 See Plutarch (Moralia 442B), who is correct insofar as he distinguishes the scientific 
faculties of nutrition and sensation from the alogical soul of bipartition on the grounds that 
nutrition and sensation are bodily off-shoots without any share in A6yoc. 

20 It might be suggested that Aristotle is not presenting a "serious" puzzle or difficulty 
for bipartition. Aristotle says that the alCOT)TLK6v cannot be classified easily as either alogical 
or logical (432a30-31), because he knows full well that his own scientific faculty of sensation 
is essentially outside the dichotomy of his own moral psychology. This suggestion seems 
to me unacceptable, not only because it reduces the stated difficulty to a mere quibble, 
but also because it fails to consider the entire criticism of bipartition advanced in this 
portion of the De Anima. In particular, it ignores the fact that Aristotle goes on to say that 
bipartition splits up the op£KTtK6v (432b3-6). This is not true of Aristotle's own bipartite 
psychology. When both criticisms of bipartition (432a30-31, 432b3-6) are considered to­
gether, it becomes most unlikely that Aristotle is criticizing his own moral psychology. 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 245 

The second passage that causes difficulties occurs in the Politics 

(1334b6-28). Here Aristotle is concerned to point out that habituation 
is employed in education before ,\oyoc is employed. In the course of 
his argument, Aristotle introduces his own moral psychology and 
locates BV{-t6C, j3oJ'\Yjc£c, and JmBv{-tta on the alogical side of the dich­
otomy (1334b22-23). This creates difficulties, if it is assumed that 
Aristotle's criticism of bipartition in the De Anima is directed in part 
against his own moral psychology. For in the De Anima Aristotle 
locates {JOV,\YJCLC on the logical side (432b5). This location may be neces­
sary, if Aristotle is going to charge bipartition with splitting up OP€~LC. 
But the location needs considerable explanation if it is assumed that 
the bipartition in question is Aristotle's own moral psychology. For 
as the Politics makes clear, Aristotle's own bipartite psychology 
locates {JOV,\YJCLC on the alogical side.21 

These difficulties can be removed if we understand that bipartition 
takes more than one form. The fact that in the De Anima Aristotle 
does not seem to include himself among the proponents of bipartition 
and then brings forth arguments largely ineffective against his own 
moral psychology becomes intelligible when we realize that Aristotle 
is not criticizing his own bipartite psychology. Rather he is criticizing 
a particular kind of bipartition that was developed in the Academy 
out of tripartition by bringing together the spirited and the appetitive 
faculties. A closer look at 432b5-6 will help to make this point clearer. 
Here Aristotle is criticizing bipartition, but instead of employing the 
label T(J '\0Yov .EXOV to refer to the logical half, he uses the label 
'\0YLCTLKOV, which belongs to the vocabulary of tripartition (432a25). Is 
this a confusion? Perhaps, but only a very minor one. For Aristotle is 

21 \Ve cannot construe De Anima 43Zb5 to mean that {30VATJCLC is a logical ~P£~LC only in 
that it responds to the injunctions of Aoyoc (see Alexander 74.6-13). The De Anima passage 
is quite clear in its wording. {30VATJCLC is said "to occur in the AOYLCTLKOV." As at Topics 126a13, 
{3oVATJCLC is located in the AOYLCTLKOV. W. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford 1902) 
3.456, follmving Eaton, suggests that Aristotle's usage of {3oVATJCLC is not uniform, for in the 
Politics {30VATJCLC is connected with the alogical and not with the logical soul as in the De Anima. 
Certainly the word fJoVATJCLC is used in different ways. (See the remarks of H. G. Ingenkamp, 
Untersuchungen Z,1I den pseudoplatonischen Definitionen [Wiesbaden 1967] 64-6S.) For at least 
a partial understanding of the different usages of {30VATJCLC and especially for a fuller under­
standing of why the De Anima and Politics differ in locating {3oVATJCLC, we should, I think, 
consider the pOSSibility of nvo different kinds of bipartition: an Aristotelian version (Pol. 
1334b6-28), and an Academic version that developed out of tripartition by bringing 
together the two lower faculties into a Single aAoyov (cf De All. 432bS-6 with Top. 126a3-16, 
and see below). 



246 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

criticizing a variety of bipartition which identifies the logical half of 
the dichotomy with the ..\O,),LCTLKOV of tripartition. Aristotle has in 
mind that kind of bipartition which is already suggested in the 
Republic22 and dearly indicated in the Timaeus-a dialogue which 
groups together the spirited and appetitive elements as the mortal 
soul and opposes this combination to the ..\0YLCTLK6v as the immortal 
soul. Apparently tripartition and this related form of bipartition 
enjoyed a contemporaneous life within the Academy. At least the 
Topics, which seems frequently to reflect discussion within the 
Academy, introduces for illustrative purposes not only tripartition 
but also that version of bipartition which is a variation on tripartition 
(129alQ-16).23 We may suspect that, just as in the Topics Aristotle 
takes note of two closely related Academic psychologies, so in the 
De Anima he is concerned with members of the Academy, when he 
criticizes those who advance tripartition and those who advance 
bipartition (432a24-26). 

The Timaeus can help us to understand Aristotle's charge that the 
alc{}'1JTLKOV cannot be comfortably located in either the logical or 
alogical soul (432a3Q-31). While the Timaeus introduces tripartition 
and even assigns each of the three psychic parts its own bodily location, 
the Timaeus, as we have already said, presents a bipartite version of 
tripartition. The ..\O,),LCTLK6v is divine and elevated spatially to a seat 
in the head. The other two psychic parts are mortal and are located 
in the trunk of the body. For our purposes the important point is 
that the Timaeus not only employs this bipartite version of tripartition 

22 At 439E5 Glaucon suggests that spirit is not some third psychic element but rather 
identical in nature to the appetitive element. At 571 c3-572B1 Socrates describes two different 
kinds of sleep by opposing the '\OyteTtKOV to the two lower elements. See Dirimeier, 
Nikcmachische Ethik (supra n.14) 278-79. 

23 To illustrate that a relative property may be a difference that holds usually and in 
most cases, the Topics distinguishes the '\OyteTtKOV from the ~1Tt9vp.1jTtKOV and 8VP.tKOV and 
states that the one commands and the other serves usually but not always (129a10-16). 
This passage from the Topics names the three psychic parts of tripartition. In this respect 
it agrees with De Anima 432a25, which also names the AoytCTtKOV, 9VP.tKOV and J1Tt8vft1jTtKOV. 

However, it seems to differ from De Anima 432a25 in an important respect. While De Anima 
432a25 is introducing tripartition in contrast with bipartition, the Topics passage appears to 
be dealing with a bipartite version of tripartition. By grouping together the 8VP.tKOV and 
J1TL9vp.1jTtKOV in opposition to the '\OYLC'TtKOV, the Topics passage creates a particular kind of 
bipartition-namely, that kind that is under consideration at De Anima 432b5-6 and that 
groups together spirit and appetite to form a single alogical faculty. On 129a10-16 and 
bipartition, see Dirlmeier, Magna Moralia (supra n.14) 164; on tripartition in the Topics, see 
v. Arnim, op.cit. (supra n.14). 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 247 

but also attempts to handle sense perception. And this attempt seems 
to result in just the kind of difficulty which Aristotle asserts does 
occur when the sensitive faculty is referred to bipartition. For at one 
time the Timaeus seems to treat the AOytCTLKOV or immortal soul as 
the center of consciousness to which sensory motions are transmitted 
(43-44, 64B), and at another time it seems to associate the mortal soul 
with a'tc87Jctc (61c, 69D). In this regard certain passages are especially 
difficult, if not confusing. In explaining pleasure and pain, the Timaeus 
first connects sensation with the if>poVtj.Lov (64B5, apparently the brain, 
which is the locus of the immortal soul or AOYLCTLKOV)24 and subse­
quently refers pleasurable sensations caused by sudden replenish­
ments to the mortal soul (65A5). The sensation of taste is explained by 
reference to veins that are said to extend to the heart (which is in the 
region of the ()Vj.LOEL8€c) and that apparently do not continue on to the 
brain or seat of the AOYLCTLKOV. 25 By contrast, the effect of bad odors 
is said to extend from the head to the navel (67 A4-5) and so would 
seem to affect the entire soul, both its mortal and immortal portions.26 

Similarly, hearing is described as a process extending not only to the 
brain and head (67B3-4) but also to the liver (67B5).27 And finally, 
discussing the maintenance of mortal creatures, the Timaeus first 
introduces plants, which are said to possess the E1TL8vj.L7JTLKOV and 
a'tc87JCtc (77B3-6),28 and then considers veins, which not only water the 

24 See the note of A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford 1928) 447. 
25 The account of tastes is particularly perplexing. It is not explicitly said that the veins 

terminate at the heart, and so the possibility is left open that the veins continue on to the 
brain. Taylor, op.cit. (supra n.24) 465, assumes some kind of connection between the heart 
and the brain. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London 1937) 270, suggests that the sense 
messages do not have to pass through the heart to reach the brain. Further, pungent tastes 
are associated with particles that rise toward the senses (or sense organs) in the head (65E7) 
and so seem to have little connection with the veins extending to the heart. F. Solmsen, 
"Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," AJP 76 (1955) 156 n.26. 
cautions that the heart is not strictly speaking the seat of the (JVp.oHStC (the heart is in the 
region of and closely associated with the (}Vf.L0HStc [70A7-D6] but is not its seat), and suggests 
that had Plato wished to indicate a connection between tongue and soul, he would have 
made the connection explicit. In whatever way we interpret this passage, we can, I think, 
say that it helps point up the difficulty of handling a scientific or biological faculty of 
sensation within the framework of a bipartite version of tripartition. 

26 For the navel as a boundary of the £m(}vf.L'YJ7'tK6v see 70EI, 77B4. See also Taylor, op.cit. 
(supra n.24) 476: "Since at 70El the navel is mentioned as the boundary of the tenement 
devised for the £m(Jvf.L'YJ7'LK6v, the result is that smells affect the whole 'seat of the soul' from 
one end to the other." 

27 The liver is located in the region of the £m(JVf.L'YJ7'LK6v (71A7-Bl). 
28 At 77 A4-5 Timaios says that plants are endowed with alc(J1}C£LC different from those 

7+G.R.B.S 



248 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

body but also divide in the region of the head and so seem to serve 
the brain and AOY£C7"LKOV in regard to sense perception (77D6-B6).29 
Whether or not we think that each of these passages presents a diffi­
culty for the location of sensation within a bipartite version of tri­
partition, we can, I think, agree that collectively these passages do 
indicate a problem. We can agree30 that in the Timaeus Plato has not 
altered sufficiently his psychic framework to house the scientific (i.e. 
biological) faculty of sensation. And we may suspect that when Aris­
totle criticizes bipartition for its inability to handle sensation, he is 
thinking of bipartition much as it appears in the Timaeus.31 He is 
thinking of certain members of the Academy who collapsed the 
spirited and appetitive faculties into one and so formed a bipartite 
version of tripartition. 

This suspicion seems to be confirmed when we reflect again on 
Aristotle's charge that bipartition splits up opegtc (432b4-6). Ad-

possessed by men. Hence when Timaios subsequently says that plants possess the third 
kind of soul, which concerns pleasant and painful ardJTJCLC in conjunction with ~1TL8vp.la£ 
(77B5-6), he would seem to be connecting the bn8vp.TJ'nKOV with alc8~c£LC different from 
those possessed by man. This porti.on of the Timaeus would seem to have been partly 
responsible for Aristotle's insistence that there is no sixth sense (De An. 424b22-425bll). 
See Solmsen, op.cit. (supra n.25) 153. 

29 See Taylor, op.cit. (supra n.24) 546-47. 
30 With Solmsen, op.cit. (supra n.25) 154-55. 
31 It is not surprising that the De Anima's criticism of bipartition can be referred for 

elucidation to a literal interpretation of the Timaeus. We may compare how in Book I of 
the De Anima (406b26-407bll) Aristotle construes (too) literally the myth of the Timaeus 
and so can fault Timaios' account of the world soul. (See Ross, op.cit. [supra n.ll] 189: "He 
(Ar.) may well be criticized as having taken the myth as if it were sober prose.") Certainly 
the objection to spatially separated parts (432a20) is directed most naturally against a ver­
sion of bipartition (or tripartition) like that advanced in the Timaeus. For taken literally, 
the Timaeus has a different bodily seat for each psychic part. Still, it would be a mistake to 
think that Aristotle's criticism is directed only (or perhaps even primarily) against the 
Timaeus. (We might expect Aristotle to name Timaios as at 406b26.) Most probably Aris­
totle is criticizing a group (ol M 432a26) within the Academy who followed the lead of 
Plato's Timaeus and endeavored to handle biological soul functions within a particular 
bipartite framework. We may compare the a..rropla£ considered by Aristotle toward the 
beginning of his discussion of moral weakness in the Nicomachean Ethics. First Aristotle 
introduces some men ('nv~c EN 1145b22) who deny the possibility of doing wrong know­
ingly. Here Aristotle mentions Socrates and is quite certainly referring to Plato's Protagoras 
(352B). After remarking that this view goes against the phenomena and needs further 
clarification, Aristotle turns to another group ('nv~c EN 1145b31) that tries to explain 
moral weakness by making a psycholOgical distinction between knowledge, which is 
strong, and opinion, which is weak. Here Aristotle seems to have in mind certain members 
of the Academy who may have been influenced by a passage like Timaeus 5IDE. See Dirl­
meier, Nikomachische Ethik (supra n.14) 478. 



WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH 249 

dressed to his own version of bipartition, the charge is very odd. For 
Aristotle frequently refers to OPEgLC as a mark of the alogical soul.32 

He never refers it to the logical soul. Further (and this is the important 
point), {3ovt..'I7CLC cannot be located in Aristotle's logical soul.33 This is 
not just a matter of textual evidence, though the evidence of the 
Politics (1334b22-23) is important. It is also and primarily a matter of 
how Aristotle conceives of the dichotomy of bipartition. For Aristotle 
the dichotomy of bipartition is primarily a dichotomy between 
reasoned deliberation and emotional response. Practical wisdom, 
which is the virtue of the logical soul, is a perfection of deliberation. 
Moral virtue, which is the virtue of the alogical soul, is a perfected 
disposition in regard to emotion (EN IlOsb19-1106a13). All emotion 
is located in the alogical soul. This is not true of tripartition and (we 
may add) the bipartite version of tripartition. For these Academic 
psychologies assign {10Vfl'l7ctC, alcxvJ!7], and possibly other emotions to 
the flOYLCTLKOV. 34 Each psychic part including the flOYLCTLKOV has its own 
peculiar drives and desires.35 In contrast Aristotle's Own moral 
psychology groups together all desires and emotions in the alogical 
soul. The logical soul is no longer the seat of desires and emotions 
like {3oVfl'l7ctC and CXLCXVV'I7' It is the seat of means-end deliberation and 

32 See, for example, EN 1102b30, 1139a17-b5; Pol. 1334b20. 1 say "a mark of the alogical 
soul" because I want to avoid the suggestion that the alogical soul is to be identified with 
the OPEKTtKOV (together with the alcB7)TtKOV and </>aVTaC'nKov). 1 have argued already (supra 
with n.16) that the alogical soul is the capacity for emotional response and so includes not 
only motive force (OPEfLC) but also cognition. This is clearly implied at EN 1098a3-5. Still, 
for the purposes of refuting the suggestion that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is a self­
criticism, it does not matter whether the alogical soul is restricted to non-cognitive func­
tions like OPEfLC or includes certain cognitive functions. In either case all OPEfLC belongs on 
the alogical side, so that Aristotle's charge of splitting up the faculty of locomotion cannot 
be leveled against his own brand of bipartition. 

33 Cf. Gauthier and Jolif, op.cit. (supra n.14) 2.193. 
34 For {30VA7)CtC and alcxvVTJ in the AoytCTtKoV see Topics 126a8, 13. Von Arnim, op.cit. (supra 

n.14) 74-76, suggests that </>tAla and JLlcoc should be aSSigned to the AoytCTtKOV and that </>tAla 
is a kind of fJoVA7)CtC. Whether or not we follow v. Arnim in his interpretation of 126a12-13 
(I do not think he adequately explains 113bz), we must agree that </>tAla is closely related 
to {30VA7)ctC and that in his account of emotions Aristotle defines </>tAELV as a particular kind 
of {3ovAEcBaL (Rhet. 1380b36-37). 

3S The Republic states that each of the three psychic parts has its own bnBvJLlat (580D). 
The AoytCTtKOV is said not to care about wealth and reputation but to be directed wholly 
toward knowledge (581A5-7). See, for example, Raphael Demos, The Philosophy of Plato 
(New York 1939) 317-18, who points out that each of Plato's three psychic parts "is really 
a complete soul, in the sense that it includes all the characteristic psychical functions" 
(318). Each enjoys not only a cognitive aspect but also a desiderative and emotional aspect. 
This is not true for Aristotle's bipartite psychology. 



250 ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY 

reasoned reflection concerning emotional response. Of course, reason­
ing can direct or alter desires and emotions, but it is distinct. In terms 
of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology, there can be no question of 
splitting up opegLc and locating {3OVA1JCLC in the logical part. That 
question arises only when bipartition is conceived of as a simple 
variant of tripartition. 

My conclusion, then, is that there are different kinds of bipartition 
and that a failure to note the difference has misled some com­
mentators into supposing that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is in 
part a self-criticism. Aristotle is not criticizing his own moral psycho­
logy but rather an Academic version of bipartition that arose from 
tripartition by collapsing together the OVfLOELDEC and E7TLOVfL1JTLK6v. 
Aristotle did not identify his own moral psychology with this variant 
on tripartition and would have objected to the (unqualified) suggestion 
that his own bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition. 

RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY 

July, 1970