"Synesis" [Greek] and the Expression of Conscience Rodgers, V A Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Fall 1969; 10, 3; ProQuest pg. 241

~(jVEO't<; and the Expression 
of Conscience 

v. A. Rodgers 

l!.'1 I ~ I I' , 1\\ I 
lV. ENELAUS. TL XP7JfLa 7TWJ'XELS; TLS a a7TOIV\VaW voaos; 

O f I " I ~ ~ '" I RESTES. 7J aVVEaLS, OTL avvowa DEW ELpyaafLEVOS. 

M ~./..~ -1. ' \./.." \ , -I.' ENELAUS. 7TWS 'f'TJS; ao'f'ov TOL TO aa'f'ES, OV TO fL7J aa'f'ES". 

O \ , I \ I' f '" -I.f)' , RESTES. /\V7T7j fLa/\LaTa y 7J OLa'f' ELpovaa fLE-
M '" \ \ ff}' '\\'U " ENELAUS. DELV7J yap 7J EOS, alV\ OfLWS LaaLfLos. 

A T EURIPIDES' Orestes 395ff, Orestes is portrayed as subject to 
fits of madness since his murdered mother was buried five 
days previously. He and Electra are to have their fate decided 

by the people of Argos, and Electra anxiously awaits the arrival of 
their uncle Menelaus, who is their only hope of safety. When he 
appears he recoils in horror at the sight of Orestes and describes him 
as TLva VEpTlpwv, so wasted is he by the madness. It is thus quite 
natural for him to ask Orestes, in the first line of the passage quoted 
above, what the voaoS" is which is destroying him, but the answer he 
gets puzzles him. Orestes refers to something called aVVEaLS, or, in 
other words, OTL aVVOLoa OELV' ElpyaafLlvoS". Menelaus fails to get his 
meaning, and we ourselves may well ask what Orestes, or Euripides, 
did mean. 

The line has attracted a good deal of attention, and is frequently 
cited as an example of the existence in Classical Greek of a term or 
formula which may be rendered by the word <conscience'. Zucker, 
for instance, comes to the conclusion from a study of this and other 
passages that, HWir finden in der Zeit der Sophistik die Vorstellung 
vom bosen Gewissen und seiner Beunruhigung und vom guten 
Gewissen und der von ihm ausgehenden Befriedigung in der Form 
des haufigen Ausdrucks: sich bewusst sein baser Taten-sich keiner 
bosen Taten bewusst sein, mit Bezugnahme auf Einzelfalle und auf 
den inneren Gesamtzustand. Mit anderen Worten: wir finden 
in dieser Vorstufenform die Vorstellung vom riickschauenden 

241 



242 EYNEEIE AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

Gewissen."l Similarly Gernet remarks on a particular passage of Anti­
phon, "II n'y a d'ailleurs pas encore dans ce passage de terme abstrait 
pour designer la <conscience': Euripide parait Ie premier a employer 
ainsi Ie mot aVV€aL~ (Or. 396) a une occasion qui fait justement 
penser a notre texte."2 The same line is also one of the passages cited 
in LS] as examples of the use of the word aVV€aL~ in the sense of 
< • , consaence. 

That aVV€aL~ and related nouns and verbal formulae can properly 
be rendered by the word <conscience' may be correct, but it is a recog­
nised problem in translation that it is very difficult to find exactly 
equivalent expressions in any two languages, not least when the two 
concerned are an ancient and a modern one, and when the terms 
involved are as complex as that of <conscience'. In English we talk, for 
instance, of a <guilty conscience', of <conscience-money', of 'freedom of 
conscience' and so on, when it is evident that different aspects of the 
word <conscience' are meant. When considering this word as a possible 
rendering for aVV€aL~ and related expressions, we must therefore ask 
first what meanings the word carries for us, and then which, if any, of 
these meanings correspond to the usage of the Greek expressions. 

A discussion of all the implications of the word 'conscience' would 
be beyond the scope of this article, but one basic distinction which 
can be recognised in our use of this word is that between what Zucker 
calls the <backward-looking conscience' and the 'conscience' which 
prompts a course of action, and which might therefore be called 
<forward-looking'. Thus we talk of having a clear or guilty conscience 
with reference to our past actions, and of following the dictates of our 
conscience when faced with alternative courses of action. But as well 
as this basic distinction, a further valid distinction can, I think, be 
made in the case of each of the two kinds of conscience so far described. 
When we talk of having a clear or guilty conscience with reference 
to past actions, we can mean simply that we are aware or are not 
aware of having, whether by commission or omission, rendered our­
selves liable to penalties if we are apprehended. These penalties can 
be the legal penalties incurred by transgressing the laws of the state, 
or the censure, wrath or vengeance of those whom we have offended. 
'Conscience' in this sense could thus be defined as an 'awareness of 
culpability', much as it is used in Shakespeare's "conscience does 

1 F. Zucker, Syneidesis-Conscientia (Jenaer akademische Reden 6, 1928). 
2 Antiphon, ed. Gemet (Bude, Paris 1954) p.135 n.l. 



V. A. RODGERS 243 

make cowards of us all." This awareness is usually associated, as here, 
with feelings of fear, and can be accompanied by a feeling of remorse 
which is prompted by fear of sanctions and allied with a sense of one's 
own stupidity in having done the deed. But we can also use phrases 
like 'having a guilty conscience' and 'being conscience-stricken' to 
denote a feeling of 'moral guilt'. By this I mean the awareness that 
one has knowingly violated standards of behaviour to which one 
subscribes, an awareness which is usually associated with feeling 
ashamed of oneself. This connotation of such phrases as 'being 
conscience-stricken' is clearly quite different from 'awareness of 
culpability', a distinction we often draw when talking of past actions. 
Indeed the recognition of an act as 'morally wrong', that is, as con­
travening one's own code of behaviour as distinct from incurring some 
external penalty, is a necessary prerequisite of a sense of moral guilt. 

There are thus at least two senses in which the word 'conscience' 
can be used with reference to past actions, and a similar complexity 
is, I think, inherent in this word when used with reference to a future 
course of action. When a person hesitates to do something he can say, 
for example, "It would be on my conscience," and he can mean by 
this that what he did would be an offence rendering him liable to 
penalties and therefore to the concomitant fear of being found out and 
punished. This use of the word 'conscience', which I may call 'scrupu­
lous fear', would thus correspond to the 'awareness of culpability' 
with respect to past actions. But very frequently, of course, the word 
'conscience', particularly when found absolutely, is used to denote a 
personal conviction of the rightness or wrongness of a course of action. 
Thus when talking of 'freedom of conscience' or of a 'conscience 
clause' in legislation, we mean the right of an individual to act in 
accordance with his personal conviction of what is right and what 
wrong. This meaning clearly differs fundamentally from 'scrupulous 
fear', since it has reference to a personal code of behaviour as distinct 
from a recognition that certain things are deemed right or wrong by 
others so that one will be rewarded or punished accordingly. This 
meaning, defined by the OED as 'a moral sense of right and wrong', 
thus corresponds to the use of the word 'conscience' to denote 'moral 
guilt'. Indeed the two uses are very closely related, since it is when one 
has acted against one's convictions that one feels moral guilt. 

We can thus distinguish in our use of the word 'conscience' at least 
these four elements, namely 'awareness of culpability', 'moral guilt', 



244 ~YNE~I~ AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

<scrupulous fear' and <a moral sense of right and wrong'. With these 
in mind let us now turn to the Greek word O'VV€O'LS' and related expres­
sions. In the lines quoted from Orestes the abstract noun is explained 
or glossed by the expression O'vvoLOa o€tv' €LpyaO'/LlvoS', and this phrase 
is itself almost certainly, as Zucker suggests, a shortened version of 
the commoner C1Vv€LolvaL TL €aVTCfJ. The latter expression seems to 
have been used first by Sappho,3 but the fragmentary nature of the 
example precludes any attempt to discover how it was used. In 
Herodotus both O'VVOLoa and C1VYYLVWO'KW ( -O/LaL) are found. aVvoLoa 

is used to denote knowledge shared with others,4 TtXS' o~ /Lav7"7}tas TtXS 

, ',1.\' "', "" , 'JIe' YLVO/L€VaS' TOVTOVS' 'fJVl\aO'O'€LV J C1VV€LOEVaL DE KaL TOVS v wVS J or, as a 
development of this meaning, to denote common knowledge of some 
fact about some other person, which can be to his credit or discredit: 
, "" ~ "\ \ , 'c \ , , '\' A""'" ~ €K D€ TWV al\l\wv O'v/L/LaXwv €s €I\€Y€TO KaT OI\LYOVS', TO LOL € tOEa TE V7r7JPX€ 

oLaMywv Kat €l TlOLO't TL XP'Y]O'T6V O'vvll0€€ 7T€7ToL'Y]/Llvov (Hdt. 8.113.3). 
avyyLVWO'KW (-O/LaL) on the other hand appears to indicate a sharing 
of opinion with someone, an admission or acceptance of the fact that 
he is right. When, for example, the Sicyonians and the people of 
Aegina have taken part in an attack on Argive territory, Argos as the 
victim immediately seeks redress and demands a fine from both 
peoples, with the result that, ELKVWVLOL /Llv VVV O'VYYVOVT€S' aOLKfjO'aL 

• \' ., '\ " 'r' ., A' ~ """ W/Lol\0'Y'Y]O'av EKaTOV Tal\aVTa €KTELO'aVT€S' as 'Y]/LLOL E tVaL, LyLV'Y}TaL D€ OVTE 

O'VVEYLVWO'KOVTO ~O'av TE a·U(}aO/.O'TEpOL (Hdt. 6.92.2). Clearly the Sicy­
onians are <pleading guilty'. They are admitting, or acknowledging, 
the correctness of the Argive charge, and are paying the proposed 
fine in order to appease Argos and escape worse penalties. The people 
of Aegina, on the other hand, are 'pleading not guilty'. They are 
denying the truth of the charge, presumably in the hope of getting off 
scot-free. CTVyyLVWO'KW (-O/LaL) thus denotes a sharing of the other 
person's point of view, a meaning which lies also behind the cognate 
noun avyyvw/L'Y]. For this word means not so much 'forgiveness', in 
the sense of taking pity on someone who has perhaps no excuse to 

offer for his action, but rather a recognition of that person's reasons 
for his action. One shares his view of the action and so admits that he 
does not deserve the anger or reprisals with which one is threatening 

3 ;.yw S' ;p.' [ai:TaL I 'TOVTO av]volSa, Sappho fr.Z6.llf Lobel-Page. 
4 Hdt. 6.57.4, cf Solon 1Z.15f (1. M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian [Berkeley 1919]), Aesch. 

Cho. Z15ff, Soph. El. 9zff, etc. This basic meaning continues to be the one most frequently 
found, and is often used to denote' complicity', as for example in Eur. Hec. 870f, avvLu(h p.£v 

, • {1 \ , , I ... I~"" ~, ~ \ , yap, TJV n OVI\EVUW KaKOV 'Tlf' 'TOVO a1TOK'TELVaV'TL, avvopaCT[J' oE fLTJ. 



V. A. RODGERS 245 

him. Thus when Croesus keeps Atys away from hunting and fighting, 
Atys is highly annoyed because of the poor figure he is cutting (Hdt. 
1.37.2-3). When Croesus explains the reason, namely that a dream had 
warned him that his son would die as the result of a wound, Atys 
acknowledges the validity of the reason, saying, avyyvwl1:Yj p.ev CfJ 7reXm;p 

'TOl, lSovn yE 5!jJ£v 'To£av7'7}v, 7rEpt €p.e 4>vAaK~v EXE£V (Hdt. 1.39.1). 
When aVYY£lIwaKw and aVYYlllwaKop.a£ are used by Herodotus each 

once with the reflexive, they appear to differ from the non-reflexive 
uses in denoting specifically an admission or conclusion about oneself 
which is reached after talking the thing over with oneself, as it were. 
The Sicyonians, for instance, admitted to a charge with which they 
were taxed by someone else, whereas Periander 7rapTJf3~KEE Kat aVVEY£-

I C' ..... , I 'S" ~ , \, ".... \~I 

IIWaKE'TO EWV'TCP OVKEn ELva£ Ovva'TOS 'Ta 7rpTJyp.a'Ta E7rOpaV TE Kat otE7TELII 

(Hdt. 3.53.1). He 'admits to himself', 'realises' or 'is aware of' his own 
inability to cope, without being necessarily taxed with it by someone 
else. In the same way the Spartans, having driven Hippias out of 
Athens, are recorded as saying, av8pES avp.p.axoL, aVYYLVwaKop.Ev 

aV'TOLaL ~P.LV ov 7ToL~aaaL opOws (Hdt. 5.91.2). This is not so much an 
acknowledgement of the truth of an accusation as an independent 
realisation of their error.5 

aVlloLoa is not found with the reflexive in Herodotus, but when it is 
used elsewhere in Greek literature,6 it appears, like avYYLVwaKw ( -op.al) 

to differ from the non-reflexive uses in indicating that the action of 
the verb, the 'knowing', is shared not with others but with oneself. 
It thus comes to mean something like 'to be aware of' or 'conscious of' 
something about oneself. Thus in a fragment of Gorgias (82 B lla.5 
D.-K.) we find, in suitably rhetorical language, on p.ell 0011 ou aacpws 

(Elows> <> Ka'T~Yopos Ka'TTJyopEL p.ov, aacpws oraa' aVIIOLoa yap €p.aV'TijJ 

5 One may note a parallel example in Lys. 9.11, avvJyvwaav Si Ka~ ao'To~ ar/>£atv ws 
-?otK7JK6'T~s. This passage together with the two Herodotean passages are the only three 
examples of the use of avyytyvwaKw (-ofLat) with the reflexive cited by LS] before Dion. 
Hal. In Soph. Ant. 926, also cited under the reflexive uses by LS], the verb is unusually used 
with a nominative participle directly dependent on it. This may be equivalent to a reflexive 
use (cf. Eur. Or. 396 and n.lO below), but the sense of the expression seems from the context 
to be that of the non-reflexive verb 'to admit', rather than that of the reflexive verb 'to 
be aware of'. 

6 The use of this expression does not become in any way frequent before the end of the 
fifth century B.C. It does not seem to appear at all in some major authors such as Herodotus, 
Aeschylus, Thucydides, and possibly Sophocles (Stob. 3.24 attributes to him one fragment 
containing the expression [v.l. aO-r<l)], = fr.845 Nauck).1t then appears with some frequency 
in the speeches attributed to Antiphon, particularly V and VI, in Plato's dialogues and in 
Xenophon. Aristotle, Demosthenes and Isocrates seem to use it a couple of times each. 



246 ~YNE~I~ AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

uacpws ov8€v Towihov 71'f£71'0£TJKWS; and at Aristophanes, Eq. 184, 
gvvf£L81vaL Tt pm 80Kf£tS uavTcp KaAOV. This latter example also serves 
to show that the expression is essentially neutral, since it can be used 
in connection with good and praiseworthy facts as well as bad. 

The mere occurrence of either UVYYWWUKW ( -op.a,) or uvvot8a with 
the reflexive would thus hardly justify the use of the word <con­
science' in any of the meanings discussed above, since these expressions 
would seem to indicate mere awareness or consciousness of some 
fact about oneself. But though this may be true of these expressions 
in isolation, are they perhaps used in contexts where the sense of the 
whole passage may justify 'conscience' in any ofits senses? When these 
expressions are found in connection with some good quality in one­
self, as for instance in the line of Aristophanes quoted above, the 
concept as a whole clear I y bears no relation to ' conscience'. If anything, 
the predominant note is one of pride, much as we talk of 'conscious 
pride' with reference to our virtues or achievements. It is only when 
these expressions are used in connection with some unpleasant fact 
that the context as a whole can, but need not necessarily, suggest the 
notion of 'conscience'. Thus when Periander CTUVf£ytVWO'KETO €WVTCP 

OVK/Tt f£lva, 8vvaT6s Td: 71'p~yp.aTa i71'0pav, there is nothing to suggest 
that we are dealing in this passage with <awareness of culpability', 
least of all with <moral guilt'. But in the second example from 
Herodotus where the Spartans confess their mistake, they not only 
admit something to their discredit, but by their attempts to rectify 
the situation, i71'€tTf£ 8€ iKf£tVa 71'0'~UaV'Tf£S ~P.&pTOP.€V, vVV 71'f£LPTJUOP.f£O& 

ucpEa ap.a vp.tV aKf£op.f£vOL (Hdt. 5.91.3), reveal both a fear of the 
consequences of their own willed action and a sense of their own 
stupidity that could perhaps amount to that 'remorseful regret' 
which can accompany 'awareness of culpability'. 

It is thus only the connection of the expressions uvyytYVWUK£LV 

( -f£uOa{) Tt EavTcp and CTUVf£L8/vaL T' EavTcp with some discreditable 
fact and with those feelings which were seen to be associated with the 
various meanings of' conscience' which could justify any reference to 
'conscience', and it is only these feelings which can determine which 
of the meanings of 'conscience' could be useful in any particular 
passage. Thus at Aristophanes, Vesp. mfr, 

..... "" ..... -"'i:' 71'WS ovv f£p.aVTCfJ TOVT f£yW svvELuop.at, 
,i,.' ",\' "<;' I I .,.,f£VY0V'T a71'0 vuas avopa; Tt 71'0Tf£ 71'f£Luop.aL; 



V. A. RODGERS 247 

').).''1' )., () 'l:.' , 
(XI\I\ W 7TOI\VT£fLT)TO£ lOOt ~ vyyVWTlO fLO£' 
II \" , )/~ "..... I 
aKWll yap aVT Eopaaa KOV 'TOVrWV 'Tp07TOV, 

the verbal expression appears rather unusually in the future tense; 
but it is clear from the context that we are not dealing with the 
<future-looking conscience', but with concern for a past action in 
which the future tense expresses an inability even to admit the deed 
to oneself because of the terrible consequences it will incur (TL 7TO'TE 

7TELaofLat;). It is also interesting that the act is described as being 'out 
of character', which might suggest that we are dealing with 'moral 
guilt'; but such a phrase can refer to the fact that a person is normally 
law-abiding and does not do what will get him into trouble. Indeed 
that this statement occurs in a deprecatory prayer to the gods would 
indicate that Philocleon is offering as grounds for acquittal (~VYYllW'TE) 
the fact that he is 'of previously good behaviour'. It is thus unlikely 
that 'moral guilt' is here implied, particularly as he also claims that 
his act was not deliberate. The basic reaction to the deed is one of fear­
ful foreboding of the consequences, which would seem to indicate, if 
anything, the 'awareness of culpability' which was defined earlier. 

It is the association of particular reactions to one's actions with the 
expression aVllEtDEllat 'Tt eav'Tip which alone justifies any reference to 
the word 'conscience', and of the types of reaction noted when we 
distinguished the meanings of 'conscience', it would seem that, as in 
the Aristophanes passage, fearful foreboding alone is conveyed by 
this expression. Thus it is because Alcibiades fears the censure of 
S h h ' '<:" ~ , " '<:' ocrates t at e says, EyW OE TOVTOll I-'OIlOIl aWXVll0l-'at. aVllOWa 
\, ""'" " "~ , ( ,~..... .... c:\ l' 

yap El-'aVTtp allTtl\EyEtll fLEll ov OVll(XI-'Elltp W~ OV OEt 7TotEtll <X OVTO~ 

KEAEVEt, E7TEtOcXll OE a7TEA()w, ~TT'YJI-'Elltp 'Tfjs 'Ttl-'fis V7T() TWll 7TOAAWll ••• KaL 
.. "<:' " ,.). , ,).). , ,. <:' , ""<:' 
OTall £ow, <x£aXVll0l-'at T<X WI-'0I\OY'YJI-'Ella. Ka, 7TOl\I\aK'S I-'Ell 'YJ0EWS all £00'1-" 

athOll 1-'7] OVTa EV all()pOJ7TOLS (PI. Symp. 216Aff). Again we are hardly 
dealing here with an expression of moral guilt since, though he has 
accepted or agreed that he ought to do what Socrates suggests, his 
reaction to doing the opposite is to fear the consequences of not 
doing it, namely Socrates' censure. He is ashamed, certainly, but the 
shame he feels is not <of himself' but 'before Socrates'. It is a shame 
which is evoked by the external stimulus of seeing Socrates, so that 
his reaction is to wish him dead. 7 

7 A situation similar to that in which Alcibiades finds himself is described in Xen. An. 
1.3.10 (cf Mem. 2.9.6), waTE KaL /LETa7TE/L7TO/Livov alhov OUK £BiAW fABEtV, TO /LEV /LeyLaTov 



248 };YNE};[}; AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

This combination of the expression CTVV€LSEVaL TL eavTcp with anxious 
foreboding, amounting to what could be termed 'awareness of 
culpability', is, as one might expect, most commonly found in the 
context of the law courts and of the relations between men and gods. 
Plato provides us with a good example of the latter when Cephalus 
describes the reaction of men to the approach of death (Rep. 330E4ff) 
• ,/.' "" l' \ '" , \' \ , \ 'r "'''' \ V7T0'f'Lae; 0 ovv KaL OELJLaToe; JL€UTOe; YLYV€TaL KaL aVCt/\oYL!:o€TaL 7J07J KaL 

'"' tI I , ~ I t \ .,.. C" t ..... , ...... (3' \ \ \ 
UK07T€L €L nva Tt 7JotK7JU€V. 0 JL€V OVlI €VPLUKWV €aVTOV €V T<p L<p 7TOlV\a 

, ~, '\ ~ .....~, rI t -~ 0 " I ~ , 
aOLK7JJLaTa KaL €K TWV V7TVWV, WU7T€P Ot 7TaW€e;, aJLa €Y€LpOJL€VOe; U€LJLaWH 

\ r ~ \ ~ '\ '''' ~ '" \ '" \ • ~ "'''' '" , • '" ~ KaL !:oT/ JL€Ta KaK7JC; €1\7TWOe;. T<p U€ JL7JU€V €aVT<p aULKOV UVV€WOTL 7Jona 

EA7T~e; a€~ 7TCXP€UTL Ka~ ayaO~ Y7JPOTP0cP0C;. A distinction is drawn here 
between the man who has skeletons in his cupboard and the one 
who has none, and it is interesting that the counterpart to our expres­
sion is a verb of 'finding out' or 'discovering' (€VptUKWV). What is 
described is an examination of one's past life to find out if any of one's 
actions have violated the (divine) law (aSLK~JLaTa) and therefore 
render one liable to penalties. There is no question here of that shame 
of oneself which results from a violation of one's personal code of 
behaviour, but rather of the uneasiness of mind or peace of mind which 
results from the presence Of absence of an awareness of culpability. 

In the sphere of the law courts one particular passage in Antiphon 
(5.93) merits discussion in detail: €v S' 'tUT€ on 013K av 7TOT' ~AOOV Ete; T~V 

'\ '" c''''' ~ ~ ~ '" \ , ~ '" ' '?' 7TOI\LV, € t n s VlIrJ07J €JLaVT<p TOLOVTOV' VVV O€ 7TtUT€VWV T<P otKat<p, OV 

\ I '''' " "t. ' '" \ 'r () '" \ • ~ '" I 7T1\€OVOe; OVO€V €UTL asLOV avopt CTVvaywVt!:o€U at, JL7JO€V aVT<p UVV€£Oon 
'" , , ~)' \ () \ , (3 , , \ ..... , ,,~ 

avouLOV HpyaUJL€V<p JL7Jo €te; TOVe; €OVe; 7JU€ 7JKOTt· €V yap T<P TOtOVT<p 7J07J 

\ \ ~, \. ,I. \ c ' '0 '\ --\ ~ '" \ Kat TO UWJLa a7T€LpT)Koe; T) 'f'V)(17 CTVV€s€aWa€v, € €I\Ovaa TUI\aL7TWp€LV ULa 

\ \ C "', • ~ ~ "'\ t. "', ~ ,\ ~ \', 
TO JLT) S VV€W€VaL €aVTT/' T<P O€ S VV€LOOn TOVTO aVTO 7TPWTOV 7TOI\€JLLOY 

, " , \ ..... I " t 'II, '\ \' t I 
€aTLV' €TL yap Kat TOV aWJLaToe; LaXVOVToe; 7J 'f'V)(17 7TpOa7TOI\€t7T€t,7JYOVJL€VT) 

Ti]v n,."wptav 0;' ijKELV TCttJTT)V nov aaE{3T),."aTWV· iyw S' i,."aVTcp TOLOVTOY 

0138EV tvv€L8we; 7]KW €le; vJLae;. It is of this passage that Gernet says, as 
mentioned above, "Ces conceptions et considerations psychologiques 
ne sont pas de date tres ancienne; il n'y a d'ailleurs pas encore dans 
ce passage de terme abstrait pour designer la 'conscience': Euripide 
parait Ie premier a employer ainsi Ie mot avv€ate; (Or. 396) a une 
occasion qui fait justement penser a notre texte."8 The French word 

alCTxvv61-'€VOS on CTvvOL1)a €~V'To/ 7raV'Ta £tpwCTl-'lvos av.r6v, ;7r£LTa Kat 1)£1)u':"s I-'~ >..a{1wv 1-'£ 1)tKTJV 
€m8fj . .. 

8 Though these two passages do not, perhaps, have much more in common than the use 



V. A. RODGERS 249 

conscience covers, of course, an even wider range of meanings than 
English <conscience', since it denotes both consciousness and con­
science, so that what particular aspect or aspects of la conscience 
Gernet considers present in this passage is not clear. Certainly it 
would be unwise, I think, to talk of <conscience' in English without 
specifying the particular aspect involved. In the passage the defendant 
says that he would not have returned to the city <me sentant coupable' 
as Gernet himself translates. An unwillingness to face someone or go 
somewhere indicates fear of the consequences of one's actions, 
and this same reaction has already been noticed in other passages 
where the general context might suggest <awareness of culpability'. 
There is certainly in this passage, as Gernet points out, evidence of 
that deeper psychological observation which is very much in evidence 
at the time, but it is the observation of the effect on a defendant of 
the presence or absence of awareness of culpability. What causes the 
guilty man's mental unease is not any feeling of <moral guilt', but his 
fear of rY]JI 7"£fLwptaJl ••• T<VJI am:/3YJfLchwJI. As Demosthenes points out 
in a similar observation (19.208), raAYJOE<; lOXvpOJl, Kat roiwaJlrtoJl aOOEJlE<; 
ro oVJlEt8€Jlat 7TE7TpaKoow allTOt<; ra 7TpaYfLara. rotiT'o 7Tapa£pEtrat rY]JI 

()paovTYjra r~JI rovrwJI, rOl17" a7TOOrpEtpEt r.ryJl YAwrraJl ••• OtW7TaJl 7TOtEt. 

Consciousness of culpability creates a lack of confidence to face a jury, 
and it is this aspect of the word <conscience', rather than that of 
<moral guilt', which lies behind these passages.9 

It would seem from the passages discussed that the phrase OVJIELaiJlaL 

7"L Javr0 means no more than 'awareness' or 'consciousness' of 
some fact about oneself, but that the association with it of a feeling 
of fearful foreboding might justify reference to the expressions 
'guilty conscience' or 'clear conscience' in the sense of the presence or 
absence of an awareness of culpability. What, then, of the line in 
Euripides' Orestes? It would seem that OVJlEOL<; is here used as a noun 
equivalent of oVJIE£8€Jlat 7"£,10 a phrase which, as we have seen, means 

of the phrase uvv€t~EVat n €alYrip, it is certainly true that instances of this expression do 
seem to increase at roughly this time. Thus this passage of Antiphon dates probably from 
around 415 B.C., the Or. from 408(?) and the Thesm. from 410(1). 

DC" < ~. ~ . ~fJ ' ,<' '\., \' ~ ~(M :J' 0 UVVtUTOPWV alYrq.o Tt Kav II paO'lYraTOS TJ UVVfUtS alYrOV ofU\OTaTOV HliaL TrOLH en. 
fab.inc. fr.632 Edmonds) and TO /L7] avvE,SEvat yap av-rov Tip fJlq.o , &.3lKTj/La /LTj~~V ~~OV7]V 
TrOAA7]V EXft (Antiph. fab.inc. 269 Edmonds), also Isoc. 1.16,3.59. 

10 It is noticeable that EUripides does not use the dative of the reflexive pronoun with 
uvvnl)EvaL. In all but two passages the verb means 'knowledge shared with others', but both 
here and in Med. 495 (UVIIOtUfJ&. '1' fls E/L' OUK fVOPKOS wv) the nominative participle seems 



250 l:YNEl:Il: AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

no more than to be conscious of something. To the noun also this 
meaning, and this only, can be attributed. It is certainly an unusual 
use of the noun, but that it denotes 'consciousness', rather than 
'conscience' in any of its senses, is, I think, clear from the meaning of 
the phrase which it summarises.l1 

But does the context perhaps justify some reference to 'conscience'? 
Compare this passage with Aristophanes, Thesm. 476f, where the same 
or a very similar expression occurs: 

, \ \ ,\ .... fI 'N'\ \ , I 
EyW yap aVT7J 1TPWTOV, ,va P:1] al\/\1]v /\EyW, 
(; , ~" ~ \ \ \ ~ , , 
~ VVOUJ EJLavT"{J 1TOl\/\a OEtV ••• 

Zucker is of the opinion that the actual use of this expression differs 
in the two passages, in that here it means only 'ich weiss von mir'. This 
difference of usage can, I think, hardly be proved, and he himself 
gives no evidence beyond saying that the phrase can refer to 'moral­
ische Tatbestande'. Differences there certainly are in the two passages, 
but they lie not in the expression itself, which in both cases means 'ich 
weiss von mir', but in the reaction to what has been done. It is very 
obvious that Mnesilochus has no qualms whatsoever about what 'she' 
has done. Orestes, on the other hand, is in obvious distress, and 
describes his condition as AV1T'1]. But can one even so talk justifiably, 
in Orestes' case, of a guilty conscience in any sense? The adjective he 
uses to describe his deed is OELVOS-, a word which appears to bear no 
moral connotations at all, being used of things which are extraordi­
nary or monstrous. What he is conscious of is the full horror of the 
deed, a feeling which need have nothing to do with awareness of 
culpability or with moral guilt. That awareness of culpability may 
form part of his distress cannot be denied, but it seems to me that 
what is being described here, with again that subtler observation of 

to indicate that the knowledge is shared with oneself, so that the expression is eqUivalent to 
the commoner uvv€£Ot"va£ n iavrip. 

11 The normal meaning of aVV€O'£, (from O'VviTJ/Lt, O'VvtEvat pace Plato [erato 412A], who 
appears to derive it from O'JJV€tlL', O'VvtEvat) is, of course, 'understanding' or 'intelli­
gence'. Euripides' use of it as eqUivalent in meaning to O'UJ1€tSlvat Tt iavrip (does he perhaps 
derive it from that word?) is, I think, without precedent, and only two other examples are 
cited by LS]. In the fragment of Menander (quoted above n.9) it is used as an equivalent 
of O'VVtO"TOpWV alrrip Tt, which is clearly related to O'Vv€£Ot"vat Tt iavrip. The Polybius passage 
(ouSds yap OVTWS OiYrfi p.ap-rvs iO"T~ cpo{J€POS oiYr€ Kan/y0pos O£tVO, WS 7/ uW€O'tS 7/ iyKaTOtKovO'a 
TatS iKaO"TWV .pvXat, 18.43.13) is considered to be in all probability a gloss and lacks a context 
which would give it a precise meaning, but the description of O'JJV€O't, as p.apTvs cpo{J€POS 
might suggest 'awareness of culpability'. 



V. A. RODGERS 251 

psychological matters, is an irrational, amoral sense of horror which 
can end in madness. One play cannot be used to explain another, 
but it is interesting to note that in the Electra Orestes relives the scene 
of the murder, which was an experience clearly sufficient to prey on 
his mind and destroy it. 

There is thus no evidence to support the rendering of the word 
UVV€ULS by the word' conscience' in any of its senses. It is used with the 
meaning 'consciousness' and is therefore synonymous with UVV€tS7]ULS, 

the meaning of which is likewise' consciousness' as is shown by its use 
in Democritus: €VLOL OV7JTfjS cpVU€WS S,aAvuw OUK €l06T€s avOpcmTOL, 

UVV€,S~UEL S~ TfjS €V Tip {3tcp KaKo1Tpayft0UvV7JS, TOV TfjS {3LOTfjS XPOVOV €V 

Tapaxa'is Kat cpo{3ots TaAaL1TWpEOVUL.12 The passage is akin to the one 
in the Republic discussed above, and describes the same awareness of 
culpability and the consequent fear of sanctions. So too the use of the 
word uvvvo,a in Eur. Andr. 804ff would seem to denote some kind of 
meditation on or awareness of one's past actions: 

<;: I \',. fE ' \ , OEU1TOLva yap KaT OLKOV, pftLOV7JV /u:yw, 
, " 0 ~ I 0' " 1TaTpos T €P7]ftW ELua crovvOLCf afta, 

l' <:' f<:' " 'A <:' I A OLaV OEOpaK€V EPYOV Vop0ftaX7]V KTaVELV 

Kat. 1TaLSa {3ovAEvuaaa, KaTOavELV OEAEL, 
, I "'~<;:<;: I 1TOULV TpEft0vua, ft'YJ aVTL TWV oEopaft€Vwv 

, ~ <:" " <;: I , \ ~ 
EK TWVO aTLftws owftaTwv a1ToaTa/\y/, 
" 0' I \." .... 'YJ KaT aVYJ KT€LVOVUa TOVS OV XP'YJ KTaVE LV. 

Hermione's reaction to what she attempted to do is to fear her 
husband's wrath and wish herself dead rather than meet him. The 
context is thus very similar to others discussed above in which 
awareness of culpability is associated with the fear of sanctions and the 
consequent desire to avoid them. To render the word by either 
'conscience'I3 or 'remorse' (LS] s.v.) could thus be misleading, since 

12 Democr. 68 B 297 D.-K. It is I1vv£lf)'TJcrH; which is the strict noun equivalent of the 
expression aVV£tOEVat Tt iavTc'iJ, and which, rather than aVv£l1tS, after the classical period 
becomes the word normally used to denote 'awareness of culpability'. The phrases op8';' 
avv£lo'T}l1tS and aya8';' I1vv£l8'T}l1tS are attributed at Stob. 3.24.11-12 to Bias and Periander 
respectively, and in the NT (J'vv€l8'T}"t' is used frequently to denote 'clear' or 'guilty con­
science'. In some passages in St Paul's Epistles it also seems to be used to mean something 
like 'scrupulous fear', with particular reference to the wrath of God (cf €v8vp.tov discussed 
below). The participial substantive T6 avvnMs is similarly found after the classical period 
with the meaning 'awareness of culpability' as in Paus. 7.10.10, tJ'TT6 avvn86Tos €7TappT}l1t(f~€TO 
aya8ov; and Stobaeus' own chapter (3.24) is entitled II£p~ TOV avvno(hos. 

13 W. H. S. Jones, "Conscience," in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, IV (Edinburgh 
1911) 38. 



252 2YNE212 AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

there is nothing to suggest we are dealing with moral guilt, and any 
justification for a reference to remorse or to awareness of culpability 
is to be found in the context rather than in the use of the word 
itself. 

One other word to which has been attributed the rendering 
< conscience'14 and which therefore merits mention is Ev8vp.wv. The 
word is interesting because it is the only one of those discussed which 
is used with reference to both past and future actions. Thus of Xerxes 
it is said (Hdt. 8.54) that he may have had sacrifice offered at Athens 
b ' 0 I I ., I • I , • I h Th d'd ecause EV VP.LOP Ot E')'EVE'TO Ep.7rp7Juav'TL 'TO 'pOV, W ereas ucy 1 es 
records (at 7.50.4) that after the eclipse of the moon at Syracuse the 
Athenians requested the generals not to proceed EVOVP.LOV 7rOWVP.EVOt. 
Is this, then, a word which could justify the rendering 'conscience' 
with reference to both past and future actions? As Hatch points out 
in his detailed discussion, it denotes primarily a feeling of anxiety, a 
weight on the heart or mind caused by fear (e.g. Od. 13.421). It then 
becomes incorporated into religious terminology when it refers 
specifically to fear of divine wrath. The word is thus used in contexts 
of fearful foreboding, which at best suggests 'awareness of culpability' 
in Xerxes' case and 'scrupulous fear' in the Athenians' case. But even 
so it must be borne in mind that the Greek word refers specifically 
to fear of divine wrath. 

It would thus appear that none of the words and expressions dis­
cussed can justifiably be rendered by 'conscience' in any of its senses. 
They denote an awareness or consciousness or anxious reflection about 
one's actions. Only certain contexts in which they occur can be said 
to justify a reference to 'conscience'; and even then, it will be noted, 
only those meanings of 'conscience' which are connected with the 
consequence of one's actions, namely 'awareness of culpability' and 
'scrupulous fear', are involved. None of the contexts justifies any 
reference to 'moral guilt' or 'a moral sense of right and wrong', 
that is to say, those meanings that have to do with a personally 
accepted code of behaviour.Is 

14 W. H. P. Hatch, "The Use of llli-n]p,oS' (and Related Words)," HSCP 19 (1908) 172; also 
LS] s.v. 

16 Zucker is of the opinion that the various elements which he considers make up the 
concept 'conscience' were already present at the time of the Sophists and might have 
become unified but for Socrates. One of these elements is the concept of 'shame before 
oneself', a feeling which, it will be remembered, was seen to be a possible concomitant of 
'moral guilt'. He refers particularly to a fragment of Democritus quoted by Stobaeus, 



V. A. RODGERS 253 

Although from our point of view we may be tempted to say that 
these words and phrases mean only 'consciousness', their use in Greek 
in fact represents an interesting shift of emphasis in the manner in 
which judgement was passed on past actions. In Homer (Il. 9.115f) 
Agamemnon replies to Nestor's criticisms of the way in which he 
took Briseis, 

1" ".1. ~~ • \" " l:. W yEpOV, OV TL .,.,EVOO~ EJLCXS aTa~ KaTEI\E£"a~' 
" ,~"', I aaGaJLTJv, ovo aVTO~ avawoJLa£ ••• 

He concedes the truth of Nestor's accusations, but describes his action 
as aTT} and himself as under the influence of aTT} (aaGaJLTJv), Indeed 
when apologising to Achilles he even claims, 

, ,~, , ", , 
EyW 0 OVK a£T£O~ E£JL£, 

.,' \ Z \ \ 11K A \''/'' A 'E ' al\l\a EV~ Ka£ J.r.10£pa Ka£ TJEpO.,.,O£TL~ p£vv~, 

'" •• ~ ,/.. \ H Q'" "16 o £ TE JLO£ EW ayoPTl .,.,PEG£V EJLfJal\OV ayp£ov aTTJV. 

He regards his action as the result of aTT}, something external to him­
self, so that he himself is blameless. In exactly the same way, as 
Boehme suggests,17 the Homeric hero tends to attribute to his ()vJL6~ 
any thought which he no longer accepts as worthy of him. Thus 
Hector, having entertained the idea of appealing to Achilles' pity 
instead of fighting him, says (Il. 22.122), 

It may also be noted that in much the same way a mistake is often 
regarded as being the result of a person having acted JLEyaA~Top£ ()VJLlfJ 

Eiga~ (Il. 9.109f) or cpPEGt AEvyaMTlG£ 7TL()~Ga~ (9.119) where the ()vJL6~ or 
CPP'VE~ would seem to be regarded as something apart from the 'self', 
which is felt to be blameless. When, therefore, the Spartans say 'we 

p:r/Mv TL /La.Mov TOUS av8pcfmovs all3E'iu8at €WV'TOV /LTJI3l Tt /La.Mov JSEpya'EU8at KaK6v, El 
I-dMEL /LTJI3E~S El137}UEtV 1) ot 1Tav-rEOS It.V8PW1TOL· ill' €WVT6V I-UfALaTa all3,(iu8aL Ka~ Toihov v6/LOV 
Tfl .pvxfl Ka8EUTaVat, cOaTE /LTJI3€v 7TOLE'iV aVE7TLn}I3Etov (68 B 264 D.-K.). This passage certainly 
describes a form of 'shame before oneself' or 'self-judgement', but that it also implies the 
existence of that personal acceptance of a code of behaviour which was seen to be the pre­
requisite of both 'moral guilt' and 'a moral sense of right and wrong' is, I think, doubtful. 
What Democritus seems to urge is that one should not do, even privately or secretly, what 
others would censure if they knew of it (cf B 244, B 84). The standard of behaviour is still 
'what others think', what is 'proper' or 'fitting' (avE7TLn}I3ELOv), rather than one's own 
'moral consciousness'. 

16 II. 19.86ff. See on this passage E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 1966) 2f, 5. 

17 J. Boehme, Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos (Leipzig-Berlin 1929). 



254 EYNEEIE AND THE EXPRESSION OF CONSCIENCE 

admit to ourselves' that we made a mistake, the recognition of error 
is no longer externalised (daO'&I-'7Jv), but is an internal awareness 
( I '~f~) O'V')I'YWWO'KOI-'EV av-rOLO'L 7JI-'W • 

It is, I think, this internal awareness expressed in the word O'VVEO'L~, 
rather than the strange use of the word itself, which puzzles Menelaus 
in the Orestes. Orestes' affliction has been attributed earlier in the play 
both by others and by himself to the OEaS EVI-'EVtoa~ (Or. 37-38), the 
a[l-'aTW71'OV~ Ka~ opaKoVTwoEL~ K6pa~.18 But in reply to Menelaus' 
question as to what is wrong with him, Orestes refers not primarily 
to these externalised agents of madness, but to O'VVEO'L~, an inner 
consciousness. This concept Menelaus fails to grasp since, as his 
question to Orestes implies (Tt~ 0" d71'6,uvO'LV v60'o~;), he understands 
Orestes' plight in terms of something external destroying him. That 
is why he is much happier when Orestes talks of AV-m] •.. ~ oLacpOEtpoVO'& 

I-'E, since this can be understood as a form of v60'o~ which, because it is 
caused from without, can be cured: OEL~ yap ~ OE6~, d,u' ol-'W~ 
l&O'LI-'O~ .19 

We are now back to the passage from which we started. I hope it 
has emerged that the mere occurrence of the word uVVEO'L~, or the 
related expressions UVYYLyvWO'KELV ( -EO'Oat) n iaVTcfJ and O'VvnolvaL n 

EavTcfJ, does not justify any reference to <conscience' in any of its 
senses. On the other hand, these words and expressions are not to 

be dismissed as mere failed candidates for such a rendering. In 
their own right they indicate a growing awareness of the inner 
self, and an increasingly subtle psychological analysis.20 

TRINITY COLLEGE. DUBLIN 

August. 1969 

18 Or. 256; cf Aesch. Choeph. 1054, arl>£ p:rrrpo, eyKOTO~ KW£,. 
19 Cf Phaedra's nurse in Eur. Hipp., who, as Dodds suggests (op.cit. [supra n.16] 56), 

cannot grasp that the p.lal7p.a affecting Phaedra's mind (line 317.) is purely internal, but 
understands it in terms of a magical incantation by enemies (line 318.). 

20 I wish to thank Professor G. L. Huxley of The Queen's University of Belfast for helpful 
criticism of earlier drafts of this article.