Epigoni' and the Law of Inheritance in Aeschylus' "Septem" Cameron, H D Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Fall 1968; 9, 3; ProQuest pg. 247

'Epigoni' and the Law of Inheritance in 
Aeschylus' Septem 

H. D. Cameron 

A ESCHYLUS' Seven Against Thebes is concerned with the division 
of an inheritance between two sons. The difficulty of reaching 
an equitable solution to the contested patrimony leads to the 

Argive attack against Thebes and the fratricidal duel between Eteocles 
and Polyneices. Behind the action and motivation of the whole play 
lies the question of the division of the estate. Presumably if the second 
part of the trilogy had survived,! this point would be even clearer 
than it is in the surviving play; but as it is we must piece together 
several important elements of the division from hints given in the 
Seven. 

Oedipus has cursed Eteocles and Polyneices with an enigmatic 
curse. He foredoomed them to the necessity of submitting the division 
of their inheritance to a foreign arbiter sprung from fire and sea 
(727ff, 941ff).2 When the full meaning of this riddling language is 
understood by the chorus after the brothers are dead, it turns out 
that the arbiter in question is the sword-foreign because iron is 
imported from the land of the Chalybians, sprung from the fire of 
the forge, and from over the sea, not as had been supposed, out of the 
sea. The play is full of references to the arbiter (8aT7}T~S') and arbitra­
tion, to the equality of shares and to just division of property.3 When 
the brothers die at each other's hand, the chorus says with heavy 
irony (908) that they have at last got equal shares, each enough of their 
patrimonial land to be his grave. Oedipus' curse is fulfilled, and the 
whole unhappy history of this family has been brought to a close in 

1 It is clear that the Septem was the final play of the trilogy from the didaskalia of the 
Medicean MS first published by Johannes Franz in Die Didaskalie zu Aeschylos Septem Contra 
Thebas (Berlin 1848). Prior to this it was thought to be the second play. 

2 T. G. Tucker in the introduction to his edition (Cambridge 1908) xxix, reconstructs the 
curse as 7TtKpoS £(JTat XPTJllaTOaalTTJS ~€VOS 7T6vTLOS 7TVptY€IITJS. 

3355,648,711, 727ff, 789, 816f, 850, 907ff, 914, 944f, 947. G. R. Manton, BICS 8 (1961) 77f, 
suggests that in the Oedipus Jocasta dreamed of an arbiter clad in Scythian costume. 

247 



248 <EPIGONI' AND LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AESCHYLUS' SEPTEM 

the third generation (758). Apollo is no longer angry (960). The race 
of Laius and Oedipus has come to an end (813). The brothers die 
childless (aT€KJlOVS 828) and with their deaths the chain of misfortune 
begun with Apollo's anger for Laius' disobedience has at last been 
terminated. 

This would seem to be a good way to end a trilogy, and it is what we 
should expect from analogy with the Oresteia, where all the themes 
and tensions developed in the first two plays are resolved in the third, 
with no loose ends or ragged edges. Unfortunately the text of the 
Seven as we have it does not resolve the elements of the trilogy in this 
way but instead introduces a totally new theme at the end. The sisters, 
Ismene and Antigone, whom we have not seen or heard of heretofore, 
are introduced into the choral dirges, and they join in mourning for 
the loss of their brothers. A herald comes in and forbids the burial of 
Polyneices. Antigone vows to bury her brother despite the order, and 
the play closes with foreboding of yet more trouble to come. If 
Polyneices is to remain unburied, he will not in fact receive an equal 
share of his patrimonial land, that is to say a grave, and the neat 
resolution outlined above falls apart. 

The introduction of this new theme at the end of a trilogy which 
seemed already to have been brought to a proper close has long been 
suspect, and in fact the offending passages can be removed simply 
without doing violence to the rest of the play. Antigone and Ismene 
are introduced in lines 861-74, but after that passage they remain 
silent for a long time until line 933, which the codices assign to Ismene. 
But the line assignments to the sisters (at 933, 947, 951, 961ff) are 
haphazard and inconsistent in the manuscripts, so that editors usually 
ignore them and assign the lines as they choose. Furthermore, there 
is no line after 874 which, by reason of its content, must be spoken 
by the sisters, and all of them can well be assigned to a hemichorus. 
The presence of the two sisters in the text is suspect, and if the ana­
pests 861-74, in which the chorus announces the arrival of the sisters, 
are removed, Antigone and Ismene are easily and neatly eliminated 
from the play. The other troublesome passage, which consists of the 
herald's injunction against burying Polyneices and Antigone's deter­
mination to defy it (1005-1078), can be eliminated just as easily. If that 
is done, the play ends at 1004 with the choral dirge, rather like the 
way the Persae ends. 

Once it has been shown that the sisters and the reference to the 



H. D. CAMERON 249 

burial of Polyneices can be eliminated from the play without violence 
to the rest, it follows that it was just as easy for someone to insert 
these passages. Perhaps in a later period when repertory of revivals 
had replaced the creative originality of the fifth-century Attic theater, 
some entrepreneur adapted Aeschylus' play to be suitable for a 
double bill with the Antigone of Sophocles. 

To show motive and opportunity is persuasive but not conclusive, 
and there have been numerous attempts to demonstrate that the 
two passages (861-74; 1005-1078) are spurious because of anachronisms, 
demonstrable dependence upon Sophocles, or non-Aeschylean 
characteristics of language and style. These discussions are compli­
cated, labored, sometimes illuminating for other problems, but not 
really decisive-at least to the skeptic-for the problem of the ending. 
It seems to be possible to marshal as many such arguments on one side 
as on the other. 

After Theodor Bergk (1884) and Wilamowitz (1903,1914) had argued 
that the ending was spurious, the first really powerful attempt to 

defend the passages was made in 1959 by Professor Hugh Lloyd-Jones. 
He was answered in turn by Eduard Fraenkel (1964) primarily on 
linguistic grounds, and in 1967 by R. D. Dawe, who addressed himself 
to the literary arguments. Recent writers agree that the essential 
question is whether a new theme is likely to have been introduced at 
the end of a trilogy.4 Those who defend the doubtful passages argue 
that Apollo's punishment of Laius does not come to an end with the 
death of the brothers, but that we are meant to have a sense of 
foreboding at the end of the Seven with hints of more trouble to come 
and of the eventual destruction of the city. If such is the case, then the 
introduction of the new problem of Polyneices' burial makes sense. 
To support this argument it is only necessary to show that there is 

, The above brief summary of the problem admittedly leaves many points untouched, 
and is meant only to give some perspective to my interpretation of the apparent reference 
to the Epigoni in line 903. The whole question of the end of the play is fully discussed by 
Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "The End of the Seven Against Thebes," CQ N.S. 9 (1959) 80ff. For refutation 
of Lloyd-Jones see Eduard Fraenkel, "Zum Schluss der Sieben Gegen Theben," MusHelv 21 
(1964) 58ff, and R. D. Dawe, "The End of Seven Against Thebes," CQ N.S. 17 (1967) 16ff. The 
bibliography provided by Lloyd-Jones is very nearly complete, but there should now be 
added, besides the two articles just cited, W. Potscher, "Zum Schluss der Sieben Gegen 
Theben," Branos 66 (1958) 140ff, and Leon Golden, In Praise of Prometheus (Chapel Hill 1966) 
56ff. The latter has a particularly clear and readable discussion of the problem. The 
question was first argued in full by Theodor Bergk, Griechische Literaturgeschichte III (Berlin 
1884) 30zff, and again by Wilamowitz, "Drei Schlussscenen griechischer Dramen," SB BeTl 
1903, 436ff, and Aischylos Interpretationen (Berlin 1914) 88ff. 



250 'EPIGONI' AND LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AESCHYLUS' SEPTEM 

at least one other undoubted passage which looks forward to the 
destruction of the city. Is it not to be found in the references to the 
Epigoni, the sons of the seven Argive heroes who destroy Thebes in 
the next generation? 

A reference to the Epigoni may lie concealed in a line of the second 
stasimon where the chorus tells the story of Laius' visit to Delphi. 
Some interpretations suppose that the original oracle of Apollo to 
Laius implies the ultimate destruction of the city.5 The problem of 
interpretation is made more difficult because the oracle occurs in a 
lyric passage and in indirect discourse (749£): Ovcj.aKovTa YEwas aT€p 

acP'€LV 7T6ALV. Presumably Laius was ordered not to beget children or 
the city would be destroyed; and since he did in fact beget children, 
the city was surely doomed. From this beginning there developed by 
extension the peculiar Opfertod interpretation, according to which 
Eteocles understands that the city is not safe until the descendants of 
Laius cease to exist, and hence devotes himself and his brother to death, 
so that the city will at last be freed from this threat.6 Solmsen in 19377 

argued decisively against such an interpretation, and Patzers and 
von Fritz9 have firITlly laid it to rest. There reITlains, however, the 

residual notion that the oracle still predicts the sure destruction of 
the city. But what it says is that ifLaius dies without offspring, he will 
be the one to save the city. It certainly does not say that the city is 
doomed if he fails to die without offspring. That kind of argument 
is so patently false that it has a name in elementary logic: the fallacy 
of denying the antecedent.10 It is conceivable that in this trilogy, where 
the true meaning of prophetic statement is understood only after the 
fact, the oracular statement "the man who dies without offspring 
saves the city" refers in fact not to Laius, as he himself supposed, but 
to Eteoc1es, who does die without offspring and does indeed save the 
city. In any case, simple logic makes it impossible to find in lines 749£ 
a prediction of the city's destruction. 

5 Lloyd-Jones, op.cit. (supra n.4) 84; Wilamowitz, A. Interp. (supra n.4) 95f. 
"Carl Robert, Oidipus I (Berlin 1915) 264f; Oskar Klotz, "Zu Aischylos Thebanischer 

Tetralogie," RhM N.F. 72 (1917-18) 616ff. 
7 F. Solmsen, "The Erinys in Aischylos' Septem," TAPA 68 (1937) 205ff. 
8 H. Patzer, "Die Dramatische Handlung der Sieben Gegen Theben," HSCP 63 (1958) 97fI. 
9 K. von Fritz, Antike und moderne Tragoedie (Berlin 1962) 193fI. 
10 Cf I. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic2 (New York 1961) 261. It is like saying, "If Pericles 

was king of Athens, then he spoke Greek. Pericles was not king of Athens, therefore he 
did not speak Greek." 



H. D. CAMERON 251 

If there is any reference to the Epigoni, it must be found in lines 
902ff: 

I 
/LEVEL 

I ~" , KTEava 0 E7TLYOVOLS 

8,' wv alvol-'opo,S 
OL' WV VELKOS- Ef3a 
Kat Bav{X-rov TDl.os. 

, I ~, , C I ~ 

€/LoLpauaVTo 0 o!:, VKapotOL 
I ll'" '" , ~ 11 KTTJ/Lau WUT tUOV l\aXELv. 

<The property remains for the €7TLYOVOLs the possessions through 
which-doomed to a sad end as they were-through which the strife 
came, and the consummation of death. In bitterness of heart they 
divided the possessions so as to get equal shares." It is made clear by 
line 905 that the whole trouble arose over the possessions. Most 
critics who cite this passage usually fail to include lines 907-8,which 
contain the key to understanding the first part. I have taken alVO/LopOLS 

to be in apposition to €7TLYOVOts and in the translation set it off by 
dashes, which I take to be the effect of repeating OL' Wv. 

Professor Lloyd-Jones argues12 that it would be hard for an audience 
not to think of the familiar story of the Epigoni when such a word is 
used, but there are grave difficulties in understanding it so. Eteocles 
and Polyneices die childless (aTEKvovS 828) and it is explicitly stated 
that the god has utterly destroyed the family (813): aihos S' avaAoL 

OfjTa OVU7TOT/LOV yEvos-. If the sons of Oedipus die childless, then there 
can be no Epigoni at all, hence no reference to them in line 903.l3 
Lloyd-Jones attempted to make aT€KVOS mean 'unfortunate in the 
filial relationship', but he admits there is no parallel for such an 
interpretation.14 Klotz15 argued that Septem 902ff meant simply that 
the possessions remain for later generations, an interpretation which 
gets rid of the conflict but which cannot be considered particularly 
apposite. We should like an interpretation more closely connected 
with the themes and plot of the Seven. 

11 r have used Wilamowitz's text. 
12 op.cit. (supra nA) 90. 

13 R. D. Dawe, op.cit. (supra nA) 20f, lists six other passages which imply that the brothers 
are childless: 734-8, 742-5, 911-14, 955, 959-60, 1054-6. 

14 Lloyd-Jones, op.cit. (supra n.3) 90; Golden, op.cit. (supra nA) 59 n.25, says that Lloyd­
Jones informed him by letter that he no longer holds this interpretation of aT£Kvo,. 

15 op.cit. (supra n.6) 617f. This position is also accepted by Golden, op.cit. (supra n.4) 59. 



252 <EPIGONI' AND LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AESCHYLUS' SEPTEM 

It is important to keep in mind that the version of the story so 
familiar from the handbooks, ancient and modern, according to which 
the brothers have agreed to rule in alternate years and Eteocles fails 
to keep his part of the bargain, is inconsistent with the Seven of 
Aeschylus, as Carl Robert saw in 1915.16 Justice is without question 
solely on Eteocles' side. The chorus, which has ample opportunity to 
criticize Eteocles, never once says he has wronged his brother. The 
strongest evidence in Eteocles' behalf comes from the enemy: the 
respected seer Amphiaraus specifically lays all blame on Polyneices 
(576ft} Furthermore we may judge from an historical exemplum in 
Lysias' funeral oration (2.7-10) that the commonplace story laid all 
the blame on Polyneices. The point of Lysias' reference is lost unless 
we can suppose everybody knew Eteocles was right and Polyneices 
wrong. 

Therefore, if Eteocles cannot have wronged his brother and if the 
alternation in rule has no place in the Seven Against Thebes, then the 
version Aeschylus relied upon will have been concerned with the 
division of the patrimony in such a way that Eteocles inherits the 
kingdom fairly and justly, and Polyneices migrates, perhaps volun­
tarily, to another country. The only other version of the story we 
have is precisely that. The scholiast on Euripides' Phoenissae 71, 
summarizes Hellanicus (FGrHist 4 F 98) as follows: cEMd.VLKOS S€ 

iUToPE'i KaTa UVV()~K7JV aVTOV 7TapaxwpfjuaL rryv f3auLAElav ' ETEOKAE'i, Mywv 
ft , ~ () ... "E \ , , f3 1\ 'f3 \'" ..., a'p€ULV aVTcp 7TpO €'VaL TOV T€OKIIEa, €, OVIIOLTO 'T7]V aULII€LaV €X€LV 7J TO 

f.LEpOS TWV XP7Jf.Ld.TWV Aaf3€'iv Kat ETEpall 7T()ALV OlKE'iV, Tall S€ Aaf36vTa Tall 

XLTwva Kat TOV Opf.LOII cApf.Lolllas allaxwpfjuaL Els "Apyos: "Hellanicus 
relates that Polyneices conceded the kingdom to Eteocles by agree­
ment, and further that Eteocles offered him a choice either to have 
the kingdom or to take a share of the movable property and dwell in 
another city. Polyneices took the chiton and necklace of Harmonia, 
and moved to Argos." This is the only version we have which is con­
sistent with the Seven, and it is reasonable to assume that a similar 
version lies behind Aeschylus' play. 

There is a parallel to this arrangement in the story which Strabo 
(8.7.1) tells of Hellen son of Deucalion, who gave his kingdom to his 

11 op.cit. (supra n.6) 1.271. The point has been argued recently by Gerhard Mueller, 
"Textkritisches zu den Septem des Aischylos," Hermes 94 (1966) 265. The story of alternation 
in the kingship appears to be an invention of Euripides. 



H. D. CAMERON 253 

oldest son and directed the younger sons to settle in other places 
outside Phthia.17 

We may rightly inquire how close to reality such a scheme of 
inheritance is, where one son inherits all the land and the other leaves 
the vidnity with some of the movable property. It is clearly quite 
different from the system of inheritance which prevailed in fourth­
century Athens, when the first straightforward evidence becomes 
available. We know from Isaeus 6.25 that property was to be divided 
into equal shares: a7TaV'TaS' 'TO US' YlflJaLovS' laofLoLpoVS' dvat. For earlier 
centuries there is no explicit evidence, but we must conclude that the 
system of equal division was impossible in early Greece because of the 
nature of land tenure. It is generally agreed that before the fifth 
century, and even into the fifth century, land was inalienable and 
indivisible.ls W. J. woodhouseI9 says, HAt the root of this traditional 
inalienability of the original family lot was the desire to keep the num­
ber of households constituting the state at a constant figure as far as 
possible." A further purpose was to keep the lots undiminished in 
size. There is evidence that land was inalienable and indivisible at 
Sparta and Corinth (Arist. Pol. 2.6. 1265b ; Pluto Agis 5). The laws which 
Philolaus the Corinthian framed for Thebes included provisions for 
adoption designed to keep the number of family plots constant and 
undisturbed CArist. Pol. 2.12.1274b; cf 2.8.1266b). At Athens the re­
forms of Solon allowed a man to will his land to whomever he chose 
rather than necessarily to his son, which would permit the accumula­
tion oflarge holdings. These reforms imply that before Solon land was 
inalienable and indivisible, and what is more, J. V. A. Fine points out 
that no sure evidence can be found that land could be mortgaged and 
sold in Athens prior to the Peloponnesian War.20 If then the purpose 
of these provisions in Sparta, Corinth, Thebes and Athens was to 
keep the original allotment of land intact as an undiminished family 
holding, the equal division of land among several heirs would defeat 
that purpose and result in atomizing the parcel into smaller and 
smaller holdings. Therefore the nature of land tenure implies a 

17 Professor T. V. Buttrey pOinted out to me the example from Strabo. For other 
examples of the succession of the firstborn to the kingship see Paus. 3.1.4; 7.2.1. 

18 See J. V. A. Fine, Horoi (Hesperia Supp!. 9, 1951) 179ft', and Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's 
Cretan City (Princeton 1960) 103ff, 110; P. Guiraud, La propriete fonciere en Grece (Paris 1893) 
53ff. 

19 Solon the Liberator (London 1938) 79. 
20 Fine, cp.cit. (supra n.18) 196. 



254 'EPIGONI' AND LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AESCHYLUS' SEPTEM 

system whereby one son-probably the eldest-inherits all the 
land. 

Furthermore, the second element in the system found in the frag­
ment of Hellanicus, that the sons who do not inherit emigrate to a 
foreign land, is also suggestive. Woodhouse says,21 "It is not unlikely 
also that the burdens and restrictions entailed by this primitive system 
of land tenure in Greece generally were, in part at least, when rein­
forced by the pressure of over-population, responsible for the centri­
fugal movement which constituted the history of Greek colonization." 

The accumulation of examples from Greek legend in Hellanicus. 
Strabo and Pausanias, coupled with deductions from the nature of land 
tenure prior to the Peloponnesian War, lead to the conclusion that 
primogeniture characterized the system of inheritance in Greece until 
sometime in the fifth century. when alienability of land and the 
system of equal division attested by Isaeus replaced it.22 

There is yet another description of such a pattern of inheritance 
which deserves attention because it is strikingly similar to the pro­
visions in Hellanicus' story. Plato in the Laws considers it essential 
that land not be atomized by successive divisions among sons (740B; 
929D),23 so the whole parcel is to go to the one son whom the father 
chooses as his heir: 0 ACtXwv 'TOV KA-rypOV KCt'TCtAE£7TErW &EI. 'TCtV'TTJ~ 'T-ry~ 

" tf I \ , __ r __ I~ a '" ,.... , \ 'f' 
O'KTJGEW~ EVCt }LOVOV KI\TJPOVOfLOV 'TWV ECtV'TOV 7TCtwWV, OV Ctv CtV'TCfJ fLCtl\tG'TCt 11 
cptAOV (7408). This leaves the problem of providing for the remaining 
offspring. Generally the daughters are to be married off and the sons 
are to be adopted by childless citizens, once again with the aim of 
maintaining a constant number of KA-rypot. But if there are no citizens 

21 op.cit. (supra n.19) 84. 
22 Fuste! de Coulanges, La Cite antique Bk. II ch. 7; Bk. IV ch. 5; Eng. transI. (Garden City 

n.d.) 83ff, 253ff, suggested that primogeniture was the rule at Athens before the reforms 
of Solon, but Ludovic Beauchet, Histoire du droit prive de la republique athenienne ill (Paris 
1897) 450ff, and J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht (Leipzig 1905-1915) 542 n.12, argue against 
this claim. But none of them takes into account the nature of land tenure, nor do they 
dwell upon the change to a system of equal division. Their argument has to do with the 
privileges of an older son rather than with the possession of land. Guiraud, op.cit. (supra 
n.18) 233, indicates that there was a change from undivided inheritance ("originairement, 
les biens se transmettaient dans son sein en bloc ee a I'eeat d'indivision") eo a second stage 

where only "une partie du patrimoine" remained undivided, and then to the final stage 
"Ie partage egal des successions." E. Caillemer, Le droit de succession legitime Ii Athenes 
(Paris 1879) 30ff, discusses certain privileges which the oldest son may have had, including 
succession to the monarchy. Cf Paus. 2.3.4,7.2.1, which were cited in n.17 above. In Ar. 
Aves 477f Pisthetaerus argues that the birds deserve sovereignty "by the right of the first­
born." 

23 A passage in the Gortynian Code (4.31), where some property could not be divided, 
may suggest that Plato had in mind a real Cretan constitution. 



H. D. CAMERON 255 

willing to adopt the younger sons, or if there are just too many of 
h ' , <:' I '\ \ I I "\ I , I I tern, Eav OE T£ULV EI\I\EL7TWULV xapL'TE~, 'Y/ 7TI\ELOV~ E7TLYOVOL yLyvWV'TaL 

(740C), then other expedients must be resorted to, such as sending 
out colonies. These provisions are treated in greater detail in Book I I 

(923n). If a non-inheriting son is not adopted, he may take a share of 
the movable property with him to a colony (923n): Nxv 8e 7T€PLytyV7}'Tat 

'TL~ TCVV VEWV avTC:p fL~ E7Tt 'TLVL KA~pc.p 7T€7TOL'Y/fLEVOS, 011 Ka'Ta 116fLOII €'\7T~.s €ls 
, , • ,1..0' 0 ' -"\ \ "l: ' - , a7TOLKLall EK7TEfL'f' 'Y/UEU aL, 'TOV'Tc.p 'TWII al\l\wII XP'Y/fLa'TWII E~ EU'TW 'Tc.p 7Ta'TpL 
~ ~ I ., '" '0 '\ \ , - , \ , ,- " \ -OLOovaL oua av E EI\T!, 7T1\'Y/V 'TOV 7Ta'Tpc.pov KI\'Y/POV KaL 'T'1}s 7T€PL 'TOll KI\'1}pOV 

Ka'TaUK€vfj~ 7TlxG'1]s. Finally, the provisions for a disinherited son 
(cX7TlX'TWp) stipulate that he must emigrate, unless some other citizen 
is willing to adopt him. Failing adoption the disinherited son is to be 
put into the hands of those in charge of the non-inheriting sons who 
have been sent out to colonies (929D): 'TOUS 'TWII €7TLYOIIWV E7TLfL€A'1}'Ta~ 

- , " , , \ - II ' , [. -, I ]" 'TWII €L~ 'T'1}1I a7TOLKLall €7TLfL€l\€LaUaL KCf.L 'TOV'TWV I.e. 'TWV a7Ta'TOpWII , 07TW~ 

&v fL€'TaUXWaL 'Tfj~ atj'Tij~ a7ToLKta~ EfLfL€'\w~. 
The interesting word for our purposes is of course E7TtyOIIO~. LS] 

defines it in these passages as 'born after or besides the presumptive 
heir'. The 'after or besides' seems to be an attempt to reconcile the 
etymological conclusion that the E7TtyovoS ought to be younger with 
Plato's clear statement (740B, 923c) that the inheriting son need not 
be the oldest. Plato decrees that the patrimony should go to the son 
deemed most worthy (923c), a provision which has the earmarks of 
Platonic innovation. The fact that Plato uses a term which ought to 
mean 'younger son' would argue for the fact that £7TtyOVOS was the 
traditional legal term for non-inheriting status under the early system 
of primogeniture. 

The claim that line 903 of the Seven contains a reference to the 
Epigoni was possible only because there was no probable alternative. 
Klotz' interpretation 'later generations' is not really pertinent to the 
Seven and its background. But in this play, which is fundamentally 
concerned with division of a patrimony between sons, such that one 
inherits all the land and the other moves to a foreign country, E7TtyOVO~ 
as a legal term is specifically appropriate. It is unlikely in the extreme 
that it is merely a vague reference to the sons of the Seven, for Poly­
neices is beyond question an €7TtYOIIOS in precisely the legal sense of a 
non-inheriting son who migrates to another country.24 

24 While it is reasonable to assume that Aeschylus considered Eteodes the elder, it 
cannot be proved explicitly. Euripides made Eteodes the elder (schol. ad Eur. Phoen. 71), 



256 <EPIGONI' AND LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AESCHYLUS' SEPTEM 

The occurrence of the word at line 903 must have been arresting 
simply because it is the appropriate legal designation for Polyneices. 
The younger son, who was not expected to inherit, also gets a share 
of the patrimonial land, namely his grave, and the chorus proclaims 
it with gnomic irony when it says "possessions devolve upon secondary 
heirs." But the familiar ironies of consanguinity which beset the 
Labdacids give the plural E1TtYOVOLS' even more startling implications. 
For both Eteocles and Polyneices are younger brothers of Oedipus, 
and as such both count as E7TtYOVOL. Beyond a mere general observation, 
the chorus says that the patrimony has devolved upon these two 
panicular brothers Eteocles and Polyneices. The whole play has 
stressed the disadvantages of Polyneices as an E7TtyOVOS'. The irony 
of getting equal shares is that Eteocles now shares the status of an 
E7TtyOVOS', and when property comes to E7TtyOVOL their share is a grave. 

The theme of dividing the inheritance is emphasized by the use 
of the adjective alvoJLopoS' 'having a wretched lot' (904), which displaces 
the expected word in this context, viZ. lUOJLOLPOS', the term used in the 
equal-division system. These choral lines recapitulate the historical 
legal development as it moves from primogeniture, inherent in 
E1TtYOVOLS, to the division in strife (907), which disrupts the old laws, 
and finally to equal division, WUT' taov AaXEtv (908). 

We can conclude that sometime between Solon and Isaeus, Athen­
ian laws of inheritance changed from the system of primogeniture to 
one whereby all sons got an equal share. Just as the reform of the 
Areopagus made the institution a matter of current interest, and the 
Oresteia is concerned with the change in homicide law from the prin­
ciple of private vengeance to that of public prosecution, so it is possible 
that a change, or proposed change, in the laws of inheritance lies 
behind the Seven. Eteocles champions the venerable system of primo­
geniture, Polyneices the innovation of equal division. Strife between 
the brothers is the result of Polyneices' attempt to institute the new 
system, so that the equal division of the land is represented ironically 
by their graves.25 

but Sophocles made him the younger (OC 375). Verrall, in his introduction to his edition 
of the Seven (London 1887) x note, and Tucker, op.at. (supra n.2) xxx, suggest that they 
were twins, but it is no more than a guess to explain equal division. 

15 We can only guess how Polyneices' greed develops beyond his desire for an equal 
share. but he will no longer settle for anything but the whole patrimony. He intends to 
seek out his brother to kill him or drive him into exile (635ft) Perhaps a hint is to be found 
in the first stasimon. where the rivalry among the looters of the city is pictured. and they 
are satisfied with neither a lesser nor an equal share: eVlN0ILOV (UAwv EXnv I oV-r€ JL€wv oiJ".· 
iaov A€N.ILILIvOt (354-5). 



H. D. CAMERON 257 

The word briyovos then, is a technical term drawn from the system 
of primogeniture, which is closely connected with the themes and 
plot of the Seven. Its occurrence at line 903 is not a hint of further 
trouble to come. Therefore arguments for the authenticity of the end 
of the Seven which rely on such a supposition cannot stand.26 

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 

May, 1968 

2& I am grateful to my colleagues Professors Herbert C. Youtie and Theodore V. Buttrey 
for helpful critidsms, and to Professor Irving M. Copi for a lesson in logic.