Is Tragedy the "Imitation of a Serious Action"? Golden, Leon Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Winter 1965; 6, 4; ProQuest pg. 283

Is Tragedy the "Imitation of a Serious 
Action"? 
Leon Golden 

BUTCHER and Bywater, Cooper and Else and nearly all of the 
other translators and interpreters of the Poetics who have 
been influential in our time, however much they may disagree 

on other major points in Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy, 
achieve a startling unanimity of opinion in rendering its first clause 
as "tragedy is an imitation of a serious action" (EO"rLV OVV -rpaycp8ta 
/Lt/LTJO'L5; 7Tp&g€W5; 0'7Tov8ata5; • •• ).1 Although, as we shall see later, 
'serious' is a term with complex overtones, its use in this context, 
following the discussion of the history and nature of tragedy and 
comedy in chapters IV and V of the Poetics, suggests to most readers 
that the clause in which it occurs is to be understood as a means of 
differentiating the serious nature of tragic action from the supposedly 
non-serious nature of comic action. 

Against this common interpretation of the passage, I believe that 
two important objections can be raised. First, the word O'7TovoaLo5;, 

which is translated as 'serious' in the context under discussion, is not 
used by Aristotle in the Poetics to denote an essential quality of 
action but rather of character.2 Secondly, whenever 0'7Tov8aLo5; is 
used in the Poetics to refer to character, it does not bear the commonly 
accepted meaning of 'serious' mentioned above. On the basis of both 

1 See the translation of this phrase at 1449bz4 in the editions of S. Butcher. Aristotle's 
Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (New York 1951); I. Bywater. Aristotle On the Art of Poetry 
(Oxford 1909); L. Cooper. Aristotle On the Art of Poetry (Ithaca 1947); G. Else. Aristotle's 
Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge [Mass.] 1957); and cf A. Gudeman, Aristoteles nEPI 
nOIHTIKHE(Berlin 1934) 161: "U7Tov8ala im Gegensatzzur Komodie"; Schmid-Stahlin, 
1.2.37: "der ernsthafte Charakter der Handlung"; M. Pohlenz. Die griechische Tragodie 12 
(Gottingen 1954) 489: " ... Darstellung einer ernst en ... Handlung." I am indebted to 
William M. Calder III for calling to my attention the last three references which clearly 
indicate the extensive influence of this interpretation of the clause in the scholarly literature 
on the Poetics. A different and better treatment of this term is offered by G. M. A. Grube. 
Aristotle: On Poetry and Style (Indianapolis 1958) ad loco and pp. xxi-xxii. See n. 8 below for a 
further discussion of Grube's interpretation. 

2 See 1448aZ-5; 1448aZ5-Z7; 1449b17-18; 1461a4-9; 1448b34; 1449b9-10. 

Z83 



284 IS TRAGEDY THE "IMITATION OF A SERIOUS ACTION"? 

of these objections I shall suggest a retranslation and reinterpretation 
of the first clause of Aristotle's definition of tragedy. 

Aristotle discusses the essential nature of action with considerable 
care and at some length in the Poetics, but in none of the passages in 
which this subject is treated is the criterion of 'serious' or 'non­
serious' used to define an essential quality of action. Where Aristotle 
discusses the essential qualities of action, the qualities that we would 
most expect to be summarized in his definition of tragedy, we find 
that they consist of completeness (having a beginning, middle and 
end), proper magnitude (not being too long or too short), unity 
(being concerned with one theme) and artistic universality (as opposed 
to history'S concern with the particular).3 These, and these alone, are 
the ways in which Aristotle discusses and categorizes the essential 
nature of actions in the Poetics. 

Completeness and magnitude, with unity perhaps implied, are 
used by Aristotle specifically in his definition to express essential 
characteristics of action which are more fully discussed elsewhere 
in the Poetics. In passages where Aristotle is concerned with actions, 
they are never differentiated on the basis of their 'seriousness' or 
'non-seriousness,' and so the importation of such a term into the 
definition of tragedy as an essential qualification of action is un­
warranted. For Aristotle all actions, be they tragic, comic or epic, 
must be judged on the criteria of completeness, magnitude, unity 
and universality. Distinctions between various kinds of action, such 
as tragic and comic, are not made by Aristotle on the basis of any 
essential quality of action itself, but on the basis of the kind of character 
imitated, which is the aspect of the work of art that is explicitly charged 
with this responsibility in the Poetics.4 

In the Poetics, then, there is only one way in which Aristotle differ­
entiates tragedy from comedy, and that is on the basis of the kinds of 
character they imitate: tragedy imitates the actions of the G7Tov8aLoL, 

comedy the actions of the cpavAoL.5 It is also on the basis of their imitat­
ing the same kind of character that Aristotle holds that tragedy and 
epic are similar, although they differ in the manner of their 
presentation.6 Thus, regularly in the Poetics, Aristotle uses the term 

3 See 1450bZl-1451bll. 
4 See 1448al-8, 16-18. Cf Else (supra n. I) 69ff. 
6 See 1448bZ4--Z7; 1449aZ--6. 
6 See 1449b9-Z0. 



LEON GOLDEN 285 

07TovoaZos in an essential relationship to character. Since a person's 
character is stamped on his deeds, G7TOVDatos can be used to describe 
the actions of one who possesses this quality of character; but when 
used in this way, it is not an essential quality of action but only a 
metaphorical one, i.e., one transferred from the character of the agent 
to the actions performed by the agent. 7 For this reason, 07TovDatos, as 
traditionally understood, has no place in an essential definition of 
tragic action. Furthermore, when used in the contexts in which it 
occurs to provide an essential qualification of character, o7TovoaZos 

does not bear the commonly accepted meaning of <serious' and so 
does not provide justification for the customary translation. 

We must seek now to determine what G7TOVDatOs- really means in 
the Aristotelian critical vocabulary and to show why the usual 
rendering of the word, in the context under discussion, is either wrong 
or highly misleading. As our starting point we have an explicit 
definition of 07ToVDatOS- which Aristotle gives in the Categories: 

" ~\ ", " " ,,) €VLOT€ O€ KaL OVOfLaTOS K€LfL€VOV ov /\€Y€TaL 7TapwvvfLws TO KaT 
,\ ", t') , ...... :) ..... ~ ~ A "" 

aVTTJv 7TOLOV /\EyofLEVOV, OLOV a7TO TTJS ap€TYJS 0 G7TOVOaLOS· T4J 
, , , " \:'.... \ I '\ \" I " 

yap apETTJV EXELV G7TOVOaLOS /\EYETaL, a/\/\ OV 7TapwvvfLws a7TO 

Tijs apETijs. (8.lOb8) 

Aristotle thus clearly understands G7TOVOaZos to be the adjectival form 
of apET~, and the word is regularly found in this sense in the Nico­
machean Ethics.s Since ap€T~ is the particular excellence of any thing 

7 See 1461a4-9 for an indication of how Aristotle conceives of noble action as conditioned 
by and dependent on nobility of character. He points out here that the motives of the agem 
and the conditions under which he operates must be taken into consideration in forming Ollr 

ultimate judgment as to whether an action is noble or not. 
8 I am indebted to Benedict Einarson for first pointing out to me the close connection 

between G7Tov3aioS" and apE''T-r] in Aristotelian thought. An excellent discussion of the 
relationship of these two terms is provided by Butcher (supra n. 1) 228-34. For other ex­
amples of this usage see EN 1099a23, 1113a25 and 1166a12-13. On the last two passages sec 
also J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1900) ad loco Grube (supra n. 1), recognizing 
the connection between G7Tov3aioS" and ape"], translates G1Tov3aioS" as ,[morally] good.' 
My objection to this is that the noun, apET-r], and its adjective, a7TOVoaLoS", as they are used by 
Aristotle and as they apply to tragedy, have a far greater range of meanings than those 
simply associated with moral virtue. This can be seen from the discussion of apE''T-r] which 
Aristotle gives us in Rh. A 9: 

flipT} 3i apErfjS" 3tKaWGvV7], avopta, Gw<pPOGvV7], I-'£yMo7Tp€7TE',a, l-'£yaAoifJVxta, £Aw8E'pt67"TjS", 
7Tpa67"TjS", </>p6V7]G'S", Go</>la. 

No one English word can adequately render apE'T-r] and G7TOVoaloS' but in the discussion 
that follows I have chosen a translation which I believe is in conformity with the range of 
meanings that Aristotle attributes to these terms. We should mention here that the ques­
tion of whether the Categories was written by Aristotle or by a member of his school has 



286 IS TRAGEDY THE "IMITATION OF A SERIOUS ACTION"? 

or person, a7TOVSatoS', as the adjective related to the noun, must bear 
some such meaning as 'excellent', 'good' or 'noble.'9 Now it is quite 
true that Aristotle is capable of using the same word in different 
senses in different works, but it is a necessary and advisable procedure 
to test the explicitly given definition in all contexts in which the word 
occurs to see whether the meaning of the word is thereby illuminated. 
If the definition fits the new context, one may feel substantial con­
fidence in interpreting the passage in question in accordance with it; 
if the definition appears inapplicable, one must seek other, indirect 
means of understanding the new passage. In regard to the interpreta­
tion of a7TOVSatoS' in the Poetics, each occurrence of the word can be 
easily, clearly and, I maintain, best understood in terms of the close 
relationship between G7TOvSatoS' and &pET~ which Aristotle posited 
in the Categories. 

In the Poetics, where G7TOvOatos occurs outside of the definition of 
tragedy in chapter VI, it is frequently rendered by translators as 
'excellent,' 'good,' 'noble' or some synonym. It may sometimes be 
legitimately translated as 'serious' in these contexts but with a mean­
ing quite different from the commonly accepted one for the occur­
rence of the term in the definition of tragedy. In those contexts where 
'serious' is a legitimate translation, it is always with the nuance found 
in such English expressions as "to take something seriously" or "a 
matter of serious import." Here 'serious' means "of high significance", 
expressing a principal quality of the apET~ of any thing or person. 
Where G7TOVOatoS' occurs in the definition of tragedy, it can be legiti­
mately, although not completely, translated by this nuance of 
'serious' provided that it be referred to character rather than to 
action, as we have argued above. We have indicated, however, that 
in the definition of tragedy G7TOVOatoS' is commonly understood as a 
term which merely differentiates the categories of non-comic and 
comic literary genres. My argument is that if G7TOVOatoS' is under­
stood in this sense of 'serious,' then a misinterpretation of Aristotle's 
use of the term is involved; if it is understood in the more significant 
sense discussed above, nevertheless, appearing as it does without 

been raised by some scholars. W. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York 1956) 9-10 shows that the 
arguments against Aristotelian authorship are inconclusive. In any event, there is no doubt 
that the Categories represents authentic Aristotelian doctrine. 

• Bywater renders the term as 'good,' Butcher as 'higher' and Else as '[of] high character.' 
See n. 1 for bibliographical references. 



LEON GOLDEN 287 

interpretative commentary in various translations, it is a highly 
ambiguous term which creates an erroneous impression. Our 
argument suggests to us that in the definition of tragedy we must 
strike the word 'serious,' whether it be to eliminate an error of 
mistaken interpretation or an error of ambiguous and misleading 
translation. 

To replace 'serious' in the context under discussion I should prefer 
the term 'noble'; its opposite quality, cpa:DAos, would then be rendered 
by 'ignoble.' The use of these terms, I believe, is justified by a com­
parison of the heroes of the most significant Greek tragedies with 
those of the most effective Aristophanic comedies. The tragic heroes 
show courage, integrity and endurance; the comic heroes are exem­
plars of every kind of sin, venal and venial, such as lust, greed and 
folly. Aristotle's use of the adjectives KaA6s and (3€ATLWV1o as synonyms 
for G7Tov8aZos, when he discusses the actions which tragedy imitates 
as opposed to comedy, clearly brings out the nuance of 'nobility' 
which is involved in the objects imitated by tragedy-the actions of 
men who are a7Tov8aZOL-and supports the interpretation of a7Tov8aZos 
given above.ll 

10 See 1448b25-26 and 1454b8-9; 1448a17-18. 
11 Butcher (supra n.1), whose perceptive discussion of the relationship of u1Tov8aioS" to 

apeT7] has already been cited, wrestles hard with the problem of the meaning of u1TovoaioS" 
in the definition of tragedy. He sees, as we have argued, that "logically, it ought, no doubt, 
to bear the same meaning-'good: 'noble'-as applied to the tragic action, that it bore in 
the previous divisions of poetry as applied to the persons whom tragedy represents 
(234-35)." However, he goes on to assert what we most emphatically deny, that 
" ... Aristotle imperceptibly glides into the meaning 'serious: 'elevated,' 'grand:-a 
meaning which the word readily admits of in reference to a thing . .. This new shade of 
meaning, which enters into the definition, is required in order to differentiate the tragic 
action from the yeAola 1TpagtS" of Comedy. He can hardly have realised the important 
bearings of the change by which the word a7TOvllawS" is freed from the limited moral refer­
ence which attaches to it in ch. ii (235)." Butcher makes his position even more explicit 
when he writes, "No one English word completely renders u1TovllalaS". The translation 
'noble: which has the merit of applying to the characters as well as to the action, yet sug­
gests too much a purely moral quality, while at the same time it does not adequately 
bring out the implied antithesis to comedy. Grave and great-these are the two ideas con­
tained in the word (241)." By translating u1TovoaLoS' as 'serious' in the definition of tragedy, 
Butcher shows us that he takes the word in its sense of 'grave' and feels that its essential 
function is to "bring out the implied antithesis to comedy." In this paper I have given the 
reasons for my belief that this approach does not do justice to Aristotle's argument. 

Butcher, who, as we have seen, mentions the logical possibility that G7Tovllcxtos in the 
definition of tragedy should have the same meaning of 'noble' or 'good' which it has when 
it refers to character, does not give any supporting arguments for discounting this pos­
Sibility and for accepting the commonly held interpretation of the term as 'serious.' This 
is especially strange since he cites in a footnote R. P. Hardie, "The Poetics of Aristotle," 
Mind N.S. 4 (1895) 35<H>4. Hardie had argued (357) that since Aristotle was constructing 
a scientific definition of tragedy, he could n0t have changed the meaning of u1TouoawS" in 



288 IS TRAGEDY THE "IMITATION OF A SERIOUS ACTION"? 

Thus the distinction between tragedy and comedy is not made by 
Aristotle on the basis of the seriousness or non-seriousness of the 
action, but on the basis of the nobility or ignobility of the characters 
who perform the actions and on the metaphorical association of this 
quality of their character with their deeds. We reject, then, the 
translation "tragedy is an imitation of a serious action" first because 
Aristotle does not employ 'serious' as an essential quality of action, 
and thus it has no place, as traditionally interpreted, in the essential 
definition of tragic action; and, secondly, because (T1TOVSarO~ as a term 
which has special and very specific reference to character in the Poetics 
does not bear the commonly accepted meaning of 'serious: but rather 
that of 'noble.' For these reasons, I suggest that what Aristotle actually 
means, as opposed to the usual interpretation of his words, is that 
"tragedy is an imitation of a noble action" or, more fully and ac­
curately, that "tragedy is an imitation of an action that reveals nobility 
of character." 

If we accept this interpretation of Aristotle's words, we reap the 
following benefits in place of the disadvantages entailed in the tradi­
tional rendering. First, in the essential definition of tragedy we 
substitute a concept 'nobility of character' which is expressly used as 
a way of comparing tragedy to other literary genres, for a concept 
'seriousness of action' which is not employed in the Poetics as an 
essential characteristic of action. Secondly, we introduce into the 
essential definition of tragedy the whole idea of character, which 
Aristotle tells us is the second most important element of plot and 
to which he devotes considerable attention in the Poetics. In the 
customary interpretation of this passage, the important subject of 
character is excluded from the definition while less important 
elements are mentioned, and the relatively trivial, even though true, 
point is made that tragedy is serious. Its seriousness is implied even 
by our revised translation and, of course, strongly implied by the 
association of tragedy with pity and fear. Finally, since our suggested 
revision accords greater significance and completeness to Aristotle's 

this context from the meaning which it regularly has in other usages in the Poetics. Since 
the term is regularly used to mean 'noble' in other passages in the Poetics, he argued, it 
had to retain that meaning in the definition of tragedy. My own arguments for translating 
it as 'noble' in the definition of tragedy are derived from quite different considerations 
than those of Hardie, but I share his concern with the fact that the customary rendering 
of this term has been based on insufficient evidence (358). 



LEON GOLDEN 289 

definition, it is more consonant with his acknowledged skill in such 
matters than the traditional interpretation. 

If we accept this new interpretation of the passage, we shall do 
more, however, than merely credit Aristotle with having constructed 
a better definition of a significant literary genre. Since for Aristotle 
art is an imitation of action, it has the capacity involved in all imita­
tion to teach us about the action, itself, to bring us to a clarified vision 
of the essential meaning of the action as it relates to human ex­
perience. I suggest that the proposed interpretation, with its emphasis 
on nobility of character, is essential to defining, in art as well as in 
life, that which is truly tragic and to separating it not only from the 
comic but also from what is merely pathetic. Whoever ponders the 
lives and fates of Prometheus, Oedipus and Medea and beyond these, 
of Hamlet, Lear and Othello, perceives something far more significant 
than the seriousness of their plight; he observes, as I believe Aristotle 
observed, human beings exhibiting some virtue, some apET~, be it 
courage, endurance or integrity in the face of an adversity of pitiful 
and fearful circumstances caused by some great miscalculation on 
their part ;12 that is, he observes human beings participating in an 
"action that reveals the nobility of their character." 

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 

December, 1965 

12 'Miscalculation' is the way in which I render Aristotle's ap.apTla. For a convincing 
demonstration that ap.apTla is an intellectual error, see M. Ostwald, "Aristotle on a/LapT{a 
and Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus," in Festschrift Ernst Kapp (Hamburg 1958) 93-108. I am 
again indebted to William M. Calder III for calling to my attention P. van Braam, "Aris­
totle's Use of ap.apTla, " CQ 6 (1912) 266-72, an earlier statement of this thesis.