John Italos’ Methodos Rhetorikê:
Text and Commentary

Thomas M. Conley

H E M°yodow =htorikØ §kdoye›sa katå sÊnocin  by
John Italos (XI cent.) has not received much attentionTfrom students of Byzantine rhetoric. The text is not easy

to obtain, and the available editions are neither very good nor
very informative.1 As a result, what attention it has received is
largely misconceived—it is not, for instance, a synopsis of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as some well-known authorities have
maintained.2

The text and commentary presented here are intended to
make Italos’ short treatise more widely accessible than it has
been and to fill out an argument I have made elsewhere that
Italos probably did not have the text of Aristotle’s Rhetoric at
hand when he composed his synopsis for the young

1 The text of the Methodos can be found in the edition by G. Cérétéli, Opuscula
selecta II (Tbilisi 1926) 33–46 (= C.), collated from three manuscripts: Marc.gr.
265 (XIV cent.), Vat.gr. 316 (XIV cent., both of which he was able to inspect
shortly before the outbreak of World War I; and Vat.gr. 1457 (XVI cent.),
which he examined in 1924. In 1966 N. Ketchakmadze, who lists additional
MSS. (pp.ix–xiii) but clearly did not collate them, republished Cérétéli's text in
Ioannis Itali Opera (Tbilisi 1966) 35–42 (= K.).

2 I made this argument briefly in “Notes on the Byzantine Reception of the
Peripatetic Tradition in Rhetoric,” in W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady, edd.,
Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle  (New Brunswick 1994) 217–242, esp.
230–233. The alleged quotations from Aristotle’s Rhetoric seem to have been
gleaned from available commentaries and prolegomena, not from the Rhetoric
itself. For the characterization of the Methodos as an epitome of the Rhetoric,
see, among others, G. Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors
(Princeton 1983) 318, who evidently follows P. Stephanou, Jean Italos,
philosophe et humaniste (Orient.Christ.Anal. 134 [Rome 1949]) 82 and 86; this
opusculum as a set of “excerpts” from the Rhetoric: O. Jurewicz, Historia
literatury bizantynskiej (Warsaw 1984) 208.

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 44 (2004) 411–437
© 2004 GRBS



412 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

Konstantinos Doukas.3 Indeed, it is far from clear that he had
even read it. As we shall see, he seems to have drawn instead
on commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and Nicomachean Ethics
and, it appears, on the last chapters of the T°xnh wrongly
attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.4 What cannot be
traced to such sources is for the most part commonplace
doctrine that is found in various prolegomena and com-
mentaries on Hermogenes and Aphthonios, or which would in
any event have been included in a rhetoric school course.

The organization of Italos’ Methodos makes it quite clear that
he was not following Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The treatise has two
large parts. §§1–10 take up some preliminary matters and a
number of “accessus” questions set out in §3, which, as we shall
see, are not the same as those found in the various prolegomena
to rhetoric that were in circulation before Italos’ time. The fol-
lowing sections, §§11–19, concern the importance of êthos, style,
and the political/ethical dimensions of the art. In this, it differs
also from, e.g., the verse epitome of Hermogenes composed by
Italos’ master, Michael Psellos (sÊnociw t!w =htorik!w diå
st¤xvn, Poemata pp.103–122 Westerink), organized along the
lines of the traditional order of Hermogenes’ works as they
appear in most manuscripts. Perhaps most strikingly, Italos
never mentions enthymemata and has scarcely anything to say
about invention by way of topoi, which of course is of para-

3 On the general question of the Byzantine reception of the Rhetoric, see
Conley, “Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium,” Rhetorica 8 (1990) 29–44, and
Conley (supra n.2). On John Italos’ career and place in the Byzantine reception
of Aristotle, Conley, “The Alleged ‘Synopsis’ of Aristotle’s Rhetoric by John
Italos and Its Place in the Byzantine Reception of Aristotle,” in G. Dahan and I.
Rosier-Catach, edd., La Rhétorique d’Aristote: Traditions et commentaires de
l’Antiquité au XVIIe siècle  (Paris 1998) 49–64. Italos (1025?–1089?), so called
because of his origins in South Italy, came to Constantinople in 1049, became a
student of Michael Psellos, and eventually rose to the rank of “leading philos-
opher” (ÏpatÒw t«n filosÒfvn , Anna Comn. 5.8.5). His unorthodox beliefs led
to accusations of heresy in 1076/7 (he was acquitted) and in 1082/3, when he
was (unjustly, most scholars believe) convicted and forced into a monastery. 

4 Text: H. Usener and L. Radermacher, edd., Dionysius Halicarnassus Opuscu-
la II (Leipzig 1929) 359–387.



THOMAS M. CONLEY 413

mount importance in Aristotle.5
The style of the Methodos is throughout almost painfully clear,

with short thought units set out directly, involving at the most
complex some parallel composition or elementary antithesis,
usually organized around m°n  and d°.  Italos makes his transi-
tions quite mechanically (e.g. §7 init., §pe‹ d¢ e‡rhtai per‹ toÊtvn
flkan«w, lekt°on ín e‡h  … [“Since enough has been said about
these things, it ought to be said that …”]; cf. §12 init.; §8 init.,
˜ti  … §k t«n efirhm°nvn fanerÚn  … nËn ín e‡h lekt°on … [“Since
this is clear from what has been said, now it ought to be said
…”]; §13 init., per‹ … efirÆsyv tå toiaËta  … ßpetai d¢ éko-
loÊyvw  [“Having said these things, it follows accordingly …”] ;
etc.); and sometimes actively engages his reader (as at §10 init.,
t¤ tÚ  … kãlliston, énagka›on efipe›n metå taËta  … [“As for
what is the best, it is necessary to say after this …”]). Italos re-
peatedly frames his lessons in the “impersonal imperative,”
using -t°on  constructions, e.g. §4.1, politikå m¢n oÔn §ke›na
=ht°on ; §7.3–4, ka‹ p«w xrhst°on tª meyÒdƒ. In all, the style of
this Methodos is not quite as sophisticated as that of some of his
Problems and Solutions  (ÉApor¤ai ka‹ lÊseiw),6 and is more like
that of the short pieces on dialectic by him that appear in the
MSS. just before this work. But these stylistic features are com-

5 This inattention to topical invention is particularly surprising since Italos
became most famous as a champion of the dialectic taught by “the ancients,”
chiefly Aristotle—as is obvious from his extant works, which include an as-yet
unedited commentary on Aristotle’s Topics. “The ancients,” he wrote in a de-
fense of the art, “fittingly called dialectic a power in itself since it is the medium
(m°sh ) of demonstrative and sophistic art alike” (K. p.1 §2). “[Dialectic] is
useful (xrÆsimow) both for conversation between individuals and for the discus-
sion of beliefs (dokoËntvn dial°gesyai)” (p.2 §5). If Anna Komnena is to be
believed, he was enormously successful in his role as ÍpatÒw : “When he took up
the chair,” she writes (Alexiad 5.9.1), “all the young flocked to him, for he
opened up to them the teachings (dÒgmata) of Plato and Porphyry … and
especially the arts of Aristotle.” Anna's portrait of Italos is not wholly
favorable, however; see Conley (supra n.3: 1998) 54–55.

6 The most accessible edition of ÉApor¤ai ka‹ lÊseiw is that of P. Joannou (in
Studia Patristica et Byzantina 4 [1956]).



414 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

mon in the commentary tradition;7 and they are, moreover,
completely appropriate, given Italos’ intended reader, his
student Konstantinos Doukas.

In short, Italos’ Methodos is more original than a set of crib
notes to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and more sophisticated than it
might appear at first glance.

toË aÈtoË filÒsofou m°yodow =htorikØ §kdoye›sa
katå sÊnocin

§1 (33.1–34.2 C. = 35.1–16 K.)
ÑH =htorikØ m°yodÒw §stin §j §ndÒjvn toË per‹ ©kaston
yevr!sai tÚ piyanÒn, diÚ ka‹ ént¤strofÒw §sti tª dialektikª,
Àw fhsin ÉAristot°lhw. diaf°rei d¢ t“ tØn m¢n oÈ prÚw tÚn
ént¤dikon ‡svw, éllå prÚw dikastãw te ka‹ d!mon …w §p‹ tÚ
ple›ston dial°gesyai, tØn d¢ prÚw mÒnon tÚn prodialegÒmenon,
ka‹ tØn m¢n §n to›w politiko›w zhtÆmasin ¶xein tØn fisxÊn, tØn d¢
mçllon §n to›w yevrhtiko›w, ka‹ tØn m¢n §j ˜lvn épofantik«n µ
merik«n sullog¤zesyai, tØn d¢ §n ta›w protãsesin ¶xein tÚ
èmartãnein ka‹ tª diay°sei toË épokrinom°nou. oÈdemiò d¢
toÊtvn éf"ristai t«n ˆntvn <tÚ> Ípoke¤menon, kayãper §p‹
t«n êllvn texn«n diak°kritai. ériymetik!w m¢n går ériymo‹

7 Such constructions are not uncommon in Hermogenes or in the scholia: see in
H. Rabe, Prolegomenôn syllogê (Leipzig 1931) (= PS), Sardianos at pp.354.15,
358.6, 359.12 ( fist°on), 355.1 (=ht°on); Doxapatres at pp.143.10, 421.22 (fist°on);
Athanaios at p.179.3 (fist°on); Anonymous, pp.169.6 (on Aphthonios) and 239.2
(on Hermogenes’ Peri staseôs ) (zhtht°on), etc. The most striking stylistic com-
parisons can be found in the pseudo-Dionysian T°xnh, which one observer (G.
Theile, reviewing Usener’s 1895 edition), asserts, rather indignantly, was
composed in a manner befitting “ein unreifer unklarer Knabe ohne Talent”
(GGA 1897, 247). Theile’s observation is as unperceptive as it is indignant. If
Italos drew on the T°xnh, it might be asked, and if the only manuscript version
of this work that we know existed in Italos’ time is the famous Par.gr. 1741,
which also contains the Rhetoric of Aristotle, how can we be so sure that Italos
never read the Rhetoric? We should not be quick to assume that 1741 was seen
by Italos, much less to infer that, if he did, he must also have seen the Aristotle
text there. Clearly, some other MSS. of the T°xnh may have been available to him.
All the passages reminiscent of Dionysius are, moreover, from the tenth and
eleventh chapters of his work, the section that appears in isolation in Marc.gr.
508—which is, to be sure, a fifteenth-century manuscript, but which likely was
modelled on an earlier collection.



THOMAS M. CONLEY 415

ka‹ meg°yh gevmetr¤aw ka‹ t«n ényr"pvn fiatrik!w s"mata
dialektikØ d¢ ka‹ =htorikØ èpãntvn oÔsai dunãmeiw t«n
boulom°nvn §pixeire›n pãnta kateilÆfasi: taÊtaiw går oÈ
mÒnon sofÒw te ka‹ pepaideum°now, éllå ka‹ t°ktvn xr!tai ka‹
skutotÒmow. ßkastow går kathgore›n peirçtai kayÉ ßkaston
prçgma ka‹ lÒgouw Íp°xein ka‹ §rvtçn ka‹ épokr¤nesyai, ˜yen
Ùry«w e‡rhntai dunãmeiw ka‹ tÚn noËn #m«n gumnãzein prÚw
élÆyeian.

In the title, katå sÊnocin  means only that this m°yodow  will not be organized by
lemmata, as is, for instance, Italos’ commentary on Topics 2–4, which draws
heavily on the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias. See the preface to
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca [CAG] II.2 pp. xlvii–l, where Wallies gives
a list of borrowings; and, for excerpts from Italos, M. Wallies, Die griechischen
Ausleger der Aristotelischen Topik (Berlin 1891) 24–27.
Line 1 ÑH =htorikØ m°yodÒw §stin  …: C. K. cite as Italos’ source Rhet. 1.2
(1355b25,) but the quotation is clearly not verbatim.
2 ént¤strofÒw §sti tª dialektikª : C. K. cite Rhet. 1.1 (1354a1) as Italos’ source.
11 ériymetik!w m¢n går ériymo‹  …: C. K. cite Rhet. 1.2 (1355b27ff).
13 dialektikØ d¢ ka‹ =htorikØ èpãntvn oÔsai dunãmeiw  …: C. K. cite Rhet. 1.1
(1354a4).
R. Kassel, Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica (Berlin/New York 1976), includes these
citations in his testimonia ad locc.

Italos begins by quoting Aristotle to the effect that rhetoric is the
counterpart of dialectic. The two arts differ in that rhetoric ad-
dresses judges and the people, whereas dialectic is addressed to one
interlocutor; the one is designed to deal with political questions, the
other with theoretical questions. Whereas dialectic reasons from
universal and particular premisses, rhetoric can argue from flawed
premisses and must take into consideration the condition of the
audience. Both, however, are not limited as regards subject matter;
and both are faculties that can train the mind to get to the truth.

Like others in the tradition who provide the versions of
Aristotle’s definition in, e.g., the prolegomena published by
Walz (e.g. Sopatros In Herm. stat. V p.15.18 Walz, where
rhetoric is called a dÊnamiw yevrhtikÆ) and Rabe (PS pp.29.6,
54.19, 103.11, etc.), Italos gets it almost right. His is the only
version that includes yevr!sai , but he calls it a m°yodow



416 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

instead of a dÊnamiw. While Aristotle does refer to m°yodow in
the Rhetoric, and explains that rhetoric’s job is tÚ piyanÚn
yevre›n  at Topics 6.12 (149b25–26), a more likely source for
Italos’ information is perhaps to be found in Alexander In Top.
(CAG II.2) p.1.4ff and ad 6.12 (149b25ff), p.484.17ff. This, as
previously noted, Italos knew intimately.

That rhetoric is the ént¤strofow of dialectic and that both can
argue both sides of a question is noted in Alexander In Top.
pp.3.25–26, 5.4ff, 519.23ff, etc.; and the comparisons with
arithmetic and geometry are taken up by Alexander at p.4.4ff.
In general, compare also In Top. pp.9.5–18 and 25.29–30.2.
Noticeably absent in Italos is any reference to enthymemes and
examples, the two chief modes of argument in Aristotle. On
rhetoric as useful to leather-cutters and carpenters, see e.g.
Alexander In Top. p.86.18ff and 227.2ff See also [Heliodoros]
Paraph. in Eth.Nic. 1.3 (1094b13ff), CAG  XIX.2 p.4.3ff (of
painters and modellers). Italos’ last observation that “these
wonderful powers” are valuable because “to be able to argue
about everything tÚn noËn #m«n gumnãzein prÚw élÆyeian” may
have been prompted by Alexander In Top. p.27.21ff. This claim
is made for dialectic by Aristotle at Top. 1.2 (101a25ff) (as
Italos noted in his ÉErvtÆsanta per‹ dialektik!w, dedicated to
Konstantinos’ brother Andronikos [C. 1.4, K. 3]), but not for
rhetoric. It does not seem necessary, in short, to look much
beyond Alexander of Aphrodisias for Italos’ information about
Aristotle on these aspects of rhetoric.

§2 (34.3–15 C. = 35.17–27 K.)
§pe‹ d¢ lÒgou dunãmeiw e‰nai tåw toiaÊtaw ¶famen ka‹ lÒgou toË
§n #m›n, diairet°on tÚn lÒgon dix«w efiw te tÚn proforikÚn ëma
ka‹ tÚn §ndiãyeton ka‹ toÊtvn •kãteron efiw ¶ntexnÒn te ka‹
êtexnon. ka‹ t!w m¢n diano¤aw t«n mer«n §at°on #m›n tØn
§j°tasin, toË d¢ proforikoË tÚ m¢n êtexnon sÊmbolon ¶stv
diano¤aw èpl«w, tÚ d¢ ¶ntexnon sÊmbolon ¶ntexnon diano¤aw
<diå`> fvn!w, ka‹ toÊtou to m¢n praktikÚn e‰nai Ípolept°on, tÚ



THOMAS M. CONLEY 417

d¢ yevrhtikÒn. sumbouleutikÚn m¢n går ka‹ dikanikÚn prak-
tikå êmfv: t“ m¢n går tÚ §k t!w sumboul!w aflretÒn, oÂon pÒlin
teix¤sai µ pÒlemon êrasyai, ékolouye›, t“ d¢ # timvr¤a t«n
kak«w diakeim°nvn. y°siw d¢ ka‹ §gk"mion yevrhtikã: # m¢n går
yevr¤an ¶xei mÒnon e‡te ±yikØn e‡te fusikØn e‡te ka‹ êllhn tinå
parå taÊtaw, tÚ dÉ §gk"mion t«n prosÒntvn aÎjhsin kal«n te
ka‹ mØ toioÊtvn.

Discourse must be divided into the inner (§ndiãyetow) and the
expressed (proforikÒw); and both of them into artistic and inartistic.
Putting aside an examination of the kinds of thinking, the two
species of artistic discourse can be subdivided into the practical and
the theoretical. The practical embraces deliberative and forensic
discourse; the theoretical includes philosophical and panegyric,
which consists in the amplification of the virtues of the subject or
their opposite.

The distinction between ¶ntexnow and êtexnow may bring
Aristotle to mind, but the same is found in the Anonymous In
Herm. Stas.  at PS p.209.9–10 and Sopatros at IV p.95.10–11
Walz. The division into logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos,
which C. finds in Doxapatres at II p.116.6–7 Walz (scholia on
Aphthonios), is brought in also at 89.26 and by Sopatros at V
p.1.11–12 Walz; and can be found also in e.g. Anon. In Stas. at
PS  p.184.1ff (= VII.1 p.1.20ff Walz), from Par.gr. 1983 and
2977—both tenth century; and the “excerpta” from Par.gr. 3032
(X cent.) (PS  pp.228.24–229.16). It is attributed to Theo-
phrastus by Athanasios (PS  p.188.7–8) and was widely
discussed in antiquity (see for instance Nemesius De natura
hominis 14 [pp.71–72 Morani], a work known well to Italos’
master, Psellos); but this distinction is not found in Aristotle
(see Conley [supra n.2] 225–226). It is interesting to note as well
that the division seems to be accepted as commonplace by
Psellos, as in e.g. Epist. 176.8 By contrast, however, even the

8 In E. Kurtz and F. Drexl, Michaelis Pselli Scripta minora II (Milan 1941)
451.27–452.4 (the letters published here are not the same as those published by
C. Sathas, Mesaionike Bibliotheke V [Venice/Paris 1876] 219–523).



418 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

earlier commentators seem to have been aware of the division of
the “kinds” of rhetoric Aristotle made on the basis of the kinds
of hearers: e.g. Anon. In Aphth. Prog. II p.630.20ff Walz; the
observations by Sopatros In stas. IV pp.51.26–52.25 Walz; the
“excerpta” from Par.gr. 3032 at PS  p.235.3ff; and cf. VII.2
p.1269.14ff Walz, from the commentary on Peri methodou
deinotêtos attributed to Gregory of Corinth (XII cent.); but Italos
seems here to follow a “neoplatonic” notion of “intrinsic”
differentia. For this whole section, compare Psellos’ sÊnociw t!w
=htorik!w (Poemata pp.103–122 Westerink) vv. 4–12.

§3 (34.16–35.6 C. = 35.28–36.6 K.)
t¤ m¢n oÈn §sti =htorikØ ka‹ t¤ diaf°rei dialektik!w, efirÆsyv §p‹
tosoËton. ékÒlouyon dÉ ín e‡h l°gein, p«w m¢n §n to›w politiko›w
¶xei tØn fisxÁn ka‹ po›a taËta ka‹ §n t¤ni tÚ xalepÚn ¶xei ka‹
t¤now p°fuken # =htorikØ ˆrganon ka‹ m°xri t¤now s“zei tØn
ofike¤an dÊnamin ka‹ t¤na prÚ taÊthw efid°nai Ùfe¤lomen ka‹ t¤w #
tãjiw, $n §n ta›w logika›w ¶xei §pistÆmaiw, ka‹ §p‹ pçsi t¤ tÚ
kãlliston t!w prokeim°nhw dunãmevw, …w ín §k toÊtvn
yevrhye¤h t!w paroÊshw pragmate¤aw ı skopÚw ka‹ prÚw tå
loipå ıdÚn ßjomen ka‹ mhd¢n égnoÆsvmen t«n §ndexom°nvn
prÚw tØn paroËsan gin"skesyai m°yodon.

This section lays out the order of discussion down to §11. The
eight questions to be addressed (p«w …, po›a  …, §n t¤ni  …, t¤now
…, m°xri t¤now …, t¤na prÚ taÊthw efid°nai  …, t¤w # tãjiw  …, §p¤ t¤
…) are clearly influenced by the approach used in the
“accessus” sections of the old prolegomena as well as by e.g.
Doxapatres; but Italos’ questions are not the same. Doxapatres
(PS  pp.127.24–128.3) lists the traditional headings in his
Commentary on Aphthonios’ Progymnasmata: ı skopÒw ,  tÚ
xrÆsimon , tÚ gnÆsion , # tãjiw t!w énagn"sevw , # afit¤a t!w
§pigraf!w , # efiw tå m°rh dia¤resiw , ı didaskalikÚw trÒpow , and
diå t¤ protet¤mhtai t«n êllvn ktl.  Compare also PS ##8, 11,
20, 32, and 33, where the same questions are treated. It should
of course be remembered that these accessus questions were gen-



THOMAS M. CONLEY 419

erated primarily to assist the student in understanding the work
at hand, tÚ parÚn bibl¤on , not the nature of the art of rhetoric
itself.9

§4 (35.7–15 C. = 36.7–14 K.)
politikå m¢n oÔn §ke›na =ht°on. ˜sa per‹ éret!w ¶xei tØn
§j°tasin oÈ pãshw, éllå t!w politik!w, kayÉ $n ka‹ poli-
teÊesyai efi"yamen, %toi prÚw éllÆlouw sunanastr°fesyai ka‹
s–zein ßkasta t«n §n t“ nÒmƒ diatetagm°nvn, …w ¶ni mãlista,
tÒ te kalÚn ka‹ tÚ d¤kaion ka‹ ˜sa §n toÊtoiw Ípãrxei para-
plÆsia,* œn dØ tØn ékrib! katanÒhsin ¶xein ¶rgon m¢n oÈ
=htorik!w plØn t«n œn éporrhtik«w ¶xomen ka‹ œn •ka-
t°rvyen toÁw lÒgouw fisxuroÁw e‰na¤ famen ka‹ piyanoÊw, t!w d¢
t«n ˆntvn §pistÆmhw ka‹ per‹ tå ényr"pina kataginom°nhw
prãgmata.

*C. and K. place a full stop here and give as a source Rhet. 1.4, 1359b6, which
appears to be a phantom reference.

Italos reminds his reader that rhetoric deals with what is
noble and just and accords with the law, explaining what he
means by politikã.  Such explanations are standard in the com-
mentary tradition: see e.g. the anonymous prolegomenon (from
Par.gr. 3032) at PS pp.39.16–40.10; Athanasios at pp.181.24–
182.9; and Markellinos at p.273.24ff. On lÒgouw fisxuroÊw  see
e.g. Alexander In Top. pp.458.31–459.3, ad 145b11.

§5 (35.16–23 C. = 36.15–21 K.)
§pe‹ d¢ dix«w tØn éretØn §gg¤nesya¤ fasin µ går proair°sei
pefÊkamen ¶xein aÈtØn µ trÒpon ßteron, tout°sti b¤&, œn yãte-
ron êxari ka‹ prÚw kak¤an épokl›non, oÈk érgÚn ¶dojen e‰nai
oÈdÉ épÚ logism«n lÒgƒ tØn toiaÊthn diãyesin ta›w dexom°naiw
cuxa›w §mpoie›n ka‹ êgein prÚw tÚ kalÒn. §n dØ toÊtoiw ka‹ tØn

9 On the traditional questions addressed in accessus literature see E. Quain,
“The Medieval Accessus ad auctores,” Traditio 3 (1945) 215–264, esp. 259;
and for a fuller account, J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled
Before the Study of an Author, or a Text (Leiden/New York 1994).



420 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

fisxÁn # =htorikØ k°kthtai, kathgoroËsa m°n œn de› kathgo-
re›n, sumbouleuom°nh d¢ tå efikÒta <ka‹> §k t«n dokoÊntvn
•kãstoiw toÁw lÒgouw poioum°nh …w e‡rhtai.
Rhetoric works its effects not through coercion, but reasoning; and so
it is able to establish the noble, tÚ kalÒn , in the souls of the listeners
or lead them to it. Rhetoric’s power enables one to accuse those who
ought to be accused and to deliberate on the basis of what seems to be
the case, tå efikÒta.

This “psychagogic” function of rhetoric is, of course, not
Aristotelian. See, however, Sardianus at PS p.214.13–14. On
virtue, compare the discussions at CAG  XX pp.235.6ff and
237.5ff, ad Eth.Nic. 5.10. This would be at odds in any event
with Aristotle as understood by [Heliodorus] ad Eth.Nic. 2.4
(CAG XIX.2 p.32.3–11). Closer to Italos here is the opusculum
by Psellos, “On the Voluntary and Involuntary.”10

§6 (35.24–36.5 C. = 36.22–6 K.)
tÚ d¢ m°giston ka‹ pãntvn xalep"taton êllvn tÚ per‹
prakt°vn dialabe›n, m°giston m¢n …w fronÆsevw ¶rgon ka‹
lÒgou §n°rgeia, xalepÚn d¢ …w per‹ mellÒntvn manteuÒmenon,
ì oÍ =ñdion §stin efipe›n mØ pepaideuom°non tÚn logismÒn. efi d°
tiw éporÆseie tãw te d¤kaw ımoË ka‹ toÁw §pa¤nouw e‰nai
logismoË fãskvn, oÈk êtopow ¶stai yumÚn t“ lÒgƒ ka‹
§piyum¤an prosãptvn.

Explanations of why frÒnhsiw and dealing with future events
are so difficult can be seen in e.g. [Heliodoros] on Eth.Nic. 6.6
(pp.119–120) and 6.9 (pp.123–124); but the idea goes back at
least to Isocrates, e.g. Against the Sophists 2.

§7 (36.6–37.5 C. = 36.23–37.6 K.)
§pe‹ d¢ e‡rhtai per‹ toÊtvn flkan«w, lekt°on ín e‡h metå taËta
t¤now p°fuken # paroËsa ˆrganon, kayãper e‡rhtai prÒteron,
ka‹ p«w xrhst°on tª meyÒdƒ ka‹ efi pãnta tå t!w Ípoy°sevw

10 Ed. D. O’Meara, Michaelis Pselli Philosophica minora II (Leipzig 1989)
108–109 #31.



THOMAS M. CONLEY 421

perilhpt°a taÊt˙ ka‹ po›a pragmatikå µ payhtikå t«n mer«n
ka‹ t¤na toÊtvn énagka›a ka‹ tina §ndexÒmena. p°fuke to¤nun
tª meyÒdƒ xr!syai kal«w ı pãntvn t«n kal«n §n §pistÆm.
genÒmenow ka‹ t¤ m¢n tÚ d¤kaion efid&w ka‹ tåw t«n êllvn éret«n
mesÒthtaw, t¤ d¢ tÚ megalÒcuxon ımoË ka‹ xaËnon, t¤ tÚ
•koÊsion ka‹ t¤ tÚ ékoÊsion ka‹ oÈk •koÊsion, t¤ te proa¤resiw
diaf°rei boulÆsevw ka‹ êmfv taËta §piyum¤aw ımoË ka‹ dÒjhw.
gelo›on går tå t!w t°xnhw ¶xein ˆrgana mØ tª t°xn. xr"menon
mhd° ti t«n §ke¤nhw §pistãmenon kal«n. t¤ går ˆfelow éndrÚw
mÆyÉ •aut“ mÆyÉ •t°roiw Ípoy°syai dunam°nou, t¤w m¢n éristÒw
§sti b¤ow ka‹ t¤ diaf°rei eÈdaimon¤aw éretØ ka‹ pÒteron
boulhtå êmfv µ ka‹ proairetå taËta; ¶oike d¢ # =htorikØ §k
te t!w dialektik!w ka‹ t!w per‹ tå %yh sugke›syai politik!w.*
diÚ kal«w 'xyai énagka›on to›w te lÒgoiw ımoË ka‹ to›w %yesi
tÚn per‹ toÊtvn dialhcÒmenon: ˘w går ¶tuxe dunatÚw énØr
pe¤yein, …w EÈrip¤dhw fhs¤n, ˆntvw kakÚw g¤netai pol¤thw noËn
oÈk ¶xvn. politikØ m¢n oÔn ka‹ =htorik!w x"riw, …w d°deiktai,
énagka›on, =htorikØ d¢ xvr‹w §ke¤nhw êxrhston ımoË ka‹
énÒnhton.

*C. cites as Italos’ source Rhet. 1.2 (1356a25–26) and 1.4 (1359b8–9).

Italos now turns to the foundations of the ˆrganon being discussed,
how it should be used, and what pragmatic and emotional factors it
should take into consideration. It is from this method that our
understanding of the noble and just grows, and of the means between
extremes that are all the other virtues, of the nature of high-
mindedness and foolishness alike, of the voluntary and the
involuntary, of choice and purpose, desire and sentiment, and the
like. Rhetoric, after all, is comprised of elements of dialectic and
politics; and if detached from the ethical, it is of no use.

It is not immediately clear what Italos means by ÍpÒyesiw
(line 3). He does not seem to be using it in the technical sense in
either rhetoric (see e.g. the anonymous prolegomenon to Her-
mogenes Peri staseôs, PS p.254.20ff; Doxapatres on Aphthonios,
PS p.130.16ff) or dialectic (Alexander In Top. p.82.15ff); but in



422 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

the broader sense of “argument,” as in the pseudo-Dionysian
T°xnh, e.g. 10.12 (p.367.18–19, 25), 10.19 (p.374.2). By Í p o -
y°syai , by contrast, he refers to a rhetorical exercise, as
[Dionysius] does similarly.

Concerns with the overlaps between rhetoric and ethics and
dialectic are hardly peculiar to Aristotle. In any event, many
comparable observations can be found in the commentary
traditions on both Topics and Eth.Nic.: cf. e.g. Alexander In Top.
pp.4.14ff, 183.5ff, 484.4ff (with regard to virtue as mesÒthw),
also 6.20ff and 95.21ff The differences between megalÒcuxow
and xaËnow, proa¤resiw and boÊlhsiw , and the rest are drawn
in the Nicomachean Ethics and commented on by Aspasius: e.g.
CAG  XIX.1 pp.58.4ff (ad 1109b30ff), 66.35ff (ad 1111b6–7),
108.2–14 (ad  1123a34). But closer to Italos may be the
opusculum by Psellos referred to above (§5), in which Psellos
draws extensively from Nemesios’ De natura hominis.

Cérétéli erroneously gives Orestes 897 as the source of Italos’
“quotation” from Euripides (kakÚw … oÈk ¶xvn ), which is in
fact from Bacchae 271. The existence of copies of that play in
circulation in the eleventh century is uncertain (there is no com-
mentary tradition); hence it is more likely that Italos quotes it
from some source such as Stobaeus Anth. 4.4.2 (II p.185 Hense).

§8 (37.6–38.7 C. = 37.7–27 K.)
˜ti m¢n oÔn §n toÊtoiw ¶xei tØn fisxÁn ka‹ ˜ti ˆrganon toË
politikoË filosÒfou, §k t«n efirhm°nvn fanerÒn. m°xri d¢ t¤now
s“zei tØn ofike¤an dÊnamin, nËn ín e‡h lekt°on ka‹ prÒteron
per‹ problhmãtvn aÈt«n. oÈ går pçn µ =htorikÚn ¶stai µ
dialektikÚn prÒblhma, kayãper oÈd¢ sofistikÚn µ §pi-
sthmonikÒn, éllå tå m¢n êmfv ¶xei tÒ te fãnai ımoË ka‹
épofãnai, tå d¢ tÚ t!w éntifãsevw yãteron mÒrion. ˜sa m¢n
oÔn toiaËtã §sti, oÈ =htorikå taËta nomist°on, éllÉ •t°raw
§pistÆmhw ka‹ t«n efirhm°nvn Íperkeim°nhw, ˜sa d¢ mÆ,
=htorik!w µ dialektik!w. §n toÊtoiw êra tØn ofike¤an dÊnamin …w
kat°rvyen dunam°nh §pixeire›n, …w e‡rhtai, oÈdÉ ín oÈd¢ m°xri



THOMAS M. CONLEY 423

pantÚw pe¤seien oÈdÉ §k pãntow fisxÊsei trÒpou efiw t°low égage›n
tÚ boulhy°n, éllÉ eån mhd¢n t«n §ndexom°nvn paral¤p˙,
flkan«w aÈtØn ¶xein fÆsomen t!w ofike¤aw éret!w. prÚ d¢ taÊthw
ka‹ ı per‹ épofãnsevw lÒgow ka‹ sxhmãtvn ka‹ ˜sa §n to›w
énalutiko›w per‹ toÊtvn e‡rhtai ãnth énagkaiÒtata. diÚ metå
tåw efirhm°naw pragmate¤aw # =htorikØ t°taktai …w §ke¤nvn
prÚw =htore¤an xrhs¤mvn Íparxous«n: ka‹ går sullogism“
xr!tai t“ §nyumÆmati ka‹ §pagvgª t“ parade¤gmati,* ì oÈk
¶jesti =htoreÊein égnooËnta. trix«w to¤nun ˆntow toË t«n
épode¤jevn g°nouw ka‹ toË m¢n ±yikoË, toË d¢ payhtikoË, toË
d¢ logikoË, §k m¢n t«n énalutik«n tÚ logikÚn ¶xomen, §k d¢ t«n
±yik«n tå loipã. per‹ går prãjeiw ka‹ pãyh # ±yikÆ, ka‹ e‡per
êllo ti énagka¤a t“ =Ætori. ka‹ går yumÚn §ge›rai ka‹
katapaËsai ÙrgØn ka‹ têlla ˜sa toÊtoiw paraplÆsia pãyh
édÊnaton ín dÒjeie to›w mØ tØn ±yikØn metioËsin.

*Cereteli sees here a reference to Rhet. 1.2 (1356a2–3).

On rhetoric dealing with “particulars,” cf. e.g. the Anonymous
at VI pp.16–17 Walz (found in Par.gr. 3032, among other MSS.);
and on the use of enthymemes, etc.—which is in the Rhetoric, to
be sure—see e.g. Alexander In Top. pp.62.6–63.19 and 86.4ff,
Italos’ most likely source. The point is, however, commonplace.
See e.g.  P S  p.240.22ff. The division trix«w  into ±yikÒw ,
payhtikÒw, and logikÒw  appears at e.g. In Top. p.190.9ff and at
the beginning of Minoukianos Per‹ §pixeireimãtvn  IX
pp.601.10–602.13 Walz. See also Syrianos I 57pp..19–58.4
Rabe (and compare Planudes at V pp.506.13–507.3 Walz).

§9 (38.8–39.12 C. = 37.28–38.16 K.)
e‡dh d¢ =htorik!w ofl m¢n yevrhtikÚn ka‹ praktikÚn ¶fasan, ofl
d¢ prostiy°asi ka‹ tr¤ton tÚ §jetastikÒn, …w tå m¢n êlla §n
to›w dikazom°noiw, tÚ d¢ §n to›w dikãzousin énãgkh e‰nai. diÚ ka‹
éntikeim°nvw ¶xein doke› §jetastikÚn ımoË ka‹ proo¤mion ka‹
éllÆlvn énairetikã. …w går §p¤pan diastr°fein doke› tÚn
dikastØn §jetastikÚn mØ ˆnta ka‹ t!w efirhm°nhw diay°sevw



424 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

éllÒtrion, kénteËyen ín e‡h d!lon …w oÈk ée‹ paralhpt°on
t“ =Ætori oÈdÉ §pil°gein ée‹ énagka›on: ka‹ går pãyouw §st‹
kinhtikÚn ka‹ énãmnhsiw ¶xon ka‹ tØn sÊstasin éfÉ œn tå
proo¤mia. diÚ payhtikå m¢n êmfv ka‹ oÈ m°rh èpl«w, éllå
perittÒn ti doke› ka‹ kakoËrgon prooimiazesya¤ te ka‹
§pil°gein. xrÆsima d¢ taËta oÈk §n ÉAreivpãgƒ oÈdÉ ˜pou
dikasta‹ basile›w µ érxiere›w µ ka¤ tinew êlloi t!w élhye¤aw
éntipoioÊmenoi, oÈdÉ §n oÂw ¶naulow ı lÒgow* diå smikrÒthta
xrÆsimon tÚ §pil°gein. DiÆghsiw d¢ énagka¤a ka‹ p¤stiw: ˘ går
ín tiw épode›jai peir“to, toËto ka‹ dihgÆsaito <ín> prÒteron,
efi mhd°n ti t«n dusp¤stvn épant–h. diÚ ka‹ énagkasyÆsetai
to›w m°resi xrÆsasyai énãpalin (ka‹ går piyan"teron) ka‹
tØn diÆghsin pistot°ron épergãsetai. §n¤ote d° diÆghsiw ımoË
ka‹ p¤stiw sumbÆsetai katå m°row: to›w går kairo›w summeta-
bãllesyai efi"yasin ofl égvnizÒmenoi ka‹ prÚw toÁw éntid¤kouw
n¤stasyai paradÒjvw oÈ prÚw télhy°w, éllå prÚw tÚ dokoËn
ßkastow épobl°pvn ka‹ …w ín tÚn dikastØn §k pantÚw pe¤seie
trÒpou. diÚ ka‹ Plãtvn ¶oike diabãllein oÈ =htorikÆn, éllå
kakoÆyeian, ˜yen ofl m¢n diå ploËton, ofl d¢ diÉ élazÒneian,** ofl
d¢ diÉ êllaw oÈk §painetåw diay°seiw =htorikØn meti°nai do-
koËsi. marture› d¢ ka‹ tÚ §n ta›w pÒlesin ÍpÚ t«n p ãlai
=htÒrvn gegenhm°nvn. éllå toÊtvn m°n ëliw, ka‹ t!w paroÊshw
pragmate¤aw oÈk éllÒtrion.

*C. K. (followed by Kassel) see here a reference to Rhet. 3.13 (1414b4–6).
** Kassel sees here a reference to Rhet. 1.2 (1356a29–30).

To the species (e‡dh) yevrhtikÒn/praktikÒn should be added a third,
§jetastikÒn. It is not always necessary to include both a prooimion
and an epilogue, which works on the emotions and is redundant when
it simply repeats what was said in the opening. Such prooimia are
not useful before the Areopagus, however, nor when the judges are
rulers (basile›w) or church authorities (érxiere›w). The narration
(diÆghsiw) and argument (p¤stiw), by contrast, are always required;
although sometimes the narration itself amounts to an argument.

It may seem tempting here to see Italos follow “Aristotle” in
the Ad Alexandrum by bringing in exetastikos, but the term is



THOMAS M. CONLEY 425

found all over in Alexander’s commentary on the Topics (e.g. at
pp.28.17, 69.24, 147.18, 157.14, etc.); and see for instance
Doxapatres’ lectures on Aphthonios at II p.118.6ff Walz. The
same lore (understanding political and dicanic rhetoric as
“practical” and panegyric as “theoretic,” i.e., regarded as a
spectacle) can be found in Syrianos as well, e.g. at II p.11.21ff
Rabe, IV p.60.9–14 Walz. It is not necessary to cite Eth.Nic.
1414b4–6 as Italos’ source. These matters are standard in the
treatments of tå ¶rga t!w =htorik!w, as e.g. Doxapatres In
Aphthonii progymnasmata, PS pp.125.21–126.21.

Italos seems to follow Aristotle Eth.Nic. 1.1 (1354a21ff) on
the practices permitted before the Areopagus, and 3.14 and 19
in pointing out that prooimia and epilogoi are not always
necessary. On the Areopagus lore, however, see the anonymous
prolegomenon to Hermogenes’ Inv., at VII.1 pp.64.8–65.6 Walz,
from the tenth-century Par.gr. 2977. Aristotle, moreover, cer-
tainly did not believe that a narration was virtually a pistis in
itself (cf., to the contrary, Rhet. 3.13 [1414a30ff]). Italos is
perhaps making an inference from the traditional lore that holds
piyanÒthw to be one of the virtues of a good narration: see e.g.
Doxapatres on Aphthonios, II pp.234.1–240.5 Walz, where
Doxapatres also reports the opinions of John Geometres. Nor of
course did Aristotle have anything to say about basile›w  or
érxiere›w ; but we do find the same idea—indeed, almost the
same wording—as that here in Italos in the prolegomena to
Planudes’ commentary on Hermogenes Inv. (at V p.365.25ff
Walz), most of which was compiled from much earlier scholia,
mainly, it seems, Par.gr. 2977.

§10 (39.13–18 C. = 38.16–20 K.)
t¤ d¢ tÚ t!w =htorik!w kãlliston, énagka›on efipe›n metå taËta,
t«n går érxaiot°rvn ofl m¢n sunyÆkhn Ùnomãtvn ”Æyhsan, ofl
d¢ tÚ piyanÒn, ofl d¢ ka‹ ßterÒn ti dokoËn aÈto›w. fa¤netai d¢
oÈd¢n t«n efirhm°nvn toioËton: tØn går ÍpÒkrisin ofl
xari°steroi ka‹ ofl pollo‹ l°gousin: 'yow går Ípemfa¤nousa



426 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

t«n pros"pvn y°lgei …w §p¤pan tÚn ékroatÆn.

Some of the older authorities say the best (kãlliston) part of
the art resides in composition (sunyÆkh), others in persuasive-
ness (piyanÒn), and so on. But it appears to be none of the
aforementioned. Those with better judgment (ofl xari°steroi)—
who are indeed many—say it is delivery (ÍpÒkrisiw), for that is
what enchants (y°lgei) the average hearer (…w •p¤pan tÚn
ékroatÆn).

 For this peculiar power of delivery, see the similar obser-
vation by Athanasios, PS p.177.5ff (citing Theophrastus: fr.712
Fortenbaugh/Huby/Sharples). One of the “older [i.e. more tra-
ditional] authorities” Italos refers to may be his teacher, Psellos;
cf. V p.598.4–7 Walz, from Psellos’ Peri synthekês. Psellos says
elsewhere, however, just what Italos does: see the Peri rhetorikês
attributed to him.11 Aristotle, of course, recognizes the power of
ÍpÒkrisiw , but rejects it as belonging more properly to “the
actor’s art” (Rhet. 3.1 [1403b35–1404a8]).

§11 (39.19–40.14 C. = 38.21–25 K.)
éllÉ §peidØ ka‹ %youw §mnÆsyhmen, f°re per‹ aÈtoË e‡pvmen,
˜sa to›w paroËsi lÒgoiw prosÆkei, dielÒntew efiw politikÒn te
ka‹ =htorikÒn, œn tÚ m¢n filosof¤aw e‰nai doke›, tÚ d¢ t!w
paroÊshw pragmate¤aw. tÚ går ˆntvw zhte›n kalÒn te ka‹
d¤kaion …w pragmate¤aw •t°raw pãlai prÚw ÑErmog°nouw Ùry«w
e‡rhtai, §n d¢ to›w paroËsi per‹ aÈt«n dior¤sai xalepÒn.
ÜEpetai d¢ t“ %yei gn"mh ka‹ l°jiw ka‹ t°xnh. ka‹ dØ ka‹
diairet°on tÚ 'yow ka‹ ériym“ diorist°on prÒteron. diaire›tai
to¤nun katå ¶ynh ka‹ g°nh ka‹ #lik¤aw ka‹ proair°seiw ka‹
tÊxaw ¶ti te ka‹ §pithdeÊmata. mime›syai går §n to›w lÒgoiw tØn
toË l°gontow prosÆkei fvnØn efidÒta ékrib«w, pÒteron ÜEllhn
µ bãrbarow ı toioËtow, ÉAyhna›ow µ Spartiãthw. fa¤netai d¢ mØ
to›w aÈto›w e‰nai tå aÈtå, éllå to›w m¢n êgrion e‰nai ka‹

11 In M. Papillon and L. Brisson, Longin Fragmenta. Rufus Ars rhétorique
(Paris 2001) 211.73–76. Psellos’s source was identified as Longinus by P.
Gautier, “Michel Psellos et la Rhétorique de Longin,” Prometheus 3 (1977)
193–203.



THOMAS M. CONLEY 427

fonikÚn tÚ 'yow ka‹ prÚw émÊnasyai •toimÒtaton, to›w d¢ polÁ
diaf°rein nvyre¤& te ka‹ suntom¤& ka‹ égr¤& ka‹ deil¤&, kayå
dØ ka‹ SkÊyai diaf°rousi Kelt«n ka‹ FrÊgew Mus«n ka‹ êlloi
êllvn, sof¤& te ka‹ sun°sei, Àsper Xalda›o¤ te ka‹ AfigÊptioi
ka‹ e‡ tinew êlloi toÊtoiw paraplÆsioi.

Discussion of the speaker’s gn"mh, l°jiw, and t°xnh comes after some
observations on 'yow. 'yow may be divided along the lines of race
(¶ynow), lineage (g°now), age (#lik¤aw), moral choices (proair°seiw),
fortunes (tÊxaw), and accomplishments (§pithdeÊmata). One’s diction
is a sure sign of what sort of person one is (e.g. cruel [êgriow] or craven
[deilÒw]) or of one’s native culture.

Italos wants to distinguish betweeen rhetorical/political con-
siderations about êthos and philosophical analyses of it, recall-
ing no doubt the distinction drawn by [Dionysius] at Technê
p.375.9ff or the observations Hermogenes makes at Staseis 1.1
(pp.28.3–29.6 Rabe) (or the remarks by the commentator ad loc.
at e.g. VII pp.114.3–115.24 Walz and the scholia printed by
Walz at p.114).

On gn"mh, l°jiw , and t°xnh  and the components of 'yow here,
the most striking parallel is again [Dionysios] Technê 11,
p.375.4–5, and the discussions at 377.5ff: the dia¤resiw—
¶ynow , g°now, #lik¤a , proa¤reseiw , tÊxai, §pithdeÊmata—is the
same as that at 377.15–16.

The cruelty of the Skythians and Kelts, the cowardice of the
Phrygians and Mysians, and the wisdom of the Chaldaeans and
Egyptians were commonplace even in antiquity. For a general
survey see A. Dihle, Die Griechen und die Fremden (Munich
1994).

In the sections that follow, gnomê is taken up in §13, technê in
§14, lexis in §15, a distribution also based on [Dionysius] at
Technê 11.7–9 (pp.381.11–386.11).

§12 (40.15–41.19 C. = 39.1–21 K.)
§pe‹ oÔn e‡rhtai per‹ toÊton flkan«w, lekt°on ín e‡h per‹ t«n
•j!w ka‹ pr«ton per‹ g°nouw, efi patÆr §stin ı l°gvn ka‹ patØr



428 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

bãrbarow µ n°ow tØn #lik¤an. de› går tå toiaËta sumpl°kein
éllÆloiw tãw te proair°seiw ımoË ka‹ tåw tÊxaw, §n¤ote d¢ ka‹
tå loipå ékoloÊyvw to›w efirhm°noiw strathg«n µ =htÒrvn µ
kolãkvn µ filargÊrvn µ êllvw gevrg«n µ l¤xnvn: §k dØ
toÊtvn oÈ mÒnon ÍpÒkrisin, éllå ka‹ prÒtasin ımoË ka‹
p¤stin sxo¤hmen ín flkan«w. ka‹ går §k t!w t«n trÒpvn diaforçw
diatriba‹ g¤nontai ka‹ d¤aitai kék toÊtvn %yh, ka‹ toÊtoiw
pãlin énalÒgvw afl prãjeiw, éfÉ œn ofl lÒgoi ka‹ per‹ ìw # kr¤siw.
de› d¢ mØ lanyãnein …w oÈ mÒnon toË l°gontow Ípokr¤nesyai
énagka›on tÚn trÒpon, éllå prÚw ˜n ı lÒgow ka‹ per‹ œn. …w
går tÚ prãttein oÈ mÒnon ì de› kalÚn ka‹ …w de›, éllå ka‹ ˜te
ka‹ ˘son ka‹ prÚw oÓw pros!kon §sti ka‹ §n oÂw, oÏtv ka‹ tÚ
l°gein xrhsim"taton, efi tØn éretØn Ípemfa¤nei toË l°gontow ka‹
tØn zvØn énep¤lhpton ka‹ tØn proa¤resin énejapãthton.
xrÆsimon d¢ toËto oÈ =Ætorsi mÒnon, éllå ka‹ basileËsi ka‹
nomoy°taiw ka‹ sxedÚn ëpasi to›w m°llousin Ùry«w §n ta›w
pÒlesi diatr¤bein. oÈ går #don!w xãrin tÚ l°gein oÈd¢ toË
§japatçn tÚ prosdialegÒmenon µ katepa¤resyai t«n égn"tvn
(toËto går eÎhyew), éllå toË tØn éretØn katoryoËn ka‹
émÊnesyai per‹ pãtrhw, …w fhsin ÜOmhrow  [Il. 13.243]. de› d¢
kayãper mhtr‹ ka‹ patr¤di bohye›n éretØn kayãper trofe›a
taÊt. parexÒmenon. marture› d¢ t“ lÒgƒ Dhmosy°nhw Íp¢r
ÑEllÆnvn kinduneÊsaw, efi ka‹ Perd¤kkaw ÉAyÆnhsi misyÚn Íp¢r
toË l°gein ép(tei.

Lineage, age, and the rest determine one’s style and delivery, hence
one’s believability, if they are all consistent with one another. One
must keep in mind the mode of delivery of the speaker, to whom, and
about what he is speaking. The appearance of good moral character
depends on these. This is important not only for public speakers, but
also for kings and lawmakers; for they speak not just for the sake of
pleasure or of fooling the hearer, but also to set them on the road to
virtue.

Cérétéli notes the parallels in this section with Hermogenes
Stas. 3 (29.4–5 Rabe) and Id. 2.3 (304.5ff Walz = 321.5ff Rabe); 



THOMAS M. CONLEY 429

and there are also similar discussions in Doxapatres on Aph-
thonios (II p.500.3ff) Walz and in [Dionysius] Technê 6 (p.
380.5ff). For the list of “characters,” compare Theon Progymn. I
p.116.1ff Walz. Once again, we seem to be dealing with mater-
ial shared by many writers on rhetoric.
 At the end, both C. and K. print PrÒdikow, giving in the
apparatus prdikow  as the MS. reading. This cannot be right. The
reference here may be to the example of Perdikkas in Dem.
13.24 (taken out of context).

§13 (41.20–42.18 C. = 39.22–40.7 K.)
per‹ m¢n oÔn %youw ka‹ p«w diaret°on, efirÆsyv tå toiaËta.
ßpetai d¢ ékoloÊyvw ka‹ per‹ gn"mhw efipe›n ka‹ prÒteron t¤
§stin. ÉAristot°lhw to¤nun tØn toË §pieikoËw ¶fhsen ékrib!
kr¤sin, tÚ d¢ §pieik! §lattvtikÚn e‰nai t«n dika¤vn. efi oÔn
ékribe›w ˜ tÉ §pieikØw ımoË ka‹ # kr¤siw, ékribe¤aw ín e‡h ka‹ #
gn"mh. toËto d¢ tÚ mÆtÉ §llip°w mÆte perittÚn mÆte ti §nant¤on §n
•aut“ ¶xon: tÚ m¢n går ésyene¤aw ÍpÒdeigma, tÚ d¢ teryre¤aw,
tÚ d¢ ép¤yanon ımoË ka‹ akÒzhlon ka‹ oÈ mikrÚn §pif°ron
§n¤ote to›w l°gousi k¤ndunon. de› d¢ metre›n to›w te kairo›w ımoË
ka‹ to›w prãgmasin, ¶ti d¢ ta›w t«n dikast«n µ §kklhsiast«n
diay°sesi tÚ =htoreÊein ımoË ka‹ l°gein. toËto d¢ xalepÚn
dior¤sai t“ lÒgƒ (§n går to›w kayÉ ßkasta tå toiaËta. diÚ
§mpeir¤aw de›tai ka‹ xrÒnou ka‹ afisyÆsevw), ÍpÚ d¢ toË lÒgou
bohye›syai pãnu énagkaiÒtaton: m°tron går toË l°gein
êriston tÚ •kat°rvyen feÊgein tåw efirhm°naw kak¤aw ka‹ mhd°n
ti t«n §jagvn¤vn §nyume›syai. éllÉ §ãn ti toioËton sumba¤h, §j
énãgkhw de› katafeÊgein §p‹ tå prãgmata µ §p‹ toÁw dikaståw µ
§p‹ toÁw éntid¤kouw aÈtoÁw ka‹ prÒfasin ¶xein eÎlogon, …w
§ke¤nouw ˆntaw afit¤ouw toË oÏtv dial°gesyai.

As for gn"mh, we may ask what it is: it is the good judgement (ékribØ
kr¤siw) of a reasonable man (§pieikÆw) that neither falls short of or
exceeds what is appropriate. Compare [Dionysius] at Technê
pp.382.15–17, 384.17–21. The main consideration here is the ability
to size up the situation and stick to the point.



430 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

The definition of gnomê comes from Eth.Nic. 6.11 (1143a20–
21). The discussion here should be read against the background,
perhaps, of the materials collated by Eustratios on Eth.Nic. 6.11
(CAG XX pp.371.15ff, 373.21–22); and on epieikeia, see Alexan-
der In Top. p.225.8ff. The “mean” appealed to here is cast in
commonplace terms, but compare [Dionysius] 382.15. There is
an echo of Italos’ analysis also at In Top. pp.183.5ff (citing
Eth.Nic. 2.8 [1108b5ff]) and 432.2ff.

§14 (42.18–43.4 C. = 40.8–16 K.)
metå dØ taËta trept°on tÚn lÒgon ep‹ tØn t°xnhn ka‹ deikt°on,
…w e‡h parå tØn gn"mhn, §peidØ taÈtÚn ¶doj° tisi: tÚ går m°tron
kekt!syai ka‹ ésfãleian §n t“ l°gein t°xnhw ên e‡h ka‹ t°xnhw
ér¤sthw. diaf°rei d¢ oÈ m¤kron t“ tØn m¢n gn"mhn kr¤nein ‡svw
ka‹ §pitãttein tå efirhm°na, tØn d¢ t°xnhn poie›n. tãxa <dÉ> ín
tiw Ùry«w kr¤nein §re› tØn gn"mhn, efi katå t°xnhn kr¤nein. …w
går tÚ kr¤nein toË poie›n ßteron, oÏtv ka‹ gn"mh t°xnhw. éllå
prooimiãsasyai m¢n Ùry«w ka‹ dihgÆsasyai ékrib«w ka‹
§pixeir!sai piyan«w t°xnhw ín ¶ih èpl«w, tÚ d¢ mÆte perittå
mÆte §llip! fy°gjasyai gn"mhw.

It is important to keep in mind the difference between gnomê and
technê. The former provides the basis for judgment (kr¤nein) and the
latter for production (poie›n). The soundness of a speaker’s gn"mh lies
mainly in his respect for the mean: mÆte perittå mÆte §llip!.

At p.382.15ff of the Technê, [Dionysius] lays down the same
criteria, adding mØ §nant¤a.  Mastery of the technê, Italos says
here, enables one to begin rightly (Ùry«w), lay out the narrative
precisely, and argue (§pixeir!sai) persuasively.

§15 (43.5–15 C. = 40.17–25 K.)
tØn d¢ l°jin dieukrinht°on t“ tØn m¢n poihtikØn e‰nai µ
tragikØn, tØn d¢ dikanikØn µ flstorikØn, ka‹ efi Jenof«ntow µ
YeopÒmpou µ ÉAristot°louw µ ÉArxilÒxou. prÚw går toÁw pa-
laioÁw sfçw •autoÁw énap°mpontew ka‹ toÊtouw ˜son dunatÚn
§kmimoÊmenoi yarre›n ¶xomen perigen°syai toË prãgmatow ka‹



THOMAS M. CONLEY 431

zhlvto‹ pçsi kayesthk°nai. §n går §ke¤noiw oÈ tª l°jei
douleÊei tå noÆmata, éllå tå §n tª fvnª t«n §n tª cuxª
payhmãtvn kay°sthke sÊmbola. tÚ dÉ énãpalin eÎhyew ımoË
ka‹ êtexnon prÚw t“ douloprep¢w e‰nai ka‹ éndr«n égora¤vn:
douloprep¢w går tÚ <toË> kre›tton Ípotãttein t“ xe¤roni ka‹
fy°ggesyai mØ nooËnta ka‹ mØ afide›syai ésxhmonoËnta.

Varieties of l°jiw may be distinguished by genre (poetic or tragic and
dicanic or historical), or by reference to individual authors (Xeno-
phon or Theopompus, Aristotle or Archilochus). The ancients did not
let their choice of words determine their thoughts (noÆmata), but
what is set out orally (§n tª fvnª) are symbola of what they felt in
their souls. One must be careful not to seem lowly.

I know of no comparable analysis of l°jiw  except for that in
[Dionysius] Technê  p.386.12ff, where we get dikanikÒn ,
flstorikÒn , dialektikÒn (!), and kvmikÒn.  Italos’ remark about ofl
palaio¤ as models for imitation is reminiscent of observations
made by [Dionysius] at pp.373–374; and see also the scholia
minora from Marc.gr. 433 (XI cent.) printed by Walz at VII
p.868 n.28.

§16 (43.16–44.21 C. = 40.26–41.8 K.)
taËta m¢n går oÏtv* divr¤syv, leg°syv d¢ metå taËta per‹
problhmãtvn ka‹ pÒsa g°nh aÈt«n ka‹ t¤na taËta ka‹ po›a
m¢n toÊtvn =htorikã, po›a d¢ sofistikå µ dialektikã. ¶sti
to¤nun prÒblhma zÆthsiw §j §ndÒjvn prÚw prçjin µ yevr¤an
sunte¤nousa. per‹ )w éntifatik«w dojãzousin ofl égvnizÒmenoi.
diÚ ka‹ stãsiw parå to›w palaio›w k°klhtai. tÚ går “énti-
fatik«w” taÈtÚn ín ¶ih t“ “stasiastik«w,” kénteËyen d!lon,
…w oÈ pçn prÒblhma stãsiw, éllÉ ˜sa katå =htorikØn
tugxãnei m°yodon µ dialektikØn émfot°rvn éntistrÒfvn Ípar-
xous«n: tå går ériymhtikå µ gevmetrikå zhtÆmata tugxãnei
oÈ stãsiw.** §pe‹ d¢ pçn prÒblhma lÒgow §st‹n épofantikÒw,
pçn d¢ toioËton Ípoke¤menon ¶xei ka‹ kathgoroÊmenon, énãgkh
tÚ kathgoroÊmenon µ …w efid«n µ …w ˜ron µ …w ‡dion µ <…w>
sumbebhkÚw kathgore›syai, ka‹ tå m¢n =htorikå §k sumbe-



432 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

bhkÒtvn ¶xei tØn érxÆn, tå d¢ sofistikå µ dialektikå §j
èpãntvn: per‹ går pãntow toË protey°ntow efis‹ problÆmata.
diaf°rei d¢ # sofistikØ t!w m¢n =htorik!w t“ kayÒlou e‰nai, t!w
d¢ dialektik!w t“ e‰nai =htorikÆ: =htorikØ går §sti filo-
sofoËsa. e‡dh d¢ problhmãtvn …w m¢n épÚ g°nouw, e‡rhtai
prÒteron, …w d¢ xarakt!rew §j fide«n sugke¤menoi §n to›w
•pom°noiw, …w d¢ poiå ˆnta §n t“ parÒnti =hyÆsetai. ¶sti d¢ tå
toiaËta µ panhgurikØn ¶xonta poiÒthta µ dikanikØn, µ
payhtikØn µ ±yikØn µ miktÆn. ˜sa m¢n oÔn m°geyow ¶xei ka‹
lamprÒthta ka‹ katoryvmãtvn éfÆghsiw, taËta panhgurikå
ín ¶ih t“ sxÆmati. ˜sa d¢ per‹ cil!w d¤khw ¶xei tØn ém-
fisbÆthsin, dikanikã. efi d¢ pãyouw efis‹ kinhtikå µ ±y«n ¶mfasin
¶xonta, tå toiaËta payhtikå µ ±yikå kale›tai, tå dÉ §j
èpãntvn ¶xonta tØn fisxÁn, miktã. ßkaston d¢ toioÊtvn prÒsv-
pon ¶xon §n •aut“ ka‹ prãgmata ¶ndoja ¶ndojon e‰nai l°getai
katå tÚ prÒsvpon, efi dÉ êmfv ¶ndoja. ka‹ ı trÒpow …saÊtvw, efi
d¢ tå m¢n oÏtvw ¶xei, tå d¢ êllvw, émf¤doja. efi d¢ parå tØn t«n
poll«n dÒjan Ípãrxonta, efikÒtvw ín klhye¤h parãdoja.

* So both C. and K.., but taËta m¢n oÔn … seems preferable.
** C. K.: tugxãnonta oÈ stãseiw.

Now we should say something about the kinds of problÆmata that
are proper to rhetoric (as opposed to sophistical and dialectical). A
prÒblhma is an inquiry bearing on theory or practice based on accepted
opinions (§j §ndÒjvn ) on an issue about which—as is not the case in
arithmetic or geometry—there seem to be contrary propositions that
give rise to a stasis. A rhetorical problêma is like a dialectical one in
that, since every problêma is a logos apophantikos  ( i.e., an assertion,
not a question), we need to proceed by defining and dividing the
issues to be addressed (compare Alexander In Top. pp.36.28–37.23).
Rhetorical problêmata involve particulars (compare Alexander
p.37.20ff), and all the different kinds of discourse are marked by
different qualities. Sophistic differs from rhetoric in being universal,
and from dialectic in being rhetorical, for sophistic is rhetoric
“philosophizing.”

Compare also the lore about rhetorical problêmata with e.g. PS
pp.208.4ff, 256.3ff. This subject is, in any event, of considerable



THOMAS M. CONLEY 433

concern to commentators on the Topics: see e.g. Alexander at
pp.82.12–83.2, etc. Italos’ explanation of s t ã s i w  is
commonplace (cf. Syrianos at II pp.48–49 Rabe, Sopatros at IV
p.199.5–6 Walz, and e.g. PS pp.211.9–10, 292.22–23, 330.3ff).
Interestingly, this is the only place in the M°yodow where Italos
mentions stãsiw, a topic he discusses in one of his “quod-
libetical” questions, #61 in ÉApor¤ai ka‹ lÊseiw (pp.83–84
Joannou). Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that Italos
says nothing about tÒpoi  in his synopsis, which would be sur-
prising if he was in fact trying to epitomize Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
As an expert dialectician, he would certainly have recognized
the importance of, and functions of, tÒpoi  in rhetorical ar-
gumentation.

The notion of a =htorikØ filosofoËsa  goes back at least to
Philostratos (V S  480), but see also Psellos Epist.  174 (V
p.442.15–16 Sathas) and his Chronographia 6.197, where he
says that rhetoric can ta›w … §nno¤aiw filosofe›.

§17 (44.22–45.17 C. = 41.9–25 K.)
§pe‹ d¢ pçsan m°yodon épodeiktikØn ¶k tinvn e‰nai énagka›on,
kayãper §n to›w énalutiko›w e‡rhtai, de› mØ mÒnon §p‹ t«n
êllvn, éllå ka‹ §p‹ t!w =htorik!w ımo¤vw ¶xein. §p‹ m¢n oÔn
t«n êllvn §pisthm«n e‡rhntai afl érxa‹ ka‹ ˘n trÒpon
lambãnousin ofl kayÉ ßkasthn §pistÆmhn ka‹ éfÉ œn, §p‹ d¢ t!w
=htorik!w lel°jetai nËn. ¶sti går labe›n tå toiaËta §k t«n
•pom°nvn to›w l°gousin µ kayÉ œn ı lÒgow §st‹n µ Íp¢r œn
diisxur¤zontai •kãteroi: ßkastow går t«n e‡te legÒntvn µ
prattÒntvn poiÒw t¤w §sti katã te tÚ t!w cux!w 'yow ka‹ tØn
§ktÚw §n°rgeian. ì §piskope›n de› …w t«n êllvn a‡tia ka‹ per‹
œn ı lÒgow. §p‹ m¢n oÔn t«n legÒntvn mçllon ±yik«w µ
payhtik«w, )tton d¢ logik«w §pixeirht°on, §p‹ d¢ t«n
prattÒntvn µ prajãntvn % ti toioËton mellÒntvn poie›n
énãpalin. tÚ m¢n går logik«w §pixeire›n fisxurÒterÒn pvw …w
b¤aion ka‹ prÚw toÁw lÒgƒ Íper°xontaw prote¤nesyai
énagkaiÒtaton, tÚ d¢ payhtik«w µ ±yik«w )tton m°n ti fisxÊei tª



434 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

t°xn˙, §n¤ote d¢ ka‹ meg¤sthn §nde¤knutai tØn dÊnamin …w —n
èploËn ti ka‹ éper¤ergon ka‹ dokoËn mçllon tª élhye¤&
stoixe›n katå <toÁw> polloÊw.* toËto d¢ g¤netai dix«w: µ går
fyÒnƒ t«n poll«n prÚw toÁw §n =htore¤& tugxãnontaw µ
ÍpolÆcei tª per‹ aÈt«n toÊtvn …w dialogom°nvn piyan«w ka‹
kakourgoÊntvn §n ta›w pÒlesin.

*katå pÒllouw  C. K.

As it is necessary to look into the argumentative method in any
branch of knowledge, so too in the case of rhetoric. One must take into
consideration who is speaking, about what, and what each side is
declaring about it, for speakers and actors have their own particular
qualities, either because of inner character or outside influences. In
speaking (rhetorically), it is more necessary to argue with character
and emotion than with logic, whereas in acting it is the opposite.
Character and emotion are less weighty technically, but sometimes
arguing forcefully and seeming closer to the truth arouses the ill will
of the many toward those who have the floor or the impression that
they may be acting badly in civil affairs.

Italos here betrays a dialectical bias, but conveys some com-
mon sense about rhetorical argumentation. Unlike dialectical
arguments, his point seems to be, rhetorical arguments are
determined by particular circumstances and intentions; and
rigorous, unemotional arguments are likely to put audiences off.

§18 (45.18–26 C. = 41.26–32 K.)
lambãnetai d¢ tå §j œn ofl lÒgoi ¶k te t!w t«n legÒntvn Ípoc¤aw
µ prattÒntvn, …w e‡rhtai, µ §k t«n pragmãtvn aÈt«n faner«n
ˆntvn oÈx …w kak«w pepragm°nvn ÍpÉ aÈt«n µ kal«w, éllÉ …w
kak«w µ kal«w µ kreittÒnvw µ xeirÒnvw •kat°rvyen duna-
m°nvn de¤knusyai. oÓtv m¢n oÔn ¶stai épÒdeijiw =htorikÆ, e‡ tiw
efiw tå proeirhm°na épobl°caw §pixeirÆseien eÔ ka‹ …w ín
d°xoito, kín mØ pollãkiw pe¤seie piyan«w dialegÒmenow oÈd¢n
dio¤sei, frÒnimow Ãn ka‹ ékribØw katå tØn t°xnhn.

The materials for speeches are drawn from the assumptions of
speakers or actors, or from the actions themselves when their
evaluation is not self-evident, but can be argued (“with difficulty or



THOMAS M. CONLEY 435

elegantly” or “done well or poorly”) on both sides (•kat°rvyen).
Anyone who has paid attention to what has just been said will be
able to argue persuasively, being of good sense and technically
accurate.

Italos’ point is similar to that which Hermogenes makes at the
beginning of On Invention—that one must tailor the prooimion to
the particular inclinations and judgments of the audience ad-
dressed. If that is right, however, one might expect to see here a
reference to ÍpÒlhciw , as in Hermogenes and Italos at §17 end,
not Ípoc¤a as in line 1. It might make sense to read here some-
thing like “the materials for speeches are drawn from [the aud-
ience’s] ‘supposition of wrongdoing’”— i.e., “suspicion”—which
is how Ammonios, e.g., defines Ípoc¤a (De adfinium vocabu-
lorum differetia, p.126 #486 Nikau); but that does not seem to be
supported by the examples Italos gives at lines 2–5. Instead of
hazarding an emendation (for which there is no manuscript
evidence), we might take Ípoc¤a  in the general sense of “mental
uneasiness”—uncertainty about whether a deed was performed
“well or poorly,” for instance. But I think Italos is thinking here
of something very close to ÍpÒlhciw , which refers in Her-
mogenes to the audience’s “presumptions” or “impressions”
about what is good or true or not, which the rhetorician must
take into consideration. The other term in this passage that
should be remarked upon is •kat°rvyen—there must be argu-
ments on both sides of a question.

§19 (46.1–21 C. = 41.33–42.11 K.)
§pe‹ d¢ trittÚn e‰nai tÚ t!w épode¤jevw ¶famen g°now ka‹ tÚ m¢n
±yikÒn, tÚ d¢ payhtikÒn, tÚ d¢ logikÒn, per‹ m¢n oÔn tÚ ±yikÚn
flkanÚn ¶stv tÚ toË =Ætorow égayÚn ¯n ka‹ katå fÊsin ka‹
fanerÚn §n pçsin, …w oÈd°pote ¥lv kakourg«n §n t“ l°gein. diÚ
ka‹ t«n êllvn éjiopistÒterow ín dÒjeie ka‹ épodox!w êjiow,
kín mØ logik«w §pixeirÆseien ı toioËtow, Àsper ka‹ ı
énãpalin §pixeir«n dika¤aw §pitimÆsevw. mãlista de toËto
sumba¤nei §n ta›w eÈnomoum°naiw t«n pÒlevn,*  oÂa per‹



436 JOHN ITALOS’ METHODOS RHETORIKE

Afigupt¤vn ka‹ Lak"nvn. §n går AfigÊptƒ oÈ parÒntew
pro°teinon, éllå •kat°rvyen grafª toÁw lÒgouw pare¤doun. Ú
<m¢n ±yikÚn>** …w moxyhrÚn §kkl¤nonte, ka‹ tØn toË dikastoË
pollãkiw tarãtton diãnoian, tÚ d¢ payhtikÚn <…w ˜ti> **
§l°ouw §st‹ kinhtikÚn ka‹ mØ §«n éd°kaston e‰nai tÚ dikastØn
mhdÉ ékroçsyai §p¤shw émfot°rvn, …w afixmãlvton t“ pãyei
ka‹ ˜lon yat°rou m°rouw, éfÉ o* dØ ka‹ tÚ pãyow kek¤nhto, tÚ
d¢ logikÚn <…w> ** b¤aion ëma ka‹ ¶ntexnon ka‹ ÍpÚ pãntvn, …w
e‡rhtai, yaumazÒmenon. diÚ ka‹ Ípoc¤an ‡svw par°xon …w mØ
pãnth élhy°w, éllå épat«n tª t°xn. …w gohte¤& xr"menon ka‹
fenak¤zon toÁw polloÊw. diÚ %youw §pimelht°on ka‹ lÒgou …w
ˆntow éxrÆstou yat°rou xvr¤w. ı går §k moxyhråw diano¤aw
proenhnegm°now lÒgow ép¤yanow ín dÒjeie kín piyan«w
die¤lektai.

*mãlista … t«n pÒlevn: C. K. find an echo here of Eth.Nic. 1.1 (1354a20).
** Supplevit C.

On the three rhetorical “proofs” (apodeixeis)—the ethical, the
pathetic, and the logical—let it be observed that if the speaker has
a good ethos, he will be more worthy of belief (éjiopistÒterow) than
one who does not, even if he does not argue logically (kín mØ logik«w
§pixeirÆseien), especially if he seems to have the interests of the city
at heart.

While it might be argued that this echoes Rhet. 2.1, Aristotle
does not go quite this far. And see Alexander In Top. p.
224.2–23, concerning ofl éjiopistÒteroi.

I have not found the source of the information Italos relates
about Egyptian legal procedure.

Conclusion
The chief impression one takes away from reading this work

is that it is extremely cerebral and schematic. Italos’ main
interests are largely limited to the relations between rhetoric and
dialectic, which makes sense once we recognize Alexander of
Aphrodisias lurking in the background—especially at the
beginning, on the ént¤strofow question, and in his relatively



THOMAS M. CONLEY 437

long disquisition on problÆmata in the middle of the work. All
of this is, of course, consistent with Italos’ broader concerns
with dialectic. As a result, even in those parts where he seems
to depend on pseudo-Dionysius’ T°xnh, the ordinary concerns
of writers on rhetoric are overshadowed. One of the shortest
sections (15), for instance, is on style—and “style” restricted to
considerations of diction, it would seem. And while it is true
that this m°yodow  is presented katå sÊnocin , the almost total
absence of examples and of models for imitation is surprising
—especially if we are right in seeing pseudo-Dionysius as one of
his chief sources.

In short, young Konstantinos would not have learned much
about how to be a persuasive speaker from reading this short
work. But then again, perhaps Italos himself did not know much
about that, either. As Anna Komnena remarks, Italos toË
=htorikoË n°ktarow oÈk §geÊsato  (Alexiad 5.8.6).1 2

June, 2004 244 Lincoln Hall
University of Illinois
702 S. Wright St.
Urbana, IL  60801
t-conley@uiuc.edu

12 I wish to express my gratitude here to the anonymous reader for GRBS and
to Prof. D. M. Schenkeveld, both of whom have been enormously helpful.