Swist ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 2017 Jeremy J. Swist Sophistry and Sorcery in Libanius’ Declamations Jeremy J. Swist HE ASSOCIATION between rhetoric and magic has a long history.1 What began as a neutral analogy by Gorgias was co-opted by Plato and the Attic orators, who cast sophists negatively as sorcerers (γόητες) in order to undercut their persuasiveness.2 Combined with Old Comedy, most importantly Aristophanes’ Clouds, these writers trans- mitted the models of intellectual caricature to the canonical school texts of the Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine periods. These foundational texts influenced the literary productions of professors and students of rhetoric, whose “crown of the cur- riculum” were the fictional speeches, delivered by stock or historical characters, known as declamations (µελέται).3 The majority of surviving declamations in Greek are by the Antio- chene sophist Libanius (314–393 CE).4 Several of these model 1 On the role of magic in Greek rhetorical theory from Gorgias to the Second Sophistic see J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (London 1975); J. O. Ward, “Magic and Rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renaissance: Some Ruminations,” Rhetorica 6 (1988) 57–63. For a general overview of the history of this association see W. A. Covino, “Magic And/ As Rhetoric: Outlines of a History of Phantasy,” Journal of Advanced Compo- sition 12 (1992) 349–358. 2 Gorg. Hel. 8–10, 14; Pl. Resp. 413B–D, 584A, Menex. 235A, Soph. 234C– 241B; Aeschin. 2.123, 152, 3.137, 207; Dem. 18.276, 19.102, 109. 3 For an introduction see D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge 1983); M. Winterbottom, Roman Declamation (Bristol 1980). 4 To Libanius are attributed 51 declamations, 17 of which are either spurious or of uncertain authorship. For discussion see R. Foerster and K. Münscher, “Libanios,” RE 12 (1925) 2509–2518; D. Najock, “Unechtes T 432 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 exercises are delivered by characters who attack orators, sophists, and philosophers by employing the traditional literary stereotypes, which often link their professions to illicit magic. While declamations have been traditionally read as recyclers of classical material in the vacuum of an anachronistic fantasy world that has been called Sophistopolis, it is now increasingly accepted that declamations often had serious educational and social functions.5 Likewise, cases can be and have been made for how certain declamations, especially those of Libanius, directly reflect their authors’ anxieties about contemporary events, such as the plight of traditional religion and education.6 I will demonstrate here how the interplay of magic and sophistic stereotypes opens another pathway between declama- tion’s real and imagined worlds. The anti-intellectual rhetoric in Libanius’ Declamations can be connected to how he perceived ___ und Zweifelhaftes unter den Deklamationen des Libanios: Die statistische Evidenz,” in M. Grünbart (ed.), Theatron: Rhetorische Kultur in Spätantike und Mittelalter (Berlin 2007) 305–355; R. J. Penella, “Libanius’ Declamations,” in L. Van Hoof (ed.), Libanius: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge 2014) 110–112. 5 Examples of such studies pertaining to Roman declamation are W. M. Bloomer, “Schooling in Persona: Imagination and Subordination in Roman Education,” ClAnt 16 (1997) 57–78; E. Gunderson, Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World (Ann Arbor 2003); A. Corbeill, “Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire,” in W. Dominik and J. Hall (eds.), A Companion to Roman Rhetoric (Malden 2007) 69–82. 6 See E. L. Bowie, “Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic,” in M. I. Finley (ed.), Studies in Ancient Society (London 1974) 166–209; Russell, Greek Declamation 108–109; T. Whitmarsh, The Second Sophistic (Oxford 2005) 66– 73; G. Tomassi, “Tyrants and Tyrannicides: Between Literary Creation and Contemporary Reality in Greek Declamation,” in E. Amato et al. (eds.), Law and Ethics in Greek and Roman Declamation (Berlin 2015) 247–267; L. Pernot, “Il non-detto della declamazione greco-romana: Discorso figurato, sottintesi e allusioni politiche,” in L. C. Montefusco (ed.), Papers on Rhetoric VIII Declamation (Rome 2007) 209–234; Penella, in Libanius: A Critical Intro- duction 125–127; A. J. Quiroga Puertas, “Demosthenes’ Moral and Legal Arguments in Libanius’ Declamations,” in Law and Ethics 287–306; J. Swist, “Pagan Altars and Monarchic Discourse in Libanius Declamation 22,” Phoenix 70 (2016) 170–189. JEREMY J. SWIST 433 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 and presented problems that Hellenic, pagan paideia faced in the second half of the fourth century, when associations be- tween sophistry and sorcery became a dangerous aspect of the competition between the pagan intellectual elite and the new political establishment under Christian emperors. I begin by analyzing the ethological declamations before considering the contemporary context, and then read Libanius’ famous defense of Socrates (Decl. 1) in light of that context.7 This analysis at the very least should establish and reinforce that the Declamations deserve consideration in discussions of Libanius’ engagement with his world outside the lecture hall. The refutation of the mage The strongest links between sophistry and sorcery in Li- banius’ declamations are made in Decl. 41. Of his large corpus of declamations, Decl. 41 is the only one in which an actual magician and magic are the focus.8 Its theme is as follows: a city is suffering from a plague, which the Delphic oracle pre- dicted would be ended by the sacrifice of a human child. The child chosen by lot is that of a mage (µάγος), who promises to end the plague himself should they spare his son.9 This de- 7 Greek text: R. Foerster, Libanii Opera (Leipzig 1909–1913). All trans- lations are my own. For an overview of Libanius’ Declamations see Penella, in Libanius: A Critical Introduction 107–127. 8 There are no surviving Greek declamations devoted to magical topics before Libanius, and few magical themes; see [Hermog.] De Inv. 3.10; Sopat. In Hermog. 5.85–86; Syr. In Hermog. 96; Anon. Problemata Rhetorica 48 [Walz VIII 410]. Russell (Greek Declamation 26 n.38) explains this lack by noting the absence of such themes in classical Attic literature. They were evidently more popular in Latin declamation, as suggested by Quintilian’s dismissal of such themes as irrelevant to real-world deliberation and liti- gation (Inst. 2.10.5). See [Quint.] Decl.Mai. 4, 10, 14, 15. 9 Lib. Decl. 41 hypoth.: λοιµὸς ἐπεῖχε τὴν πόλιν. ἔχρησεν ὁ θεὸς παύ- σασθαι τὸν λοιµόν, εἰ ὁ δῆµος ἑνός του τῶν πολιτῶν παῖδα θύσειεν. ἔλαχεν ὁ τοῦ µάγου. ὑπισχνεῖται παύσειν τὸν λοιµόν, εἰ ἀπόσχοιντο τοῦ παιδός. βουλεύονται. For a translation of this declamation with notes see D. Odgen, Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Sourcebook (Oxford 2002) 290–299. 434 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 liberative speech is delivered against the mage’s proposal by a fellow citizen, who early on attacks the mage’s character with the commonplace stereotypes of his profession, such as grave robbing, necromancy, and fraternizing with evil demons (41.7, 30). In addition to using the more negative label “sorcerer” (γόης), the speaker also employs stock terms of abuse against sophists and orators. He accuses the mage of long-windedness and falsehood (µακρολογία, ψευδολογία, 41.1–3). The mage, he claims, is playing the charlatan (ἀλαζονευόµενον), is an im- postor (φενακίζει) who aims at misleading (παράγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ), and takes pay for his services (µισθόφορος, 41.8, 15, 22). These terms of abuse occur elsewhere in Libanius’ Declamations,10 but they are laid on the mage with considerably more frequency, especially when aimed directly at the speaker’s rhetorical op- ponent. Nor are the mage’s qualities as both a sorcerer and sophist mutually exclusive (41.3):11 Two things especially about the mage’s public speaking (δηµηγο- ρίας) bother me, citizens, first that many of the citizens here, charmed by this man’s words (τοῖς τούτου κεκηληµένοι λόγοις) (and he is guilty of these things too) are dying of the plague… This initial denigration plays with the tradition of associating rhetoric and magic, and sets up the remainder of the speech as a refutation not only of the mage’s arguments, but also of the efficacy of his techne. The speaker aims at leaving the impression that only the sorcerer’s eloquence possesses any semblance of magic, and that his ability to stop the plague cannot be trusted.12 For instance, he had not been able to foretell, and thus forestall, his son being chosen by lot to be sacrificed (41.31). Instead the speaker makes his own prediction that the 10 The speaker attributes µακρολογία to his talkative wife in 26.31. Socra- tes refers to the Sophists as ἀλαζόνες in 1.7 and 2.24, as does the speaker in 33.42 against the philosophers. 11 δύο δέ µε, ὦ πολῖται, µάλιστα τῆς τοῦ µάγου δηµηγορίας ἀνιᾷ, ἓν µὲν ὅτι πολλοὶ νῦν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν τοῖς τούτου κεκηληµένοι λόγοις, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτων οὗτος αἴτιος, ἀποθνήσκουσι τοῦ λοιµοῦ. 12 Ogden, Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts 298. JEREMY J. SWIST 435 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 mage will rhetorically invent (εὑρήσεις) a host of arguments for delaying his stopping of the plague (41.34). On the surface, Decl. 41 is a bare invective against magic, but when juxtaposed with Libanius’ own experiences and attitudes regarding magic, its message is not so clear.13 As is the case with all declamations, the viewpoint of the fictional speaker is not necessarily that of the author. While Decl. 41 features no description of the speaker himself, its Hypothesis presents a morally ambiguous case that could be convincingly argued either way. Although the speaker depicts the mage as impiously defying the god of Delphi, the oracle demanded a human sacrifice, which to a traditional Hellene was a barbaric rite and counter to the value of philanthropia. The humanity of the mage, on the other hand, and his paternal instinct should not be dis- counted. Moreover, the speaker’s skepticism toward magic in Decl. 41 is not shared by Libanius. However exaggerated might have been his critics’ depiction of him as “more superstitious than all mankind,” Libanius’ own writings document a firm belief in the efficacy of magical practices and the existence of daimones, benevolent and malevolent.14 A functional hypochondriac, he believed that daemonic spirits could inflict diseases, and he often resorted to magical alternatives to medical treatments.15 Furthermore, the speaker’s vendetta against magic contra- dicts Libanius’ approach in his orations and letters. While the 13 Libanius’ writings are frequently mined for discussions of magic in Late Antiquity, but Decl. 41 is seldom included. C. Bonner, “Witchcraft in the Lecture Room of Libanius,” TAPA 63 (1932) 40–42, cites it for evidence of the role of demonology in the magical practices of Libanius’ day. Ogden, Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts 298–299, sees it mainly as recycling classical authors’ constructions of mages and magic. 14 John Chrys. Ad vid. iun. 96; A. J. Quiroga Puertas, “The Old Man Van- ishes: Magic, Literature, and Political Philosophy in Libanius’ Or. 19.30,” Hermes 144 (2016) 246–247. 15 E.g. Or. 1.243–250, 25.67, 36.1. See S. Trzcionka, Magic and the Super- natural in Fourth-Century Syria (London 2007) 125–126, 136–138. 436 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 speaker argues that the spellbinding nature of the sorcerer’s eloquence distracts the audience and serves evil ends, Libanius more often gives the association of persuasion and spellbinding a positive spin. In the Antiochicus he celebrates the city coun- cilors’ ability to moderate the behavior of their governors “as though by incantation (ἐπῳδῇ) … thus they possess a spell (φάρµακον) mightier than those men’s authority.”16 Much as Libanius sought magical as well as medical cures for his own ailments, so he thought that the charms of persuasion to temper a ruler’s character had a pharmaceutical aspect. Logoi as pharmaka in the positive sense, moreover, is a theme in a number of Libanius’ letters.17 In another passage the speaker characterizes the mage as the type that fraternizes with malevolent daimones, with whose aid he is able to put curses on various body parts of his enemies, including making them tongue-tied (γλῶτταν ἀπέστρεψαν, 41.29). In Libanius’ day, these were typically defixiones cast, allegedly at least, between rival athletes and rival sophists, Libanius himself having been a victim. Yet even his reaction to being personally attacked by sorcerers reveals his reluctance to condemn their art. In 386 he experienced a sharp decline in his physical and mental health that compromised his ability to de- claim, which his doctors diagnosed as magically caused. In his Autobiography he reports his dismissal of his friends’ advice to prosecute certain men solely on the grounds that they practiced magic: “I was not of that attitude.”18 Upon finding a dead chameleon in his lecture hall, which confirmed for him that he had in fact been hexed, he delivered Or. 36 (Περὶ τῶν φαρµά- 16 Lib. Or. 11.141: τοῖς δὲ θρασέσιν ἀνεῖργον τὴν ἀσέλγειαν ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σοφίας ἀνάγκαις καὶ καθάπερ ἐπῳδῇ τῇ ῥητορείᾳ τρέπον τὸν θυµὸν εἰς πρᾳότητα. οὕτω τῆς ἐκείνων ἐξουσίας ἰσχυρότερον κέκτηνται φάρµακον. See R. Cribiore, Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century (Ithaca 2013) 123, and on Libanius’ relations with governors The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch (Princeton 2007) 240–242. 17 E.g. Ep. 581.4, 698.2. 18 Lib. Or. 1.248: ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτ᾽ αὐτός τι τοιοῦτον ἔπασχον. JEREMY J. SWIST 437 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 κων), which despite the title amounts to a defense of his career against all possible guilty parties, rather than an accusation against any one of them. Nowhere in the oration is sorcery condemned per se, or the “certain sorcerers” who were hired by the guilty party to do the deed (36.1). Norman vaguely suggests that Libanius wished to avoid “stirring up a hornet’s nest” if he brought suit against anyone;19 it is possible that Libanius did not wish to ignite another mass hysteria of magic trials that would implicate sophists and sorcerers both (discussed below). In sum, when read against the historical background, it is plausible that Decl. 41 goes beyond recycling literary common- places and reflects a contemporary controversy over magical practices in its author’s time, especially in connection with rhe- torically trained intellectuals. The speaker’s prejudices against magic, along with his rhetorical associations between sophistry and sorcery, may reflect popular perceptions of Libanius’ pro- fession, as a number of related declamations also suggest. Anti-intellectual rhetoric in the Declamations Decl. 41 applies anti-intellectual labels to a professional sorcerer. A number of Libanius’ other declamations do the reverse, dressing sophists and orators not only in the traditional language of comic ridicule, but in some cases also of sorcery. We find this occurring almost exclusively in the ethological declamations, which are entirely fictional and often delivered by anonymous stock characters familiar from New Comedy.20 To begin, we find anti-sophistic rhetoric in Libanius’ famous Decl. 26, in which a talkative wife drives a grouch (dyskolos) to petition for suicide before the city council.21 To build his ethos, 19 A. F. Norman, Antioch as a Centre of Hellenic Culture as Observed by Libanius (Liverpool 2000) 125. 20 These types of declamation were particularly popular in Libanius’ day; see Russell, Greek Declamation 88. 21 Decl. 26 was evidently popular in Libanius’ own lifetime, on the tes- timony of [Basil.] Ep. 353 Courtonne. Translation with introduction and notes: D. A. Russell, Libanius: Imaginary Speeches (London 1996) 113–123. 438 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 the silence-loving grouch first establishes his disdain for the “long-windedness” (µακρολογία) of professional orators and sees no “profit in the spoken word” (τοῦ ῥήµατος τὸ κέρδος, 26.3–7). He then proceeds to inveigh against his wife’s lo- quacity in similar terms as though she were an orator herself. In a reversal of gender roles, the husband prefers a quiet exis- tence within the oikos, while his wife constantly inquires into civic affairs outside the oikos (26.15). Like a sophist, moreover, she delivers an encomium of a rooster, and her husband peti- tions for suicide because filing for divorce might cause her to break into the courtroom and orate (ῥητορεύσει) on her own behalf (26.14, 45, 51).22 Decl. 29, another prosangelia, is a request for suicide, made by a parasite whose host, a rich man, has taken up a life of philosophy, thus forsaking the worldly wealth on which the parasite made his own living. But he does not accuse his host of any wrongdoing, rather those who persuaded him to abandon luxury, people who “abuse themselves with wakefulness, fast- ing, and hard labor … pasty-faced men who don’t wear shoes, and who go about half-naked.”23 They took his host and “be- witched him with their many words (κατεγοήτευσαν πολλοῖς ῥήµασι) … evil sorcerers (γόητες ἄνθρωποι καὶ πονηροί) cap- able of persuading anyone of anything: poverty, derangement, 22 Like many of Libanius’ declamations, Decl. 26 is a προσαγγελία, or self- denunciation, in which the speaker begs for legal suicide (see Russell, Libanius: Imaginary Speeches 35–37). Many προσαγγελίαι were possibly meant as “figured speeches” (ἐσχηµατισµένοι λόγοι), whose goal of persuasion was other than their professed aim (see Whitmarsh, Second Sophistic 57–59). Rus- sell (113) thinks the husband’s true intention is for the council to ratify a divorce, bypassing his wife’s right to due process. In Decl. 29 the parasite perhaps wished, instead of his own suicide, that his host return to his former lifestyle; see Penella, in Libanius: A Critical Introduction 112. 23 Decl. 29.22: δεινοί τινές εἰσι παρ’ ἡµῖν ἑτέρους διαφθείρειν ὄντες κακοδαίµονες αὐτοὶ τὴν τύχην, οἷς ἔργον οὐδὲν ἢ τὸ τιµωρεῖσθαι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὡς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ πιέζειν ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λιµῷ καὶ πόνοις, τοὺς ὠχριῶντας λέγω, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους, τοὺς γυµνοὺς ἐξ ἡµισείας, οἷς ἀπεύ- ξαιτ’ ἄν τις καὶ περιτυχεῖν. JEREMY J. SWIST 439 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 hunger, and becoming one of the walking dead.”24 Their physi- cal descriptions as pallid zombies borrows heavily from the Urtext of intellectual parody, Aristophanes’ Clouds, in which phi- losophers and sophists are targeted as threats to the traditional values of Athenian aristocrats.25 As Phidippides in the Clouds forsook his athletic physique and complexion along with horse- manship, so the parasite’s host in Decl. 29 abandoned aristo- cratic symposia and was transformed into a ghost of his former self. The language of sorcery (κατεγοήτευσαν … γόητες) asso- ciated with intellectuals, on the other hand, is not Aristophanic, but derives from later authors such as Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Plato who drew the parallels to stigmatize sophistic per- suasion. We also see sophistry and sorcery mixed in Decl. 48, in which a son pleads for his own disinheritance (apokeryxis) as his reward for heroism after his father refused to grant the original award he had requested, namely to annul the disinheritance of the son’s brother.26 He blames his brother’s disinheritance on the jealousy of those who persuaded his father to disown him. These same men oppose the son in this trial as well:27 24 Decl. 29.23: ἐκεῖνοι τὸν τρόφιµον λαβόντες κατεγοήτευσαν πολλοῖς ῥήµασι παθόντες µὲν οὐδὲν δυσχερές … γόητες ἄνθρωποι καὶ πονηροὶ καὶ πάντα πείθειν δυνάµενοι … πενίαν, παράνοιαν, λιµόν, τὸ τεθνηκότας ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι, οὗτοί µοι τὸν τρόφιµον ἀπολωλέκασι. 25 Ar. Nub. 98–104: Στρεψιάδης: οὗτοι διδάσκουσ᾽, ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῷ, / λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια κἄδικα. / Φειδιππίδης: εἰσὶν δὲ τίνες; / Σ.: οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἀκριβῶς τοὔνοµα: / µεριµνοφροντισταὶ καλοί τε κἀγαθοί. / Φ.: αἰβοῖ πονηροί γ᾽, οἶδα. τοὺς ἀλαζόνας / τοὺς ὠχριῶντας τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις, / ὧν ὁ κακοδαίµων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν. 26 On the popular theme of disowning (ἀποκήρυξις/abdicatio) in declama- tion see Russell, Greek Declamation 31–32; M. Johansson, Libanius’ Declamations 9 and 10 (Gothenburg 2006) 66–69, and “Nature over Law: Themes of Dis- owning in Libanius’ Declamations,” in Law and Ethics 269–286. 27 Decl. 48.50–51: οἶδα τοίνυν ὡς οὗτοι τὴν αὐτὴν προσοίσουσι µηχανὴν καὶ τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον παράξουσιν, ὅσῳ συνείθικας εὐχερῶς ἀποκηρύττειν καὶ τολµᾶν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ βοᾶν· ἀλλότριον ὃν γεγέννηκα ποιοῦµαι. οὐκ ἀνθέ- ξεις τοῖς σοφισταῖς τούτοις, ὦ πάτερ, οὐδ’ ἂν σφόδρα ἐθέλῃς τὴν ἀριστείαν αἰδεῖσθαι. βούλει σοι προείπω καὶ τὰ ῥήµατα τῶν γοήτων; 440 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 I know, then, how these men will apply the same device and will mislead you (παράξουσιν) as easily as you have been accus- tomed to readily disown and dare to shout in the courtroom: “I am making a stranger the one I sired!” You will not hold out against these sophists (σοφισταῖς), father, nor would you be very willing to revere my heroism. Do you also wish me to foretell you the words of these sorcerers (γοήτων)? The son, who plays to the democratic audience by confessing his own lack of speaking experience (δέδοικα … τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀπειρίαν, 48.5) undermines his father’s case by associating him with sorcerer-sophists who have relied on rhetorical/magical means to mislead the father. In Decl. 33, we find a miser (φιλάργυρος) too cheap even to spend money on sacrifices or libations for the gods.28 His hop- lite son had requested a crown of olive as a prize for heroism in battle instead of a pot of gold. As a result, his father tries to disinherit him, “since he is wiser (σοφώτερος) than his father and has condemned the lifestyle that I esteem”—σοφώτερος meant sarcastically.29 In the narrative section, the miser recalls his deliberations over his son’s education (τὰ παιδεύµατα, 33.11). He had decided to invest in military training for his son in hope of material rewards, rather than send him to the “thinking-shops” (φροντιστηρίοις) of the philosophers, since they despise material wealth (33.12). Nevertheless, the son had evidently fallen under the spell of these intellectuals in his choice of reward, and has become one of them. When the son objects that the law permitting fathers to disown their sons does not apply to war heroes, the father retorts “here you’re being a skillful sophist (κοµψὸς καὶ σοφιστής), but when there is a need to get rich, you’re a fool!”30 He calls his son’s arguments that 28 Decl. 33.21; transl. and comm. Russell, Libanius: Imaginary Speeches 158– 168. 29 Decl. 33.2: ἐπεὶ οὖν σοφώτερός ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ὃν µὲν ἐγὼ τιµῶ βίον, τούτου κατέγνωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἕτερον ἐξεῦρεν ἑαυτῷ, ζητείτω καὶ οἰ- κίαν ἑτέραν. 30 Decl. 33.29: “ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἠριστευκόσι κεῖται,” φησίν, “ἐγὼ δὲ ἀριστεύς. ἐνταῦθα κοµψὸς καὶ σοφιστής, οὗ δὲ δεῖ πλουτεῖν, ἠλίθιος.” JEREMY J. SWIST 441 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 place glory over wealth “the stuff of those delusional, pre- tentious men (ἀλαζόνων) who dazzle people’s imaginations (δοξοκοπούντων), in whose company you would find nothing but cheeks full of hot air, but much hunger within. Those people gave you such an education (ἐπαίδευσαν).”31 The language ex- plicitly connects sophistic parody to institutional paideia. The reference to phrontisteria recalls Socrates’ school in the Clouds, but in the imperial Greek of Libanius’ day it also denoted, un- ironically, any place of contemplative study.32 Decl. 12, finally, mixes Aristophanic parody with sorcery ac- cusations as well. Here we see an ethological character of the misanthrope (µισάνθρωπος) merged with the historical figure of Timon of Athens.33 The speech is simultaneously a request for suicide to escape being in love with Alcibiades, and an accusa- tion of Alcibiades for aiming at tyranny.34 But to build his ethos as a misanthrope, he first spews venom at humanity at large, and he cynically unmasks the true nature of sophists and phi- losophers. Anyone clever at speaking (δεινὸς εἰπεῖν), he claims, “makes false accusations and commits perjury,” while anyone who philosophizes is “a sorcerer who pries into the heavens (γόης ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πολυπραγµονεῖ).”35 He implicates Alcibiades in these charges by identifying sophists and philoso- phers among the pimps and flatterers in his entourage (12.39). Here, language that echoes Socrates’ alleged astronomical pur- 31 Decl. 33.42: τὰ τῶν τετυφωµένων, ὦ παῖ, µοι λέγεις, τὰ τῶν ἀλαζόνων, τὰ τῶν δοξοκοπούντων, παρ’ οἷς οὐδὲν ἂν εὕροις ἢ γνάθους πεφυσηµένας, τὰ δ’ ἔνδον λιµὸς πολύς. ἐκεῖνοί σε ταῦτα ἐπαίδευσαν. 32 Philostr. VA 2.5, 3.50, 6.6, 6.9, VS 509, Imag. 1.27; Them. Or. 13.165b, 175a; Synes. Regn. 19. 33 For literary accounts of Timon see Ar. Lys. 805 ff., Av. 1547; Plut. Ant. 70; Luc. Tim. 34 Russell, Greek Declamation 121–122. 35 Decl. 12.9: δεινὸς εἰπεῖν· συκοφαντεῖ. δικάζειν ἐγχειρεῖ· τὰ τῆς ἐπι- ορκίας ἕπεται. φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ· γόης ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πολυπραγ- µονεῖ. 442 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 suits36 is combined with charges of goeteia. Overall, Timon represents how the misanthropos, the opposite of a philanthropos, typically views philosophy and oratory. Between imagination and reality Intellectual stereotypes such as we have examined occur almost exclusively in the ethological declamations, which place the Old Comedy ridicule of intellectuals, particularly from Aristophanes, into the mouths of ethically deficient, New Comedy characters. Characters in Libanius’ historical decla- mations, exemplary figures such as Demosthenes whose moral arguments serve Libanius’ educational goals, rarely adopt this rhetoric.37 The ethological speakers, on the other hand, wield no edifying arguments, leading most scholars to conclude that these comic declamations served no higher purpose than pure entertainment: as Russell put it, “there is no pill inside the sugar coating.”38 Yet the pill arguably exists in the fact that a sophist’s declamations are model exercises in both the faithful portrayal of character and the construction of an argument designed to be persuasive to a specific audience.39 The comic 36 Ar. Nub. 225, Pl. Ap. 19B. 37 An exception is Decl. 9.7, when Neocles says that “the incantations” (ἐπῳδαί ) of his schoolmasters had little effect on the impulses of his son The- mistocles’ mind. For discussion of the Demosthenic declamations and their engagement with Libanius’ own day see Quiroga Puertas, in Law and Ethics 287–306; Swist, Phoenix 70 (2016) 170–189. On moral instruction in Greek and Roman rhetorical exercises and declamation see C. Gibson, “Portraits of Paideia in Libanius’ Progymnasmata,” in O. Lagacherie and P.-L. Malosse (eds.), Libanios, le premier humaniste: Etudes en hommage à Bernard Schouler (Ales- sandria 2011) 69–78, and “Better Living through Prose Composition? Moral and Compositional Pedagogy in Ancient Greek and Roman Pro- gymnasmata,” Rhetorica 32 (2014) 1–30; M. Kraus, “Les conceptions politiques et culturelles dans les progymnasmata de Libanios et Aphthonios,” in Li- banios, le premier humaniste 142. 38 Russell, Greek Declamation 88; cf. Johansson, in Law and Ethics 283–284. 39 Ethopoeiai were an essential part of the progymnasmata. See Russell, Greek Declamation 11–12; C. Gibson, Libanius’ Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric (Atlanta 2008) 355–357, and “Libanius’ Progymnasmata,” in Libanius: A Critical Introduction 136. JEREMY J. SWIST 443 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 characters must be persuasive to the fictional audience of fellow democrats, of an Athens-like polis where sophists and philoso- phers, as in the Clouds, are held in suspicion.40 But for the sophist’s real audience, moral instruction and social comment may also be implicit: whereas Aristophanes comically exploited the flaws of both the rustic Strepsiades and the sophistic Socra- tes, these declamations of Libanius portray only the former type, and create the morally instructive effect that antipathy to pepaideumenoi correlates with defects in moral character and lack of public spirit. Beneath the evident humor of Decl. 26, for instance, is the more serious implication that the refusal to exercise civic duty is a surrender of one’s masculinity, and in the dyskolos we may read the targets of Libanius’ frustration at the decline of civic engagement and service in the curia of con- temporary Antioch.41 The declamatory dramas construct a reality that would likely influence how Libanius’ actual audi- ence in the fourth century CE perceived the real world around them, who would connect the comic characters’ assault on phi- losophy and rhetoric to analogous problems in their own day. It is arguable that much as the tyrants of his declamations may be mirrored by tyrannical figures in the real world,42 Libanius’ comic characters may in turn be read as parodic and typological representations of the forces he perceived as threats to pagan, Hellenic paideia, whose marginalization corre- sponded, as he saw it, to the expansion of imperial bureaucracy and an ascendancy of “uneducated” nouveaux riches under Christian emperors.43 In a number of his Orations Libanius 40 Russell calls this imaginary polis Sophistopolis, on which see Greek Decla- mation 22–39. 41 Cf. Kraus, in Libanios, le premier humaniste 148. 42 On the connections between declamatory and contemporary tyrants in Late Antiquity see P.-L. Malosse, “Sophistiques et tyrannies,” in E. Amato (ed.), Approches de la Troisième Sophistique: Hommages à Jacques Schamp (Brussels 2006) 172–176; Kraus, in Libanios, le premier humaniste 147–148; Tomassi, in Law and Ethics 256–261. 43 Lib. Or. 62.21–23; see also 1.255, 3.26, 58.21–22. Cf. P.-L. Malosse, 444 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 represents these men in the same language as the misers and misanthropes of his Declamations,44 while he likewise rhetorically exaggerates the poverty of his own profession in correspon- dence to the malnourished zombies of the declamatory intel- lectuals.45 In Oration 31, for instance, in which he requests public funding from the city council of Antioch to support his teaching assistants, he reproves those who would not sell off any public property as too “miserly, tightfisted, and money- loving” (νῦν φιλάργυρος, νῦν γλίσχρος, νῦν φιλοχρήµατος) to save paideia from extinction.46 In rhetorical exercises, φιλάργυ- ρος invariably denotes the miserly type, and Libanius’ use of it outside of those contexts is rare. Moreover, Libanius con- sistently advanced the notion that rhetorical paideia was no longer valued as one’s ticket into the political establishment. Much like the miserly father in Decl. 33, who refused to send his son to the schools of the sophists because such a profession would not make him rich, Libanius presents in Or. 62.21 a similar, popular dismissal of his profession: fathers would rather send their sons to Beirut to study Latin and Roman law to launch a more lucrative public career. The growing disparity between men in power and men of letters, he claimed, made the latter into targets of mistrust and resentment.47 ___ “Libanius’ Orations,” in Libanius: A Critical Introduction 90; Cribiore, The School of Libanius 236–237. 44 See Lib. Or. 31.41, 42.24, 62.10. 45 On Libanius’ rhetorical exaggeration of his profession’s poverty see L. Van Hoof, “Lobbying through Literature: Libanius, For the Teachers (Oration 31),” in L. Van Hoof and P. Van Nuffelen (eds.), Literature and Society in the Fourth Century AD: Performing Paideia, Constructing the Present, Presenting the Self (Leiden 2014) 71. 46 Or. 31.41: ἀλλ’ ὁ λαµπρὸς ἱπποτρόφος, Ἥλιε, καὶ ὁ τοὺς ἀθλητὰς ἐξ ἅπαντος ἀγείρων µυχοῦ καὶ ὁ θηρίων πλῆθος ὠνούµενος καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ταῦτα µαχουµένους ἰχνεύων, ὧν ἕκαστον διασείειν πέφυκε τῶν λειτουρ- γούντων τὰς οὐσίας, νῦν φιλάργυρος, νῦν γλίσχρος, νῦν φιλοχρήµατος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ µὲν κινδυνευόµενον λόγοι, τὸ δὲ σῶσαι τούτους δυνάµενον πλέθρα γῆς; 47 See R. Cribiore, “The Value of a Good Education: Libanius and Public Authority,” in P. Rousseau (ed.), A Companion to Late Antiquity (Oxford JEREMY J. SWIST 445 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 Such social competition, according to Peter Brown, was also a driving force behind sorcery accusations in the late fourth century.48 Declamatory sorcery accusations may thus have been a creative expression of such concerns, parallel to Li- banius’ claim in Or. 62 that “being a competent orator is now the grounds for accusation.”49 The atmosphere in which these charges occurred was filled with the rhetoric of Christian bishops who added a religious dimension to the association of paideia and magic, with claims that “the Hellenes” bewitch (γοητεύουσιν) the soul,50 and that “tyrants, emperors, sophists with their irresistible eloquence, sorcerers, magicians, and demons” are in an unholy alliance against the truth of God.51 Libanius himself in a letter of 363 observes that those who “think the gods are nonsense” are the same as those who “think that people who wear the tribon are sorcerers (γόητας),” here referring to the white cloak of philosophers and sophists.52 Even during his reign, the emperor Julian acknowledged this phenomenon, and how the modern, “uneducated” Cynics were complicit with the Christians in their assault on paideia by ___ 2009) 239. 48 P. Brown, “Sorcery, Demons, and the Rise of Christianity from Late Antiquity into the Middle Ages,” in M. Douglas (ed.), Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations (London 1970) 22–24. Accusations were also made among rival sophists, much as they were among athletes, to try to expose their suc- cess as illegitimate and assisted by magical means, especially in a case where one sophist is accused of hexing another’s speaking ability. Libanius was both the victim and the alleged perpetrator of such sorcery. 49 Or. 62.44: νῦν δὲ πλεονέκτηµα µὲν τὸ µὴ δύνασθαι λέγειν, ἔγκληµα δὲ τὸ ῥητορεύειν ἱκανῶς. 50 Greg. Naz. Or. 2.104; cf. Or. 4.55, 7.11.5, Carm. de se 1426. On Christian association of paganism and sorcery see M. Kahlos, Debate and Dialogue: Christian and Pagan Cultures c. 360–430 (Abingdon 2007) 110–112. 51 Joh. Chrys. De Babyla 11: τὰ µὲν γὰρ παρ’ ἡµῖν ἅ φατε πλάσµατα εἶναι καὶ τύραννοι καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ λόγων ἄµαχοι σοφισταὶ ἤδη δὲ καὶ φιλό- σοφοι καὶ γόητες καὶ µάγοι καὶ δαίµονες καθελεῖν ἐσπούδασαν. 52 Ep. 803.4: γόητας ἡγεῖτο τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τρίβωσιν ἐκεῖνος ὃς καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγεῖτο εἶναι φλήναφον. 446 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 teaching the young that “the genuine devotees of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle are … sorcerers, sophists, lunatics, and poisoners.”53 This illustrates how both the bishops and the de- clamatory characters see no meaningful difference between philosophers and sophists. Declamatory sorcery accusations went beyond parroting and parodying the enemies of paideia: they may have reflected existential fears among pagan intellectuals not only for their professions but also their persons. Under Constantius II, Valentinian, and Valens, several pagan philosophers and soph- ists in Rome, Antioch, and elsewhere were executed on the charge of illicit and treasonous magic.54 As Christian bishops were quick to associate pagan religion with illicit magical prac- tices, in the minds of educated pagans such allegations were often perceived as pretexts for persecution against pagan paideia at the hands of imperial bureaucrats, especially after the death of Julian when educated pagans whom Julian had elevated found themselves in a dangerous position. Sorcery accusations were an occupational hazard throughout Libanius’ career,55 to the point of being investigated at Valens’ personal request.56 Libanius was acquitted, he reports, much to the emperor’s chagrin. A century later, the pagan historian Zosimus would claim likewise that sorcery and pagan paideia were closely linked in the paranoid minds of these emperors.57 Valens suspected “all those who were then renowned in philosophy or otherwise classically educated,” and dispatched the proconsul Festus to 53 Jul. Or. 6.197d: οἱ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους χορευταὶ γνήσιοι γόητες εἶναι λέγονται καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ τετυφωµένοι καὶ φαρµακεῖς. See also Jul. Or. 6.193a, 7.224a-c; Mis. 353b. 54 For analyses of the magic trials under Constantius and the Pannonian emperors see M. W. Dickie, Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World (London 2001) 244–245; N. Lenski, Failure of Empire: Valens and the Roman State in the Fourth Century A.D. (Berkeley 2002) 218–234. 55 Lib. Or. 1.43, 50, 71, 162. 56 Lib. Or. 1.171–172. 57 Zos. 4.1.1–2; cf. Amm. Marc. 26.4.4; Lenski, Failure of Empire 218–219. JEREMY J. SWIST 447 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 Asia “so that there would be no man of letters left.”58 Another pagan historian, Ammianus, notes that the libraries of several of those executed were publicly burned on the grounds that they were illicit tomes (inliciti), when in fact they were mostly “titles of various liberal disciplines and law.”59 As discussed by Salzman and Sandwell, the legal ambiguity bound up in the term superstitio between pagan religion and illicit magic was exploited by zealous governors to justify the summary prohibi- tion of pagan practices and the demolition of temples.60 Yet as noted by Trzcionka, the religious persuasions of these authors did much to frame sorcery accusations and inquisitions as convenient means to attack paganism, despite the more likely reality, as demonstrated by Lenski and others, that political fac- tors more concrete than a monolithic pagan-Christian polarity 58 Zos. 4.14.2: πρὸς δὲ ὀργὴν ἄµετρον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀναστὰς ὑπόπτως εἶχε πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ τηνικαῦτα διαβοήτους ἢ ἄλλως λόγοις ἐντεθραµµένους. 4.15.2: τῶν δὲ ἀτοπηµάτων ἦν κολοφὼν Φῆστος, ὃν εἰς πᾶν εἶδος ὠµότητος πρόχειρον ὄντα τῆς Ἀσίας ἀνθύπατον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔστειλεν, ὡς ἂν µηδεὶς τῶν περὶ λόγους ἐσπουδακότων ἀπολειφθείη· καὶ εἰς ἔργον ᾔει τὸ βούλευµα. 59 Amm. Marc. 29.1.41: deinde congesti innumeri codices et acervi voluminum mul- ti sub conspectu iudicum concremati sunt, ex domibus eruti variis ut inliciti, ad leniendam caesorum invidiam, cum essent plerique liberalium disciplinarum indices variarum et iuris. 60 For example, by the Christian Praetorian Prefect of the East Cynegius, who interpreted an edict of Theodosius I in 385 against divinatory sacrifices (Cod.Theod. 16.10.9) to attack pagan shrines in the vicinity of Antioch. See M. R. Salzman, “ ‘Superstitio’ in the Codex Theodosianus and the Persecution of Pagans,” VigChr 41 (1987) 177–183; I. Sandwell, “Outlawing ‘Magic’ or Outlawing ‘Religion’? Libanius and the Theodosian Code as Evidence for Legislation against ‘Pagan’ Practices,” in W. V. Harris (ed.), The Spread of Christianity in the First Four Centuries (Leiden 2005) 90–109. Cf. M. Kahlos, “Artis heu magicis: The Label of Magic in Fourth-Century Conflicts and Disputes,” in M. R. Salzman et al. (eds.), Pagans and Christians in Late Antique Rome (Cambridge 2016) 171–173. Sandwell disputes Salzman’s claim that Christian emperors used superstitio in their legislation with intended am- biguity of the term, but does accept that the ambiguity was nevertheless exploited by others. 448 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 were at play.61 Libanius professed nevertheless that hiera and logoi were inextricably linked, and so an attack on one was an attack on both.62 Libanius’ anti-paideia declamations may re- flect the growing persecution complex, later fully expressed by Zosimus, that many of his contemporary pagans may have felt in his own time. Behind the grouch’s wish for orators to be silent in Decl. 26, or the rich man cutting out the orator’s tongue in Decl. 36, may have been Libanius’ real fear of Hel- lenic oratory being forced into silence.63 It is plausible that both religious partisanship and social competition with the apaideutoi were reflected in the boorish declamatory characters’ opposition to the pepaideumenoi in the declamations of Libanius, who himself had been accused of magic multiple times. Real-life sorcery accusations may have prompted him to inject magical language into the stock Ari- stophanic formulae of intellectual parody, especially when they independently can connect with his general concerns for the state of traditional paideia. The vulgar, comic characters who deliver such anti-intellectual rhetoric may reflect popular atti- tudes in Libanius’ own day, attitudes fueled by bishops and bureaucrats, but also by rival sophists. These characters, while constructing caricatures, can be themselves caricatures of those who make such accusations in real life, however exaggerated for literary effect. While persuasive to the fictional audience that feeds on sophistry-sorcery stereotypes, their appearance as their own stereotypes discredits their arguments in the eyes of the real-world audience who may then view real-world sorcery accusations with skepticism. 61 Trzcionka, Magic and the Supernatural 63; Dickie, Magic and Magicians 256–257; Lenski, Failure of Empire 211–233. 62 Lib. Or. 62.8. Cf. Or. 13.1; Jul. Ep. 36 Wright. 63 See Or. 30.8, where amid the monastic destruction of pagan shrines, priests are forced “to be silent or die” (σιγᾶν ἢ τεθνάναι). On Libanius’ fear of silenced oratory see A. J. Quiroga Puertas, “Libanius’ Horror Silentii,” in The Purpose of Rhetoric in Late Antiquity (Tübingen 2013) 223–244; Swist, Phoenix 70 (2016) 184–186. JEREMY J. SWIST 449 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 The defense of Socrates In light of what we have discussed, we may examine one more declamation, one cast in a different mold. Those so far examined have included attacks on intellectuals, but in Decl. 1, Libanius’ apologia of Socrates, we have a defense.64 Libanius here gives creative voice to concerns about his own profession from a different perspective, and of all his declamations, Decl. 1 has received the most scholarly recognition as communicating with Libanius’ own day. H. Markowski had proposed that the speech be read as an allegorical defense of the emperor Julian, while Bernard Schouler has more recently argued that it de- fends Libanius’ own career.65 Following on Schouler I will show that one of Decl. 1’s strategies of defending Hellenic, rhe- torical paideia is to distinguish its genuine form from its various misrepresentations both past and present. Decl. 1 is a work of historical fiction in which an anonymous advocate steps in after Socrates gives his own apologia, i.e. that written by Plato or Xenophon, and Libanius uses the historical situation to his advantage.66 He throws the arguments of Socrates’ accusers, that he corrupted the Athenian youth, in their faces:67 64 For translations and analyses see Russell, Imaginary Speeches 17–57; W. M. Calder III et al., The Unknown Socrates (Wauconda 2002) 39–110. 65 H. Markowski, De Libanio Socratis defensore (Breslau 1910) 169–170, whose interpretation is followed by D. G. Hunter, “Borrowings from Li- banius in the Comparatio Regis et Monachi of St. John Chrysostom,” JThS 39 (1988) 527–528; Calder et al., The Unknown Socrates 40; Russell, Imaginary Speeches 19–20; B. Schouler, “Que cherchait Libanios en défendant So- crate?” in L. Brisson and P. Chiron (eds.), Rhetorica philosophans: Mélanges offerts à Michel Patillon (Paris 2010) 189–204. For discussion of the varying interpretations of Decl. 1 see Penella, in Libanius: A Critical Introduction 125. 66 Russell, Imaginary Speeches 18–19. 67 Decl. 1.102–103: νέοι δὲ πατέρων τε πρότερον ἄγοντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς λέγεις, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀδελφῶν ὑπερορῶντες καὶ καθάπερ ὑπὸ γόητος ἑλκόµενοι τοῦ Σωκράτους τί πλέον ἂν ἐζήτησαν τοῦ νεῦσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον; … τίς οὖν πατὴρ ἀπεκήρυξε τὸν αὑτοῦ φάσκων πονηρὸν διὰ Σωκράτην γεγονέναι; τίς οἴκοι καθεῖρξε τὸν υἱόν, ὅπως µηκέτ’ ἀκούοι τῶν διαφθει- 450 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 As for the youth, who hold that man in higher regard than their fathers, as you claim, and despise their brothers insofar as they are drawn on by that sorcerer (γόητος) Socrates, what more would they have sought than his nodding? … So what father has disinherited (ἀπεκήρυξε) his son claiming that he has become a bad person because of Socrates? Who has shut his son indoors, lest he hear his corrupting words any longer? Nobody. Libanius represents his opponents’ position as directly accus- ing Socrates of being a genuine sorcerer. Such a characteri- zation of Socrates is found in a number of Plato’s dialogues.68 Yet in Plato these characterizations are always metaphorical representations of the effect of Socrates’ words on his inter- locutors and made by other characters such as Thrasymachus in the Republic.69 Moreover, as Meno points out in the epony- mous dialogue (80B), Socrates’ charming rhetoric could be dangerously misconstrued as actual sorcery, which is what the anonymous speaker in Decl. 1 suggests here. Furthermore, Socrates’ advocate asks whether any scenario in which fathers disowned their sons on account of their being educated by Socrates has actually ever occurred. For the imaginary Athen- ian audience, the answer is no. But Libanius’ real audience has seen this, not in real life, but in other declamations, such as Decl. 33. Fathers’ disinheritance of sons (apokeryxis/abdicatio) was a popular declamatory theme, especially in the Libanian cor- pus. The miser in Decl. 33, as we have seen, disowns his son because the son had been taught by intellectuals to despise material wealth. For both the real and the imagined audience, Libanius tries to show that the accusations against Socrates are no truer than sophistic stereotypes. Yet as stereotypes, they may still be used by Libanius to his rhetorical advantage before an imagined Athenian audience. Like Libanius’ contemporary Himerius, the speaker dis- tinguishes Socrates from the ‘First Sophistic’ sophists such as ___ ρόντων ῥηµάτων; οὐδείς. 68 See de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric 33–34. 69 Pl. Resp. 358D, cf. Sym. 215C. JEREMY J. SWIST 451 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus.70 These are the sophists he casts as “those who bewitch everyone” (τοῖς ἅπαντας γοητεύουσιν, Decl. 1.22, 153). Likewise for Libanius’ real audience he may reinforce the Philostratean distinction (VS 1.481) between the original sophists as underminers of society and sophists in their own day as stewards of paideia and Hel- lenic civilization. The speaker also repeatedly emphasizes the profiteering motives of the Sophists, while Socrates never charged money for his teaching (Decl. 1.16, 22, 166). Here is a sure parallel with Libanius, who himself claims in more than one oration not to have required any fees for his teaching, only accepting donations in proportion to his students’ means.71 The lack of description of the speaker’s own character invites us to place Libanius in both the imaginary and the real-world contexts of this speech’s performance, yet still achieving the rhetorical aims directed at either audience. To the fictional Athenian demos, Libanius uses popular mistrust of sophists to his advantage to persuade them that Socrates does not fit the stereotypical description of them; yet in his own image he presents Socrates as the ideal sophist nonetheless.72 He asks “who is the better counselor (σύµβουλος) for the city, the one who is mad with desire for money … or the one who exhorts us to wisdom rather than wealth?”73 Libanius turns the arguments of the anti-intellectual declamatory characters on their heads, asserting that paideia, not wealth, is what confers eloquence, 70 Him. Or. 35.8–21, 38.4–7; cf. R. J. Penella, “Himerius’ Orations to his Students,” in T. C. Brennan and H. I Flower (eds.), East and West: Papers in Ancient History presented to Glen W. Bowersock (Cambridge [Mass.] 2008) 141. 71 Or. 36.9, 62.19. Since he held the imperial chair of rhetoric at Antioch, Libanius’ school was subsidized by the imperial government; see R. A. Kaster, “The Salaries of Libanius,” Chiron 13 (1983) 37–59. 72 B. Schouler, La tradition hellénique chez Libanios (Paris 1984) 130. 73 Decl. 1.89: πότερον οὖν βελτίων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, σύµβουλος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώταις ὅστις ἐκµαίνει περὶ χρηµάτων ἐπιθυµίαν … ἢ ὅστις ἐπὶ τὴν φρό- νησιν µᾶλλον ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον παρακαλεῖ; 452 SOPHISTRY AND SORCERY IN LIBANIUS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 and also qualifies one to best advise the state.74 The miserly father of Decl. 33, in contrast, asserts that “wealth makes an orator more intelligent, renders a plaintiff more credible, and secures a defendant’s acquittal.”75 Overall, Decl. 1 is an apologia of paideia made palatable for a classical Athenian audience, as a speech designed to compensate for the rhetorical tactlessness of Socrates’ own apologia, as well as for a contemporary late antique audience for whom the utility of a sophist must be reinforced. Conclusion Of all extant declamations, Greek and Latin, those of Libanius are the only ones that dramatize anti-intellectual viewpoints.76 This fact alone, however, does not convincingly turn correlation with contemporary issues into causation. First, there is the simple accident of transmission, for while etho- logical declamations predominate in Libanius’ corpus, there is sufficient evidence that comic characters had appeared in declamations since at least the second century CE, and some of these lost texts could have employed anti-intellectual rhetoric.77 Second, the bare fact that declamations can rarely be con- vincingly dated, especially within such a broad span of time as Libanius’ career, usually precludes any claims that these works may be reactions to specific historical events, e.g. the magic trials at Antioch. Finally, the intellectual stereotypes employed, including those that link rhetoric and magic, are largely unoriginal and derived from classical sources, especially Ari- stophanes and the Attic orators. 74 Decl. 1.88: ὀρθῶς οὖν ὑπολαµβάνει Σωκράτης τῶν πεπαιδευµένων, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν εὐπορούντων τὸ δύνασθαι λέγειν ἡγούµενος. 75 Decl. 33.53: ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ῥήτορα φρονιµώτερον ἔδειξε καὶ κατήγορον πιστὸν ἀπέφηνε καὶ φεύγοντα ἐξῃτήσατο. 76 The declamatory characters of Choricius of Gaza (fl. 510 CE) use stock accusations of sophistry, but only as brief rejoinders to the voiced objections of their legal opponents. It is also likely that Choricius, active a century later, was influenced by Libanius. See Choric. Decl. 6.29, 7.51, 10.40. 77 Luc. Salt. 65; Russell, Greek Declamation 88. JEREMY J. SWIST 453 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 57 (2017) 431–453 With these points of caution in mind, it is nevertheless worth considering that this material was selected and manipulated by a master sophist who in his orations and letters was so per- sonally invested in the status of traditional paideia under an ascendant Christian imperial establishment. When a boorish miser attacks sophists and philosophers on the stage, it is not farfetched that certain audience members, or readers of cir- culated texts, would be reminded of the persecution of pagan intellectuals in the real world. Such a dissolution of the fourth wall is also nothing new. One recalls Euripidean characters, such as Hecuba in Trojan Women, who profess anachronistically modern ideas about the nature of the gods, only to be met with confusion and rejection by less sophisticated characters like Menelaus.78 Libanius’ declamations, while looking backward to the past, could also function as mirrors held up to his own society in order to identify, through parody, how those who possessed wealth and political power were in opposition to the cause of eloquence and education. As Socrates at the end of the Symposium argued that the same author could write both comedy and tragedy, so the comedy of intellectual caricature as presented by Libanius may reflect the tragedy of paideia in the late fourth century CE, and the conflict of power and wealth with its perennial nemesis: eloquence.79 February, 2017 Department of Classics University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa 52242 jeremy-swist@uiowa.edu 78 Eur. Tro. 884–889. 79 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Classical Asso- ciation of the Middle West and South annual meeting in Williamsburg in 2016. I am grateful to Craig Gibson for his assistance in the revision process, and to my anonymous readers and the editor of GRBS for their valuable criticism and suggestions.