Morassi ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 Article copyright held by the author(s) and made available under the Creative Commons Attribution License CC-BY https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ War Mandates in the Peloponnesian War: The Agency of Athenian strategoi Davide Morassi O QUESTION the extent of the agency of Athenian strategoi might seem idle. Under the so-called radical democracy, the demos had most, if not all, decision- making power.1 It is not surprising that some scholars recognise little agency in the strategoi because they were strictly bound by the ecclesia’s instructions.2 Nevertheless, alongside the references to the demos’ control and its harshness towards magistrates, several passages show the strategoi acting with a certain amount of independence.3 This discrepancy is noteworthy and raises 1 On the power of the fifth-century ecclesia in comparison with that of the fourth century see e.g. E. M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2006) 82; R. Osborne, Athens and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge 2010) 67. 2 C. W. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 (Wiesbaden 1971) 37–38, W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War II (Berkeley 1974) 42– 56, R. K. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge 1988) 82, 146. D. Hamel, Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period (Leiden 1998) 1, 115–117, 158–159, deserves special mention because her formulation of the issue has been particularly influential on later scholars. 3 On the Athenians’ harshness see e.g. Theopompus FGrHist 115 F 105 (Ath. 532A–B); Pritchett, Greek State II 18–19; M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford 1991) 216; Hamel, Athenian Generals 117–118, 133–136. On the strategoi’s power in the field: M. H. Hansen The Athenian Assembly at the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford 1987) 51–54, and Athenian Democracy 268–271; S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479–323 BC 4 (London 2011) 147–148; J. Crowley, The Psychology of Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2012) 116. These scholars recognise T 2 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 pressing questions about the strategoi’s agency and degree of control. This article aims to shed light on this conflicting evidence by discussing the mandates issued to strategoi in the period of the Peloponnesian War. “Mandate” denotes the tasks, along with their related instructions and constraints, that the ecclesia as- signed to one or more strategoi. By comparing reported man- dates with the actions and behaviour of the strategoi in the field, we are able to perceive and assess their agency and indepen- dence. The paper is divided into two parts. The first focuses on the power and role of the strategoi in setting and then executing the mandate, which shows the extent of their authority and the independence they could exercise. The second addresses the discrepancies in the evidence and offers an explanation of the ‘precise’ mandates. This line of enquiry could have significant ramifications: if the strategoi are found to have greater agency and power than usually supposed, our perception of the Athenian radical de- mocracy may change significantly. 1. Discussing and executing the mandate The ecclesia voted on every military expedition, deliberating on the objective, the resources allotted, and which magistrates to appoint.4 The tasks assigned could be extremely various, from collecting money from the allies5 to verifying that oaths had been sworn correctly6 to undertaking lengthy military ___ these powers as extensive, but without a proper examination of the con- flicting sources. 4 P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1971) 113–114; Hamel, Athenian Generals 5, 14–25, 40–44; M. R. Christ, “Conscription of Hoplites in Classi- cal Athens,” CQ 51 (2001) 399; Crowley, The Psychology 27–35. 5 E.g. Thuc. 3.19, 4.50.1; Xen. Hell. 1.1.8, 1.4.8. For discussion, L. Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1–5.24 (Berkeley 1993) 134–138. 6 E.g. IG I3 11, 40; II3 412. DAVIDE MORASSI 3 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 campaigns. The ecclesia also received regular reports from the strategoi, which might hint at the power of the assembly to recall the strategoi if their performance was deemed unsatisfactory.7 To say that the demos was in charge is not an understatement.8 Yet, the strategoi were involved in the decision-making process. The clearest example is Nicias and Alcibiades’ debate in the ecclesia discussing the appointment of the strategoi for the Sicilian expedition and the chances of success of the cam- paign.9 Hamel points out that the Athenians voted against Nicias’ advice, demonstrating that the strategoi did not speak from a privileged position but were treated the same as other citizens in the assembly.10 However, while Hamel may be 7 In the fourth century, in every prytany the ecclesia voted to reconfirm the strategoi in their mandate: Lys. 30.5; [Ar.] Ath.Pol. 43.4, 48.3, 61.2. Cf. Pritchett, Greek State II 28–29; P. J. Rhodes, “ΕΙΣΑΓΓΕΛΙΑ in Athens,” JHS 99 (1979) 110; J. T Roberts, Accountability in Athenian Government (Madison 1982) 15–17, 21; M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. (Odense 1975) 26; Sinclair, Democracy and Participation 157. There is no similar evidence for the fifth century. The only known case of a strategos being recalled is Alcibiades in 415 (Thuc. 6.61.5, Plut. Alc. 22); this however was only to be tried for parodying the Eleusinian mysteries. But A. C. Scafuro, “Epicheirotonia and the So-called ‘euthynai of generals,’ ” in B. Biscotti (ed.), Kállistos Nómos. Scritti in onore di Alberto Maffi (Turin 2018) 201–203, hypothesises that the ecclesia already had the power to recall strategoi in the fifth century. On reports: Thuc. 4.27.3–4, 7.8–9; Pritchett II 45–56. 8 E.g. Hamel, Athenian Generals 14, 19, 21–23, 40; R. Balot, “Democra- tising Courage in Classical Athens,” in D. M. Pritchard (ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2010) 94–95; Scafuro, in Kállistos Nómos 199, 201. 9 Thuc. 6.9–26. See also Hdt. 6.132; Thuc. 1.140–144, 4.2.2; Plut. Per. 29. 10 Hamel, Athenian Generals 12–14, 26. The strategoi were involved in the summoning of the ecclesia (Thuc. 2.22.1, 4.118.1–4; IG I3 93.20–21 mentions the strategoi setting a meeting of the Assembly, but their participation is not clear) and could add items to the agenda, presumably for the discussion of military matters (IG I3 61.51–56). Cf. Rhodes, Athenian Boule 45; Hansen, 4 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 correct from an institutional point of view, there is reason to believe that the strategoi were more influential than the average Athenian. Plato writes that the most στρατηγικοί Athenians were the most influential in discussions of military matters.11 The fifth century does not seem different. In 425 the strategos Demosthenes requested authority over the fleet being led toward Sicily by Eurymedon and Sophocles (Thuc. 4.2.2): Δηµοσθένει δὲ ὄντι ἰδιώτῃ µετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐξ Ἀκαρ- νανίας αὐτῷ δεηθέντι εἶπον χρῆσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις, ἢν βούληται, περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον. Demosthenes held no command after his return from Acar- nania, but at his own request, the Athenians granted him leave to use these ships at his discretion on their voyage round the Peloponnese. (transl. Hammond) The Athenians approved Demosthenes’ proposal even though it was only vaguely formulated.12 The Athenians discussed and ___ Athenian Assembly 19, 24–25, 51. 11 Grg. 455B–C. Plato writes in general terms, but he plausibly refers to the Athenian experience, as this was familiar to him. Cf. A. Andrewes, “The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36–49,” Phoenix 16 (1962) 84, for a similar argument on financial savviness. 12 V. J. Hunter, Thucydides: The Artful Reporter (Toronto 1973) 61–62, argues that no public decree granted Demosthenes his authority because otherwise Eurymedon and Sophocles would have been aware of his plan. However, this would not be the first case in which the ecclesia granted poorly defined powers to a successful commander, if we can trust Herodotus on Miltiades’ mandate in 488 (Hdt. 6.133). For doubts on this tradition see Hamel, Athenian Generals 168–170; J. Boëldieu-Trevert, Commander dans le monde grec au V e siècle avant notre ère (Franche-Comté 2007) 83. Furthermore, the only other governing body which might have issued Demosthenes’ man- date is the boule, which doubtfully had the authority to assign a military mandate. See Rhodes, Athenian Boule 113–114. F. S. Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece (Ann Arbor 1999) 196–197, argues that the boule might step in to preserve the secrecy of the missions. Nevertheless, the passages relating to military expeditions are either doubtful (Diod. 11.39.4– 5, 13.2.6; see n.33 below) or controversial. In 397/6 Demaenetus joined Conon with one ship, but the well-to-do Athenians vehemently protested DAVIDE MORASSI 5 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 voted upon what the strategoi proposed, and while they could disagree with the strategoi, more often than not the proposals were accepted.13 Furthermore, the ecclesia’s prerogative to issue a binding mandate constitutes great power, but how the strategoi achieved the objectives needs to be discussed. Did the ecclesia specify this as well? After gathering a substantial number of texts, Hamel con- cluded (115–117) that the assembly could issue very specific instructions, which the strategoi, mindful of their accountability, followed to the letter. In general terms, that is correct, but it should be noted that mandates with precise instructions are attested less frequently. Only six of the passages collected by Hamel have detailed instructions on how to conduct their cam- paigns. This amounts to less than a quarter of her examples.14 The remaining passages mention an area of operation,15 campaign objectives or enemies to fight,16 only occasionally providing other vague details.17 This ratio decreases even more ___ the lack of discussion of this mandate (Hell.Oxy. FGrHist 66 F 6 ix.1–2 = McKechnie and Kern vi.1–2). Cf. K. Simonsen, “Demaenetus and the Trireme,” Mouseion 9 (2009) 284–286. 13 As to the example of Nicias in 415, it should be emphasised that another strategos, Alcibiades, was involved in the debate endorsing the Sicil- ian expeditions and rousing the Athenians to war. 14 Thuc. 1.45.2–49.4, 1.57.6, 3.3.3–4, 35-36, 7.20; Diod. 13.2.6. A seventh passage, Xen. Hell. 2.1.31–32, can be added to Hamel’s list (see 12 below). 15 Thuc. 2.26.1 (= Diod. 12.44.1), 2.85.5–6, 4.2.3, 7.29. Hansen, Eisangelia no. 90, sees Dem. 23.104 as a mandate; the hypothesis is plausible, but the terms are extremely vague. 16 Thuc. 2.69.1, 4.2.3; Diod. 12.44.1, 65.1–2, 81.4. 17 E.g. Thuc. 2.26.1; Diod. 12.81.2; Dem. 15.9. Hamel, Athenian Generals 115, interprets Thuc. 3.86.4 as a precise mandate as well. However, Thucydides implies a difference between the effective mandate, helping Leontini, and the truer cause for the expedition, which was not necessarily 6 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 when one considers the many examples in which the mandate is only implied in our sources,18 or is not particularly clear.19 Such a low percentage demands an explanation. It is possible that the authors only recorded the details either when it suited their agenda or when this was necessary to understand the nar- rative,20 but we should not overlook the possibility that ‘precise’ mandates, those containing detailed instructions on how to carry out a mission, were relatively rare. In other words, the ecclesia decided what was worth pursuing, while the how was left to the strategoi. A perfect example of this is the planning of the second Sicilian campaign (415). The ecclesia deliberated over who should lead the campaign, the resources to allot, and the main objectives to achieve. However, Thucydides does not report any discussion of tactics or strategy in the assembly. Instead, he records a discussion among the three strategoi assigned to the campaign concerning their strategies to approach Sicily. Nicias wanted to pursue the objectives specified in the official man- date: support Egesta against Selinus and limit hostilities against Syracuse to a show of force (Thuc. 6.47).21 Alcibiades intended to build an advanced base in Messene along with a network of alliances, then attack Syracuse (6.48). Lamachus proposed a ___ part of the mandate. Cf. Kallet-Marx, Money 153 n.1. 18 E.g. Thuc. 1.114.1, 1.115.2, 2.23.2–3, 2.58.1, 2.95.3, 3.91.1. 19 E.g. Thuc. 1.111.2–3, 3.51, 3.91, 4.76, 5.2, 8.15–16. 20 E.g. van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London 2004) 152; Boëldieu-Trevert, Commander 55–56; M. Whitby, “Reconstructing Ancient Warfare,” in P. Sabin et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare I (Cambridge 2007) 65. 21 Thuc. 6.8.2 records the following objectives: fighting for Selinus, participating in the rebuilding of Leontini, if feasible, “and to do in Sicily whatever they knew to be best for the Athenians (καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γιγνώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοις).” Nicias evidently wanted to keep the campaign as contained as possible, sticking to the explicit objec- tives. DAVIDE MORASSI 7 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 direct attack on Syracuse, relying on the element of surprise (6.49).22 It is quite evident that Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lama- chus did not receive precise instructions on how to pursue the assembly’s objectives.23 One might conclude that the freedom of these three strategoi was due to their unusual position as strategoi autokratores; other strategoi, however, showed similar independence. In 432 Ar- chestratus and his (unnamed) colleagues were initially sent to Macedonia to fight against Perdiccas (Thuc. 1.57.6, 59.2). But when the news of Potidaea’s revolt reached Athens, the ecclesia issued new instructions: quash the rebellion in Potidaea and nearby cities, dismantle Potidaea’s city walls, and take hos- tages.24 Once they had arrived in the area, however, the strategoi evaluated their forces as insufficient to engage Potidaea and instead attacked the Macedonian cities Therme and Pydna (1.59.2, 1.61.2). Admittedly, the demos sent Archedamus and his colleagues to achieve both objectives, and Thucydides is not very clear on whether the two mandates were both valid or if the latter replaced the former.25 It is worth mentioning that the 22 For discussion see G. Cawkwell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War (London 1997) 82–83. 23 Hamel, Athenian Generals 117–118 n.7, argues correctly that Alcibiades and Lamachus did not depart from their mandate. But it is undeniable that the difference between the three strategies denotes the absence of the ecclesia’s indications on the matter, otherwise the entire discussion would have been useless. There is reason to believe that a council of strategoi and higher officers discussed these matters in the field, deciding by majority vote: see e.g. Hdt. 6.109 ff.; Thuc. 7.60, 8.25–27; Plut. Nic. 20.6–7. Cf. E. F. Bloedow, Alcibiades Rexamined (Wiesbaden 1973) 10–11; Hansen, Athenian Democracy 237; Hamel 95–99; E. M. Harris, “The Rule of Law and Military Organisation in the Greek polis,” in Symposion 2009 (Vienna 2010) 410. S. Johnstone, A History of Trust in Ancient Greece (Oxford 2011) 118–121, con- vincingly suggests that the strategoi looked for consensus in their decisions. 24 Thuc. 1.57.6. Cf. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 79–85. 25 A. W. Gomme, “I.G. i.2 296 and the Dates of τὰ Ποτειδεατικά,” CR 55 8 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 strategoi analysed the situation in the field and interpreted the mandate accordingly. There is no doubt that taking Potidaea and stopping the revolts in the area was the priority, but the circumstances obliged the strategoi to take an operative decision. Similarly, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, and Conon displayed some agency when dealing with their mandate in 413. Once he had escorted Charicles to raid the Peloponnese as instructed (Thuc. 7.20, 7.26), Demosthenes raised additional troops in Zacynthus and from the Messenians. When he encountered Eurymedon returning from Syracuse, they decided together to send their ten best ships to Conon, who was deployed in Naupactus and feared a Corinthian fleet (7.31). The mandate says nothing about holding ships back; it seems unlikely that Conon had the assembly’s approval for his request. Demos- thenes and Eurymedon made an independent decision in light of the circumstances. The above examples are corroborated by several other pas- sages that hint at independent decisions made by the strategoi. For example, in 430 Carcinus, Proteas, and Socrates, returning from an expedition “around the Peloponnese,” became aware of the invasion of Megara and decided to join the enterprise (Thuc. 2.23.2, 2.31.1). Phormio was highly successful in de- fending Naupactus and controlling the gulf of Crisa, where he was sent in 428, but he also took the liberty of making a brief expedition to the interior of Acarnania to secure the area after the Spartans’ departure (2.69, 2.102–103). The strategoi De- modochus and Aristeides were sent to collect funds in the Hellespont, but this did not stop them from attacking An- tandrus, which was fortified by the Mytileneans (4.75.1). Thu- ___ (1941), esp. 59, 64, believes in two concurrent mandates and associates them with the expedition. In Gomme’s defence, a double mandate is attested in Thuc. 4.2.3; but S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1991–2008) ad 1.57.6, questions the connection of this inscription (IG I3 365) to Thucydides’ account. Cf. Kallet-Marx, Money 79. DAVIDE MORASSI 9 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 cydides implies that this was an impromptu decision triggered by the news of the Mytileneans’ interest in Antandrus. The demos neither sent additional troops nor seemed to be involved in any sense in the planning of the attack. Similar discretionary power was allowed when making tacti- cal decisions. In 412 Phrynichus and his colleagues were in charge of a fleet sent to combat the Spartan offensive in the eastern Aegean (Thuc. 8.24–25). However, when he became aware that the Peloponnesian fleet was approaching, Phryni- chus urged his colleagues to retreat (8.27.1–2):26 Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου ἐπύθετο τὰ τῶν νεῶν σαφῶς, βουλοµένων τῶν ξυναρχόντων ὑποµείναντας διαναυµαχεῖν, οὐκ ἔφη οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ποιήσειν τοῦτο οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἐς δύναµιν ἐπιτρέψειν. ὅπου γὰρ [ἔξεστιν] ἐν ὑστέρῳ σαφῶς εἰδότας πρὸς ὁπόσας τε ναῦς πολε- µίας καὶ ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις ἱκανῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν παρασκευασαµένοις ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι, οὐδέποτε τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὀνείδει εἴξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύσειν. But when the Athenian general Phrynichus received clear information about this fleet from Leros, although his fellow commanders wanted to stay where they were and fight it out at sea, he said no: he would not undertake such a fight himself, nor would he allow them or anyone else to do so if he could help it. When it was open to them to postpone battle until they had pre- cise knowledge of the number of enemy ships they faced and the relative number they could muster themselves with time spent on proper preparation, he would never take such an uncon- sidered risk simply to avoid an accusation of dishonour. There was nothing dishonourable in Athenians making a strategic retreat from an enemy navy. (transl. Hammond) This episode demonstrates that the strategoi could have direct control over tactical decisions, and that casts light on the 26 Thucydides highly praises Phrynichus for his wisdom; see Hornblower, Commentary ad 8.27.5. 10 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 retreat from Syracuse in 413. After a disastrous night offensive against Epipolae, Demosthenes and Eurymedon advocated for retreating from their position (Thuc. 7.47.3–4). But Nicias strongly opposed the idea, arguing that the Athenians would disapprove and prosecute the strategoi when they returned home (7.48.3–4). Comparison with Phrynichus’ example suggests that Nicias’ reservations were due not to his lack of authority but rather to his concern over what the Athenians might think of him. Demosthenes disagreed with Nicias, confirming that Nicias’ actions did not necessarily represent what a strategos was expected to do, but a strategos’ personal choice, which was open for debate.27 Thus, there is reason to think that strategoi could exercise some agency and independence within the limits of their mandate. This conclusion is corroborated by several mandates that we can confidently call vague. The sources record several mandates in terms of the area of action,28 allies to support,29 or enemies to fight.30 These mandates imply that the strategoi were in charge of figuring out the details of a campaign, whilst the ecclesia defined the campaign’s objectives and grand strategy.31 27 At Thuc. 7.49.2 Demosthenes refers to the ecclesia’s vote to end the mission not as a fact but as an eventuality. And yet he still argued that it was imperative to move the army from their position. 28 E.g. Bottieia and Chalcidice, Thuc. 2.79.1; Chalcidice, 5.2, 8.64.2; “on the other side of the Peloponnese,” 3.94.3. 29 E.g. the king of Egypt, Thuc. 1.112.2; Selinus, 6.8.2. 30 Thuc. 2.69.1. Some fourth-century examples are Teleutias (Xen. Hell. 4.8.25) and Philip II (Dem. 12.16: “saying to everybody that you ordered him to fight [me], if there was the chance, πολεµεῖν αὐτῷ προστάττετε, ἂν καιρὸν λάβῃ).” 31 On the difference between tactics, strategy, and grand strategy see A. G. Platias and C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy. Athenian and Spartan Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and their Relevance Today (Athens 2006) 20–23. DAVIDE MORASSI 11 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 2. The peculiarities of precise mandates The evidence we have seen is consistent, but how do we integrate it with the undeniable examples of precise mandates? To address the issue, the six examples of precise mandates will be discussed in detail to bring out the patterns, the significant characteristics, or the scenarios that prompted the ecclesia to issue more precise instructions. It is significant that four of the six passages record precise instructions regarding acceptable terms of surrender and how to handle prisoners.32 The ecclesia gave precise instructions to the strategoi about the demands to be made of Potidaea (432/1) and Mytilene (428/7) when they were sent to crush their re- volts: destruction of the city walls for both poleis, surrender of hostages for the former and of the fleet for the latter (Thuc. 1.57.6, 3.3.3–4). The same should be said for Diodorus’ dubious report that the strategoi and the boule agreed to enslave Selinus and Syracuse at the beginning of the second Sicilian campaign.33 The last example, once again involving the revolt of Mytilene, is slightly different (3.33–34). After taking the city, the strategos Paches sent word to Athens asking for instructions concerning the fate of the Mytileneans, which sparked the famous debate between Cleon and Diodotus.34 A pattern seems to be unfolding. The ecclesia wanted control 32 Hamel, Athenian Generals 51–55, underlines the intense activity of the ecclesia in these areas. 33 Diod. 13.2.6, 13.30.3. Rhodes, Athenian Boule 41, reasonably doubts this tradition because of its discrepancy with Thucydides’ account. It might also be stressed that Diodorus implies that the strategoi received instructions on how to handle the prisoners from the assembly as well, which might reflect some conflict in his sources or even his confusion. 34 Thuc. 3.37–45. Cf. P. Debnar, “Diodotus’ Paradox and the Mytilene Debate (Thucydides 3.37–49),” RhM 143 (2000) 161–178, esp. 168–170; A. Andrewes, “The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49,” Phoenix 16 (1962) 65–85. 12 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 over the acceptable terms of surrender for the enemy and de- liberated on the handling of war prisoners. This interference by the assembly limited the strategoi from a diplomatic point of view, but not necessarily in practical matters such as tactics and strategy.35 For instance, it is worth noting that Paches showed himself to be very keen and receptive to the ecclesia’s instruc- tions and will, but did not ask for guidance regarding tactical matters.36 The battle of Aegospotami partially confirms this conclusion. Xenophon (Hell. 2.1.31–32) states that it was de- creed that the right hand of every Peloponnesian prisoner be cut off, but there is no mention of instructions regarding which strategies or tactics the strategoi had to adopt. When Alcibiades showed up, advising them to move the fleet to Sestos and promising troops, the strategoi chased him away, saying not that their mandate was different, but that they, not he, were in charge of these matters. Nevertheless, on three occasions the ecclesia demonstrated its power to instruct the strategoi on how to conduct a campaign: the campaign of Corcyra in 433, that of Mytilene in 428/7, and the second Sicilian expedition in 413. All three of these fascinating episodes seem to belong to very specific—if not exceptional—scenarios. The mandate for the fleet sent in aid of Corcyra shows the same concern for politics and diplomacy as the previous examples. The first contingent received unequivocal instruc- tions on how to engage the Corinthians:37 35 Pace Hamel, Athenian Generals 40–41, 97, these are not “limited military action(s).” She admits that the strategoi had the authority to call a truce with the enemy (e.g. Thuc. 3.4.2–4), which is hardly negligible. 36 H. D. Westlake, “Paches,” Phoenix 29 (1975) 110; Hornblower, Com- mentary ad 3.28.2. However, Westlake also emphasises Paches' initiative during the campaign. 37 Thuc. 1.45.3; cf. 1.49.4, 53.4. DAVIDE MORASSI 13 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 προεῖπον δὲ αὐτοῖς µὴ ναυµαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἢν µὴ ἐπὶ Κέρ- κυραν πλέωσι καὶ µέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων: οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναµιν. προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ µὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδάς. Their instructions were not to engage with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra and were about to land on Corcyra itself or any territory belonging to it: in that case, they should do what they could to prevent them. The purpose of these instructions was to avoid a breach of the treaty. (transl. M. Hammond) Thucydides draws attention to the terms of the peace of 446 between Athens and Corinth and the concern for the close re- lationship between Corinth and Sparta.38 He explicitly stresses that the Athenians did not intend to break the treaty and they declared that they had not done so when accused by the Corinthians (1.53). The situation was controversial and delicate enough to allow for the strategoi’s initiative, thus honoring pre- cise instructions. This reading is corroborated by two episodes in the fourth century, in which the ecclesia gave peremptory orders of re- deployment because a new treaty had been signed.39 These underline the ecclesia’s concern for the geopolitical scenario and how this limited the strategoi. A passage of Demosthenes’ Against Timotheus is particularly explicit in this regard. Demosthenes 38 On the complexity of the diplomatic scenario: de Ste Croix, Origins 76– 77; Hamel, Athenian Generals 18. L. J. Samons, Pericles and the Conquest of History: A Political Biography (Cambridge 2016) 135–137, underlines the Athenians’ caution in avoiding a rupture with the Corinthians. Hornblower, Commentary ad 1.53.4 and Greek World 114–115, suggests that the strategoi overstepped their mandate, which only authorised them to protect Cor- cyra’s territory. However, Thucydides reports the strategoi’s claim not to have broken the treaty, suggesting that they did not recognise their inter- vention as a proper act of war but a necessary operation to protect Corcyra. 39 Xen. Hell. 6.2.2, 6.4.1, 7.4.1. Cf. Hamel, Athenian Generals 40–44; Horn- blower, Greek World 192. 14 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 claims that Timotheus received the mandate to help the satrap Ariobarzanes while avoiding the enmity of the Great King of Persia at all costs (15.9). Timotheus had a bad track record in the matter; in 374 he jeopardised the Athenians’ effort to end hostilities with Sparta by reinstating the exiles in Zacynthus (Xen. Hell. 6.2.1–4). Although he did not explicitly disobey the ecclesia’s orders to stop fighting, his behaviour still went against the Athenian agenda. Unsurprisingly, the assembly now went the extra mile to avoid the creation of a similar situation, especially if Timotheus’ actions might have caused hostilities with Persia. Consequently, it is plausible that the ecclesia felt the need to issue more detailed instructions in delicate situations, which need not imply that this was a habitual practice. The case of the first expedition to Mytilene in 428 is more complicated. After hearing of Mytilene’s defection, the demos approved an expedition against the Lesbian polis, indicating precise terms for Mytilene’s surrender and ordering Cleippides and his two colleagues to attack by surprise, having received in- telligence regarding a festival outside of Mytilene’s walls (Thuc. 3.3.3–4). Two aspects of this passage are particularly note- worthy. First, this is one of three precise mandates related to Mytilene’s revolt. The demos’ involvement does not seem casual; Thucydides’ rendering of the debate over the fate of Mytilene’s inhabitants after its surrender shows the strong emotions the Athenians felt on the matter.40 Thus it is plausible that the Athenians wanted more control of the campaigns in which they were more emotionally invested. Second, the passage warns us against the practicability of tactical discussion in the assembly. The information about the festival was precious intelligence; it is significant that it was discussed in the ecclesia.41 However, a man overheard the 40 Cf. Andrewes, Phoenix 16 (1962) 75, 81; Debnar, RhM 143 (2000) 170– 171; Balot, in War, Democracy 97–98. 41 Cf. J. Ober, “Thucydides on Athens’ Democratic Advantage in the DAVIDE MORASSI 15 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 Athenians' intentions and rushed to Mytilene with this piece of intelligence.42 The Athenians’ surprise attack failed: when the army arrived, they found the Mytileneans ready and defending the city walls. The risk of leaking essential information was concrete, and the strategoi were aware of the importance of keeping their plans secret, even from their own men.43 Thus it seems unlikely that public discussion of tactical matters in the ecclesia was a common practice.44 If this had been the case, we would hear of several other leaks, especially given the traffic in Athenian harbours. Demosthenes’ mandate in the winter of 414/3 provides a third example of precise instructions (Thuc. 7.20, 7.26). When he was appointed commander of the main contingent sent to Syracuse in response to Nicias’ request for reinforcements, Demosthenes was also ordered to wait for Charicles, who was sent to Argos to ask for troops to undertake certain actions in the Peloponnese. It is possible that the ecclesia wanted to pair the inexperienced Charicles with a more seasoned strategos, but the Athenians might also have issued the order to save men and resources.45 By temporarily redeploying Demosthenes’ ___ Archidamian War,” in War, Democracy 65–87, at 80–81, on the circulation of information in Athens. However, as Russell, Information 79–80, correctly stresses, some Lesbian informants brought the news of the revolt to Athens (Thuc. 3.2.3). Cf. Hornblower, Commentary ad 3.2.3, on the private motiva- tions behind this intelligence leak. The intelligence on the festival probably came from the same informants too. 42 Cf. Russell, Information 83–86. 43 E.g. Thuc. 7.48.1, 7.49; Xen. Hell. 1.1.15. Cf. Russell, Information 192– 193, 196. 44 Cf. Rhodes, Athenian Boule 114. Hornblower, Commentary ad 3.3.5, won- ders if the information leak occurred at a higher level than the assembly, raising the question whether the mandate was even discussed in the ecclesia. Cf. n.12 above. Russell, Information 197–198, notes the tendency of the com- manders not to share their plans with their troops. 45 Charicles was a prominent political figure in the period, but this is the 16 WAR MANDATES IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 troops to Charicles’ raids in the Peloponnese, the Athenians reduced the number of ships and men necessary for the latter. It seems reasonable to recognise a similar scenario in 425 (see above), when Demosthenes was granted vague powers over un- disclosed operations in the Peloponnese region. In sum, the discrepancy between strategoi acting reasonably independently and the assembly issuing precise mandates is less severe than expected. Precise mandates seem to occur in two scenarios: in terms of surrender, especially about the handling of prisoners, and in exceptional circumstances.46 Delicate diplomatic situations, highly emotional campaigns, and even the rational use of resources made it necessary for the ecclesia to issue precise instructions to the strategoi, at least occasionally. Otherwise, the strategoi were bound to a specific objective but were reasonably independent in choosing how to attain it. Conclusion: the power of the strategoi From this examination, we can conclude that the sources suggest that the strategoi retained considerable agency. They seem to have exercised influence over the Athenians, especially in the discussion of military matters. This is not to say that they were always listened to, especially given that individual strategoi might favour different lines of action, but their role in defining the mandates should not be underestimated.47 Additionally, as many instances demonstrate, they were often able to exercise their agency within the mandates issued by the ecclesia. The assembly had the power to micromanage its ___ only strategia associated with his name; see PA 15407, PAA 983120. 46 Cf. Hamel, Athenian Generals 51. 47 It should also be taken into consideration that the strategoi had an important role in defining the logistics and the practical aspects of campaign organisation. Scholars have given too little space to the issue, with the exception of D. Engels, “Logistics: Sinews of War,” in B. Campbell et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion of War in the Classical Period (Oxford 2013) 351– 368. I intend to discuss this matter further elsewhere. DAVIDE MORASSI 17 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 62 (2022) 1–17 commanders, but there is reason to believe that it did so only in particular circumstances. The situation is quite different regarding acceptable terms of surrender and what should be done with prisoners. The ecclesia retained control of these matters, probably because of the lasting nature of these provisions. Still, there were exceptions, which once again suggests that strategoi had considerable power in the field, kept at bay only by the threat of trials at the end of their term in office.48 Consequently, we should be wary of undervaluing the power and independence of Athenian strategoi, even under a radical democracy. The undeniable power and control exercised by the demos is only apparently antithetical to magistrates with sub- stantial power, especially when operating outside of Athens. It seems reasonable to argue that the demos dictated the grand strategy and objectives of a campaign, thus the most ‘political’ aspects of the military effort. The challenges when micro- managing a complex military expedition with limited means of communication obliged the Athenians to allow some indepen- dence to the persons they elected to the highest military ranks. In these circumstances, the Athenians’ harshness in the ac- countability trials would make more sense; it was a measure to keep abuses and selfish behaviour to a minimum.49 December, 2021 Oxford davide.morassi@gmail.com 48 Prisoners: e.g. Hdt. 9.119; Thuc. 2.92.2, 6.61.3, 6.62.3–4; Xen. Hell. 1.2.12–13, 1.5.19; Plut. Alc. 29. Negotiations with other poleis: e.g. Thuc. 4.54.2; Osborne/Rhodes, Greek Historical Inscriptions 478–404 B.C. no. 185. 49 This article is a revised version of my research on the institutional powers of the Classical Athenian strategoi, which constitutes a chapter of my doctoral thesis. I am very grateful to Prof. Rosalind Thomas, who first supervised the thesis and then found the time to give me feedback on this piece, and to GRBS’ anonymous reviewers. Lastly, I would also like to warmly thank Jasmine Doris for her suggestions and constant support. I take responsibility for any mistakes remaining.