Ojennus ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 ISSN 2159-3159 Article copyright held by the author(s) and made available under the Creative Commons Attribution License CC-BY https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Apollonius Rhodius and the Stoic Doctrine of the Emotions Paul Ojennus NE OF THE MOST SALIENT FEATURES of the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius is the unprecedented access the reader has to the mental lives of its characters. Medea’s monologues constitute the clearest example, but characters such as the Lemnian women or Telamon also contribute to this im- pression. Other figures, especially Jason, remain opaque, so that applying common-sense ideas of character to them has proven difficult. Nearly contemporaneously with the composition of the Argonautica, the Stoics were developing systematic arguments about the soul and emotions, that the soul was thoroughly rational and emotions were nothing more than erroneous judgments, breaking with philosophical models that attributed emotions to irrational parts of the soul. While earlier discussions relating Apollonius to the Hellenistic schools focus on ethics, and recent work explores his engagement with their teachings on fate, the poet’s reception of contemporary doctrines of the soul and emotions has not been explored. This study uses a model of engagement: Apollonius does not replicate philosophical doc- trines, but selects, adapts, or probes them in constructing the mental lives of his characters, juxtaposing them with traditional epic representations. Three themes emerge: Apollonius’ char- acters often fall into emotional states through erroneous judg- ments, analogous to the Stoic model, and in contrast to earlier models that separate emotions from thought. Influenced by strong emotions, his characters are unable to articulate their impressions, corresponding to Apollonius’ well-known use of O PAUL OJENNUS 189 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 ἀµηχανίη (being at a loss), likely referencing Skeptical ap- proaches. Medea’s hesitations allude to the difficulty the Stoics encounter in explaining psychic conflict. Apollonius updates inherited epic representations of the emotions, enriching them with ideas and images from the contemporary philosophical schools and the controversies surrounding them. 1. Backgrounds 1.1. Apollonius and philosophy Following upon earlier approaches detailing the Alexandrian poets’ engagement with Aristotle,1 it is becoming clear that Apollonius engaged a range of philosophers and doctrines. His references to Empedocles’ cosmogony in Orpheus’ song in Book 12 and Circe’s beasts in Book 43 are now familiar, though their precise function is debated.4 Apollonius’ engagement with De- mocritus is also clear: Medea’s enchantment of Talos reflects the 1 E.g. appropriating Aristotelian scholarly techniques, as in Callimachus’ Pinakes, but rejecting his poetic teachings: R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford 1968) 134– 138, 143. 2 T. Phillips, Untimely Epic: Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica (Oxford 2020) 161– 167, developing earlier comparisons in P. Kyriakou, “Empedoclean Echoes in Apollonius Rhodius’ ‘Argonautica’,” Hermes 122 (1994) 309–319, at 309– 313, and M. Asper, “Apollonius on Poetry,” in T. Papanghelis et al. (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Apollonius Rhodius2 (Leiden 2008) 167–197, at 178; cf. D. P. Nelis, “Demodocus and the Song of Orpheus (Ap. Rhod. Arg. I, 496–511),” MusHelv 49 (1992) 152–170; L. A. Marshall, Uncharted Territory: Receptions of Philosophy in Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica (diss. Ohio State Univ. 2017). 3 Phillips, Untimely Epic 158–161, developing earlier comparisons in Kyria- kou, Hermes 122 (1994) 317–318; R. Hunter, The Argonautica of Apollonius: Literary Studies (Cambridge 1993) 165, and Apollonius of Rhodes: Argonautica IV (Cambridge 2015) 175–178; cf. Marshall, Uncharted Territory. 4 Phillips, Untimely Epic 158–167, argues that the references create temporal tension: Circe’s creatures recall an age prior to the Argonauts, but from Empedocles’ viewpoint, posterior to the Argonauts, analogous to the Argo- nautica being both ‘before’ and ‘after’ Homer; see J. Clauss, “Cosmos without Imperium: The Argonautic Journey through Time,” in M. A. Harder et al. (eds.), Apollonius Rhodius (Leuven 2000) 11–32, at 23–25. 190 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 philosopher’s understanding of the evil eye,5 alluding, Powers argues, to the contemporary debate among the Epicureans.6 Marshall identifies Parmenides as an important philosophical source for Apollonius.7 Apollonius’ reception of Hellenistic philosophers is more con- tentious. Early approaches focused on imagery, demonstrating that Apollonius knew the texts, but concluding that he adopted their figures, not their doctrines. Fränkel sees that the bee simile at 2.130–136 alludes to an early Stoic writing also reflected in Epictetus.8 Likewise, he notes that the simile of light glancing off water at 3.755–760 recurs in Epictetus, concluding that both drew on early Stoic sources, but rejecting the possibility that Apollonius adopted the relevant doctrine.9 Fränkel develops the idea that Apollonius’ Heracles alludes to his appropriation by the Stoics as a model for the sage:10 Heracles’ refusal of his elec- tion, his abstinence from the sojourn on Lemnos, his perplexity over his broken oar, and his justification for killing Theiodamas point to a serious, intellectual Heracles that is deflated by his emotional response to Hylas’ disappearance. Scherer notes that 5 4.1638–1688 with Hunter, Argonautica IV 302–303 ad loc.; M. Dickie, “Talos Bewitched: Magic, Atomic Theory, and Paradoxography in Apol- lonius’ Argonautica 4.1638–88,” PLLS 6 (1990) 267–297, at 272–275. Text: F. Vian and É. Delage, Apollonios de Rhodes: Argonautiques2 I–III (Paris 1976–1996); translations are by the author. 6 N. Powers, “Magic, Wonder, and Scientific Explanation in Apollonius, Argonautica 4.1638–93,” PCPS 48 (2002) 87–101, at 87–97. 7 Marshall, Uncharted Territory 149–192. 8 H. Fränkel, “Apollonius Rhodius as a Narrator in Argonautica 2.1–140,” TAPA 83 (1952) 144–155, at 151. 9 Noted in H. Fränkel, “Problems of Text and Interpretation in Apollonius’ Argonautica,” AJP 71 (1950) 113–133, at 127 n.29, and “Das Argonautenepos des Apollonios,” MusHelv 14 (1957) 1–19, at 17–18; developed in Noten zu den Argonautika des Apollonios (Munich 1968) 376–379; see discussion below. 10 Noted in Fränkel, AJP 71 (1950) 127 n.29; developed in Noten 115 on 1.855–856, 143 on 1.1187–1189, and 147 on 1.1245. PAUL OJENNUS 191 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 Phineus’ prophecy is suggestive of Stoic fatalism.11 These observations focused on individual motifs, and scholars did not entertain the suggestion that Apollonius engaged the doctrines. Later studies argued for engagement, rehabilitating Jason from his reception as an anti-hero,12 arguing that he exem- plified the ethical stance of one of the schools. Klein suggests that Jason’s ἀµηχανίη stands for Skeptical ἀπορία.13 Clayman argues that Pyrrho’s methods were available to Apollonius and his style of weighing alternatives is reflected in Medea’s monologues and Jason’s dilemmas.14 Williams contends that Jason embodies Stoic ethics, reading his ἀµηχανίη as hesitation for reflection, and his leadership as Stoic οἰκείωσις (“appropriation”).15 Similarly, Mori detects an Aristotelean background to Telamon’s anger over the loss of Heracles, discerning when anger is appropriate, and touching on the physiology of anger.16 While these ap- proaches have not produced scholarly consensus, they contrib- ute to understanding Apollonius’ reception of the Hellenistic 11 B. Scherer, Mythos, Katalog und Prophezeiung: Studien zu den Argonautika des Apollonios Rhodios (Stuttgart 2006) 157, following C. Beye, Epic and Romance in the Argonautica of Apollonius (Carbondale 1982) 118–119; cf. L. Nyberg, Unity and Coherence: Studies in Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica and the Alexandrian Epic Tradition (Lund 1992) 85–86; Hunter, Literary Studies 93. 12 For Jason as anti-hero see G. Lawall, “Apollonius’ Argonautica: Jason as Anti-Hero,” YCS 19 (1966) 121–169; C. Beye, “Jason as Love-Hero in Apol- lonius’ Argonautika,” GRBS 10 (1969) 31–55; S. Jackson, “Apollonius’ Jason: Human Being in an Epic Scenario,” G&R 39 (1992) 155–162; R. Hunter, “ ‘Short on Heroics’: Jason in the Argonautica,” CQ 38 (1988) 436–453. 13 T. Klein, “Apollonius’ Jason: Hero and Scoundrel,” QUCC 13 (1983) 115–126, at 125–126. 14 D. Clayman, “The Skepticism of Apollonius’ Argonautica,” in Harder, Apollonius Rhodius 33–53, updated in D. Clayman, Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonism into Poetry (Berlin 2009) 188–208. 15 M. Williams, “Stoicism and the Character of Jason in Apollonius’ Argo- nautica,” Scholia N.S. 5 (1996) 17–41. 16 A. Mori, The Politics of Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica (Cambridge 2008) 82–90. 192 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 philosophies, establishing that the Alexandrian poet had access to their writings and engaged with their doctrines.17 1.2. The emotions in Hellenistic philosophy Thus, there is an emerging consensus that Apollonius engages the philosophical tradition, from early exponents to contem- porary controversies. Given the focus on the schools’ ethical teachings, we can identify a gap in our understanding, namely how Apollonius receives the doctrines that modern philosophers identify as ‘philosophy of mind’: explanations of the soul, per- ception, decision-making, and emotions.18 Annas outlines the topics in the Hellenistic schools, identifying the soul, perception and thinking, and emotions as central foci.19 These occasioned controversies in the middle of the third century, when Apol- lonius was writing.20 The development of the Stoic doctrine is complex; the central teachings: the soul’s physicality, impres- sions and assent, impulse, and the passions were introduced by Zeno (331/0–262/1),21 though their canonical expressions were 17 On Klein as “suggestive” see Hunter, CQ 38 (1988) 436 n.6; on Williams, R. Glei, “Outlines of Apollonian Scholarship, 1955–1999,” in Brill’s Compan- ion to Apollonius 1–28, at 12. 18 The schools did not identify ‘philosophy of mind’, but J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley 1992) 9–10, argues that these topics cohere in the Hellenistic philosophies and finds ‘philosophy of mind’ a useful heuristic. 19 Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind; recent surveys—V. de Harven, “Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind,” in J. E. Sisko (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity (London 2019) 214–235, and F. Masi and F. Verde, “Mind in an Atomistic World: Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition,” 236–257— focus on the soul, perception, and thinking for the Stoics, and the soul and mental states for the Epicureans. 20 Apollonius’ dates are problematic; see R. Hunter, Apollonius of Rhodes: Argonautica III (Cambridge 1989) 1–9, for the evidence and tentative con- clusion for the publication of the Argonautica in the 240’s, and J. Murray, “Anchored in Time: The Date in Apollonius’ Argonautica,” in M. A. Harder et al. (eds.), Hellenistic Poetry in Context (Leuven 2014) 247–284, at 258–267, for the argument that Apollonius’ descriptions of the night sky reflect the year 238, suggesting revision through that date. 21 For Zeno’s dates see T. Dorandi, “Chronology,” in K. Algra et al. (eds.), PAUL OJENNUS 193 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 often formulated by Chrysippus (281/277–208/204, scholarch 230/229–208/204),22 for example, that the passions do not arise from irrational elements in the soul, but are the result of false value judgments within a unitary, rational soul (Galen SVF III 463). These teachings broke with the approaches of Plato and Aristotle, and were immediately controversial.23 1.3. Traditional epic models of the emotions Apollonius’ reception of philosophical approaches to the emotions necessarily appears in the context of his pervasive engagement with Homer. Scholarship on emotions in Homer has a long history, and became particularly controversial in the middle of the twentieth century, responding to Snell’s argument that Homer lacked a unified sense of the psyche.24 Recent schol- arship has focused on other topics such as agency and cog- The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) 31–54, at 38; on the physicality of the soul, Cic. Acad.Pr. 1.39 = SVF I 90; on impressions and assent, Sext. Emp. Math. 7.228–231 = SVF II 56; our sources do not associate impulse with Zeno, but the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on the nature of walking (Sen. Ep. 113.23 = SVF II 836; cf. B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism [Oxford 1985] 50–53) suggests that the doctrine was established early and refined over the third century; on the passions, Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 4.2.1–6 = SVF III 463, and 4.3.2–5. 22 Dorandi, in Cambridge History 38–40. 23 Arrius in Stob. Ecl. 2.88.8–89.3 = SVF III 378; cf. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 108–110. A debt is owed to M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge 2001), who promotes the relevance of Stoic teachings on the emotions to modern cognitive approaches; I do not engage her broader arguments since my focus is literary-historical, but she constitutes important background. For the break with Plato and Aristotle and attendant controversy see M. Frede, “The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul,” in M. Schofield et al. (eds.), The Norms of Nature (Cam- bridge 1986) 93–110. 24 B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (Boston 1953) 8–17; recent scholarship rejects this view, but acknowledges Homer’s preference for specific organs over ‘mind’ or ‘body’: S. Lye, “Homeric Body and Mind,” in C. Pache (ed.), The Cambridge Guide to Homer (Cambridge 2020) 142–144, at 143. 194 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 nition.25 I do not review this scholarship in detail, but identify themes that enjoy consensus and illustrate Apollonius’ develop- ments. First, Homer tends to deploy physical affect to communicate emotional states: facial expression, tears, and the like tend to represent inner states directly, and internal audiences tend to interpret them accurately. When Achilles nurses his resentment after the heralds take Briseis, his tears reflect his affliction and Thetis interprets them correctly.26 When Odysseus listens to Demodocus, he weeps; despite his concealing it, Alcinous sees and understands (Od. 8.83–95). Complexity in emotions is not at issue; Odysseus’ tears communicate a nuanced response: sorrow for the transience of his glory, grief for his lost comrades, regret that his former actions do not fit his current values, and so forth.27 Rather, Homer uses affect to communicate the emotion, rather than emphasizing a tension between inner and outer selves, or suggesting the incommensurability of individual emo- tions.28 Second, emotions (and sometimes cognition) are dramatized as externals: gods, parts of the psyche, or forces. When the heroes gather their courage, the narrator represents this as a god putting valor into their hearts.29 When the suitors break before 25 J. Christensen, The Many-minded Man: The Odyssey, Psychology, and the Therapy of Epic (Ithaca 2020) 23–28. 26 Achilles’ affect: Il. 1.348–351, 357, 361, 364; Thetis’ interpretation (outer tears represent inner πένθος): 1.362–363. On the appropriateness of Achilles’ tears: S. Schein, Homer: Iliad Book I (Cambridge 2022) 160 on 1.349. 27 Similarly, I. de Jong, A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey (Cambridge 2001) 198–199, on Od. 8.83–92. 28 With caveats: Auerbach’s (E. Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature [Princeton 1953]) denial of inner depths over- reaches (especially for the Odyssey, where dissimulation and delayed revelation are thematic: de Jong, Narratological Commentary 326 on Od. 13.253–286, 386 on Od. 16.4–219). 29 E.g. Il. 5.1–2, with G. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary II (Cambridge 1990) 53, on 5.2–3. PAUL OJENNUS 195 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 Odysseus’ attack, Athena shakes the Aegis and panic seizes them.30 Last, making decisions on the basis of emotion (or cognition) tends to be represented dialogically: another hero, a god, or a separate part of the psyche serves as an interlocutor. When Achilles becomes angry with Agamemnon, his impulse is to violence, but Athena convinces him to withdraw instead (Il. 1.188–222); Athena dramatizes Achilles’ second thoughts or prudence overcoming his anger.31 When Odysseus sees the suitors taking the maidservants to bed, he addresses his κραδίη, convincing it not to act but remain in disguise until the right moment (Od. 20.6–24).32 Yet Athena is physically present, she touches Achilles and acts as Hera’s agent to save Agamemnon; Homer uses her to reveal Achilles’ decision-making process.33 Apollonius adopts these techniques at times, typically with characters from an earlier generation, such as Idas, Aeetes, or Heracles. 1.4. A model of engagement The model employed here, examining Apollonius’ reception of teachings on emotions in the Hellenistic schools, follows Acosta-Hughes and Stephens on Callimachus’ response to Plato, and Ojennus on Apollonius’ engagement with philosophical debates about fate.34 Acosta-Hughes and Stephens trace Cal- limachus’ engagement with Plato, arguing that the poet avoids the specific challenges the philosopher poses, since that would 30 Od. 22.297–298; since A. Lesky, Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos (Heidelberg 1961), described as “double determination”: human decision and divine intervention are parallel, reinforcing explana- tions, not competing ones. 31 G. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary I (Cambridge 1985) 73, on 1.193–194. 32 J. Russo, M. Fernandez-Galiano, and A. Heubeck, A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey III (Oxford 1992) 109, on 20.18–24. 33 Schein, Homer: Iliad Book I 22–23. 34 B. Acosta-Hughes and S. Stephens, Callimachus in Context: From Plato to the Augustan Poets (Cambridge 2011) 23–83; P. Ojennus, “Apollonius of Rhodes, Hellenistic Philosophy, and Fate,” AJP 139 (2018) 215–248. 196 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 concede that philosophy existed outside of language where it could reasonably judge literature, but frames Plato’s philosophy as a species of literature, so that the philologist (Callimachus) may competently judge it. Callimachus’ self-depiction in Aetia fr.1, writing poetry in obedience to Apollo, rewrites Plato’s por- trayal of Socrates in prison, reinterpreting Apollo’s command to make music by writing poetry, not practicing philosophy.35 This reference to Socrates understanding philosophy as a sort of lit- erature (µουσική Pl. Phd. 59C) indicates the contradiction with his practice in the Ion and Republic of judging literature from the standpoint of philosophy, as if philosophy were outside of litera- ture. This strategy positions Callimachus as critic parallel to Socrates so that he can judge Plato’s writing, now understood as a literary genre. Similarly, Ojennus frames Apollonius’ reception of the debates about fate in Hellenistic philosophy, so that the poet claims epic poetry as the privileged position for adjudicating those debates. Idmon’s choice to join the expedition, despite foreknowing his fate to die in its course, recalls the Stoic doctrine that divination relies on fate being pervasive and ineluctable: it is only possible to predict events that are foreordained. But it also recalls criticisms by Epicurus and others that this view of fate is incompatible with ethics: it is nonsensical to praise or blame someone for what they did necessarily. Ojennus identifies this as generic rivalry also: rather than side with the Stoics or their critics, Apollonius leaves the question of compatibility open, and assigns to the epic poet (himself) authority over praise and blame. When Idmon dies and the Boeotians and Nisaeans honor his tomb as that of Agamestor, Apollonius corrects the error and returns praise to Idmon.36 Applying this approach to Apollonius’ treatment of emotions, I will argue that he contrasts Stoic teachings with traditional epic models and other current ap- proaches; he does not replicate the philosophical teachings, but 35 Acosta-Hughes and Stephens, Callimachus in Context 33–35. 36 Ojennus, AJP 139 (2018) 227–229. PAUL OJENNUS 197 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 uses them to update his epic model and allow the debates to energize his presentation of character. 2. Posing the problem: Jason and Idas at Pagasae After preparations for the expedition are complete and the Argonauts extend their dinner with conversation, Apollonius shows Jason afflicted with ἀµηχανίη (1.460–461): ἔνθ’ αὖτ’ Αἰσονίδης µὲν ἀµήχανος εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα, κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς There, in turn, Aesonides, at a loss within himself, was brooding over the details, like one depressed Jason’s emotional response to assuming leadership is complex, and the narrator withholds direct access to that response, in contrast to the Homeric model where affect helps communicate emotional states.37 Idas challenges Jason to express himself in a more Homeric manner,38 setting up competing models of under- standing emotions in the Argonautica. 2.1. Jason’s emotions and Idas’ critique Earlier, when Idmon prophesies the Argonauts’ ultimate success but his own death, Apollonius signals his use of complex emotional responses, recalling his Homeric model: νόστῳ µὲν γήθησαν, ἄχος δ’ ἕλεν Ἴδµονος αἴσῃ (“they were glad over their return, but anxiety seized them over the fate of Idmon” 1.449).39 Thus Jason, with the others, is affected by gladness and anxiety. Turning to Jason, he adds further complexity: Jason is ἀµήχανος “at a loss,”40 κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς “like one depressed,” πορφύρε- 37 Hunter, Literary Studies 19. 38 Cf. Il. 18.426, Hephaestus prompts Thetis to reveal the purpose of her visit: αὔδα ὅ τι φρονέεις ≈ 1.463–464 µετὰ φρεσίν … αὔδα. Thetis responds at length. 39 Hom. Od. 9.62–63 = 565–566 = 10.133–134 ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέοµεν ἀκαχήµενοι ἦτορ / ἄσµενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, φίλους ὀλέσαντες ἑταίρους (“from there we sail onwards, grieved at heart / gladdened to be safe from death, having lost our dear comrades”), but juxtaposing γήθησαν and ἄχος. 40 The translations “without resource” and “helpless” seem overly intel- 198 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 σκεν “brooding.”41 Forfending the objection that there is no ‘real’ mental state behind his affect,42 Apollonius indicates that Jason has conflicting emotions about his leadership elsewhere: he is glad for Heracles’ backing (γηθόσυνος “glad”), but diffident over the Argonauts’ support (εἰ µὲν δή µοι κῦδος ἐπιτρωπᾶτε µέλεσθαι, “if you in fact entrust to me the honor to take care of the expedition” 1.350–352), he is encouraged by oracles and the help of the heroes (ἐπεὶ µάλα δεξιὰ Φοῖβος / ἔχρη, ἀτὰρ µετέπειτά γ’ ἀριστήων ἐπαρωγῇ, “since Phoebus prophesied very / favor- ably, and additionally with the help of the princes” 1.301–302, cf. 1.448–449, 2.641, 3.1134–1135), but burdened by respon- sibility for the safety of the Argonauts (2.635–637,43 cf. 1.416– 418, 1.449), and concerned about their inexperience (2.417– 418); he regrets leaving his parents defenseless (1.904–909, cf. perhaps 1.534–535).44 When Apollonius presents Jason’s emo- lectual; Apollonius primarily uses ἀµηχανίη to represent emotion rather than cognition: Jason does not lack understanding, but feels overwhelmed, “at a loss”; see further below. Similarly, E. Sanders, “Love, Grief, Fear, and Shame: Medea’s Interconnecting Emotions in Book 3 of Apollonius’ Argo- nautica,” G&R 68 (2021) 45–60, sees Medea’s ἀµηχανίη as conflict between emotions, suggesting “without means” or “at a loss.” 41 LSJ9 s.v. posits the figurative senses: “be troubled, brood, ponder”; F. Montanari, The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Leiden 2015) s.v., more nar- rowly “meditate, ponder” for Apollonian usage, but the Homeric senses “be troubled, brood” are available for Apollonius. Some instances have this nuance: 2.546, the exile, in his agitation (note ὀξέα), grasps images; 3.23, Athena weighs the options; 3.397, Aeetes’ spirit weighs two plans; 3.456, as Medea considers Jason, she thinks no one is like him; 3.1161, Medea broods over what an evil deed she has shared in; 3.1406, Aeetes weighs what path to take. 42 The documentary fallacy, as Hunter, Literary Studies 19–20. 43 With caution, since the narrator later calls this a “test” (2.638). 44 Compare the narrator’s generalization at the wedding of Jason and Medea (4.1165–1167): ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔ ποτε φῦλα δυηπαθέων ἀνθρώπων τερπωλῆς ἐπέβηµεν ὅλῳ ποδί· σὺν δέ τις αἰεὶ πικρὴ παρµέµβλωκεν ἐυφροσύνῃσιν ἀνίη. For, however, never do we tribes of suffering humans PAUL OJENNUS 199 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 tional response at Pagasae as complex, that is congruent with emotional responses developed further elsewhere. In contrast, Idas’ apprehension of Jason’s emotional state ap- pears naïve (1.463–465): Αἰσονίδη, τίνα τήνδε µετὰ φρεσὶ µῆτιν ἑλίσσεις; αὔδα ἐνὶ µέσσοισι τεὸν νόον. ἦέ σε δαµνᾷ τάρβος ἐπιπλόµενον, τό τ’ ἀνάλκιδας ἄνδρας ἀτύζει; Aesonides, what is this stratagem you are turning over in your mind? Speak your intention in our midst. Or does fear come upon you and overcome you, which terrifies cowardly men? Idas performs his familiar function in the Argonautica, an archaic foil to the modern Jason.45 Scholars have not previously de- scribed Idas’ riposte as challenging Jason to express his emotions like a Homeric hero, but Jason’s emotional isolation replays Achilles’ seclusion on the shore after Agamemnon’s heralds take Briseis, so Idas’ challenge may be understood as alluding to the Homeric model.46 Apollonius develops this model: the expecta- tion that Idas’ question will prompt Jason to explain his feelings remains unfulfilled. Moreover, Idas casts Jason’s ruminations in intellectual terms: Jason is working out a “stratagem” (µῆτιν) in tread with full foot on pleasure; but always some bitter affliction has come alongside our joys. 45 H. Fränkel, “Ein Don Quijote unter den Argonauten des Apollonios,” MusHelv 17 (1960) 1–20. J. Clauss, The Best of the Argonauts: The Redefinition of the Epic Hero in Book One of Apollonius’ Argonautica (Berkeley 1993) 79–83, com- pares Homeric oppositions of strength and intelligence: Odysseus and Achilles Od. 8.73–82, Idomeneus and Ajax Il. 23.488–491. 46 For Jason’s emotional isolation note the contrast of Jason as κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς (1.461) with the Argonauts as τερπνῶς ἑψιόωνται (1.459); the recol- lection in 1.455–457 of Od. 9.8–10, contrasting the Phaeacians’ feast with Odysseus’ sorrow, reinforces the sense of emotional separation. For Achilles see above; for Apollonius’ reference to Il. 1 (or Telemachus on the shore in Od. 2, or Odysseus on the shore in Od. 6) see J. Carspecken, “Apollonius Rhodius and the Homeric Epic,” YCS 13 (1952) 35–143, at 102; for Apol- lonius’ characters ‘replaying’ scenes from Homer see Hunter, Literary Studies 18–19. 200 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 his “brain” (φρεσί);47 he has an “intention” (νόον) which Idas as- sumes he can articulate (αὔδα).48 The cognitive cast of Idas’ questioning is particularly stark in view of the broader Homeric allusion, since Achilles is associated with “anger” (µῆνιν) rather than “stratagem” (µῆτιν); the paronomasia with Il. 1.1 would be typical of Apollonius. When Idas considers that Jason may be overcome with fear, he attempts to assuage that fear by re- moving its cognitive basis (1.466–471): ἴστω νῦν δόρυ θοῦρον, ὅτῳ περιώσιον ἄλλων κῦδος ἐνὶ πτολέµοισιν ἀείροµαι, οὐδέ µ’ ὀφέλλει Ζεὺς τόσον ὁσσάτιόν περ ἐµὸν δόρυ, µή νύ τι πῆµα λοίγιον ἔσσεσθαι µηδ’ ἀκράαντον ἄεθλον Ἴδεω ἑσποµένοιο, … Be witness now my impetuous spear with which I obtain greater glory in the wars than others, nor does Zeus prosper me so much as my spear, that, then, there will be no destructive adversity nor unfulfilled endeavor since Idas accompanies you, … Idas’ assurance contrasts with Jason’s diffidence, but the sugges- tion that Jason has fallen into this torpor because of a mistaken judgment departs from the Homeric model, alluding to a Hel- lenistic understanding of emotion.49 47 See n.38 above for comparison with Homer. A taxonomy of Apollonius’ intellectual and emotional vocabulary remains a desideratum. C. Pietsch, Die Argonautika des Apollonios von Rhodos: Untersuchungen zum Problem der einheitlichen Konzeption des Inhalts (Stuttgart 1999) 246–257, focuses on Book 3, and his Platonic framework seems overly schematic; Sanders, G&R 68 (2021) 48–50, focuses on Medea in Book 3, also using a Platonic approach (48 n.16). In Apollonius, µῆτις means “stratagem, plan,” e.g. 1.677, 1.1291, 2.225, 2.383, etc.; φρένες are the organ of cognition, e.g. 1.508, 2.534, 2.950, 3.18, etc.; the φρένες can be disturbed by emotion, disrupting thought, e.g. 1.1232, 3.382, etc. 48 In Apollonius, νόος typically means “thought, intention, plan”: 1.242, 1.439, 2.182, 2.226, 2.325, etc.; Pietsch, Die Argonautika 246–247, 256–257, and Sanders, G&R (2021) 45–60, too readily identify it with a Platonic intellectual organ (“mind”); it occasionally has this sense: 2.212, 2.306, etc. 49 Achilles is not sullen because he misunderstands Agamemnon; Aga- PAUL OJENNUS 201 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 2.2. Idas’ model of thoughts and emotions and early Stoicism The exchange at Pagasae is programmatic, presenting models of thought and emotion that Apollonius contrasts throughout the epic. The episode recalls Homer where characters’ emotions arise naturally from the action, and their interlocutors’ questions prompt articulation of their emotions. For Jason, thought and emotion are interwoven in complex ways that are not easy to articulate. For Idas, thoughts can be articulated, as in Homer, but emotions are erroneous judgments that can be cured by correcting their cognitive basis. This fits our understanding of Apollonius’ Idas as an overdrawn archaic hero whose behavior contrasts Jason’s Hellenistic sensibilities.50 Apollonius’ use of Homer is well understood, and Jason’s ἀµηχανίη is well recog- nized, likely representing a response to Skeptical approaches to thought and emotion, but the rationalizing turn that Idas represents, corresponding to the Stoic approach, has not been explored. To clarify, Apollonius does not represent Idas as a Stoic, or his advice as Stoic doctrine, but his (implicit) model of what emotions are engages the Stoic doctrine. We can approach this engagement in several ways. First, thoughts are readily ar- ticulable in language: Idas asks Jason to utter his thoughts. This corresponds to the Stoic teaching on judgments: judgment is assent to the linguistic content corresponding to an impression. Thoughts originate from a sense perception or “impression” (φαντασία); in adult humans the mind gives “assent” (συνκατά- θεσις), assigning truth value to the linguistic representation or “sayable” (λεκτόν) corresponding to the content of the impres- memnon in fact dishonored him. Telemachus is not depressed because he misunderstands the assembly; the assembly in fact demonstrated his lack of support. 50 Fränkel, MusHelv (1960) 1–20, which some see as unbalanced (e.g. Glei, in Brill’s Companion to Apollonius 6), others as apt (e.g. Clauss, The Best of the Argonauts 81–83). 202 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 sion; this assignment is a “thought” (νόησις).51 Second, emotions are incorrect judgments; when Idas thinks Jason may be afraid, he understands a cognitive error on Jason’s part: Jason under- estimates his, Idas’, help.52 This doctrine was always contro- versial, but the controversy was exacerbated in the middle of the third century by Chrysippus’ emphasis on the identity of judg- ments and emotions,53 and continued throughout the Hellenistic period.54 Third, since emotions are identified with incorrect judgments, they may be remedied by correcting their cognitive basis, as Idas encourages Jason by explaining why he need not be afraid. This doctrine was controversial within the Stoa itself, Cleanthes advocating that the judgment of what constitutes a good or evil should be corrected, and Chrysippus that a secon- dary judgment, e.g. “it is appropriate for me to be distressed at the presence of this evil,” should be corrected first.55 Idas’ failure 51 On impressions see Aetius 4.12.1–5 = Long/Sedley 39b = SVF II 54 (part); on assent and λεκτά, Cic. Acad.Pr. 1.40–41 = Long/Sedley 40B = SVF I 55, 61, 60 (part); on thought, Diog. Laert. 7.51 = SVF II 61. Cf. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 75–78. 52 Stoic emotions are functionally rational, i.e. reasoned judgments based on perceptions and beliefs, but contrary to normative reason, judging things other than virtue to have the highest value; see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 105–106, 114. 53 Chrysippus’ emphasis likely lies behind Galen’s construal that Chrysip- pus “contradicted” Zeno about the emotions; see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 109. 54 E.g. Zeno admits that when an emotion is removed, a “scar” remains (Sen. Ira 1.16.7 = SVF I 215, cf. M. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion [Chicago 2007] 91); the doctrine of the propatheia developed to account for emotion-like responses not involving assent, see Graver 102–108. Posidonius adduces further examples, e.g. emotional responses to instrumental music, that imply emotional responses without assent (fr.168 E.-K. = Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 5.6.20–22; cf. Graver 78). 55 For the two judgments constituting emotions see Cic. Tusc. 3.61, 74; for the mistaken ascription of value as necessary, Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 4.5.21– 25 = SVF III 480 (part) = Long/Sedley 65L; for the mistaken ascription of appropriateness as necessary, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10b, Cic. Tusc. 3.61. Cf. Annas, PAUL OJENNUS 203 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 to encourage Jason then refers to his employing Cleanthes’ prescription, which is superseded by Chrysippus’ advice, so that Idmon’s reproof, ἄλλοι µῦθοι ἔασι παρήγοροι (“there are other encouraging words” 1.479), alludes to the controversy. 3. Emotions as judgments in the Argonautica Although Idas’ cognitive model of the emotions acts as a foil to Jason’s more problematic psyche, understanding emotions as incorrect judgments that can be assuaged by correcting intel- lectual beliefs remains one of several important models. 3.1. Telamon and Jason When the Argonauts discover they have abandoned Heracles, Telamon reacts emotionally, accusing Jason (1.1289–1292): Τελαµῶνα δ’ ἕλεν χόλος, ὧδέ τ’ ἔειπεν· Ἧσ’ αὔτως εὔκηλος, ἐπεί νύ τοι ἄρµενον ἦεν Ἡρακλῆα λιπεῖν· σέο δ’ ἔκτοθι µῆτις ὄρωρεν, ὄφρα τὸ κείνου κῦδος ἀν’ Ἑλλάδα µή σε καλύψῃ, … But wrath seized Telamon, and he spoke thus: Sit there at your ease, since it was planned by you, after all, to leave Heracles; and the stratagem arose from you, that his renown might not overshadow you throughout Greece, … Telamon speaks his mind like a Homeric hero, but, as with Idas and in contrast to Homer, his emotion is based on a mistake: Telamon’s anger is nothing other than his (factually) incorrect judgment that Jason planned to abandon Heracles and (nor- matively) incorrect judgment that it is appropriate to become angry.56 This recalls the Stoic model of anger, namely the Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 108–115, and Graver, Stoicism 41–46. For the con- troversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, Cic. Tusc. 3.76–77, cf. Graver 196–197 and Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago 2002) 121–123. 56 Telamon does not articulate the second judgment, but it is implied in Jason’s pardon (1.1340–1342): ἐπεὶ οὐ περὶ πώεσι µήλων οὐδὲ περὶ κτεάτεσσι χαλεψάµενος µενέηνας, ἀλλ’ ἑτάρου περὶ φωτός. since not over flocks of sheep nor over possessions did you become difficult and angry, 204 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 judgments that someone has inflicted an evil on oneself and that it is therefore appropriate to be angry.57 Moreover, Telamon’s anger dissipates when Glaucus corrects his judgments: it was not Jason’s plan, but Zeus’: Τίπτε παρὲκ µεγάλοιο Διὸς µενεαίνετε βουλὴν / Αἰήτεω πτολίεθρον ἄγειν θρασὺν Ἡρακλῆα; (“Why beyond the plan of great Zeus do you intend / to bring bold Heracles to the city of Aeetes?” 1.1315–1316); it is not appropriate to desire to recover Heracles: τῶ µή τι ποθὴ κείνοιο πελέσθω (“Therefore let there not be any desire for him” 1.1320). Glaucus’ correction of the cognitive basis of Telamon’s anger causes it to dissipate and prompts reconciliation: Αἰσονίδη, µή µοί τι χολὠσεαι, ἀφραδίῃσι / εἴ τί περ ἀασάµην (“Aesonides, do not become wroth with me at all since by thoughtlessness / I was bewildered” 1.1332–1333). Framing Telamon’s cure in terms of Stoic therapy highlights the irony and intertextual play that we expect from Apollonius:58 the irascible Telamon evokes Sophocles’ Ajax, who would rather die than abandon his anger,59 but then is updated in terms of a Hel- lenistic understanding of the emotions.60 The ease with which Telamon abandons his anger occasions some irony: Ajax’ in- but over a man who was your companion. Jason understands that Telamon’s anger includes a judgment about appro- priateness; unlike the Stoics, he approves. Mori, The Politics 86–87, reads Telamon’s anger (1.1332–1335) as an Aristotelean mix of cognition and emotion; ἀφραδίῃσι and ἀµπλακίην certainly suggest cognition. As the ap- propriateness of anger was controverted by the Stoics and Peripatetics (Cic. Tusc. 4.43; Graver, Cicero on the Emotions 163–165), an allusion to that con- troversy fits the model of engagement adopted here. 57 See n.55 for references. 58 Cf. Hunter, Literary Studies 18–19, on intertextuality and irony in the elec- tion episode. 59 Scholars compare Telamon to Achilles in the Iliad (e.g. Clauss, The Best of the Argonauts 205–208; Mori, Politics 86–87), but a reference to Sophocles’ Ajax is also likely, given the representation of the Argonauts as the fathers of the heroes who fought at Troy, cf. Clauss, in Apollonius Rhodius 23. 60 See above for complex references as typical of the Alexandrian poets’ engagement with controversies in the tradition, as in Acosta-Hughes and Stephens, Callimachus in Context, and Ojennus, AJP 139 (2018) 215–248. PAUL OJENNUS 205 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 transigent temper secures his heroic stature,61 so when Telamon is placated his stature is reduced. The epic’s central value of ὁµονοίη (“likeness of mind”) is secured,62 but the tension between Hellenistic approaches to emotion and its role in traditional de- pictions of heroism remains. Again, Jason’s emotions contrast with the Stoic and Homeric models (1.1286–1289): ὁ δ’ ἀµηχανίῃσιν ἀτυχθεὶς οὐδέ τι τοῖον µετεφώνεεν οὐδέ τι τοῖον Αἰσονίδης, ἀλλ’ ἧστο βαρείῃ νειόθεν ἄτῃ θυµὸν ἔδων. But struck with being-at-a-loss, Aesonides uttered neither such a word as this nor as that, but sat deep in heavy infatuation, gnawing at his heart. Jason’s silence contrasts with Telamon’s rash words, and Apol- lonius emphasizes his inability to formulate the alternatives in language. Jason does not address his heart like a Homeric hero, dramatizing his dilemma, nor does he form a false judgment, which Glaucus might correct and so remove his emotion; Jason’s affect must be accounted for otherwise.63 3.2. Aeetes and Jason Similarly, in Jason’s interview with Aeetes, Aeetes’ initial reaction suggests the Stoic model of the emotions, but appears alongside reactions that evoke other approaches. Aeetes’ re- sponse to Argos is similar to Telemon’s accusation (3.367–370): ἄναξ δ’ ἐπεχώσατο µύθοις εἰσαΐων, ὑψοῦ δὲ χόλῳ φρένες ἠερέθοντο. φῆ δ’ ἐπαλαστήσας — µενέαινε δὲ παισὶ µάλιστα Χαλκιόπης, τῶν γάρ σφε µετελθέµεν οὗνεκ’ ἐώλπει —, ἐκ δέ οἱ ὄµµατ’ ἔλαµψεν ὑπ’ ὀφρύσιν ἱεµένοιο· 61 B. Knox, The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Berkeley 1964) 13. 62 For ὁµονοίη as a central value see Vian and Delage, Apollonios I 16–17; Mori, The Politics 52–90. For the Argonautica as contesting traditional ideas of heroism, Hunter, Literary Studies 15–25. 63 Jason’s ἀµηχανίη likely engages the Skeptic pursuit of ἀταραξία; see Clayman, Timon 193–194, discussed below. 206 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 But the lord became wroth at his words as he listened, and his wits flew aloft with choler. He was indignant and spoke—but he was especially angered at the sons of Chalciope, for he expected that they had come on their account—, and his eyes flashed under his brows in his eagerness: Aeetes’ anger is based on, or is nothing other than, rational judgments that are false. Like Telamon, Aeetes articulates his judgments: the Phrixids have come for his throne (3.375–376, also his misinterpretation of Helius’ oracle 3.594–605) and have enlisted the Argonauts to help them (3.595–596). With the normatively false belief that it is appropriate for him to be angry over the plot,64 Aeetes’ anger evokes the Stoic model: some irrational part of the soul does not overcome his judgments, but his judgments themselves, being mistaken, constitute his anger. Jason, like Glaucus, attempts to soothe Aeetes’ anger by correct- ing its cognitive basis: οὔ τι γὰρ αὔτως / ἄστυ τεὸν καὶ δώµαθ’ ἱκάνο- µεν, ὥς που ἔολπας (“For not at all for this / did we arrive at your city and home, as you expect, I suppose” 3.386–387). Lacking Glaucus’ divine authority, Jason fails to mollify Aeetes, and his anger does not subside. Next, in Aeetes’ reaction to Jason, Apollonius employs a Homeric model (3.396–400): τοῖο δὲ θυµὸς διχθαδίην πόρφυρεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι µενοινήν, ἤ σφεας ὁρµηθεὶς αὐτοσχεδὸν ἐξεναρίζοι, ἦ ὅ γε πειρήσαιτο βίης· τό οἱ εἴσατ’ ἄρειον φραζοµένῳ, … But his heart in his chest brooded over a two-fold desire, whether he should set out and slay them in haste, or make trial of their strength; this seemed better to him as he considered it, … 64 Strictly, the Stoics did not consider that factually mistaken judgments, “the Phrixids seek my crown,” occasioned emotions, only normatively mis- taken judgments, “an evil is in prospect, namely the loss of my kingship” (being deposed is not an evil); see Stob. Ecl. 2.89.4 = Long/Sedley 65A (part) = SVF III 389. Apollonius’ thematization of factually mistaken judgments apparently represents normatively mistaken judgments. PAUL OJENNUS 207 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 As Rosenmeyer observes, this imitates Homeric decision- making: the hero ponders two options, then selects the second. Where others (Ancaeus, Hera, and Alcinous) complicate the pat- tern, verging towards the Hellenistic model of Jason and Medea, Aeetes reproduces the Homeric form precisely: the first option is not a real possibility, but dramatizes the inevitability of the second.65 This characterizes Aeetes as a relic of the Homeric past, whose behavior provides a contrast with the modern Jason, like that of Idas earlier.66 When Aeetes imposes the trial, Jason is overcome with ἀµηχανίη, as at Pagasae and Chios (3.422–425): ὁ δὲ σῖγα ποδῶν πάρος ὄµµατα πῆξας ἧστ’ αὔτως ἄφθογγος, ἀµηχανέων κακότητι. βουλὴν δ’ ἀµφὶ πολὺν στρώφα χρόνον, οὐδέ πῃ εἶχε θαρσαλέως ὑποδέχθαι, ἐπεὶ µέγα φαίνετο ἔργον. But [ Jason], silently fixing his eyes at his feet, stood in place without speaking, at a loss in the evil situation. For a long time he turned over the proposal,67 but was not in any way able to undertake it in good courage, since it seemed a great task. As after Heracles’ abandonment, Jason is unable to select one of two options: to reject the proposal as impossible (µέγα … ἔργον 3.425, cf. ἄεθλον ὑπερφίαλον 3.438) or to accept it as necessary (ἀνάγκης 3.430). He nominally accepts Aeetes’ terms, but ac- tually puts off a decision until consulting the Argonauts, as is clear later: ὅ δή νύ οἱ—οὔ τι γὰρ ἄλλο / βέλτερον ἦν φράσσασθαι— ἀπηλεγέως ὑποέστην (“This very thing, then—for there was not anything else / better to say—I undertook without further consideration” 3.500–501).68 As before, he is “at a loss” (ἀµηχα- 65 T. Rosenmeyer, “Apollonius Lyricus,” StIt 10 (1992) 177–197, at 181– 183. 66 M. Williams, “The Character of Aeëtes in the ‘Argonautica’ of Apol- lonius Rhodius,” Hermes 124 (1996) 463–479, at 477. 67 Taking βουλήν as Aeetes’ proposal, not Jason’s own plan, excluded by ἀµηχανέων; similarly, in Stoic language, µέγα ἔργον is the propositional con- tent of the impression (φαντασία ≈ φαίνετο) that Jason does not assent to. 68 Similarly Rosenmeyer, StIt 10 (1992) 183. 208 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 νέων 3.423, cf. ἀµηχανίῃ 3.432), expressed with speechlessness (ἄφθογγος 3.423). Apollonius presents different models of the emotions: a Stoic-like emotion based on incorrect judgment, a Homeric deliberation, and a Hellenistic phenomenon of being overcome with ἀµηχανίη. 3.3. Heracles’ anger and emotion in Chrysippus Thus, among others, Apollonius employs a model of emotion as essentially cognitive, but the soul, once it makes an incorrect judgment, is disturbed and acts irrationally. Heracles’ anger over the loss of Hylas allows us to refine our understanding of his en- gagement with Stoic thought specifically. An important difficulty for the Stoics is that those experiencing an emotion often resist having their mistaken judgments corrected; they may recognize their error but continue under the sway of the emotion.69 Galen quotes Chrysippus defending the Stoic position:70 οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι καθ’ ὁρµὴν οὐ πλεονάζει ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις, ἀλλὰ συναπαρτίζει τι τῇ ὁρµῇ ὥστε καὶ στῆναι, ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ µεταβάλλειν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ’ ὁρµὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὁρµὴν ἡ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ µὴ µεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξαµένων. Such as when someone walks according to impulse the movement of his legs is not excessive, but corresponds to the impulse so as to stop and change whenever he wishes. But when someone runs according to impulse this sort of thing no longer happens, but the movement of the legs is excessive beyond his impulse so as to be carried away and not change obediently as soon as he has started to do so. Chrysippus defends the doctrine that emotions are rational judgments, corresponding to the decision to start running, but cannot be governed by reason once entered upon, correspond- ing to the runner’s difficulty stopping or changing directions. Apollonius makes this analogy literal in several passages. Hera- 69 Cf. the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, n.55 above; also, Posidonius’ criticism of Chrysippus, Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 5.6.22–26 = Long/Sedley 65Q. 70 De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 4.2.15–16 = SVF III 462 (part) = Long/Sedley 65J (part). PAUL OJENNUS 209 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 cles reacts emotionally to Hylas’ disappearance: τῷ δ’ ἀίοντι κατὰ κροτάφων ἅλις ἱδρὼς / κήκιεν, ἐν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἷµα (“but when he heard, over his temples plenty of sweat / dripped, and, within, his dark blood seethed in his guts below” 1.1261–1262),71 and he runs where his feet carry him: ἐς δὲ κέλευθον / τὴν θέεν ᾗ πόδες αὐτοὶ ὑπέκφερον ἀίσσοντα (“and he ran onto that path on which his feet themselves carried him as he hastened” 1.1263–1264). As with Chrysippus, Heracles’ enter- ing an emotional state is figured as beginning to run; once he has become angry,72 his reason cannot restrain his anger, so he com- mits ‘irrational’ acts, such as killing the Boreads (1.1302–1306), just as he does not direct his running, but goes where his feet carry him.73 The symbolism of running for being overcome with emotion recurs more elliptically, cross-referencing the fuller treatment of Heracles. When Medea is elated at Jason’s promise of marriage, her feet carry her on their own: ψυχὴ γὰρ νεφέεσσι µεταχρονίη πεπότητο. / αὐτοµάτοις δὲ πόδεσσι θοῆς ἐπεβήσατ’ ἀπήνης (“for her soul had flown aloft with the clouds. / But she boarded the swift wagon by her feet on their own” 3.1152–1153). When she leaves to join the Argonauts, the same connection appears: τροµερῷ δ’ ὑπὸ δείµατι πάλλετο θυµός […] τὴν δ’ αἶψα πόδες φέρον ἐγκο- 71 Mori, The Politics 84, sees an allusion to Aristotle in the boiling blood, confirming the sense of philosophical engagement. 72 Note χωόµενος (1.1263), with a subtext of passion for Hylas (Beye, GRBS 39 [1969] 46–47; Hunter, Literary Studies 38, with further bibliography in n. 114). 73 The image may be traditional; cf. Theocritus 13.70: ὃ δ’ ᾇ πόδες ἆγον ἐχώρει (“but he went where his feet led”), understanding Theocritean priority with A. Köhnken, “Hellenistic Chronology: Theocritus, Callimachus, and Apollonius Rhodius,” in Brill’s Companion to Apollonius 73–91. Yet, Apollonius associates Heracles’ feet carrying him away with his emotional state, while in Theocritus his disturbance (ταρασσόµενος περὶ παιδί 13.55) is separated from the image (but also: µαινόµενος· χαλεπὸς γὰρ ἔσω θεὸς ἦπαρ ἄµυσσεν, “raving; for a difficult god within was piercing his liver” 13.71). Theocritus has the generic χωρέω “proceed”; Apollonius uses θέω “run,” more precisely repre- senting Chrysippus’ image. 210 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 νέουσαν (“and her spirit shook with trembling fear … and her feet quickly carried her as she hastened” 4.52, 66). Likewise Jason when he is seized by fear returning from his sacrifice to Hecate (3.1221–1222), and Medea when shame and desire drive her in different directions, whether or not to approach Chalci- ope (3.651–653). In each case the subject experiences a powerful emotion, dramatized by their feet acting on their own, clearly running in the cases of Heracles and Medea in Book 4.74 Apollonius’ thematization of characters being overcome with emotion so that their feet run away with them, then, refers to Chrysippus’ discussion of how emotions, themselves functionally rational judgments, can overcome reason. This reference en- courages us to read other emotional responses as engaging the Stoic model. 4. Apollonian ἀμηχανίη Apollonius sometimes recalls his Homeric models to mark them as antiquated, as with Aeetes’ wrath, and, when he evokes the Stoic model, there can be a sense of irony, as when Telamon quickly abandons his anger. These models are contrasted with Jason’s ἀµηχανίη; I now examine Apollonian ἀµηχανίη as alter- native model for the emotions in the Argonautica. 4.1. The Lemnian women Examining how fear overcomes the Lemnian women when they espy the Argo illuminates the relationship between the cognitive model of the emotions and ἀµηχανίη in Apollonius, since they progress from one to the other. Before the Argo ap- proaches, the narrator describes the emotions of the women, what pleases them and what they fear (1.627–632): τῇσι δὲ βουκόλιαί τε βοῶν χάλκειά τε δύνειν τεύχεα πυροφόρους τε διατµήξασθαι ἀρούρας ῥηίτερον πάσῃσιν Ἀθηναίης πέλεν ἔργων οἷς αἰεὶ τὸ πάροιθεν ὁµίλεον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔµπης ἦ θαµὰ δὴ πάπταινον ἐπὶ πλατὺν ὄµµασι πόντον 74 Vian and Delage, Apollonios 73 n.2 on 4.66, note that the image recurs at 4.1121 without the sense that the feet are acting independently. PAUL OJENNUS 211 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 δείµατι λευγαλέῳ, ὁπότε Θρήικες ἴασι. But for them cattle-herding of cattle and donning bronze armor and cleaving wheat-bearing fields was easier for them all than the works of Athena with which they always spent their time before. But still, after all, very often indeed they gazed with their eyes over the broad sea in grievous fear as to when the Thracians would come. The preferences and fears of the women are expressed as judgments: herding is easier than spinning, the coming of the Thracians is fearful. The cognitive depiction of their emotions wavers when they see the Argo: φὰν γάρ που ἱκάνειν / Θρήικας. […] ἀµηχανίῃ δ’ ἐχέοντο / ἄφθογγοι, τοῖόν σφιν ἐπὶ δέος ᾐωρεῖτο (“For they thought, surely, that the Thracians had arrived … and by being-at-a-loss they were kept speechless, such fear hung over them” 1.636–639). With the characteristically Apollonian που75 the narrator signals that their thoughts become less trans- parent, and they enter a state of being-at-a-loss (ἀµηχανίη), causing their speechlessness. This demonstrates how Apollonius relates emotions and ἀµηχανίη: emotions are often compatible with the Stoic cognitive model, where their bases are expressed as judgments, but sudden or intense impressions produce emo- tional turmoil, preventing the articulation of judgments that might be handled rationally, dramatized by speechlessness. Clayman aptly compares this ἀµηχανίη to Pyrrho’s ἐποχή (“suspension of judgment”),76 but that comparison may be refined: Clayman focuses on the cognitive aspect of ἀµηχανίη, especially the use the dilemma to achieve it,77 but Apollonius also regularly indicates an emotional component, as with the Lemnian women’s fear. Thus, Apollonius does not adopt Skeptic ἐποχή exactly, but adapts and deploys it for poetic ends, where it appears as one mental model among several.78 75 Clayman, Timon 206. 76 Clayman, Timon 191, 194, on the Lemnian women. 77 Clayman, Timon 192–193. 78 Clayman adumbrates these possibilities (194 on emotion, 208 on the Argonautica exposing flaws in Skepticism), but her focus is cognition. 212 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 4.2. ἀμηχανίη as an emotional state Apollonius’ use of ἀµηχανίη to indicate emotional turmoil is thematic. As noted above, when Aeetes sets the challenge for Jason, the hero is characterized as ἄφθογγος and ἀµηχανέων (3.423, quoted above). The Argonauts react similarly when Jason relates the encounter (δὴν δ’ ἄνεῳ καὶ ἄναυδοι ἐς ἀλλήλους ὁρὀωντο, / ἄτῃ ἀµηχανίῃ τε κατηφέες, “but for a long time they looked at each other in silence and speechless, / downcast be- cause of their infatuation and being-at-a-loss” 3.503–504). When Phineus prophesies the trials awaiting the Argonauts, they are overcome with fear and fall silent (τοὺς δ’ εἶθαρ ἕλεν δέος εἰσαΐοντας. / δὴν δ’ ἔσαν ἀµφασίῃ βεβοληµένοι, “but immediately fear seized them as they listened. / And for a long time they were struck with speechlessness” 2.408–409). At Apollo’s appearance on Thynias wonder overtakes them (τοὺς δ’ ἕλε θάµβος ἰδόντας ἀµήχανον, “but irresistible amazement seized them when they saw him” 2.681); only at length (ὀψέ 2.684) can Orpheus ar- ticulate their experience.79 Grief overcomes the Argonauts at the death of Tiphys (ἄτλητου δ’ ὀλοῷ ἐπὶ πήµατι κῆδος ἕλοντο· / δὴ γάρ, ἐπεὶ καὶ τόνδε παρασχεδὸν ἐκτερέιξαν, / αὐτοῦ ἀµηχανίῃσιν ἁλὸς προπάροιθε πεσόντες, “but they reaped unendurable grief over the destructive disaster; / for, indeed, when they buried him forthwith, / they fell there before the sea at a loss” 2.858–860). When Eros shoots Medea, she is speechless (τὴν δ’ ἀµφασίη λάβε θυµόν, “and speechlessness seized her spirit” 3.284), and she spends much of Book 3 trying to articulate her feelings. Speech- lessness overtakes Aeetes at Jason’s performance in the trial (τὸν δ’ ἕλεν ἀµφασίη ῥιπῇ στιβαροῖο σόλοιο / Αἰήτην, “but speechless- ness seized Aeetes at the cast of the stout lump” 3.1372–1373). The repetition of key terms (ἀµηχανίη/ἀµήχανος, ἀµφασίη) estab- lishes the theme of emotional turmoil that drives characters to an impasse, cross-referencing the fuller descriptions of the phe- 79 Here ἀµήχανον has its Homeric sense “irresistible,” but also evokes the theme of emotional turmoil producing speechlessness. Orpheus also repre- sents Apollonius: emotional turmoil exceeds the powers of philosophy to describe, but may be handled by an epic poet. PAUL OJENNUS 213 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 nomenon. While fear is common, wonder, grief, and desire also trigger the state. Thus, for Apollonius, ἀµηχανίη is not only a cognitive state, but also, even predominantly, an emotional one, engaging the Skeptic pursuit of ἀταραξία, but also suggesting that suspension of judgment is indistinguishable from emotional turmoil.80 4.3. ἀμηχανίη and psychic conflict Apollonius’ construction of ἀµηχανίη, expressed by ἀµφασίη, and its tendency to arise when characters are unable to articulate their thoughts, provides a counterexample to the cognitive model of emotions. The Argonauts fall into ἀµηχανίη not by assenting to linguistic content corresponding to an impression, but because they cannot formulate that content at all.81 The Stoics’ cognitive model of the emotions was always controversial, so when Apollonius juxtaposes that approach with his char- acters’ ἀµηχανίη, he is likely alluding to the controversy. This context enables a better appreciation of Apollonius’ use of Stoic imagery in describing Medea’s impasse at the end of her great monologue. An important objection to the Stoic model was its difficulty in accounting for psychic conflict: weakness of the will, indecision, regret, remorse, and the like.82 It broke from the models of Plato and Aristotle, where emotions resided in ir- rational parts of the soul;83 indeed, the need to explain such 80 Clayman, Timon 194, distinguishes “two kinds of amechania,” but it is un- clear that Apollonius ever presents a purely cognitive, ‘positive’ one. 81 This question is not unanswerable; the Stoics probably did not claim that individuals consciously formulated all judgments or could always articulate them (Graver, Stoicism 45), but it emphasizes the counterintuitive nature of the model. 82 On indecision see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 116–117; on weakness of the will, Inwood, Ethics 132–139; on regret and remorse, Graver, Stoicism 193–196. 83 The Stoics sometimes adduced parts of the soul, corresponding to the senses, but these were subordinate to the ἡγεµονικόν, which alone made judgments; for the parts of the soul see Aët. 4.21.1–4 = Long/Sedley 53H = 214 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 phenomena was an important motivation for the division of the soul.84 Chrysippus defends the Stoic model, arguing that appar- ent instances of psychic conflict are vacillations in the judgments of a unitary soul; Plutarch reports:85 ἔνιοι δέ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυοῖν διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλὰ ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ’ ἀµφότερα, λανθάνουσαν ἡµᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει µεταβολῆς· οὐ συνορῶν- τας ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυµεῖν καὶ µετα- νοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς καὶ φεροµένη πάλιν αὑτῆς ἐπιλαµβάνεσθαι· But some say that that emotion is not something other than reason, nor that there is a difference and civil war between the two, but that it is the turning of a single reason to both, escaping our notice by the suddenness and speed of the change; not seeing that it is the same part of the soul by which it is our nature to desire and repent, to become angry and to fear, to be borne toward the shameful by pleasure and, being borne back again, to hold onto itself. Apollonius engages the controversy: Medea does not manifest conflict between reason and emotion like her Euripidean self (καὶ µανθάνω µὲν οἷα δρᾶν µέλλω κακά, / θυµὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐµῶν βουλευµάτων, “And I learn what evils I am about to do, / but my anger is stronger than my deliberations” Med. 1078–1079),86 but deliberates over the competing demands of her family, social SVF II 836 (part); for the ἡγεµονικόν, Chalcidius 220 = Long/Sedley 53G = SVF II 879 (part); cf. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind 61–64. For the controversy note Panaetius’ attempt to reconcile the Stoic and Platonic models: Annas 118, citing Cicero’s attempt in Tusc. 4 to ‘rescue’ the Stoic position as evidence of how counterintuitive it could appear. 84 Pl. Resp. 439E–440B; for psychic conflict as a central justification for the tripartite soul see S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, in J. Sihvola et al. (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dodrecht 1998) 1–19, at 2. 85 Virt.mor. 446F = SVF III 459 (part). 86 Authenticity and sense debated; see D. Mastronarde, Euripides: Medea (Cambridge 2002) 388–397, but clearly in Apollonius’ text of Euripides, indicating a conflict between an emotional θυµός and a rational subject of µανθάνω (and probably βουλεύµατα); elsewhere Chrysippus adduced the passage as a test case for the Stoic model (Gal. De Hipp. et Pl. decr. 3.3.13–22 = SVF II 906). PAUL OJENNUS 215 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 expectations, pity for Jason, and so forth, but comes to an im- passe.87 Likewise, Jason, when he decides to ambush Apsyrtus, does not acknowledge that it is dishonorable, but, being over- come by fear, does it anyway, but describes his plan in cognitive terms.88 With Medea, Apollonius probes the cognitive model: why, if her soul is rational, can it not reach a decision? His en- gagement with the Stoic model seems certain, given the allusion to a Stoic treatment of the topic at the end of Medea’s mono- logue (3.756–760): Ἠελίου ὥς τίς τε δόµοις ἐνιπάλλεται αἴγλη, ὕδατος ἐξανιοῦσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται, ἡ δ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ὠκείῃ στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται ἀίσσουσα· ὣς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης. As a ray of the sun quivers in a house, reflecting on water which indeed was just poured either in a bowl or perhaps a pail, and here and there darting it is made to tremble with the swift eddy: even so also the girl’s heart trembled in her chest. As Fränkel notes, since Epictetus (Disc. 3.3.20–22) uses this image, both authors must be drawing on an early Stoic text; recognizing that Apollonius does not present Medea as a com- mitted Stoic, Fränkel concludes that the poet borrows the image for its vividness, not its doctrine.89 Reframing Apollonius’ en- gagement, that he does not represent his characters as Stoics, but juxtaposes Stoic doctrines with other models, we recognize that the allusion engages the debate over psychic conflict. Accepting 87 Clayman, Timon 193–194, clarifies the cognitive nature of Medea’s de- liberations, arguing that her ἀµηχανίη corresponds to Skeptic ἐποχή. 88 E.g. διζήµεθα (“investigate” 4.396), δόλον (“trick” 4.404). The narrator obfuscates the relationship between Jason’s speech and his actual intentions, indicating that he spoke out of fear of Medea’s anger (ὑποδδείσας 4.394) and that he was fawning on her (ὑποσσαίνων 4.410). Contrast Menelaus’ delibera- tion Il. 17.91–101. 89 Fränkel, MusHelv 14 (1957) 17–8, and Noten 378. 216 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 that Epictetus represents the original comparison,90 we can un- derstand that it represents the denial of true dilemmas. Epictetus explains: καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν σκοτωθῆ τις, οὐχ αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦµα, ἐφ’ οὗ εἰσιν· καταστάντος δὲ καθίστα- ται κἀκεῖνα (“and whenever someone suffers from vertigo, his skills and virtues are not confounded, but his pneuma is, on which they lie; but when it is calmed, they are also calmed” 3.3.22). The ray of light represents virtue (correct judgment); when the soul is undisturbed, it decides (“reflects”) correctly and con- sistently, but disturbed by emotion, incorrectly and incon- sistently.91 Apollonius, then, engages the Stoic model creatively here, referring to their denial of true dilemmas, but testing its verisimilitude. Readers may find it more or less convincing that, if only Medea’s psyche were cleansed of its emotions, she would decide virtuously. As often, Apollonius suggests that the reality is more complex: Medea’s concerns (µελεδήµατα 3.752) are judg- ments that occasion emotions (δειδυῖαν 3.753), which have an impetus of their own (cf. above, discussion of Heracles running); disentangling cognition and emotion may not be as straight- forward as the Stoic account suggests.92 Yet, rereading Medea’s monologue in view of the simile and its Stoic contexts, we can also see that Apollonius’ style evokes the “suddenness and speed of change” that Chrysippus attributes to the soul laboring under emotion, in the passage from Plutarch quoted above. Her short sentences, often coinciding with verse end, and particularly the 90 So Fränkel, Noten 378, on 3.755–760, 766–769, tentatively suggesting Aristo as the source. 91 Epictetus (and the Stoics generally) correlates consistency with correct- ness; for consistency in Epictetus see Disc. 2.26.3, 3.23.34; in the early Stoa, Plut. Virt.mor. 440E–441D = Long/Sedley 61B. 92 This may be further reflected in Apollonius’ locating this process in Medea’s “heart” (κραδίη 3.755, κέαρ 3.760), rather than in her “mind” (e.g. νόος), though the Stoics also placed the (unitary, rational) soul in or around the heart (see e.g. Chalcidius 200 = SVF II 879 = Long/Sedley 53G); the current understanding of Apollonius’ intellectual vocabulary prevents con- fidence; see n.47 above. PAUL OJENNUS 217 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 rapid questions in 3.779–782, evoke the troubled waters of the simile. Her “here or there of evils” (ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα 3.771) reiterates the “here and there” of the sunbeam. Since this aptly describes Medea’s deliberations, it seems compelling that Apol- lonius uses the reference to the early Stoic text to enrich our appreciation of Medea’s apparent psychic conflict, and to mark how he has updated his character to reflect the latest discussions about the phenomenon. 5. Conclusions Examining how Apollonius’ characters suffer emotions, how they encourage and persuade one another, how they work through their emotions, and how they become overwhelmed reveals several themes corresponding to controversies over the nature of the emotions proposed by the Stoics contem- poraneously with the composition of the Argonautica. Naturally, Homer continues to provide an important model, but we may expand our appreciation, since the Stoic model, where the soul is unitary and rational and emotions are incorrect judgments, appears to lie behind various interactions, as when Idas tries to encourage Jason by reminding him of his help, when Telamon abandons his anger once Glaucus corrects his assumptions, or when the Lemnian women panic on seeing the Argo, thinking it is a Thracian ship. Apollonius’ characters repeatedly fall into emotional states through mistaken judgments. This model is contrasted with Apollonius’ well-known thematization of ἀµηχα- νίη, where characters cannot formulate judgments at all. This theme engages Skeptic ἐποχή, if ironically, blurring cognitive suspension of judgment with emotional upheaval. Heracles’ re- sponse to Hylas’ abduction engages another controversy: how the rational soul can set itself into an irrational state. The hero’s feet running away with him recalls Chrysippus’ defense of the Stoic position. Finally, Medea’s great monologue and its after- math engage the controversy of how the Stoic model might account for psychic conflict, where Medea considers her options in a functionally rational way, but because her soul is disturbed by emotion, she cannot commit to a course of action, capped by 218 APOLLONIUS AND THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF EMOTIONS ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 188–218 the image of the sunbeam reflected on water, referencing a Stoic discussion of that very phenomenon. Recognition of engagement with Stoic teachings on emotions enriches our appreciation of Apollonius’ poetry: As expected, Apollonius plays the doctus poeta, updating his characters to reflect the latest thinking on emotions, the soul, and psychic conflict, while allowing room to identify gaps and current controversies. Apollonius’ references to the doctrines are often ironic and witty: he makes reference to Stoic teaching about functionally rational emotions, which can overcome reason, even as he deflates Heracles’ role as the proto-philosopher; Idas, the model for hyperbolic archaic heroism, attempts to analyze and cure Jason’s emotions; the irascible Telamon quickly gives up his anger when its rational basis is corrected. Again, Apollonius uses the references to underline the realism and pathos of Medea’s plight: her heart flutters and she constantly changes her plans because that is what the soul does when it is disturbed by emotion; we all might suffer the same. March, 2025 Whitworth University Harriet Cheney Cowles Memorial Library Spokane, Washington pojennus@whitworth.edu