Kurpios ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 ISSN 2159-3159 Article copyright held by the author(s) and made available under the Creative Commons Attribution License CC-BY https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Nature, Nurture, and the Harmful Effects of Stoic Teaching in Plutarch’s Life of Cleomenes Marcin Kurpios HE UNIQUE DOUBLE PAIR of the Lives of Agis and Cleomenes and Tiberius and Gaius Gracchi constitutes a vast treasure trove of insights into Plutarch’s biographical project. Studies by G. Roskam and M. de Pourcq have shed new light on the dynamics of Plutarch’s moralizing approach in these Lives, as well as on how the principles of character and com- parison influence their formal construction.1 Although those analyses have also explored how the form and content of these four Lives harmonize with Plutarch’s moral philosophy, it re- mains to be examined in what way his conception of personality and its development are put to work in the individual biogra- phies forming the double pair.2 1 G. Roskam, “Ambition and Love of Fame in Plutarch’s Lives of Agis, Cleomenes, and the Gracchi,” CP 106 (2011) 208–225; M. De Pourcq and G. Roskam, “Mirroring Virtues in Plutarch’s Lives of Agis, Cleomenes and the Gracchi,” in K. De Temmerman et al. (eds.), Writing Biography in Greece and Rome: Narrative Technique and Fictionalization (Cambridge 2016) 163–180. See also G. Marasco, Commento alle biografie plutarchee di Agide e di Cleomene I–II (Rome 1981); H. G. Ingenkamp, “Plutarchs ‘Leben der Gracchen’. Eine Analyse,” ANRW II 33.6 (1992) 4298–4346; A. Powell, “Spartan Women Assertive in Politics? Plutarch’s Lives of Agis and Kleomenes,” in Sparta: New Perspectives (London 1999) 393–419; L. Thommen, “Agis und Kleomenes als Vorläufer der Gracchen,” MusHelv 74 (2017) 54–65; D. G. Shipley, “Agis IV, Kleomenes III, and Spartan Landscapes,” Historia 66 (2017) 281–297. 2 Plutarch’s ethical psychology in the Lives has received interesting treat- T MARCIN KURPIOS 467 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 This paper focuses on Plutarch’s depiction of the develop- ment, structure, and manifestations of Cleomenes’ personality in the Life of Cleomenes. My goal is twofold. First, I aim to dissect Plutarch’s understanding of the king’s personality and its chief determinants. Second, I intend to enquire into how Plutarch conceived the influence of Stoic teaching on Cleomenes’ emo- tional and behavioral patterns. 1. Young Cleomenes encounters Sphaerus A good starting point is Plutarch’s mention of the relation between the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus of Borysthenes and Cleomenes in the latter’s early years (Cleom. 2.2–3).3 While the question of the philosopher’s influence on Cleomenes has been noted, it is Sphaerus’ alleged involvement in the political reforms introduced by the king, rather than the possible impact of philosophical instruction on his personality, that has received more scholarly attention.4 This poorly understood passage is, ment in, e.g., C. Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford 2006) 412–421; T. E. Duff, “Models of Education in Plutarch,” JHS 128 (2008) 1–26. In this paper I prefer to use the term “personality” rather than “character,” on the grounds that the former stresses understanding and ex- plaining a person psychologically while the latter appraises them as a moral agent. To be sure, Plutarch is also concerned with “character,” but he argu- ably had a deeper interest in “personality” structure and development apart from moral judgment; cf. C. Gill, “The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus,” CQ 33 (1983) 469–487, at 472–473. For interconnec- tions of themes and concepts between the Moralia and the Lives see esp. A. G. Nikolaidis (ed.), The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’ (Berlin 2008). 3 Plutarch also mentions an interaction between Sphaerus and king Cleom- enes III at Cleom. 11.4. Sphaerus was first a student of Zeno of Citium and afterwards of Cleanthes of Assos. On Sphaerus’ life and writings in general see Diog. Laert. 7.177–178 = SVF I F 620; Diog. Laert. 185 = F 621; Plut. Cleom. 2.11 = FF 622–623; Ath. 8.354E = F 624; and P. Steinmetz, “Die Stoa,” in H. Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophie der Antike IV (Basel 1994) 579–581; T. Dorandi, “Chronology,” in K. Algra et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) 40. 4 Some scholars have been convinced that Sphaerus was the primus motor of 468 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 arguably, the key to understanding Plutarch’s view on the king’s specific natural predispositions and their interaction with ex- ternal factors. Plutarch writes (Cleom. 2.2):5 λέγεται δὲ καὶ λόγων φιλοσόφων τὸν Κλεοµένη µετασχεῖν ἔτι µειράκιον ὄντα, Σφαίρου τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου παραβάλλοντος εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίµονα καὶ περὶ τοὺς νέους καὶ τοὺς ἐφήβους οὐκ ἀµελῶς διατρίβοντος. ὁ δὲ Σφαῖρος ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγεγόνει τῶν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως µαθητῶν, καὶ τοῦ Κλεοµένους ἔοικεν ἀγαπῆσαί τε τῆς φύσεως τὸ ἀνδρῶδες καὶ προσεκκαῦσαι τὴν φιλοτιµίαν. It is said also that Cleomenes studied philosophy when he was still a stripling, after Sphaerus of Borysthenes had made a voyage to Sparta and busied himself sedulously there with the youth and young men. Sphaerus had become one of the leading disciples of Zeno of Citium, and it would appear that he admired the manly nature of Cleomenes and increased the fires of his high ambition. The first aspect of this passage that requires comment is the very way that the information about Sphaerus is introduced: λέγεται δὲ καὶ, “it is also said that…” This has been read by some prominent Plutarchan scholars as implying that Plutarch doubts whether that information is true.6 However, this interpretation Cleomenes’ reforms: F. Ollier, “Le philosophe stoïcien Sphairos et l’oeuvre réformatrice des rois de Sparte Agis IV et Cléomène III,” REG 49 (1936) 536–570, at 546; Marasco, Commento alle biografie 361–363; A. Banfi, “La Stoa Antica ed i tentativi di riforma costituzionale a Sparta nel terzo secolo,” in D. Ambaglio (ed.), Syngraphe: materiali e appunti per lo studio della storia e della letteratura antica II (Como 2000) 93–105; Thommen, MusHelv 74 (2017) 57. In contrast, E. N. Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity II (Lund 1974) 70 with nn.156–158, and R. Martínez Lacy, “Esfero en Esparta,” Noua tellus 21 (2003) 19–22, are more skeptical about Sphaerus’ actual role. G. Hoffmann, “Anaplèrôsis et agôgè au temps des rois Agis IV (244–241) et Cléomène III (235– 222),” in J. Christien et al. (eds.), Sparte hellénistique: IVe–IIIe siècles avant notre ère (Besançon 2014) 115, 123, seems to assume Sphaerus’ influence on the king’s psychological development, but offers no elaboration of the specifics. 5 Text: R. Flacelière and É. Chambry, Plutarque. Vies XI (Paris 1976); transl.: B. Perrin, Plutarch’s Lives X (London 1921). 6 E. Gabba, “Studi su Filarco. Le biografie plutarchee di Agide e di Cleo- MARCIN KURPIOS 469 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 of Plutarch’s λέγεται has been disproved in the careful study of Cook, who has made a compelling case that Plutarch uses λέγεται when he adduces information that actually substantiates the truth about the hero’s character.7 The verb therefore does not exclude that Plutarch believed that Sphaerus’ influence on Cleomenes’ personality was considerable; actually the opposite seems more plausible.8 Now, Plutarch indicates that Cleomenes attended philo- sophical lectures of Sphaerus in adolescence or early adulthood, thus within the period of the early development of his per- mene,” Athenaeum 35 (1957) 3–55, at 36; Marasco, Commento alle biografie 359, “il λέγεται è indicativo proprio di un dubbio.” The introductory formula has also been taken to indicate a switch to a different source rather than Plutarch’s main authority in the Life, Phylarchus. Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta II 69–70, suggested that Sphaerus himself could be identified as that other source; similarly, W. Africa, Phylarchus and the Spartan Revolution (Berkeley 1961) 18. For Phylarchus’ Histories as a primary source for these Lives see Flacelière and Chambry, Plutarque. Vies XI 2–19; Marasco, Commento alle biografie 24–42. 7 B. L. Cook, “Plutarch’s Use of λέγεται: Narrative Design and Source in Alexander,” GRBS 42 (2001) 331–359. E. Badian, “Plutarch’s Unconfessed Skill: The Biographer as a Critical Historian,” in T. Hantos (ed.), Laurea inter- nationalis. Festschrift für Jochen Bleicken (Stuttgart 2003) 28–29, also analysing the Alexander, still treated the formula as implying Plutarch’s doubt, but his claims, in contrast to Cook’s, were not supported by arguments based on Plutarch’s text. On Plutarch’s quotations see W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O’Neil, Plutarch’s Quotations (Oxford 1959); J. M. Dillon, “Plutarch’s Use of Unidenti- fied Quotations,” in M. Jufresa (ed.), Plutarc a la seva època: paideia i societat (Bar- celona 2005) 273–281; E. Bowie, “Plutarch’s Habits of Citation: Aspects of Difference,” in The Unity of Plutarch’s Work 143–157. On his handling of sources see C. B. R. Pelling, “Plutarch’s Adaptation of his Source Material,” JHS 100 (1980) 127–140; A. G. Nikolaidis, “Plutarch’s Criteria for Judging his Historical Sources,” in C. Schrader et al. (eds.), Plutarco y la Historia, Actas del V simposio español sobre Plutarco (Zaragoza 1997) 329–341. 8 We can adduce further examples of Plutarch’s use of λέγεται that do not imply negation or rejection of thus introduced information, e.g. at Cleom. 22.7, where λέγεται is used in a passage that perfectly matches and supports Plutarch’s account; cf. Cleom. 6.1, Lyc. 8.9. 470 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 sonality.9 The statement that he noticed Cleomenes’ “natural manliness” seems to highlight the fact that the king by then demonstrated some raw inborn personal qualities, but not yet a fully developed personality. This may imply that, according to Plutarch, Cleomenes had the potential to be courageous, or serious in his attitude.10 This is directly connected with the idea that Sphaerus “enflamed” Cleomenes’ φιλοτιµία. Excessive φιλο- τιµία is, to Plutarch, obviously detrimental.11 But in the immedi- ately following comment on Leonidas and Tyrtaeus’ influence on young men, Plutarch seems to say that enflaming Cleomenes’ φιλοτιµία was not in itself a bad thing (Cleom. 2.3): Λεωνίδαν µὲν γὰρ τὸν παλαιὸν λέγουσιν ἐπερωτηθέντα, ποῖός τις αὐτῷ φαίνεται ποιητὴς γεγονέναι Τυρταῖος, εἰπεῖν· “ἀγαθὸς νέων ψυχὰς κακκανῆν.” ἐµπιπλάµενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιηµάτων ἐνθουσιασµοῦ παρὰ τὰς µάχας ἠφείδουν ἑαυτῶν. For Leonidas of old, as we are told, when asked what manner of poet he thought Tyrtaeus to be, replied; “A good one to inflame the souls of young men.” And indeed they were filled with divine inspiration by his poems, and in battle were prodigal of their lives. Plutarch is fairly clear here that, just as “enflaming” or en- couraging young men through Tyrtaeus’ poems had a positive effect on the battlefield, strengthening the φιλοτιµία of Cleom- enes was also potentially beneficial. It is thus not plainly stated here that Sphaerus made Cleomenes’ φιλοτιµία excessive.12 9 For Plutarch a µειράκιον is a person under twenty-one: Brut. 27.3. 10 CGL (2021) s.v. ἀνδρώδης: “of manly character,” “of a true man”; as a noun: “quality of manliness.” Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic. 1171b6, Rh. 1391a22 which pairs φιλοτιµία with manliness. 11 On φιλοτιµία in Plutarch see A. E. Wardman, Plutarch’s Lives (London 1974) 115–124; B. Bucher-Isler, Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plu- tarchs (Bern 1972) 12–13; F. Frazier, “À propos de la ‘philotimia’ dans les ‘Vies’: quelques jalons dans l’histoire d’une notion,” RPh 62 (1988) 109–127; T. E. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford 1999) 83–89; G. Roskam et al. (eds.), The Lash of Ambition. Plutarch, Imperial Greek Literature and the Dynamics of Philotimia (Leuven 2012). See the discussion at 486–487 below. 12 Pace Roskam, CP 106 (2011) 213, who seems to read the passage as al- ready thematizing excessive (and thus negative) φιλοτιµία. MARCIN KURPIOS 471 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 However, Plutarch continues by adding that other factors need to be taken into account (2.3): ὁ δὲ Στωϊκὸς λόγος ἔχει τι πρὸς τὰς µεγάλας φύσεις καὶ ὀξείας ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ παράβολον, βαθεῖ δὲ καὶ πράῳ κεραννύµενος ἤθει µάλιστ’ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδίδωσιν. However, for great and impetuous natures the Stoic doctrines are somewhat misleading and dangerous, although when they per- meate a deep and gentle character, they redound most to its proper good. This comment seems to highlight two main elements: first, the king’s φύσις, which is described as µεγάλη and ὀξεῖα; and second the Stoic teaching of Sphaerus, in which that φύσις played a role. Cleomenes is counted here among the µεγάλαι/ὀξεῖαι φύσεις and, as we can see from Plutarch’s statement in the preceding chapter,13 he does not qualify as having the deep and gentle character mentioned here. It is important to ask what is so peculiar to Cleomenes’ µεγάλη/ὀξεῖα φύσις—what could pro- duce “something hazardous and precarious” through its inter- action with the Stoic λόγος,14 or how this interaction relates to, or possibly aggravates, the effects of φιλοτιµία. To understand what, in Plutarch’s view, these factors implied for the king’s personality and attitudes, we need to begin by con- sidering the basic elements of Plutarch’s conception of human personality and its development, with particular attention to the notion of µεγάλη φύσις. 13 Cleom. 1.3: “He [Cleomenes] had not, however, the scrupulous and gentle nature (τὸ δ’ εὐλαβὲς ἄγαν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρᾶον) for which Agis was re- markable.” Cf. further at 480–481 below. 14 S.-T. Teodorsson, “The Education of Rulers in Theory (Mor.) and Prac- tice (Vitae),” in The Unity of Plutarch’s Work 339–350, at 346, is, to the best of my knowledge, the only scholar who has noted this exact problem, but he merely rephrases the statement of Plutarch: “Cleomenes received some Stoic instruction by Sphaerus of Borysthenes, which Plutarch however regards as detrimental rather than useful to great natures (2.2 –6).” 472 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 2. Plutarch’s conception of personality 2.1. The basic structure and development of personality To consider Plutarch’s theory of the structure of personality and its development relevant to the interests in this paper, we should first review his concept of the human ψυχή.15 The soul for Plutarch divides into two main components. The first is τὸ παθητικόν, the non-rational part, which is subdivided into τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν “appetitive” and τὸ θυµοειδές “spirited.”16 While τὸ θυµοειδές is the more active part, responsible especially for such emotions or affective states as anger, indignation, shame, and ambition, τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν responds primarily to bodily instincts and thereby produces desires and appetites.17 Second, there is the rational part, τὸ λογιστικόν, which is supposed to regulate the non-rational components (De virt. mor. 442C–443C, 444B–445B). Plutarch operates with Platonic- Aristotelian concepts in this area.18 From this classification 15 For an overview see Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 469–487, and The Structured Self 229–238; Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 74–78; F. Frazier, Histoire et morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque (Paris 2016) 108–128; S. Xenophontos, Ethical Education in Plutarch. Moralizing Agents and Contexts (Berlin 2016) 22–37; F. Ferrari, “Plu- tarch von Chaironeia,” in C. Riedweg et al. (eds.), Die Philosophie der Antike V.1 (Basel 2018) 576–579. 16 Plut. De virt. mor. 441F–442C. On the division of the soul in Plutarch, most instructive are Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 72–78; B. Castelnérac, “Plutarch’s Psychology of Moral Virtue: ‘Pathos’, ‘Logos’, and the Unity of the Soul,” AncPhil 27 (2007) 141–163; P. Volpe Cacciatore, “Psyche in Plutarch’s Works,” in J. Opsomer et al. (eds.), A Versatile Gentleman: Consistency in Plutarch’s Writing: Studies Offered to Luc Van der Stockt (Leuven 2016) 59–68. 17 On these two sub-components see Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 73; Ferrari, in Die Philosophie V.1 577. On the root word θυµός, which in its basic physical sense means “breath,” but also “temper,” or “the heart, as the seat of the emo- tions,” see D. Cairns, “Thymos,” in OCD online (2019). 18 θυµοειδές as opposed to τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν: Pl. Resp. 440E. Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic. 1102b30 and Pl. Phd. 108A for τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν. On Plutarch’s Platonism see F. Ferrari, “Platone in Plutarco,” in I. Gallo (ed.), La biblioteca di Plutarco (Naples 2004) 225–235. On its blending with Aristotle’s concepts: D. Babut, “Plutarque, Aristote, et l’aristotélisme,” in L. Van der MARCIN KURPIOS 473 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 emerges the concept of ἦθος as the quality that the irrational part takes from the rational as a result of long-term habituation (ἕξις).19 Thus, in terms of structure, ἦθος basically denotes the complex of interrelations between the rational and irrational parts of the soul developed by an individual, which ultimately translates into an individual’s unique interests, values, drives, and emotional patterns.20 Plutarch seems to lay particular stress on the latter two components in his moral assessment in the Lives, i.e. on finding a balance between the total elimination of ap- petites and passions and complete indulgence.21 Before ἦθος even develops, each individual starts with a φύσις, i.e. his innate endowment, which marks a person’s individuality early in their development. While innate predispositions are not always necessarily expressed in the ἦθος that is eventually devel- oped,22 they can be either constantly at work or activated in cer- tain circumstances, particularly if the ethical training received has not been sufficient.23 In such a case, a stable ἦθος cannot be achieved, and a certain lack of cohesion in the personality may result.24 Moreover, natural predispositions are fairly constant Stockt (ed.), Plutarchea Lovaniensia (Leuven 1996) 1–28; P. Donini, “Plutarco e Aristotele,” in La biblioteca 255–273. 19 ἕξις denotes a settled condition of the capacity, becoming either virtue or vice, depending on whether the non-rational component has been edu- cated by reason: Plut. De virt. mor. 443D. πάθος is basically a state of mind and was typically rendered in Latin as “affectus” (cf. Quint. Inst. 6.2.8); it seems thus adequate to render it in English as “affective state” (B. Inwood, “Stoic Ethics,” in K. Algra et al. [eds.], The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy [Cambridge 1999] 700). 20 Ferrari, in Die Philosophie V.1 578. 21 Plut. De virt. mor. 451C; Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 475 with n.39. Whether and how a hero controls his passions by reason is one of the crucial themes in the Lives: Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 75–82. 22 Plut. De sera 551D, 562B; Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 474. 23 See e.g. Plut. Sert. 10.5–6; Xenophontos, Ethical Education 34–35; Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 478–479. 24 Plut. Mor. 52A–B, 52F–53A, 97A; Alc. 16.1–6; Demetr. 1.7; Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 475. 474 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 and important,25 but the final shape of one’s personality depends on the nurture and education (ethical training) received, of which the highest form is philosophical παιδεία.26 In terms of development, therefore, Plutarch’s model of personality may be defined as psychobiological, insofar as major personality traits are shaped by temperament (natural endowment), learning, and environmental factors.27 2.2. The µεγάλη/ὀξεῖα φύσις In the passage about Sphaerus (Cleom. 2), Plutarch seems to single out a particular instance of natural endowment—µεγάλη/ ὀξεῖα φύσις—but there only fleetingly. Since he implies that this was the core component of Cleomenes’ predisposition, it is essential to enquire exactly what it means. Possessing a “great nature” is expounded in greater detail in De sera numinis vindicta 552C–D:28 οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱ µεγάλαι φύσεις µικρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν οὐδ’ ἀργεῖ δι’ ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ δραστήριον, ἀλλ’ ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρονται, πρὶν εἰς τὸ µόνιµον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ γεωργίας ἄπειρος οὐκ ἂν ἀσπάσαιτο χώραν ἰδὼν 25 In some cases Plutarch seems to imply a change of φύσις, but there the word φύσις is actually used in a rare meaning of long-established character (see Sull. 30.4–6 with Gill, CQ 33 [1983] 478 n.61; Xenophontos, Ethical Edu- cation 35). 26 Xenophontos, Ethical Education 22–28; Gill, CQ 33 (1983) 474, 477; F. Becchi, “Plutarco tra platonismo e aristotelismo: la filosofia come παιδεία dell’anima,” in A. P. Jiménez et al. (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles (Madrid 1999) 25–43. See also, on παιδεία in the Roman Lives, C. B. R. Pelling, “Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture,” in M. Griffin et al. (eds.), Philosophia Togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford 1989) 199– 232; S. C. R. Swain, “Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch,” JHS 110 (1990) 126–145. 27 Cf. “Cloninger’s Psychobiological Model of Personality,” APA Dictionary of Psychology (2018): https://dictionary.apa.org/cloningers-psychobiological- model-of-personality. 28 Text: W. R. Paton, M. Pohlenz, W. Sieveking, Plutarchi Moralia III (Leip- zig 1929); transl. P. De Lacy, B. Einarson, Plutarch’s Moralia VII (Cambridge [Mass.] 1959), with slight alterations. MARCIN KURPIOS 475 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 λόχµης ἔµπλεω δασείας καὶ φυτῶν ἀγρίων καὶ θηρία πολλὰ καὶ ῥεύµατα καὶ πολὺν ἔχουσαν πηλόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ µεµαθηκότι δι- αισθάνεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὑποδείκνυσι καὶ τὴν µαλακότητα τῆς γῆς, οὕτως ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ µεγάλαι φύσεις, ὧν ἡµεῖς µὲν εὐθὺς τὸ τραχὺ καὶ νύττον οὐ φέροντες ἀποκόπτειν οἰόµεθα δεῖν καὶ κολούειν, ὁ δὲ βελτίων κριτὴς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τὸ χρηστὸν ἐνορῶν καὶ γενναῖον περιµένει λόγου καὶ ἀρετῆς συνεργὸν ἡλι- κίαν καὶ ὥραν, ᾗ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις καρπὸν ἀποδίδωσι. For great natures bring forth nothing trivial, and the vigor and enterprise in them is too keen to remain inert; nay, they drift about on heavy seas before coming to rest in their abiding and settled character. And so, as one ignorant of agriculture, on seeing a piece of ground overgrown with dense thickets and weeds, over- run with wild animals and water-courses, and covered with mud, would not find it to his liking, while to him who has learned to discriminate and judge these very circumstances reveal the vigor, depth, and looseness of the soil, so great natures put forth at first many strange and villainous shoots, and we, at once impatient of their rough and thorny quality, fancy that we should clear them away and cut them short; whereas the better judge discerns even in this their good and noble strain, and waits for them to reach the maturity that lends support to reason and virtue and the season when their nature yields her proper fruit. This passage has been interpreted as stating that naturally well-endowed men may turn out badly if they are not given proper nurture.29 Such a reading has been advanced in con- nection with the mention of µεγάλη φύσις in Demetr. 1.7, where Plutarch adduces Plato and writes that a µεγάλη φύσις can de- 29 Cf. T. E. Duff, “Plutarch, Plato and ‘Great Natures’,” in Plutarco, Platón 313–332, at 318–319, who also treats passages from several Lives (but not the passage about Cleomenes and Sphaerus from the Cleomenes) by applying that notion; so also Xenophontos, Ethical Education 27. F. Frazier and L. R. Lanzillotta, Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque (Leiden 2019) 187–222, is the most recent, thorough analysis of De sera, but they focus on its overarching themes and do not address in detail the passage where µεγάλη φύσις is discussed. 476 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 velop either great vices or great virtues.30 We can, however, dig deeper and ask what psychological qualities Plutarch meant to be inherent in such an endowment, i.e. what would be those qualities of “greatness” that can be either destructive or pro- ductive. In Demetr. 1.7 Plutarch does not indicate a particular work of Plato, and the passages proposed by scholars as being possibly alluded to31 do not actually discuss φύσις with the qualifier µεγάλη; they either specify well-predisposed individuals, and those in very specific areas (esp. philosophy),32 or refer to greatness in rather vague terms.33 µέγας can be an epithet of gods or men (“great/mighty”), but, rather than implying generally positive moral potential, when combined with φύσις it usually stands for intensity or a great degree of its qualities.34 This is 30 Plut. Demetr. 1.7: περιέξει δὴ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον τὸν Δηµητρίου τοῦ Πολιορ- κητοῦ βίον καὶ τὸν Ἀντωνίου τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ἀνδρῶν µάλιστα δὴ τῷ Πλάτωνι µαρτυρησάντων, ὅτι καὶ κακίας µεγάλας ὥσπερ ἀρετὰς αἱ µεγάλαι φύσεις ἐκφέρουσι, “This book will therefore contain the Lives of Demetrius the City- besieger and Antony the Imperator, men who bore most ample testimony to the truth of Plato’s saying that great natures exhibit great vices also, as well as great virtues” (transl. B. Perrin, Plutarch’s Lives IX [Cambridge [Mass.] 1920). 31 Duff, in Plutarco, Platón 325–330, and Xenophontos, Ethical Education 27. 32 Pl. Resp. 491E–492A, esp. τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν (491D7), τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶµεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας (491E1–2), ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως (E4–5), ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν (E5–6), τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν (492A1–5). 33 In Pl. Grg. 525E1–526B4 it is the position of great power, not natural endowment, that makes individuals likely to become morally wrong (ἐκ τῶν δυναµένων … κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν); φύσις is not even mentioned there. Similarly, in Hp.Mi. 375E the topic is strong ψυχή due to its prudence. Cri. 44D discusses what οἱ πολλοί are capable of in terms of right or wrong. Cf. Duff, in Plutarco, Platón 319, who discusses the notion of µεγάλη φύσις in De sera, and then reads Cor. 1.1–2 in this light, where, however, Plutarch mentions γενναία καὶ ἀγαθὴ φύσις, and Alc. 6.1, which has δι’ εὐφυΐαν ἁπτο- µένων τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ. 34 LSJ s.v. µέγας “big, of bodily size” (A.I.1a); “vast, high” (A.I.2); “great, mighty,” of gods and men (A.II.1); “strong, of the elements, etc. … of properties, passions, qualities, feelings, etc., of men” (A.II.2); “with a bad sense, over-great” (A.II.5). MARCIN KURPIOS 477 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 specified in the passage of De sera quoted above: ἡ ὀξύτης, which can denote cleverness, but also rapidity or quickness to anger;35 τὸ σφοδρόν, excess, violence, or vehemence, also in connection with anger,36 and τὸ δραστήριον, which denotes activity, efficacy, or energy.37 The φύσις described by Plutarch thus seems to entail a kind of strong affective and impulsive potential, and decreased ability to control or self-regulate behavior. To gain an even better under- standing of this notion, we can adduce Plutarch’s reference to µεγάλη φύσις in a passage of the Lysander, where he quotes Aristotle (Lys. 2.3): Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὰς µεγάλας φύσεις ἀποφαίνων µελαγχολικάς, ὡς τὴν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἡρακλέους, ἱστορεῖ καὶ Λύσανδρον οὐκ εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῇ µελαγχολίᾳ περιπεσεῖν. And Aristotle, when he sets forth that great natures, like those of Socrates and Plato and Heracles, have a tendency to melancholy, writes also that Lysander, not immediately, but when well on in years, was a prey to melancholy.38 There seems to be little doubt that Plutarch quotes the identi- fication of µεγάλαι φύσεις with µελαγχολικοί approvingly, i.e. he assumes that it is accurate. He is here probably referring to an extensive section of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, in par- ticular the passage where the author writes that those who are 35 See Plut. De coh. ira 453A–B, connected with τὸ θυµοειδές. LSJ s.v. ὀξύς, from which the abstract noun ἡ ὀξύτης derives, has “sharp, keen” (I.1); “in reference to the senses” (II); “hasty … esp. quick to anger, passionate” (III.1); cf. its links with irascibility in Arist. Eth.Nic. 1126a18. CGL s.v. ὀξύς: “(of feelings, unstable or dangerous events and circumstances) rapid in onset or acute in intensity.” 36 Plut. De coh. ira 453B; cf. LSJ s.v σφοδρός “vehement, violent, excessive”; it appears together with φιλότιµοι in Pl. Ap. 23E. 37 See Frazier, Histoire et morale 268–269, for the neuter substantive τὸ δραστήριον as “la tendance active de la personnalité,” and its combination with τὸ σφοδρόν in other Lives. 38 Transl. B. Perrin, Plutarch’s Lives IV (London 1916). 478 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 outstanding (περιττοί) in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry, or arts, are all likely to be µελαγχολικοί.39 In this passage, the melancholic disposition is determined by an excess of black bile that can be either cold or hot: in the former case individuals are obtuse, while in the latter they are µανικοί, astute but also prone to mood changes ([Pr.] 954a22–23, 28–30). The µελαγχολικοί are also discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics in the context of ἀκρασία, “weakness of will,” indicating a deprivation of con- sideration before acting.40 Plutarch thus seems to draw on the notion that φύσις in the sense of a natural predisposition affects the personality of men. Moreover, he applies this notion in ex- plaining the behavior of Lysander in a later passage of the Life, where he connects the melancholic disposition with a tendency to vehement anger (παντάπασι χαλεπὸς ὢν ὀργὴν διὰ τὴν µελαγχο- λίαν ἐπιτείνουσαν, Lys. 28.1).41 We can also add a passage from the Alexander in which Plutarch cites Theophrastus on the physi- ological constitution of the king, esp. his warmness of bodily humors, as producing a tendency to drinking and to be θυµο- ειδής; the quality of σφοδρός is also mentioned (Alex. 4.3.7).42 39 [Pr.] 953a10–29. The treatise, quoted by Plutarch as being of Aristotle’s authorship is, however, likely a summary or revised version of Theophrastus’ lost On Melancholy. See the thorough analysis by P. J. van der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge 2005) 139–168, and J. Radden, The Nature of Melancholy. From Aristotle to Kristeva (Oxford 2000) 55–60. Cf. M. Protopapas-Marnelli, “The Affections of the Soul according to Aristotle, the Stoics and Galen: On Melancholy,” Peitho 11 (2020) 121–141, at 133–136. 40 Arist. Eth.Nic. 1150b25, 1152a18–19. Van der Eijk, Medicine and Philoso- phy 160–168, has shown that the theory of [Pr.] 30.1 harmonizes with the concept of melancholy in the Nicomachean Ethics. 41 That Lysander in Plutarch’s account was affected by melancholy- induced anger in his late years is entirely consistent with Plutarch’s view that one’s natural endowment can be latent in adulthood and activate itself in some circumstances, see 473–474 above. On χολή and anger see also De coh. ira 457D–E. 42 D. Bosman, “Plutarch’s Alexander,” in D. Ogden (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Alexander the Great (Cambridge 2024) 348–363, at 362, seems thus MARCIN KURPIOS 479 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 Overall, understanding Plutarch’s references to µεγάλη/ὀξεῖα φύσις as denoting a psychological constitution which is rooted in physiological processes seems to find considerable support across Plutarch’s texts.43 This kind of φύσις implies a particularly active τὸ θυµοειδές part of the ψυχή, and hence a tendency to vehement πάθη, especially anger, but also impulsiveness, high motor ac- tivity, and (as a result) a decreased ability to control behavior. Such a psychological constitution overlaps with the modern concept of novelty-seeking temperament.44 While modern re- searchers tend to explain such a predisposition by neurological factors, ancient thinkers looked to physiological processes in the body.45 It seems therefore that substantial inferences about Cleom- enes’ natural endowment can be drawn from Plutarch’s brief mention of µεγάλη/ὀξεῖα φύσις in reference to the king. Let us see now whether and how it ties in with Plutarch’s other remarks on Cleomenes’ natural endowment and the nurture that he re- ceived in his youth. 3. Cleomenes’ natural endowment and the question of external influences The preceding section investigated what kind of predisposition can be implied by µεγάλη and ὀξεῖα φύσις, which is ascribed to to be correct in reading this passage in the Alexander in direct connection with the µεγάλη φύσις from the quoted section of De sera. 43 Plutarch adopts Aristotelian/Peripatetic concepts where he considers them useful to express or interpret what he sees as being in line with Plato, see the positions cited in n.18 above. 44 In C. R. Cloninger’s model of personality, novelty-seeking temperament is a major predictor of impulsive behaviors and activities associated with personal risk, and, if extreme, may develop into bipolar disorder, which has been shown to correspond in many aspects to the Peripatetic concept of melancholy; see M. ter Borg, “Aristotle and DSM on ‘Bipolar’ Melancholy: Symptoms, Medication, Link to Creativity,” Medical Research Archives 9 (2021) 1–18. 45 J. A. Gray’s model has proposed a link between certain temperaments and specific neurotransmitters; novelty-seeking would be linked with dopa- mine flow, cf. n.27 above. 480 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 Cleomenes at Cleom. 2. His natural endowment is also discussed before the mention of his interactions with Sphaerus (Cleom. 1.3): ἦν δὲ καὶ φιλότιµος µὲν καὶ µεγαλόφρων ὁ Κλεοµένης καὶ πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀφέλειαν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Ἄγιδος εὖ πεφυκώς, τὸ δ’ εὐλαβὲς ἄγαν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρᾶον οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ κέντρον τι θυµοῦ τῇ φύσει προσέκειτο καὶ µετὰ σφοδρότητος ὁρµὴ πρὸς τὸ φαι- νόµενον ἀεὶ καλόν. ἐφαίνετο δὲ κάλλιστον µὲν αὐτῷ κρατεῖν ἑκόντων, καλὸν δὲ καὶ µὴ πειθοµένων περιεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκβιαζόµενον. And, besides, Cleomenes was aspiring and magnanimous, and no less prone by nature than Agis to self-restraint and simplicity. He had not, however, the scrupulous and gentle nature for which Agis was remarkable, and his natural courage was always goading him on, as it were, and fiercely impelling him towards that which in any case appeared to be the honorable course. He thought it a most excellent thing to rule over willing subjects, but a good thing also to subdue such subjects as were disobedient, and force them towards the better goal. We can see that Plutarch describes Cleomenes’ natural endow- ment by applying the conceptual framework of the subdivision of the non-rational part of the soul (472–473 above). First, he highlights that Cleomenes was naturally well predisposed (εὖ πεφυκώς) to ἀφέλεια, “simplicity,” and ἐγκράτεια, “self-restraint,” in relation to sensual desires and appetites; these pertain to the appetitive part of the soul, τὸ ἐπιθυµητικόν. Second, he specifies Cleomenes’ θυµοῦ τῇ φύσει, thus invoking the θυµοειδές; in this sphere, Cleomenes had a predisposition for excess.46 This is opposed to τὸ εὐλαβές, control or ability to maintain prudence, and τὸ πρᾶον, mildness (related particularly to emotions).47 This characterization is fully consistent with the understanding of 46 See a similar gap between the two components of the non-rational part of the soul in the disposition of Alexander (self-restraint in relation to sensual pleasures vs tendency to anger, impulsiveness etc.): Plut. Alex. 4.4–5, 5.3, 21.4, 23.1, 22.4; cf. Cor. 1.3–4. 47 For πραότης in the Lives see H. Martin, “The Concept of Prāotēs in Plutarch’s Lives,” GRBS 3 (1960) 65–73; Frazier, Histoire et morale 312–315. Cf. J. de Romilly, La douceur dans la pensée grecque (Paris 1979) 275–307. MARCIN KURPIOS 481 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 µεγάλη φύσις advanced in the previous section of this paper. Further, Plutarch also highlights as part of Cleomenes’ natural disposition his tendency to be φιλότιµος, along the predisposition to be high-minded. Following Plato, Plutarch defined φιλοτιµία as arising from, or having its basis in, the τὸ θυµοειδές, as the latter is particularly connected to the sense of right and wrong.48 This is consistent with the way Plutarch links the exceptional activity of Cleomenes’ θυµός with impulses towards what seemed morally right to him (πρὸς τὸ φαινόµενον ἀεὶ καλόν, Cleom. 1.3). Cleomenes’ inborn φιλοτιµία thus denotes a tendency towards affective engagement in moral values and judgments. As for proper nurture or παιδεία, Cleomenes, like Agis, did not receive it (in contrast to the Gracchi).49 His environment was generally permeated by ἡδονή, “pleasure,” τρυφή, “luxury,” and there was no ἄσκησις, “exercise,” or training towards σωφρο- σύνη, “moderation,” or καρτερία (“endurance”).50 The only pos- sible instance of psychological/ethical instruction mentioned by Plutarch was thus Sphaerus. But Plutarch seems to exclude the role of any external influences on the appetitive component of Cleomenes’ disposition; the king, as highlighted above, had the natural capability to master the appetites and drives connected to the ἐπιθυµητικόν. Moreover, he relates that the king truly 48 Plut. De virt. mor. 452D; Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 83–84. See Pl. Resp. 440E for θυµοειδές as a part that reacts emotionally to a sense of right and wrong, causing anger, indignation, shame, etc. For φιλοτιµία as inextricably con- nected with anger see De coh. ira 457B. 49 Plut. Comp. Agis Cleom. et Gracch. 1.2: ἡ δ’ Ἄγιδος καὶ Κλεοµένους φύσις ἐρρωµενεστέρα φαίνεται τῆς ἐκείνων γενοµένη, παρ’ ὅσον οὔτε παιδείας µετα- λαβόντες ὀρθῆς, ἔθεσί τε καὶ διαίταις ἐντραφέντες ὑφ’ ὧν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι διεφθόρεισαν, αὑτοὺς ἡγεµόνας εὐτελείας καὶ σωφροσύνης παρέσχον, “But Agis and Cleomenes would appear to have had even sturdier natural gifts than theirs, in so far as though they did not receive a correct training, and were reared in those customs and ways of living by which their elders had long ago been corrupted, they nevertheless made themselves leaders in simplicity and self-restraint.” 50 Plut. Cleom. 2.1, 3.1. 482 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 remained simple and moderate in respect to sensual pleasures.51 We find no explicit statement that Cleomenes’ simplicity and moderation were somehow fostered or adjusted by teachers, family, or any other factors. Even though Sphaerus is associated with the reinstitution of the traditional Spartan regime of self- restraint, when mentioning his personal interaction with Cleom- enes Plutarch seems to focus exclusively on the impact on Cleomenes’ affective side, the θυµοειδές.52 And this, we have seen, included extraordinary activity, impulsiveness, and am- bitiousness. How could Cleomenes’ interaction with Stoic teachings negatively influence his personality? This question will be first approached by shedding light on Plutarch’s account of the Stoic views on personality, the regulation of affective states and be- havior, and then by applying them to Cleomenes’ biography. 4. Plutarch on the fallacies of early Stoic ethical psychology Plutarch’s negative view on Stoic ethical psychology was primarily aimed at the early Stoa which frequently took issue with Platonic-Aristotelian theories; this inevitably includes Zeno and his disciple Sphaerus.53 Plutarch does not discuss Sphaerus’ teachings specifically, probably as a result of the identification of 51 This is particularly underscored by the characterization in Cleom. 13. 52 For such neat distinguishing and possible separate functioning and treat- ment by Plutarch of the two parts in practical ethics see De coh. ira 453B–C. 53 On Plutarch and Stoicism in general see D. Babut, Plutarque et le stoïcisme (Paris 1969); J. Opsomer, “Plutarch and the Stoics,,” in M. Beck (ed.), A Com- panion to Plutarch (Malden 2014) 88–103. G. Roskam, Plutarch (Cambridge 2021) 33–39. Already A. Grilli, “Aspetti del rapporto tra Plutarco e lo stoicis- mo,” in I. Gallo (ed.), Aspetti dello stoicismo e dell’epicureismo in Plutarco (Ferrara 1988) 7–19, convincingly argued that Plutarch did not criticize the Stoa beyond Panaetius. Cf. G. Boys-Stones, “Thyrsus-Bearer of the Academy or Enthusiast for Plato? Plutarch’s de Stoicorum repugnantiis,” in J. Mossmann (ed.), Plutarch and his Intellectual World (Swansea 1997) 41–59; Becchi, in Plutarco, Platón 25–43; M. R. Niehoff, “Philo and Plutarch as Biographers: Parallel Responses to Roman Stoicism,” GRBS 52 (2012) 361–392. MARCIN KURPIOS 483 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 his doctrines with those of his teachers,54 and Plutarch’s criticism of those doctrines, at least when it comes to theory, is well studied. The extant fragments or reliquiae of Sphaerus are very scarce, but the titles of certain works ascribed to him suggest that he wrote especially on psychology and ethics; we know of a longer work Περὶ παθῶν δύο (On Passions) in two books, Περὶ ὁρµῆς (On Impulse), and Περὶ ἕξεως (On Habits).55 One of Plutarch’s essential points in his critiques is the early Stoics’ position on the structure of the human soul, namely their choice not to recognize the separate existence and agency of the non-rational component, τὸ παθητικόν.56 In particular, he crit- icizes the Stoic approach to πάθη, viz. their definition of a πάθος as either a result of a mistaken opinion (κρίσις) on a relevant matter or as itself being a mistaken opinion, which results from an assent to an impression (φαντασία).57 On this view, the agent may judge whether his affective response is appropriate or not: when the thing he believes to be good is not actually good, then the state is not defensible; but when it is appropriate, the result is a “good affective response,” εὐπάθεια. One is thus supposed to eliminate psychological instability by correcting one’s beliefs.58 In Plutarch’s view this is fundamentally erroneous, since only by assuming the existence of two distinct psychic parts can we 54 Plutarch underlines Sphaerus’ close connection with Zeno, Cleom. 2.2: ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγεγόνει τῶν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως µαθητῶν. See Steinmetz, in Die Philosophie V.1 576. 55 Diog. Laert. 7.177–178 = SVF I F 620; cf. n.3 above. 56 Plut. De virt. mor. 441C–442C. H. G. Ingenkamp, “De virtute morali. Plu- tarchs Scheingefecht gegen die stoische Lehre von der Seele,” in Plutarco, Platón 79–86; Gill, The Structured Self 207–229; Ferrari, in Die Philosophie V.1 577. 57 Diog. Laert. 7.110–111 and SVF I FF 205–206, 208–209; A. A. Long, “Stoic Psychology,” in The Cambridge History 560–584; Inwood, in The Cam- bridge History 699–705. Steinmetz, in Die Philosophie V.1 546–548, is par- ticularly useful for Zeno’s qualification of the basic πάθη. 58 M. C. Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” Apeiron 20 (1987) 129–177. 484 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 provide the contribution of reason.59 If there was no psychic function detached from reason, it would be impossible to speak of ἦθος as conditioning the affective part by repeated processes of habituation and there would be only cognitive processes di- rected towards the formation of opinions/beliefs.60 For Plutarch, the Stoics were also wrong in holding that one should completely eliminate “wrong” πάθη (ἀπάθεια), instead of moderating them by λόγος (µετριοπάθεια). He thus criticizes the Stoic doctrine of εὐπάθεια as a mere game of finding euphemisms for passions, which actually imply the twofold structure of the soul.61 What is more, since Plutarch defines virtue as a kind of µέτρον in relation to πάθος,62 πάθη are necessary material for virtue, important in ethical training.63 Even more crucially, Plutarch notes that calling these different names offers nothing in terms of the actual control of them, not to mention permanent habituating; it actually leaves them as they are with no change in the mental state of the agent.64 If they persist and thus become repeated and unrestrained, they create a bad habit (e.g. repeated anger be- coming irascibility: De coh. ira 454D). What could the Stoic doctrine thus conceived mean for an 59 Plut. De virt. mor. 447B–C; Gill, The Structured Self 221–223. Plutarch also argues that numerous Stoic doctrines are at odds with common convictions: De comm. not. 1058E–1086B. 60 Inwood, in The Cambridge History 705. 61 Plut. De virt. mor. 447B–449C; Gill, The Structured Self 226–228, 233–234. Cf. J. Dillon, “Plutarch the Philosopher and Plutarch the Historian on Apatheia,” in A Versatile Gentleman 9–15. For Stoics’ self-contradictions see also Plutarch’s discussion in De Stoic. rep. 1033A–1057C. For implied criticism of the Stoics’ radical approach to passions and virtue in general see De prof. virt. 76C–84B. 62 Plut. De virt. mor. 444F; F. Ferrari, “Moderatismo etico e controllo delle passioni in Plutarco,” in G. Giardina (ed.), Le emozioni secondo i filosofi antichi (Catania 2008) 135–162. 63 Plut. De virt mor. 449F, 451D–452A, esp. 451D–E; Gill, The Structured Self 234 with n.125: e.g. emotions are useful in “standing by reasoning” and “intensifying” the virtues. 64 Plut. De coh. ira 462F–463A, calling out specifically Zeno. MARCIN KURPIOS 485 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 individual with the natural endowment defined as in the case of Cleomenes? First, even if such a person endeavored to eliminate πάθη, as the early Stoics postulated (in Plutarch’s account), they would constantly combat, and—should the impossible mission of reducing πάθη to near-zero be successful—lose the necessary re- source for ethical training. Second, and more practically, given the Stoic notion that emotion based on correct judgment does not need to be modified, it would be crucial to establish whether the agent is able to properly evaluate the matter and the circum- stances in order to produce correct beliefs (and thus appropriate, “innocent” emotions). But if an impulsive person, who has a ten- dency to intense affective states, is erroneous in their judgment, and nevertheless undertakes a course of action, they will not be willing to question their state as inadequate. Rather, they will identify their state exactly as correct judgments about reality and as grounds for taking appropriately vigorous action. This, if repeated, may lead to a pattern of overconfidence rather than questioning one’s beliefs. For such an individual it would rather be commendable to treat one’s passions based on detailed analy- sis and diagnosis of the experienced state, the ensuing realization of how harmful one’s condition is, and further steps which gradually alleviate the affections.65 For Plutarch, self-questioning is essential to the path of ethical progress, which should be con- tinuously pursued.66 In sum, Stoic ethical teaching, as Plutarch tends to conceive it, may either disorganize one’s management of the different components of the soul or reinforce the natural affective-cogni- tive tendencies of the agent, rather than manage or modify them. In effect, such instruction would likely impair the development of a proper ἦθος as a settled and coherent character. To be sure, Stoic ethical theory may be viewed as too abstract and sophisticated to be transmitted to the king by the phi- losopher, or to be actually applied by the king to his actions. 65 De garr. 510C–D, 513D–514C; De coh. ira 453D. 66 De prof. virt. 85E–86A; De coh. ira 453D; cf. Roskam, Plutarch 65–66. 486 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 Although there are indications elsewhere that Plutarch was ready to accept statesmen’s or kings’ familiarity with advanced philosophical teachings, it is still debatable whether he thought that such figures were likely to live according to those teach- ings.67 Thus, I would not venture to assert that Cleomenes studied and absorbed all the Stoic ethical principles in their complexity; I would only maintain that, in Plutarch’s mind, Sphaerus’ teachings could have exerted some effect on the young king’s approach and behavior. Let us now proceed to investigate whether this described im- pact of the Stoic ethical teaching on individual predispositions is reflected in Plutarch’s description and general assessment of Cleomenes’ adult behavior and personality traits. 5. Cleomenes’ personality in adulthood and the traces of Stoic influence 5.1. The problem with Cleomenes’ φιλοτιμία In the passage that served as the point of departure of this paper, Plutarch states that Cleomenes’ φιλοτιµία, which is part of his natural endowment, was enflamed by Sphaerus (Cleom. 2.2 προσεκκαῦσαι τὴν φιλοτιµίαν). Without doubt, excessive φιλοτιµία was viewed by Plutarch as dangerous (ἐπισφαλές), and it is im- portant to understand why. Plutarch answers this question by saying that it (Agis 2.2): 67 Plutarch writes that Alexander was well acquainted with the ethical and political λόγος of Aristotle (Alex. 7.3–4, 8.4), and even with the “secret and more profound teachings” (τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλιῶν), but he also seems to imply that the impact on the king was not effective (8.4, 55.7– 8, 74.5, 77.3; see also De Alex. fort. 329B–D). Cf. Socrates’ ethical instructions for Alcibiades, who nevertheless turned out to be an unrewarding disciple (Alc. 4–6). A less disputable instance is that of Dion, whose character and actions are described as influenced by Plato (Dion 1.2–4, 4.3–7, 6.4, 11.1; cf. 2.5, in which Dion is called an ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος alongside Brutus). Cato the Younger’s close acquaintance with the Stoic Antipater of Tyre, and in par- ticular the former’s devotion to Stoic ethical and political doctrines, is another example (Cat. Min. 4.1, cf. 10.1–2 for Cato’s relationship with Cordylion of Pergamum, who was learned in the Stoic doctrines). Several passages suggest that the philosophical learning was put to work in Cato’s actions and attitudes (8.1, 9.4, 11.3–4, 14.2). MARCIN KURPIOS 487 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 ἐκφέρει γὰρ εἰς µανίαν καὶ παραφροσύνην ὕπαιθρον ἐξουσίας µεγάλης ἐπιλαβοµένους, ὅταν µὴ τὸ καλὸν ἔνδοξον εἶναι θέλω- σιν, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὸν ἡγῶνται τὸ ἔνδοξον εἶναι. sweeps them away into manifest folly and madness as they grasp after great power, when they refuse to regard what is honorable as glorious, but consider that what is glorious is good. Plutarch thus suggests that excessive φιλοτιµία is basically an uncontrolled affective state which drives incorrect identification of what is morally good; under such a µανία one tends to in- terpret the glorious for the morally good, not the other way round.68 Strong affective engagement impairs one’s ability to properly distinguish what is really morally good from what should rather be considered as glorious. Hence, if Cleomenes had the κέντρον τι θυµοῦ urging him to impulsively pursue what seemed morally right to him, and en- flaming φιλοτιµία meant increased risk of misidentifying the ἔνδοξον as the καλόν, the result would necessarily be excessive affective engagement in the (“objectively”) glorious rather than the good. In other words, given Cleomenes’ naturally overactive τὸ θυµοειδές, one should be particularly cautious with political ambition, as it by itself can lead to µανία, especially in a person who was prone to impulsiveness and vehement affective states. It seems that Sphaerus’ impact on Cleomenes can be blamed for this tendency becoming the king’s personal trait. Moreover, this trait was not simply too rigid a political course,69 but rather led to a set of impulsive, affective reactions connected to the sense of the morally good. This seems to be confirmed and exemplified by the anecdote about the stories about Agis told to Cleomenes by Xenares, which, Plutarch says, caused his excessive eagerness or elation (ἐµπαθέστερον προσέχων καὶ κινούµενος ὑπερφυῶς πρὸς 68 Cf. Frazier, Histoire et morale 268–269, who distinguishes between military and civil, or political, φιλοτιµία in Plutarch. 69 Roskam, CP 106 (2011) 213, notes this aspect of Sphaerus’ possible impact on Cleomenes, “Quite remarkably, this risk [of excessive ambition] is here connected directly with philosophical instruction,” but does not elabo- rate on the affective nature and consequences of φιλοτιµία. 488 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 τὴν καινοτοµίαν τοῦ Ἄγιδος, Cleom. 3.3). This anecdote comes after the remarks about Cleomenes’ interactions with Sphaerus, which may further suggest a causal relationship between those and the king’s reactions. 5.2. Cleomenes’ recklessness and overconfidence Nevertheless, as argued in the first section of this paper, Plu- tarch strongly suggests that Sphaerus’ influence on Cleomenes was even deeper than just enflaming his φιλοτιµία, identifying as the key to this influence the specificity of the Stoic teaching in combination with Cleomenes’ natural predispositions. More concretely, a µεγάλη φύσις impacted by Stoic λόγος was likely to produce τι ἐπισφαλές, “something precarious,” and παράβολον, “hazardous.”70 These two words point to instability, uncertainty, and recklessness, and thus can lead us to the traits of Cleomenes’ adult personality: τόλµα, “recklessness,” and θρασύτης, “over- confidence.”71 In the σύγκρισις, the most reflective part of the biographies, in which the heroes are compared “from a dis- tance” and thus in a more generalizing way,72 Plutarch recapitu- lates Cleomenes’ behavior and attitudes (Sync. 4.1): 70 LSJ s.v. ἐπισφαλής has “prone to fall, unstable, precarious” (I), “making to fall, misleading” (II.1, citing Plut. Quaest.conv. 653D); “dangerous” (II.2); s.v. παράβο- λος “with a side-meaning, deceitful”(I); “exposing oneself or what belongs to one: hence, of persons, venturesome, reckless” (II.1), “of things and actions, hazardous, perilous” (II.2). 71 Thus the associations in Plut. Num. 8.1–2: συστᾶσα µὲν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόλµῃ τινὶ καὶ παραβόλῳ θρασύτητι τῶν θρασυτάτων καὶ µαχιµωτάτων ἐκεῖ πανταχόθεν ὠσαµένων, “It was brought into being at the very outset by the excessive daring and reckless courage of the boldest and most warlike spirits, who forced their way thither from all parts” (transl. B. Perrin, Plutarch’s Lives I [London 1914]). Cf. Reg. et imper. apophth. 206B, τῶν δὲ τολµηµάτων τὰ παρά- βολα καὶ µεγάλα. 72 See H. Erbse, “Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs,” Hermes 84 (1956) 398–424; Duff, Plutarch’s Lives 243–309, and “Plutarchan Synkrisis: Comparisons and Contradictions,” in L. Van der Stockt (ed.), Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch (Leuven 2000) 141–161; C. B. R. Pelling, “Synkrisis Revisited,” in A. Pérez Jiménez et al. (eds.), Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works: Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter (Malaga 2005) 325–340; Roskam, CP 106 (2011) 221–222. MARCIN KURPIOS 489 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 ὁ δὲ Κλεοµένης τοὐναντίον θρασύτερον καὶ βιαιότερον ἐπὶ τὴν µεταβολὴν ἦλθε τῆς πολιτείας, ἀποκτείνας τοὺς ἐφόρους παρα- νόµως, οὓς καὶ προσαγαγέσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις κρατοῦντα καὶ µετα- στῆσαι ῥᾴδιον ἦν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἄλλους µετέστησεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. Cleomenes, on the contrary, undertook his change of the con- stitution with too much rashness and violence, killing the ephors in unlawful fashion, when it would have been easier to win them over to his views or remove them by superiority in arms, just as he removed many others from the city. Cleomenes thus approached the political changes with rashness or confidence (θρασύτερον) and brutal violence (cf. Sync. 4.2), while, in contrast, the Gracchi avoided civil bloodshed, showing caution, εὐλάβεια (Sync. 4.3). We also witness Cleom- enes’ excessive boldness in the crucial moment of the Life, namely in the account of his coup against the ephors and the exiling of some citizens; θρασύτης is here underlined as the main driver of his actions.73 In addition, the king approaches the deposing of the ephors “being greatly elated and persuaded” (µέγα φρονῶν ἤδη καὶ πεπεισµένος, Cleom. 7.1). His annihilation of Archidamus is another case in point (Sync. 5.1–2). Further, Cleomenes’ exceptional confidence is also recognized by the Achaeans in the course of his military actions against them.74 Plutarch thus seems to have viewed it as a persistent trait in Cleomenes’ attitude and behavior. Plutarch concludes the comparison with the Gracchi by stress- ing Cleomenes’ τόλµα, which was great as measured against that of Gaius (Sync. 5.6): 73 Plutarch implies that Cleomenes’ courage persisted through the whole process, weakening only for a moment, but was then revived (ἐθάρρησε, Cleom. 7.3). As Frazier has shown, Histoire et morale 273, verbal forms stemming from θρασ/θαρς- are frequent in the Lives as the concept involves strict connection of the mental state to the action based on it. 74 Cleom. 16.2: ὡς δ’ οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ, τοῦ Κλεοµένους ἐκπεπληγµένοι τὸ θράσος, ἀλλὰ καὶ δικαίαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων, “when they paid no heed to him in their consternation at the daring spirit of Cleom- enes, but actually saw justice in the demands of the Lacedaemonians.” 490 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀποφήνασθαι, Τιβέριον µὲν ἀρετῇ πεπρωτευκέναι τίθηµι πάντων, ἐλάχιστα δ’ ἡµαρτηκέναι τὸ µει- ράκιον Ἆγιν, πράξει δὲ καὶ τόλµῃ Γάϊον οὐκ ὀλίγῳ Κλεοµένους ὕστερον γεγονέναι. But if I am to express my opinion of them individually, I should say that Tiberius led them all in exemplary virtues, that the youth- ful Agis committed the fewest errors, and that in achievement and courage Gaius fell far short of Cleomenes. Thus, when Plutarch arrives at the most synthesizing description of Cleomenes, he focuses on his τόλµα, which in particular de- termined his way of introducing political change (cf. Sync. 2.1). This trait, when seen across the Lives, refers to a particularly eager attitude towards risky action with little calculation, which was dangerous for public order and stability when applied to the internal affairs of the polis. Although it can be valued by Plu- tarch positively if combined with sound reason, it is essentially different from praiseworthy courage, ἀνδρεία.75 While θράσος/ θρασύτης seems to imply the feeling of confidence activated in the face of action, τόλµα can be understood as a permanent per- sonal quality determining a tendency to certain types of action.76 For Cleomenes, it indeed persisted until, and actually con- tributed to, his very end, as he committed suicide “with good courage” (αὑτὸν εὐτόλµως ἀνεῖλε, Sync. 3.1). Overall, τόλµα and θράσος/θρασύτης occur, first, in Plutarch’s summarizing charac- terization and contrast between the king and the other three figures, and, second, as active factors driving some of Cleom- enes’ most consequential actions. It is crucial that, in Cleomenes’ biography, the two elements are combined and interrelated: overconfidence can lead to excessive risk-taking, and the ex- 75 True ἀνδρεία, Plutarch says elsewhere, does not need bile or anger but can be mild: De coh. ira 458D–E. See Frazier, Histoire et morale 270–272; cf. J. Pinheiro, “La valeur de la tolma dans les Moralia de Plutarque,” in R. Hirsch- Luipold et al. (eds.), Plutarch’s Religious Landscapes (Leiden 2021) 208–225. 76 In the account of the operations against the Achaeans Cleomenes is said, first, to “boldly challenge” them, τολµηρῶς δὲ προκαλούµενος (Cleom. 14.2), and in connection with this was admired for his θράσος (16.2); cf. the com- bination in Cic. 42.2. See also Frazier, Histoire et morale 272–275. MARCIN KURPIOS 491 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 perience of success achieved in a risky situation may bolster the over-confidence even further, and aggravate a loss of behavioral control. It seems that such a combination is particularly negative for Plutarch, being elsewhere associated with criminals and wrongdoers.77 Such a development is consistent with Cleomenes’ natural predisposition as we have explored it in the previous sections: an excessive tendency to risk-taking and a weakness to engage in activities that are dangerous or highly subject to chance can be seen as developed, especially in unfavorable conditions, from a novelty-seeking and impulsive temperament (478–479 above). The Stoic instruction, which locates impulses in the chain of mental states rather than in the body or the non-rational part of the soul, could well—from Plutarch’s perspective—cause serious mishandling, if not aggravation, of Cleomenes’ impulses. Over- confidence, in turn, is essentially an overestimation of one’s actual ability to perform tasks successfully, excessive certainty in the accuracy of one’s beliefs, and failure to distinguish inferences from assertions.78 This is precisely one of the consequences of Stoic ethical-psychological teaching for a person who is already predisposed to intense affective states (485 above). Plutarch seems to have reasoned that, if an impulsive and ambitious per- son is supposed to regulate passions with reason, rather than see the affective states as something separate and from a distance, they will land in the very same place from which they started, probably with a strengthened state and perhaps with a different name given to that state. In sum, while Cleomenes’ σωφροσύνη and related traits are ex- plained by Plutarch as expressions of Cleomenes’ φύσις, despite the degenerate milieu in which he lived and his lack of ethical 77 Plut. De sera 548E: delayed punishment “strengthens the wrongdoer in confidence and boldness,” αὔξει δὲ θρασύτητι καὶ τόλµῃ τὸν µοχθηρόν; cf. Pinheiro, in Plutarch’s Religious Landscapes 220. 78 Cf. the definition in the APA Dictionary of Psychology (2018), https:// dictionary.apa.org/overconfidence. 492 NATURE, NURTURE, AND STOIC TEACHING ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 education, his over-confidence and tendency to risk-taking seem to have emerged from the interaction between Cleomenes’ natural endowment and external factors—and no factors are spelled out or implied by Plutarch other than the teachings of Sphaerus. In other words, Plutarch’s mention of Sphaerus’ influ- ence on Cleomenes seems to possess an explanatory significance; it highlights and provides a necessary factor that needs to be introduced if Cleomenes’ attitudes and behavior are to be under- stood. By portraying Cleomenes’ personality as testified to by his deeds, Plutarch sought to define the factors that made the king what he was, and his Academic view on early Stoic ethical psychology seems to have offered a likely explanation. Ulti- mately, for Plutarch, Stoic instruction represented a deeply problematic and inadequate kind of ethical training. 6. Conclusion In this paper I have explored how, in Plutarch’s account, Cleomenes’ natural predispositions combined with the nurture that he received resulted in the specific traits of the king’s per- sonality and attitudes. In particular, I have combined an analysis of Plutarch’s notions of personality development and structure with close reading of the relevant sections of the Cleomenes. I have endeavored to shed new light on the poorly explored notion of µεγάλη φύσις that features in the passage about Sphaerus, as well as on Plutarch’s thinking about the specificity of φιλοτιµία in connection with Stoic teachings. As I hope to have shown, the information provided by Plutarch on Cleomenes’ contact with Sphaerus represents an integral and necessary part of the ex- planation of the king’s personality and actions. In addition, I have highlighted how coherent and systematic Plutarch is in his application of his theory of the soul and personality structure and development to the presentation and analysis of Cleomenes’ per- sonality. My enquiry has also revealed how Plutarch’s negative view of the Stoic doctrine expounded in the Moralia is put to operative work in the Life, and translates into a description of the development of an actual psychic apparatus of a specific indi- vidual. In doing so, I hope to have advanced our understanding MARCIN KURPIOS 493 ————— Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 65 (2025) 466–493 of Plutarch’s characterization of Cleomenes, as well as the various nuances in his conception of the development of the human personality in general.79 September, 2025 Marcin Kurpios University of Wrocław, Faculty of Languages, Literatures and Cultures marcin.kurpios2@uwr.edu.pl 79 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for their insightful comments and suggestions, which have greatly improved this paper.