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Homer, tyranny, and democracy
Hammer, Dean
Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Winter 1998; 39, 4; ProQuest
pg. 331

Homer, Tyranny, and Democracy 

Dean Hammer 

I
N THE LAST DECADE scholars have taken increasing note of the 
complexity of Homeric political organization. 1 Where before 
issues of authority were placed in the context of the oikos, so 

that leadership appeared largely as patrimonial and legitimacy 
as an issue of "might,"2 recent arguments have begun to place 
these questions in the context of the emergence of the polis. 

1 The following will be cited by authors' names: 
Walter Donlan, "The Pre-State Community in Greece," SymbOslo 64 (1989) 5-

29 
--, "The Relations of Power in the Pre-State and Early State Polities," in The 

Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece, edd. L. G. Mitchell and P. J. 
Rhodes (New York 1997) 39-48 

M. 1. Finley, The World of Odysseus2 (New York 1979) 
Kurt Raaflaub, "Horner to Solon: The Rise of the Polis, The Written Sources," in 

. The Ancient Greek City-State, ed. M. H. Hansen (Copenhapen 1993) 41-105 
--, "Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy,' in Demokratia: A 

Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern, edd. J. Ober and C. 
Hedrick (Princeton 1996) 139-174 

--, "Homeric Society," in A New Companion to Homer, edd. Ian Morris and 
Barry Powell (1991: a) 

--, "Politics and Interstate Relations in the World of Early Greek Poleis," 
Antichthon 31 (1997: b) 1-27 

--, "Power in the Hands of the People: Foundations of Athenian Democracy," 
in Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges, edd. Morris and Raaflaub 
(Dubuque 1997: c) 

--, "Soldiers, Citizens and the Evolution of the Early Greek Polis," in 
Mitchell/Rhodes (1997: d) 49-59 

Max Weber, Economy and Society I, edd. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley 
1978). 

Translations of Homer are Lattimore's with occasional modifications. 
2Finler, writes that the "principle of lesitirnacy" by which the basileus rules 

is "might' (87). For Finley, "non-kinship mstitutions of the community" were 
shaped in the "image of the household and the family." The king appears in the 
image of the father. "In certain of his functions-in the assembly, for example, 
or in offering sacrifices to the gods-the king in fact acted the patriarch." Terms 
for ruling, as in the verb anassein, are used "with almost complete indifference" 
to describe rule of a community and rule of a household (83). 

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 39 (1998) 331-360 
© 2000 GRBS 

331 



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332 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

Scholars have found persuasive evidence for the development of 
a community identity, the consolidation of an aristocracy, and 
the emergence of citizenry. But less clear is the relationship 
between the three. That is, within the emergent community, how 
can we understand relations of authority between the leaders 
and the led? 

The Iliad and Odyssey seem to point in contradictory 
directions. The people do not initiate action, but neither are they 
simply quiet. The basileus appears at times to be interested in 
the tide of "public" opinion while at other times willing to 
suppress violently the expression of this opinion. And though 
an assembly of the people exists in which leaders present 
courses of action, the leaders appear free to follow or ignore 
whatever might be the expressed sentiment. Difficulties of 
interpretation are exacerbated both by the nature of epic poetry, 
which seeks to tell a story rather than convey history or social 
change, and by the paucity of knowledge about the nature of 
politics in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. 

To fill in some of these gaps, scholars have often sought to 
locate Homeric society either by looking back to a Mycenaean 
past or by looking forward to the emergence of a polis. There is a 
danger, however, in reading into Dark Age community organiza­
tion either the residue of earlier forms of monarchy or the 
evolutionary telos of later polis development. As Donlan points 
out, in talking about attempts to locate Homeric community in a 
Mycenaean past, "we know almost nothing about the social 
organization of the Mycenaeans, and nothing at all about the 
social structure of the 'Dorian' newcomers."3 Furthermore, polis 
development does not follow a neat evolutionary trajectory, as 
suggested by the widespread emergence of tyranny in the 
seventh and sixth centuries. Any model of Homeric politics, 
thus, must be able to explain both the importance of the 

3W. Donlan "The Social Groups of Dark Age Greece," CP 80 (1985) 293-
308, at 293-294. 



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DEAN HAMMER 333 

developing role of the people without, in turn, assuming an 
evolutionary trajectory from kingship to polis. 

Three models, in particular, have been important in framing 
our understanding of authority relations. First, a royal model 
sees Homeric political relations as developing out of earlier 
forms of monarchy. In this approach, the Homeric basileus 
appears as a king who, invested with sacred authority, rules by 
personal prerogative over quiescent subjects.4 A second model, 
influenced by a Marxian notion of class competition, posits an 
increasing division and conflict developing in the eighth century 
between an exploitative aristocracy and an exploited, but 
increasingly resistant, people. The epic is placed in the context 
of class conflict in which the poem appears as an ideological 
tool of the elite to legitimate the exploitative relations of 
power. 5 A third approach notes aspects of stratification and 

4Gschnitzer makes a credible argument that the basileus appears as an heir 
(at least in name) of a Mycenaean local official: Fritz Gschnitzer, "BAI:IAEYI:: 
Ein terminologischer Beitrag zur Friihgeschichte des Konigtums bei den Grie­
chen," Innsbr.Beitr.z.Kulturwiss. 11 (1965) 99-112. The argument for sacred 
kingship takes this view one step further. The contention is that the basileus 
inherits, not just the name, but tIle vestiges of sacred authority. See G. Glotz, 
The Greek City and its Institutions (New York 1930) 7; Henry Maine, Lectures 
on the Early History of Institutions (New York 1888) 35; R. Bonner and G. 
Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle (Chicago 1930) 9; 
E. Benveniste, IndO-European Language and Society, trans!' E. Palmer (Coral 
Gables 1973) 323-326, 382; Rudolf Kastler, "Die Homerische Rechts- und 
Staatsordnung," in Zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. E. Berneker (Darm­
stadt 1968, orig. 1950) 172-195; J. Walter Jones, The Law and L~al Theory of 
the Greeks (Oxford 1956) 28; Sigrid Deger-Jalkotzy, Herrscha tsformen bei 
Homer (Vienna 1970) 80-88; P. E. Easterling, "Agamemnon's S eptron in the 
Iliad," in Images of Authority, edd. M. M. Mackenzie and C. Roueche (Cam­
bridge 1989) 104-121, at 114; John Lenz, Kings and the Ideology of Kingship in 
Early Greece (c. 1200-700 B.c.): Epic, Archaeology and History (c!.iss. C01umbia 
1993); Robert Mondi, "I:KHnTOYXOI BAI:IAEIl:: An Argument for Divine King­
ship in Early Greece," Arethusa 13 (1980) 203-216. 

sSee Ian Morris, "The Use and Abuse of Homer," ClassAnt 5 (1986) 81-
138; Peter Rose, "Ideology in the Iliad: Polis, Basileus, Theoi," Arethusa 30 
(1997) 151-199; William Thalmann, The Swineherd and the Bow: Representa­
tions of Class in the Odyssey (Ithaca 1998); David Tandy, WarrIOrs into 
Traders: The Power of the Market in Early Greece (Berkeley 1997); G. E. M. de 
Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca 1981); Ellen 
and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (Oxford 1978); 
and J. Bintliff, "Settlement Patterns, Land Tenure and Social Structure: A 
Diachronic Model," in Ranking, Resource, and Exchange, edd. C. Renfrew and S. 
Shennan (Cambridge 1982) 106-111. 



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334 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

competition in society, but more emphasis is placed on the 
increased recognition and integration (albeit unwilling, at times) 
of the people into political association.6 Scholars point not only 
to the formalization of public assemblies, but to the importance 
of the people in witnessing, and even influencing, decisions 
about public matters, the distribution of goods, the adjudication 
of disputes, and the conduct of foreign relations. 7 

While each model points to important elements of the 
Homeric world, none is sufficient for understanding the 
authority relations between leaders and led. Both the royal 
model of kingship and the model of an elite counter-reaction to 
the emergence of a people rest on an incomplete understanding 
of relations in the Iliad. In particular, too much emphasis is 
placed on the coercive aspects of rule and insufficient attention 
is paid to how the emergence of a public space alters the claims 
to authority made by the elite. More convincing are suggestions 
that leadership must account for the increasing assertiveness of 

6See Raaflaub "Homer and die Geschichte des 8.Jh.s v. Chr.," in Zwei­
hundert Jahre Homer-Forschung, ed. J. Latacz (Stuttgart 1991) 205-256; 1993; 
1997a; 1997b; 1997d; Karl-Joachim H61keskamp, "Agorai bei Homer," in Volk 
und Verfassung im vorhellenistischen Griechenland, edd. W. Eder and K.-J. 
H61keskamp (Stuttgart 1997) 1-19; Donlan 1989; 1997; "Political Reciprocity 
in Dark Age Greece: Odysseus and his hetairoi," in Reciprocity in Ancient 
Greece, edd. C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite, and R. Seaford (Oxford 1998) 51-71; 
Christoph Ulf, Die homerische Gesellschaft: Materialien zur analytischen 
Beschreibung und historischen Lokalisierung (Munich 1990); Hans van Wees, 
Status Warriors: War, Violence and Society in Homer and History (Amsterdam 
1992) 31-36; Michael Gagarin, Early Greek Law (Berkeley 1986) 27; Jasper 
Griffin, Homer on Life and Death (Oxford 1980) 11; T. Gschnitzer, "Zur 
homerischen Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung: Grundcharakter und 
geschichtliche Stellung," in Latacz 182-204; S. Douglas Olson, Blood and Iron: 
Stories and Storytellin$ in Homer's Odyssey (Leiden 1995) 188; Fran<;ois Ruze, 
Deliberation et pouvolr dans la cite grecque: de Nestor a Socrate (Paris 1997) 
19-29; and Pierre Carlier, La royaute en Grece avant Alexandre (Strasbourg 
1984) 186 ("C'est Ie roi qui decide, mais il decide en public"). 

7Formalization (role for heralds): II. 2.99,9.11; Od. 2.6-7; formalization 
(proper seating): II. 2.96-97, 99, 9.13; Od. 2.14, 8.5-7; public matters: II. 1.54-
305, 2.84-398, 2.788-808, 7.345-379, 7.381-411, 7.414-420, 9.9-79, 11.806-
807, 18.243-313, 19.34-237; Od. 3.126-150, 8.5-45, 16.361, 20.146; distribu­
tionofgoods: II. 1.125-126,2.227-228,11.704; Od. 13.14-15; adjudication: II. 
18.497-508, and Gagarin (supra n.6); foreign relations: II. 3.205-224, 3.245-
345,7.66-205, 11.122-142; Od. 21.15-21; and Raaflaub 1997b; other mentions 
of assemblies: Od. 10.114-115, 15.468. 



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DEAN HAMMER 335 

the people, both historically and in the epic. Donlan gives some 
sense of the resultant complexity of authority relations when he 
identifies three different forms of authority, all operating at 
various degrees. Drawing from Weber, he argues that there are 
elements of "traditional authority" by which the basileus 
maintained authority through an appeal to tradition (such as 
heredity), elements of "charismatic authority" in which 
authority depended on the personal qualities of the individual 
to maintain a following, and even elements of "legal-rational 
authority" with which the basileus is imbued to protect the 
themistes of Zeus.s But we need to explain not only that 
different aspects of authority inhere in leadership, but how 
these different elements cohere. My suggestion is that like a 
chemical reaction, the interaction of these different elements of 
authority actually creates a different, and quite volatile, form of 
authority relations, one that Max Weber describes as 
plebisci tary. 

A "plebiscite" has many connotations, not the least of which 
is the practice of a direct form of voting in affirmation or 
rejection of a leader or a policy.9 But that is not the only form of 
a plebiscite. Plebiscitary politics, as described by Weber, can be 
conceived of more generally as one in which the decisions of 
leaders derive at least part of their legitimacy from the acclaim, 
or perceived acclaim, of the people. Plebiscitary leadership is 
not exclusive from the chiefdom form of organization discussed 
by Donlan. Nor is plebiscitary leadership incompatible with 
claims by individuals to extraordinary, even divine, associa-

8Donlan 199742-43. Others, too, have identified overlapping authority 
relations, both in the epics and contemporaneous with their composition. J. V. 
Luce, "The Polis in Homer and Hesiod," PRIA 78 (1978) 1-15, comments that 
the "polis" appears "under its autocratic ruler, but not without some rudiments 
of a wider political structure" (11). See also Raaflaub 1993, 1997b, 1997d, and 
Bj0rn Qvilfer, "The Dynamics of the Homeric Society," SymbOslo 56 (1981) 
109-155. 

9J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York 1960), for 
example, draws on the connection of a plebiscite to voting in his discussion of 
modern forms of totalitarianism. 



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336 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

tions. Rather, plebiscitary politics arises when charismatic 
forms of authority become subject to "an anti-authoritarian 
interpretation. 1110 

The validity of charismatic rule, to recall Weber, rests on 
recognition by the ruled of a leader's claim to some extraordin­
ary personal, heroic, or divine traits that justify his leadership. 
Recognition of the authority of the charismatic leader is treated 
as a "duty. II But charismatic rule, he suggests, may be affected 
by broader political, economic, and social changes, which place 
pressure on the political organization to make issues of 
leadership increasingly publicY In the eighth century, these pres­
sures included increasing population density that heightened 
demands on resource usage;12 the rise of other communities that 
created security concerns;13 the intrusion of a market that 
placed pressure on resource allocation and control;14 the con­
solidation of an aristocratic identity that increased claims on 

IOWeber 266. 
11 Weber 266. Among the elite, authority relations appear as "collegial." In 

a collegial system, according to Weber, an important aspect of maintaining 
one's position as a preeminent head is "consultation with formally equal 
members" (272). Aspects of collegiality have been noted by Lenz (supra n.4); 
Carlier (supra n.6) 182-187; Y. Andreyev "Greece of the Eleventh to Ninth 
Centuries B.c. in the Homeric Epics," m Early Antiquity, ed. I. M. Diakanoff, 
trans!' A. Kirjanov (Chicago 1991) 328-348, at 344; Donlan 1989 25 (as a 
culmination of the unstable chiefdom system); Robert Drews, Basileus: The 
Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece (New Haven 1983); and Raaflaub 
1996 151. See also Barbara Patzek, Homer und Mykene: Miindliche Dichtung 
und Geschichtsschreibung (Munich 1992) 131-132, and Egon Flaig, "Das Kon­
sensprinzip in homerischen Olymp. Uberlegungen zum gotllichen Entscheidungs­
prozess Ihas 4.1-72," Hermes 122 (1994) 13-31, on the importance of consen­
sus in Homeric society. Suggestions of such collegiality appear at II. 2.53-86, 
2.402-440, 3.146-160, 4.322-323, 4.344, 7.323-344, 9.70-178, 9.422, 12.210-
250, 13.726-747, 14.27-134, 15.283-284, 18.243-313, 18.497-508, 18.510-
511, 22.99-110; Od. 3.127, 6.54, 11.509-511, 16.242, 16.419-420, 22.230. 

12See A. M. Snodgrass, The Dark Ages of Greece (Edinburgh 1971) and 
Archaic Greece (Berkeley 1980); J. N. Coldstream, Geometric Greece New York 
1977); Robin Osborne, Greece in the Making, 1200-479 BC (London 1996); 
Rose (supra n.5). 

13See Fran<;ois de Polignac, Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek 
City-State (Chicago 1995); Chester G. Starr, Individual and Community: The 
Rise of the Polis, 800-500 B.c. (New York 1986); Raaflaub 1997d. 

14See Tandy (supra n.S). 



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DEAN HAMMER 337 

the resources;15 and the emergence of self-conscious demos that 
further heightened demands on the political system, leading to 
either integration or suppression.16 These pressures create a 
seemingly subtle transformation in which "recognition" of 
charismatic authority is not "treated as a consequence of 
legitimacy" but "is treated as the basis of legitimacy."17 The 
leader, though he may retain charismatic elements, comes to 
premise his personal authority on recognition by the ruled. 

The people, through the assembly, do not vote nor do they 
make binding decisions.ls But neither are they compliant, inert, 
absent, or silenced. We see decisions "enacted" in a public 
space. These enactments may take a variety of forms: consulta­
tion with the people before a decision is made, the appeal by a 
leader for approval of a decision, and even debates between 
leaders before the people. The term "enacted" is useful because 
it draws attention to the public aspects of the activity without, 
in turn, claiming that a formalized or democratic process is in 
place. Within the public space, leaders play to the crowd, 
seeking to persuade, cajole, or elicit support. But this alters the 
nature of the political dynamic, and the nature of political 
legitimacy, as leaders draft their appeals in anticipation of a 
response. Within the broader political field comprised of the 
demos, laos, or plethos, the decisions, and the authority of leaders 
in proposing these decisions, derive at least part of their 
legitimacy from the acclaim, or perceived acclaim, of the 
people.19 

lSSee Qviller (supra n.8). 
16See Morris (supra n.5); Raaflaub 1997a, 1997b; Donlan 1989. 
17Weber 266-267. 
18In particular, we do not see a principle of majority rule. Carlier (supra 

n.6) 186 n.231: "Les moyens de determiner queUe est l'opinion majoritaire ne 
manquent pas." See also Fran~ois Ruze, "Plethos, Aux origines de la majorite 
politique," in Aux origines de I'Helienisme (Paris 1984) 247-263, at 248-249; 
Raaflaub 1997b 15. 

19Thou~ laos and demos are not synonymous, their meanirIgs overlap, e.g. 
n. 18.301, 'let him give them to the people (Auo'icrl), to use them in common 



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338 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

The notion of plebiscitary politics is helpful in making sense 
of what otherwise appear in the epics as inconsistent or 
incoherent relationships between the leaders and the people. 
Moreover, plebiscitary politics allows us to situate the Homeric 
epics in the political developments of Greece. In particular, it 
provides the political context for addressing the complex 
relationship between the rise of tyranny and the emergence of 
democracy. Rather than viewing tyranny as a remnant of an 
older, monarchical time that must then be overthrown by the 
people, or as the anticipation of a newer, democratic time led 
by the people, we can view tyranny and democracy as emerging 
similarly from this plebiscitary context. Plebiscitary politics 
provided a public space, often volatile, in which a vocabulary 
of democracy could develop. 

Plebiscitary Politics 
The peculiar combination of a charismatic and public basis 

of legitimacy is suggested in the openings of both the Iliad and 
the Odyssey. The Odyssey begins with Telemachos calling an 
assembly, a critical first step toward restoring order in the 
community.20 The assembly is associated, in general, with some 

(Ko."taOTlI.lOpOPl10al)"; Od. 16.95-96,114, "do the people (Mol) hate you through­
out this place (Ol1~ov) .,. It is not that all the people (0f1~~) hate me." Both terms 
refer to the people of a community. Laos and laoi often refer to the followers of a 
leader whereas demos refers to both a named territory and the people of the 
territory: see L.fgr.E. 275-278, 1633-1644; Benveniste (supra n.4) 371-376; 
Donlan 1989; Michel Casevitz, "Sur Ie concept de 'peuple,'" in La langue et les 
textes en grec ancien, ed. F. Letoublon (Amsterdam 1992) 193-199; Johannes 
Haubold, Homer's People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation (Cambridge 2000). 
Plethos seems to refer frequently to an undifferentiated multitude (II. 2.488, 
11.305, 11.360, 11.405, 15.295, 17.31, 17.221, 20.197, 22.458; Od. 11.514, 
16.105). Plethos is not used as a pejorative term for demos or laos, however. 
Plethos, demos, and laos are all used to refer to the mass of disorderly people (II. 
2.143,2.198,2.191). And the plethos are not portrayed only unsympathetically. 
They express approval when Odysseus silences Thersites (ll. 2.278); Ajax 
appeals to Achilles on behalf of the plethos (ll. 9.641); and the plethos march in 
an orderly way back to the ships (II. 15.305). 

20The twenty years that pass without an assembly in Ithaca have been used 
as evidence for the unimportance of public meetinss in Homeric society (Finley 
197980). We should not take the length of time lIterally, but as suggestive of 



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DEAN HAMMER 339 

"public matter" (~TU!tOV) that a member of the community may 
want to put forward (1tUpaucrK£'w.l) and argue (ayop£un) (2.32). 
In this case, though, the matter relates to Telemachus' "own 
need," namely, the intrusion of the suitors into Odysseus' house­
hold (2.45). The assembly becomes a space for Telemachos to 
"declare" his claim against the suitors in front of the people and 
the gods, so that he may later seek compensation from the 
suitors (1.272-273, 2.76-78). 

Telemachos, however, still helpless in his "childhood" 
(vl11tluac; 1.297), cannot simply summon the people and expect 
them to listen. Athene, thus, instills in him the courage (IlEVOC;) 
to call the assembly (1.88-91). Moreover, Telemachoslacks the 
personal authority of his father because he has never proven 
himself in either battle or counsel. So Athene bestows upon 
Telemachos the aura of the divine so that he may command the 
attention of the assembled people in his father's absence 
(2.12-14): 

8E(j1tE(jlT\v 0' apu tiP yE Xaptv lCUtEXEUEV 'A8"vT\. 
tOY 0' apu 1taVtE~ Auol E1tEPXOIlEVOV 8T\EuvtO' 
E~Eto 0' EV 1tatPO~ 80)1((!>, d~uv OE yEPOVtE~. 

Athene drifted a divine grace upon him, 
and all the people marveled at him as he came forward. 
He sat in his father's seat, and the elders made way before him. 

Telemachos possesses, at least momentarily, the charismatic 
authority of his father. But acclaim is not treated, in turn, as a 
duty of the people. Rather, Telemachos must seek public 
affirmation for his appeal. 

In the meeting with the Phaiakians, Athene similarly conveys 
a magical grace upon Odysseus as he appears in the assembly 
(8.18-22): 

Odysseus' long absence. Furthermore, this hiatus appears abnormal and, in 
fact, reveals the near breakdown of the community. The infrequency of meetings 
in Ithaca is juxtaposed to their frequency elsewhere. See Od. 2.32 (association 
of assemblies With public matters), 10.114-115, 15.468,8.10-45. 



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340 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

tip 0' ap' 'A8tlvT\ 
8£O'1t£O'tT\v KUt£X£U£ xaplv K£8uAn t£ KUt ro/lOl~ 
KUt /llv IlUKPOUPOv KUt1taO'O'ovu 8ilK£v io£0'8ul, 
ro~ K£v <PUltlK£O'O'l <PtAO~ 1tavt£O'O'l "(£vOltO 
O£lvO~ t' uiooto~ t£ ... 

and upon him Athene 
drifted a divine grace upon his head and his shoulders, 
and made him taller for the eye to behold, and thicker, 
so that he might be loved by all the Phaiakians, and to them 
might be wonderful and respected ... 

These two instances do not point to divine kingship, but to a 
more complex intertwining of charismatic and public elements 
of leadership. No one element seems to exist by itself. 
Telemachos and Odysseus show attributes of the divine, and 
the people in tum admire them. But in each case, the claims of 
the leaders are subject to public acclamation. 

The combination of a charismatic and public basis of 
legitimacy is suggested in the opening of the Iliad as well. The 
charismatic basis of Achilles' authority is indicated not just by 
his heroic stature within the community, but by the role of Hera 
in prompting Achilles to call the people to assembly (1.54-
55).21 Achilles' personal authority operates, in tum, in a public 
setting in which the people seem to play some role in expressing 
their opinion. When the priest Chryses seeks to ransom his 
daughter, urging that this will honor Apollo, the people "cried 
out in favor" (e1tEuq)'TU.l.ll(HlV) that Chryseis be returned to her 
father (1.22). The people are not successful, but what is striking 
is that even Achilles, in recounting the events to his mother, 
should mention their outcry as support for his position (1.376). 

In a later assembly, Diomedes advises that the people 
should refuse the offer of gifts, rather than the return of Helen, 
by the Trojans. In responding to him, all the Achaians "shouted 

21 Suggestive of these charismatic elements, as well, is how the people of Pro­
tesilaos longed (1t08EOV) for their leader (2.703-710) and how Nireus cannot 
attract a following because he was "a man of poor strength" (aAcmuovo~ 
2.675). 



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DEAN HAMMER 341 

... admiring the words of Diomedes" (£1ttaxov . .. lluOov aya(J­
(JaliEvol .1toll~()EO<;, 7.403-704). Two aspects are worth noting. 
First, the public acclamation has elements of personal admira­
tion, as agamai is used frequently to express a wonderment 
toward an exceptional individuaP2 Second, Homer uses the 
language of the heroic war-cry to depict the voice of the people 
in assembly. Elsewhere, taXO) is compared in noise to the roaring 
sea, blazing forest fire, wind in the oaks, and the tempering of 
an ax blade, and is associated with great feats of personal 
prowess, communal strength, and divine terror.23 In the com­
petitive world of the warrior, the cry corresponds to strength, 
courage, and individual distinction.24 By depicting the people as 
shouting their approval, Homer not only reveals the force of the 
people, but also lends their voice some legitimacy by associating 
it with the agonistic, heroic world. Mentor, in fact, expresses 
anger with the people precisely because they sit "in silence" 
(avecp) and do not try to stop the suitors through words, 
"though they are so few, and you so many" (Od. 2.239-241). 

Plebiscitary Politics and the Volatility of the Political Field 
In a purely charismatic form of association, the acclaim of 

the people is treated as a duty that is directed toward one 
recognizably charismatic leader. In plebiscitary politics, 
however, acclaim is up for grabs. This makes the Homeric 
political field volatile.25 The leaders, in seeking acclaim, can go 
in two directions. They can use whatever personal authority 

22See also II. 3.181, 3.224, 7.41, 9.51. 
23Comparison to noise: n. 14.393-401; Od. 9.392; personal prowess: n. 

5.297-302, 8.321, 16.784-785, 18.160, 18.228-229, 20.285; Od. 4.454; 
communal strength: n. 13.834-835, 15.312-313, 16.78-79, 17.262-266; divine 
terror: n. 5.784-792, 5.859-863, 11.10-14, 14.147-152, 15.321-327, 20.48-53. 

24 See J. E. Lendon, "Voting by Shouting in Sparta" (forthcoming). 
25For a discussion of politics as a field, see Dean Hammer, "The Politics of 

the Iliad," CJ 94 (1998) 1-30, and The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Politi­
cal Thought (Norman, forthcoming). 



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342 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

they have to seek public acclaim for a community good, as does 
Achilles in Book 1. Or they can play upon the more autocratic 
elements of charisma by "hid[ing] behind" a legitimacy that 
appears to be derived from "the will of the governed."26 Unlike 
democratic forms of politics in which the office, and not the 
individual, has authority, under a plebiscitarian form of politics 
the choices of the people can be used as "unconditional 
acclamations of the leader's authority."27 

We get our first hint of this volatility in Book 2 of the Iliad 

when Agamemnon summons the people to assembly to test their 
desire to continue fighting. Achilles had not only assailed Aga­
memnon's courage and leadership the day before, but had 
suggested that no one would readily (7tpo<ppcov) obey him 
(1.150). Agamemnon, in calling the assembly, attempts to shore 
up his personal legitimacy by seeking public affirmation of the 
war effort. In stirring up the "passion" (8u/.lov) of the multitude 
(2.142), however, Agamemnon misjudges badly the reaction of 
the people. The assembly resounds with a "thundering shout" 
(2.149 aAcxAll'tip), a term used also to describe the cries of war. 
Powerful in their numbers, the people almost create /I a 
homecoming beyond fate" (2.155). Ironically enough, the 
political field fragments through the acclaim of the people, and 
is restored only through the personal authority of Odysseus, as 
he is instructed by Athene (2.166-210). 

The danger that the people, powerful in their voice, will seize 
upon ill-advised words is also expressed later by Odysseus 
who rebukes Agamemnon for his potentially "ruinous" advice 
to leave battle (14.84). Odysseus' concern is that the people will 
follow words that are not spoken soundly (apncx 14.92) and 
rise, in a unison born of passion, to obey the leader unthink­
ingly. And Nestor points to the general volatility of plebiscitary 

26Weber 268. 
27Peter Breiner, Max Weber & Democratic Politics (Ithaca 1996) 21. 



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DEAN HAMMER 343 

politics when he speaks of how the Achaians act "like children" 
when they hold assembly (2.337) because they too easily forget 
the work of war as they swing quickly from fear to enthusiasm. 

In the Odyssey Nestor traces the emergence of this volatility 
in describing how the Achaians carne to be divided against each 
other after they had sacked Troy. Nestor describes (3.127-129) 
how Odysseus and he: 

OUt£ 1tot' dv ayopl1 oix' E~a1;o~£v OUt' EVt ~OUA,l1' 
aU' Eva eu~ov EXOVt£ v6q> Kat E1tlq>POVt ~OUA,l1 
q>pa1;6~£e' 'ApyciotOtv 01tffis OX' aptcHa Y£VOtto. 

never spoke against one another, neither in council nor assembly, 
but forever one in mind and in thoughtful planning, 
we worked out how things would go best for the Argives. 

Nestor is not saying that he never debated. Rather, he is 
describing a division that arises when people argue for their 
own interests rather than the good of the community. This is 
suggested by his use of the word oiXa, which generally in the 
epics indicates a division of purpose or separation.28 

In contrast to thoughtful planning, Nestor continues, 
Menelaos and Agamemnon called the Achaians into assembly 
"wildly" (Ila\jl-), "in no kind of order" (ou KatCt. KOajlOv), late in 
the day, and after heavy drinking (3.137-140). In the drunken 
assembly, as Nestor recalls (148-150): 

IDS to> ~£v XaA,£1tOtOtV a~£t~O~£Vffi E1t££crcHv 
Ecrtacrav· ot 0' av6poucrav EUKV~~tOEs 'AxatOt 
iJxl1 eEcr1tEcrin, oiXa BE crq>tcrtv t\voavE ~OUA,~. 

SO these two, after making exchange with hard words, stood up 
to go, and the rest of the strong-greaved Achaians rushed out 
with inhuman clamor, and two opposed counsels pleased them. 

Each leader played to the drunken passions of the people, 
stirring them to a noisy acclaim that divided the community. 

28See II. 18.510, 20.32, 21.386; Od. 16.73, 19.524, 22.333. 



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344 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

Not only maya leader endanger the stability of the public 
space by speaking unwittingly to the people, but the instability 
of the crowd may also undermine the recognition of good 
counsel. When speaking at the assembly upon Achilles' return, 
Agamemnon says (II. 19.79-82): 

EO""tu6to~ /lev KUAov aKOUEt v, ouoE EOt KEV 
uppaUnv· XUA£1tOV yap £1ttO""tu/levq> 1tEp EOV"tt. 
avopwv 0' £v 1toAA0 o/laoq> 1tW~ Kev "tt~ aKOUO"at 
~ £l1tOt; PMpuut oE Atyu~ 1tEp £rov ayopll"ti!~. 

it is well to listen to the speaker, it is not becoming 
to break in on him. This will be hard for him, though he be able. 
How among the great murmur of people shall anyone listen 
or speak either? A man, though he speak very clearly, is baffled. 

Even the best counsel risks being lost in the noise of a dis­
orderedly crowd. 

In two encounters between Hektor and Poulydamas, the 
volatility-and warnings-about plebiscitary leadership are 
most clear. At a critical juncture in battle, when deciding 
whether to continue to attack the Achaians or to retreat for the 
moment, Poulydamas says to Hektor (11. 12.211-214): 

"EKtop act /lev 1t(O~ 1l0t E1tt1tAi!O"O"Et~ ayoPl1O"tV 
£O"SAa q>pu~O/levq>, E1tct OUOE /lev OUOE EOtKE 
ofj/lOV EOV"tU 1tUPE; ayopEUe/lEV, oU"t' EVl pOUAl1 
oU"te 1t0"t' £V 1tOAeIlq>, O"ov oE Kpa"to~ ulEv ae;nv· 

Hektor, somehow in assembly you move ever against me 
though I speak excellently, since indeed there is no good reason 
for you, in your skill, to argue wrong, neither in councils 
nor in fighting, and ever to be upholding your own power. 

According to Poulydamas, Hektor continually uses the acclaim 
of the people to confirm his personal authority. To counter 
Hektor's sway over the people, Poulydamas calls for an 
"interpreter of the gods" who will be able to explain "the truth 
of portents, and whom the people believed in" (12.229). 
Hektor, though, rejects Poulydamas' argument. The problem, as 



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DEAN HAMMER 345 

Poulydamas suggests later, is that Hektor is "too intractable to 
listen to reason" (13.726) because he believes that he possesses, 
by himself, both prowess in battle and wisdom in counsel. 

Hektor's willingness to play to the people has disastrous 
consequences for the strategic decision of how to respond to the 
re-entrance of Achilles in battle. The decision is so important, 
and the fear so great, that the people cannot even sit 
(18.245-314). Poulydamas argues in assembly that the army 
should take a defensive posture behind the walls rather than 
risk the onslaught of Achilles. Rather than listening to counsel 
and being open to possible arguments against attack, Hektor 
wins the debate by appealing to the unthinking impulses of the 
crowd (18.310-313): 

0)(; "EKtWP uyopEU', btl oE T pow; KEAaOT]OUV, 
VTPtlOt· tK yap O<pEWV <PP£vu~ dAEto ITuAAa~ 'A9i]vT]. 
"EKtOpt !lEV yap t1tTlvT]ouv KUKa !IT]ttOWVtt, 
ITouAUOcl!lUvtt 0' up' OU tt~ o~ to9ATJV <ppasEtO /3ouAi]v. 

So spoke Hektor, and the Trojans thundered to hear him; 
fools, since Pallas Athene had taken away the wits from them. 
They gave their approval to Hektor in his counsel of evil, 
but none to Poulydamas, who had spoken good council before them. 

Like Agamemnon in the Iliad and Menelaos and Agamemnon in 
the Odyssey, Hektor attempts to use the public space to affirm 
his personal authority. The results are as unpredictable as they 
are severe. In their unwitting endorsement of Agamemnon's 
suggestion that they return horne and in Menelaos and Aga­
memnon's divided counsel on returning horne after the war, the 
thundering acclaim of the people fragments the political field. 
So also, by playing upon the impulses of the assembly, Hektor 
imperils the survival of the community. 

Plebiscitary Politics and Political Excellence 
In the volatile plebiscitary space, we can see the operation of 

a political ethic, however rudimentary, that attempts to balance 



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346 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

the charismatic and public aspects of authority. Charismatic 
elements remain, as elites can gain glory through a "political 
heroism" by speaking great words in assembly. When Achilles 
withdraws from battle, he is portrayed as never again going 
either to battle or "to assemblies (ayopr,v) where men win 
glory" (KUOUXVEtpav Il. 1.490). Similarly, Phoenix reminds 
Achilles that it is in "debate" (ayopEffiv) that "men are made 
pre-eminent" (apl1tp£1tE£~ 9.441). As Schofield comments, in 
discussing the advice that Diomedes offers in Book 9, "the 
crucial point for the present is that Diomedes' speech is in its 
own way as much a feat of prowess as one of his exploits on 
the battlefield."29 One sees a notion of distinction and acclaim 
that corresponds to the words of the elite in the assembly of the 
people. 

Political excellence rests, in part, upon the favor of the 
divine, which is why Hera is associated with Achilles' calling of 
the assembly in the Iliad, and Athene is associated with both 
Odysseus and Telemachos. But such excellence also requires an 
ability to articulate a position in a public space. This political 
language, as Martin's helpful analysis indicates, consists of 
public speech acts (or muthoi) which involve a "performance" 
and a claim to authority "before an audience."3o Such political 
excellence seems to rest on a number of factors. In part, there 
are rhetorical abilities, including an ability to order words 
properly (the opposite of Thersites' disorderly, or akosmos, 
speech, Il. 2.213; also Od. 8.179),31 and the ability to speak 
concisely (pauros) and lucidly (ligus) (Il. 3.213-215, 4.293). 
Physical gestures add authority to the message as well. Antenor 
describes Odysseus on the embassy with Menelaos: when it was 
his time to speak, Odysseus "would just stand and stare down, 

29Ma1colm Schofield, "Euboulia in the Iliad," CQ 36 (1986) 6--31, at 14. 
3OR. P. Martin, The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad 

(Ithaca 1989) 37. 
31 See Martin (supra n.30) 17. 



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DEAN HAMMER 347 

eyes fixed on the ground beneath him, nor would he gesture with 
the staff backward and forward, but hold it clutched hard in 
front of him, like any man who knows nothing" (Il. 3.217-219). 
Yet his "great voice" and "words" were second to no other 
mortal (221). And political excellence requires virtues of the 
mind, such as soundness (artia,l1. 14.92) and thoughtfulness 
(epiphron,Od. 3.128) on the part of the leaders, and orderliness 
by the people.32 

An important part of the political language is, as Nestor 
explains to Agamemnon, an ability to speak for the good (Il. 
9.100-102): 

teO crE XPi11tEPt JlEV <pucr8ut E1tO~ i)O' E1tUKOUcrUt, 
KPfli\vUt OE: KUt aAAcp, Ot' av ttVU 8uJlo~ uVeOrn 
fi1tElV fi~ uyu86v. 

It is yours therefore to speak a word, yours also to listen 
and grant the right to another also, when his spirit stirs him 
to speak for the good. 

Nestor's statement is important because it both restricts the use 
of public acclaim for one's personal power and identifies a re­
sponsibility by the leader to maintain this public, participatory 
space. As he advises Agamemnon (74-77): 

1tOAArov 0' UYPOJlEVWV tip 1tdcrwt o~ KEV aptcrtflv 
~ouAi1v ~ouAEUcrTl' JlUAU OE XPEcO 1t(ivta~ 'AxutOu~ 
Ecr8Ai\~ KUt1tUKtVi\~, on 01]10t EyyU!h vflrov 
KUtOUOlV 1tupa 1tOAAa. 

When many assemble together follow him who advises 
the best counsel, for in truth there is need for all the Achaians 
of good counsel, since now close to our ships the enemy 
burn their numerous fires. 

Nestor's point is that personal authority rests in a larger public 

32See Schofield (supra n.29) for discussion of euboulia, or good counsel, as 
an important attribute of good leadership in the Iliad. This public ethic that I am 
suggesting here, and that Schofield also suggests, stands in contrast to Finley's 
view that soundness and good sense are not heroic virtues (1979 115-117). 



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348 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

space, in which one must be able to distinguish good advice 
from bad and make sound decisions for the community good 
amidst the clamor of the crowd. 

On a number of occasions, the community good assumes 
prominence in arguments or concerns of the leaders.33 Aga­
memnon says in the assembly, for example, that he will agree to 
give up his war prize because "I desire that my people be safe, 
not perish" (II. 1.117). Later, he will lament that he will be 
dishonored because he has lost so many of his people (2.115). 
Outside of the assembly, the leaders appeal to Paris to return 
Helen because the Trojan people are dying (6.327). Antenor 
confronts Paris in assembly because he fears that more harm 
will come to the Trojans (7.345-353). Ajax entreats Achilles to 
return on behalf of the "multitude of the Danaans" (9.641). 
Hektor fears that he will be shamed because he brought ruin to 
his people by not listening to good counsel (22.104-107). And 
Odysseus says that Agamemnon's words are not worthy of 
distinction, even though the leader speaks them, precisely be­
cause they threaten the survival of the community (14.83-102). 
We do not need to consider these moments as selfless gestures. 
Rather, the considerations suggest a connection, often fragile, be­
tween individual excellence in words and deeds, and the well­
being of the community. 

When scholars dismiss the public role of the assembly, they 
often do so by noting that, ultimately, the leaders decide, often 
in disregard of public opinion. As Finley puts it (80), the 
"assembly was normally summoned by the king at his pleasure" 
and the people "neither voted nor decided" but simply 
expressed their "acclamation" which the "king was free to 
ignore." Andreyev, too, argues that the "people's assembly" is 
either a "docile tool in the hands of a small group of kings" or 
ineffective on occasions when it does express an opinion 

33 On the theme of the role of the leader in protecting the people see Haubold 
(supra n.19) 37-40, 47-100. 



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DEAN HAMMER 349 

because it lacks any "legal force."34 But this misunderstands the 
nature of plebiscitary politics. As Weber says (267), the assent 
or dissent of the public in a plebiscitary form of government 
may at times be "only formal or fictitious." Indeed, as we see 
with the intimidation of Ka1chas and Thersites, as well as the 
disregard that Paris has for the request of the Trojan assembly 
(Il. 7.362), this is not a democracy. But that does not render a 
plebiscitary politics unimportant. A plebiscitary form of politics 
is significant because it rests upon a system of values in which 
decisions are enacted in a public space and subject to com­
munity acclaim and sanction. It is a space constituted by both 
the elite and the people. 

Plebiscitary Politics, Tyranny, and Democracy 
a. Tyranny 

A plebiscitary form of politics is useful not only for making 
sense of authority relations portrayed in the Homeric world, but 
also for situating Homeric politics in later political develop­
ments, particularly the appearance of tyranny and the rise of 
more participatory forms of politics. Understanding the re­
lationship between the eighth century world of Homer,35 the rise 

34Supra n.ll, 342. 
35Though the epic refers to a heroic past, it is "near-contemporary" in 

meaning: K. Raaflaub, "A Historian's Headache: How to Reacf 'Homeric 
Society"?" in Archaic Greece: New Evidence and New Approaches, edd. N. 
Fisher and H. van Wees (Cardiff/London 1998) 181. For discussions of how 
the epic portrays the world of the second half of the eighth century, see further 
RaaflauB, "Homer, the Trol'an War, and History," CW 91 (1998) 387-403; 
1997a 628; W. Donlan, "Due ling with Gifts in the Iliad: As the Audience Saw 
It," Colby Quarterly 24 (1993) 144; Morris (supra n.5); Ulf (supra n.6); van Wees 
(supra n.6); J. V. Luce, Homer and the Heroic Age (New York 1975); Tandy 
(supra n.5); and James Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Durham 1994). 
For views of the epic as portraying an earlier time, see Finley 1979; W. Donlan, 
"The Homeric Economy," in New Companion (supra n.l) 649-667; "Homeric 
"tEIlEVO~ and the Land Economy of the Dark Age," MusHelv 46 (1989) 129-145; 
"The Unequal Exchange between Glaucus and Diomedes in Light of the Ho­
meric Gift-Economy,' Phoenix 43 (1989) 1-15; Donlan 1989; Donlan (supra 
n.3); Donlan and Carol G. Thomas, "The Village Community of Ancient Greece: 
Neolithic, Bronze, and Dark Ages," Studi Mlcenei ed Egeo-Anatolici 31 (1993) 
61-71; A. Andrewes, The Greeks (New York 1967) 41-48; A. W. H. Adkins, 



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350 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

of tyrannies starting in the seventh century, and the emergence 
of more participatory forms of government in the succeeding 
centuries has often been complicated by attempts to place these 
developments in an evolutionary trajectory from the coercive 
rule of monarchy or oligarchy to the popular rule of 
democracies. We have already seen that Homeric authority 
relations are more complex than this. Neither does the 
appearance of tyranny fit easily into this scheme. Tyrannies are 
often established at a point in which the public space and 
public protections are expanding, as with the rise of Peisistratus 
after the Solonian reforms. To account for this, some scholars 
have viewed tyrannies as either a monarchical "counter­
revolution"36 or the outcome of elite rivalry that is imposed 
upon a quiescent public.37 But viewing tyranny as a reassertion 
of monarchy makes it difficult to understand ancient testimony 
about the participation of the people in this form of rule. We are 
no better served, however, by reading tyranny as an "ex­
pedient"38 to break down a closed system of "hereditary 
aristocratic dominance" and create "a much more 'open' 
society."39 Tyrannies certainly altered the political landscape, 

Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960), and "Homeric Ethics," in New 
Companion 694-713. Some have argued that the Iliad contains so many 
inconsistencies or inaccuracies, resufting from its composition over several 
centuries, that the epic cannot be interpreted as portraying any functioning 
society: notably Snodgrass, "An Historical Homeric Society?" }HS 94 (1974) 
114-1'25, and supra n.12 (1971); G. S. Kirk, Homer and the Oral Tradition 
(Cambridge 1976) 40-68; Cold stream (supra n.12) 18; Wolfgang Kullmann, 
"Homers Zeit und das Bild des Dichters von den Menschen der mykenischen 
Kultur," in Homer's World: Fiction, Tradition, Reality, edd. 0. Andersen and M. 
Dickie (Bergen 1995) 57-75; James Whitley, Sty1e and Society in Dark Age 
Greece (Cambridge 1991); C. J. Ruijgh, "D'Homere aux origines proto-myce­
niennes de la tradition epique," in Homeric Questions, ea. J. P. Crielaard 
(Amsterdam 1995) 1-96, at 21-24; A. G. Geddes, "Who's Who in 'Homeric' 
Society?" CQ 34 (1984) 17-36. 

36Stewart Oost, "Cypselus the Bacchiad," CP 67 (1972) 10-30, at 24. See 
also Robert Drews, "The First Tyrants in Greece," Historia 21 (1972) 129-144. 

37Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989) 65. 
38Glotz (supra n.4) 136 and de Ste. Croix (supra n.5) 281 (quoting Glotz). 
39de Ste. Croix (supra n.5) 280-281. Wood and Wood (supra n.5) 29, who 

characterize the polis as emerging from a class struggle for the "liberation of a 



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DEAN HAMMER 351 

breaking the political hold of traditional aristocratic families, 
reorganizing the citizenry, and increasing both the material and 
symbolic importance of the polis through public works projects, 
monumental architecture, civic and religious festivals, and the 
cultivation of art.40 This argument becomes murky, though, 
when used to explain the political context from which tyrannies 
arose in the first place. Seeing tyranny as an expedient, and 
thus assigning democratic purposefulness to the public in look­
ing to tyrants, poses several problems. First, we cannot explain 
why the very group that was interested purportedly in economic 
and political reform would rest content with tyranny for over 30 
years in Athens, over 70 in Corinth, and 100 in Sicyon (Arist. 
Pol. 1315b12-34). Second, we cannot explain why the pop­
ulace, as in Samos, sometimes resisted the end of tyranny.41 
Finally, we cannot explain why popular rule sometimes pre­
cedes tyrannies, as in Heraclea Pontica42 and Mesopotamia,43 
and why, in these cases, a form of popular rule is sometimes 
restored (Heraclea Pontica) and sometimes not (Mesopotamia). 

Plebiscitary politics provides us a way to understand both 
ancient testimony about the public's role in the establishment of 

producing class," simply skip over any discussion of the appearance of tyranny 
m the seventh and sixth centuries. 

40See James McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece 
(Ithaca 1993); Raaflaub 1997c 39; Philip Brook Manville, The Origins of 
Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton 1990) 162-173; Frank Kolb, "Die 
Bau-, Religions- und Kulturpolitik der Peisistratiden," JdI 92 (1977) 99-138; H. 
A. Shapiro, Art and Cult Under the Tyrants in Athens (Mainz 1989); Michael 
Stahl, Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archiiischen Athen (Stuttgart 1987); 
Walter Eder, "Polis und Politai: Die Auflosung des Adelsstaates und die 
Entwicklung des Polisbiirgers," in Euphronios und seine Zeit, edd. W.-D. 
Heilrneyer and I. Wehgartner (Berlin 1992) 24-38. 

41Hdt. 3.142-143; Eric Robinson, The First Democracies: Early Popular 
Government Outside Athens (Stuttgart 1997) 118-120. 

42Arist. Pol. 1304b31-34; Robinson (supra n.41) 111-113. 
43Thorkild Jacobsen, "Early Political Development in Mesopotamia," and 

"Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia," in Toward the Image of 
Tammuz and Other Essays on Mesopotamian History and Culture, ed. W. Moran 
(Cambridge 1970) 132-156, 157-170. See Robinson (supra n.41) 17-25 for a 
summary of the literature on early non-Greek democracy. 



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352 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

tyrannies, and how democracies (or more participatory forms of 
rule) would emerge from tyranny. I am suggesting a relationship 
in which both tyranny and democracy emerged from the volatile 
plebiscitary political space that developed in the previous two 
centuries. In fact, I would suggest that the plebiscitary realm 
served as a laboratory for democracy, giving to the elite and the 
people the practice, and, in turn, an evolving vocabulary, of 
public enactment. Plebiscitary politics was not a sufficient con­
dition for democracy. But the existence of a plebiscitary space 
before tyranny, and the maintenance (and sometimes elabora­
tion) of this space by the tyrants, provided the context for the 
discussion, expansion, and institutionalization of more demo­
cratic forms after the fall of tyranny.44 

Aristotle offers important insight into the role of the people 
when he distinguishes between an older form of tyranny, in 
which kings went beyond their hereditary power to establish a 
"more despotic rule" (8£a7tO'ttKo)"t£pa~ a.PXTl~), and a newer 
form, in which tyrants rose to power by gaining the trust 
(1tlcr't£Ue£v't£~) of the people (8~ /lou) and the multitude 

44 Jacobsen (supra n.43) provides some corroboration to this argument in his 
discussion of early political development in Mesopotamia. He identifies what 
he describes as "primitive democracy" in early Mesopotamia that corresponds, 
in significant ways, to our discussion of the operation of plebiscitary politics. 
In particular, "the ruler must lay his proposals before the people, first the 
elders, then the assembly of the townsmen, and obtain their consent, before he 
can act" (163). Over time, however, Mesopotamia veers in a more autocratic 
direction from a natural tendency of leaders to desire to maintain their 
position, the accumulation of powers in one leader through claims of perpetual 
emergency (particularly war), and the appearance of a new model of autocratic 
rule with the kingship of Kish, which successfully established control by force 
over large territories. Jacobsen describes a process in which the assembly, 
which is not institutionalized, is particularly vulnerable to the assertions of 
the more autocratic claims to chansmatic authority by the king (146-147). This 
move to autocracy is, in tum, supported by the development of claims of divine 
election and the InStitutionalization of the "dynastic principle," in which the 
king would designate his successor (142-151). Critiques of Jacobsen can be 
addressed largely, I think, by substituting "plebiscitary politics" for "primitive 
democracy." This provides a way to understand the pohtical role of the people 
without positing a sovereignty of the people. Mesopotamia serves as a case in 
which the autocratic elements of plebiscitary leadership assert themselves and 
then get institutionalized. 



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DEAN HAMMER 353 

(1tA~eOU~). This trust may be created by the tyrant portraying 
himself as one of the people, by speaking against the nobles, or 
by claiming to defend the people against injustice (Pol. 
1310b12-17). Aristotle calls the new type of tyrant a 
demagogue (81l, .. w.y(Oy6~). In this context, the term does not refer 
to a politically conscious movement on the part of the people, 
but a different form of tyranny that acquires legitimacy from a 
public space of the people. 

Oost, downplaying the role of the people in the establish­
ment of tyranny, suggests that plethos and demos are used 
anachronistically by Aristotle .. The mass of people "are not 
politically conscious yet"; these terms more likely refer to 
support from a smaller group of the "hoplite middle class."45 
Though Oost is certainly correct that "demagogue" is a term 
developed later, and that the hoplites may have played a 
critical role in the formation of tyranny, he is incorrect in his 
characterization of the eighth and seventh century meaning of 
the plethos and demos. We have seen that in the Homeric epics 
these refer to the common people who are capable of acting in 
concert. Such action has consequences for the leadership and 
the community even though the people may not act according to 
a coherent set of political principles. The plethos of the seventh 
and sixth century, like the multitudes portrayed in the Homeric 
epics, did not initiate a political program, but they were not 
passive. And the leaders of the seventh and sixth centuries, like 
the Homeric elite, did not simply command, but enacted their 
decisions publicly to gain the acclaim of the people. 

Aristotle's and Herodotus' conflicting stories of the rule of 
Peisistratus reveal this paradox of the public nature of tyranny. 
Though they differ in the conclusions they draw, both tell of 
Peisistratus' return from exile in which he enters on a chariot 
driven by a woman dressed as Athene. For Herodotus, the 

4500st (supra n.36) 20. 



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354 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

people worshipped (1tp0<J£uxov'to) the woman and welcomed 
Peisistratus, as he was seen in the presence of the divine (1.60). 

For Aristotle, similarly, Peisistratus gains power through the 
acclaim of the people. In his description of Peisistratus' first 
return from exile, Aristotle says that the people "fell to the 
ground and accepted him with awe" (eauJ.1(i~ov't£C;). With his 
second return, Peisistratus had the crowd disarmed while he 
spoke. After the arms were locked away, he "concluded his 
speech" and "told the crowd not to be surprised or alarmed by 
what had happened to their weapons; they should go home and 
look after their private affairs-he would take care of the 
state."46 

We can make sense of the seeming paradox of a tyrant 
coming to rule through an appeal to the people by placing these 
activities in the context of plebiscitary politics. The notion of a 
plebiscitary space allows us to understand the role of the 
people in participating in the illusion of Peisistratus' "divine 
presence."47 As Connor has pointed out, "The ceremony thus 
served as an expression of popular consent-twa-way com­
munication, not, as so often assumed, mere manipulation."48 
Within this plebiscitary space, Peisistratus is able to gain 
legitimacy. But once in power, he disperses the people from any 
public role even though, by Aristotle's account, he rules 
moderately. The collapse of this political space, as this case 
illustrates, need not rest on force but may result from the 
acclaim (whether sensible or not) of the public. 

What stands out, not only in the accounts of Peisistratus, 

46Ath.Pol. 14.4, trans!. Moore. 
47Rebecca Sinos, "Divine Selection: Epiphany and Politics in Archaic 

Greece," in Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece, edd. C. Dougherty and L. Kurke 
(Oxford 1998) 73-91, at 83-84. 

4BW. R. Connor, "Tribes, Festivals and Processions: Civic Ceremonial and 
Political Manipulation in Archaic Greece," IHS 107 (1987) 40-50, at 44. 



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DEAN HAMMER 355 

but in those of other tyrants,49 is the continual appeal made by 
the tyrant to the people, even if that appeal is duplicitous. This 
appeal is made not only in the rise to power, but also in the 
maintenance of power. Salmon suggests, for example, that a 
small council, probouloi consisting of representatives from each 
of the eight tribes, and an assembly may have been established 
under the tyranny at Corinth.5o The assembly clearly did not 
decide policy. But suggestive of a plebiscitary form of politics, 
the probouloi may have served to convey the attitudes of the 
people to the leadership and, in tum, to guide the assembly to 
"take decisions which conformed with the views" of the coun­
cil.51 Upon the death of Polycrates in Samos, Maeandrius called 
an assembly (cruvaydpa.~) to set out the terms of his reign, to 
which the assembly refused his conditions (Hdt. 3.142). And 
Peisistratus is said to have kept both the political and legal 
institutions intact during his rule.52 Though it is not clear what 
role the people played in the rule, it is likely that a council and 
some form of a people's assembly was established and 
consulted.53 McGlew observes, "If tyrants presented themselves 
as liberators or founders, they must have understood the polis's 
power to judge them, for they were determined to finesse that 
judgment by appearing to act in the polis's interest, to deserve 
its honor, and to have passed its scrutiny." In comparison to 
earlier despotism, "the tyrant's relationship to his subjects was 

490n the elective tyranny of Pittacus of Mytilene, see Arist. Pol. 
1285a34-1285b4; Cypselus in Corinth, 1310b29-32 and Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90 
F 57. On attempts by Maeandrius to surrender the tyranny in Samos, Hdt. 
3.142-143. On the rise of Deioces among the Medes, Hdt. 1.96-101. On 
Theagenes at Megara and Lygdamis at Naxos, Arist. Pol. 1305a25-26, 
1305a37-1305b1). 

soJ. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth (Oxford 1984) 205-209, 231-239. 
51 Salmon (supra n.50) 235. Thucydides mentions a role of the Corinthian 

assembly (suUoyo~) in negotiations between Corinth and Argos (5.30.5). For 
the role of the probouloi and their relationship to an assembly in oligarchies, see 
the general remark at Arist. Pol. 1298b26-35. 

52Hdt. 1.59; Thuc. 6.54.5; Ath.Pol. 14.3, 16.2, 16.8-10; Pluto Sol. 31. 
53 Salmon (supra n.50) 205-207, 234-236. 



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356 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

changing."s4 We can understand this changing relationship as 
one in which leaders-even tyrants-were expected to enact 
their decisions and their claims to authority in a public space. 

b. Democracy 
The plebiscitary realm may be helpful, as well, in thinking 

about the relationship between the aristocracy and people in the 
development of democracy. The emergence of democracy is com­
monly seen as either elite- or mass-led. Raaflaub, for example, 
points to the central role of the aristocracy in formulating 
notions of political equality as a response to tyranny.S5 The 
aristocratic notion of equality would, in turn, be expanded 
slowly to encompass a broader segment of the population, 
including the thetes. To make their incorporation acceptable to 
the elite, the "full political integration of the thetes" would 
require a "massive and lasting change in their economic or social 
status and/or communal function."56 Raaflaub traces this 
change to the role of the thetes as "decisive contributors to their 
city's security and power" as rowers for the naval fleet. s7 By 
contrast, Ober argues against the "view of history that sup­
poses that all advances in human affairs come through the 
consciously willed actions of individual members of an elite." 
He suggests, instead, that the democracy in Athens "was the 
product of collective decision, action, and self-definition on the 
part of the demos itself."SB In fact, he argues that in 508/7, 
when Isagoras and Cleomenes attempted to seize control of 
Athens, the demos initiated and carried through a democratic 

54 McGlew (supra n.40) 215. 
55 Raaflaub 1996 144; 1997c. 
56Raaflaub 1997c 45. 
57 Raaflaub 1997c 46. 
580ber, "The Athenian Revolution of 508/7 B.C.E.: Violence, Authority, 

and the Origins of Democracy," in Dougherty /Kurke (supra n.47: orig. 1993) 
215-232, at 216; see also "Revolution Matters: Democracy as Demotic Action 
(A Response to Kurt A. Raaflaub)," in Democracy 2500? (supra n.1) 67-85. 



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DEAN HAMMER 357 

"revolution without leadership" that created a "rupture" 
between one "understanding of the world and another."59 

The notion of plebiscitary politics allows us to identify a 
much more paradoxical relationship between the elite and 
people. Not only may it have been the people who took part in 
the establishment of tyranny, as I suggested earlier, but also it 
may have been the aristocracy who would draw on these 
plebiscitary relationships with the people to establish 
democracy.60 The model suggested here does not require either 
individual moments of elite volition or revolutionary moments 
of mass consciousness, but is more interactive in how the 
conditions for democracy are created. 

An important role for the elite exists. As Raaflaub points 
out, "Tyranny deprived the aristocrats of such shared control of 
power, which now became a value that needed to be 
formulated, claimed, and fought for"; in this context, "isonomia 
and isegoria were created and became prominent." Elite 
articulation of these principles may well have underlain the 
resistance to attempts by Isagoras and Cleomenes to abolish the 
boule in Athens.61 In formulating these concepts, though, the 
aristocracy had to draw on an already developing demos­
consciousness. The demos, by Herodotus' account, played an 
important role, by acting 'ta uu'ta <ppovTtcruv't£<;, in the expulsion 
of Isagoras and Cleomenes (Hdt. 5.72). But we do not have to 
posit, as does Ober, that this action marks the birth of a 
sustained, leaderless, and revolutionary program by the demos.62 

In fact, the textual evidence cannot bear the weight of Ober's 
interpretation. First, the elite are not irrelevant in this story but 

590ber, "Revolution" (supra n.58) 68--69. 
60This dynamic seems to be suggested in the discussion of Peisistratus' 

leadership by Valerij Gouschin, "Pislstratus' Leadership in A.P. 13.4 and the 
Establisrunent of the Tyranny of 561/60 B.C." CQ 49 (1999) 14-23. . 

61 Raaflaub 1996 144. 
62 1 will set aside the problem that there is no historical example of a 

successful, sustained, and feaderless democratic revolution. 



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358 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

initiate resistance that is then continued on a larger scale by 
"the rest of the Athenians." Second, the demos do not create a 
program but are acting in the context of promised reforms by 
Cleisthenes. 63 And third, the description of the people as 'ta 
au'ta <ppov"O'av'tE~ certainly describes a civic consciousness, but 
nothing suggests that it means an exclusive, revolutionary con­
sciousness. As we saw in Homer, the demos are often depicted 
as acting in concert, sometimes in agreement and sometimes in 
disagreement with the elite. When Homer uses forms of <pPOVEOO, 

such as when Nestor recounts his agreement with Odysseus 
(Gd. 3.128-129), the language often describes a common sense 
of purpose oriented to the community good.64 Herodotus, too, 
seems to suggest a shared sense of purpose among the mass and 
elite when he links the actions. The elite resist and then "the rest 
of the Athenians," who shared in this purpose, also resist (Hdt. 
5.72).65 

Herodotus, in fact, seems to depict the operation of 
plebiscitary politics in which mass and elite act, react, and, 
importantly, interact in a public space. After the fall of the 
Peisistratids, Cleisthenes initially loses to Isagoras in the 
struggle for power among the elite. So Cleisthenes wins over the 
people (OTlllOV) by promising them some political share 
(Ilotpav). Having attracted the people, Cleisthenes now emerges 
as stronger than Isagoras' faction (Hdt. 5.69). Herodotus is 
describing a plebiscitary realm in which Cleisthenes vies for 
power through an appeal to the people. This account is 
supported by Aristotle, who states that Cleisthenes wins the 

63Raaflaub, "The Thetes and Democracy (A Response to Josiah Ober)," in 
Democracy 2500? (supra n.l) 87-103, at 89. 

64As examples, see II. 1.73, 1.253, 2.78, 2.283, 4.361, 6.79, 13.135, 13.345 
(divided in purpose), 15.50, 22.264 (divided in purpose), Od. 2.160, 2.228, 
7.158. 

65 1 agree here with Raaflaub 1997c 41. 



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DEAN HAMMER 359 

support of the people (of\llov), offering a share (a1tootoous) of 
government to the multitude (1tAn8tt).66 

Herodotus describes how Isagoras responds by enlisting the 
help of Cleomenes, from Sparta, who together banish Cleis­
thenes and other prominent Athenians, and by attempting to 
dissolve the Council. At this point, the Council resists (av-
11cr'ta8Ei<JT]s), Isagoras and his followers seize the Acropolis, 
and then "the rest of the Athenians who were of one mind" 
('Afrr)vatwv ok oi. AOl1tOt 'ta au.a <ppovncrav'tes) join together and 
besiege the Acropolis. By the third day, an arrangement is made 
whereby the Spartans on the Acropolis are sent back and the 
rest are sentenced to death (5.72). In Aristotle's account, the 
Athenians bring back Cleisthenes who becomes the leader of the 
people (Ath.Pol. 20.3). Herodotus even says that Cleisthenes 
gave the Athenians their democratic state (6.131). In assigning 
an important role to both Cleisthenes and the demos, Herodotus 
is not contradicting himself, as Ober holds,67 but describing a 
complex and volatile interaction between the demos and the elite 
in which claims to authority must be enacted among the people. 
Ober in fact seems to point to this operation of plebiscitary 
politics in his own analysis: elsewhere he sees a growing 
community consciousness of the people under the tyranny of 
Peisistratus. 68 And in his discussion of the "Revolution" of 
508/7, he notes how Cleisthenes, in his struggle against the 
Spartan tyranny, allies with the demos: "Kleisthenes' leadership 
was not dependent on constitutional authority, but rather on his 

66Ath.Pol. 20.1-2. We can understand apodidomi here as suggesting that 
Cleisthenes grants or offers what is due to the demos. Cleisthenes does not, in 
any absolute sense, "hand over" government (transl. Rackham), but promises to 
increase the share of control by the demos. 

670ber ("Revolution," supra n.58) 83 "[does] not accept the historical agent 
Herodotus proposes here" and notes that Herodotus 'elsewhere views the 
demos as the main agent of democratic change." Certainly, we do not have to 
believe or disbelieve Herodotus on all things. I find it less than comfortable, 
though, to pick and choose when and how we are going to believe Herodotus 
when he is writing about the same thing. 

680ber (supra n.37) 66-fJ7. 



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360 HOMER, TYRANNY, AND DEMOCRACY 

ability to persuade the Athenian people to adopt and to act on 
the proposals he advocated."69 

For Ober, the II Athenian Revolution" of 508/7 is a revolu­
tionary act of collective self-definition by the demos. But, as I 
have suggested here, we see this development of a shared space, 
both among the elite and with the demos, established much 
earlier in the creation of plebiscitary politics. Rather than being 
a "revolution in the demos' perception of itself and of an 
aristocrat's perception regarding his own relationship, and that 
of all men of his class, to the demos,"7o this period marked a 
response by both the elite and the demos to the volatility of the 
plebiscitary space. The "Revolution" did not mark the creation 
of new relationships, but a transformation of this plebiscitary 
space into a more stable, rational-legal configuration of office 
and law. 71 

July, 2000 Department of Government 
Franklin and Marshall College 
Lancaster, Penn. 17604 
d_hammer@acad.fandm.edu 

690ber, "Athenian Revolution" (supra n.58) 216. See also Ober (supra n.37) 
68-69, 84-86, for the role of the elite in leading reforms. 

7oOber, "Athenian Revolution" (supra n.58) 228. 
71 An earlier version of this article was gresented at the Center for Hellenic 

Studies. My thanks to Tom Banks, Walter onlan, Kurt Raaflaub, and Fellows 
at the Center for their comments.