Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The problem of dramatic expectation in Aristotle's Poetics
Corcoran, Clinton D
Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Fall 1997; 38, 3; ProQuest
pg. 285

The Problem of Dramatic 
Expectation in Aristotle's Poetics 

Clinton D. Corcoran 

Em:t OE ou ~ovov n:A£ius E01't npaSEO><; ~ ~l~TJOlS aAAa KUt 
qlOPEpwv KUt EAEElVWV, 'tuthu OE YlVE'tUl KUt ~aAlO'tU (huv 
YEvTJ'tUl nupa ",",v M;uv Ol' UAATJAa' 'to yap eUUIlUO'tOV 0{l't0><; 
E;El IlUAAOV i1 Ei ano 'tou UU't'Olla1'OU KUt 'tils 'tUXTJS, End KUt 
1'WV ano 'tUXTJS 'tUU'tU eUU~UOl(o'tu'tu OOKEl OOU roonEp 
Enl'tTJOES CPUlVE1'Ul YEYOVEVUl.1 

A long-standing debate exists concerning the phrase napa 'tTtv 
06~av ("contrary to expectation"). Does it refer to expectation 
on the part of the audience or a character? Butcher reads be­
yond the Greek, translating, "events come on us [the audience] 
by surprise," while others argue that it must be the expectation 
of the characters that is reversed. 2 D. W. Lucas (133) sets the 
problem as follows: 

If those are right who explain peripeteia and anagnoresis in the 
light of nupa 't~v M;uv (52a4), the question arises, whose 
oo;u? G. Else is emphatic that it is the expectation of the au­
dience, and he is supported by the context of 52a4 where 'to 
euu~uo'tov is more easily applicable to the audience than to 
the characters. Yet this cannot be right. There are, for the 
audience, few major surprises in Greek tragedy .... 

1 Arist. Poet. 1452al-7: "But since the imitation of a complete action is not 
the only end [of tragedy], but also actions that are pitiful and fearful, this end 
is best produced when actions occur contrary to expectation, and yet still on 
account of one another. For they are more wondrous if they happen in this 
way rather than of themselves or by accident. For even things that occur by 
chance are most wondrous when they appear to come about for a purpose." 

2 S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art4 (New York 
1951) 329ff; see also P. Turner, "The Reverse of Vahlen," CR N.S. 9 (1959) 207-
215; F. L. LUCAS, "The Reverse of Aristotle," CR 37 (1923: hereafter 'F. Lucas') 
98-104; Gerald F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge [Mass.] 
1957); D. W. LUCAS, Aristotle's Poetics: Introduction, Commentary, and 
Appendices (Oxford 1968: 'D. Lucas'). 

285 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286 EXPECTATION IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 

But Lucas is, I believe, too quick to dismiss Else's suggestion. 
The solution to this puzzle may be that the expectation is not 
purely either the character's or the audience's, but one shared 
by both. 3 I shall argue that the reversal of the action is the bridge 
that links the character's and the audience's expectations. 

1. M. Glanville suggests that F. M. Cornford advanced just 
such a reading of the expectation passage in an unpublished 
article connecting the definition of reversal to the confutation 
of a general expectation. He explains that "the words KaSU1tEp 
dpT\'tat occurring in the definition of 1tEpt1tf'tEta at 1452a22 do 
not refer to 7.1451a13 or to 10.1452a19, but instead to 9.1452a4, 
1tapa rljv 06~av bt' aAAT\Aa.4 He further elaborates: 

If the reference to 1452a4 is correct, Ka90,1tEp etPll'tat will 
mean "occurring in the way that I have said" and be equivalent 
to COO'tE yivEcr9cn 1tapa 'tt,v 06~av Ot' c'iUllw, so that the full 
definition now runs: "DEpl1tE'tEla is a change of the action to 
the opposite such that events bring one another about in a 
way that is contrary to expectation, but at the same time, we 
say, probable or necessary."5 

3 Lucas seems to have hardened his position from an earlier article, "Pity, 
Terror, and Peripeteia," CQ N.S. 12 (1962) 52: "The purpose of this article is to 
show that if one has to be chosen to the exclusion of the other, the expectation 
of the characters must be intended, but further to suggest that Aristotle made 
no clear distinction between the two, because it was generally assumed that 
the audience watching the play shared to a great extent the experiences of the 
characters in the drama." 

4 I. M. Glanville, "Note on PERIPETEIA," CQ 41 (1947) 73. The other two 
passages seem unlikely to be referents of lCa9ultep etpTl1:m. Elizabeth Belfiore, 
Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion (Princeton 1997) 149, has re­
cently argued for a reference to chapter 10 because "The passage in Poetics 10 
is nearer; moreover, it is the passage in which Aristotle first distinguishes 
simple and complex plots. The phrase 'contrary to expectation', on the other 
hand, occurs in a discussion of simple plots: the paragraph at 9.1451 b33 begins 
with 'of simple plots', and there is no mention of complex plots until the be­
ginning of the next chapter at 10.1452aI2. Moreover, 'contrary to expectation' 
refers to a broad class of unexpected events, not only to those involved in peri­
peteia." I agree that "contrary to expectation" refers to a broad class of actions 
that can include a reversal of action, a reversal of fortune, or a reversal of 
intention. The discussion from 9.1451 b33-52all concerns tragic plots in 
general and it is not limited to simple plots. Although 52a19 concerns the 
causation between incidents, it has little to do with the nature of reversals. 

5 Glanville (supra nA) 73; see also O. J. Schrier, "A Simple View of Peri­
peteia," Mnemosyne SER. 4 33 (1980) 96-118; D. Allen "Peripeteia quid sit, 
Caesar occisus ostendit," Mnemosyne SER. 429 (1976) 338-41; J. Kamerbeek, 
"A Note on Arist. Poet. C. XI, 1452 A 22-26, 29-33," Mnemosyne SER. 4 18 
(1965) 279ff; Turner (supra n.2) 207- 215; F. Lucas 98-104. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CLINfON D. CORCORAN 287 

Thus peripeteia and anagnoresis should be read in the light of 
the phrase napa 'ti1v 86~av (S2a4 )-or better put, napa 'ti1v 
b6~<xv should be read in light of the larger plot elements of 
reversal and recognition. Kamerbeek (supra n.S: 279) agrees 
with Glanville: 

As is well-known the passage [1452a22-26, 29-33J is as contro-
versial as any in Aristotle's Poetics. Else (with Bywater and 

Butcher) seems to be right in taking 'trov 7tpanojl£vc.ov 22, 3 
as meaning "the events of the playas it moves along" against 
Vahlen's interpretation, viz. "What one did or is doing for a 
particular purpose" and that 'trov 7tpanoll£vc.oV depends on 
jlE'taf3oA~. 

But these three elements-reversal of actions, reversal of inten­
tion, and expectation-are not exclusive; in fact, they are com­
plementary. Schrier (supra n.S: 108) proposes an elegant resolu­
tion to the debate: the reversal of intention does not exclude the 
interpretation of reversal as a change in the course of events, 
but rather it becomes the pivotal causal action in the tragic 
sequence: 

Aristotle repeats 'touvav't:1ov not without purpose, referring 
back to 1.22, where it is used in the definition. But what he 
means is simply this: instead of realizing his intention to 
make Oedipus happy and to free him from his fear, the 
Messenger exactly produces the opposite effect; this implies: 
he plunges him into a sea of sorrow. The Messenger's appear­
ance, therefore, brings about a llE'tapOAT, e~ Eu'tuXla~ d~ 
OUO"'tuXlav, in other terms, a llE'taf3oAT, 'trov 7tpa't't0ll£vc.oV d~ 
'to evav'tlov in the life of Oedipus. 

Of course the Messenger is surprised; of course Oedipus is sur­
prised; and of course, as Lucas is correct to point out, the 
audience does know Oedipus' identity. But none of this 
changes the fact that it is quite a peculiar or perhaps amazing se­
quence of actions in which we discover we may have mur­
dered our father and married our mother. This is the kind of 
thing that does not normally happen; it is against all normal 
expectation. Wonder is a function of the construction of events, 
and events that are contrary to the expectation of the audience 
make the most wondrous of reversals. 

Viewed as actions, mythos, ethos, and dianoia are all parts of 
the plot. Character and thought are subclasses of actions within 
any plot. The reversals of fortune and intention of the charac­
ters will naturally be subsumed as a part of the larger reversal of 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

288 EXPECTATION IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 

action within which it takes place. We may classify these 
elements that occur 1tapa 'tTJv M~av (1452a4) as: 

1. Reversal of action: 
ean OE 1tEpl7tE'tEUX f.LEv it £l~ 'to Evav'tiov 'to)V 1tpa't'tof.LEvCl)V 
f.LE'ta/3oA1! lCa9a1tEp ElpTJ'tal (1452a22) 

2. Reversal of fortune: 
£lalv OE lCa'ta. f.LEV 'ta. il9TJ 1towi 'tlVES. lCCX'ta. OE 'ta. 1tpaSEl~ 
eUOCXlf.LOVE~ il 'tOUCXV'tlOV (1450a19) 

3. Reversal of intention (of characters): 
Messenger, Danaus (1452a24-29).6 

The corresponding reversals of the first three elements of plot 
may be events that proceed "contrary to expectation.'" Thus 
reversals of action, changes of fortune, and reversals of 
intention may all be events that proceed "contrary to expec­
tation." In the best plots the reversal of action would usually 
cause the change of fortune and the reversal of intention. 

The Statue of Mitys anecdote that immediately follows 1452a7 
is an excellent example of a change in the course of action, a 
reversal of fortune, and an action that is contrary to a character's 
intention (1452a7-11). The end "seems a fitting outcome" in 
that, as Aristotle notes, it has the appearance of design and it 
satisfies our moral sense. Yet it could not be considered a full 
reversal unless it were built into a plot in which, as in this case, 
all the incidents leading up to it formed a necessary or probable 
sequence connecting crime to punishment. Nussbaum, who 
argues persuasively for the role of luck in Aristotelian tragedy 
("luck is seriously powerful") is unwilling to admit the Mitys 
example as a probable incident. 7 Chance incidents, Nussbaum 
writes, "are also to be distinguished from atuchema, or a 
mischance that has a purely arbitrary or external origin. (An 
example of the latter is probably Aristotle's case in which 
someone is killed when a statue happens to fall down on him.)"8 
But the fact that this is, in itself, a chance or mischance event 
does not exclude its being an event that fits a greater design. 

6 Besides reversals of action (these two events being the turning points of 
these plays) and bringing about reversals of fortune for Oedipus, Danaus, and 
Lyneus, the messenger and Danaus also suffer reversals of intention (thought). 
In seeking to relieve Oedipus of his fear, his information in fact confirms it, in 
going to kill his enemy Danaus is in fact the one slain. 

7 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge 1986) 384f. 

8 Nussbaum (supra n.7) 382. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CLINTON D. CORCORAN 289 

Aristotle uses the Mitys story to illustrate the way in which 
even coincidental events that are contrary to expectation may 
still follow the rule of 'probable and necessary' actions. The 
Mitys story is fitting in that (1) the trend of actions turns back 
on itself and the murderer is killed by his victim, making it a 
complete action; (2) there is a morally fitting reversal of fortune, 
because the murderer does not escape punishment; and (3) 
there is a reversal of expectation, because the action is contrary 
to expectation yet ends perfectly as the agent becomes the in­
strument of his or her own unravelling. One may even imagine 
a reversal of intention in a situation in which the murderer may 
have had the statue erected in order to hide his crime, yet it 
picks him out. Although rare, the causation here is not impos­
sible. As Aristotle says, "Such an event is probable in Agathon's 
sense of the word: 'it is probable,' he says, 'that many things 
should happen contrary to probability."9 For Aristotle, events 
constructed in this way are the most amazing (8auJlacr'ttol'ta'ta, 
1452a6). 

Perhaps the best example of the difference between a general 
reversal of expectation and the subtype of intention is the 
famous example of a reversal from the History of Animals 
(590B 13-19): "polypus eats crab, crab eats conger, conger eats 
polypus."lo Aristotle's use of the term peripeteia in this passage 
is noteworthy. Belfiore is mistaken to consider this ich­
thyological reversal a "red-herring."ll The example reveals an 
action that is both contrary to expectation and which doubles 
back on itself, but involves no intention on the part of anything 
in the causal seq uence. 12 For Belfiore, "Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to decide which fish is subject to peripeteia, fer we 
cannot determine the referent of w\:)'twv. Grammatically, we 
would expect it to refer to the crayfish, who are mastered by 
larger fish in the example immediately following 'for'." 13 But the 
passage is not really so unclear; it makes good sense if what is 
reversed is not any particular intention (for nothing involved in 

9 Poet. 1456a23ff: ECJ'ttY OE 'tou'tO Eh(o~ WCJltEP 'Ayuewy AEyn, dK6~ yap 
ytYEO"eUl ltOAA.a KUlltUpa 'to dK6~. Tr. Butcher 69. 

10 G. Schneider, Aristotles, De Animalibus Historiae (Leipzig 1811) 349: at 
OE KUpU~Ot Kpa'touCJl !lev 'troy !lE)'UAWY iX9Uwy, Kat 'tt~ CJU!l~UtYEl ltEpl1tE'tEla 
't01J'tWY £YtOl~. Tou~ !lEY yap KUpU~OU~ Ol7tOA{l1tOOE~ Kpa'tOUCJlV. 

11 E. Belfiore, -nEPInETEIA as Discontinuous Action: Aristotle's Poetics 
11.1452a22-29," CP 83 (1988) 183-94. 

12 Belfiore (supra n.4) 152; HA 590b13; Butcher (supra n.2) 331. 
13 Belfiore (supra n.11) 193, and (supra n.4) 152f. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

290 EXPECT A nON IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 

this sequence has any intentions beyond instinct), but rather the 
general human expectation (£v30~a) of this causal sequence. 
The koinos topos "big fish usually eat small fish" is reversed 
when you become the food of your food. As F. Lucas 
comments (101), "Change the dramatis personae to man, 
chicken, worm, and you get a touch of life's macabre irony, 
over which Webster might have chuckled and James Thomson 
actually does. The eater is eaten by what is meat for his meat." 
What is reversed is then the £v3o~a shared by 'most or all men', 
not the intention of any of the presumably non-rational sea 
creatures. 

Several logical consequences follow the above divisions. Re­
versals of fortune and intention are neither necessary nor suf­
ficient conditions for a true reversal of action, yet given the 
nature of tragic acitons, they will almost invariably accompany 
such changes. A reversal that controverts a character's intention 
may be the best kind of action contrary to expectation, but it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for a reversal of action. And the 
best recognitions are those that are concomitant with a reversal 
of the action, fortune, and intention (1452a32f). Reversals that 
entail recognitions that are contrary to expectation and yet still 
follow one another are, as Aristotle notes, logically the best.14 
But this leaves the obvious question: why are they the best? 

The continuation of the expectation passage (1452a4-7) sug­
gests an answer. The reversals of action, fortune, and intention 
provide a learning opportunity for the audience and character: 
they teach the rule, or its exception, thereby illustrating the 
universal in poetry. Golden rightly emphasizes that learning is 
the essential element of a well constructed plot: "I argue that in 
the Poetics, Aristotle's theoretical treatise on art, only one 
essential pleasure is assigned to all forms of mimesis, including 
tragic and comic mimesis, and that is the pleasure of learning 
and inference."15 He quotes Aristotle's Rhet. 1371b2-l0 to 
make the point: 

Since learning and wonder are pleasant, such things as artistic 
imitation must be pleasant; for example, painting, sculpture, 

14 Just as tragedy is possible without character, so a reversal of the action is 
possible without a change of fortune for the protagonist. This is obvious in 
comedies in which the world may disintegrate around the comic protagonists 
while they continue on oblivious to their surroundings. 

15 Leon GOLDEN, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis (=American Clas­
sical Studies 29 [Atlanta 1992: hereafter 'Golden']) 102; cf his" Aristotle on 
Comedy," JAesthArtCrit 42 (1984) 286-90. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CLINTON D. CORCORAN 

and poetry-indeed, every successful imitation of an object, 
even though the object which is imitated is not itself pleasing. 
Our delight is not in the original; rather there is an inference: 
This is that; and so the act of learning takes place.16 

291 

Aristotle observes (Poet. 1448b 17) that "The reason why men 
enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find 
themselves learning and inferring, and saying perhaps, 'That is a 
So and SO'."17 We know what happens to Oedipus, but what we 
really want to know is how it could happen. 18 It is the construc­
tion of the events, not the ending, that brings us back to great 
drama again and again. What set of circumstances and choices 
brings about the doom of this kind of character? Contrary to 
popular belief, knowing the end of a drama does not reduce our 
fascination or wonder with it. Thus, an action's being "contrary 
to expectation" is not primarily due to surprise or suddenness, 
but rather to amazement and wonder ('to 80.ulwCJ'tov) at the 
construction of events. Aristotle continues: "So also hairs­
breadth escapes from danger are pleasant, for such things excite 
our wonder (80.uJ..lo.CJ'to.)." 19 Escapes are exciting and fascinating 
because we want to know how such impossible odds can be 
overcome, just as in a tragedy we want to know how things 
went wrong. 20 In a reversal the known is shown by a probable 
sequence to be connected to something we do not expect it to 
be connected to, but once that result is revealed we feel and 
recognize the connection. What is contrary to expectation is the 
unfolding of the peculiar series of events: they confound EV-
00;0. and produce wonder, and then learning, and finally delight 
from the learning. Thus the pleasure of actions that proceed 
contrary to expectation is fourfold. First they cause surprise 
(1to.po. 'tT)v M;o.v), then wonder ('to 80.uJ..lo.CJ'tov ), then learning 

16 Golden 102; Lane Cooper, tr. The Rhetoric of Aristotle (Englewood 1932) 
65. 

17 Else (supra n.2: 131f) reads: ot'to~h:r'ivo[~]. 
18 Schrier (supra n.S: 11Sf) sees the tension created between the ·what" of 

events and the ·how" as an instrument for creating dramatic suspense. 
19 1371bloff: Kat ai. 1trpUtlh£lat Kat 'to 1tapa IllKPOV O"ro~EO"eal tK 'twv 

KlV~h)vO)v' 1teXv'ta yap em>llaO"'ta 'ta\J'ta; tr. Cooper 65. 
20 The artistry of hairbreadth escapes in 'thirties serials often violates this 

aesthetic principle, relying instead on a lapse of memory or a camera trick to 
make the inescapable escapable. For example, the last scene of an episode 
shows the danger much closer than it appears when the next episode picks up 
the story. On the contrary, the escapes of Aristophanes' heroes always rely on 
invention, such as Dicaeopolis' coal kidnapping scheme in the Acharnians. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

292 EXPECT A TION IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 

(J.l.av8avElv Kat. <JUAAoyi~Ecr8al), and finally delight in the learn­
ing (on J.l.av8avElv ou J.l.OVOV 'tOtC; q)\AO<JOCPOlC; llOl<J'tov aAAo. Kat. 
'tOtC; aAAolC; OJ.l.OiWC;).21 

Aristotle never expressly discusses avayvwPll<JlC; as a reaction 
on the part of the audience. D. Lucas denies (133) that the 
phrase "contrary to expectation" can refer to the audience: 
"Since in general the audience knows the end of the story and 
the characters do not, the surprise must belong to the latter. 
This is clinched by the facts of anagnoresis. Peripeteia and ana­
gnoresis are parallel forms of J.l.E'tapoAf), as is emphasized by the 
J.l.EV and ()E at 52a22 and 30." But if my argument is correct and 
the phrase "contrary to expectation" does apply to reversals of 
action, fortune, and thought in general, then whenever there is a 
concomitant reversal and recognition, a situation arises in which 
avayvwPll<JlC; is a recognition or discovery for both the charac­
ter and the audience. 

This may be clarified by considering that what is recognition 
on the part of a tragic character is often the catalyst for catharsis 
in the audience. When Oedipus' attempt to demonstrate his wis­
dom reveals instead his deep ignorance of his origins, by exten­
sion we are shown our own ignorance. Oedipus' discovery of 
his ignorance about the human condition is a recogniton that 
marks the convergence of the learning of the audience and the 
hero. As F. Lucas put it (102): 

The peripeteia is the [result of] blinded human effort [that 
achieves] the very opposite of its aim. The anagnoresis [which 
it is misleading to render 'recognition' instead of 'discovery' 
-Aristotle expressly says (1452a34ff) that it may be not only 
of persons but also of things and facts] is the realization of 
that blindness, the opening of the eyes that Ate, who hurts 
men's minds, or Fate, or just human weakness had sealed .... In 
vain we pray, like Ajax, to perish at least in the sunlight, see­
ing the faces of our foes; for the blindness Tiresias taunts in 
Oedipus is the blindness of all men, knowing not themselves, 
knowing not what they do. 

A condition for the occurrence of catharsis is the intersection 
of the audience's recognition with that of the hero's discovery. 
His recognition is now their pity for what they had feared all 
along. When their knowledge is identical with the hero's, the 
tension of the audience's knowing something the hero does not 
know is relieved, and their pity and fear are then purged. Thus, 

21 Poet. 1452a4-7, 1448b16, 1448b13f. 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CLINTON D. CORCORAN 293 

in a very fundamental way, it is impossible for the audience not 
to experience what the hero recognizes. The emotional and in­
tellectual component of the catharsis are inseparable. Catharsis 
cannot simply mean clarification or homeopathic purgation; it 
must be an intellectual recognition and an emotional release at 
one and the time.22 

In conclusion, the poet may choose a course of action con­
trary to opinions that are generally held (Ev8o;o.) in order to 
demonstrate the error they involve (hamartema or hamartia). 
The knowledge gained from a concomitant reversal and recog­
nition may parallel a character's or the audience's expectation, 
but it does not belong to either one alone. All that is necessary 
is that it is thought to be a generally accepted position, proverb, 
or maxim (that wealth is blind: cf Ploutos), or that it is accepted 
by sophists (cf Clouds) or professionals (cf. the jurors in 
Wasps). Hence the audience and characters learn in a reversal 
'what exceptions there may be' to the Ev8o;o. about the general 

22 Else (supra n.2: 433-39, 446-50) has a similar discussion of catharsis as a 
kind of Aristotelian moral judgment that combines a ·prerequisite" 
intellectual recognition with a subsequent emotional purification: "It is a 
pleasure springing from emotion, but an emotion authorized and released by 
an intellectually conditioned structure of action" (449). Recogniton that the 
tragic deed is done in ignorance but still from some fault, i.e, that it is not 
simply miaron. There is some responsibility for the act and contrition for it 
allowing for purification. Thus, "the catharsis is not a change or end-product 
in the spectator's soul, or in the fear and pity (i.e., the dispositons to them) in 
his soul, but a process carried forward in the emotional material of the play 
by its structural elements, above all by the recogniton" (439). Else identifies 
recognition as a process tied to the structural elements of a play and the direct 
cause of the emotions produced. As Else notes, his theory leaves only Oedipus 
Rex and Iphigenia in Tauris as plays that perfectly fit this model (446). If 
Else's theory of catharsis were correct, then he would be right to criticize 
Aristotle's theory as fitting too few plays and missing many other master­
pieces (446). But the notion of recognition being tied to purification is too 
restrictive. Recogniton may be of any flawed action (hamartema) or character 
fault (hamartia), and even of the role of chance events in life if they are tied 
properly to the plot. The notion of purification is too restrictive in another 
sense; the construction of events in Bacchae, Oedipus at Colonus, Agamem­
non, or the plots of Aristophanes' comedies, creates the dramatic pleasure of 
wonder. Wonder is tied directly to a recogniton of how one event 
unexpectedly but logically results in another. Not all tragedy relies on the 
protagonist'S learning in a recognition of moral fault or in experiencing a 
purification. Here we may think of the Medea. Furthermore, there may not be 
a fault at all, as is arguably the case in Antigone. Else denies that the idea of 
catharsis is relevant to comedy because there is no hamartia or pathos to be 
purified, but comic plots and agons are often set in motion by the recognition 
of the unexpected consequences of an initial hamartema (447). 



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

294 EXPECT A nON IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 

course of affairs, character, or thoughts. 23 Plot (mythos) is an 
extended argument in the form of actions, fates, and expecta­
tions, a passage between the contraries (-to fVaV'tlOv) of ignor­
ance and knowledge (1452a22). Aristotle calls reversal and recog­
nition the most emotionally powerful parts of the plot because 
they are capable of entrancing or possessing ('I'UXayCllYt'i) the 
audience (1450a32). Janko translates, "the most important things 
with which tragedy enthralls [us] are parts of the plot-reversals 
and recognitions."24 Thus the best change of actions, fortune, 
and intention take place contrary to expectation, because the 
imitation of this type of action produces the greatest wonder at 
the occurrence, the most tragic emotions, and the greatest 
amount of learning. 25 

HIGH POINT UNIVERSITY 

July, 1999 

23 I agree with Poulheria Kyriakou, "Aristotle's Philosophical Poetics," 
Mnemosyne SER. 4 46 (1993) 347, who argues that the entire plot of a tragedy 
can be "translated into a '1tp6'ta(Jt~ £voo';o~,' and that plot (mythos) can be 
considered "as an enthymematic polysyllogism." 

24 R. Janko, Aristotle, Poetics I (Indianapolis 1987) 9. 
25 My thanks to the many careful notes of the anonymous reader.