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Some passages in Polyaenus Stratagems concerning Alexander
Hammond, N G L
Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Spring 1996; 37, 1; ProQuest
pg. 23

Some Passages in Polyaenus 
Stratagems concerning Alexander 

N. G. L. Hammond 

I
N THIS ARTICLE I am concerned with the historical worth of 
some passages in Polyaenus concerning Alexander. and 
therefore with the sources from which these derive, 

whether directly or through an intermediary.l It should be 
noted that Alexander's stratagems were of greater importance 
to Polyacnus than any others, for thc emperors Marcus 
Aurelius and Lucius Verus, to whom Polyaenus dedicated his 
work, were about to campaign against the Parthians in the very 
parts of Asia where Alexander and his Macedonians had de­
feated the Persians; and they would be able to learn from the 
prowess of Polyaenus' ancestors and from their ability to defeat 

I I use the standard English version of the title. It is uncertain whether the 
Greek title was l:'tpU'tT1"rlIlU'tu, implied in Polyaenus' prefaces, or l:'tpu't1l­
"ylKO:, as in some codices, summarised in the Teubner edition of I. Melber (n.l; 
cf KrentzlWheeler 4), whose Greek text I cite here. The following abbrevi­
ations are used: A G=N. G. L. Hammond, Alexander the Great: King, 
Commander and Statesman} (Bristol 1989); Arr.=Arrian Anabasis Alexandri 
(Teubner ed. by G. Roos, 1967); ATKINSON=J. E. Atkinson, A Commentary on 
Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam 
1980); BOSWORTH C=A. B. Bosworth, A Historical Commentary on Arrian's 
History of Alexander I-II (Oxford 1980-95); BOSWORTH, Conquest= idem, 
Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge 1988); 
BURASELlS=K. Buraselis, -The Roman World of Polyainos. Aspects of a 
Macedonian Career between Classical Past and Provincial Present," 
APXAlOrNn~IA 8 (1993-94) 121-40; DEvINE 1986=A. M. Devine, "The Battle 
of Gaugamela: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study," AneW 13 (1986) 87-116; 
DEVINE 1987=A. M. Devine, -The Battle of the Hydaspes: A Tactical and 
Source-Critical Study," AneW 16 (1987) 91-113; HAMILTON=J. R. Hamilton, 
Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary (Oxford 1969); KRENTZ and W HEELER=P. 
Krentz and E. L. Wheeler, Polyaenus, Stratagems of War I-II (Chicago 1994); 
P A =Plutarc h, Life of Alexander (after the Loeb edition); Sources=N. G. L. 
Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great: An Analysis of Plutarch's Life 
and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrau (Cambridge 1993); TARN=W. W. Tarn, 
Alexander the Great II (Cambridge 1948); THA=N. G. L. Hammond, Three 
Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-Called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, 
Justin and Curtius (Cambridge 1983). 

23 



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24 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

the Persians (4 praeJ, 'tCx<; apnCx<; 'trov lllu:'tEpcov 1tpoyovcov; 1 
praeJ, 'to Kpan:'iv nEpcrrov 1tOAE/lOUV'tCOV ouvacr8at). We may 
therefore be confident that Polyaenus took special pains to un­
derstand and present Alexander's stratagems to the emperors. 2 

For our part many ancient accounts of Alexander have sur­
vived, and we are therefore better able to study the methods of 
Polyaenus in Strat. 4.3 than elsewhere in his work. In Part I an 
attempt is made to identify Polyaenus' sources for each strata­
gem, and in Part II my conclusions are summarised and then 
compared with the conclusions of other scholars. 

I. The Sources of Some Stratagems 

4.3.27. Alexander defeated Darius at Arbela. Phrasaortes, a relative 
of Darius, with a large Persian force was guarding the Susian 
Gates; and they are indeed narrow, high mountains. The Mace­
danian attack on them was easily repelled by the barbarians, who 
shot at them with slings, arrows, and rocks, so that Alexander re­
called them and at a distince of thirty stades rca 6 km.J was making 
the palisade [of his camp]. There was an oracle of Apollo that an 
alien wolf [lykos] would indeed become his guide on the road 
against the Persians. There came in fact to Alexander a herdsman 
wearing a wild beast's skin, admitting that he was a Lycian 
[Lykios], and [saying] that there was a path round the mountains, 
a path concealed by the dense canopy of the forest, and known to 
him alone because he pastured his cattle. Recalling the prophecy, 
Alexander trusted the herdsman. Indeed he ordered the entire army 
to stay in camp and kindle many fires, attracting the eyes of the 
Persians.3 But he issued a secret order to Philotas and Hephaes­
tion, to the effect that whenever they should see the Macedonians 
appear on the top of the mountains they should attack from be­
low, and he himself leading the Hypaspists, one brigade [phalanx] 
of heavy infantry, and all the Scythian archery along the slight 
pathway advanced eighty stades [ca 16 km.] and camped where he 
was covered by a close-set forest. And going round during the 
midnight hour he came upon the enemy asleep; and at daybreak 
the trumpets were sounding the signal from the top of the moun­
tains. Hephaestion and Phi Iotas began to lead forward their Mace­
donians from the palisade. The Persians were caught between the 

2 At 5 praef Polyaenus indicates that the emperors were reading his work. 
3 The contrast between this order and the secret order that follows was part 

of Alexander's deception, for the order to "the entire army" to stay in camp, if 
leaked to the enemy, would mislead him, even as the many fires were in­
tended to do. One may compare similar deceptions: Arr. 5.10.1, 11.2 fin. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 

troops from above and the troops from below. Some were killed, 
some flung themselves over the cliffs, and some were taken alive.4 

2S 

For Alexander's attack on the Persians at the Susian Gates, 
Polyaenus could have read the accounts of Diodorus, Plutarch, 
Curti us, and Arrian. If he did so, he could have derived the 
oracle of Apollo about a Lycian from PA 37.1f and/or Curt. 
5.4.4, but not from Diod. 17.68.5, who described the Lycian but 
did not mention an oracle, nor from Arrian, who did not in­
clude either the Lycian or the oracle in his narrative. Even as 
regards Plutarch and Curtius it is probable that the resemblan­
ces in the matter of the oracle between them and Polyaenus 
were due to a common source. 

Polyaenus chose not to follow the account of Arrian, for he 
named different officers: the Persian Phrasaortes and Hephaes­
tion and Phi Iotas in charge of the base camp, whereas Arrian 
had named Ariobarzanes and Craterus (3.18.2, 4, with Philotas 
accompanying Alexander for part of the circuitous route). S Plu­
tarch had nothing to offer except the oracle (PA 37.1f), and 
Diodorus was much briefer than Curti us, with whom he had 
some points in common (THA 131). We turn therefore to a 

4 'AA£~avopo<; EV 'Ap~TJA.ot<; ~apElov EVt1CT)OEV. <I>paoaOptTJ<;. ~apdou ouy· 
YEV,,<;, TtOAA"V XElpa nEpOtri]v EXrov E<pUAaOOE ta<; Louoioa<; TtUAa<;' ai. OE apa 
dOtv OpTJ otEva K"at inl'TJMX. tOUtOt<; TtpOO~UAA.oVta<; tou<; MaK"E06va<; El)­
K"OAro<; aTtEK"pouOvtO 01. ~up~apot o<pEv06va<;. ~£ATJ, Tt£tpou<; a<pt£VtE<;' COOtE ava­
K"aAEoa<; autou<; 'AAE~avopo<; aTtO tptUK"OVta otaOtrov xupaK"a E~UAAEtO' ~v 
OE A6ywv 'ATtOAArovO<;. 00<; apa ~£vo<; AUK"O<; TtYE)lOOV au'til> til<; OOOU til<; K"ata 
nEporov Y£VOtto. TtPOOEtOt 0" til> 'AAE~UVOp<t> ~OUK"OA.o<; 9TJpdav EXrov OtOA"V. 
O!lOAOYrov ott AUK"w<; ~v. K"at 00<; K"UK"~ 'trov oprov atpaTto<; £tTJ til> OUVTJPE<PEl 
tT]<; UATJ<; aTtOK"EK"p'U)l)l£VTJ, autil> O/: )lov<t> ytYVWoK"otto Ota t"V VO)ln,V trov ~orov. 
ava)lvTJ09d<; 'AAE~avopo<; tOU !lavtdou TttO'tEUEt til> ~OUK"OA<t>. t"V )lEV 0" 
TtUoav o'tpanav EK"£AEUOEV EV otpatoTt£o<t> !l£VEtV K"a t TtOAAa Ttupa ava­
K"a tEtV , E<PEAK"O)l£Vou<; t"V trov nEporov oWtv. <I>tAclrtq. OE K"at 'H<patottroVt Ttap­
uYYEA)la oou<; aTtoPPTJ'tOv, oTtotav K"ata K"Opu<pT]<; trov oprov lOrom 'tOu<; MaK"E-
06va<; EK"<pav£vta<;. autou<; K"Utr09EV TtpOO~UAAEtV, auto<; tou<; ilTtaoTttota<; 
ayrov K"at !ltav OTtAttrov <puAayya K"at to l:K"u9tK"oV tO~tK"OV ooov ~v Ota tT]<; 
atpaTtou tT]<; AETttT]<; oyOOTJK"OVta OtUOta TtpoEAeoov TJuAioato TtUK"at;o)lEvo<; UAn 
oaOUtUtn. )l£OTJ<; OE VUK"to<; TtEptEAeoov ETt£OtTJ tOl<; TtOAE)ltOt<; K"a9EUOOUOtv· 
apxo)l£vTJ<; OE Tt!l£P<XI; a1. OUATttYYE<; EOTJ)latvov aTtO tT]<; K"Opu<pT]<; trov oprov' 
'H<patottrov Or K"at <I>tAclrta<; tou<; EK" tou xupaK"o<; MaK"E06va<; TtpOOT]yov. Ot 
n£pOat !l£OOt trov avro9Ev TtOAE!ltrov K"at trov K"Utro9Ev aTtOATJ<i>9tVtE<; oi. )lEv 
EK"tdvovto, 01. Or K"atEK"PTJ)lvtt;oVtO, 01. Or Et;royPEUOVtO. 

5 The Ptolemy at Arr. 3.18.9 is probably Ptolemy, son of Lagus (so Bos­
worth, C I 328f, to which add that Ptolemy, son of Lagus, had just been men­
tioned at 3.17.6). If that is so, he will have known the names of the Persian 
commander and of the other officers in the operation. 



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26 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

comparison of Curtius and Polyaenus. The following points are 
in common: "Sus ian Gates" (C. 5.3.17), Persian slingers (5.3.19), 
a withdrawal of thirty stades (5.3.23), the oracle (5.4.11), many 
fires at night to deceive the enemy (5.4.14), dense foliage en 
route (5.4.24f), and the arrival of Alexander at a high peak at 
dawn (5.4.27). These points are sufficient to indicate that Poly­
aenus drew this part of his account from Curtius. 6 Who was 
Curtius' source? The probable answer is Cleitarchus, who, 
writing for a Greek audience, may well have introduced the 
oracle of Apollo, which was clearly an invention post eventum. 7 

In other matters, however, Polyaenus differed from Curti us. 
Thus Polyaenus gave different names for the officers. He 
described the turning movement by Alexander as lasting a day 
and a night, whereas Curtius extends it over a night, a day, and a 
night (5.4.17, 19,22,26).8 He reported that Alexander came 
upon the enemy at midnight, whereas Curtius had Alexander 
reach the summit at dawn unopposed and then see the enemy's 
position (5.4.26£). Polyaenus had the base camp alerted to 
Alexander's arrival on the summit by trumpet blasts, whereas 
Curti us said that the shouting reached the camp (5.4.29). 9 We 
conclude, then, that Polyaenus followed Curti us, using 
Cleitarchus, for some parts only. Whom, then, did Polyaenus 
follow for the other parts? 

The derivation of Arrian's account now becomes relevant. He 
named Ptolemy as holding the minor command during the 
turning movement, and the inference is that Arrian was fol­
lowing Ptolemy, who had mentioned his own participation (see 

6 See Sources 70, where I argue that Cleitarchus was the source for the 
oracle. 

7 So Hamilton 97, agreeing with H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, The 
Delphic Oracle (Oxford 1956) I 241, and W. Heckel, «Alexander at the 
Persian Gates," Athenaeum 58 (1980) 171. 

8 Bosworth, Conquest 91 ("probably over two nights"), follows Curtius. But 
the distances are such that a day and a night are likely to be correct, for the 
Persian position and the Macedonian base camp were only thirty stades 
(some 6 km.) apart. That distance suits the geographical identification of A. 
Stein, Old Routes of Western Iran (London 1940) 25. Diodorus (17.68.6), like 
Arrian, mentions only one night. For my account of the whole operation see 
A G 167f with Fig. 15 inset and n.l05. 

9 As the two positions were some 6 km. apart, it is impossible that the Mace­
donians could have seen their compatriots or heard their shouts. Arrian's 
account is to be preferred with Alexander attacking during the darkness 
before dawn and giving the signal to those in the base camp by trumpet-call 
(3.18.7). 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 27 

supra n.5}. It was characteristic of Arrian to prefer the account 
of a participant. The features of Polyaenus' account not found in 
Curtius and Arrian are as follows. Polyaenus used cp6.A.ay~ for a 
brigade of heavy infantry and x6.pa~ for an encampment. These 
words came from a source conversant with Macedonian termin­
ology.IO Then the defeat of Alexander at the Susian Gates was 
minimised, and a smaller force was given to Alexander by Poly­
aenus than by Arrian (the hypaspists, one phalanx of infantry, 
and all the Scythian archers in Polyaenus, as compared with 
Arrian's force, which added the Agrianians, the Royal Squadron 
of Companion Cavalry, and a tetrarchy of cavalry). The proba­
bility is that Polyaenus was following Aristobulus for these 
features. 

To summarise, Polyaenus probably took his account in part 
from Curtius (who had drawn on Cleitarchus) and in part from 
Aristobulus. The merit of Polyaenus' account is that it is clear, 
relatively concise, and at several points corrective of the sensa­
tional and sometimes clearly false narrative of Curt. 5.3.17-4.33. 

4.3.22. In the battle against Porus, Alexander drew up the cavalry 
on his right wing so that half of it faced the enemy and the rest 
was at an angle, while he placed the phalanx and the light-armed 
[infantry] on the left wing and from them at an angle a force [of 
cavalry]. Porus formed a line of many elephants opposite [the 
Macedonians] and he himself was on the left, riding the leading 
elephant. He placed the other elephants at intervals of fifty feet as 
far as the right wing. The spaces between the elephants he filled up 
with infantry, so that the formation resembled a great wall, the 
elephants being like towers and the infantry like curtain walls 
between the towers. This was indeed the position when Alexander 
gave the order to lead the infantry against the enemy, and himself 
drove the cavalry more impetuously rightwards, his aim being to 
outflank those opposite. Guarding against this, Porus led [the in­
fantry] against him, but because the beasts could not keep up he 
was breaking his formation at many points. With the Macedonians 

10 The same usage appears in Arr. 1.14.2f; 5.20.3, 21.5. At 3. 9.6 'ta~t<; refers 
presumably to a hypaspist brigade, and <paAuy~ to a pikemen brigade. These 
passages in Arrian were derived from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 
praef). Bosworth argues (HSCP 81 [1977]; C I 118) that Ptolemy wrote 'ta~t<; 
and Aristobulus <paAuy~. But it is most unlikely that officers in Alexander's 
army used different terms; further, if the Macedonian term was <paAuy1;. then 
we should expect Ptolemy as a Macedonian to have used it and Aristobulus as 
a Greek to have used 'ta~t<;. I suggest that Arrian wrote 'ta~t<; as the normal 
term of his day, but that he occasionally reproduced <paAuy~ from his source 
(Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus). 



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28 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

charging into the gaps he was compelled to turn and fight face to 
face. Meanwhile the cavalrymen with Alexander were first in their 
encircling movement, and driving the Indians together from be­
hind won a most complete victory, which made Alexander king of 
Indian terri tory .11 

It is necessary to add a note about my translation in response to 
A. M. Devine (1987). We agree well enough on the translation 
of the end of the first sentence, where Devine writes "and 
adjacent to these he posted [another] 'angled formation' (£1tt­
lCUIl1tto<;)." Where we differ is that he assumed that this "angled 
formation" consisted not of cavalry but of infantry. If this were 
so, Alexander's left wing would have been exposed to attack by 
Porus' cavalry, whereas in other set battles Alexander had pro­
tected the left flank of the phalanx with cavalry as well as with 
light-armed infantry. Polyaenus will have read the accounts of 
the battle order in Curt. 8.14.15 12 and Arr. 5.16.3, in which Alex-

11 'AAE~UVOpO<; EV 'tn 1tpo<; nropov IlUXU 'to Ili:v t1t1tt1(OV E1tt 'tou O£~lOu KEPCO<; 
(m~£v EV Il£'tO)1tcp 'to fllltC)"\J, 'to Of Aol1tOV EV E1tlKUIl1tlcp, 'tl]V Of <j)UAuyyu KUt 
'tou<; EAu<ppOU<; E1tt 'tou AulOU KEPCO<; (J'tll(J£ KUt 0.1t0 'to{J'tcov E1tmlll1tlOV ('tu~£. 
nropo<; Of 1tOAAOU<; EA€<pUV'tU<; o.V'tl1tUpu'tu~u<; uu'to<; IlEv KU'ta 'to AalOV E1tt 
'tOU TnOUIlEVO\J EAE<pUV'tO<; ~v' 'tou<; Of Aol1tOU<; O .. E<pUV'tU<; EK OlU(J'tlJIlU'tO<; 
1tcv'tlJKOV'tu 1tOorov IlEXPl 'tOU OE~lOU KEPCO<; (J'tll(J£' 'ta OE JlE(JU 'troY ellplCOV 
o.VOpU(Jl 1td;01<; aVE1tAlJP(O(JEV, lOO't£ ~v 'to axl1llU 't£lxn IlquAcp 1tUPU1tAlJ(JlOV, 
Ot IlEV aE<pUV'tE<; EOlKO't£<; 1tUPYOl<;. Ot Of 1td;ot Il£(J01tUPylOl<;. (VeU Oi] 1tUpuy­
ydAu<; 'AA€~uvopo<; 'toU<; 1tE~OU<; o.V'tl1tupuynv 'tOl<; 1tOAEJllOl<;, uu'to<; 'tl]V l1t1tOV 
£ret 06pu (J<poopo't£pov llAu(J£v ~O\JA6IlEVO~ U1tEPKEPU(Jal 'tou<; Evuv'tio\J<;. 'tOU'to 
<pUAU(J(J0IlEVO<; nropo<; aV'tl1tUPl1YE. 'tif> OE Ill] <p9UVElV 'ta ellPlU OlE(J1tU Ku'ta 
1tOAAa 'tl]V 'tU~lV. 'troY MUlCCOOVCOV 'tOl~ OlU(J1tU(JJlU(JlV EIl1tl1t'tOV'tcov 
';VUYKU~E'tO Ku'ta 1tpo(JC01tOV E1tl(J'tPE<pCOV ayCOVl~Eaeal. EV 'tOu'tcp <p9UVO'U(JlV Ot 
1tCpt 'tOY 'AAE~UVOpov t1t1tEl<; (K1tEPU:AeoV'tE<; KUt Kata VOlto'U (J'UVEAU(JUV'tE<; 
'tou<; 'IvoouS 'tEAECO'tu'tllV VlKllV aV£lAOV'tO (JlEe' iiv ~U(JlAEU<; 'IvolKl1<; 
'AA€~uvopo<; ';v). 

My translation agrees with that of Krentz, except that a1tO 'tou'tcov seems to 
me to depend on btlKUIl1tlOV ('tU~E ( cf a1tO 'tOU AulOU at 4.3.17), Porus to be 
the subject of otEmta (cf OtE(J1tU at 4.3.17), and (J'UVEAU(JUVtE<; to mean 
"driving the Indians together." Further, at 4.3.6 (discussed below) I take 'ta 
(JKE'UO<pOpU to mean "baggage" (see «Army Transport in the Fifth and Fourth 
Centuries," GRBS 24 [1983] 31= Collected Studies [Amsterdam 1993] I 429), 
and at 4.3.17 (see below) I take 'tOl<; OlU(JrtU(JJlu(Jt to mean «gaps" as at 4.3.22. 

12 The artO 'tou'tCOV E1tlKUllrtlOV on the left of the light-armed infantry in 
Alexander's battle order was commanded by Coenus, who was ordered to 
move towards the enemy's right wing (Arr. 5.16.3, where 00<; E1tt 'to O£~tOV is 
contrasted with (1tt 'to EUWVUIlOV KEPU<; 'troY 1tOAElllcov). When the cavalry of 
the Indian left wing turned left to face Alexander's cavalry, Coenus was to 
turn to his right (Curt. 8.14.15, dextrum move) and attack that cavalry from 
behind (Arr. 5.16.3, KU't01tlV). The supposition of Devine (Fig. 1) and of Bos­
worth (C II 296 Fig. 4; confused in Conquest 128f), that Coenus drove back 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 29 

ander moved "with the bulk of the cavalry" towards Porus' left 
wing and Coenus in command of two hipparchies was sent "as 
towards Porus' right wing." He will have assumed that his 
reader would understand the "angled formation" on the Mace­
donian left wing to consist of cavalry. Some sentences later 
Devine has Alexander "lead on the right-wing cavalry more 
vigorously"; but this is not a correct translation of 'tTtv Y1t1tOV btl. 
Mpu <Jcpo(5pon:pov iP. .. ucrEV. 13 In the next sentence toUto CPUAucr­
crOJ,1fVO<; nwpo<; is mistranslated as "at this point, Porus, standing 
on guard, also advanced," for the middle form of CPUAa<Jcr()) 
means "be on one's guard against" (see LSJ S.v. C.II.1), and 
"advanced" misses the force of the compound verb. Devine 
continues: "Lest the elephants should overrun it, the phalanx 
divided itself into many parts; and when the Macedonians 
counterattacked in sections, the enemy formation was com­
pelled to keep wheeling about in order to fight face to face" (see 
supra n.11 for the Greek text). This is entirely mistaken. 

Polyaenus presents the victory over Porus as a victory by 
Alexander's cavalry, which encircled the Indians and drove 
them into a confined space from the rear.14 In this Polyaenus 
differed fundamentally from Diodorus and Curtius, for whom 
the phalanx's victory over the elephants was the turning point. 
Polyaenus agreed, however, with Arrian, who concluded his 
account in a similar manner (5.17.7): "Alexander threw his cav­
alry in a circle round their whole formation ... and thus the In­
dian cavalry were cut down in the action with few exceptions." 

Polyaenus gives a fuller account of Alexander's original battle 
order than any other surviving writer. It enables us to under­
stand the opening actions of Alexander's forces in Arr. 5.16.2f 
and the instructions given by Alexander at Curt. 8.14.15, for the 

the cavalry of the Indian right wing and then pursued it behind Porus' line to 
the Indian left wing, is without foundation in the ancient evidence. 
Boswonh's supposition that dextrum m07Je can mean "assail the right" is not 
supported by Lewis and Short. They do, however include an elliptical 
meaning (s.'V. m07Jeo LA.l): here "move yourself" or "move your troops." My 
account of the battle is in A G 211 ff with Fig. 20 and nn.141-44. 

13 The spear being held in the right hand, the expression btt. 06pu means 
"toward his right." Here it goes not with 'tl)V lltltOV but with TlAacrrv. 

\4 From that position the Macedonian horses did not face the elephants, of 
which they were terrified (Arr. 5.10.2, 11.4, 15.5f; Cun. 8.14.23). Despite these 
passages Bosworth (Conquest 128) supposed that "the Macedonians had 
acquired experience of elephants over the previous months and could cope 
with them." 



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30 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

formations of cavalry drawn up at an angle to the line of the in­
fantry (EV E1ttlWIl1ticp and E1ttKall1tlOV f'to.;EV) were evidently at a 
forward angle in each case, with Alexander commanding "the 
main cavalry force'" ('tl)v 1tOAAl)V 't11~ l1t1tOU) on the right and 
Coenus the cavalry on the left (Arr. 5.16.3; Curt. 8.14.15 init.). 
With this disposition of his forces Alexander was ready to make 
the cavalry forces under his own command advance impetu­
ously and to bring forward his infantry line en retard (Arr. 
5.16.3 fin.). Polyaenus does not mention the action of Coenus, 
but we learn from Curt. 8.14.15 and Arr. 5.16.3 that Coenus was 
to advance "as towards the right,"15 and then on "seeing" Alex­
ander already engaged against the enemy cavalry and that cav­
alry in confusion, he was to attack "from behind. "1(' 

Polyaenus turns immediately to the position of the elephants 
in the battle order of Porus. Herein he differs radically from 
Arrian, who has the elephants in front of the phalanx of infantry 
(5.16.2), but he agrees with Diod. 17.87.4f and Curt. 8.14.13, 
who fill the spaces between the elephants with armed men 
(nva IlEOOV, inter armatos) in order to protect the flanks of each 
elephant. Polyaenus' comparison of the Indian battleline to a 
walled city with towers and curtain walls was the same as in the 
accounts of Diodorus and Curtius. Arrian was clearly correct, 
for the purpose of placing the elephants just ahead of his own 
infantry (but not out of contact with the infantry line, as in De­
vine's plan [1987: 113]) was to break up the dreaded phalanx of 
pikemen. 17 

15 Devine (1987: 110) has an interesting note in which he regards w<; btl. as 
interchangeable with btl. But there is no sense in using the two expressions in 
consecutive sentences unless there was some difference in meaning. 

16 It is important to note that Coenus had to be able to see what was hap­
pening around Porus' left wing, implicitly in Arrian and explicitly in Curtius' 
viderisque me in media ardore, ipse dextrum move et turbatis infer signa, and 
that the enemy Coenus was to attack was already thrown into confusion. 
These passages alone prove that the reconstructions of the battle by Devine 
(1987: 113 Fig. 1) and by Bosworth (C II 296 Fig. 4) are incorrect in making 
Coenus attack or just follow the cavalry on the right wing of Porus' army. So 
too they both disregard Arr. 5.16.2, where Alexander decided not to advance 
against the centre of the Indian phalanx, for they show the Macedonian 
phalanx attacking the entire length of the Indian phalanx in their plans. 

17 Porus' disposition was made for defense only. Bosworth's statement (C II 
293) that" Arrian gave Porus an offensive strategy" seems to rest on a misun­
derstanding of Arr. 5.15.6, where Porus argues that the Macedonian infantry 
would not make a frontal attack on his own phalanx, "for they would be 
barred by the Indian infrantry engaging them frontally and would be 
trampled on by the elephants turning upon them" (KU"Ca (J"COf1u "C£ yap uv 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 31 

When the action developed beyond his left wing, Porus led 
his infantry from line into column, moving to its left. But gaps 
now arose in the right flank of the column, because the ele­
phants proceeded slowly and irregularly. Into the gaps the 
Macedonian infantry charged. Porus was compelled to halt his 
column and turn it back into line, facing the Macedonians. Thus 
the infantry battle started not in the centre, which Alexander 
had decided to avoid (Arr. 5.16.2, lC<l'tU Il£O'ov ), but in the left 
part of Porus' line. 

Polyaenus must have obtained his opening description of 
Alexander's battle order from a source not used by Diodorus, 
Curtius, and Arrian. Polyaenus might have deduced the de­
velopment of the battle from these three authors, but it is more 
likely that he continued with the initial source. He differs from 
Arrian in making the distance between the elephants fifty 
paces 18 and in having the Macedonian infantry charge into the 
gaps that developed in the Indian infantry. Therein he is prob­
ably correct, for Arrian became so absorbed in describing the 
infantry's attacks on the elephants that he mentions the Indian 
infantry only as being trampled by the retreating elephants and 
finally cut down from all sides (5.17.6£). Arrian's source was 
certainly Ptolemy, a participant accompanying Alexander (Arr. 
5.13.1),19 It is probable that Polyaenus based his version on Aris­
tobulus' account, which was well charged with military detail as 
we see from Arr. 5.14.3; and it was Aristobulus who reported 
Darius' order of battle at Gaugame1a. 

4.3.20. Alexander besieged a strong place in Indian territory. Being 
terrified (the) Indians made an agreement to come out with their 
weapons. On coming out they occupied another [a second] hill 
and set up their guard-posts. Alexander was leading his forces 
against them while the Indians were shouting out "the agreement." 
He admitted that he had made an agreement about their coming 

ltPO~ 'tWV OltAt'tWV ltpocr~aAA6v'tUlV £lpy£crem Kat Ka'talta'tT]ei)cr£<Jem [1tt­
cr'tP£IjfUV'tUlV [It' au'tOu<; 'tWV £A£<pUV'tWV). 

18 Polyaenus is probably to be preferred, for when we combine Arrian's 
figure of 200 elelphants with his interval between elephants of 100 paces, we 
would have a phalanx some 6 km. in length. See my arguments in AG 212. 

19 See my analysis of the sources in AG 215f. Bosworth (C II 262) gives the 
overall view that much of Arrian's account was based on Ptolemy, -but it 
remains uncertain how much material is added from Aristobulus." 



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32 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

out, but [he said that] nothing at all had been promised about 
release.20 

This account is very similar to Diod. 17.84.1£. The Indians, 
named there as mercenaries, are contrasted with the native 
people (the Assaceni of Massaga) by Plutarch (PA 59.6; see 
Sources 106). It was as mercenaries that the Indians were to 
come out "with their weapons," for they depended on their 
weapons for further employment. Now, according to Dio­
orus, "they advanced for eighty stades rca 16 km.] and en­
camped without interference, unaware of what was about to 
happen." When Alexander attacked them, "the mercenaries at 
first kept shouting that the attack was contrary to the sworn 
agreement ... but Alexander shouted out to them in a loud 
voice, that he agreed to their leaving the city but not to eternal 
friendship with the Macedonians" (17.84.2). It is apparent that 
Polyaenus and Diodorus both drew on a longer account in 
which both the destination-the second hill-and the distance 
had been stated. I have argued elsewhere that Diodorus' source 
was an account by Cleitarchus (THA 53, 79, 149; Sources 106). 
It is therefore probable that Polyaenus too drew on that 
account. 

Where was the first hill? In the long and largely different 
account by Arrian (4.26.1-27.4) a hill was mentioned at the start 
of the action. Then Alexander intended to make his camp close 
to the walls of Massaga, but when the defenders made a sortie 
he withdrew a distance of some seven stades "towards a hill" 
(4.26.2, 1tPO~ rflAo<pOV 'tlva). This hill was presumably the first 
hill to be mentioned in any full account. I suggest that Alex­
ander made his camp there when he realised how aggressive the 
defenders of Massaga were. Later, when under the agreement 
the Indian mercenaries left the city, they were sent to encamp 
farther away from the city and did so according to Polyaenus 
on "a second hill" (A.6<pov En:pov). This hill cannot be the first 
hill, as Bosworth (C II 175) presumed in ignoring Polyaenus' 
"second hill." Rather, Alexander's camp was between the city 
and the mercenaries' camp on the second hill. 

20 'AAcl;avopos xwpicp 'tTiS 'IvOlKllS EXUP41 ltpo(JeKUell'to' <po~llecV'tes 'IvOol. 
(JUVEeev'tO /lee' altAWV El;eAeelv. oi /lEV El;eAe6v'tCS A.O<pov £'tCpov Ka'tCA.a~ov'to 
Kat <pUAaKC:xS Kaei(J'tav'to. 'AAEl;avopos EltTlrC 'tf]v OUva/llV 'twv 'IvOwv 
Eltl~OCO/lCVWv 'tC:xS (JUVeTjKUS. <> OE ltEpt E1;600u /lEV ro/lOAOyCl (Juv'tceelcr9Ul, ltEpl 
01: a<pc(JEcos Ill] OEV \m£crxilcr9Ul. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 33 

In case there was treachery by the Assaceni and the mer­
cenaries, Alexander was anxious not to be at close quarters with 
either. If I am correct in supposing that the Macedonian camp 
was on the first hill, it was seven stades from the city. Diodorus 
(17.84.1) says that the mercenaries encamped "eighty stades 
from the city." This is not the impression given by Arrian 
(4.27.3), who places the mercenaries on a hill "opposite" (uv'tt-
1tOpo<;) the Macedonian camp," and by the Metz Epitome 43, in 
which the mercenaries' camp was "at no great distance" from 
the city (ab oppido haud Longe ).21 The differences are much 
more radical in regard to the fate of the city, relations with the 
queen Cleophis and the allegations of treachery in the beha­
viour of Alexander and of the mercenaries. Polyaenus' merit is 
that he gave a clear summary from a detailed account in which 
Alexander behaved in a treacherous manner. Similar forms of 
deception were attributed to Philip by Polyaenus at 4.2.4f. Poly­
aenus' source was neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus (they under­
lay Arrian's account), but it was very probably Cleitarchus. 

4.3.17. Alexander was drawing up his army at Arbela. Darius was 
planting with caltrops the space of the engagement between the ar­
mies. The Macedoman indeed realised this. Leading his right wing 
he gave the order to follow rightwards, in order that he should 
pass round the area planted with the caltrops. As the Persian en­
deavoured to oppose Alexander by leading his own army left­
wards, he was continually disrupting his own cavalry's forma­
tion. Charging into the gaps, Alexander-and equally Parmenio 
too on the left-avoided the caltrops and compelled the enemy to 
flee.22 

Polyaenus wrote as if the caltrops covered most of the space 
between the enemy lines, and the avoidance of them was the 
main consideration in Alexander's course of action. In these 
respects Polyaenus exaggerated, for Darius had to leave clear of 

21 It is possible that the number "eighty stades" is an error of Diodorus or 
his copyists (so e.g. Bosworth, C II 175), but it may have been a figure added 
for verisimilitude by Cleitarchus to his very sensational account, as reflected in 
Diod. 17.84: THA 53. 

22 'AA1~uv15po<; EV 'Ap~ljAot<; ltupnacrcr£'to. ~Up£to<; 'to J!nUlXJ!tOV 'tTl<; crufl­
~OA.Tl<; 'tPt~OAot<; lCU'tEcrlt£tp£. Tou'to 15i1 cruvt15wv <> MUlC£15wv 'tou O£~tou lCEPro<; 
ijyoUfl£VO<; Eltl 156pu ltUpTlYynAEv UlCOAoUe£tV, Oltro<; It£ptEA.90t 'tOY 'tOltOV 'tOY 
1(U't£crltUPJ!EVOV 'tUt<; 'tPt~OAot<;· <> BE nEPOTI<; av'tmupaYEtv ltEtPWfl£vO<; Elt' acr­
ltlOU oticrltU cruv£xoo<; 'tilv l1t1tOV. 'tOt<; 15tucrltacrflucrtv Efl~UA.WV 'AA.t~uv15po<;. 
<>flOtro<; OE lCUt nupfl£Vlrov alto 'tou AutoU, 't<x<; flEV 'tPt~OAo'\l<; E~V£'\lcruv, 'tou<; oE 
ltOAEJ!lOU<; q>£uy£tV itvaylCucruv. 



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34 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

caltrops not only pathways for his three groups of scythed 
chariots, so that they could charge across "the space of engage­
ment'" ('to ~£'t<xiX~LOV 't~<; OU~POA~<;), but also the ground in 
front of his own right wing for his cavalrr to launch an attack. 23 

During the action the ground in front 0 Darius' left wing was 
crossed without difficulty by Alexander's troops and by 
Darius' cavalry. The only place where caltrops could have been 
was in front of the centre where Darius was, and then only in a 
small area somewhere between the runways for two groups of 
chariots. 

Polyaenus was not alone in attaching great importance to 
caltrops. They figured prominently in Curtius' account, as 
follows. A deserter informed Alexander that "Darius had 
spread iron caltrops planted in the ground over which he 
believed his enemy would send forth his cavalry" (4.13.36; tr. 
Rolfe). Alexander summoned a meeting of commanders and 
warned them of the area with the caltrops. When he advanced, 
he did so in oblique formation, "in order both to pass round the 
place of the snares (insidiarum locum) and to engage Darius, 
who was guarding his [left] wing" (4.15.1; cf 4.14.8). 

That caltrops could have been planted in advance was en­
visaged in Arrian's account (3.9.4). At a conference of comman­
ders, which Alexander convened on first seeing the enemy, 
Parmenio advised him to undertake a full reconnaissance, in 
case there were impediments or "spikes hidden in the ground" 
(oK6A01t£<; K<X't<X1t£1tTly6't£<;). As this passage was based on an ac­
count by Ptolemy, who in my opinion consulted the Journal of 
Alexander (see Sources 228f), the thought that there might be 
such spikes is to be regarded as historical. It was worth re­
cording in Ptolemy's history presumably because such caltrops 
had been planted. Where then could they have been? When we 
consider a Persian battle order, preserved in Arrian, we see that 
Darius in the centre with his Royal Cavalry Squadron, 1,000 
strong, was heavily protected against any frontal attack, for 
ahead of him were four groups of cavalry in line. Then in front 
of one of them-the Indian cavalry24-some elephants were 

23 I refer to my plan of the battle in A G 142 Fig. 14 and to that of Devine 
(1986: 114 Fig. 2). which is generally in agreement with mine. They are based 
on the captured order of battle of the Persian army (Arr. 3.11.3). which 
Aristobulus cites. 

24 The Indian cavalry's horses were trained to act together with elephants. 
and it was in the company of the Indian cavalry that the elephants were 
mentioned in Arr. 3.8.6. In the course of the battle the Indian cavalry were 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 35 

posted, let us say on the left of the line (Arr. 3.8.6, 11.6); then in 
front of the central group were fifty scythed chariots with a 
prepared runway; but there were no troops in front of the right 
of the line. It is here that a nest of caltrops would have pro­
tected Darius. If they were there, we can see what Darius had 
in mind. His expectation was that Alexander would deliver a 
frontal attack on the centre in the hope of capturing or killing 
him. If Alexander should do so, his forces would be disrupted 
by the charge of the chariots; and if they advanced again, they 
would hit the spike-field on their left and be up against the 
elephants on their right. Darius' policy in this central area was 
entirely defensive, for his fine cavalry had only one route for an 
advance, namely along the runway after the chariots had 
charged. On the wings he expected that his much more 
numerous cavalry would be able to take the offensive, outflank, 
and defeat the Macedonian army. 

Scholars have generally rejected the planting of caltrops as 
"surely a fiction" and as "a legend."25 How then did they first 
enter the tradition? For his description of the battle Curtius in 
my opinion used several sources but principally Cleitarchus, an 
unreliable writer.2(, Arrian followed the accounts of Ptolemy 
and/or Aristobulus, who knew Cleitarchus' work and at times 
corrected it. I have inferred from Arrian's account that Ptol­
emy mentioned the fear of caltrops because they had in fact 
been planted. Polyaenus did not follow the account of Curtius, 
for Curtius (4.15.1) placed Darius on the Persian left wing and 
had Alexander move to his right in order to engage Darius, 
whereas according to Polyaenus Darius moved his own troops 
to their left. It is more likely that Polyaenus drew on the 
account of Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus either via Arrian or 
directly, and that he found there the mention of caltrops. This 
suggestion is supported by Polyaenus' attribution of the victory 
to Alexander's exploitation of gaps in the enemy formation, 
precisely as Arrian did (3.14.lf, l«x'to. 'to ~hEXOV ). 

close to Darius (Arr. 3.13.1). Devine (1987: 114) placed the elephants in front 
of Darius' Persian cavalry, but it is doubtful whether their horses had been 
trained to act close to elephants. 

25 So Devine (1986) 89; Atkinson 437, who reports (428) the views of some 
other scholars. 

26 I have discussed Curtius' sources in AG 138£ and THA 100, 122£, and 128; 
see also Atkinson 447f ("Cleitarchus may have been the common source [of 
Diodorus and Curtius]"); Devine (1986) 91£. 



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36 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

It is probable then that Darius planted caltrops, that Alexander 
knew where they were, and that he did in fact avoid them. 
Polyaenus was providing not an account of the battle but an 
example of a use of caltrops; and he therefore seized on the 
stratagem of Alexander's incidental avoidance of the spike-field. 
Polyaenus made the same point and used the same terms in his 
account of the battle against Porus (4.3.22). 

4.3.6. Alexander was engaged in his last battle against Darius at 
Arbela. No small force of Persians, going round [the Macedo­
nians], were plundering the baggage of the Macedonians. Parmenio 
advised Alexander to go to the help of the baggage-bearers. Alex­
ander said: "No need at all to break the formation of our phalanx. 
Our need is to fight our enemies themselves. If defeated, we have 
no longer any use for our baggage; and if victorious, we shall have 
both our own baggage and that of our enemies.27 

In making the Persians "go round'" the Macedonian wing Poly­
aenus agrees with Diod. 17.59.5 (7t£ptt7tm:u<Jat), PA 32.5 (7t£pt-
7t€J.l\"av'to~), and Curt. 4.15.5 (circumvehi). On the other hand, 
he differs from Arrian, who had the Persian cavalry pass 
through a gap in the Macedonian phalanx (3.14.5, Ka'tU 'to 
<it€xov). We infer then that Polyaenus shared a common source 
with the first three writers, who in my opinion were following 
the version of Cleitarchus. 28 As Polyaenus differs from Arrian, 
he also therefore did not here use Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, 
Arrian's sources. As for Parmenio's advice to Alexander, we 
find similar versions in PA 32.5ff and Curt. 4.15.5-9, for which I 
have argued that Cleitarchus was the main source.29 

Polyaenus' choice was unwise, for the account of the attack 
on the baggage-camp,30 which Arrian derived from Ptolemy 

27 'AA.t~avopo~ tv 'Ap~';A.ot~ 'tT]V uo'ta'tT]v fLaXT]v ~apd'!lltap£'taooE'to. fLoipa 
n£porov OU1( OAiY'l It£ptEA.e6v'tE~ 'ta 01(Euo<pOpa 'troY Ma1(EOOVOOV o t,;pltasov . 0 
napfL£vioov 'AAr~avop'!l O\)yE~OUAEUE 'tOt~ OK£UO<pOpOt~ ~0T]9£iv. 0 oE • cUoEv', 
EtpT], • ltapaAU£tV XpT] 'ti1~ <paAayyo~, ana 'tOt~ ltOAEfLiot~ au'toi~ fLaXEo9m· 
lJt'tT]9EVtE~ fLEv yap OU1(E'tt 'troY 01(EUO<p0POOV XpnSOfL£V, VtKtioaV'tE~ OE Kat 'ta 
lJflE'tEpa 1(at 'ta 'troY ltOArflioov £~OfLEV.' 

28 See THA 20ff, 27 (Diodorus), 122f (Curtius); Sources 38-42 (Plutarch). 
29 See supra n.28 and A e 138ff for a general view of the sources for the 

battle of Gaugamela; sources of Curtius: Atkinson 446ff; Devine (1986) 91. 
30 This part of the battle has been the subject of much controversy, not to 

say confusion. I gave my version in A e 143, 146£ in 1980-the same year as 
the versions of Atkinson (438f) and Bosworth (C I 308). Devine's view (1986: 
99, 105 with nn.71H, 105, 124f) is on much the same lines as mine, but see 
eRBS 24 (supra n.11) 31 on skeuophora and· Arrian's Use of Callisthenes?" 
in ClBuli 68 (1992) 89f. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 37 

and/or Aristobulus, is factual and not sensational: "some of the 
Indians and of the Persian cavalry" (3.11.5) broke through a gap 
in the infantry, reached the baggage-camp and were then de­
feated by a detachment from the rear rank of the double 
phalanx. These cavalrymen came from the Persian centre, as I 
noted above (ad 4.3.17). The Persians whom Arrian next 
mentioned were from the Persian right wing; they outflanked 
and attacked Parmenio's troops (3.14.6 fin.). There they were 
joined by the defeated members of the first group, so that 
Parmenio's men were attacked from both sides (allq>t~A(j)V) 
and Parmenio sent for help. Alexander, now victorious in the 
enemy centre, brought his Companion Cavalry from there 
towards the Persian right wing, clashed with the retreating 
"Parthyaeans, some of the Indians, and the largest and strongest 
force of Persians" (3.15.1), who were in formation, having 
broken off their action against Parmenio's Thessalians (3.15.3).31 
Polyaenus, or rather his source, conflated the two Persian 
attacks and made Parmenio ask for help to be sent to the 
baggage-camp. 

4.3.11. The Thracians having prepared many heavy-laden wagons to 
let loose on the Macedonians, Alexander ordered them to avoid as 
many [wagons] as possible, and should they be caught to go 
down on the ground and hold their shields overhead, so that it 
would happen that the rushing wagons would leap over them. As 
this was done in the actual event, the Thracians' preparation of the 
wagons proved useless.32 

The only other extant account of this campaign is in Arr. 1.1.4f 
and I have argued that Arrian derived it from Ptolemy and/or 
Aristobulus. Thus Polyaenus could have obtained his version 
either from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus or from Arrian. There 
are striking verbal echoes 33 between Arrian and Polyaenus, so 
much so that we should conclude that Polyaenus made direct 

31 For this interpretation see A G 147, where En is taken not with OlCOICElV 
but with (X,tE'tP(X,tE1:o in Arr. 3.15.1; for the confusion see Bosworth, C I 309ff. 

32 'AAE~avopo~ ep~ICWV napEcrICEuacr~tvrov ICa'tayo~ou~ a~a~a~ nOAAa~ 
EnaqnEVat 'tOl~ MaICE06crt napTjYYEtAEV au'tol~ EICICAlVEtV JlEV ocra~ OUvatv'to. d 
OE ICa'taAaJl~aVOtv'to. ICaOtEV'ta~ au'tou~ npo~ 'tl]V yilv unEpnOEVat 'ta~ acr­
nioa~. onro~ cruJl~aivot CPEpOJlEVat~ 'tal~ aJla~at~ unEpnll00.v. 'tou'to 'tOt ICal. EV 
au'til 'til ndp~ YEVOJlEVOV i\AEY~E 'tOt~ ep~~l.v aXPllcr'toV 'tl]V 'tWV aJla~wv 
napacrICEuTjv. 

33 These include ltaprcrICEuacrJlEvrov. EltacptEVat. ICa'taAaJl~avotv'to. ltpO~ 'tl]V 
yilv. cprPOJl(vat~ 'tal~ aJla~at~, and illtEPltll0iiv. My account of the action is in 
AG46. 



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38 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

use of Arrian. The only difference is that Polyaenus said that the 
wagons were "heavy-laden" (K<X't<xy6~ou~). He probably in­
vented this detail in order to make the stratagem more im­
pressive, for Arrian merely said that the Thracians collected 
wagons initially to form a defensive laager. 

4.3.12. Alexander took Thebes by concealing a sufficient part of his 
force and putting Antipater in command of it. He in person led 
the visible force against the strong part of the [Theban] positions 
(btl 'tou~ ExUpou~ 'trov 't01tO>v). The Thebans came out against him, 
and they fought not ignobly against that visible force. At the cri­
sis of the battle Antipater raised up his hidden force, went round 
in a circle to where the wall was rotten and unguarded, and at that 
point he occupied the city and raised the signal. Alexander saw it. 
He shouted out: "Thebes is already mine." The Thebans were 
fighting stoutly, but when they turned and saw the city captured, 
they fled. 34 

There are three accounts elsewhere of the capture of Thebes: 
Diod. 17.12; PA 11.9f; Arr. 1.8.12-17. The first two have points 
in common, which are best explained if they drew on a com­
mon source, namely Cleitarchus. 35 Arrian's version is com­
pletely different: his source was Ptolemy with touches of Aris­
tobulus (Sources 20Sf). Where does Polyaenus' version stand? 
It is incompatible with Arrian's account, which attributes the 
break into the city to Alexander. It resembles that of Diodorus 
in that it is a Macedonian officer who first led a detachment into 
the city (17.12.3); but while Polyaenus provides a concealed 
force under Antipater, Diodorus has Perdiccas lead a force 
through an unguarded postern gate. Nor does Polyaenus chime 
in with Plutarch, in whose short account the Macedonian 
garrison of the Cadmea made a sortie and overcame the 
Thebans from behind (PA 11.10). 

Arrian's version, based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus, is to 
be regarded as true to the facts. Diodorus and Plutarch have 

H 'AAi~uvopo<; EAUP£ sljpu<; 'tl)<; OUVUfl£W<; lJ(UV1"!V UltOJ(PUIjIU<; J(Ut 'tu~u<; 
Elt' uu'tl)<; 'AV'tlltU'tpOV' 't1"!V OE <pC(V£PUV uu'to<; ~YEV Eltt 'tau<; EXUPOU<; 'troY 'tOlt­
WV. 8TJ~UlOl 01: £ltE~l)Aeov J(Utltpo<; 't1"!V OPWflEVTJV OUVUfllV OUK uy£vvro<; UV'tl-
1t<lPE'tUOOOV'to. 'AV'tlltU'tpO<; £V 'tip J(UlPip 'tl)<; flUXTJ<; 't1"!V J(E~PUflflEVTJV OUVUfllV 
uvucnljou<;. J(uKA.Cfl ltEPl£AeWV. n ouepov KUt aq>UAunov i]v 'to 'tElXO<;, 'tuu'tl1 
K<l'tEAU~E'tO 't1"!V ltOAlV K<l\ OTJfl£lOV ~pEV. ·AA.E~<lVOpO<; lOWV UVE~OTJOEV, 00<; TlOTJ 
'tu<; 8lj~u<; EXOl' 8TJ~<llOl 01: EUProO'tW<; fluxoflEVOl, 00<; £loov £'no'tp<x<p£V'tE<; 
r.uAIllJ(UlUV 't1"!V ltOAlV. Eq>£uyov. 

35 For the points in common see T H A 195 n.17; for Cleitarchus as the 
source, THA 13f, 26ff; Sources 25ff. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 39 

points in common that seem due to a common source, namely 
Cleitarchus. Polyaenus followed a source that represented the 
Thebans as "fighting stoutly." He had that in common with Clei­
tarchus, but he must have obtained his report of the hidden 
force from a source other than Cleitarchus-a source for which 
one cannot offer a name. In any case, Polyaenus unwisely chose 
an account that did not rest on historical fact. 

4.3.16. While crossing the Granicus Alexander outflanked the wing 
of the Persians, as they were about to attack from a commanding 
position, by himself leading them, the Macedonians, upstream to 
the right [literally, "towards the spear'"]. The phalanx charged and 
routed them.36 

Polyaenus did not derive this passage from the author followed 
by Diodorus (17.19.3; almost certainly Cleitarchus: THA 16f, 
23f, 26) in making Alexander cross the river unopposed. On the 
other hand, Arrian agreed with Polyaenus in describing a move 
in the riverbed by Alexander, "continually extending his forma­
tion at an angle where the stream was pulling," i.e., against the 
current (1.14.7).37 A further point of agreement is the part 
played by the phalanx in the centre of Alexander's formation, 
for Arrian also had the Macedonians of the centre break 
through first and then the Persian wings collapse (1.16.1). More­
over, Polyaenus' statement that Alexander outflanked the Per­
sians enables one to understand in Arrian's account how his 
"light-armed infantry" inflicted heavy casualties on the Persian 
cavalry (1.16.1), for these infantry were the Archers and the Ag­
rianians stationed on Alexander's right wing (1.14.1), and they 
now overlapped the Persians' left wing and attacked the flank of 
that wing. 

36 'AAi~uvopOIi fpavl1cov olU~uivoov nEPcruli E~ il1tEpOE~ioov buov'tuli (uu­
touli) uu't0li btl oopu 'touli MUKE06vUIi avuyuyrov il1tEPEKEpucrEV' 1] Or q>aA.ay~ 
Ttp<>crTtEOOUcru 'toUIi TtOAEJ,ltouli EtpEIjIU'tO. 

I have translated Kora'is' emendation, [TtlOOPU as printed by Melber, in­
stead of the reading of the archetype, ETtl uooop, which I prefer. The sense is the 
same, as Kwaterwards" and ·spearwards" both lead one upstream, which is 
the meaning also of the compound avuyuyrov (cf uvoo 'tau Tto'tUJ,lOU at 4.3,9 ). 
The text was misinterpreted by E. Badian (Ancient Macedonia II [Thes­
saloniki 1977] 288 n.51), for he makes Alexander move his men downstream, 
which would have led to confusion in the centre and not to an outflanking of 
the enemy. 

37 See my "The Battle of the Granicus River," JHS 100 (1980) 75 (=Collected 
Studies III 95). 



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40 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

Arrian's sources were Ptolemy and Aristobulus, as he pro­
claimed in his Preface, and in this case we know that he fol­
lowed Ptolemy, because Plutarch cited Aristobulus when re­
porting the number of Alexander's losses, which were given 
differently by Arrian (PA 16.15; Arr. 1.16.4).38 We conclude, 
then, that Polyaenus derived his account at 4.3.16 from a long 
account by Ptolemy, whether directly or indirectly. It is of 
crucial importance for understanding the battle. 39 

4.3.29. Alexander invaded the land of the Sogdians. It is all rough 
and hard to traverse. In the centre of it a rock rises up which is 
accessible only to birds that fly. Around the rock a thick forest of 
close-packed trees made the unscalable cliffs even more unscalable. 
The rock was occupied by Ariomazes with a large, powerful force 
of Sogdians, and he had springs of water inside the rock and an 
abundant supply of foodstuffs. After riding round the rock and 
noting its natural features Alexander issued his orders. Three hun­
dred young men were to be selected who had experience and skill 
in rock-climbing, and they were to make their way unarmed up 
through the thick forest and to pull one another up with fine 
ropes. Once they gained the summit, they were to take off the 
white waistbands which they were wearing, tie them to very long 
poles and raise them up above the foliage, so that the intensive 
waving of the bright waistbands all together would be visible to 
the enemy above and to the Macedonians below. Well, the rock­
climbers with great exertions reached the top, and as the sun rose 
they waved their waistbands. The Macedonians below raised a 
mighty, resounding shout. Ariomazes, astounded that all the 
army was on the way up and that he was already caught from 
above, surrendered himself and the rock to Alexander in the belief 
that Alexander's power and fortune were more than human.4o 

38 Hamilton 38: Mit is clear ... that Plutarch uses Aristobulus.» 
39 My account of the battle (supra n.37: 73-88) differs from the accounts of, 

for instance, K. Lehmann, "Die Schlacht am Granikos,» Klio 11 (1911) 230-
44; R. Lane Fox, Alexander the Great (London 1973) 122; Badian (supra n.37); 
and Bosworth, Conquest 4off. 

40 ·AA.E~UVOpO<; (VE~UA.eV ei<; 'tT]V royoluvrov xropuv. i] OE (crn 1tacru 'tpuXetu 
KUt oucr~u'to<;' 1thpu OE KU'tU IJ.E<J11V avu'telVCl (opvi8wv) 'tOt<; 1t'tllVOt<; [1J.0VOl<;] 
~UcrlIJ.O<;· tv KUKA.q> OE UA.ll Oucr£tU KUt 1tUKVl] 'tou<; a~u'tou<; KPllIJ.VOU<; a~U'tro­
'tEPOU<; eipyut;E'to. 'tl]V ItE'tpUV 'APlOIJ.Ut;l1<; 1J.£'tu 1tou..t;<; xnpo<; KUt Kup't£pa<; 
royoluvrov Ku'teA.U~£'to 1tllYu<; uou'to<; EXwv EVoov KUt ItUPUcrK£Ul]V crl'tirov 
u<p(}ovov. 'AA.E~uvopo<; 1tepll1t1tucrUIJ.£vo<; KUt Ku'tulJ.u8iliv 'tu<; <pucrEl<; 'tTJ<; 1tE't­
pu<; (KEA.£ucre 'tPlUKOOiou<; A.oyuou<; veuviu<;, ot<; ~v UOlCTJOl<; KUl 'tEXVll KplllJ.vo­
~u't£tV, aoltA.ou<; KU'tOltlV 'tt;<; ItE'tpU<; OlU ItUKVt;<; UA.ll<; aVEpltClV KUt A.£1t'tOt<; 
KUA.Ol<; aVllJ.aV uu..l]A.ou<;· (ltElOUV OE 'troY KOpU<prov KpU'tl] crrocr lV, t;rovu<; 
A.£UKU<;, n<; dxov, A.uOUIJ.EVOU<; KOV'tOt<; dJIJ.l]K£<Jl1tEPlU\jIUl KUt 'toU'tOu<; \J1tEP 'tT]v 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 41 

Polyaenus did not follow Arrian's account, for there is no men­
tion in Arrian of the thick forest, the approach through the 
forest, the foliage on top of the rock, and the springs of water 
on the rock. Polyaenus does not mention the snow, which in 
Arrian's account provides a supply of water and makes the 
ascent so difficult that, when some thirty men fell to their 
death, the bodies were lost in the snow, nor the exchange of 
jibes about "flying men." On the other hand, Polyaenus and 
Curtius have some points in common: copious springs of water 
inside a cavern on the rock (Curt. 7.11.3); the king rode round 
the rock (a distance of some 30 km; 7.11.2); his orders were 
reported at some length (expanded into a speech at 7.11.7-12); 
300 young men were to be selected (7.11.7); on gaining the sum­
mit they were to signal with white garments (7.11.11, evadite in 
cacumen; quod cum ceperitis, candidis velis signum mihi 
dabitis); these garments were raised aloft on their spears 
(7.11.19); and when that did happen, there was shouting by the 
entire army (7.11.25, totius exercitus clamor). Whereas Arrian 
limited the operation to a single night (Arr. 4.19.1, 'tftc; VUK'tOC;), 
Polyaenus and Curtius made it cover at least a day and a night 
(Polyaenus having the men proceed through the dense forest to 
the back of the rock; Curt. 7.11.14, 16 [diem], 21 [postero die]). 

It is evident that Polyaenus disregarded Arrian's account, no 
doubt based on Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus (Arr. 1 praef). He 
chose to follow Curti us, or alternatively to go back to Curti us' 
source or rather sources, for I have argued elsewhere 41 that 
Curtius followed Aristobulus for the actual ascent of the rock 
and Cleitarchus for the background and the finale, the scourg­
ing and crucifying of the Sogdian leaders (7.11.28). There are in­
teresting parallels between what we have ascribed to the influ­
ence of Cleitarchus and the account of the operation at the Su­
sian rocks in Polyaenus 4.3.27 and in Curt. 5.3.17-4.33, which 
derived from Cleitarchus (supra ad 4.3.27). In each case Cleitar-

UATlV uvm:£lVElV, waH aElpoUl; KUt AUI11tpa~ 'ta~ ~WVUI; E1tt 1tA£la'tov 'ttvua­
aOI1EVU~ KUt 'tOl<; avoo ~Up~UpOl<; KUt 'tOl<; KU1:oo MUK£OO(JtV opaa9at. Ot I1rv Of] 
KPTlI1VO~U1:at auv 1tOAAi!> 1tovcp KU1:U KOpU<pf]V (yEVOI1EVOl) uVlaxov'to<; 1,AlOU 1:U~ 
~wvu<; UVE<JI:lauv' Ot Or MUKEOOVE~ I1EYU KUt AaI11tpOV KU'tooeEV ,;MAU~UV' 0 
Or 'AplOI1U~Tl<; EK1tAayc1.<;. 00<; 1tuaTl<; 1:Tl~ a'tpu'tlii<; uvu~atvouaTl<; KUt 00<; i\OTl 
KU'tU Kopu<Pll<; i:uAooKW<;. UU1:0V 't£ KUt tf]V 1tE1:PUV 1tapCOooK£V 'AAE~UVOpcp 
eElO'tEpUV U\J1:OU tiJv Ouval1lV Kat 'tl]V 'tUXTlV 1,yoUI1EVO~. 

41 THA 144f. Bosworth (C II 125) has criticised me for believing in these 
two sources and called it "contamination," but his own theories involve what 
he calls "two complicated contaminations" (126). 



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42 POL YAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

chus has expanded an operation to cover at least a day and a 
night instead of Arrian's single night; he has had the troops take 
provision for two or three days; he has added a thick forest and 
dense foliage; he has invented conversations and a speech by 
Alexander; and he has exaggerated the exhaustion of the troops 
(e.g. Curt. 5.4.18; 7.11.17). For his part Polyaenus exaggerated 
the boldness of the stratagem by stating that the climbers went 
"unarmed" (a67tAO\)~), whereas Curtius had them armati "with 
swords and spears only" (7.11.14) and Arrian implied that they 
were lightly armed and not, as the defenders supposed, "exactly 
fully-armed" (4.19.4, a1(pl~&~ OntAlcr~£VO\)~). 

In his account of the two very strong rocks that Alexander 
captured, Strabo reports the one was "in Sogdiane the rock of 
the Oxus," but some say «the rock of Ariamazes (517C= 
11.11.4). Polyaenus agrees with Strabo, for he places his rock in 
Sogdiane and has it defended by Ariomazes-thus in agreement 
with Curt. 7.11.1-whereas Arrian (4.17.4) called it just "the in­
Sogdiane rock" and did not name a defender. 42 

4.3.30. The Cathaei, a division of the Indians, made a desperate op­
position to Alexander. He killed them from the youth upwards 
and razed their strongest city, Sangala. India was pervaded by the 
bad report that Alexander was waging war in a murderous, bar­
barian manner. As he wished to change his reputation, when he cap­
tured another city in Indian territory, he took hostages and made 
a treaty; and then on coming to a third city, which was very large 
and we11-populated, he placed the hostages-old men, women, and 
children-in front of the phalanx. The inhabitants, recognizing 
those of their own race and seeing the evidence of Alexander's clem­
ency, opened their gates and admitted him as suppliants (I!E'tU 
ilCE'tllPtroV). The report spreading at once persuaded the Indians to 
accept Alexander willingly.43 

42 So also Strabo's other rock, Kthe in-Bactriane rock of Sisimithres," was 
also called Kthe rock of Sisimithres" (PA 58.3), Kthe in-Pareitacae stronghold, 
another rock, named after Chorienes" (Arr. 4.21.1), but just Ka rock" in the list 
of contents of Diodorus 17 KE' and at Curt. 8.2.20. See Hamilton 129, who is 
clearer than Bosworth, C II 124ff. 

43 'Al..tc,avopo<; Ka9alou<;, floipav 'Ivoiilv EC, CX1tOVOla<; uvna'tuaav Tj~l]OOV 
bc'tEtvE Kat ltOl..lV au'tiilv ruyyal..a 'tTjv Kap'tEpro'tU'tl]V Ka'ttcrKa\jlEv. oll1KE 
'tou<; 'Ivoou<; q>tlfll] ltovl]pa 00<; 'AI..Ec,uvopou q>OVlKiil<; Kat ~ap~aplKiil<; ltol..Efl­
ouv'to<;. (, or f!E'ta~Ul..l..Etv 'tTjv 06c,av ~ouMflEVO<; al..l..l]v ltOl..lV (ola) 't11<; 'IvolKl1<; 
i:I..OOv. 0fltlPOU<; W~OOV, altElcruflEVO<; Eltt 'tPl'tllV ltohv ~AeEv EUflEyt911 KatltOI..U­
clv9proltov, 'tuc,a<; ltpO 'tll<; q>uWYYo<; 'tOu<; 0fltlpoU<;. ytpov'ta<;. lta'ioa<;. yuva'iKa<;. 
Ol Or 'tou<; Of!Oq>Ul..ou<; yvroplcraV'tE<; Kat 'ta £pya 't11<; 'AI..EC,civopou qnl..av9proltla<; 
OpiilV'tE<; uVOlYOUcrl 'tE 'ta<; ltUW<; Kat f!E'ta lKE'tllPliilv au'tov EO£c,av'to. au'tlKa 
iJ q>tlf!ll olaopaf!OUaa £ltElaEV 'IvOou<; £KOV'ta<; 'Al..tc,avopov O£XEcrBm. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 43 

Diodorus mentions briefly (17.91.4) the costly siege of "the 
largest and strongest city" of the Cathaei and Alexander's 
burning of it. Curtius describes the city as "great by the stand­
ards of the region," the escape of only a few men, and the de­
struction of the city (9.1.18, excidium urbis). Arrian gives a long 
description of the siege of Sangala (5.22.4-24.5), the capture of 
70,000 persons, and the razing of the city, of which the territory 
was given to Indians who came over to Alexander voluntarily 
(5.24.8). The ultimate source of all these accounts was the de­
scription by Ptolemy (holding a command during the siege) 
and/or Aristobulus. 44 The opposition was, as Arrian makes clear 
and as Polyaenus says, "desperate" (E~ tl1tovotm;; tlv'tto'taoav), 
and the casualties were very high for the Cathaei 45 and higher 
than usual for the Macedonians (Arr. 5.24.5).46 It is probable that 
Polyaenus exaggerated the "murderous" element in saying that 
Alexander killed the inhabitants "from youth upwards," for 
Arrian's full account (5.24.5) has Alexander take over 70,000 
pnsoners. 

The taking and parading of hostages 47 are described also at 
Curt. 9.1.23 (obsides ducebantur ante agmen). The surrender of 
Indians as "suppliants" also occurs at Diod. 17.91.4 (,.u:B' 
i,1CE'tT1Ptwv). Arrian reports only incidentally that, at the time of 
the razing of Sangala, Indians of the region were coming over 
voluntarily (5.24.7).48 The further effect of Alexander's policy of 
clemency ('tf1~ 'AAE~avDpou cptAavBp((l1tta~, as Polyaenus puts 
it) was described not by Arrian but by Diodorus (17.91.7,93.1) 
and by Curtius (9.1.30, 36). Polyaenus may have drawn his final 

H It is generally agreed that they were Arrian's sources, with Ptolemy pre­
dominating: Sources 256£; Bosworth, C II 327, citing the views of earlier 
authors . 

.s As at Thebes and at Tyre, when there was opposition and fighting within 
the city, the casualties were respectively 6,000 (Diod. 17.14.1) and 8,000 (Arr. 
224.4), as compared with 17,000 at Sangala (Arr. 5.24.5), where the Cathaeans 
and their neighbours had congregated (5.22.4f). 

46 Bosworth (C II 334: "the military population [of Sangala] was clearly 
massacred en bloc") disregarded the statement that over 70,000 were captured 
(Arr. 5.24.5). Presumably he took Polyaenus as his authority, although he did 
not mention him. 

47 The taking of hostages indicates that a treaty had been concluded, for the 
hostages were intended as a guarantee that the treaty would be kept. 

48 Arrian abbreviates a great deal, and this is a good example. See Bosworth, 
C II 336£. 



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44 POL Y AENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

remark from reading either Diodorus or Curtius or their 
source, Cleitarchus.49 

4.3.31. Alexander observed that the land of the Cossaei was rough 
with high, inaccessible mountains and that there was a multitude 
of notable warriors in the mountains; there was therefore no expec­
tation of taking it. Someone came reporting "Hephaestion has died 
in Babylon:' He [i.e., Alexander] proclaimed universal mourning 
and was hurrying away to the burial of Hephaestion. The scouts 
of the Cossaeans, as they saw men departing, scattered themselves. 
Alexander, sending cavalrymen by night, captured the unguarded 
approach-route to the mountains, and [himself] turning back 
from his march and appearing (in support of) the cavalrymen, to­

gether with them subjugated the land of the Cossaei. This action, 
they say, was a consolation to Alexander for his grief over 
Hephaestion.5o 

A similar description of the land and its warriors at Arr. 7.15.1£ 
explains more fully than Polyaenus that a regular force could 
not capture the territory, because the Cossaei left their villages 
and took to the high mountains, from which they later returned 
and resumed their practice of brigandage.51 Arrian had earlier 
mentioned (7.14.9) that mourning was ordered throughout the 
whole barbarian country, and he placed "a considerable time" 
of mourning (7.15.1, Xpovo<; auxvo<;) before Alexander's expe­
dition towards the Cossaei. Diodorus too has an interval of time 
between the death of Hephaestion (17.110.8) and the invasion of 
Cossaea (17.111.4). He describes the coun try and the warriors 
in similar terms. Strabo (524C= 11.13.6) cites Nearchus' report 
that the Cossaei were a tribe of brigands, exacted tribute from 
Persia, and were checked from their audacious way of life by 
Alexander in a winter campaign. Such remarks recur at Arr. 
Ind. 40.6£, who gives Nearchus as his source (Ind. 20.1; 40.5, 9). 

49 Alexander's policy of harshness followed by clemency succeeded also in 
southern Pakistan; see A G 230. 

50 ·AA.t~avOpo<; 'tljv Koooaiwv xwpav rwpa 'tpaxetuv 'te Kat OPll UljIllA.a Kat 
imp&ma Ka t1tAT190<; £v 'tOt<; oPCOtv uvoprov OoKlfLWV' ou 'tOtVUV EAe'iv £Ant<;. ~KE 
'tl<; aYYEAAwv • 'Hq>ato'ttWV £v Ba~uAroVt 'tE9VllKCV'. 0 Or KOtVQV 1tEv90<; £1tay­
ydAa<; £1tt 'tljv 'Hcpa to'tlwvo<; 'tUcpljv l)1t£iye'to' Ot OK01tOt 'trov Koooatwv. ava­
Scuyvuv'tU<; 00<; etOov [au'tou<;]. aU1:Ot Ote<JltuPlloav. 'AAE~avopo<; VUK'tWP 1.1t-
1tEa<; 1tEfLljla<; 'tljv £<; 'tCx oPll 1tUpoOOV acpUAaK'toV Ka'teAu~e'to Kat 'tT1<; OOOt-
1topia<; U1tOKAtVa<;. £lttcpavet<; 'tOl<; l.1t1te1JOt ouv a\J'tol<; 'tljv Koooatwv xwpav 
ExnpWoU'to. 1:O\)'to 'tu (pyov 'tT1<; btl. 'Hq>Uto'ttwVt AUltll<; 1tapllyoPllfLa CP<XOtV 
'AAe~uvOpcp yevEo9m. 

51 These tactics were employed by resistance groups in the Balkans in 
World War II. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 45 

Plutarch places Alexander's order for mourning some time 
before the campaign against the Cossaei (P A 72.3f). It is clear 
that Polyaenus drew on the same source or sources as these 
writers, namely Ptolemy, who took part in the campaign (Arr. 
7.15.3), and Nearchus. Polyaenus dramatises the stratagem on 
his own initiative by moving the proclamation of mourning 
down to the start of the campaign. 

The preliminary capture of the 'approach-route', which Poly­
aenus describes, occurs in the plural in Diodorus (17.111.5, 
7tpoK<X'tO.A<x~OIlEVO<; 't&.<; 7t<Xpo~ou<;). Polyaenus' final comment, 
that the campaign was said to be a consolation to Alexander in 
his mourning, is echoed in Plutarch's remark that "this was 
called a death-offering to Hephaestion" (PA 72.4). The 7t<XPTl­
YOPTlIl<X in Polyaenus and the EV<XYLoIl6<; in Plutarch imply in 
each case a turn to a new source that they shared in common. If 
so, Polyaenus stopped short of Plutarch's statement that Alexan­
der "slaughtered all Cossaeans from the youth upwards," even 
though Polyaenus (4.3.30) had used that phrase of the Cathaei. 
In the present case Polyaenus was wise, for the statements by 
Diodorus, that Alexander took very many prisoners and by lib­
erating them obtained the submission of the Cossaeans, and by 
Arrian (Ind.), that Alexander founded cities so that the Cos­
saeans should adopt a settled life, are to be accepted as histori­
cal, 52 as their sources were respectively Ptolemy or Diyllus and 
Nearchus. 53 

4.3.24. When Alexander was administering justice in the presence of 
Macedonians or Greeks, he thought fit to keep the court modest 
and democratic, but when he did so in the presence of the bar­
barians he thought fit to have it brilliant and fit for high com­
mand, thereby astounding the barbarians even with the form of 
the courtroom. At any rate, when he was administering justice in 
the presence of Bactrians, Hyrcanians, and Indians, he had his mar­
quee set up as follows. The marquee was of a size for 100 couches; 
it was supported by fifty gold columns; the upper part was 
covered by extensive canopies overhead, which were interwoven 
with gold and decorated with embroideries. On the inner side 
round the marquee there stood first of all 500 Persian Apple­
bearers, in full dress uniforms of purple and quince-yellow cloth. 

52 See my account in A G 242 with n.167. Alexander and Peucestas recruited 
Cossaei: Arr. 7.23.1. 

53 For these writers see Sources 140, 298; THA 74 (Diyllus). I suggested 
(Sources 298) that the idea of a death-offering may have been taken over from 
an account by Cleitarchus. 



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46 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

After the Apple-bearers there were archers up to the same number; 
they differed in their uniforms, some being clad in flame-coloured 
garments, others in dark blue, and others in deep-dyed scarlet. In 
front of them stood Macedonians, silver-shielded, 500 of the tall­
est men. At the centre of the marquee the golden throne was 
placed, on which he presided and conducted his business; the 
Bodyguards stood by the king on either side as he was givng 
judgment. The marquee was encircled by the Guard of elephants, 
fully equipped, and by 1,000 Macedonians, wearing Macedonian 
uniforms. Next to them 500 Susians in purple dress, and after 
them, encircling the entire parade, 10,000 Persians, the most hand­
some and the tallest of their race, adorned with every Persian 
finery, all carrying their short swords. Such was Alexander's court 
of justice when he was judging in the presence of the barbarians.54 

Anecdotes about Philip as the final judge in Macedonia show 
that proceedings there were almost informal, and appellants 
were completely outspoken in addressing the king. As Poly­
aenus indicates, this continued to be so in Asia when Alexander 
judged the cases of Macedonians and Greeks, for he kept one 
ear ready to hear the words of the defendant (PA 42.2ff). We 

54 'AAi~uvopo<; tv IltV 'tOt<; Mma:OO<Hv i\ EV 'tOt<; "EAATJ<H Ol1'U~ooV Ilf'tPWV 
Imt OTJIlO'ttICOV EXEtV 'to OllCua't1]plOV EOOlClIlU~£v, EV Ot 'tOt<; ~ap~upot<; AallltPOV 
ICUt (J'tpa'tTJYtlCov, ElCltA1]aaoov 'tOu<; ~up~upou<; ICUt 'tq> 'tou OtlCua'tTJPlou a~1]llu'tt. 
EV youv BulC'tpot<; lCul 'YplCuviot<; lCul 'IvOol<; OtICU~ooV dXE 'tT,V alCT]vT,v roO£ ltE­
ltotTJIlEVTJV. ft alCT]vT, 'to Iltyt:eO<; ~v ICAtvrov £ICU'tOV' xpuaEOl lCioVE<; ult£'ti8EV'tO 
uu'tU It£V't1]ICOV'tU' UltEp'tElVOV'tE<; oupuvlalCot Ihuxpuaot. ltOtIC1AilUatv EICltEltOVT]­
IlCVOl. 'tov avoo 'tOltOV EaICEltU~oV. nipam Iltv ltpro'tOt It£V'tUICO<HOt IlTJA.o<POPOt 
ltI:pt 'tT,V alCT]vT,v EV'tO<; 'la'tuv'to ltOPCPUpUl<; ICUt IlTJA1VUt<; Ea8"atv E~TJalCT]llivot. 
Ilua Ot 'tou<; IlTJA.ocpOPOU<; 'to~mat 'tov taov apl81l0v EXOV'tE<; 'tUl<; f.a8"at Ot1]A­
Aa'ttov' Ot IlEV yap uu'trov cpA.Oytvu. Ot OE ICUUVW, Ot OE uaYtvo(lucp" ltEPtE~i­
~ATJV'tO. 'tou'toov ltpOla'tUV'to MUICE06vE<; apyupU01tlOE<; ltEv'tulCoalOl 'trov llE'Yia­
'toov avOprov. lCa'ta OE 'to Iliaov tl1<; alCT]v,,<; 0 XPU(J"QU<; EICEt'tO 8p6vo<;, ECP' ot ltpO­
lC(x81]Il£vo<; EXPTJIlU'tl~EV' Ot aoolla'toCPUAaIC£<; EcpEa't1]ICEaUV iXU'tEPc08cv 'tou ~U­
a1.A£oo<; OlICU~OV'tO<;. EV ICUICACP 't,,<; alCT]v,,<; 'to 'trov CACCPUV'toov a'YTJllu OlEaICCU­
uallEVOV Ecpca't1]ICCt ICUt MulCc06vc<; X1AlOl (J'tOA.a.<; MUICEOOVtlCa<; EXOVt£<;. Eltt 
'tOU'tOl<; ltEV'tUICOcnOt rouatot nop<pupoaX1]IlOVE<;, ICUt IlE'ta 'tou'tOU<; f.V ICUICACt> nuv­
't(()V ntpaat IlUptol (nEparov) Ol ICUAAla'tOt lCul IlEYla'tOl, ICEICUAAooltlallEVOl 
ltlXV'tt lCoallCt> nEpcnlCq>. ltUV'tE<; UlCtvUICU<; EXOV'tE<;. 'tOlOVOE ~v 'AAE~UVOpOU 'to 
ollCua'ti]ptoV EV 'tOl<; ~plXipol<;. 

See Griffith in G. T. Griffith and N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Mace­
donia II (Oxford 1979) 393f. W. L. Adams (in Ancient Macedonia IV [fhes­
saloniki 1986] 48ff) discusses freedom of speech in Macedonia without men­
tioning this passage in Polyaenus. It seems that Alexander presided as Hege­
mon in some cases tried in the court of the Greek League, before he left for 
Asia. The trials of Cleander, Sitalces, and Heracon were instigated by accusa­
tores ... e provincia (Curt. 10.1.2), who were exercising the right of appeal that 
Alexander as King of Asia had granted to all his subjects. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 47 

know little of trials when barbarians were defendants or appel­
lants; the best example is probably the trial of Heracon, first 
acquitted and later "convicted by men of Susa" (Arr. 6.27.5). 

A marquee was probably customary at Macedonian festivals. 
In 335 B.C. a marquee for 100 couches was set up for Alexander 
at Aegeae, not for administering justice but for entertaining 
guests at a state banquet "with splendid equipment" (Diod. 
17.16.4). On the other hand, the gold columns, the canopies dec­
orated with gold, the embroideries, and golden throne were 
Asiatic features in the Persian manner. 55 Alexander marked this 
combination of Macedonian and Persian royal customs by 
parading elite forces of both Macedonia and Persia. 

The Bodyguards, standing by the king, were Macedonians of 
high rank, usually seven in number. The 500 "Macedones" 
constituted the Royal Infantry "Guard of the Macedonians" 
(Arr. 1.8.4), drawn from the tallest men, as already in Philip's 
time (Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F348). The 1,000 Macedonians 
wearing Macedonian uniforms constituted the Royal Hypaspist 
Guard (Arr. 1.8.4).56 The Persian units, parallel to these, were 
the 500 Apple-bearers, 57 and two groups of 500 each, namely 
the Archers and the Susians. The number of Apple-bearers was 
reduced from the 1,000 of the Persian King's Guard, in order to 
equal the size of the Macedonian Infantry Guard. The Susians 
were also armed with bows, as Phylarchus (Ath. 539E) placed 
after the Apple-bearers a force of 1,000 archers. These Susians 
wore purple uniforms because, according to Phylarchus, 
Alexander had granted them that colour of uniform. 58 The 1,000 
archers were equal in number to the Royal Hypaspist Guard. 
On the other hand, there was no Macedonian equivalent to the 
Guard of Elephants and the 10,000 Persians, for they indicate 

55 Plutarch (PA 37.7) tells the story of Alexander sitting for the first time "on 
the throne of Darius under the golden canopy"; and the marriages of Alex­
ander and his Companions to Asiatic women were celebrated "in the golden­
canopied marquee" (Plut. Mor. 329D), appropriately because they were con­
ducted in the Persian manner (Arr. 7.4.6). 

56 These two guards are defined in my "The Various Guards of Philip II 
and Alexander III," Historia 40 (1991) 403ff (=Collected Studies II 186ff). 

57 When the Apple-bearers formed the Guard of the Persian king, they had 
numbered 1,000 (Hdt. 7.41.1f; Heracleides of Cumae, FGrHist 689Fl=Ath. 
514 B). On the funerary car of Alexander a tablet showed as attendant on the 
king a Guard "of Macedonians" and a Guard of • Apple-bearers" (Diad. 
18.27.1 ). 

58 Phylarchus, FGrHist 81 F4. SO too Eumenes granted the wearing of the 
purple: Pluto fum. 8.7. 



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48 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

that the reception was for the Asiatics. We may note that a 
Guard of Macedonians, a Guard of Apple-bearers, and a group 
of Elephants were portrayed on the tablets that accompanied 
the funerary car of Alexander (Diod. 18.27.1). 

Polyaenus' account presents striking similarities (even in 
precise phrases) to the account of Phylarchus, writing in the 
latter third century B.c.,59 but differences indicate that Polyaenus 
did not draw entirely from Phylarchus. The likelihood is that 
both were familiar with an account written near the time of 
Alexander, i.e., in the latter fourth century B.C., presumably by 
the court historian Chares.6o 

The most prestigious place in the marquee, after the Body­
guards, was accorded to the MaKEoovE<; apyupacHnoE<; by 
Polyaenus and to apyupacr7ttOE<; MaKEoovE<; by Phylarchus. 
Polyaenus alone dates this form of ceremonial to within the 
time when Indians were present, i.e., in 326-325 B.C. It is then 
understandable that such features of the marquee as the golden 
columns were inspired by those of the palaces of the Indian 
kings where they administered justice (Curt. 8.9.23-27). 

An explanation of the term apyupaO'7ttOE<; appears just before 
the invasion of India: 61 because the equipment of Indian soldiers 
was said to be enriched with gold and ivory (Curt. 8.5.4), 
Alexander adorned his cavalry with gold and silver, and "he 
added silver plates to the shields" (Curt. 8.4.3) and "called his 
army (exercitum) 'Argyraspides' after the silver shields" Oust. 
12.7.5). As I have argued elsewhere (THA 104, 147f, 151), the 
common source of Curtius and Justin in these passages was 
very probably Cleitarchus. Although Cleitarchus may well 

59 Phylarchus, FGrHist 81 F4. For instance in both accounts um:p'tElVoV'tE<; 
Ot)pClVlO'1COl bUl;(p1loOl1totld4taotV bmE1tOVTUJ.£VOl, 1tOp<llUPOl<; lCal. fJ,T)AlVUl<; Ea9Ti­
otV Ei;T)O'1CT)fJ,EVOl and EV lCUlCACP 'tij<; 01CT)vij<; 'to 'tow EA.E<pUV't(J)V iiY'lfJ,a OlEOlC£\)­
aofJ,£vov E<pEO'tTtlCEl. 

60 Chares mentioned the marquee for 100 couches in his account of the mass 
wedding (Ath. 538c). Aelian (V H 9.3) gave a similar version, but it is not 
relevant here, as Aelian wrote after Polyaenus. 

61 It is generally agreed that mention of Argyraspides in the battle order of 
the Macedonians at Gaugamela in 331 B.C. at Diod. 17.57.1 and Curt. 4.13.26 
are anachronistic: see my view cited above (n.56: 416). Tarn (II 149-53) 
maintained that all references to Argyraspides as existing in the reign of 
Alexander were anachronistic, but he failed to mention the Argyraspides of 
Phylarchus, Polyaenus, and Aelian. His view has been supported by D. 
Kienast, Philip Il. 'Von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden 
(Munich 1973) 287; R. A. Lock, "The Origins of the Argyraspids," Historia 26 
(1977) 377. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 49 

have exaggerated, it is to be noted that Curtius and Justin were 
not restricting the addition of gold and silver ornamentation, 
and in Justin's case the name" Argyraspides," to any individual 
unit or units. 62 We may, however, be confident that Alexander 
would have issued such shields first of all to his Infantry 
Guards. That may explain why Chares, if he was the ultimate 
source of the statement in Polraenus, described one of the 
Infantry Guards in the court 0 Alexander as "argyraspides" 
within the years 326-325 B.C., and why Alexander created "a 
Persian unit of Argyraspides" at Opis in 324 B.C. (Arr. 7.11.3). 

II. Conclusions and Comparisons 

As argued above, the writers whose accounts Polyaenus used 
for his own versions were in all probability the following: 

Cleitarchus: 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 
4.3.20 (mercenaries at Massaga) 
4.3.6 (camp at Gaugamela) 
4.3.30 final remark only (Sangala) 

Ptolemy: 4.3.16 (Granicus) 
4.3.31 in part (Cossaei) 

Aristobulus: 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 
4.3.22 (Hydaspes) 

Ptolemy and/or 
Aristobulus: 4.3.17 (caltrops at Gaugamela) 

4.3.30 the main source (Sangala) 

Nearchus: 4.3.31 in part (Cossaei) 

Phylarchus: 4.3.34 the main source (court of justice) 

Curtius: 4.3.29 (Sogdian rock) 

Arrian: 4.3.11 (Thracian wagons) 

X (unidentified) 4.3.27 in part (Susian Gates) 

4.3.12 (Thebes). 

Of these the original writers were Cleitarchus, Ptolemy, Aris­
tobulus, and Nearchus; the secondary writers Phylarchus, who 
had probably used Chares, an original writer; Curtius, who had 

62 Bosworth's "this new term was reserved for the hypaspists" (Conquest 
270) is his own ipse dixit. Tarn (II 151) had given some reasons for advancing 
a similar view. 



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50 POLYAENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

probably relied on Cleitarchus and Aristobulus; and Arrian, 
who had used Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. In each case Poly­
aenus presumably chose a writer, because he found in his work 
the most striking version of a stratagem (most clearly the choice 
of Curtius for 4.3.29, the Sogdian rock). 

The secondary writers may be called intermediate or Zwis­
chenquellen. The clearest example of Polyaenus using such a 
writer is at 8.35-42, where Polyaenus took his versions of the 
acts of eight courageous women from Plutarch's Mulierum 
virutes 16-27 (Mar. 253F-63c). Polyaenus abbreviated accur­
ately and wrote in his own style. He even kept the same order, 
although it was haphazard. Plutarch had given his reason for 
doing so: "Cases of individual bravery I will put down as they 
come to me, not in any order, because I think that the record of 
the present subject does not at all require a chronological ar­
rangement" (tr. F. C. Babbitt).6J Polyaenus evidently thought 
likewise, not only in this context but also in recording the strata­
gems of Alexander at 4.3, for the emperors were interested in 
the subject of each stratagem and not in its date. But when we 
try to assess the historical worth of each item, the Zwischen­
quelle does not usually help; Plutarch, for instance, rarely 
named his source.64 

For Alexander's stratagems Polyaenus added 'improving' 
touches to make a stratagem more striking still: 4.3.11, "heavy­
laden" wagons," 4.3.29, "unarmed" warriors, 4.3.17, caltrops 
covering "the space between the armies," 4.3.30, the inhabitants 
of Sangala "slain from the youth upwards," and 4.3.31, the 
proclamation of mourning at the start of the campaign against 
the Cossaei. We owe to Polyaneus some points not in the 
surviving accounts of other authors: the use of slings at the 
Susian Gates (4.3.27), the 'outflanking' at the Granicus (4.3.16), 
the 'second' hill at Massaga (4.3.20),(,5 the position of Porus on 

63 P. A. Stadter, Plutarch's Historical Method: An Analysis of the Mulierum 
Virtutes (Cambridge [Mass.] 1965) 16, commented on this repeated order. 

64 On the other hand, the unknown author of the Mulierum Virtutes 
named as sources Herodotus, Ctesias, Timaeus, Hellanicus, Aeschines Soc­
raticus, Xenophilus, and Menecles, no doubt truthfully. See A. Westermann, 
Paradoxographoi, Scriptores rerum mirabilium Graeci (Braunschweig 1839) 
213ff. 

6S A. Abramenko, • Alexander vor Mazagae und Aornus," Klio 76 (1994) 
203 n.71, argues that Polyaenus was referring to Indian mercenaries leaving 
not Massaga but Aornus. He did not notice the 'second hill', which on my 
interpretation places the episode at Massaga. 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 51 

the leftmost elephant66 and the space of fifty feet between the 
elephants (4.3.22), and the Indians among those to whom Alex­
ander administered justice (4.3.24). Another contribution by 
Polyaenus was his own clear, factual, and uniform style, which 
overlaid and concealed the style of his sources. 

On my interpretation of only some passages on Alexander, it 
is apparent that in 4.3 Polyaenus had read the works of original 
and secondary writers before he made his own choice, and that 
he consulted quite a wide range of such writers. This interpreta­
tion indicates that Polyaenus was justified-at least in the pas­
sages here considered-in claiming that he had engaged in much 
original and laborious enquiry (2 praef: a<p' ocrllC; lcrwpiac; Kat 
ocrep 1tovep 'taoE crUA.A£~aJlEVoc;). 67 

My conclusions may be compared with those of nineteenth­
century scholars, whose views were epitomised by J. Melber 
('<Cber die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung 
Polyans, NJbb Supp!. 14 [Leipzig 1885J 417-688). His con­
clusions for Alexander's stratagems, with which alone we are 
dealing, may be summarised as follows. Polyaenus did not 
arrange the thirty-two stratagems of 4.3 in their chronological 
sequence, i.e., from 336-323 B.C. Melber did observe such a 
sequence, however, within three separable parts of 4.3, which 
he called "Groups": namely, items 1-10, 11-22,23-31. In fact his 
observation was less than accurate, for in his Group 1 items 1-2, 
5 are undatable; in Group 2 items 7-10 are not in chronological 
sequence, and items 13-14 are undatable; and in Group 3 items 
24-25 are out of chronological sequence, and item 28 is undat­
able. The next step in Melber's argument was that each Group, 
its content being (he thought) in chronological order, must have 
been drawn from a separate source (on the assumption that the 
source had arranged its material in chronological order). He 
proceeded next to identify those separate sources as follows: 
for Group 1 an Anekdotenversammlung, an Apophthegmen­
sammlung, and for item 9 an excerpt from a Sammlung; for 

66 This is probably correct, as in Devine (1987) 108, for from this position 
Porus would have been able to order and to direct the left part of his phalanx 
to turn left and move to the left and he would have been in the thick of the 
fighting. Had he been in the centre, he could not have seen the course of the 
action beyond his left wing, and he would have been on the periphery of the 
fighting, for the centre was at least 1.5 km. from the left wing. 

67 Buraselis (121) has shown that the Prefaces addressed to the two 
emperors are to be treated as -basic evidence." I am grateful to him for 
sending me an offprint. 



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52 POL Y AENUS CONCERNING ALEXANDER 

Group 2 the history of Cleitarchus, whether directly or 
indirectly (p.615); and for Group 3 a Sammelwerk (p.616).68 

Melber's derivation of his Groups 1 and 3 from already 
existing 'Collections', which Polyaenus would merely have 
copied, is not compatible with the emphasis that Polyaenus 
placed on his own research and his own labours. Nor when we 
consult the available 'collections' do we find any significant use 
of them by Polyaenus for the stratagems of Alexander. Thus 
the thirty-four items in Plutarch's Apophthegmata of Alexan­
der (Mor. 1790-81 F) and the thirty-two items of Polyaenus 4.3 
share only one in common, namely the order that the Mace­
donians should shave their beards, so as not to afford a hand­
hold for their enemies (Plut. no. 10, Mor. 180B; Polyaen. 4.3. 
2)-an order ascribed to Alexander also at Pluto Thes. 5.4. 69 The 
gap between Frontinus' collection of stratagems and that of 
Polyaenus was some eighty years, and it would have been easy 
for Polyaenus to have simply copied items from Frontinus. The 
relation between them is very different. Only one item, namely 
Alexander's refusal to drink water from a helmet when it was 
not available for his men, is shared (Front. 1.7.7; Polyaen. 
4.3.25), but Polyaenus might have taken it from elsewhere, as 
Arrian remarks (6.26.1) that "some others" told the story (e.g. 
Curt. 7.5.10; P A 42.7). In three instances it seems that Poly­
aenus corrects Frontinus without naming him,l° At 1.11.14 
Frontinus ascribes to Alexander the trick of transferring onto a 
liver the words "victory for the king" and then showing the 
liver to his men. Polyaenus gives a fuller account of the trick 
but ascribes it to Attalus (4.20). No doubt Polyaenus is right, for 
Alexander respected the omens of sacrifice that his seer Aris­
tander interpreted (e.g. Arr. 4.4.3). Frontinus (3.7.4) attributes a 
stratagem during a siege of Babylon to Alexander, which Poly­
aenus attributes to Cyrus-correctly, for Alexander never 
besieged Babylon, whereas Cyrus did and used that stratagem 

68 Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler viii) make the point that 8the practical aim 
of the military type of stratagem collection ... sets stratagem collections apart" 
from other collections. 

69 Also in Synesius 16, p.79 C. E. Rohde, RhM 38 (1883) 303f, held the view 
that Polyaenus used Plutarch directly and that the ultimate source was 
Ptolemy. 

70 One reason for the silence of Polyaenus may have been the relationship 
between Frontinus and Marcus Aurelius, as Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler 
xiii) remarks, for 8Marcus Aurelius' great-great-grandfather had married Fron­
tinus' sister." 



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N. G. L. HAMMOND 53 

(Hdt. 1.191.3; Xen. Cyr. 7.6.16). At 1.4.9-9a Frontinus gives two 
accounts of a stratagem in crossing a river, namely the Hydas­
pes (1.4.9) and the Indus (1.4.9a); of these the first is very brief, 
and the second, naming the Indus instead of the Hydaspes, is 
inaccurate (cf Arr. 5.12.4-14.6). Polyaenus (4.3.9) puts matters 
right in a full account derived from Arr. 5.10.3 or Arrian's 
sources. So much for Polyaenus' use of such 'collections' as 
have survived for his stratagems of Alexander. 

Modern scholarship lays less stress on 'collections'. Thus, 
writing generally of Polyaenus' work, Wheeler (Krentz and 
Wheeler xv) writes: "No doubt he did consult other stratagem 
collections ... it is improbable that he could have hoped to gain 
the well-read Marcus Aurelius' attention merely by reworking 
another exempla collection." Whereas some writers had had 
doubts, Wheeler states firmly that "as a pleader in Roman 
courts Polyaenus had to know Latin" (xiii), and in consequence 
could have read the works, for instance, of Frontinus and Cur­
tius. That is clearly correct. There is also more readiness to 
believe that Polyaenus did sometimes consult the works of 
earlier authors. Thus in a dissertion of 1970, R. J. Phillips 71 main­
tained that Polyaenus consulted Theopompus, Hieronymus, 
Phylarchus, Duris ("possibly"), and Plutarch. In 1987 D. M. 
Lewis72 argued that Polyaenus (4.3.32) used Ctesias, possibly 
through Cleitarchus, for the list of foods for the Persian kings. 
In 1994 Wheeler (Krentz and Wheeler xv) went further. He 
named seventeen authors of whom "traces have been found ... 
with much debate over their direct or indirect use." I have tried 
to show here that for some passages concerning Alexander 
Polyaenus consulted six identifiable authors.7J 

CLARE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 

June, 1996 

71 The Sources and Methods of Polyaenus (diss.Harvard University 1970), 
summarized in HSCP 76 (1972) 297f. 

72 -The King's Dinner (Polyaenus IV 3.32)," in H. Sancisi-Weedenburg and 
A. Kuhrt, edd., Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources (Leiden 1987) 81: 
- On the whole the case is strongest for Ctcsias." 

73 This paper has been extended and improvcd as a result of suggestions by 
the Editor's reader to whom I am very grateful.