Thucydides and the 'Constitution' of the Peloponnesian League Lendon, J E Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Summer 1994; 35, 2; ProQuest pg. 159

Thucydides and the 'Constitution' 
of the Peloponnesian League 

J. E. Lendon 

for Donald Kagan 

SPARTA'S RELATIONS with the members of her Peloponnesian 
League were governed by bilateral treaties that obliged 
them to follow her in war.! It has become widely accepted, 

however, that at least by the fifth century a multilateral pro­
vision modified these bilateral relations: on questions of peace 
and war, the allies were only bound to follow Sparta's lead if a 
majority vote at a congress of representatives of the League's 
cities sanctioned Sparta's decision. 2 The existence of this alleged 
'constitution' of Sparta's League is attractive, not least because 
gatherings of the allies are attested before the League embarked 
upon wars or concluded peace, and because mention is made of 

1 The term "Peloponnesian League," unattested in the sources (which refer 
to "the Lacedaemonians and their allies" or "the Peloponnesians") is a mod­
ern convenience to describe the cities more or less subject to Sparta and bound 
by unequal treaties to "have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, 
and to follow the Spartans wheresoever they may lead" (e.g. Xen. Hell. 2.2.20, 
4.6.2). On these treaty obligations see T. Pistorius, Hegemoniestreben und Au­
tonomiesicherung in der griechischen Vertragspolitik klassischer und hellenis­
tischer Zeit (Frankfurt a.M. 1985) 87-93, 120-25. 

Z U. Kahrstedt, Griechisches Staatsrecht I: Sparta und seine Symmachie 
(Gottingen 1922) 28M; G. BUSOLT and H. SWOBODA, Griechische Staatskunde 
II (Munich 1926: hereafter 'Busolt and Swoboda') 1330-34; J. A. O. LARSEN, 
"Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A Study of Spartan Foreign Policy and the 
Genesis of the Peloponnesian League," CP 27 (1932) 140, and "The Constitu­
tion of the Peloponnesian League. I," CP 28 (1933: 'Larsen 1933') 259; K. 
Wickert, Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung his zum Ende des 
archidamischen Krieges (diss.Erlangen 1961) 29; and, the standard recent 
treatment, G. E. M. de STE. CROIX, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War 
(London 1972: 'Ste. Croix') 104-23, esp. 115-18, followed by e.g. P. A. Cart­
ledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta (London 1987) 11 f. Even the lone 
recent dissenter, D. KAGAN, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca 
1969: 'Kagan') 13-21, capitulated in the face of Ste. Croix's onslaught: The 
Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (Ithaca 1981) 41 n.21. 

159 



160 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

voting at some of those meetings. 3 Nevertheless, it is argued 
here that the balance of evidence is against the existence of any 
such explicit provision limiting Sparta's rights: the direct 
evidence for the provision is equivocal at best; there is, 
moreover, evidence that no such provision existed; and, in any 
event, there is no need to posit such a provision to explain the 
reported behavior of Sparta and her allies. Once this is admitted, 
a better understanding is possible of the speech Thucydides has 
the Corinthians give before Sparta's assembled allies in 432 
(Thuc. 1.120-24), and, more generally, of relations wi thin 
Sparta's League on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. 

1. Thuc. 5.30-31 

The case for the existence of the majority-vote covenant rests 
upon Thuc. 5.30.1, where the historian describes the Spartans' 
attempt in 421 to convince the Corinthians not to form an 
alliance with Argos in the wake of the unpopular Peace of 
Nicias: 

AaKE~a.\.~oVWt ~£ aio9o~EVOt 'tOY 9pouv 'tou'tov EV Tfl nEAonov­
VTtoCf' Ka9Eo'tIDta. Kal. 'toue; KOPlV9toue; ~l~aoKuAOUe; 'tE '(EVO­
~£voue; Kal. au'toue; ~£AAov'tae; o1tdoEo9al 1tpOe; 'to "A p,(oe;, n£~­
nOUOl1tp£O~Ete; Ee; 'tl,V KOPlV90v ~OUAO~EVOl1tpOKa'taAa~E'iv 'to 
~£AAoV Kat nnrov'tO 'tTtV 'tE EOTtYTlOW 'tou nav'toe; Kat d 'Ap­
'(dOte; o<prov U1tOO'tUV'tEe; ~u~~axol eooV'ta.\. 1tapa~TtoEo9at 'tE 
e<paoav al)'tOUe; 'toue; OpKOUe; Kat Tl~l1 U~lKE'iv on ou o£xov'tal 
'tae; 'A911Vatrov o1tov8ue; dpll~£VOV cipwv dva.\. on av 'to nAf)-
90e; 'trov ~u~~uxrov 'l'l1<PtOll'tal 11v ~Tt n 9Erov 11 'hpwrov 
KWAu~a n.4 

3 Before Leuctra, meetings where a vote of the allies is clearly attested are: 
440 (Thuc. 1.40.5,43.1), 432 (1.119-25), 421 (5.17.2, 30.1), and 404 (Xen. HelL 
3.5.8; cf 2.2.19). In 378 we hear of a 86YflU 'tOlV O'UflflUXWV, a decree of the 
allies (Xen. Hell. 5.4.37). Other meetings of the allies where it is not absolutely 
clear whether they were asked to vote, or just to advise the Spartans as the 
Corinthians and others did in 432 (Thuc. 1.67-72), include ca 504 (Hdt. 
5.91ff), 428 (Thuc. 3.8-15), 423 (4.118.4, 9), 412 (8.8.2), 396 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2: the 
wording does not leave the existence of this meeting beyond doubt), 382 
(5.2.11-23),376 (5.4.60), 371 (6.3.3-20). 

<4 "The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, seeing that this tumult had 
arisen in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians were the creators of it and 
were themselves about to enter into alliance with Argos, sent ambassadors to 
Corinth in the hope of preventing what was about to happen. They accused 
[the Corinthians] of being the instigators of the whole affair and of intending 



J. E. LENDON 161 

In this passage the Spartans insist that Corinth, which had 
refused to become party to the peace with Athens, should have 
joined in the peace because a majority of the allies voted for it. 
If the majority-vote provision adduced here is a 'constitutional' 
requirement of the Peloponnesian League, then a majority vote 
of the allies compels members to make peace, and scholars may 
have been justified in supposing that a majority vote was 
required for war as well. 5 But there is no clear indication that the 
Spartans are appealing here to an abiding regulation of the 
League, and if this passage is returned to its context in 421, it 
appears likely that they are not, as the Corinthian reply to the 
Spartan appeal shows (Thuc. S.30.2ff): 

KopivSwt bE nupov'twv o<pi<n 'trov ~ull~.Hixwv OOOt oub' uU'tOI. 
EbE~UV'tO 'taS o1tovbas (1tUpEKaAEouv bE uu'tOUS uU'tOI. 1tpO­
'tEPOV) av'tEAeyov 'tOlS AUKEbatllOviotS a. IlEV l1btKOUV'ta ou 
b"AOUV'tES av'ttKpUS on OU'tE lOAAWV o<piotv a1tEAa~OV 1tUp' 
'AS"vuiwv OU'tE 'AVUK'tOPWV el 'tE n aAAO Evollt~OV EAUO­
oouoSat 1tPOOXTJIlU bE 1tOWUIlEVOt 'taUS E1tt 9p~1CTJS 11" 1tpO­
brooEtv' 0IlOOat yap UU'tOlS OPKOUS ibict 'tE O'tE llE'ta flon:tbE­
U'trov 'to 1tpro'tov a<pio'tuv'to KUt aAAous UO'tEPOV. OUKOUV 
1tupu~uivEtv 'taUS 'trov ~ullflaxwv OPKOUS £<puouv OUK E<nOV­
'tES ES 'tas 'trov 'ASTJvuiwv 01tovbas' aErov yap 1tiO'tEtS 01100-
UV'tES EKEivOtS OUK UV EUOPKElV 1tpobtbOv'tES uU'tOus. eiPTtoSat 
0' on 11V Ill, 8Erov 11 ;,prowv KroAullu n' <putvE08at oilv o<ptOt 
KroAullu SElOV 'taU'to. KUt 1tEpt IlEV 'trov 1tUAatrov OPKWV 
'tOOUU'tU cl1tOV. 6 

to revolt from them and become allies of the Argives, and said moreover that 
they [the Corinthians] were going to transgress their oaths, and that they had 
already done wrong by not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, it having 
been agreed that what a majority of the allies voted was to be sovereign, unless 
there was a bar to do with gods or heroes." 

5 A. W. GOMME. A. ANDREWES, and K. J. DOVER, A Historical Commentary 
on Thucydides IV (Oxford 1970: hereafter 'HCT') 25f; see also supra n.2. 

6 "In the presence of those of their allies who had refused to accept the 
treaty (for they had summoned them beforehand) the Corinthians made reply 
to the Lacedaemonians, not stating openly the matters in which they had 
been unjustly used, be it that they had not recovered Sollium or Anactorium 
from the Athenians, or any other respect in which they thought themselves 
disadvantaged, but instead offering as a pretext that they could not betray 
their Thracian allies, for they had sworn oaths separately with them, first 
when they rebelled with the Potidaeans, and again on later occasion. The 
Corinthians denied, therefore, that they had transgressed the oaths of the 
allies in not entering into the treaty with Athens; having sworn upon the faith 
of the gods to their Thracian friends, they could not give them up save by 



162 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

Thucydides says that Corinth chose to rely on the escape clause 
having to do wi th gods or heroes to excuse her refusal to ratify 
the peace, but notes that she could have complained that Sollium 
and Anactorium ("town[sJ of the Corinthians" that Athens had 
taken in 431 and 425 respectively: Thuc. 2.30.1, 4.49.1) had not 
been returned. He even implies that this might have been a 
more legitimate objection than what the Corinthians actually 
used (a mere 1tp0O'xTnW). What are the possible grounds for this 
still-born objection? 

A contemporaneous complaint by Elis, another non-partici­
pant in the Peace of Nicias, solves the mystery. The Eleans, 
Spartan allies, are found, when faced with Spartan aggression, 'tTtv 
~'\)v8ilKTlV 1tpoCP£pOV'tE~ EV n ElPTl'tO a EXOV'tE~ E~ 'tOY 'A't'tlKOV 
1tOAEIlOV Ka8lO''taV'to 'tlVE~ 'tau'ta ExoV'ta~ Kat E~EA8ElV (Thuc. 
5.31.5).7 At hrst sight this seems to be an appeal to the Peace of 
Nicias, in which it was agreed, at least informally, that territories 
conquered by the erstwhile foes should be returned to their 
original owners. 8 But it cannot be such an appeal: Elis refused to 
ratify the peace (Thuc. 5.17.2), and thus can have had no right to 
make claims under it formally or informally.9 Moreover, the 
territories Elis had lost had fallen into Sparta's hands, not into 
those of Athens. An agreement between Sparta and her allies 
that guaranteed the return of lands lost during the war must be 
posited. 10 It is to this agreement that Thucydides thinks that 

breaking their oaths. Besides, the expression was, 'unless there was a bar to do 
with gods or heroes'. Now here, as it appeared to them, there was such a bar. 
So much they said about their old oaths." (This translation, as well as the 
others, draws upon Crawley.) 

7 "putting forward the agreement in which it was said that whatever each 
had entering the Attic War, they should have leaving it." The association 
between the complaint of the Eleans and the potential objection of the 
Corinthians is made by C. Meyer, Die Urkunden 1m Geschichtswerk des 
Thukydides (=Zetemata 10 [Munich 1955]) 94. 

8 HCT IV 28f, correctly discarded by Ste. Croix 121. 
9 Cf. J. Classen and]. Steup, Thukydides (Berlin 1912) V 261. But the 

Eleans' application of the agreement to the" Attic War" amply disproves 
Steup's contention (Thukydideische Studien I [Freiburg 1881] 61 f, reproduced 
in Classen and Steup V 261 f) that the Eleans are referring to another consitu­
tiona I provision of the Peloponnesian League. 

10 That some otherwise unknown agreement must be inferred from the 
Elean complaint has been understood since G. Grote, Greece 2 VII (London 
1888) 19 n.t. But Grote curiously thought it referred to a decision of the allies 
to assign the income of their dependent cities to the war effort, and was a 
guarantee that they should have them back after the war was over. Ste. Croix 



J. E. LENDON 163 

Corinth could have appealed in complaining of her failure to 
receive back Sollium and Anactorium. 

Perhaps the most likely context for such an understanding is 
the League congress in 432 when the allies voted for war, and 
where it was "resolved that the necessities be procured by 
every state, and that there be no delay" (Thuc. 1.125.2).11 Thu­
cydides' terse description of the business transacted at this 
meeting is illuminated by occasions in the fourth century when 
the Spartan alliance similarly bound itself to fight wars under set 
terms. In 382 the Spartans and their allies decided how large an 
army was to be sent against Olynthus, decreed that member 
cities that did not want to send troops might send money 
instead, agreed that the Spartans were to fine any state that did 
not send its allotment, and discussed tactics (Xen. Hell. 
5.2.20-23,37).12 In 378, when Agesilaus led the League's army 
against Thebes, it was the "decree of the allies" (86yJ.lu 'trov (JUJ.l­
J.laXrov) that war should be made upon any member of the 
League that carried on a private war while Agesilaus' army was 
in the field (Xen. Hell. 5.4.37). At minimum, we must take it 
from Thucydides' statement that the League congress in 432 
defined each city's contribution to the war effort; moreover, if 
Diodorus (12.39.4) be believed, the congress agreed to dispatch 
an ultimatum to Athens, requiring the Athenians to rescind the 
Megarian decree as the price of peace. The guarantee about 
possessions that the Eleans mentioned-and Thucydides thinks 
the Corinthians might have mentioned-seems apropos here. 

12lf, echoing G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chae­
roneia IIP (Gotha 1904) 857, deems it "an ingenious device to prevent the allies 
from being tempted to fight each other while the war lasted, without openly 
placing any restraint on their right to do so." But the allies showed no 
hesitation in fighting one another (Thuc. 4.134 with HCT III 625; 5.29.1, 31.3) 
and the League was perfectly willing explicitly to forbid intra-league wars in 
378 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.37), so why resort to devices in 432? 

11 Busolt (supra n.l0: 857) suggested that the guarantee was passed at a 
separate meeting of the League in early 431. 

12 Larsen (1933: 261) notes that a similar arrangement about the commuta­
tion of men into money was in force in 373 (Xen. Hell. 6.2.16), and argues that 
the meeting in 382 passed a "constitutional amendment" to the League's con­
stitution. The evidence, however, no less supports a hypothesis that this com­
mutation was provided for on a number of separate occasions during the early 
fourth century. A pre-war agreement about how war was to be waged in com­
mon was also clearly contemplated in the 418 treaty between Sparta and her 
defeated opponent Argos: Thuc. 5.77.6, 79.3 with HeT IV 13Sf. 



164 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

Yet whenever it was before the outbreak of the Archidamian 
War that Sparta gathered her allies and agreed with them that 
"whatever each had entering the Attic War, they should have 
leaving it," it is in the context of this agreement that we must 
understand Sparta's claim that Corinth was bound to make 
peace by a majority vote of the allies. For if Thucydides thinks 
Corinth could have replied to the Spartan envoys' complaint 
under the terms of this pre-war agreement, it was naturally 
under the terms of this agreement that Sparta complained. The 
provision that peace could be made only upon a majority vote 
of the allies, mentioned without context by the Spartans, is, then, 
probably not an abiding 'constitution' of the Peloponnesian 
League, but instead part of Sparta's agreement with her allies for 
the prosecution of the war against Athens. 

Leaving aside the military and diplomatic measures taken at 
the League congress of 432, we suggest that before the outbreak 
of the war agreement was reached between Sparta and her allies 
on at least two points: that the co-combatants were guaranteed 
to emerge from the war with at least the possessions they had 
when they entered, and that the making of peace required a 
majority vote from the allies, a vote that should be binding upon 
all unless there was a bar having to do with gods or heroes. This 
pre-war agreement was confirmed with oaths; to prove that 
they have not "transgressed the oaths of the allies" (Thuc. 
5.30.3), the Corinthians adduced their oaths to the Thracians, 
that is, a bar to do with gods or heroes; and at the end of the 
Corinthians' apologia, Thucydides remarks laconically, "so 
much they said about their old oaths" (5.30.4).13 

The pre-war agreement between Sparta and her allies was, 
therefore, a treaty; it was, in fact, an unexceptional example of a 
class of Greek treaties made between allies in contemplation of 
war against a third party: treaties that inter alia settled in advance 
the potentially vexed question of how peace with that third 
party might be concluded. Analogous in intent was Sparta's 
treaty with the Persians in 412 (Thuc. 8.18), setting out the terms 
upon which the signatories were to make war together against 
the Athenians. The treaty guaranteed that neither party should 
make a separate peace with Athens. And it is easy to adduce 

13 Thucydides' use of 1tOAmOU~ OPKOU~ (5.80.2) to refer to oaths made at the 
beginning of the war (accepting the interpretation of H C T IV 146) indicates 
that the 1tOAmrov OPKCOV to which the Corinthians refer here need be no older 
than that. See also Thuc. 2.22.3, 3.86.3 with HCT II 78, 387 for 1toA(xt6~ 
alliances that are not so very old. 



J. E. LENDON 165 

other Greek treaties in which the parties agreed not to make a 
separate peace with the common enemy: all signatories to the 
treaty had to agree beforehand.14 The majority-vote provision of 
Sparta's pre-war agreement with her allies was a predictable 
modification of this conventional measure in the face of the 
large number of cities-often themselves at odds-that made up 
Sparta's League. It is the same solution adopted in a treaty 
between Athens (presiding by now over her Second Naval 
League) and Corcyra in the 370s: "it shall not be permitted for 
the Corcyraeans to make either war or peace without [the 
agreement of] the Athenians and the majority of the allies." 15 

The pre-war agreement of Sparta and her allies was drawn up 
to guarantee the unity of the League in adversity. The majority­
vote provision was intended to guard against the making of a 
separate peace, and to ensure that when peace was made, it 
would be observed. It required that the League should fight 
against and treat with Athens as a group. Yet to that necessary 
provision was added a countervailing safeguard, for if the 
majority could force peace upon the rest, the interest of a hard­
pressed minority might be sacrificed to those of a war-weary 
mass. Thus it was agreed that peace could not be made unless 
the losses of all were made good. Certainly this agreement was 
prompted by the sectional division in the League, which 
Thucydides stresses repeatedly, having Archidamus observe 
that "a war which each has undertaken for his private interests 
... is not easily settled in a creditable fashion" (Thuc. 1.82.6). The 
agreement was designed exactly to ensure that despite the 
diversity of interests in Sparta's League, the war could be settled 
credi tabl y .16 Perhaps the agreement was also inspired by the 
memory of Sparta's bolt home after the battle of Tanagra during 
the First Peloponnesian War in 458 or 457, when she made a 
four-month truce with Athens and left Boeotia to her fate at 

14 The treaty of 412 was later refined and to an extent renegotiated (Thuc. 
8.37, 58); but the provisions concerning the making of peace with Athens are 
found in all three treaties. Measures against separate peace: Thuc. 5.23.2, 47.4; 
cf 5.80.1; Staatsvertr. 148,263,293,309. 

15 Staatsvertr. 263: 1t6[A}f:[Jl]ov o£ Kat dptlVllV Ill, E~£tVat KopKUpatOt<; 1totTJoao­
Sat [<'l]v£u 'ASllVatCOv Kat [-taU 1t]AtlSOU<; 'trov OUIlIlUXCOV. 

16 On the sectional division in the Peloponnesian League, Thuc. 1.119f, 122.2, 
125.1, 141.6f. The League's members even fought private wars with each other 
during the war against Athens: supra n.10. 



166 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

Oenophyta. 17 In the event, the terms of the agreement were far­
sighted, if futile: for in the view of the cities that refused to ratify 
the Peace of Nicias it was exactly the kind of separate peace they 
had feared. 

As we interpret Thuc. 5.30, therefore, all Spartan claims and 
Corinthian counter-claims (possible and actual) about the past 
are made under the terms of the pre-war agreement, and none 
of them under a 'constitution' of the Peloponnesian League or 
the Peace of Nicias. To begin with, the Spartans "accused [the 
Corinthians] of being the instigators of the whole affair and of 
intending to revolt from them and become allies of the Argives, 
and said moreover that they were going to transgress their 
oaths.» 18 Pondering the future, then, the Spartans contemplate 
Corinth's revolting from Sparta, thus violating the old bilateral 
treaty that made her a Spartan ally, and thereby breaking her 
oaths. Concerning the past, however, they then claim that she 
has "already done wrong by not accepting the treaty with the 
Athenians, it having been agreed that what a majority of the allies 
voted was to be sovereign, unless there was a bar to do with 
gods or heroes,» that is, the Spartans accuse the Corinthians of 
having violated the pre-war agreement. 

In their reply, the Corinthians ignore the Spartan hypothesis 
about the future. In defending their conduct in the past, the 
Corinthians (Thucydides observes) could have replied under 
the provison of the pre-war agreement, which required that 
each should exit the war with all possessions intact and thus 
rendered the peace with Athens illegitimate, as Sollium and 
Anactorium had not been restored to them. But the Corinthians 
decided instead to rely upon the bar having to do with gods and 
heroes, which was a term of the majority-vote provision of the 
pre-war agreement: in the face of such a bar, they were not 
bound by the vote. Thus they argued that they were not 
violating the oaths sworn over the pre-war agreement.19 

17 Tanagra: Thuc. 1.108; Diad. 11.80-83; and esp. PI. Menex. 242B; see Kagan 
91-94. 

18 Thus Andrewes (Her IV 25) interprets this difficult sentence. 

19 The Spartans speak of future oath-breaking, and the Corinthians defend 
themselves against accusations of oath-breaking in the past: there are two 
separate sets of oaths here. The context makes clear that aOtKEtv in the Spartan 
accusation (5.30.1) is variatio for 1tapa~aiv£tv 0PlCOUC;, just as, e.g., it is for cmov­
Oat AfA:UoSat at 1.87 (cf 1.79.2). Thus the Spartans accuse the Corinthians of 
intending to violate one set of oaths (those of the bilateral treaty between 
Corinth and Sparta) and having violated a second (those of the pre-war agree-



J. E. LENDON 167 

Thucydides stands convicted of excessive compression in his 
account of this quarrel between Sparta and her allies; he requires 
that we have knowledge of a pre-existing agreement between 
them to which he makes only trifling reference. But compres­
sion is this historian's characteristic vice, and it is particularly 
marked in Book 5. 20 If the pre-war agreement be admitted, and 
Sparta's complaint to Corinth seems at home in it, the only 
direct evidence that Sparta's right to command her allies was 
limited by a multilateral regulation of her League evaporates. 21 

And even if this reconstruction is not accepted in detail, Thuc. 
5.30f is shown to be muddled to such a degree that it is dan­
gerous to infer that the Spartans allude to a 'constitution' of the 
Peloponnesian League when they complain to Corinth. 

II. No Majority-Vote Provision 

There is thus no clear testimony that a majority vote of the 
allies governed the activities of Sparta's League. Moreover, 

ment). The Corinthians ignore the first accusation and defend themselves 
against the second. 

20 H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Uneasy Peace-A Study in Political 
Incompetence," CQ 65 (1971) 315-25, highlights the roughness of much of 
Book 5: "It might almost have been written by Xenophon" (315). He signals 
compression as a particular difficulty (316); cf HCT V 375-79. Thucydides 
may also be alluding to this pre-war agreement when he records the allies' 
worry that the terms of the peace of Nicias (5.18) could be amended by the 
Athenians and Spartans alone, when properly all Sparta's allies should have 
been consulted (5.29.2f). If it was agreed that a vote of the allies was needed to 
make the treaty, the allies reasoned that a similar vote should be needed to 
change it. 

2! And with it, all the explicit evidence that the allies were always guaran­
teed the right to opt out of league actions on the basis of a bar having to do 
with gods or heroes, as, e.g. Busolt and Swoboda (1334), Larsen (1933: 260), 
and Ste. Croix (118ff) believed. We do see such excuses given for refusals to 
come on league expeditions (e.g. Xen. Hell. 4.2.16, and perhaps 2.4.30 and Paus. 
3.9.2; for a delay rather than a refusal, Thuc. 8.9.1), but the Spartans held such 
conduct against the Mantineans (Xen. Hell. 5.2.2), implying that allies did not 
have an agreed-upon right to refuse to participate on these grounds. In 
practice, the scrupulous Spartans would have respected an ally's genuine 
religious bar (see Thuc. 5.54.2), whether or not this was formally guaranteed: 
they abandoned expeditions themselves when the omens were unfavorable 
(e.g. Hdt. 6.76; Thuc. 5.54.2, 55.3; Xen. Hell. 3.2.24); and when an enemy, 
Argos, adjusted her calendar so that her holy month coincided with Spartan 
invasions of her territory, the Spartans needed divine permission to ignore 
even so dishonest a truce (Xen. Hell. 4.7.2f). 



168 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

plenty of evidence attests that Sparta was not formally required 
to consult her allies to lead them into war or to make peace on 
their behalf. In 1974 Werner Peek published an inscription of a 
treaty enrolling the otherwise unknown Aetolian Erxadieis in 
the Peloponnesian League ("to follow the Spartans wheresoever 
they may lead by land or sea"), which provides the first 
reasonably full text of one of the bilateral treaties of which the 
League was composed. 22 Not only is the majority-vote pro­
vision not mentioned, but lines 12ff commit the Erxadieis "not 
to make peace without the Lacedaemonians"23-i.e., Sparta alone 
is recognized as sovereign in matters of making peace; in this 
realm, relations between Sparta and an ally are purely bilateral 
and unequal. It is difficult to reconcile this stark statement with a 
Spartan obligation to get a majority vote of her allies to make 
peace on behalf of the League. 24 

22 W. Peek, Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag (=AbhLeip 65.3 [Berlin 
1974]), who dates it (12) to 500-470; see also P. A. Cartledge, "A New Sth_ 
Century Spartan Treaty," LCM 1 (1976) 87-92, and "The New 5th-Century 
Spartan Treaty Again," LCM 3 (1978) 189-90 for the 420s; contra, D. H. Kelly, 
"The New Spartan Treaty," LCM 3 (1978) 133-41 for ca 388; P. Bonk, 
Defensiv- und Offensivklauseln in griechischen Symmachievertragen (diss. 
Bonn 1974 [1978]) 73f for the early fourth century. The absolute date does not 
matter: the treaty clearly falls within the life of the Peloponnesian League. 

2J IlEB£ lC[UtaA:uhlV] nmi:8m (lVEU AU[lCEBuq.l.Oviov] IlEBEvi. Peek's recon­
struction (supra n.22) is confirmed by his critic F. Gschnitzer, Ein neuer 
spartanischer Staatsvertrag und die Verfassung des Peloponnesischen Bundes 
(=Beitr.z.kl.PhiI93 [Meisenheim am Glan 1978]) 41. The treaty may also com­
mit the Aetolian Erxadieis not to treat for peace without the Lacedaemonians 
(thus Peek 7, Kelly [supra n.22] 134ff; Cartledge [supra n.22 (1978)] 189), but 
Gschnitzer (7) reconstructs the text differently. 

24 Cartledge (supra n.22 [1976]: 91) avoids this consequence by excluding the 
Aetolian Erxadieis from the Peloponnesian League" on geographical, military 
and political grounds," although (as Gschnitzer [supra n.23] 23-26 shows) 
there is no reason to suppose that the Aetolian Erxadieis are not a Pelopon­
nesian people. Here Cartledge appeals to Ste. Croix's distinction (102-05) 
between members of the Peloponnesian League proper, whom he defines as 
those having the right to vote at League congresses, and Sparta's other, various, 
and far-flung allies, who do not. Rejecting the constitutional requirement for 
votes, we necessarily reject this definition of League membership as well. 
Gschnitzer (33f) is quite right to insist that the Aetolian Erxadieis do by this 
treaty become members of the League, and, adopting Peek's dating, tries to 
avoid the contradiction by supposing (1) that the majority-vote provision had 
not yet been enacted by the early fifth century (then how would he explain 
Hdt. 5.91 ff, seemingly a meeting of the League ca 504 ?); or (2) that the major­
ity-vote provision was enshrined somewhere in the lost ending of the text (to 
take up again a subject-<lecisions on peace and war-already dealt with by 
the fragment [lines 10-14], which has by its end [lines 16-22] moved on to 



J. E. LEND ON 169 

Second, in the treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos in 
the winter of 418/417, the parties agreed, Thucydides reports 
(5.79.3), that at DE 1tOl cnpan:ia<; DEn KOlVac;;, ~OUA.E1)Ecreat 
AwcEDall.lOviroc;; Kat 'Apydroc;; 01tct Ka DlKalo'ta'ta Kpivav'tac;; 'tOtC;; 
~UJlI.UIXOl<; ("if it shall be anywhere necessary to make an 
expedition in common, the Lacedaemonians and Argives shall 
consult upon it and decide as may be most fair for the allies" [tr. 
Crawley J). Andrewes notes that "on the face of it [this measure] 
overrides completely the right of Sparta's older allies to decide 
by majority vote whether they should go to war or not. "25 But if 
they never had such a right, there is no contradiction. 

Third, in a speech of the Athenian Autocles in 371 to the 
Spartans and their allies, Xenophon (Hell. 6.3.7f) writes: 

ouv,tf9£o9£ j.lEV yap 1tpO~ 'ta~ oUj.lj.luXiou~ 1tOAn~ 't01ho 1tp&­
'tOY UKOAOu9£tV 01tOt iiv UJlet~ rryilo8e. KUt"tOt 'ti 'to'l)'tO utno­
vOj.li~ 1tPOOltKet; 1tot£to9£ Of 1toA£j.liou~ OUK UVUKOtvOUj.l£VOt 
'tOt~ OUJlj.laXOt~ KUt E1tt 'tOU'tOU~ ;'yeto8£· roo't£ 1tOAAaKtS E1tt 
'tous £UJl£v£o'ta'tOUS UVCX'YKaCOV't(1,t O'tpcx't£uetv oi. A£y0j.l£VOt 
UU'tOVOj.lOt dvm.26 

If the Spartans lead their allies against their enemies without con­
sulting them, Sparta's right to summon her allies to war can 
hardly have been subject to their vote. 

praxis, and there to contradict the earlier statement?); or (3) that the majority­
vote provision, being multilateral, had no place in a bilateral treaty (but would 
a bilateral treaty be written that contradicted it, as this one seems to do ?). 

25 Andrewes, HCT IV 141, but he adds that "it might, however, be envis­
aged that, after Sparta and Argos had jointly decided that they wished to 
make war, a conference of the Peloponnesian League should still meet in the 
old way." 

26 "For the first thing you enjoin upon your allied cities is that they should 
follow wheresoever you may lead: how does that square with autonomy? And 
without having consulted the allies, you make enemies and lead the allies 
against them, so that often the so-called autonomous are compelled to cam­
paign against their closest friends." This passage, not surprisingly, was prob­
lematic for]. A. O. Larsen, "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League. 
II," C P 29 (l934) 9f, who was driven to posit a change in Spartan policy: 
although in the fifth century Sparta was obliged to put questions of war to her 
allies' vote, the arrogant fourth-century Spartans, riding roughshod over their 
allies' rights, had imposed upon them new treaties eliminating the necessity of 
consulting them. Note also that Xenophon (Hell. 6.3.18f) describes the for­
malities of making peace in detail on this occasion-necessarily so, because the 
peace foundered on a technical flaw (Agesilaus would not let Thebes take the 
oath for the Boeotian cities)-and there is no mention of a vote of the allies. 



170 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

Finally, we turn from texts to actions of the Peloponnesian 
League that cast light on the question. In ca 506 the Spartan king 
Cleomenes summoned the alliance to war. Herodotus relates 
(5.74ff) that he did not tell the allies the goal of his expedition, 
which was to install Isagoras as tyrant at Athens. On the eve of 
battle, the Corinthians decided that the cause was unjust, and the 
army dissolved. At this date, clearly, a League assembly (much 
less an affirmative vote) was not required for Sparta to lead out 
her allies: the allies were not even told why they were going. 27 

Almost a century later, in 419, when the Spartans asembled their 
allied troops at Leuctra on their frontier, "no one knew whither 
they were advancing, not even the cities which sent them" 
(Thuc. 5.54.1). The allies had good reason to be puzzled: Argos 
had attacked Epidaurus, Sparta's ally (Thuc. 5.53), but the Spartan 
point of departure was as suited to a march against Argos' allies 
Elis and Mantinea, both in rebellion from the League. In the 
event, the expedition was abandoned when the sacrifices 
proved unfavorable. But if the allies did not know against whom 
they were marching, they cannot have voted for the war.28 
Consider also Sparta's allies' reactions to the campaigns of 
Agesilaus into Boeotia in 378 and 377. Plutarch describes the 
allies as unwilling to participate in these League expeditions. 
They were "offended at Agesilaus," and "said that they did not 
desire to waste away hither and thither year after year" (Ages. 
26.3f). They seemed to be on the verge of refusing to serve 
when Agesilaus won their continued loyalty with a ruse (Ages. 
26.4f). But there was a League congress in 378 (Xen. Hell. 
5.4.37); if the allies were so unwilling, and it lay in their power to 
do so, why did they not veto the expedition? They complained 

27 This is admitted by those who advocate the multilateral provison; they 
necessarily believe that the requirement for a vote was introduced after this 
debacle, perhaps in response to it: Larsen (supra n.2 [1932]) 140-45; Ste. Croix 
11Mf. 

28 Thuc. 5.54.1, nb£l bE oubd:; a1tOl (J'tpaUUO\)(JlV, oubE at 1tOA£l:; £~ ~v 
£1tf.1l<P8T}(Jav, with Hey IV 73f for commentary and ~eography. Could failure 
to consult the allies have been permissible under special rules of the League, 
which allowed Sparta to summon her allies to march against rebels (Busolt 
and Swododa 1334) or participate in 'defensive' wars unconsulted (e.g. Ste. 
Croix 112-15)? But Sparta could not very well invoke such exceptions without 
telling her allies where they would be going. Moreover the distinction between 
'offensive' and 'defensive' wars is spurious: even supporters of the Athenian 
attack on Melos (Thuc. 5.97ff) and the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.6.2) could 
think these acts 'defensive'. Who ever admits to an 'offensive' war? 



J. E. LENDON 171 

bitterly, but they came when Sparta called: they can hardly have 
had the right to thwart Spartan plans by voting. 

On the evidence, Sparta's theoretical right to lead her League 
to war and peace was unlimited. Considered individually, 
scholars' arguments to discount individual testimonia to this fact 
(supra nn.26-28) can seem compelling; but in the face of the 
massed evidence they convey an unsettling sense of special 
pleading. So informal, irregular, and ad hoc were the meetings of 
the Peloponnesian League that Thucydides (1.141.6) can have 
Pericles fault the Peloponnesians for "using no single council 
chamber, and thus not accomplishing anything immediately and 
efficiently. » 

Sparta was not obliged to consult her allies or canvass their 
votes. Yet she sometimes chose to do both. To understand 
why, appeal must be made to the realities of power and Sparta's 
position as the by-no-means over-mighty hegemon of a frac­
tious League. Herodotus described what happened in ca 506 
when the Spartans led their League out and the allies proved 
recalcitrant: a shambles. On later occasions allies simply refused 
to go on expeditions (e.g. Xen. Hell. 2.4.30; 3.2.25, 5.5) and even 
if they came, they might come slowly (Thuc. 3.15.2, 8.9.1). 
Sparta could not coerce all her allies at once, and she could 
hardly coerce her more powerful allies at all. 29 Moreover, her 
allies supplied the lion's share of the League's military strength. 30 

Whatever Sparta's theoretical rights, if the allies were not willing 
to go on expeditions, there was little point in setting out against a 
powerful enemy. Herodotus describes (5.91ff) a meeting of 
Sparta's allies called in ca 504 to convince them to support the 
restoration of Hippias as tyrant at Athens: the allies were 
opposed and the project was abandoned. Had the allies not been 
consulted, the League army might have dissolved like 
Cleomenes' a few years before. Sparta consulted her allies in the 
first place simply to find out if enough were willing to go to 
make the expedition practical. 

Whatever Sparta's moral or legal claims to lead her allies with­
out consulting them, her weakness vis-a.-vis her allies, and her 

29 For Spartan expeditions against refractory allies, Ste. Croix 342, and see 
also Xen. Hell. 3.5.5 for 395. On Sparta's power relations with her allies, 
Kagan 21-26, adding Thuc. 1.141.6, where Pericles says of Sparta's allies that 
they 1tav'tE~ ... iao'VllCJ>ot OV'tE~. Ste. Croix 306 has adduced Thuc. 3.79.3 to show 
that iao'VllCJ>Ot in Thucydides can mean "with the same power of effective 
decision" rather than "with equal votes." 

30 For contributions to League expeditions, Busolt and Swoboda 1335ff. 



172 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

heavy reliance on allied soldiers, ensured that in practice consul­
tation was often essential. Calling meetings of the League also 
served to encourage allied adherence to Sparta's decisions, for 
the Spartans might try to persuade their allies, as when they 
explained why they wished to restore Hippias, or they might 
rely on interested parties outside the League, as in 418, when 
envoys of Mitylene were summoned to Olympia (Thuc. 3.8-15; 
cf Xen. Hell. 5.2.11-20), or inside the League: in 432 the Corin­
thians especially, but others as well, lobbied their fellow-allies 
for action (Thuc. 1.119-25; cf Xen. Hell. 5.4.60). In 382, when an 
expedition against Olynthus was in contemplation, Xenophon 
explains that many "who desired to gratify the Lacedaemonians" 
urged war (Hell. 5.2.20). Just as Athens could rely on the lesser 
cities of her alliance to support her in the assembly of the Delian 
League (Thuc. 3.10.5; HeT II 262, 264), so perhaps Sparta's 
lesser allies could be relied upon to join with her in pressuring 
the unwilling. 

Sometimes the Spartans set their allies to voting: Thucydides 
has the Corinthians claim to the Athenians that "when the 
Samians were in revolt [440] we did not cast our vote against 
you when the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes 
as to whether to help them" (Thuc. 1.40.5; cf 1.41.2,43.1). Why 
Sparta consulted her allies on this occasion is easily explained: 
she had little hope of aiding a besieged Samos-either by in­
vading Attica or sending a fleet-without the help of the other 
cities in her League, and especially Corinth; when the allies 
refused, the project was necessarily abandoned. But why have a 
formal vote? And why have a formal vote of the allies for war in 
432 (Thuc. 1.87.4, 119)? 

An understanding of what open voting meant to the Spartans 
makes the war votes of the Peloponnesian League explicable. In 
432 the pro-war ephor Sthenelaidas put the question of war with 
Athens to the Spartan assembly: "he said that he could not deter­
mine which roar was greater (for they voted by shouting and 
not with ballots) and, hoping by making them show their 
opinions openly to stir them up for war," he called for a division 
(Thuc. 1.87.2). This was, as Classen realized, a form of coercion: 
it was much easier for a Spartan anonymously to shout "no" 
than to walk over and stand in a group of presumptive cowards.31 

31 J. Classen and J. Steup, Thukydides I (Berlin 1919) 240, followed by D. M. 
Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 42. Cf coercive open voting at Megara: 
Thuc. 4.74.3; for secret voting at Acanthus, presumably to guard against this: 
Thuc. 4.88.1. 



J. E. LENDON 173 

It is likely that voting had the same coercive function in 
Sparta's League. The atmosphere at League meetings was men­
acing: the allies met the Spartan proposal to restore Hippias in ca 
504, which they widely opposed with silence. Only when the 
brave Socles, from powerful Corinth, a state largely invulnerable 
to Spartan punishment, spoke against the proposal, did the other 
allies add their voices to his (Hdt. 5.92f). This is not the conduct 
of a free and sovereign assembly: the allies clearly feared Sparta's 
wrath if they opposed the demands she thought legitimate. In 
432, and perhaps on all occasions, Sparta put the war to the vote 
of her allies after she had made her own decision for war (Thuc. 
1.118f; Ste. Croix 117). Setting the allies to vote was thus similar 
to forcing Delphic approval of a Spartan expedition to Asia by 
first consulting a pliant oracle of Zeus and then inquiring of 
Apollo "do you agree with your father?" (Plut. Mar. 191B, 208F-
209 A). When Sparta called her allies to vote she called on them to 
affirm their loyalty: a League member's vote signified not so 
much whether she favored going to war (that decision Sparta 
had already made for her) as whether she was willing to obey 
Sparta's Diktat and the terms of her treaty with Lacedaemon. 
The votes forced members of the League publicly to commit 
themselves to sending troops, and as in 432 the same meeting 
might define the preparations each city was to make. The votes 
served to intimidate opponents, and to flush out waverers: 
those cities that demurred at the vote could instantly be marked 
down for punishment. The use of compulsory open voting to 
daunt the timid and coerce the weak should come as no surprise 
to anyone familiar with the practices of modern tyrannies, the 
Senate of Imperial Rome, or university department meetings. 

Thus when in 432 the Spartans, "having summoned the allies, 
said that it seemed to them that Athens had acted unjustly, but 
that they desired to put the matter to a vote, having summoned 
all the allies, so that they might make war, if it seemed good, 
having deliberated in common" (Thuc. 1.87.4); or, as Thucyd­
ides describes it elsewhere, "having summoned the allies, de­
sired to put the question of whether the war was necessary to a 
vote" (1.119), they desired to do so in order to compel their 
allies, whose enthusiasm for the war varied, to commit them-



174 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

selves to the propositions that the war was just and necessary, 
and to pledge themselves to fighting alongside Sparta. 32 

The congresses of Sparta's Peloponnesian League were instru­
ments of Spartan policy: the Spartans had good reasons to sum­
mon their allies to counsel and to vote. But among these reasons 
there cannot be found a constitutional scruple that obliged her 
to submit questions of war and peace to a majority vote of the 
League. We have shown that the only piece of direct evidence 
for such a provision probably refers to something else entirely, 
and, furthermore, that there is ample evidence against such a reg­
ulation. We must confirm Kagan's view (21) of Sparta's relations 
with her allies: "on every occasion it was political or military 
reality, not constitutional regulations, which were decisive." 

III. Thuc. 1.120-24 and the Peloponnesian League 
on the Eve of the War 

A happy consequence of this conclusion is the light it sheds 
on the speech of the Corinthians before the assemblied allies 
(Thuc. 1.120-24). This is an old enigma: as early as 1919 Schwartz 
noticed the marked contrast between the moderate and reason­
able tone of this Corinthian address and the fire-breathing of the 
earlier Corinthian speech to the Spartan assembly (1.68-71). In 
the earlier speech the Corinthians bitterly castigated Spartan leth­
argy and demanded immediate and decisive action against the 
Athenians; in the latter they promise no more reproaches, and 
even speak of a negotiated settlement with Athens. But the 
strategic situation, which earlier so alarmed the Corinthians, had 
not changed: Potidaea was still under siege-its plight worsening 
day by day-and the hoped-for invasion of Attica was still many 
months away. Could these two speeches perhaps have been 
written at different times, and could Thucydides' interpretation 

32 Notice Thucydides' choice of ~OUAoflat to describe the Spartan decision in 
both cases. The Spartans "desired" the vote; they were not obliged to hold it. 
There are also two attested occasions when the League gathered to vote on 
peace. We have argued that in 421 (Thuc. 5.17.2, 30.1) they did so under the 
terms of the pre-war agreement. In 404 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.8), a similar agreement 
may have been in effect, or the Spartans may have wanted to intimidate as 
many allies as possible into supporting her widely unpopular decision not to 
destroy Athens (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19). The agreement of Sparta's allies may also 
have been solicited for the peace treaty between Sparta and Argos in the 
winter of 418/417 (Thuc. 5.77.8), but the text and its interpretation present 
difficulties. 



J. E. LENDON 175 

of events have changed in the meantime?33 But in such 
speculation lies the Thukydideische Frage, and frustration. 

Gomme's answer to Schwartz's analysis of the speeches was 
to stress the intervening Spartan decision for war: "[to] me the 
difference in their tone seems exactly explained by the two 
situations, the one before any open move for the war and 
addressed to Sparta, the other after the Spartan decision and 
addressed to the other states, big and small, some of which were 
reluctant and hesitating." Gomme's reply (HeT I 419f) is com­
pelling if the League assembled did not have the right to vote 
against the war; if, on the other hand, it did have that power, the 
tenor of the Corinthian speech is quite puzzling, for, in 
Schwartz's acute words (supra n.33: 114), the Corinthians "er­
mahnen die Bundesmitglieder mit der Ruhe von Leuten, die 
sicher sind ihren Willen im wesentlichen durchgesetzt zu 
haben." In what is conventionally interpreted as a speech 
begging the allies for their votes, before an assembly competent 
to choose peace instead of war, the Corinthians seem to take the 
war for granted. In the envoys' words, the allies are already 
"rousing war" ('tov 1tOA£/.LOV £'Y£lpOf.l£V); the question is not 
whether to start, but when to stop (1.121.1, 124.2). An Athenian 
blockade of the Peloponnese is assumed, whatever effect the 
Corinthian speech has upon its hearers (1.120.2). The reasons for 
the war, upon which one would expect the Corinthians to 
dwell, are neglected in favor of consideration of ways and means 
for fighting it (1.121.2-122.1, 124.1). Regardless of the view one 
takes of Thucydidean speeches, whether they represent what 
was appropriate under the circumstances or adhere closely to 
what was actually said (1.22.1), the Corinthians seem to be 
anticipating the result. 

The mystery is solved if it be accepted that the earlier Spartan 
decision for war bound the allies as well. When the envoys from 
Corinth speak before the League congress, the decision to go to 
war is already made, and their confidence and calm are justified. 
"Gentlemen of the allies," say the Corinthians, "we can no 
longer blame the Spartans: they have themselves voted for war 
and called us; together for that purpose" (Thuc. 1.120.1: ou Kat 
au'tot £'I'll<Pt<jf.lEVOl 'tov nOA£f.l0v £tal Kat Ttf.las £s 1"01)'[0 V1)V 
~uvf1Ya'Yov), that is, the allies have been summoned for the 
explicit purpose of voting for war: they are publicly to signify 

33 E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (Bonn 1919 [1929]) 
113f, and following him on the composition question, M. Pohlenz, 
"Thukydidesstudien," NAkG (1919) 98; contra, e.g., J. de Romilly, Thucydides 
and Athenian Imperialism, tr. P. Thody (Oxford 1963) 32. 



176 'CONSTITUTION' OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE 

their acceptance of the Spartan decision. In his introduction to 
the Corinthian speech Thucydides describes the Corinthians 
canvassing the cities privately, "in order that they vote the war, 
fearing lest Potidaea be destroyed beforehand" (1.119: WO'tE 
'l'T1CPloaoSal 'tOY 1tOAqlOV ()dho'tE~ 1tEpi 'tTI I1o'tEl()al~ J..l1l 1tpO­
()lacpSapfl). Thucydides does not entertain the possibility that 
the allies might vote against helping Potidaea. Corinth canvasses 
them to encourage promptness. 

The objective of the Corinthian speech is not a favorable vote, 
which is assumed, but the zealous conduct of the war by the 
allies, for which arrangements were made after the vote 
(1.125.2). Thus the Corinthians concern themselves not with the 
vote per se, but rather with the state of mind in which war will 
be voted: "knowing that the time of necessity is upon us, and 
that the things said here are best, vote the war not fearing im­
mediate terror, but enthusiastic for the more durable peace that 
will rise out of it" (Thuc. 1.124.2). The allies "must go to war 
boldly for many reasons," and the reasons (divine sanction, and 
a mass of allies) are for boldness in war's prosecution, not war 
itself (1.123). 

It is for actual military cooperation from the various, variously 
interested, members of the League, not for the vote, that the 
Corinthians need to rally support: the question about the inland 
states is not how they will vote, but whether they will llouXa­
~ElV ("remain inactive," 1.120.3) or <lJ..lUV(DOl ("defend" or 
"avenge") the coastal states (1.120.2). The Corinthians are 
worried that "the Athenians art sufficient against all of us put 
together, and stronger than each city individually, and unless we 
resist them united-each city and tribe-they will easily get the 
better of us divided" (1.122.2). If the cities do not come together 
and fight as a unity, but delay, "some are already being harmed 
while the others-if it become known that we have met but not 
dared to avenge outselves-will suffer the same soon after" 
(1.124.1). The war is assumed; the envoys' stress throughout is 
on the unity of the League; the question is whether all of Sparta's 
allies will do her bidding. Corinth clearly felt that some would 
not, and with justice: despite the Corinthian canvass, not all the 
allies even came to the meeting, and the vote, although a fore­
gone conclusion, was not unanimous, that is, some of Sparta's 
allies indicated their reluctance to fight, despite their treaty 
obligations.34 

H Vote and absence of some from the congress, Thuc. 1.125.1 with HeY I 
420. 



J. E. LENDON 177 

The purpose of the Corinthian speech before the congress of 
the Peloponnesian League was to shore up Sparta's alliance, to 
convince Sparta's allies to contribute wholeheartedly to the war. 
With it, Thucydides confirms the picture of relations on the eve 
of the war between Sparta-supreme in principle but limited by 
her actual power to coerce or cajole-and her allies-subject in 
principle on matters of peace and war, but in practice often free, 
and very much inclined, to act as they will-implied by the pre­
war agreement between Sparta and her allies. In that agreement 
the mutual wariness of the co-combatants against Athens ex­
pressed itself in provisions that were intended to safeguard the 
interests of all members of the League against the sectional in­
terests of some. A majority of the allies would make peace with 
Athens, but not unless the peace guaranteed the return of all 
possessions lost during the war. Sparta and her allies went to war 
grimly aware of the diversity of interests in their alliance, and 
aware of the pressure that a great war was likely to put upon it. 

The Peloponnesian League had no 'constitution'. Its legal basis 
was nothing more than a series of bilateral treaties obliging the 
allies "to have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans and 
follow the Spartans wheresoever they may lead." Meetings of 
the League, and votes at those meetings, were manifestations of 
the realities of power rather than constitutional nicety. And at 
the outset of the Peloponnesian War, that reality was a League 
whose members, as Thucydides has Pericles express it 
(1.141.6£), 

each strive to accomplish their own ends, so that often noth­
ing is accomplished. Some are vehement to take vengeance 
upon a foe, others to spend as little as possible. They as­
semble slowly and attend but briefly to common interests; 
mostly they attend to their own. Each thinks that no harm 
will come of his neglect, that someone or other will see to 
things for him, so that, because they all maintain the same 
view separately, no one notices the common enterprise 
falling apart.35 

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

N O'lJember, 1994 

35 I am pleased to thank E. A. Meyer and R. K. Garner for their help and 
suggestions. All remaining faults of commission and omission are my own.