STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

Posidonian Polemic and Academic 
Dialectic: The 1m pact of Carneades 

upon Posidonius' I1£Pl nu8&v 

John A. Stevens 

T HE FRAGMENTS of Posidonius' ethical doctrines preserved 
by Galen contain a polemical attack on Chrysippus' doc­

trine of the passions. 1 Posidonius' motives for this attack 
are not well understood, and many critics argue that Posidonius 
simply did not understand Chrysippus or misread him. 2 Others 
interpret Posidonius' work on the passions primarily as a 
doctrinal reaction to Chrysippean monism: 

1 The principal commentaries are 1. G. KIDD and L. EDELSTEIN, edd., 
Posidonius 2 (Cambridge 1988: hereafter 'EK'): references to the fragments are 
by page and line numbers unless noted otherwise; W. Theiler, Poseidonios: 
Die Fragmente (Berlin 1982); P. DE LACY, Galen: On the Doctrines of Hip­
pocrates and Plato (Berlin 1978-84: 'Dc Lacy'): all references to this treatise 
(PHP) arc after Dc Lacy; and M. Pohlenz, "De Posidonii Libris IT £ P t 
Ilu9wv," Fleck. J. Suppl. 24 (1898) 537-653. See also L. Edelstein, "The Philo­
sophical System of Posidonius," AJP 57 (1936) 286-325; J. fILLIO:--;- LAHILLE, Le 
De ira de Seneque et la philosophie stoicienne des passions (Paris 1984: 'fillion­
Lahille') 128-99; M. Laffranque, Poseidonios d'Apamee. Essai de mise au 
point (Paris 1964) 404-514; K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios (Munich 1921) and 
"Poseidonios (3)," RE 22.1 (1953) 558-826; and A. GUBERT-THIRRY, "La 
theorie sto'icienne de la passion chez Chrysippe et son evolution cheL 
Posidonius," RPhil75 (1977: 'Glibert-Thirry') 393-435. 

2 KIDD tries to explain Posidonius' motivation as a function of his interest in 
aetiology and scientific inquiry: "Philosophy and Science in Posidonius," 
A&A 24 (1978: hereafter 'Kidd [1978]') 7-15, esp. 13 (see n.7 infra); "Posido­
nius on Emotions," in A. A. Long, cd., Problems in Stoicism (London 1971) 
200-15; n26, 58, 62, 85; FF 35,176 with II 48-52, 72ff, 173-78, 646-51. C1 Gli­
bert-Thirry 395: "cclui qui dclibcrcment ou non lit mal Chrysippe." B. IN 
WOOD (Ethics and fluman Action in Early Stoicism [Oxford 1985: hereafter 
'Inwood']), whose treatment of Chrysippus I follow for the most part, resorts 
to the current views of the problem: Posidonius is interested in explaining 
psychological phenomena (129£); Galen is to blame (140, 143, 147); or Posi­
donius is just wrong (140 n.51, 149f, 154). I shall argue that Posidonius did not 
misunderstand, but understood all too well: a more controversial but also 
more interesting possibility. 

229 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

230 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

For nearly a hundred years Posidonius has baffled students 
of Stoicism. While it is agreed on virtually all hands that his 
thought differs in many essentials from that of the Old 
Stoa, there has been little agreement on what these essentials 
are. While it is generally recognized that his psychological 
theories are to be contrasted with those of Chrysippus, and 
differ from those of his unorthodox teacher Panaetius, the 
extent of Posidonius' heresy even in this area is disputed. 
And about other branches of his thought the confusion is 
almost totaJ.3 

I hesitate to attribute serious misunderstandings of the or­
thodox position to Posidonius, Galen's source for much of 
the discussion. But Posidonius did disagree with the early 
Stoics about these fundamental issues.4 

But ancient philosophy is not religion. Such prejudicial labels 
as 'orthodox/unorthodox' and 'heresy' discourage an indepen­
dent assessment of Posidonius' achievements. Philosophical 
doctrines in the ancient world were only stable to the extent that 
they could withstand vigorous debate. To understand Posido­
nius' attack on Chrysippus, it is necessary to appreciate the 
Stoa's position in debates of the first century B.C. Carneades had 
earlier shown the dialectical vulnerability of certain of Chrysip­
pus' monistic formulations. Posidonius' contemporary, Antio­
chus of Ascalon had blurred the distinctions between the 
Peripatos, the Old Academy, and the Stoa. The Stoa had to re­
spond to these attacks if it was to survive and maintain its 
identity. 

The fragments of Posidonius' ethical doctrines have never 
been placed properly into the dialectical context of these late 
Hellenistic debates. His arguments against Chrysippus in 
Galen's De placitis are known to be polemical. But it would be 
profitable to understand how doctrinal disputes in the interval 
between Chrysippus and Posidonius should shape our reaction 
to the arguments. To say that Posidonius attacked Chrysippus 
polemically reveals nothing about the merit of his arguments or 
the forces that might have persuaded him to adopt a polemical 
stance. An analysis of the arguments and their contexts will not 
only show what Posidonius did and did not understand about 
Chrysippus' doctrines, but will also clarify his motives. The fun-

3 J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 20l. 
4 Inwood 140 n.51 on Chrysippus' theory of the monistic soul, the passions, 

and their cure as in Galen P I1 P 4-5; Fillion- Lahille (153) also uses "ortho­
dox"/ "unorthodox." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 231 

damental question is whether Posidonius chose to attack Chry­
sippean monism for the reason he gives, namely that he thought 
it failed in a material way to explain the cause of the passions, or 
for another unspecified reason. An investigation of this kind is 
also warranted to explain Posidonius' rather Platonic psychol­
ogy-a staggering compromise on a cornerstone of Stoicism. 

Three preliminary considerations affect analysis of Posidonius' 
arguments in the De placitis: Galen's reliability, the attitude 
adopted towards Posidonius, and the possibility of evaluating 
the truth of Posidonius' claims about Chrysippean monism. 

(1) Certain upper limits for Galen's reliability may certainly be 
set. Galen, attacking Chrysippus by name, treats his doctrines at 
length as the most conspicuously monistic, and wishes to prove 
that Plato's doctrines on the location, composition, and function 
of the soul are correct (PH P 4.234.12-21). He is also quite 
willing to assimilate Stoicism to Platonism. 5 Galen has reasons 
for misrepresenting or distorting Chrysippus' doctrines. At 
PHP 4 Galen reports, often out of context, all evidence he can 
find for the inconsistency of Chrysippus' monism. Conversely, 
although Galen may tend to over-assimilate Stoics to Platonism, 
he views himself as an ally of Posidonius. Despite uncertainty 
on the reproduction of actual quotations, Galen probably has 
been more trustworthy in his reporting of Posidonius than of 
Chrysippus. (, 

5 E.g. PlIP 5.334.20-336.1: "For I did not promise, in this treatise, to go 
through whatever each of the philosophers held about the soul, but to examine 
what truth the doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates have. Accordingly, I made a 
refutation of Chrysippus to achieve this goal. As for Zeno, if he meant to 
advocate the same things as Chrysippus, he will be liable to the same charges. 
If, on the other hand, he meant to follow the principles of Plato, as Cleanthes 
and Posidonius did, then he would be a fellow in our school of philosophy. 
But if, as I am persuaded, he thought that the passions supervene on judg­
ments, he would fall between the worst school of thought on these matters­
that of Chrysippus, and the best, which Hippocrates and Plato were the very 
first to expound. Posidonius says, however, that Pythagoras also held this 
view, but since no writing from Pythagoras himself has survived to our day, he 
bases this on the writings of some of his students. As I said a little before, my 
account did not proclaim that it would teach the history of ancient doctrines, 
but only that it would examine what was said on the part of Hippocrates and 
Plato." On the significance of Posidonius' claims about Pythagoras for the 
transmission of Middle Platonic doctrine on the soul, see P. A. Vander 
Waerdt, "Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral 
Psychology," GRBS 26 (1985) 373-94, esp. 384ff. 

6 For Galen's use of Posidonius see EK TT 58-64. Kidd asks (EK II 51 ad IT 

61-63) "Was Galen simply following Posidonius in this section [De Placitis 
4-5, p.336.15J, or using him for his own purposes? TT 61-63 all suggest the 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

232 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

(2) Posidonius claims an interest in the cause (ahia) of the pas­
sions, which, he argues, Chrysippean monism cannot adequate­
ly explain. This is undeniably a feature of his entire philosophical 
enterprise, as Kidd has shown. 7 It would be a mistake, however, 
to extend Posidonius' demand that both philosophers and scien­
tists must begin from observable facts to the claim that they 
employ 'scientific objectivity' in the modern sense,8 for if we 
assume that Posidonius procedes 'scientifically', any 'dialectical' 
manipulation of the argument by him will seem out of character. 
But it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that any Hellenistic 
philosopher follows a modern conception of scientific proce­
dure rather than ancient dialectic's complex modes of argument. 
An example of how dialectical strategy may overtake an 
apparently scientific principle may be seen in the following: 

KUt nuv8uvnul y£ ,cov n£pt ,OY XpUCHnnOY OUK OAlYUKl<; EV 
'Tl O£pt nu8cov £uuwu npuy~u't£l«(, ,1<; +J 't11<; nA£OvusoU(Jll<; 
oP~l1S £(J'tlV (Xl'tlu. 0 fl!:v yap AOYOS OUK (Xv Mvuno y£ 

latter, however extensive and basic the use." Galen undeniably reports 
Posidonius' fragments within the context of his own goal of demonstrating the 
truth of Plato's and I Iippocrates' doctrines. It would be wrongly inferred from 
Kidd's assessment, however, that this agenda has tainted the so-called 
fragments of Posidonius. I take Kidd to mean only that the contexts into 
which Galen may have inserted otherwise genuine Posidonian fragments 
cannot be trusted. On Galen's treatment of Chrysippus and Posidonius see 
also Fillion- Lahille 124f, 153. 

7 For Posidonius' interest in aetiology see Strab. 2.3.8=EK T 85, Sen Ep. 
95.65=EK 176.4, Prise. Lyd. Solutiones ad Chosroem p.72.2-12 Bywater=EK T 
26, and EK II 169f ad 34.12-20; for Posidonius' application of this argument in 
TIEpt1tu8wv see EK 150b; 158; 161f; 164.100; 165.10; 166.2,19; 168.1, 187.10,61. 
Posidonius claims that his method is based on observable fact and that he uses 
"deductive proof from first principles" (a1t60£tc,l~), for which see Galen PHP 
4.258.19-22 (=EK T 83); 5.292.25-94.3 (=T 62), 356.25-51'.3 (=156); Proc!. In Euc. 
Elementa 216-18.11=EK 47.30-75; cf Simp!' in Phys. 2.2 (193b23) p.292.21-31 
Diels=EK 18; 1. C. KIDD, "Orthos Logos as a Criterion of Truth in the Stoa," 
in P. M. IIuby and C. C. Neal, edd., The Criterion of Truth (Liverpool 1981: 
hereafter' Kidd, "Criterion "') 147; sec especially Kidd (1978) 11 ff, where he 
shows that Posidonius' conception of a1t6o£lc,l~ is that of pure mathematics. 

8 Fillion- Lahille speaks (176) of his" rigueur scientifique." Kidd argues con­
vincingly that Posidonius places aetiology above science and thus the phil­
osopher above the scientist: the scientist observes the world and gives an aitia 
for it, but only the philosopher can give the ailia, although he too must begin 
with the facts. He summarizes Posidonius' attitude toward Chrysippus: "In 
ethics, Posidonius' quarrel with and criticism of Chrysippus' psychological 
theory was simply that it did not even square with the facts, and so could 
hardly give an u i Tio: or explanation, far less the explanation for them" (1978: 
13). Posidonius could argue ad hominem: EK II 170. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

nA£OvaS£lV napa 'ra famoD npaY/-la'ra 'rf Kal /-lE-rpa. npo­
bllAOV oily, (os hEpa 'rts aAoyos £<J'rl buva/-llS ai'ria 'rOD 
nAfovasw8m 'r~v OP/-l~v imep 'ra /-lE-rpa 'rOD Myou.9 

233 

Posidonius argues (according to Galen) that reason is perfect and 
therefore incapable of error or excess. If this is the case, he was 
willing to reduce Chrysippus' intricate model of monistic psy­
chology to tautological absurdities. The Stoa was famous for its 
doctrine about the transformations of reason in human develop­
ment from mere seeds in infants to a perfected state found only 
in the wise man (e.g. Cic. Fin. 3.16-26). In Chrysippus' theory, 
"the reason which is being disobeyed in a passion is Right Rea­
son, the normative standard of all proper conduct which Chrys­
ippus identified with Zeus" (Inwood 156 with n.126); that is, pas­
sion is called 'excessive' or 'irrational' only in relation to the per­
fect reason of nature or of the wise man, not with reference to a 
typical man's reason as Posidonius has interpreted the argument 
(for the sage, who alone possesses perfected reason, is immune 
to the passions).lo Any false impression about the purity of 
Posidonius' procedure must be removed so that his dialectical 

9 Galen PHP 4.248.6-11==EK 34.12-18==157.4-10: "and he asks those in the 
circle of Chrysippus not a few times in his treatise, On the Passions, what is 
the cause of the excessive impulse. For reason would not be able to 'exceed' 
beyond its own acts and measures. It is perfectly clear then that some other 
irrational faculty causes the impulse to exceed the measures of reason .... " For 
Posidonius' frequent charge of self-refutation, see EK II 74 ad T 85 and ad T 83, 
FF 34, 159, 164.87-93, 165.121; see also Kidd, "Criterion" 140. 

10 It may be that Posidonius actually wishes to maintain that human reason 
is perfect, because he posits irrational elements in man's soul to explain the 
cause of passion. He also says that orthos logos, i.e., the "perfected reason" 
possessed only by the wise man, is a criterion (D.L. 7.54==EK 42; see Kidd, 
u Criterion" 148f, and infra 316). Even Posidonius, however, allows that false 
suppositions may arise" in the theoretical sphere" (!:v !lEV 'tip 8£WPTJ'tt1Cip) 
from weakness in the rational faculty (Galen PHP 5.320.24==EK 169.79-82). 
Posidionus' point may be a mathematical axiom that a thing cannot 'exceed' 
itself, or it may be an attempt to prove self-refutation: "why would reason 
want to command that an impulse be greater than it commanded?" The sense 
of O\J1( (Xv OUVat'to (supra n.9) is not entirely clear. Even if Posidonius regards 
man's reason as perfect rather than perfectable, and this seems unlikely, this 
passage demonstrates that he uses his own premises about reason to criticize 
Chrysippus' conclusions. This method of argument is designed to create the 
appearance of aetiology (as the definition of reason as that which "preserves 
measure" in its actions, is, he would claim, an 'evident fact'); but the subtlety 
of his argument's shifting premises shows that Posidonius employs as much 
dialectic as deductive proof in this instance. Kidd (EK II 170) sees the 
argument as part of an ad hominem attack on Chrysippus. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

234 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

strategy, his arguments, and the place of his arguments in the late 
Hellenistic debates may be seen for what they arc. 

A related problem is how Posidonius may have treated earlier 
Stoics. According to Galen the assimilation of Cleanthes, and on 
occasion Zeno, to Platonism comes from Posidonius: 

'0 IlEV ODV [loaEl8wvw<;, w<; av oillat .E8pallll£vo<; EV yEW­
IlE'tPlc;t Kat 1l00AAOV .Wv UAAWV L.WtKWV uno8Ei~EO"tV £nw-
8at aUVEl8tall£Vo<;, 118£a811 '~V .E npo<; .u acx.<pw<; <PatVOIlEva 
WXX11V Kat 'l-]V alnou npo<; ainov EvavnoAoyiav 'tou Xpualn­
nou Kat nElpO:'tat Ill-] 1l0VOV eau'tov 't01.<; [lAa'tWVtK01.<;, UAAU 
Kat'tov Knn£a Z~vwva npoauyEtv. 11 

Posidonius' adoption of a more Platonic psychology would sug­
gest that there is no reason to doubt Galen's claim. 12 If a Stoic 
argues that Plato's model of the soul was essentially correct, it 
makes perfect sense that any evidence in the works of Zeno and 
Cleanthes would be manipulated to indicate their concurrence. 
It is likely, although it can never be certain, that Posidonius tried 
to make Zeno adopt a Platonic psychology. Moreover, any 
assumption that Posidonius differs from his predecessors in that 
his philosophical procedures are free from the taint of dialectical 
subtleties (as Galen asserts) needs reconsideration.D 

(3) A clear understanding of Chrysippean doctrine on human 
action now disproves Posidonius' claim that Chrysippean mon­
ism cannot give an account of the aitia of passion. 14 It may be 

11 Galen PH P 4.258.19-23=EK Tf 93,99: "Now Posidonius, a man reared in 
geometry, as I believe, and trained beyond the other Stoics to follow 
demonstrative proofs, was ashamed of Chrysippus' conflict with evident facts 
and of his self-contradictions; and Posidonius tries to bring not only himself 
but also Zeno of Citium into the company of the Platonists" (tr. De Lacy 259). 
See also EK T 5sf. 

12 See Kidd, "Criterion" 144. Posidonius, however, could disagree with Zeno 
e.g. on the definition of passion: Galen PHP 5.292.17-25=EK 152 (n.22 infra), 
4.246.36-4S.6=EK 34.1-12. On Posidionius' attempt to create conflict between 
Chrysippus and Zeno, "the Chrysippean theory of the passions is in all essen­
tials the same as the theory of Zeno and the other early Stoics" (Inwood 143). 

13 De sequela 2.77.17-78.2=EK T 58: EK£lVOI !lEV (Sc. 01. UAAot L'tolKOl) yap 
c1toaCl.v i:Cl.mou; 'tilv ltCl.'tp10Cl. !laAAOv ~ 06Y!lCl.m ltpOOOUVCl.l, noanowvlO<; OE 
'tilv 'twv LTWlKWV a'tpWlV !l(lAAOV ~ 'tilv aATj8nuv; c/ PHP 4.258.23ff= EK T 

59. 
14 Inwood shows (127-81) that Chrysippus' fragments present a coherent 

analysis of the cause of the passions. Inwood's account is preferable because he 
demonstrates the central role of "reservation" (nn.47-53 infra) in the monistic 
definition of passion as an "excessive impulse" (n.24 infra). Other scholars 
rarely discuss this concept, but Inwood shows (esp. 155-73) that this is 
precisely how a monist would explain the ailia of passion. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

]OI-IN A. STEVENS 235 

that Posidonius 'believed' what he 'argued', namely that Chrysip­
pean monism was inadequate in this regard, but this is a naive 
assumption for a modern critic. Posidonius as a Stoic need not 
have been any more committed to the truth of his arguments 
against Chrysippus than other philosophers were to their argu­
ments in refutation, although Stoics are not ordinarily suspected 
of subtle dialectical strategies. It is equally possible that he knew 
how Chrysippus might have responded to each of them. Never­
theless, Posidonius' claim that Chrysippean monism cannot ex­
plain the cause of passion need not be regarded as the truth 
about Chrysippean doctrine, nor even about what Posidonius 
believed. Rather, an independent modern analysis should, if pos­
sible, establish how fairly Posidonius treated Chrysippus, and 
where and for what purpose he manipulated the argument. 

Some evidence suggests that Posidonius had the position of 
the Stoa in the Hellenistic debates very much in mind. Posido­
nius claims that his writings on the passions have a direct connec­
tion to Stoic doctrine of the telos, the "goal of life" and says 
more than once that the two topics are bound "as if by a single 
cord" (w<J1t£P h lJ.lac; lJ.llplv8oD oEi')£<J8at).15 His discussion of 
the history of Stoic formulae for the telos reveals an interest in 
the vigorous Academic attack on the Stoa on this subject: 

a o~ 1t<XPfV1£~ fVlOL 10 OjlOAOyOUjlfVW~ ~l1V aua1EAAouaLV d~ 
10 1tO:V 10 EV()£XOjl£VOV 1tOL£lV EV£K<X 1roV npQHWV K<X1a 
qrU0Lv 0flOlOV <X-lHO nOLODv1£S 10 GKOnOV Ex~18£(J8<XL 1TjV l,oovTjv 
111T]v aOXAllal<Xv 11 UAAO n 1OLOD10V. fan O£ jlCXXllV Ejl<J><Xlvov 
K<X1a <XU1Tjv 1TjV EK<popav, K<xAOV ()£ K<Xt. (1)O<XLjlOVLKOV OUOEV. 
1t<xpEn£1<XL yap K<X1a 10 aV<XYK<xtOV 10 1fAH, 1EAOS O£ OUK 
fanv' aAA(1. K<Xt. lOUWU OL<XAll<peEV10~ 6p8ro~ f~£(J1L jl£V <xu10 
xp~ae<XL 1tP~~ "0, OHXKon1£L~ 1aS a,nopl<XS, ~~ Ot a~o<pl(J1<X~ np,o-
1HVOU(Jl, jlll jl£V10L y£, 1<p K<X1<X £jlnHPLaV 1WV K<X1<X "11V 
OAllV <pU(JlV aUjl~<XLVOV1WV ~l1V on£p laoouv<Xjl£110 OjlOAOYOU­
jlfVW~ Eln£lV ~l1V, l,VlK<X jl~ lODlO jllKp01p£nro~ auvn:lV£l £i~ 
10 1rov aOLa<popwv TUYX(XV£lV. 16 

15 Galen PH P 4.286.6f=EK 150a.9; cf NiP 5.326.12-16=EK 30; Fillion­
Lahille 154. 

16 Galen P J1 P 5.328.8-18=:EK 187.25-37: "But some people, disregarding 
these things, contract 'tll O).!oAoyOU).!£vw<; sTjv [Zeno's formula for the telos] into 
'doing everything in one's power for the sake of the primary things in 
accordance with nature' [roughly Antipater's formula] and make it similar to 
setting up pleasure or freedom from pain as the skopos. But in the expression 
itself, this creates the appearance of contradiction and contains nothing about 
virtue and happiness. hlf these things are necessarily a result of the end, but 
they arc not the end. On the other hand, when this formula is understood in 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

236 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Posidonius regards Zeno's formula as correct and misunder­
stood by Zeno's followers (see n.l00 infra). His reference to 
sophists" (O"OCPlo"lUl) is most revealing. Although his intended ref­
erent is left unnamed, Hirzel suggests that Posidonius may have 
had Carneades in mind.17 Hirzel's conclusion, supported by the 

'text, speaks of aporiai put forward by Stoic opponents-a mode 
of argument that the Academics favored. This passage also gives 
the telos-formula of Antipater and Chrysippus, Carneades' prin­
cipal targets. Posidonius shows not only that he was interested 
in defending Zeno's definition of the telos against Academic 
attacks, but also, and most importantly, that he was concerned 
about the poor dialectical response of the Stoics to these attacks: 
neither Chrysippus' nor Antipater's formulae could dissolve the 
aporiai. 18 

This passage suggests that Posidonius intended his doctrines to 
respond to both Chrysippus' doctrines and the wider historical 
debate between Stoics and Academics. Posidonius' real target is 
not so much Chrysippus as the creators of the aporiai to which 
the Stoics did not adequately reply. But this fragment also 

the right way, it is possible to use it to cut through the apariai which the 
sophists bring forward but 'to live according to the experience of what 
happens in the whole of nature' [Chrysippus' formula] cannot cut through 
them because that is equivalent to saying 'to live consistently when this does 
not lead unworthily to acquiring the indifferents'. I print Kidd's aotu<popcov in 
the last line (proposed by Wyttenbach), rather than the manuscript reading 
otmpopwv as De Lacy or owcpopcov proposed by Bake and Pohlenz. 

17 R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philasophischen Schriften II (Leip­
zig 1882) 242. Posidonius never mentions Carneades by name, but in Hellenis­
tic debates the intended opponent was customarily unnamed. See P. A. V AN­

DER WAERDT, "Colotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Skepticism," GRBS 30 
(1989: hereafter 'Vander Waerdt, "Colotes"') 231 n.18, and "Hermarchus and 
the Epicurean Geneology of Morals," TAPA 118 (1988: 'Vander Waerdt, "Her­
marchus"') 87-106, esp. 90,94. 

18 If Ot oocplo'tui in fact alludes to Carneades, then Galen may have accur­
ately reported direct quotations of Posidonius, because his own Academic pur­
poses would justify omitting Posidonius' defense of the Stoa against Academic 
attacks. Galen may have deleted Posidonius' other references to Academic 
aporiai, if they were frequent, or omitted them through misunderstanding. But 
this is speculation. If Calen knowingly reponed a characterization of Aca­
demics as Ot 00cplO'tni, he was capable of impartiality even at the expense of his 
intellectual forbears. Kidd notes Galen's occasional criticism of Posidonius: 
"Euemptosia-Proneness to Disease," in W. W. Fonenbaugh, cd., On Stoic 
and Peripalelic Ethies. The Work of Anus Didymus (=RutgStClHum 1 [New 
Brunswick 1983]) 110 ad PH P 5.296.18-36=EK 163.30-52. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 237 

reveals a more interesting problem: Posidonius' summary of 
Antipater's telos-formula seems to use Carneades' words. 

Antipater's formula in Stobaeus: reav 'to Ka8' ainov reOtEtV 
DtllVEKWS Kat areapa~eX'tcos repos 'to 'tUYXeXVElV 'tWV repo­
llYOU!.u':VCOV Ka'tu <jJUOtv.19 

Carneades representation of Antipater's formula in Plutarch: 
'to reeXv'ta 1U reap' £au10v reo lEtV £Kao'tov £V EKU 'tou 'tU,,{­
XeXvflv 'tWV repw'tcov Ka'tu <jJUOlV. 20 

Posidonius~ a,I,lusion ~o An~ipater's ~orn;ula: reav 'to EVDEXO­
IlEVOV reOlflv £V£Ka ,cov repco,cov Ka,a <jJUOlV. 

Admittedly, knowledge of Carneades, who wrote nothing, 
depends on Cli to mach us' fai thful preservation of what he 
argued (D.L. 4.65, 67). Although Plutarch's direct use of Clitoma­
chus is uncertain (supra n.20), the assumption that Plutarch re­
produces Carneades' words seems justified: the context is 
clearly the debate between Carneades and Antipater, and the ar­
guments are entirely consistent with testimonia on Carneades' 
mode of argument, i.e., he accepts the premises of his dialectical 
opponents for the sake of debate (Lactant. Div. Inst. 5.14.3ff). 
Most importantly, these arguments would not be effective if the 
words were different. The alteration of phrases in these three 
versions may seem subtle, but (as I shall show) Carneades' 
attack on the Stoic telos is based on his substitution of £V£KU for 
Antipater's 1tp6<;. Posidonius' EV£KU suggests the possibility that 
he criticized Antipater for the formula not as he proposed it, but 
as Carneades represented it. 

19 Stab. Eel. 2.76.13ff=SVF III Ant.57. Clement's single formula (Strom. 2.21, 
179 Sylb.=V.2 497 Pott.=SVF III Ant.58) appears to conflate the two: 
'AV1:trra-rpo; ... -rb -riAo; K£l08at tv -r~ OITJV£KW; Kat o.rrapa~o.-r(j); 
ExA£Y£<Jeat flfV n1 K(Xnt <pU<J1V, (lTC£KAfY£<Jem Of 1a TC(xP(X <pU<JlV 1.JTCOAafl­
~o.V£l. 

20 Mar. 1071A= SVF III 195. Von Arnim argues (SVF I xiv) that Clitomachus 
was Plutarch's source, but I l. Cherniss (PLutarch's MoraLia XIII.2 [Cambridge 
1976] 397-406) is sceptical: Plutarch kept notebooks (UTCOflVT]fl(Xm: Mar. 464 F), 
in which he may have recorded quotations at various stages in his life and 
from a number of sources. Indeed the only reference to Carneades (1072 F) in 
this portion of the De comm. not. (26£) is hardly decisive. After giving the 
entire argument in a manner to suggest an Academic source, Plutarch men­
tions Carneades as if reading another source (tr. Cherniss 765): "But there are 
those who think that his argument is directed against Antipater and not 
against the Stoic system, for, they say, it is he who under pressure from 
Carneades takes cover in these verbal ingenuities" (ciAAa Wlna !lEV £l<JlV at 
rrpo; 'Av-rtrra-rpov oiOf.LCVOl AEY£08at flT] rrpc); -rT]v a'tp£01v' £X£lVOV yap urrb 
Kapv£<xoo\l TCld;clfl[VClV de; 1(X{na; K(X1(XOU[0eat -ra; c\lPTJ<JlAoyia;). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

238 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Posidonius employs this dialectical strategy throughout his 
attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions: he not only at­
tacks Antipater in this instance as Carneades represented his 
position, but also attacks Chrysippus' doctrines not as written, 
but as Carneades represented them. Such a sophisticated dia­
lectical procedure, difficult to demonstrate at the very least, re­
quires the following preliminaries: (1) an account of what Chry­
sirpus actually said and meant (I-II below); (2) a reconstruction 
o Carneades' attacks against his ethical doctrines and of the 
subtle means by which he manipulated them to show their self­
refutation (III); and (3) an analysis of Posidonius' arguments in 
which quotations of Chrysippus (through Posidonius as pre­
served by Galen) are separated from arguments loosely at­
tributed to Chrysippus, though actually conceived by Car­
neades (IV-V). 

The documentation of Posidonius' strategy requires a detailed 
discussion of Chrysippean ethics and an equally detailed examin­
ination of Carneades' responses. My first aim, demonstrating 
the importance of £V£KU in this passage, presupposes knowledge 
of how Stoic doctrines on the passions, selection, and the telos 
are interconnected. Then Carneades' attack on the telos and 
Posidonius' use of his words can be more easily understood and 
the significance of his use of £V £KU may be seen. This fragment 
represents the one piece of persuasive prima facie evidence that 
Posidonius actually put Carneades' words contra Antipater into 
Antipater's mouth. The implications of this evidence provide 
the proper context for Posidonius' arguments on the passions, 
in which Carneadean arguments are given to Chrysippus. 

After demonstrating this striking and pervasive dialectical 
strategy, I shall offer a new account of Posidonius' motivations. 
He intends to do far more than refute Academic aporiai. Were 
that his only intention, he might have quoted Chrysippus and 
Carncades and exposed the dialectical manipulation of the for­
mer by the latter. Posidonius must have felt that monism was in­
defensible, but this does not mean that he endorsed the argu­
ments against it, nor does it mean that he wished to abandon all 
the ethical doctrines that conform to it. As his strategy was to 
show that Chrysippus' doctrines as Carneades represented 
them are self-contradictory, it might be reasonably concluded 
that one of his primary objections to monism was its verbal vul­
nerability, e.g. to attacks from common sense. If it is easy to say 
that Posidonius' own Platonic model of the soul changes Stoic 
ethics radically, it is far more difficult to determine whether cer-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 239 

tain concepts of the earlier Stoa are yet retained within his 
model. I shall argue that Posidonius designed his own ethical 
doctrines to revive and preserve precisely those doctrines that 
Carneades attacked most vigorously. Although his model of the 
soul certainly leads to some new doctrines, its primary function, 
I suggest, is to render Stoic ethics invulnerable to Academic 
attack. He attempts to explain in the language of common sense 
what the earlier Stoa had explained by paradox. His strategy, in 
my view, demonstrates an even higher degree of dialectical 
sophistication than that for which Chrysippus was known. 

Certain attractive features of this thesis compensate for its 
troubling implications. Although earlier critics thought that Posi­
donius did not understand Chrysippean monism and that he 
sacrificed important features of its rationalism in favor of certain 
features of Platonism, it can now be said that he makes such 
compromises to defend the Stoa against the Academy, and that 
he is first and foremost a dialectician. Indeed, Posidonius' own 
formula for the telos, when seen in the context of its dialectical 
function, preserves the Stoic doctrines on selection and on the 
good that suffered most at Carneades' hands. Whether this new 
portrait of Posidonius' philosophical contributions is more posi­
tive or persuasive than the existing one, I argue nevertheless that 
this portrait is of value because it relates his fragments to the 
most famous of the Hellenistic debates, and because it demon­
strates how Posidonian ethics descend from those of Chrysip­
pus and the early Stoa. 

I. Stoic Doctrine on the Passions 

Galen reports that Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius each had 
a different definition of the nature of passion. The implications 
of each formulation should be clarified from the beginning in 
order to understand the context of Posidonius' arguments. 21 

Xpu<JtTCrco<; /-lEV o-{)v EV '"Coo rcpo:l1:CO TIEpt rcu8&v cm08£l1(vuvUt 
rcElPCl-tUl KP1<JElS 1:lVaS d~at '"Cou' AOYW1:lKOU '"Ca mx8T), Z"v(t)v 
8E OD '"Cas KP1<JElS UtHCXS, aAAa '"Cas ETClYlVO/-l£VUS utnu'is <JU<J-

21 Inwood discusses the different definitions of Zeno and Chrysippus (129ff 
with nn.14-17) and correctly defends a monist interpretation of both figures; 
Glibert-Thirry (402ff) summarizes the debate over monist and dualist 
interpretations. Athough both were monists, I want to suggest a subtle 
difference between the two positions based on Cleanthes' treatment of the 
passions at Cic. Tuse. (n.37 infra). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

240 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

'toAue; Kat (Ota)&U<JEte; ETCap<JEte; 'tE Kat 'taTCEtVW<JEte; 'tlle; 
\jIuXllS EVOfll~EV EiVUl 'tu TCaS,.,. 0 DO<JElOWVlOe; O£ aflC?o'tEpOls 
<hevExSde; ETCUlVEl 'tE ufla Kat TCpo<JLnat 'to DAa'twvoe; 06)'­
fla Kat av'tlA£)'El 'tOte; TCept 'tOY XpUCHTCnov oute KPlOElS dvUl 
'tu naS,., OEtKVUWV OU'tE E1tt),lvoflEva KPl<JE<J1V, aAAu Ktv~­
(JEte; nvue; £'t£pwv ouvaflEwv aAo),wv, ae; 0 DAa'twv rovo­
fla<JEV £1ttSufl,.,nK~v 'tE Kat SUflOetOll.22 

Zeno and Chrysippus base their definitions upon a monistic 
model of the soul, which possesses reason alone,23 whereas 
Posidonius' Platonic model has three powers. Zeno is credited 
with defining passion as ~ aAo),oc; Kat rcapa q)'l)O'tV 'V'Uxftc; 
KlVTlO'lC;, 11 6p~~ rcAEOva~0'Ucra,24 and as a rc'tOla 'V'UXftC;.2~ He 
divides the passions into four categories: desire, fear, pain, and 
pleasure (D.L. 7.110=SVF 1211), and says that pain, for instance, 
is "a fresh opinion of evil bemg present" (Galen PHP 4.281.24= 
SVF I 212: 8o~av rcpocrq>a'tOv 'tou KaKov au'tcp rcapdval). The 
significance of rrpocrq>a'tOv, whether Zenonian or not, is clear in 
Cicero: it is an opinion containing the proposition" that it is 
fitting to submit to grief."26 

22 Galen PHP 5.292.17-25=EK 152: "Now Chrysippus, in the first book of 
his treatise On the Passions, tries to demonstrate that the passions are certain 
judgments of the reasoning faculty, but Zeno considered that the passions are 
not the judgments themselves, rather the contractions and expansions, risings 
and failings of the soul which follow upon the judgments. Posidonius, 
diverging from them both, praises and associates himself with Plato's doctrine 
and opposes the circle of Chrysippus by demonstrating that the passions are 
not judgments nor do they follow upon judgments, but rather certain 
movements of other powers (of the soul) which Plato called 'desiderative' and 
'spirited'." Cf 4.246.36-248.6=EK 34.1-12. On their positions see J. Gosling, 
"The Stoics and aKpucrlu," Apeiron 20 (1987) 192-95. For general discussions 
of Stoic doctrine on the passions, see M. Frede, "The Stoic doctrine of the 
affections of the soul," in M. Schofield and G. Striker, edd., The Norms of 
Nature (Cambridge 1986) 93-110; M. Nussbaum, "The Stoics 011 the 
Extirpation of the Passions," Apeiron 20 (1987) 129-78. 

23 Cic. A cad. 1.38f=SVF 1207; Plut. Mor. 441c-D=SVF 1202. This is of course 
an oversimplification of early Stoic views on the soul. For a brief survey of the 
problems and scholarly debates, see Glibert-Thirry 402ff; Inwood 27-41. 

24 D.L. 7.110=SVF I 205: "an irrational movement of the soul contrary to 
nature or excessive impulse." Cf Cic. rusC. 4.11; Philo De spec. leg. 4.79; Stab. 
Eel. 2.39.4, 88.8ff; Clem. AI. Strom. 2.12, 54.5, 59.6; and see M. GIUSTA, I 
dossografi di ctica (= PubbFacLettFil 15 [Torino 1967: hereafter 'Giusta']) 238, 
268. 

25 Stob. Eel. 2.39.5 =SVF 1206, 88.11f: "a fluttering of the soul." 
26 Cic. Tusc. 3.7 4=S V F I 212: ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. For Stoic 

definitions of passion see Giusta II 238-48. Cicero's definitions of individual 
passions use the formula rectum esse videatur: e.g. grief is opinio recens mali 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 241 

From these dennitions it is not easy to discern precisely what 
a passion is: is it a movement of the soul, an impulse, the result 
of a judgment, or an opinion? Inwood's explanation of Stoic 
action theory (129ff) accounts for how it could be all four. Man's 
impulses to things are not mere movements of the soul in 
monistic psychology; rather they are "commands to oneself 
which one obeys";27 that is, impulse has one component, a 
rational act (an imperative), and another component, an action 
(motion). When a man sees something that might be appropriate 
for him, like a piece of cake (Inwood's example), he has the 
power to deliberate whether to allow his impulse to pursue the 
cake. In addition to his imperatival power of impulse, he also has 
the ability to exercise assent. An assent is a "judgment" (KptcnC;), 
and erroneous judgments are "opinions" or "beliefs" (86~at); so 
86~at form a subset of KplG£lC; (Inwood 130 n.l1). Assents are 
made to propositions (AEK'TCX) that may be theoretical statements 
(e.g. "There is a piece of cake"), which will not rouse him to 
action, or "hormetic," i.e., "impulse causing" statements, that 
will rouse him to action (e.g. "It is appropriate for me to eat the 

praesentis in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur (T usc. 4.14). 
A. BONHOFfER (Epictet und die Stoa [Stuttgart 1890: hereafter 'Bonhoffer, 
Epiktet'] 269f), followed by Inwood (146ff), shows that Zeno and Chrysippus 
intended rrpo(J(p<HO:; to mean what Cicero says here; (/ Giusta II 246-50. Arius 
says (2.89.2f) that "rrpo<J<pU'to:; is used in place of stimulative of an irrational 
contract ion" CtO OE n pO<J<pa'to:; 0. v't t 'tOU K t VTj't t KOU <Ju<J'toA~ S o.Ao'You (11) 
frrap<Jcws) and that an "horrnetic impression of something appropriate" must 
be present for all human impulses to occur (2.86.17f: 'to OE KlVOUV 'tllv 0PllllV 
OUOEV £-rcpov dVCH A('Y0u<JtV (lAA' 11 <pav'tu<JtUV bpJlTjHKT]V 'tOU Ka8~Kov'tOS 
aU'to8cv). Proof that Leno believed that an impression of "the appropriate" is 
necessary for impulse comes from Arcesilaus' response to the apraxia-argument 
(which uses Stoic premises) that two things are necessary for action: "an 
impression of something appropriate, and an impulse to it" (Plut. Mor. 
1122c-D: lj 'Y(lP rrpac,t:; OUOtV OEt'tat, <pav't(X(Jl(XS 't01) OtKclOU Kalnpos 'to <paVEY 
OiKEtOV 6PIl~S). See A. A. L01\'G and D. N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers I 
(Cambridge 1987: hereafter 'Long and Sedley') 456. Plausibly, Zeno held that 
an impulse to passion must result from an assent to the proposition that 
something appropriate is present; the" something" would be a passion itself­
hence ut aegritudincm suscipcre oportcat. At any rate, it certainly holds for 
Chrysippus-a most important point. In passion the content of the "fresh 
opinion" (Mc,ex rrp<lO<pcno:;) must be that "it is appropriate to submit to 
passion." 

27 Inwood 62; see Plut. Mar. 1 037F""SVF III 175 part; contra, Gosling (supra 
n.22) 183, 199ff. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

242 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

cake").28 The impulse that follows a hormetic proposition would 
be a command (e.g. "Eat the cake! "). The imperative shares a 
common predicate with the statements (the cake), but each 
speech act has its own effect on the soul. A passion, therefore, 
may be defined as a motion (xtvTlmc;), an impulse (OPIlT)), or an 
opinion (86~a). If it is called a movement or an impulse gone to 
excess, it might also be said to "follow upon the judgment" 
(Zeno's formulation); if it is called an erroneous decision, it 
might be said that the impulse is really caused by the opinion 
(Chrysippus' formulation). Inwood argues (130f) that impulse 
and assent always occur together, and that it is rather pointless to 
debate which formulation is correct. But it is a question with 
which Chrysippus seems to have been concerned, so the 
distinction ought not to be dismissed just yet. 

The important consideration in this monistic psychology is 
that passion is a movement of the rational soul in a manner con­
trary to reason. For the Stoics this process is of supreme gravity 
because it means that man is rejecting his own nature. Chrysip­
pus' etymology of AunT) ("pain" or "grief") is "the dissolution of 
the whole human being" (Cic. Tuse. 3.61=SVF III 485). The goal 
of life is to live in accordance with reason. Passion destroys 
man's only means to happiness (Stob. Eel. 2.75.11=SVFI 179). 

Posidonius, however, uses a tripartite model of the soul to 
explain the passions not as judgments but as movements of the 
soul's other two parts, which are irrational. In his Platonic 
model,29 reason ought to control the irrational powers; 30 when it 

28 Inwood 60; see also A. A. Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism," in 
Long, ed. (supra n.2), 75-113. 

29 Galen PH P 5.312.29-34 (=EK 142), 8.482.32-484.4 (=32). I say "Platonic" 
because Posidonius does not appear to accord e1J~6<; its privileged position in 
Plato (Ti. 70A, Phdr. 253c-54B, Resp. 4.439E-41c). At PH P 5.350-54, where 
eu~ is claimed as the natural ally of reason, Galen is conspicuously silent 
about any agreement on this point by Posidonius. In Posidonius the two 
irrational faculties are distinct, although he couples them as 'to 7ta8T\'tlKOV 
(PHP 4.288.9=EK 165.139f), 'to o."A.oyov (PHP 4.290.7ff=EK 165.174-77), and 'to 
7ta8T\'ttKOV 't£ Kat o.AoyOV (PHP 5.324.8 [=EK 31.12], 5.330.18f [=EK 
168.14f]). This implies that Posidonius understood tripartition as a Peripatetic 
dichotomy: see Vander Waerdt (supra n.5) 373-94; D. Rees, "Bipartition of the 
Soul in the Early Academy," jHS 77 (1987) 112-18. 

30 Posidonius called his divisions "faculties" (o1Jva~£t<;), not" parts" (~PT\); 
see Inwood 18-41; EK II 674. Diogenes of Babylon may have preceded 
Posidonius in revising Stoic doctrine on the soul: Paul Vander Waerdt has 
kindly brought to my attention Philodemus De musica 4 call. 56*, 57*.40f, 
69*.3, 74*, where Diogenes (unlike Posidonius) speaks of the soul's J.liPT\. See 
D. Delattre, "Philoderne, De la rnusique: livre IV, colonnes 40* a 109*," 
CronErcol19 (1989) 49-143. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 243 

does not, they move quite naturally towards an end that is 
contrary to reason (Galen PHP S.326.20-27=EK 187.4-13=SVF 
III 460). Posidonius argues that it is absurd to claim that reason 
can reject itself or that it will command an impulse exceeding the 
measure it has set (supra n.9). 

Zeno's definition of passion as a "fluttering of the soul" helps 
to explain how passion is conceived within a monistic frame­
work. Plutarch records an interpretation of passion in monistic 
psychology as "a turning-about of reason in alternate directions 
so quickly that one does not notice."31 Inwood describes (164) 
why the wise man is free from passions and why all others are 
subj ect to them: 

When a man falls away from his own better judgement, 
through a failure to act with the necessary circumspection 
and reflection, it is because he has in his soul a set of incon­
sistent opinions. This would not be the case if the agent had 
fully assimilated his reason to Right Reason. A sage has 
done this, and this is why all of his actions are according to 
Right Reason. When a man has in his soul conflicting opin­
ions, then the over-all condition of his soul is weak. His 
judgements on practical and ethical matters are liable to be 
reversed when external circumstances lead him to assent accor­
ding to one of his incorrect opinions and so to issue to him­
self incorrect commands. 

Stobaeus says that the Stoics call passion an "opinion" in the 
sense of a "weak supposition" (Eel. 2.89.1f=SVF III 378: 1tapa­
AafJ.~avE(J8at 1:ilv o6~av aV1:t 1:il~ a(J8Evou~ u1toAfl'j1E(J)~). All 
unwise men have unstable dispositions-inconsistent or "unhar­
monious" sets of opinions-that make up their reason (logos). 
When a fool is confronted with a moral dilemma, he may form 
presentations for himself to which his reason assigns various 
lekta that conflict with one another. He may assent first to one 
proposition, then to another that conflicts with it. Such an alter­
nation creates Plutarch's fluttering effect. When the fool assents 
in this way, weakly and without circumspection, he puts himself 
at the mercy of his own presentations. He is still a responsible 
actor, but he has become passive in a sense.32 

31 Pluto Mol'. 446f-47A (=SVF III 459 part), 441 C-D; Long and Sedley I 422. 

32 Inwood 162. This is an oversimplification of the actual processes as the 
Stoics understood them. They say that man does not assent to the proposition 
but to the presentation in which the proposition subsists-an important aspect 
of Stoic epistemology, at the center of which lies the phantasia kataleptike. 
Although Zeno held that assents are made to presentations, Arcesilaus charged 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

244 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

The Stoics also say, however, that a passion is a single opinion, 
a "fresh opinion of the presence of good or evil." Zeno and 
Chrysippus may have had different understandings of this doxa: 
for Zeno passion results from the doxa, but for Chrysippus 
passion is the doxa itself. As it is not only the belief that these are 
present but the "fresh" belief that causes passion (3o~cx rrpocr­
<pcx'WC;), Cic. Tusc. 3.74f (=SVF 1212) merits re-examination: 

Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali 
praesentis, in qua opinione iLlud insit, ut aegritudinem 
suscipere oporteat. 

Additur ad hanc definition em a Zen one reete, ut iLLa 
opinio praesentis mali sit recens; hoc autem verbum sic 
interpretantur, ut non tantum iLiud recens esse velint, quod 
pauLLo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in iLia opinato malo vis 
quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam ':Jiriditatem, tam 
diu appeLLetu)' recens. Ut Artemisi,~ iLia, MausoLi Cariae )'egis 
uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnassi fecit sepulcrum, quam 
diu vixit, vixit in luctu, eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. 

that they are really made to propositions (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.154), and Sto­
baeus confirms that later Stoics agreed (Eel. 2.88.4ff=SVF III 171: KUt ouy­
Ku'tu8cO£l; )lEv o.SlCOf.mOl 'tlOW, Op)lo.; OE [ret KU'tllYoPTJ)lu'tu, 'to. m:ptEx0)lEVo. 
reO); tv 'tOt; o.SlCO)lUOtV, 0'1; oUYK'tu8cOEt;). Sextus says that a rational 
presentation is one" in which it is possible for what has been presented to be 
expressed in language (Math. 8.70=SVF II 187: Ku8' llv 'to q>uv'tuo8Ev EO'tl 
AOYCil reupuo'tT]oat). The evidence conflicts with Zeno's doctrine of the 
phantasia kataleptike and supports Arcesilaus. Zeno, however, nowhere states 
that what is "apprehensible" in the phantasia kalaleplike is propositional; on 
the contrary, he uses an iconic metaphor of "stamping" -as of a coin ( Math. 
7.236=SVF I 58; Cic. Acad. 2.18, 77=SVF I 59)-and says only that this 
presentation has the power to reveal its object (Cic. Acad. 1.41 =SV F I 60) and 
that it is such that it could not arise from what is not (Math. 7.247-56=SVF II 
65). Part of the motivation for describing phantasia in non-propositional terms 
occurs in debates on the role of phantasia in passion. Presentations are said to 
cast a persuasive appearance that "drags" one to assent. Chrysippus describes 
phantasia as an antecedent cause of evil (nn.45, 154 infra). Carneades accepts 
for the sake of argument the "pull of the presentations" alone and without 
assent as a cause of passion (Plut. M or. 1057 A-B=S V F III 177). Because of the 
impact of presentations, "weakness of soul" (o.o8cv£tu) is also a critical issue in 
the cause of passion (n.1 09 infra): see Frede (supra n.22) 103ff; Long and Sedley 
I 201f; F. II. Sandbach, "Phantasia Katalcptikc," in Long (supra n.2) 12f; Long 
(supra n.28) 82ff, 91 ff with nn.24f; and Inwood 56-59, 72ff, 86£ with nn.212f, 
92. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens, quae tum denique non 
appellatur recens, cum vetustate exaruit. 33 

245 

The structure of this passage suggests that Cicero cannot assign 
the phrase ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat to Zeno, 34 who is 
credited only with adding the word "fresh," not with its deh­
ni tion, and his followers' dehni tions-" thriving" and "having a 
certain greenness "-are still a step removed from the propo­
sition, "it is fitting to submit to grief." It is difficult, never­
theless, to construct an argument showing that Chrysippus and 
Zeno essentially disagreed on the definition of passion. 35 An 
attempt to account for Galen's different wordings (supra n.22) 
would have to rely, somewhat as follows, on the meager 
evidence available. 

The evidence that Chrysippus spelled out the definition of 
prosphatos comes from the Stoic treatments for those in a state 
of passion. Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes about the 
proper cure for passion (Cic. Tuse. 3.77=SVF I 577).36 Cleanthes 
tried to convince those in pain or grief that they were mistaken 
in their belief that evil was present, because only virtue is good 

33 "1 think that it has been said enough that grief is a belief that evil is 
present, the content of which includes that 'it is fitting to submit to grief'. 

To this definition, it was rightly added by Zeno that the belief that evil is 
present is 'fresh'. They interpret this word such that they would have not only 
that which happened a little before be fresh, but however long a certain force 
inheres in the supposed evil so that it 'thrives' and has a certain 'greenness', 
they would have it be called fresh. The famous Artemisia, the wife of Mauso­
Ius, King of Caria, who commissioned that eminent sepulcher at Halicarnas­
sus, lived in grief her entire life, and wasted away consumed with it. For her, 
the belief was fresh every day, since it is no longer called fresh only when it 
has withered to dust with age." 

34 The Latin shows that Cicero's source is, as might be expected, later than 
Zeno. He begins by saying that recens (npoa<pa1o<;) is Zenonian, but his 
interpretanlur indicates a later doxography. Perhaps whatever Zeno said about 
npoa<pa'to<; requ ired clarification and ut aegriludinem suscipere oporteat was 
proposed. 

35 Except for circumstantial evidence (supra n.26), convincing proof is lack­
ing that Zeno understood the definition of npoa<pa'to<; to contain the propo­
sition ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. In the present state of the evidence I 
do not accept Inwood's view (147, 153) that Zeno and Chrysippus agreed on 
the nature of the passions. Cf Bonhoffer 270. I shall argue for a subtle dif­
ference in their positions that Posidonius exploits. 

36 Inwood (146-54) does not emphasize Cicero's evidence on Cleanthes in 
the doxography on npoa<pa'to<;. In my view, Cleanthes' position can reveal 
something about Zeno's position and forms the background of Posidonius' 
discussion of moral progressors that 1 nwood (154) dismisses. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

246 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

and only vice evil. What they perceive as evil only appears to be 
so. Cleanthes learned this treatment from ZenoY But Cleanthes 
could do nothing to relieve the passion of a moral progressor 
like Aeschines' Alcibiades, who was overcome with grief when 
Socrates demonstrated his lack of virtue (August. De civ. D. 
14.8=Aeschin. fr. 5 Dittmar). Cicero (Tusc. 3.77) sums up the 
problem raised by this example (Alcibiades' correct belief that 
evil was present could not change over time):38 "Cleanthes con­
soles the wise man who needs no consolation," i. e., the man 
who can curb passion by considering what is good and what is 
evil. 

Chrysippus seems to take up the moral progressor's case 
when he insists that the chief cause of passion is the belief that it 
is necessary. But it does not follow that passion is necessary or 
appropriate even from a conclusion that a man is without virtue 
and thus vicious. If Cicero's reports are taken together, Zeno 
seems to have understood the doxa prosphatos to mean an 
opinion that is "in full vigor" or "in the prime of youth" (ut 
vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem), and indeed this is the 
original use of prosphatos in Greek: "not yet decomposed" 
human corpses or "fresh" perishable food items (LSJ s.v.). 39 The 
concept is not necessarily temporal, nor does it denote a specific 
proposltlOn. 

Zeno's interpreters also say that the force inheres "in the 
supposed evil" (opinato malo). 40 This must mean" in the supposi-

37 Cic. ruse. 2.60=SVF I 607-clearly an historical anecdote from a later dox­
ography and thus of limited reliability (ef SVF I 422-34), but consistent with 
Cicero's general picture: Zeno coined the phrase 06~a rrpocr<jla'tO<;; later inter­
preters had to spell out its meaning; Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes 
about how to cure the passions (and therefore what the root cause was); and 
Cleanthes learned his cure for the passions from Zeno. 

38 See Plut. Mor. 1 063A-B=SVF III 539 part.; Alex. Aphr. De fato 199.14-22= 
SVF III 658; Cic. "Fuse. 3.68. 

39 Jl. 24.757; Hdt. 2.89; Zeno in Cic. Tuse. 3.75. This interpretation seems 
consistent with Zeno's definition of passion and inconsistent with Chrysippus' 
position in T use. 

40 Cic. Tuse. 3.75; ef. Ps.-Andron. On Passions I 12.3=SVF III 391: rrpocr­
b01((J)fl£vOU bnvou (Giusta II 249). <jlOlV(lfl£VOV, modifying" goods" and" evils," 
appears in some textbook definitions of the passions: e.g. Stob. Eel. 2.88.16ff= 
S V F III 378 ({:m8ufliav fl£V o{)v Kat <jlO~OV rrpOT1Yf.tcr80l, 'tTtV fl£V rrpo<; 'to 
<jlOlVOfl£VOV aya86v, 'tOY DE rrpo<; 't(l <jlOlVOj.l£VOv KaKov ); Aspasius in Eth. Nie. 
p.44.12 Heylb.=SVF III 386. On the connection between "apparent goods" 
and phantasia see nn.l07, 109 infra. Bonhoffer (266ff; ef. Inwood 147 n.86) 
argues that there is essentially no difference between" fresh" to describe the 
evil and "fresh" for the opinion. Perhaps not, but Cleanthes' cure for the pas-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 247 

tion," rather than "in the thing," but the wording may suggest 
something between the two such as "in the thing as perceived." 
In passion one assents to a presentation with a subsisting lekton 
(supra n.32). Interpreters may have taken Zeno to mean, "So 
long as the presentation that the thing is evil remains, the judg­
ment and the passion will persist," perhaps because the fool 
lacks the sufficient disposition to withhold his assent to it. 
Hence the opinion-the weak assent-will remain fresh until 
the presentation changes; and in the case of Artemisia, who con­
templated her husband's death daily, the presentation remained 
forever the same. This explanation can give real meaning to the 
use of the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus in the exemplum: the 
nobile sepulchrum created an eternal reminder or presentation 
of her husband's death. If Cicero's opinato malo is a meaningful 
rendering of what Zeno had in mind, it may be that Zeno associ­
ated the "fresh" clement in passion with the presentation to 
which the assent is given.41 This position would leave Zeno open 
to questions about the cause of passion. Presentations cannot 
<cause' action in any strict sense-one may always withhold 
assent (Origen De prine. 3.1.3). Yet Zeno might have responded 
that the wise man always withholds his assent to all but the true 
presentation, the KCXTCXATlTC'TlKil CPCXVTCX0tCX, while the fool assents 
weakly and rashly to merely persuasive presentations. 42 As 
passion is found only in fools, it might well be said that the 'fresh­
ness' of the opinion that causes the impulse remains as long as 
the presentation remains persuasive. 

Chrysippus, unlike Zeno, understands passion not as «follow­
ing upon" an assent, but as an assent itself. He concludes that the 
cause of passion and the content of its 'freshness' is an assent to 
its "appropriateness" rather than the result of an incorrect deci­
sion about the presence of good or evil (Long and Sedley I 421). 
Chrysippus tried to treat the passions by removing from the 

sions (probably taken from Zeno [supra n.37]) suggests that there was, and 
only some difference can account for the disagreement between Zeno and 
Chrysippus on the definition of passion. Moreover, the intensely rationalist 
formulation of Chrysippus suggests his intererst in finding the aitia of passion 
despite Posidonius' arguments to the contrary. 

41 Professor KiJd brings to my attention lile; n:po(J(paw'U q>avlacriae; at [Mag. 
Mar. ] 1203 b4f. Inwood (248£) argues that the [ Mag. Mar. ] shows Stoic 
influence, which would make it not a precedent but perhaps still a corollary 
depending on the date of the r Mag. Mar.]' 

42 Stab. Eel. 2.111.18-112.8 (""SVF III 548 part), 2.68.18-23 (""III 663). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

248 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

agent's mind his belief that passion is "just" or "obligatory" 
(iusta atque debito: Cic. Tusc. 3.76=SVF III 486, 4.62=III 488). A 
passage in Galen purports to show Chrysippus' inability to ex­
plain why the passions cease with the passage of time, i.e., how 
they cease to be 'fresh'. The passage, probably chosen to imply 
Chrysippus' confusion, suggests how presentation may have 
played a centrol role in the Zenonian doctrine of the passions 
that Chrysippus was possibly attempting to refine: 

OOKEt OE ).lOl ~ ).lEV 'tOW;tnll M~cx OlCX).lEVElV, on KCXKOV cx\:)'tO 0 
01-] nap£O'nv, £YXPOVl~O).lEVlle; 0' uVl£08cxl ~ OUO'tOA1-] KCXt we; 
ol).lat ~ bel 't1-]V OUO'tOA1-]V Op).lTt. 'tUXov OE KCXl 'tCXU'tlle; OlCX­
).lEVOuolle; OUX 1mCXKOUOE'tat 'ta £~fje;, Ola nOlaV aAAllV Ent­
YlVO).lEVllV Ola8EOlV OUOOUAAoYlo'tov 'tOU'tWV 'YlVO).lEVWV. ol)-rW 
yap KCXl KAcxlov'tEe; ncxuov'tat KCXt ).l1-] ~OUAO).lEVOl KACXiElv 
KACXiouOlV, o'tcxv ).l 1-] o).lOtCXe; 'tae; q>cxv'tCX<Jicxe; 'ta UnOKEi).lEVCX 
nOL'll KCXt EVtO'tfjmt n ~ ).lll8EV. OV 'tponov yap ~ 8pTtvWV 
ncxuoLe; yivEtat KCXt KACXu8).loi, 'tOLCXU'tCX EUAOYOV KCXt En' 
EKElVWV ouv,uyxav£lv £V 'tCXte; uPXCXte; ).!O:AAov ,WV npcxy­
).la,wv KlVOUV,wv, Kcx8anEp Ent ,WV ,OV YEAW,CX KLVOUV,WV 
yiv£08at Eq>llv, KCXt 'ta O).lOta 'tOU'OlS.43 

This passage, taken with Cleanthes' treatment of the passions 
(Tusc. 3.76f) and Zeno's definition of prosphatos (Tusc. 3.75), 
suggests a debate. Zeno defines the passions as EnrYlvo/-l£VU 
KPlO£Ol, that is, as the" contractions" (ouowAut) themselves. 
The cause of the contraction is the impulse; the cause of the 
impulse is the assent. But the presentation cannot be said to be 
the cause of the assent, because assent is the locus of respon-

43 Galen PHP 4.284.7-17=EK 165.59-70: "It seems to me that an opinion of 
this sort remains, that the very thing which is present is bad, but that as it (Sc. 
the opinion) lingers the contraction relaxes and, as I think, the impulse to the 
contraction. Perhaps even if this (Sc. the opinion) remains, the things which 
follow will not obey, as these things occur by some other supervening 
disposition which is hard to account for. For it is in this way that people cease 
weeping and weep even when they do not want to weep, whenever under­
lying circumstances produce dissimilar presentations and something or 
nothing interferes. For in the same way that the cessation of laments and 
weepings occurs, it is reasonable that such things should occur in those cases, 
since things are more stimulative at the beginnings, just as I said occurs in the 
case of things which stimulate laughter; and also things similar to these." Tr. 
Inwood 149 with nn.94f on the textual difficulties. Gosling argues (supra n.22: 
192f) that Chrysippus also attempted to rcfine Zcnonian doctrine on the 
passions at PI! P 4.240.18-29. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 249 

sibility and free-will. 44 The above passage, purporting to show 
the confused state of Chrysippean doctrine, may in fact pre­
serve the state of Stoic doctrine after Zeno. If a passion is an im­
pulse rather than an opinion, the passions might appear to come 
and go merely by a change of presentation without a change of 
opinion, i.e.) assent. For example, one may try to forget about 
something painful by going to a show or even taking a long vaca­
tion, and the passion may subside (thanks to a change of presen­
tation) without one's having ceased to believe that what had 
happened was bad. The seeds of Chrysippus' answer may be 
seen in Zeno's claim that all impulses are made to «something ap­
propriate" (supra n.26): the impulse to passion must have been 
judged 'appropriate', and that judgment must be reversed for 
the impulse to subside, whether consciously or unconsciously. 

The thorny point is that there are two parts to the doxa pros­
phatos: the false belief that good or evil is present, and the false 
belief that "it is appropriate to submit to passion" (ut aegritu­
dinem suseipere oporteat: Cic. Tuse. 3.74; Long and Sedley I 
421). The latter clause seems to have been associated especially 
with the word "fresh," so that when the 'appropriateness' faded, 
the doxa would cease to be prosphatos and the passion would 
subside. But the fading of the 'appropriateness' is a complex 
matter: passion may also subside merely by a change of presenta­
tion. Cicero explains Chrysippus' position that there are also 
two causes of any human action, the assent and the presentation: 

Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id 
quafe sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio 
non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum 
proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet 
rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non 
ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata 
(necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri).45 

44 Cic. Fat. 39-43=SVF II 974; Gell. NA 7.2.6-13=SVF II 1000; see Long and 
Sedley I 392ff; Inwood 44-50. 

45 Fat. 42=SVF II 974.16-24: "He thinks that he can easily explain the state­
ment that acts of assent come about by prior causes. For although assent can­
not occur unless it is prompted by an impression, nevertheless, since it has that 
impression as its proximate, not its primary cause, Chrysippus wants it to have 
the rationale which I mentioned just now. He docs not want assent, at least, to 
be able to occur without the stimulus of some external force {for assent must 
be prompted by an impression)." Tr. Long and Sedley I 387f; cf 393 for 
commentary. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

250 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

The Chrysippean theory of causation discussed here shows that 
presentations are proximate causes of assents. In the case of the 
fool, Chrysippus argues that passion fades and the doxa ceases to 
be fresh only when the agent ceases to believe that his passion is 
'appropriate' (rather than when he ceases to believe that good or 
evil is present, as Cleanthes argues: supra n.36). This may hap­
pen over time without the conscious knowledge of the agent, 
and it may result simply from a change in presentation: otav Jlll 
OJlOla<; teX<; cpaV'tacrla<; teX UnOK£lJlEVa norn (supra n.43). Among 
fools whose assents are weak and easily influenced, a change in 
presentation, i.e., in the proximate cause of action, may cause 
passions to begin and end, because the real cause of passion, the 
controlling cause, is the fool's inferior state of soul that will yield 
to any persuasive presentation. 46 

The evidence suggests that Chrysippus was particularly con­
cerned to explain the cause of passion, the clitia, and its abate­
ment. When he says that the false belief in the appropriateness 
of the passion must change for the passion to subside, he shows 
that the genuine cause of passion is the prior, the assent to the ap­
propriateness of passion, not the proximate, the impression of 
the apparent good or evil (Cic. Tuse. 3.76= SVF III 486). More­
over, he shows that of the two assents involved in the 8o~a 
npocrcpa-ro<;, that the thing is good or evil, and that it is appro­
priate to submit to passion, the latter is more correctly called the , , 
cause. 

II. Selection and the End 

If passion is a movement of the soul contrary to reason, the 
goal of life is to have one's soul always move in accordance with 
reason. The passions make man live in conflict with nature and 
unhappily. The cause of passion and the cause of a happy life are 
both to be found in man's understanding of what is most impor­
tant, that is, of what is the good. To see how Posidonius' argu­
ments on the passions might apply to his view of the end, it is 
important to understand the Stoic doctrines of good, evil, and 
the" indifferents," on which the doctrines on the passions and 
on the telos depend. 

The occasion of passion involves a certain belief about good 
and evil. The special case of Alcibiades (who really was in the 
presence of evil) notwithstanding, a man ordinarily decides that 

46 See Inwood 81; Long and Sedley I 420f. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 251 

"it is appropriate to submit to passion" when believing that 
something other than virtue or vice is good or evil. For the 
Stoics, all the things that come between are "indifferent" (aoux­
<popa). The indifferents that accord with nature have "value" 
(aSia) and are "preferred" (npoTl"ff.l£va); those contrary to 
nature have" disvalue" (anasia) and are to be "dispreferred" 
(anon POTlYll£V a: Stob. Eel. 2.84.18-85.11 =S VF III 128), and 
some have neither value nor disvalue (D.L. 7.104=SVF III 119). 
As the practice of virtue requires interaction with the world, the 
rational selection of the indifferents is the practice of virtue. 
Hence Cicero calls them the "subject matter" of virtue. The 
wise man will decide whether to commit suicide or remain in 
life purely on the basis of the availability of this subject matter 
with which to practice virtue (Cic. Fin. 3.61=SVF III 763)). 

The wise man who selects properly remains free from passion 
in the technical sense, but he experiences the rational counter­
parts of passion-the harmonious motions of the soul acting in 
accordance with reason, the Euna8nal. He will experience 
xapa (joy), a well-reasoned expansion of the soul based upon 
the correct belief that he is in the presence of good along with 
~OUATl(JlC;, the motion based upon the correct belief that good is 
approaching, and EUAa~na (precaution), the motion based upon 
the correct belief that evil is approaching (Cic. Tusc. 4.14=SVF 
III 438). He never believes that he is in the presence of evil be­
cause the wise man will always avoid vice. All definitions of the 
Euna8naL include "properly reasoned" (dJAOYOC;) motions of 
the soul, whereas passion, an irrational motion, arises from an 
improperly reasoned belief about good and evil. 

The wise man exercises "reservation" in his decisions about 
the indifferents, a certain restraint by which he acknowledges 
that their acquisition is of no consequence to his happinessY 
This mental reserve is the wise man's way of preserving his fun­
damental belief that what is indifferent cannot be good or evil 
and, therefore, that its presence or absence should not lead him 
to passion. The technical term for reservation, lm£suip£<Jlc;, is 
late (e.g. Stobaeus, Seneca, et ai. ),48 but the concept may date to 

47 Inwood 155-73; cf Bonhbffer 269f. 

48 Stob. Eel. 2.115.5=SVF III 564; Sen. Ben. 4.34=III 565 (exceptio); cf Arr. 
Epict. Diss. 2.6.9f (=IlI 191), 3.24.23f, 85ff; Fnchiridion 2f; M. Ant. 4.1, 5.20, 
6.50, 11.37. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

252 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Zeno,49 who is quoted that the ultimate source of all the passions 
is, in a way, intemperance, 50 defined as "the knowledge of what 
is to be chosen, what avoided, and what is neither" (E1tleJ'tTII1Tj 
aipE'twv Kat q>EUK'tWV Kat OU8E'tEPCOV), i.e., what is "good," what 
is "evil," and what is neither. 51 Temperance is one of the four 
Stoic virtues, along with wisdom, justice, and courage. As virtue 
is perfected only in the wise man, it follows that only the wise 
man is perfectly temperate and thus free from passion. The defi­
nition of virtue also shows the central position in which the 
Stoics place the knowledge of good, evil, and the indifferents in 
the realm of action: q>pOVTjeJlV 8' dvat E1tleJ't~f.lTjV ~v 1tOtTj'tEOV Kat 
OU 1tOtTjn~ov Kat OU8E'tEPCOV, 11 E1tteJ't~f.lTjV aya8wv Kat KaKWV Kat 
OU8E'tEPCOV q>UeJEl 1tOAl'tlKOU (AOYlKOU) ~00\). 52 

The chief function of temperance is to keep the soul free from 
excessive delights and distresses (Cic. Tusc. 4.37; 3.16ff=SVF III 
570). It can accomplish this because it urges the wise man to 
mark the greatness of the universe and his own ephemeral exist­
ence and to keep watch lest anything strike him as "unexpected" 
or "unforeseen" (nihil improvisum, nihil inopinatum, nihil om­
nino novum: Tusc. 4.37). By Stobaeus' definition of i)1tE~ai.pEeJtC; 
(Eel. 2.115.5=SVF III 564) nothing will strike the wise man "un­
foreseen" (a1tpOATj1t'LOV). Whether Zenonian or not, the "reser-

49 Zeno's "excessive impulse" implies some account of what Zeno saw as the 
meaning of "excessive." Inwood (119-26, 165-73) concentrates on Chrysippus, 
but Zeno's belief that intemperance is the cause of all passions could be 
connected to this material. 

50 Cic. Acad. 1.38f: Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tol­
lerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri 14etitia 
dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his 
quasi morbis votuit carere sapientem; cumque eas perturbationes antiqui 
naturales esse dice rent et rationis expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, 
alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur, nam et perturbationes 
voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturba­
tionum matron esse arbitrabatur immoderatam quandam intemperantium. Cf 
Tuse. 4.22=SVF III 379: intemperantiam, quae est tota mente a recta ratione 
defectio. In my view, Zeno conceived the important function of reservation 
under the heading quaedam temperantia. The term u1tf~aip£O"t~, however, is 
clearly later. Inwood (119) argues that the technical conception of "reser­
vation" probably derives from Chrysippus' intense interest in determinism: cf 
Inwood 119. Chrysippus' investigation of causation (supra n.45) revealed more 
clearly what is and is not in man's power. 

51 Stob. Eel. 2.59.4 (= SV FIll 262); Pluto M or. 441 A (=1 201). 
52 Stob. Ecl. 2.59.4ff=SVF III 262: "Virtue is the knowledge of what must 

and must not be done and of neutral actions, or the knowledge of things that 
are good and evil and neutral by nature for a rational political being." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 253 

vation" by which the wise man distinguishes the indifferents 
from good and evil is what keeps him free from the passions. 

The wise man is to have an unrestrained impulse to the good 
and from evil (Arr. Epict. Diss. 3.24.23f, 85ff), but he must exer­
cise restraint in the realm of the indifferent things. Chrysippus 
describes the role of selection in a life of virtue as follows: 

Dux 1:0ULO KaAws () XPUOtn7[0S AEy£t 15'11 /J..£XP1S av iiDllA.a /J..0l 
l11:cX £1;l1s, acl 1:WV £1)<j>UECJ1:£PCOV EX0/J..at 7[POs 1:0 1:uyxav£lv 
1:WV Ka'!cX <j>U01V· alnos yap /J..' () 8£os E7[0l110£V 1:0U1:COV EKAO':­
nKov. d D£ y£ iiD£lV on VOO£tV /J..Ot Ka8d/J..ap1:at VUV, Kat 
rt "", t \ \ r I , I ., " COp/J..COV av £7[ au'!o· Kat yap 0 7[0US, £1 <j>p£vas £tX£v, cop/J..a 
av £7[1. 'TO 7[11 AOU08at. 53 

Chrysippus makes the important point that nature intends man 
to obey fate-the reason that guides the universe-and to select 
the things in accordance with nature. Obedience to fate is man's 
primary duty. The pursuit of the indifferents is secondary. The 
wise man does all things with reservation in order to preserve 
this order commanded by nature. Reservation is indispensable 
to man's happiness inasmuch as he must select among the indif­
ferents to live and to practice virtue. 

The Stoics observe that the indifferents playa role in every 
phase of man's life. 54 Man's first impulses are to self-preserva­
tion and to things important for self-preservation (Cic. Fin. 
3.16). When he attains the age of reason, he learns that what he 
formerly sought by instinct, he now seeks by reason. The selec­
tions of the indifferents by conscious choice are "appropriate 
actions" (Ka.8~KOV'Ta.). In time the habit of performing appro­
priate acts leads to the observation that the choice of things in 
accordance with nature creates a harmony with nature that is 
choice-worthy in itself. This life of harmony wi th nature com­
prises a life of virtue that he comes to esteem more highly than 
the things he chooses. Harmony with nature includes harmony 

53 Arr. Epict. Diss. 2.6.9f=SVR III 564: "For this reason Chrysippus speaks 
properly when he says, "As long as what will happen is unclear to me, I hold 
fast to those things which are more suited to the attainment of the things in 
accordance with nature. For God himself made me inclined to select them. 
But if I knew that it is fated for me to be sick right now, I would direct my 
impulse to it. Evcn my foot, if it could rcason, would direct its impulse to being 
muddied." See Inwood 119-26. 

54 See I. G. Kidd, "The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the Summum 
Bonum, with Reference to Change in the Stoa," CQ N.S. 5 (1955) 181-94; M. 
Reesor, "The Indiffcrcnts in the Old and Middle Stoa," TAPA 82 (1951) 
102-10. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

254 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

with Zeus' divine reason that directs the fate of the universe 
(D.L. 7.87ff=SVF I 162). Man therefore directs his efforts at per­
fecting his own reason and making it conform to the perfect 
reason of Zeus. When the wise man perfectly performs appro­
priate acts in accordance with Right Reason, they are virtuous 
acts (Ka1:op8wJ.w"w: Fin. 3.21-24=SVF III 188.18,497, 11, 186). 
First impulses lead to the "preferred indifferents" (Ta KaTa 
q>~O'lV or npoTlYJl£va); they are both the "origin" (apxfJ) and the 
"material" (uATl) of appropriate actions (Ka8~KovTa); lastly, they 
are the uATl of Ka8~KovTa, the materia sapientiae, the stuff with 
which virtue and virtuous acts deal, but they are not the origin 
of virtue, and their acquisition is not the goal of virtue (Plut. 
Mor. 1069E=SVF III 491). A happy life in accordance with 
reason and fate depends upon the wise man's belief that the 
indifferents are neither good nor the goal of virtue. 

In passion one assents not only to the proposition that what is 
indifferent is good or evil but also to the proposition that passion 
is in accordance with nature. Part of the definition of the doxa 
prosphatos is that one "ought" to have a passion (ut aegritu­
dinem suscipere oporteat: supra n.26). Chrysippus sees the 
"ought" as the cause of passion; one treats passion by convin­
cing the subject that passion is not an officium, an "appropriate 
act": Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detra­
here illam opinionem maerenti, si se officio fungi putet iusto 
atque debito. 55 Posidonius also understands Chrysippus to de­
fine passion as the belief that "it is appropriate and in accordance 
with the valuation" of things that are present to be moved to 
passion (Galen PH P 4.264.23=EK 164.18: Ka8ilKov Kat Ka't' 
a~iav). On this evidence Chrysippus seems to observe that the 
agent mistakenly decides passion is "to be preferred": the doxa 
prosphatos of passion is identified with the belief that passion is 
an "appropriate act"; that is, he focuses on what the agent judges 
about passion, an internal phenomenon, rather than what he 
may judge about external things or events. 

The Stoic formulae for the telos recognize the interdepen­
dence of the doctrines on man's relationship to nature, on the 
selection of indifferents, and on the subordinate role of the indif-

55 Cic. Tuse. 3.76=SVF III 486: "But Chrysippus judges that the main thing 
in consolation is to take away this opinion from the one who is grieving, if he 
should think that he is performing an appropriate act which is just and owed." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 255 

ferents in the practice of virtue. 56 These formulae also tacitly 
recognize that passion is a threat to the happy life. Zeno defined 
the end (telos) as 'TO O~OAOYOD~£Vo)<; ~llv ("to live harmoniously 
and consistently").57 Zeno's successors revised the definition 
with the apparent intention of expressing the content of O~OAO­
YOD~£Vo)<;, i.e., to give concrete definition to "living by rational 
consistency." Stobaeus says (Eel. 2.76.1-6) that Cleanthes added 
"with nature" ('Tn Gru<Ju) to the formula because Zeno's succes­
sors felt that the shorter formula was an incomplete predicate. 
Diogenes Laertius (7.87) attributes 'Tn qrU<J£l to Zeno. Attempts 
to redefine the predicate, to spell out what should qualify 'TO 
~llv, concentrate on man's relationship to nature. Chrysippus is 
also said (Stob. Eel. 2.76.6ff) to have given the telos as "to live in 
accordance with the experience of things which happen by 
nature" (~llv KU'T' E~1tUPlUV 'TWV <pUOTt <JD~~atV6V'To)V). KU'T' E~-
1tElpiuv suggests that man should live in accordance with what 
he can observe about the divine logos. Man's goal is to make his 
logos conform perfectly with the divine logos and Chrysippus' 
formula focuses on how he should do this. Man cannot observe 
the universe as it is, but only he can understand it (Inwood 
203f). He should make himself a willing follower of fate, the ulti­
mate teacher, and, like the dog tied behind the cart (Hippo!. 
philos. 21 [Diels Dox. Graee. p.571.11J= SVF II 975), he should 
make his own motions conform with what events demand 
(D.L. 7.87f=SVF III 4; I 552, 162). 

Cicero appends Chrysippus' formula without attribution: 
vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, 
seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint 
reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae viv­
ere. 58 The addition of selection and disselection mayor may not 
belong to Chrysippus,59 but, in any event, Cicero sees Chrysip-

56 See A. A. Long, "Stoic Eudaimonism," ProcBostonColAncPhil 4 (1988) 
77-112; Inwood 203-08; T. H. IRWIN, "Stoic and Aristotelian Conceptions of 
Happiness," in Schofield and Striker (supra n.22: hereafter' Irwin') 234-42. 

57 Stob. Eel. 2.75.11 =SVF I 179. See J. M. Rist, "Zeno and Stoic Consistency," 
Phronesis 22 (1977) 168-74; C. O. Brink, "Theophrastlls and Zeno on Moral 
Theory," Phronesis 1 (1955) 141-44. 

58 Fin. 3.31 (tr. Long and Sedley I 401): "a life applying knowledge of those 
things that happen by nature, selecting those in accordance with nature and 
rejecting those contrary to nature, that is-a life in agreement and consistent 
with naturc."C! 2.34. 

59 Long and Sedley I 407; A. A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos," 
Phronesis 12 (1967) 59-90, esp. 69. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

256 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

pus' formula in expanded form as an explanation of convenien­
ter congruenterque naturae vivere, i. e., 'to 6~OAOYOU~£vOJ~ 't11 
<pUGH sTjv. Selection is logically added as the natural conse­
quence of living KU't' £~7tHptUV. As seen earlier, man's relation­
ship to nature is expressed in two ways: first, man must make 
his own logos conform to that of nature; and second, he must 
select among the indifferents in accordance with logos (cf supra 
n.S3). Cicero's formula suggests an interconnection of the two 
relationships. 

The assimilation of one's own logos to divine logos is the final 
step of OiX£lClXHs, the process by which man comes to realize the 
life that nature intended for him and by which he lives in accor­
dance with nature. Chrysippus describes this process in his DEpt 
'tEAWV (D.L. 7.8Sf=SVF III 178): man is constituted so as to be 
attracted by what will contribute to his own preservation; like 
the animals, man's impulse (6p~~) can only be stimulated by 
what is "appropriate" (OlKE10V); but because man has reason, he 
can use logos to govern his impulse. Reason performs this super­
vision as a craftsman (logos='t£XVt't11s: D.L. 7.86) practices his 
craft. Stobacus records that only "an hormetic presentation of 
something appropriate" (<puv'tUGtU 6p~£nKil 'tOU KUSi)KOV'tO~) 
can stimulate man's impulse; thus Diogenes' OlK£lOV also has the 
sense of KUSTj KOV. 60 In other contexts Stobaeus says that the pre­
ferred indifferents (the 15A11 and apxi) of KUSi)KOV'tU) are 
capable of stimulating impulse (Eel. 2.82.S-10=SVF III 121; cf 
Eel. 2.75.1 =III 131). Therefore Diogenes' logos, which super­
vises impulse, would include in its "craft" the selection of which 
indifferents will be allowed to stimulate man's impulse. Man's 
goal is to make his reason conform to divine reason; the func­
tion of his rational craft is to preside over his impulse. By this 
line of reasoning two kinds of craftsmen are discerned: those 
who supervise their impulse imperfectly because their reason 
does not conform to nature, and those who supervise it 
perfectly because their reason does conform to nature. 

60 Eel. 2.86.17f; Inwood 84f with n.208; cf supra n.26. OiKElOV as a concept 
predates the Stoics and occurs in Epicureanism: see Brink (supra n.57) 139ff; S. 
G. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," in Long, ed., (supra n.2) 114-49; J. Brunschwig, 
"The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in Schofield and 
Striker, edd. (supra n.22) 113-44; Vander Waerdt, "Hermarchus" 97 n.40. Its 
role in the apraxia~argument (supra n.26), however, suggests either that Zeno 
used the term or that later reporters like Diogenes accepted the more universal 
OiKclOV as an acceptable substitute for Ku8i1KOV. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 257 

Diogenes of Babylon defined the telos as "reasoning well in 
the selection and disselection of things in accordance with na­
ture" (EUAOYlCVC£tV EV Tn 'tWV Ka'ta qrumv EKAOyft Kat U1tEKAoyft).61 
Antipater, his student, is credited with two formulas that also 
use selection in the definition of the telos: (1) "to live continu­
ously selecting things in accordance with nature and disselecting 
things contrary to nature (~llv EKAEyojl£voUC; jlEV 'ta Ka'ta <pUCHV, 
U1t£KAqojlEVOUC; O£ 'ta 1tapa qruCHV); (2) "to do everything in 
one's power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to 
obtaining the predominating things which accord with nature" 
(1taV 'to Ka8' a\)'tov 1tOlEtv Oll1V£KWC; Kat cmapa~a'twc; 1tPOC; 'to 
'tuyxavnv 'twv 1tPOllYOUjlEVWV Ka'ta <pucnv). 62 

Both Diogenes and Antipater attempt to incorporate man's 
dual relationship (supra 2S3 with n.S3) to nature into a single 
formula. 63 For Diogenes, £uAoYlcn£lv ("to reason properly") 
expresses the first duty of making man's reason conform to 
divine reason. 64 Antipater's first formula requires selecting and 
rejecting what ought to be selected and rejected, i.e., 'ta Ka'ta 
<pU<HV and 'ta napa <jlU<JlV. In the second formula man's first 
duty consists in the effort intended by 1taV 'TO Ka8' a1.>'TOV 1tOlEtV 
OtllV£KWC; Kat anapa~a'twc;, where the adverbs may allude to 
"consistency" and where "to do everything in one's power" cer­
tainly includes the exercise of reason. But the adverbs may more 
properly allude to 'rational impulse'. A generous reading of 
Antipater's second formula might interpret it as the obligation to 
exercise the rational consistency advocated by Zeus in dealing 
with indifferents. 

Diogenes and Antipater (in his first formula) expressly empha­
size man's second duty to select the indifferents. In Antipater's 
second formula, however, man's efforts towards "acquiring" 
('tuyxavnv) the indifferents replace his duty of selection. Plu-

61 Stab. Eel. 2.76.9£=.5VF III Diog. 44ff (tr. Long and Sedley I 357); D.L. 7.88; 
Clem. AI. Strom. 2.21 p.179 Sylb. (I 497 Pan.). Diogenes and Clement omit Kat 
U1tEKAOYn. 

62 Stab. Eel. 2.76.11-15=SVF III Ant.57; tr. Long and Sedley I 357. Clement's 
single formula (Strom. 2.21 p.179 Sylb. [V.2 497 Pott.]=SVF III Ant.58) 
conflates the two: 'Av'tt1ta'!:poc; ... 'to 'tEAOC; lCEtcr8m EV 'tip OlT]V£KW<; Kat U1tapa­
~Cl.'t(l)<; EKAEyw8at fLEV 'ta Ka'ta <j>UCJlV, U1tEKAEyw8m O£ 'ta 1tapa <j>UCJlV iJ1tO­

Aall~aVEl. 

63 For continuity between the formulae of Chrysippus and Diogenes see 
Long (supra n.59) 68-73; A. Bonhoffer, "Die Telosformel des Stoikers 
Diogenes," PhiloLogus 67 (1908) 582-605. 

64 Long and Sedley I 408; Sen. Ep. 92.11 ff; cf E1JAOYO; in definitions of 
EtJ1ta8EWt: supra 251. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

258 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

tarch provides the only clue for why he may have chosen to 
define rationally consistent selection as a rationally consistent 
attempt "to acquire" the indifferents: Antipater was forced to 
defend himself against the attacks of Carneades. 65 

III. Carneades and the Stoic Telos 

It is especially difficult to discuss the impact of Carneades up­
on Stoic doctrine because he cannot be held accountable for 
positions adopted for the sake of argument. As his attacks on the 
Stoa are ad hoc (e.g. Cic. Grat. 3.80; Lactant. Div. Instit. 5.14.3ff, 
Epit. 50.8), we not only have to sift out from divergent sources 
what Carneades may have said, but must also discover the 
original context. Scholars have attempted to reconstruct the frag­
ments of his debate with Antipater from Plutarch and Cicero.66 
Plutarch complicates the task if, as generally assumed, Car­
neades began his criticism with the argument that Plutarch 
presents lastY Carneades, a student of Diogenes in dialectic 
(Cic. Acad. 2.98) and possibly thirty years his junior (Long 
[supra n.59] 75£), served with him in the Athenian embassy to 
Rome (155 B.C.). These considerations and Plutarch's clue (supra 
n.65) suggest that Carneades attacked the telos-formula of 
Diogenes via Antipater's first formula (essentially the same as 
Diogencs') and that Antipatcr attempted to answer the criticism 
of Carncadcs with his second formula. 68 

65 Pluto Mor. 1072F (=SVF III Ant.59 part), 107lA (=III 195 [supra n.20]); cf 
III AntA-7. 

66 Pluto Mor. 1070F-72F=SVF III 195,26, Ant.59; Cic. Fin. 3.22,5.16-20 and 
Tuse. 5.84=III 18, 497, 44. It is generally inferred from Plutarch's reference to 
Carneades at 1072 F that Carneades is the indirect source for the whole passage: 
Long and Sedley I 407-10. For the debate between Antipater and Carneades 
see also B. Inwood, "Goal and Target in Stoicism," JPhilos 83 (1986) 547-56; 
Irwin (supra n.S6) 228-34; Long (supra n.59); H. Reiner, "Die ethisc~e Weis­
heit der Stoiker heute," Gymnasium 96 (1969) 330-S7; O. Rieth, "Uber das 
Telos der Stoiker," Hermes 69 (1934) 13--45; Rist (supra n.57) 161-67; M. 
Soreth, "Die zweite Telosformel des Antipater von Tarsos," ArchGeschPhilos 
so (1968) 48-72; G. STRIKER, "Antipater or the Art of Living," in Schofield and 
Striker (supra n.22: hereafter 'Striker') 185-204; and, most importantly, R. 
ALPERS-GOLZ, Der Begriff IKOnm: in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (=Spu­
dasmata 8 [New York 1976: hereafter 'Alpers-Golz']) 62-101, 131-35. 

67 Long and Sedley I 407f; Striker 189f; Long (supra n.S9) 76. 
68 Striker 189; Long and Sedley I 409. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 259 

Against Antipater, Carncadcs argues that the objects of selec­
tion must be valuable only to the extent that they contribute to 
the end, which is reasoning well in their selection. This produces 
"the end is reasoning well in the selections of things having value 
with respect to reasoning well" (tEA-Oe; fa'rt 'to £uAoyta't£lv EV 'tale; 
EKAoyale; 'tWV as,lav EX6v'tWV npoe; 'to £uAoytan:lv).69 The Stoics, 
in response, argue that "selective value" is determined not by 
the contribution of the indifferents to the end, but solely on the 
basis of their accordance with natureJO Carneades then asks 
why, if they have value, their acquisition is not an end in itself. 
Plutarch's account of the debate presents first the argument that 
it is "contrary to common conception" (napa 'tllv £vvowv) that 
life should have two 'tEAT] and aKonOl: napa 'tllv EVVOUlV fan 
OUO 'tEAT] Kat aKOIWUe; npoKtla8at 'tOll Piou Kat 1111 1t(XV'tWV oaa 
npaHOIlEV E<p' £V Tl YlYVEcr8at 'tllV ava<popav En OE IlCxAAOV fan 
napa 'tllv EVVOLav &'AAo IlEV dvat 'tEAoe; En' &'AAo or 'tWV 
npa't'tOIlEvwv EKaa'tOv ava<pEpEa8at. 71 The distinction of teios 
("goal") and skopos ("target") derives from the Stoic position 
that living is an art ('tExvT]). Antipater's telos-formula seems to 

refer to this doctrinc. As the Stoic understanding of this art 
involves many interrelated concepts, it may be useful to con­
sider how this "art of living" differs from othcr arts before 
treating Plutarch's technical distinction between telos and 
skopos. 

The so-called Carneadea divisio, in which Carneades claims to 
represent all the possible goals of life (Cic. Fin. 5.16-20), begins 
with Carneades' assertion that every art must be distinct from 
what it is supposed to accomplish: est enim perspicuum nullam 
artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aiiud quod 
propositum sit arti.72 The Stoics, on the other hand, suppose a 
kind of tExvT] (ars) whose purpose is merely its practice, a 
(HOxacrHKll 1£XVT] ("aiming art").73 

69 Plut. Mor. 1072E=SVF III Ant.58 part; cf. Alex. Aphr. De an. 2.164.7, 
167.13-17. 

70 Stab. Eel. 2.80.7-13, 83.1 0-84.2=SVF III 124; D.L. 7.1 05=III 126. 
71 Plut. M or. 1 070F-71 A: "It is contrary to common conception that two 

goals and targets of life be set up and that there be not one single point of 
reference for everything we do, but it is even further contrary to common 
conception that one thing be the goal and that each of the things we do be 
referred to something else." 

72 Fin. 5.16: "for it is evident that no craft is concerned just with itself, but 
the craft and its object are distinct" (tr. Long and Sedley I 403). 

7J Striker 194f; Alex. Aphr. De an. 2.159.34; Cic. Fin. 3.24. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

260 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Their understanding of the O'tOXa<HlKl) 'tEXYTl is combined 
with their definition of the telos: "1D.o~ £01lY oi) £YEKU 1taY1U 
1tpan£1at KUeTlKOV1CO~, U\)10 O£ 1tpanE1Ul OUOEYO~ £YEKU' KU­
Kdyw~ oi) xaplY 1b.AAU, UU10 0' OUOEYO~ £YEKU." KUl1taAlY' "r.q) 
o 1taY1U 1a £Y 10 ~(<p 1tPUnOIlEYU KUeTlKOY1CO~ 1l)Y uYa<popay 
AUIl~aY£l, UU10 0' £1t' OUOEy. "74 The key word in this definition 
is £YEKU (or xaplY: "for the sake of"). The telos is the expression 
of life's purpose. A telos-formula must not contain "for the sake 
of" or an infinite regress occurs. The telos is the end of the line: 
as Stobaeus says, UU10 0' OUOEYO~ EYEKU. It follows that the art 
that describes it must be the purpose and not have another pur­
pose of its own: the practice of the o'tOxuonKi) 1EXYTl of virtue is 
the telos-not an easy concept to grasp. This craft has no other 
purpose. Its purpose is its practice, because this "aiming art" is 
the practice of virtue that needs no further purpose. The substi­
tution of £YEKU for 1tpO~ in Antipater's formula serves Carne­
ades' purposes well. Posidonius' use of that word, moreover, is 
unlikely to have been casual or a simple error, because the most 
basic of all principles of Hellenistic philosophy is that the telos 
must be the" end" of all activity of life (Long and Sedley I 398). 

The Stoics answer the charge in the divisio that no craft may 
be concerned solely with itself, i.e., contain its purpose within 
itself and depend upon nothing external for its fulfillment: 

Nee enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam 
esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et 
saltationi, ut in ipsa ins it, non foris petatur extremum, id 
est artis effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus 
sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte 
facta sunt, non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus con­
stant; quae autem-illi appellant Ka:tOp8wIHnu, omnes nu­
meros virtutts continent. Sola enim sapientia in se tata 
con versa. 75 

74 Stob. Eel. 2.46.5-10=SVF III 2: "'The telos is that for the sake of which all 
things are properly done but which is itself done for the sake of nothing,' and 
in the same way as, 'for the sake of which, everything else; itself for the sake of 
nothing.' And again, 'that to which everything done in life properly has its 
reference; itself referred to nothing'." 

75 Cic. Fin. 3.24=SVF III 11: "For we do not consider that wisdom is similar 
to navigation or medicine, but rather to acting, as I just said, and dancing, so 
that the telos, i.e., the practice of the craft, is contained within itself and is not 
sought outside of it. But there is yet another difference between wisdom and 
these other crafts, namely that in the case of other crafts, the products which 
have been made correctly do not contain all of the parts of the crafts from 
which they come; but those things which the Stoics call katorthomata, contain 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 261 

Cicero undoubtedly attempts to answer the charge that in crafts 
such as medicine the nature of the telos is disputed. From the 
patient's viewpoint, the doctor's tefos ought to be "to save the 
patient"; from the doctor's standpoint, it ought to be "to do 
everything he can." In Alexander of Aphrodisias' discussion of 
medicine (Top. 32.27-33.6), the "external result" (to 1tpOKEi~£V­
ov) of the craft of medicine is "to save the patient" (-to affiam); 
the "function" of the doctor (EprOV) is "to do everything in his 
power" (1tCxV't(X "(a EV8£XOIl£V(X 1tolT1acxt). These last words echo 
Antipater's second formula for the end (supra n.62), but 
Alexander's 1tpoKdIlEVOV and EprOV come from Aristotle (Rh. 
1355b8-14, Top. lOlb5-15).76 Medicine was one of the stock 
examples of the "aiming art" because of the obvious role of 
factors beyond the practitioner's control, e.g., fortune. For Aris­
totelians the external ufos should be the result. The Stoics re­
jected this view and placed the telos with the practitioner's func­
tion. Thus the Stoics had to sacrifice the position of common 
sense that the purpose of medicine is to heal for the paradoxical 
claim that the purpose of a stochastic craft is its practice. The 
difficulties attendant upon such a position led them to reject 
medicine as a fitting exemplum. 

It seems to do some violence to the concept of medicine to 
say, as Cicero's last line demands, that the practice of medicine is 
concerned entirely with itself and that the patient is not an 
integral part of practicing that art: the patient is not only the sub­
ject matter upon which it is practiced but also a participant in the 
healing process. 77 The Stoics must surely have regarded medi­
cine as a stochastic craft, but one insufficiently similar to that of 
virtue, perhaps because of the ability of "(UXTl to disrupt the craft 
of medicine but not the craft of virtue. 

The central issues in the debate over this art of living, then, 
were how its products or results differ from those of other 

all the elements of virtue. For wisdom alone is concerned completely with 
itself. " 

76 Irwin 229f; Long and Sedley I 409f. Alexander's 'to 1t(xv'ta 'to. EVO£X0f,1£va 
1tol'l1crm curiously echoes Posid onius (supra n.16 )-perhaps from a common 
source. 

77 Alpers-Golz's instructive list (67f) of the Academic and Peripatetic uses of 
the craft of medicine in the doxography of the stochastike techne reveals the 
probable source of Carneades' inspiration for his approach to the Stoic concep­
tion of the skopos. It is unclear in what technical language the Stoics described 
medicine. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

262 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

crafts, and in what sense it is rightly called an "aiming" art. An 
important question is at what does one aim while practicing 
virtue, if virtue is practiced for its own sake. In both Greek and 
English the image of an arch~r and target suggests that the target 
is the goal, and that we succeed or fail in our aim as we hit or 
miss the target. The concept is embedded deeply in Greek 
thought, as Cxl1-ap'tla ("missing the mark") shows. But the Stoics 
did not conceive of happiness or virtue in a common sense way, 
and their use of the image of archery was equally paradoxical: if 
virtue is practiced for its own sake, and if the practice of virtue is 
like the art of aiming, either it must not matter whether we hit 
the target or not, or the target as well as the art of aiming must 
be virtue in some sense. 

Cleanthes and Chrysippus arc credited with making the 
following distinction between telos and skopos ("what one 
looks at" or uses as a "sight"): 

TEAOS OE <PU(HV dvU1. 1:a EuOUqlOvE1V, oil EVEKa neXV1:a npeX1:-
1:£1:U1., aU1:0 of: npeXn£1:U1. jlf:V OUOEVaS of: EVEKa' 1:O\HO of: 
uneXpx£tv £V to Kat' ap£1:~V ~l1V, £V 1:0 OjlOAOYOUjlEVWS ~l1v, 
Etl, 1:UU1:0U OV1:0S, £V to Ka1:a <pUo"lV ~l1v. T~v of: EUOaljlO­
vlav ° Z~vwv c'oP10"atO 1:0V tponov 1:0\HOV' £UoU1.jlovla 0' £O"1:tV 
cupOla ~lOU. KEXPll1:U1. O£ Kat KA£eXv911S 1:0 oPC? 1:0U1:C? £V 
1:01S raU1:0U O"uyypajljlao"l Kat ° XpuO"lnnos Kat ot arca 1:OU1:WV 
neXv1:£S, 1:~V EUoU1.jlovlav dvU1. AEyOV1:£S oux £1:EpaV 1:0U EU­
oaljlovOS Plou, Kal1:Ol yE AEYOV1:ES 1:~V jl£V EUOU1.jlovlav O"lCO­
nov £KKEl0"9U1., 1:EAOS 0' dvU1. 1:0 1:UXElV 1:11S EUOU1.jlOvlas, orc£p 
1:au1:ov dvU1. 1:0 £UOU1.jlOV£lV.78 

Stoic logic dictates that the telos must stand in relation to the 
skopos as "predicate" (lCannOPTll1-a) to "body" (0ool1-a). The 
skopos is a body like Eu8all1-ovla ("happiness"); the telos is a 
predicate like 10 Eu8a.ll1-0VElv ("to be happy"),19 The telos is 'to 

78 Stob. Fe!. 2.77.16-27=5 V F III 16: "The Stoics say that the te/os is to be 
happy, for the sake of which all things are done, but which itself is done for 
the sake of nothing. They say that happiness subsists in 'living in accordance 
with virtue', or in 'living by rational consistency', or yet again (it being the 
same thing) in 'living in accordance with nature'. Zeno defined happiness in 
this way, 'happiness is a good flow of life'. Clcanthes used this definition in his 
writings, as did Chrysippus and all those after them. They say that happiness 
is not different from the happy life, but they do make the distinction that 
happiness is set out as a skopos, while the te/os is to 'acquire' happiness, which 
is the same thing as being happy." 

79 Supra n.78. A predicate is a verbal idea expressed by the infinitive with no 
expressed subject: Stob. fe!. 2.76.19ff=SVF III 3; Origen, in Ps., Migne, PC II 
1053. Stoic te!()s~formulae are all expressed as infinitives, and the idea is that 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 263 

'tUXElV 'taU (JlC07tOU, where the sense of 'to 'tUXElV seems to be 
less "to acquire" than "to make predicated of oneself." To use 
'tuYXav(t) in this way is technical if not counter-intuitive. Its usual 
sense with a genitive object is "to happen upon" something, "to 
get" it, with the recognition that "fortune" ('tUXTl), has brought 
it. But the Stoics do not hold that one "happens upon" or 
"acquires" happiness by chance. Rather one "puts it into prac­
tice" by living according to virtue. I read this important logical 
fragment to suggest that 'tuyxav(t) may have signified less "to 
acquire" than "to predicate" in this precise context. This is justi­
fied on the grounds that all Stoic ethics are devoted to the propo­
sition that happiness is within the power of the wise man. He is 
immune to fortune and has the power to "bring about" 
(predicate of himself) his own happiness. 

These concepts applied to the art of aiming would render vir­
tue the art (teehne) in one sense but also the target (skopos) in 
another sense, and the telos not "to get" virtue so much as "to 
practice" it. Stobaeus confirms that the Stoics did regard virtue 
as "an art concerned with the whole of life" (Eel. 2.66.20-67.1: 
apE'tllv, 1tEpi OAOV o1'Jauv 'tOY ~iov 'tExvTlv). But, paradoxically, if 
one aims properly, he is practicing virtue and cannot miss the 
target of virtue. This paradox cannot be avoided by positing that 
the skopos is not virtue but something else like "happiness." 
Virtue is not practiced to acquire happiness; happiness comes 
about only when virtue is practiced for its own sake. 80 A key 
concept in the Stoic position is U7tO:PXEtV ("to belong to," "sub­
sist in"). For Stobaeus, "to be happy subsists in to live in accor-

man should make himself such that he could be the subject: I live in 
accordance with nature. As man's goal is to be happy, Chrysippus holds that 
happiness (~ cuoatJlovla) is the skopos and its acquisition, i.e., to have happi­
ness ('to CUOatflOVClv) the telos. Because for Stoics the cause of a predicate is a 
body, the skopos is the cause of the telos: without happiness the thing, 'to have 
happiness' and 'to be happy', do not exist: Stab. Eel. l.138.14-139.4=SVF 189, 
II 336; A. A. Long, "The Early Stoic Concept of Moral Choice," in f. Bossier 
eta!, edd., Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Studia Gerardo 
Verbeke (London 1976) 77-92. This Stoic distinction between body and 
predicate also separates the good from what possesses the good. As a body the 
good is "choiccworthy" (a ip£'tov), but what possesses the good, a benefit 
(ffi<pO.:rlfla), is "what has to be chosen" (aipcrcov): Stob. Eel. 2.72.19, 78.7=SVF 
III 88f. Examples of aip£'tca are 'til <ppovc'iv, 'to (Htl<ppovc'iv, and other virtues 
conceived as verbs, whereas the a ip£'ta include <ppOVT)O'tI; and other virtues con­
ceived as nouns. Man does not choose the good, he chooses to have it. He does 
not choose virtue, he chooses to practice it: Long 89. 

80 Long and Sedley r 399; see SVF III 38-48 with 106. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

264 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

dance with virtue" (cf D.L. 7.89=SVF III 39). Happiness will 
automatically become predicated of the agent when virtue is 
practiced. As Chrysippus says, "only predicates that are actual 
attributes are said to belong; for instance, walking around be­
longs to me when I am walking around, but it does not belong 
when I am lying down or sitting" (Stob. Eel. 1.106.5f=SVF II 
509: w~ Kat Ka'tlTyopTUW'ta {mapXElV AE'YE'tal 1l0va 'ta aUIl~E~l1-
KO'ta, olov 'to 1tEpma'tElv u1tapXEl 1l0l O'tE 1tEpma'tw, O'tE O£ Ka'ta­
KEKAlllat t1 Ka811llal oUX u1tapXEl). A rough paraphrase might 
be that predicates such as the telos of being happy ('to EuOat­
llovElv) only "belong or subsist" when we practice them; so in 
the case of being happy (as we cannot practice happiness 
directly), the telos "belongs to or consists in" practicing virtue. 

It is a formidable muddle: (1) the telos is "to be happy," which 
subsists in "to live in accordance with virtue"; (2) the skopos is 
"happiness," but this must also subsist in the art ('tExvll) of vir­
tue, because (3) the telos is also 'to 'tUXElv 'tOU aK01tOU, which 
should mean "to hit the target" but comes to mean "to predicate 
the art of virtue" of oneself or "to practice" it. The reason for 
this manipulation of a familiar concept may be found in the Stoic 
dictum that "virtue is sufficient for happiness" (D.L. 7.127=SVF 
III 49: au'tapKl1 't' ELval au'tl"lv (Sc. apnl"lv) 1tPO~ EuOatIlOVtav). 
Such preferred indifferents as health and wealth are not neces­
sary for virtue. This is the opposite of the Aristotelian position, 
which is also the position of common sense. The Stoics use "tar­
get" paradoxically to communicate their thesis: "the aim is the 
thing, not the target." As in Greek art, e.g. Myron's Diskobolos, 
the practice of virtue is a tension. On this view, the virtue of the 
archer is the aim, not hitting the target. But then if virtue is a goal­
oriented craft, the craftsman cannot miss his target when he prac­
ti~es it correctly: the practice of virtue always hits its target­
vIrtue. 

When Carneades accuses Antipater of positing two tele and 
two skopoi, he undoubtedly pits the common-sense image of 
aiming against the Stoic paradox of the "aim that never fails." He 
gives some indication of why he accuses the Stoa of two tele and 
two skopoi when he discusses the relation of the preferred 
indifferents (what he calls 'ta 1tpw'ta Ku'ta <pUcrtV)81 to the telos: 

81 Cicero frequently uses the phrase prima naturae as though interchan­
geable with the Stoic rrpOTlYI .. U:va. Inwood (218-33) summarizes the problem of 
Carneades' influence on these texts .. See also Long (supra n.59) 70 n.32. 
Inwood (220 with nn.13f) follows Hirzel (supra n.17) III 304f and A. Bonh6f-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 265 

'tEAOC; !lEY yap 'to £KAEy£creat Kat Aa!l~eXY£tY h£tya <PPOYlIlWC; 
EKEtya (5' aU'ta Kat 'to runeXY£lY au'twy OU 'tEAOC; aAAa W<J1t£P 
UAT) nc; U1tOKEl'tat ti")y £KA£KnKi)y a~lay £xoucra.82 Carneades' 
use of UAT) Tl<; U1tOKElTal is instructive. Elsewhere Chrysippus 
uses U1tOK£t!lal in participial form to modify skopos: TOY U1tOK£l­
Il£YOY crK01tOY (Plut. Mor. 1040F=SVF III 24: "the underlying 
skopos"). In the passage quoted above, Carneades distinguishes 
«to select and to take" ('to EKAEyweat Kat 'to Aa~£lY) from «the 
things themselves and the acquisition of them" (au'ta Kat to tuy­
XeXY£lY autwy). When he calls the former the ufos and says that 
the latter is "some sort of underlying matter," he intends for us 
to conclude that the latter must be skopoi for the Stoics. This is 
the best way to make sense of his claim that they have two tele 
and two skopoi. 83 The two tele are "to select" the preferred indif­
ferents and "to take" them; the two skopoi are "the preferred 
indifferen ts" and "the acq uisi tion of the preferred indif­
feren ts. "84 

fer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet (Stuttgart 1894) 175ff. Possibly Carneades' 
argument against the Stoic position on man's first impulses in conjunction 
with his attack on the tetos (Cic. Fin. 5.16-20) is the source of this conflation. 
Inwood doubts that Chrysippus used the term "primary natural things" and 
the only evidence that Antipater used the term, aside from this passage, is 
Posidonius at Galen PHP 5.328.8-18=EK 187.25-37, which I shall argue is 
polemically derived by way of Carneades. 1tPOT}YO'UI.U:V(()V may be synony­
mous with 1tPOT}YIl[va. or it may be Antipater's translation of Carneades' 
1tp&".yca, or neither. In the textbook definition attributed to Zeno, 1tPOT}YIl£va 
are called indifferent things that we select Ka1:a 1tPOT}YOUIl£VOV "oyav (Stob. 
Eel. 2.84.24-85.1 =svr III 128). Antipater may imply some difference between 
things themselves and thc activity of thc rcason that selccts them, but it is 
unclcar what this differcnce is. 

82 Pluto Mor. 1071ll=SVF III 195: "Thcy say that the tetos is 'to select' and 'to 
takc' thcse things [Sc. HX 1tp0:l1:a lW'tCx CPUCH v J prudently, but the things them­
selves and 'to acquire' thcm arc not the telos, but somc sort of underlying 
matter with selective value." 

83 For Aa~EtV as a technical term related to selcction see SVF I 191, III 118-
22, 131f, 142. Cherniss claims (supra n.20: 748 n.d) skopos as a synonym for 
telos, thus meaning, if I understand him, that not four but two things are 
involved. I argue that Carneades allows the distinction, but manipulates the 
dcfinition of skojJos. 

84 Carncades' distinction between Aa~[tV and 't'UYXUVEtV is that a verbal 
form of thc noun ATl\jlU; implies the use of reason and must be understood as 
the product of a rational selection. 't'UYXUVEtV on the other hand implies only 
the gctting without rational selection. In my view Carneades' two tele and 
skopoi form pairs: the lelos of "selection" is practiced by applying reason to 
the subject matter (skojJos) of "the indifferents," whereas the telos of "taking" 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

266 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Carneades tries to establish that, by Antipater's own formula, 
the skopos in the aiming art of virtue must be the preferred 
indifferents. After all, Antipater had said that the telos was "to 
do everything in one's power continuously and undeviatingly 

. with a view to obtaining the predominating things that accord 
with nature" (supra n.62). He takes Antipater to mean that the 
preferred indifferents are the skopos, and the telos is "to ac­
quire" them. As the Stoics say that the telos is "to acquire" the 
skopos, clearly the preferred indifferents should be the skopos, 
at least for Carneades. 

Antipater's telos-formula is difficult enough to grasp without 
the intervention of Carneades and without the problem of stitch­
ing together the fragmentary remains of so sophisticated an 
assault upon so subtle a doctrine. But the only evidence in 
which Antipater explains himself-a very difficult and misunder­
stood text with all the Greek concepts represented in Latin­
complicates these problems: 

Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne qUIS sequI eXIS­
timet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Etenim, si cui proposi­
tum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam-sicut nos ulti­
mum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut 
conliniet,-huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint faci­
enda, ut conliniet; et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo proposi­
tum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum 
in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi 
seligendum, non expetendum. 85 

is practiced by applying reason to the subject matter of "acquiring" the indif­
fercnts: man aims at the things to select them and aims at acquiring them in 
order to take them. lIe may, however, have arranged the terms chiastically. 

85 Cic. Fin. 3.22=SVF III IS: "But from the outset any confusion arising from 
this must be removed so that no one will think that there arc two tete. For if it 
were someone's propositum (skopos or prokeimenon?) to aim a spear or an 
arrow at something-just as we say that there is a telos, this would be for him 
to do everything in his power in order to aim-in an analogy of this kind he 
must do everything in order to aim; and nevertheless, this, namely that he 
should do everything by which to attain his propositum (skopos or prokei­
menon?) would be his lelos so to speak, the kind of thing we call the highest 
good in life, but that he should strike would be something 'to be selected' as it 
were, but not something 'to be chosen'." The text with dashes supplied is of 
Alpers-Golz SO, accepted by Long and Sedley II 397f. The translation with 
Greek inserted is minco For the history of debate over the text see Alpers-Golz 
75-S2; Long and Sedley II 39S. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 267 

Besides the textual uncertainties of this passage, determining the 
Greek concepts behind these Latin terms, especially proposi­
tum, is very problematic. Skopos and prokeimenon are pos­
sible equivalents of propositum ("something that has been set 
up"), but each of these Greek words has more than one defini­
tion. The substance of the Carneades-Antipater debate turns 
upon a precise understanding of this passage. 

Irwin claims (230) that in the Stoic view of stochastic crafts 
"they call the external result the 'objective' or 'work proposed' 
(prokeimenon ergon, Latin propositum; Alex. in Top. 33, 15), 
and the competent practice of the craft the end (telos, Alex. in 
Top. 33.17-22; Quaest. 61. 12-23=SVF III 19)." He implies that 
prokeimenon ergon is a Stoic technical term translated into Latin 
as propositum, although prokeimenon ergon occurs only at 
Alex. in Top. 33.15, a discussion of non-stochastic crafts with 
Aristotelian terminology.86 Stoic use of this phrase is (to my 
knowledge) otherwise unattested. 

The possibility that the Stoics employed prokeimenon (either 
alone or as shorthand for to prokeimenon telos, ton prokei­
menon skopon, or to prokeimenon ergon) depends entirely on 
Alexander, our only source, and it is unclear whether his usage 
is Stoic or a description of a Stoic position in Aristotelian 
language. Irwin certainly errs in associating the prokeimenon 
with propositum in the simile of the archer. Striker and Long 
and Sedley erroneously follow Irwin87 because of the interpreta­
tion of a controversial passage from Alexander: 

E i 'tWV ()1:0Xa0'tlKWV 't£Xvwv 'tEAoS dval 'tls AE"(01 'to no:v'ta 
't& nap' al)'t(xs rrou:tv rrpos 'to 'toD npOKElI1EVOD 'tD'YXO:VElV, 
nwS OUX 01101WS Kat at 'tat 'toD olKEloD 'tEU~OV't(Xl 'tEAODS 'tatS 
ou 01:Oxa0'tlKalS HOV 'tEXVWV; 00KoD0l O£ Ka't& 1:OD't0 110: A-

86 The reading of this line is uncertain. Bruns prints £v yap 1 0: {n 0: u; lEAos 10 
1tPOKclllfVOV [pyov 10 £1tf<J8m 10 [pyov 10l~ xaplv 0:\)10\) YLVOIlEVOl~ ("For in 
these crafts, the telos is 'the proposed function', because the function is 
accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced"). 1£AO~, 
however, does not appear in all manuscripts. Without it the line would mean 
"and in these crafts, the external result is the function, because the function is 
accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced." That is to 
say, what the craft of shoemaking is intended to do does not differ from what 
the competent practitioner will accomplish by following the craft correctly. 
Unlike the doctor whose function is to "do everything he can" and whose 
external result is "to save the patient," the shoemaker's function, to make 
shoes, and his external result are the same. Either he has made shoes or he 
failed in his telos. 

87 Striker 195-98; Long and Sedley I 409f, II 398; Irwin nof. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

268 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

to'tU OtUCP£PflV 'tcov aAAwv ui. o'tOXUO'ttKUt. [KUt.] 't<? f.lT] 
Of.lOLWS TOD 't£AouS 'tuyxUVEtv. KUS' ODS f.l£v 'dAoS £o'tt.v uu­
'tUtS 'to 'tuX£tV 'tOD 1tpOKflf.l£VOU, OWCP£POl£V u.v 'tuu'tll' KUS' 
ODS O£ TO 1tPOKEtf.l£VOV £OTtV UUTUtS 't£Aos, ou KUt. 'tuu'toD 
't£AouS f.lT] Of.lOlWS 'tuYXUVfl, OtuCP£POt£V (u.v) uu'tcov Ku'ta 'to 
f.lT] 0f.l0lOv uu'tUtS 'to 't£AoS eX£tv. £K£tVUt f.l£V yap 't<? 'tOtS 
Ku'ta 'tT]v n~xvllv ytV0f.l£VOtS f1t£0Sat 'to 0-0 XUptv ytvov'tUt, 
KUt. 'tT]V a1tO'tuXluV uu'tUtS 'toD 1tPOKflf.lEVOU Ku'ta 'tT]V OWf.lUP­
'tLuv 'tcov ytVOf.l£VWV, ou 'tEXVtKCOS ytv0f.l£VWV, E1t£0Sat, 't£AOS 
exouot TO TUX£tV 'tOD 1tPOKflf.lEVOU· lOOV yap £V £KElVatS 't<? 
1tuv'tu 'tex 1tUp' uu'texs 1tOtllOat 1tpOS TO 'tuX£tV 'toD 1tP01Cfl­
f.lEVOU 'to KUt 'tUX£tV uU"COD' 'tuD'tU yap 1towuv'tWV 'ta 1tap' au­
'tas yLyvnat. f1t1. OE 'tcov o'toxaOTtKCOV 'to f.lT] 1tuv'tWS "COtS 
ytvOf.lEVOlS Ka'teX 'tT]V 'tEXVllV £1t£0Sat 'to o{) XUptV, ota 'to or'io­
Sat 1tpOS 'to 'tUX£tV fKeLVOU 1toAAcov, a f.lT] eO'ttv £1t1. f.l0vll 'til 
'tEXVn, ht O£ K(X1. uu'tex 'tex Ku'ta 'tT]v 'tEXVllV ytv0f.l£vu f.lT] 
ooPloSat, f.l1l0£ 'tcov au'tcov dvat 1tOtllTtKa 'to f.lT] 1tuv'tll of.lOL­
ws exouotv 1tPOOCPEP£0Sat, aAAa 1tuv'tu 11 y£ Ttva KUt aAAws 
fV uu'tUtS OUX oos 1tpoo£ooKii'to E1t£0Sat, ou 'to 'tUX£tV 'toD 1tpO­
K£tf.l£VOU TEAoS £o'ttV, aAAeX 'to u1to1tAllpcoOat 'tex 'tllS 't£XVllS· il 
'tEAOS f.lEV Kut 'tuu'tatS 'to TUX£tV 'tou"COu o{) XUptV 1tuv'tu 'ta 
1tap' autas 1t01ODOt, ota "COD 1tUVW 'ta 1tap' au'tas 1tOtllOat, 
epyov o£ '{OlOv UUtCOV 'to 1tuv'tu 'tex 1tUp' uU'texs 1tpOS 'to 'tUX£tV 
'toD 1tPOKflf.lEVOU 1totlloat 't<? f.lT] f.lOVOV 'tOD'to apK£tV 1tpOS 'to 'tOD 
1tPOKflf.lEVOU 'tuX£tV, aAAeX O£tV Kat aAAwv TtVCOV, a OUK 
[O'ttV £1tt Tn tEXVll.88 

88 QuaeSl. 2.16=SVF III 19: "If someone should say that the le/os of the sto­
chastikai tec/mai (STs) is 'to do everything in one's power with a view to 
acquiring the prokeimenon " how will they achieve their proper reios dif­
ferently from the non-stochaslikai technai (NSTs)? STs seem to differ from 
other technai especially in this, namely that they acquire their telos differently. 
According to some (Sc. the Stoics), to acquire the prokeimenon is the telos in 
STs, so they would differ in this way (Sc. having different prokeimena or 
acquiring them differently). According to others (sc. the Peripatetics), the 
prokeimenon is the tetos in STs, and S1's do not acquire the same telos 
differently; rather they would differ from NSTs in having a different telos. For 
NSTs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced by following the 
rules of the lechne, and in NSTs the failure to achieve the prokeimenon is a 
result of failing to follow the rules of the craft, i.e., the craft is not being 
practiced as it should be, and so these have as their telos the acquisition of the 
prokeimenon. For in NSTs that would be equivalent to doing everything in 
one's power with a view to the acquisition of the prokeimenon and the acqui­
sition of it. That is because these results are in the power of the craftsmen. But 
STs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced not entirely by 
following the rules of the techne, because it lacks many things with reference 
to the acquisition of the prokeimenon not contained in the techne itself; more­
over the same results in accordance with the techne are not assured, nor are 
the things productive of the same results because they cannot be applied in 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 269 

Von Arnim's inclusion of this text as a Stoic fragment is question­
able. Although Alexander begins with a paraphrase of Antip­
ater's second telos-formula, it does not necessarily follow that 
Alexander used exclusively technical Stoic language to treat a 
Stoic problem. In Aristotle prokeimenon means "the proposed" 
(Top. lOlbl2ff), where it should stand for to prokeimenon telos 
("the intended goal"), i.e., the "external result." When Alexan­
der uses the term freely (e.g. in Top. l01bS), he is probably 
following Aristotle rather than Antipater, for whom we have no 
independent evidence at all. Alexander's return to the problem 
of stochastic crafts at Quaest. 2.16 possibly resumes where his 
commentary on the Topica left off, i.e., he continues in Aristo­
telian language to discuss a Stoic objection to Aristotle. Antip­
ater's use of to prokeimenon as "external result" cannot be 
disproved and Irwin may yet be correct, but one should begin 
with more reliable evidence if possible. 

Use of ntllCXl and its compounds in both the Carneades-Antip­
ater debate and fragments on the Stoic conception of stochastic 
crafts is instructive. Alpers-Golz's collection of fragments on 
skopos and te/os readily shows that the Stoics never spoke of to 
prokeimenon as a separate technical idea for the "external re­
sult" of a stochastic craft; rather they used various forms of K£l­

llCXl together with skopos to describe it as something that is "set 
up or out" (like a target) or "corresponding to/associated with" 
the telos. She cites the following fragments with the exception of 
the fifth example, which I add: 

exactly the same way, rather all or at least some of the results in STs will turn 
out otherwise than was expected; so the telos is not the acquisition of the 
prokeimenon, but the fulfillment of the rules of the techne. Or the telos, also in 
STs is to acquire that for the sake of which one docs everything in one's power 
with a view to the acquisition of the prokeimenon, although this alone (Sc. 
doing everything in one's power or following the rules of the craft) is not suf­
ficient for the attainment of the prokeimenon; rather other things not con­
tained in the techne are needed." (.1 in Top. 33.17f. The text is that of 1. Bruns, 
ed., Supplementum AristoteLicum II.2 (Berlin 1892) 61. Von Arnim's emenda­
tions and omissions (e.g. Bruns lines 23-28) do not really solve the manifest 
difficulties of sense. I offer this translation, despite some uncertainty about text 
and sense, because (to my knowledge) it has never been translated fully. I 
follow von Arnim in omitting OU before Otaljl£pou:v at p.7 line 5 (Bruns line 10). 
Von Arnim's apparatus does not show the omission, nor does Bruns' in 
adding it. But it is manifestly the right reading, and I emend Bruns accord­
ingly. I further emend 1:0. 'to\) (Bruns line 10; von Arnim p.7 line 5) to 1:atHOU, 

thus avoiding 1:\)YX(XV [t with the accusative. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

270 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

(1) Kat.Ot yE A£yov.Ee;, .~v Il£V Eu6atllOVlav crK07tOV fK­
KEtcr8at, .£Aoe; 6' dval .0 .UXElV Tile; EU6atIlOVtac;, 07tEP 
'tau.ov dvat .ep Eu6aqlOvElv (Stab. Eel. 2.77.25ff=SVF I 554, 
III 16: "They also say that happiness is 'set out' as a target, 
but that the telos is to acquire happiness, which is the same 
thing as being happy"). 

(2) 6tacP£PElV 6£ .£Aoe; Kat crK01tOV ;,younav crK01tOV Il£V yap 
dvat .0 EKKElIlEVOV crlllla, ob .UXElV E<ptEO"8at wue; Tf}e; EU&U­
Ilovtae; cr'toxa~oll£VOUe; (Eel. 2.77.1 ff: 89 "They hold that the 
telos and the skopos are different. The skopos, they say, is 
the target which has been 'set out', and those aiming at 
happiness strive to acquire it"). 

(3) A£youcrt 6£ Kat .Ov crK01tOV .£Aoe;, olov .Ov <>1l0AOYOUIlEVOV 
~tOV uva<poptKWe; AEyonEe; E1tt .0 1tapaKEtIlEVOV KanlYOplllla 
(Eel. 2.76.19ff=SV F III 3: "They also say that the skopos is 
the telos, in the same way that they speak of the har­
monious life, referring to its 'corresponding' predicate"). 

(4) 6t' 0 Pll.EOV, Il~'f .wv upnwv nva 6l' au.~v aipn~v 
dvat, Il~'f .wv KaKtWV <pfUK'~V, UAAa 7tav.a 'tau.a 6ftV 
uva<p£pEO"8at 1tpOe; .ov lmOKElllfVOV crK01tOV' (Plut. M 0 r. 
1040F=S V F III 24: "For this reason, it must be said that 
neither are any of the virtues choiceworthy for their own 
sake, nor are any of the vices worthy of avoidance; rather 
one must refer all of them to the 'underlying' skopos"). 

(5) napa .~v EVVOUXV fcrn 6uo .£1..11 Kat crK07tOUe; 1tPOKElcr8at 
'tou ~tOU Kat Il~ mxnwv ocra 1tpanOllfv E<P' EV .t ytYVEO"8at 
't~V uva<popav, En 6£ IlUAAOV Ecrn 1tapa 't~v EVVOtaV aAAo 
Il£V dvat .£Aoe; E1t' aAAo 6£ .Wv 7tpanoll£vwv EKacrwv uva­
<p£pEO"8at (Plut. Mor. 1070F-71A: "It is contrary to common 
conception that two tele and two skopoi of life be 'set up', 
and that the reference for everything we do be not one 
thing; but it is more contrary still that the telos be one 
thing and that each thing we do be referred to yet another"). 

(6) "OIlOtOV yap [AEyEV <> naVat.LOe; .0 crull~alvov E1tt .wv 
upnwv, we; d 1tOAAOle; .o~o.ate; de; crK01tOe; £l11 KElflfVOe;, £XOt 
6' obwe; EV ainep YPullllae; 6tu<popoue; 'COle; XPwflucrtv· £18' EKUcr­
'COe; fl£v cr'COxa~ono .ou .UXflV 'tou crK01tOU, ~611 6' 0 Il£V 6ta .0U 
1tu.a~at de; .~v AfuK~v d .uXOt YPUflfl~v, 0 6£ Ota 'tou fie; 
.~v IlEAatvuv, aAAoe; (6£) 6ta WD de; aAAo '"Ct XpwflU ypufl­
flfls (E cl. 2.63.25-64 .6=Panaetius fr. 109 part: "Panaetius said 

89 The text is fairly corrupt: the manuscripts read (Jwlla not (Jlllla and (J1(E1ttO­
IlEVO'\); not Wyttenbach's (JtoxasoIlEvo'\);; Wachsmuth proposes a lacuna before 
tOO;. I give Alpers-Gcilz's text (62). None of these problems affect the coinci­
dence of (JKorrov with LO t:KK£lll£vov. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

that what happens in the case of the virtues is similar to if a 
single target [skopos] is 'set up' for many archers, with dif­
ferent colored bands on it. Then each archer would aim at 
acquiring the target, but one would acquire his, if he should 
acquire it, by striking in the white band, another by stri­
king in the black, and another by striking in another 
band"). 

271 

In the first three examples the Stoics speak of the skopos as 
something "set up or out"; Plutarch claims to quote Chrysippus 
verbatim in the fourth (M or. 1040E: 'teX~ hrtVOU AESfl~), where 
'tOY urrOKrtllEVOV <JKorrov occurs; and Plutarch's own polemic 
usage in the fifth confirms the concurrence of sk opos and rr po­
KEtIlUl. Finally, Panaetius, who takes up the simile from Antip­
ater, uses KEtl-tat in the same sense. All this suggests that to pro­
keimenon taken as "external result" was not Stoic at all, and if 
the Stoics used it, it meant skopos. 90 Thus Alexander's to prokei­
menon either derives from Arist. Top. 101 b 12££ (to prokeimen­
on telos) or he tries to represent the Stoic ton prokeimenon 
skopon. To prove the correctness of the first alternative, we 
must consider whether "external result" (Aristotelian telos) or 
skopos makes more sense at Quaest. 2.16. 

The problem is how Alexander's adaptation of Antipater's 
second formula for the telos affects interpretation of to prokei­
menon and skopos. First, Antipater's definition of skopos is 
uncertain, if he used this word where Cicero records proposi­
tum in the archer simile. Rieth and Long argued from Quaest. 
2.16 that Antipater used skopos to mean "external result." 91 Alex­
ander clearly substitutes 'tdu rrpoKflllEVOU for Antipater's 'twv 
rrpoTlYoullEVCDV KU'teX q)'UCHV. This should mean that Alexander de­
fines to prokeimenon in the formula as the "preferred indiffer­
ents" or the" external result" of a stochastic craft. Irwin, Striker, 
and Long and Sedley rightly argue (supra n.87) that Antipater 
cannot have intended skopos for 'tWV rrpollyoullEvCDv KU'teX <pUCHV 
or "external result." As Irwin puts it (228 n.25), "For virtue is 
not sufficient for its preferred external results; and if these 
constitute happiness, virtue will turn out to be insufficient for 

90 Cf Stob. Eel. 2.47.8ff, which occurs just before Arius' eclectic discussion of 
Aristotelian doctrine on the passions using Stoic terminology: Kat can (}"J(Q1t()~ 
~£V 'to 1tpoK[i~[vov d~ 'to 'tUX£lV, otov aa1tlt; 'tOSO'tULt;· 'tfAO~ S' <~) 'tou 1tpOK£l­
~fVOU 't[USLt; ("The SkOP05 is what is set out for acquisition, like a shield to 
archers; but the te/os is the acquisition of what is set out."). On Arius' 
eclecticism see n.l96 infra. 

91 Rieth (supra n.66) 28f, 32ff; Long (supra n.59) 7Sf. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

272 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

happiness, but sufficient for getting happiness. These odd results 
suggest that Rieth and Long misuse the Stoic doctrine." To 
avoid the contradiction, it must be argued either that Antipater 
deviated from the Chrysippean definition of skopos (supra 
n.79), or that he did not understand it as "external result." In the 
Ghrysippean doctrine the telos is described as an art of living; 
the skopos would be this art conceived as a body and the telos 
the "acquisition" or "practice" of this art. Does Antipater 
observe this Chrysippean distinction? 

From the problems inherent in Rieth and Long's position, it is 
possible to see Alexander in the proper light: Stoics used phrases 
like crK07tOV EKKElcr8at or 7tpoKtlcr8at (as Alpers-Golz's survey 
shows); skopos should not mean "external result"; and skopos 
and to prokeimenon in Stoic usage should refer to the same 
thing, namely the telos conceived as a body like EUDa.tj.lOVla.. It is 
obvious from Quaest. 2.16 (quoted supra 267f) that Alexander's 
to prokeimenon must mean "external result." When Alexander 
says that the craft is not sufficient for the acquisition of the pro­
keimenon, he clearly means "external result." All other evi­
dence suggests that the Stoics used forms of KElj.Wl to modify 
skopos and that to prokeimenon ought to mean skopos. Either 
Alexander stands alone in his testimony on Stoic usage, or he 
uses Aristotelian terminology. In response to Irwin (230), if to 
prokeimenon ergon is a Stoic technical term, it is a hapax lego­
menon. Further, at Quaest. 2.16 Alexander uses Aristotelian 
language to describe the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts­
and with good reason, for as Irwin shows (229f), the Stoics were 
answering Aristotle. Alexander merely frames their response in 
Aristotelian terminology. Thus the Stoics never used prokei­
menon in the way that recent critics suggest: either they did not 
use it all or it stood for skopos. 

It is now possible to translate Cicero's propositum. At Fin. 
5.16 (supra n.72) it serves as Carneades' word for "the external 
object of a craft" in the divisio (supra 259). Carneades probably 
used the Aristotelian conception of crafts in his argument against 
the Stoa; so he may have called it, like Aristotle, a telos, or a 
skopos if he attempted to manipulate the Stoic position on telos 
and skopos. In Carneades' response to Antipater's simile of the 
archer, ~a.A.Elv 'tOY crK07tOV ("to hit the target") replaces 'to 
't1ryxcivttv HDV KCHCx CPUcrlv (Plut. Mor. l071e). As Carneades 
usually takes Stoic premises and definitions, it is very likely that 
he chose to attack the Stoic concept of stochastic crafts by 
manipulating the common-sense definition of skopos as "tar-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 273 

get." He could then appeal to the Stoa's doctrine that the telos is 
'to 'tUXflV 'tou OKOn:OU and argue that by Stoic premises the 
preferred indifferents ought to be the skopos and their 
acquisition, the telos. 

Antipater also probably used skopos in the archer-simile (Fin. 
3.22=SVF III 18): propositum flrst occurs in the context si cui 
propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam ("if it were 
someone's propositum to aim a spear or an arrow at some­
thing"). If propositum were translated as prokeimenon in Alex­
ander's sense as "external result," the passage would read: "if it 
were someone's external result to aim." To make sense of this 
patent absurdity, most critics choose to interpret conliniare as 
"to succeed in aiming," i.e., "to aim at and acquire the external 
result"; Alpers-Golz, on the other hand, chooses to take propo­
situm not as a technical term but as a verbal form of propono. 92 

Both alternatives are unpersuasive. The current understanding 
of the archer-simile is based upon an untenable deflnition of 
conliniare. The only remaining choices, skopos and prokei­
menon =skopos, cause difficulties with the second occurrence 
of propositum: ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur ("that 
he should do everything by which to attain his propositum"), 
which seems close to a direct translation of Alexander's n:av'ta 
'to. n:ap au'tae; n:Ot£lV n:poe; 'to 'tOu n:POKEtfl£VOU 'tuYXavEtv 
(Quaest. 2.16=SVF III 19: "to do everything in one's power with 
a view to acquiring the prokeimenon). This apparent similarity 
has misled everyone into following Alexander for interpretation 
of the archer-simile in Cicero. 

A more probable parallel for Cicero's ut omnia faciat quo pro­
positum assequatur occurs at Stob. Eel. 2.77.lff: OKOn:OV flEV yap 
dvat 'to EKKEtfl£VOV OTlfla ot 'tUX£lV £qJt£08at 'tOue; 'tTle; £ubal­
flovi.ae; O'tOXaSOfl£VOUe; ("the skopos is the target which has 
been set out, and those aiming at happiness strive to acquire it"). 
Despite the textual problems (supra n.89), the Stoics could speak 
of "striving to acquire the skopos." Panaetius' archer-simile con­
firms this: d8' £Ka(HOe; fl£v (HOXaSOl'TO 'tOu 'tUX£lV 10u (JKOn:OU 
(Stob. Eel. 2.63.25-64.6=Panaetius fro l09: "if each one should 

92 See supra nn.87, 91. Alpers-Golz (132-35 with n.515) concludes that con­
liniare cannot mean "to hit." Moreover 'to 0"'tOxas£08at, which will not admit 
of this significance, most likely lies behind it. Panaetius' archer-simile (Stob. 
Eel. 2.63.25-66.12) clearly distinquishes between "aiming" and "acquiring the 
target" or "striking it." The latter two, 'to 'tUFtV 'tOt) O"K01tO\) and 'to 1ta'ta~at 
respectively, arc in no way confused with 'to moxaSw8at. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

274 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

aim at acquiring the skopos "). I would translate Cicero's quo 
propositum assequatur as £V£KU 'tou 't'\.)X£tV 'tou OK01tOU, where 
£V£KU would indicate the "purpose" of the archer's effort. The 
meaning of the entire phrase from ut omnia /aciat would be 
"that he should do everythi ng to attain (=for the purpose of 
attaining) his target." This reading can accommodate the Chrys­
ippean doctrine in which" to attain" means "to make predicated 
of oneself" and "target" signifies "the craft of virtue" (or here of 
"aiming"). The whole then becomes "that he should do every­
thing to make the craft of aiming predicated of himself." 

Indeed the structure of the passage in Cicero reinforces this 
reading: four ut-clauses, two purpose and two substantive, and 
one relative clause of purpose. 93 The two ut-purpose clauses ex­
plain the purpose of the archer's activity. In both the archer's 
purpose-a strange claim at first face-is "to aim" (conliniet). 
The archer's telos should be "to do everything to acquire his 
propositum" (ut omnia /aciat quo propositum assequatur). If 
propositum still means "to aim a spear or an arrow at some­
thing" (conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam), we must some­
how make sense of "to acquire to aim." Alpers-Golz rejects 
(134) this possibility out of hand: "es ware sinnlos, wenn der 
Schiitze alles tun wiirde, urn zu zielen; und er kann nicht ein 
propositum erreichen, das im Zielen besteht." But the Chrysip­
pean skopos and 't'\)YXuvw explain why this paradoxical turn of 
phrase is what Antipater intended: conliniare hastam aliquo aut 
sagittam describes the propositum as the o'tOXUO'tlKl) n:xvT\, a 
noun idea that it is the telos to "put into practice," "to predicate 
of oneself." 

This approach to the passage also resolves a more acute dif­
ficulty, namely that Antipater uses purpose clauses in his de­
scription of the archer's telos. The telos is supposed to be the 

93 Alpers-Golz (173 n.352a) takes ut omnia faciat as concessive: as hoc fol­
lows this ut-c1ause, it cannot stand in apposition to it. But this is a needless ob­
jection if Cicero uses chiasmus with the last two ut-c1auses and hoc-illud. 
Long and Sedley (II 398) take this ut-c1ause as a substantival clause in apposi­
tion to hoc. The text should read: Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne 
quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Ftenim, si cui propositum sit 
conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam-sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic 
illi facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet (Purpose)-huic in eiusmodi 
similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet (Purpose); et tamen, ut omnia 
faciat (Substantival clause anticipating hoc= ultimum) quo propositum asse­
quatur (Purpose), sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in 'lJita bonum 
dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat (Substantival clause in apposition to illud=" ac­
quisition of the indifferents"), quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 275 

end of the line, as in the pithy dictum OD XaptV 't&AAa, au'to 8' 
OU8EVO<; EVEKa (Stob. Eel. 2.46.5-10= SVF III 2). But Cicero ex­
pressly says that the archer's ultimum is facere omnia quae pos­
sit ut conliniet and omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur. In 
both cases the telos has a purpose clause embedded within it. If 
quo propositum assequatur should be translated as EVEKa 'tOU 'tU­
XElV 'tOU O"K01tOU, the Greek for ut conliniet would probably be 
£vEKa 'tOU cnoxa~E(j8at. How would infinite regress be avoided 
in both instances? The answer must be that the skopos is the 
telos conceived as a noun, as Herophilus (apud Origen) sug­
gests: 'tEAo<; ()' ELVal AEYoucrt Kan\yopT\).w OU £VEKEV 'tel AOl1tel 
1t pa't'tOJ.1EV a, au'to ()£ OU()EVO<; EVEKEV' 'to ()£ (ju~uyouv w{mp, Ka-
8a1tEp ~ Eu8alJ.10Vla 'tip EU ()alJ.10V EtV , O"K01tOV. 94 Origen neatly 
shows that OD £VEKEV 'tel AOt1tel 1tpa't'tOJ.1EVa may apply to the 
skopos as well as the telos and retain a distinction between the 
two: body and predicate e.g. "happiness" and "being happy." It 
is possible to give the telos as "to do everything for the sake of 
aiming," or "for the sake of making the skopos predicated of 
oneself." As the skopos is the stochastike techne conceived as a 
noun, that would mean "to do everything for the sake of 
practicing virtue" or here, "the art of aiming.» In the language of 
Antipater's telos-formula, 1taV 'to Ka8' au'tov 1tOtEtV £VEKa 'tOU 
'tUXEtV 'tOU <JK01tOU is the same as 1taV 'to a1Hov 1tOtEtV EVEKa 'tOU 
<J'toxa~E<J8at, which is also the same as 1taV 'to Ka8' au'tov 
1tOtElV EVE Ka 'tOu 'tEAou<;. 

The purpose of Cicero's simile is to distinguish Ka'top8wJ.1a'ta 
from Ka8ljKov'ta. His translation of Antipater gives the agent's 
propositum as "to aim a spear or an arrow at something" ( con­
liniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam). This translation of proposi­
tum helps to reveal the true effect of the simile. The ordinary 
meaning of skopos is "target." Antipater begins with "For if it , . 
were someone s target to aIm a spear or an arrow at some-
thing .... " This sounds absurd because the "target" should be the 
"something." Antipater wants to distinguish between proposi­
tum and the "something" because he uses aliquo to stand for 
what the "target" ought to be. To answer Carneades, he must 
demonstrate the distinction between the purpose and the exter­
nal result of a stochastic craft, identify the purpose of the craft 
with its practice, and reduce the external result to a reference 

94 Origen, In Psalm., Migne, PC II 1053: "They say that the telos is a predi­
cate for the sake of which everything else is done, but itself for the sake of 
nothing; and what is joined to this, just like 'happiness' to 'being happy', the 
skopos. for the telos is the end of the things to be chosen." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

276 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

point inconsequential to the successful performance of the 
craftsman. He must take this paradoxical position in order to call 
the craft of virtue a "goal-oriented" craft and his simile is entire­
ly paradoxical. Any other interpretation will do violence to his 
opening phrase, si cui propositum sit conliniare. Antipater's fi­
delity to the Chrysippean position makes the archer's target the 
activity itself and reduces what we think of as the target to the 
inconsequential aliquo. He reinforces this distinction through­
out the simile wi th purpose-clauses that refer to aiming. More­
over, he concludes with the balanced hoc-illud, where hoc, rep­
resenting the telos, refers to ut omnia faciat quo propositum as­
sequatur and illud, what is "to be selected" (seligendum), de­
notes ut feriat (Sc. aliquid: "to strike something"), i.e., "to ac­
quire the indifferents," which is not the purpose of this activity 
but only the external result. If assequor translates as '!uYXavElv= 
"to predicate," then all three uses of propositum in Cicero's de­
bate between Carneades and Antipater could be translations of 
skopos: Carneades employs it polemically in the divisio for ex­
ternal result and Antipater responds with the Chrysippean usage 
throughout the archer-simile. 

To summarize, Antipater's use of 1tp6~ in his second telos-for­
mula differs sharply from EV£Ka in Carneades' formula. Antip­
ater possibly used EVEKa, but only when its object was the telos, 
i.e., the practice or 'predication' of the skopos; for saying "one 
does everything for the sake of the telos" was not controversial. 
Carneades gives TWV 1tPcJHWV KaTa cpumv as the object of EV£Ka 
in his attempt to argue: (1) that the external result of the rational 
selection of the indifferents is the acquisition of the indifferents; 
(2) that the external result of a craft should be its purpose; (3) 
that the purpose of the craft of virtue would then be the acq ui­
sition of the indifferents; (4) that the purpose of a craft is its end; 
and therefore the Stoics should call the acq uisi tion of the indiffer­
ents the telos. Antipater tries to demonstrate that the Stoics do 
not accept the second premise, from which the equally unaccep­
table third premise and the conclusion follow. Carneades' claim 
that the Stoics have two tele and two skopoi reveals his strategy: 
the claim only makes sense if TO TUXElV is translated as "to ac­
quire," so that "the things themselves" and "the acquisition of 
the things" become separate skopoi (though the Stoics would 
call neither the skopos). The two most counter-intuitive terms 
on the Stoic side are their uses of TUYXavw and skopos. Antip­
ater's most difflcult job was to show that the practice of the craft 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 277 

of virtue IS ItS purpose. The debate may be reconstructed as 
follows: 

Carneades: When the archer aims, at what does he aim? 
Antipater: At the preferred indifferents. 
Carneades: And when he aims at these, is his purpose not 

to get them? 
Antipater: No. His purpose is merely to aim, that is, to do 

everything in his power to aim. 

Plutarch records a response of Carneades to an argument of this 
sort, in which mockery of skopos, telos, and a verb for effort 
(£q>lrllJ-l) is suggested by the alliteration of the opening clause: 

LKonC:l 8£ on 'tUll'tO nuoxoucH 'tOle; 'tl,v OKlaV lmc:puAAc:09at 
'tl,V EUU'tWV £<lnql£vOle;' ou yap anOAElnOUOLV aAAa OUIlIlE'tU­
~£pOUOl 'tl,V a'tontUV 'to AOy~, noppw'tu'tw 'tWV £VVOlWV 
a~w'tUIl£VT]V. we; yap d 'to~£uoV'tU ~u{T] 'tte; OUXt nuV'ta 
nOt£lV 'ta napa al.l'tov EV£KU 'tou ~aAElv 'tOY Olconov aAAa 
EV£1CU 'tou nuv'ta nOlftoat 'ta napa atl'tov, aivtYflaOtv 0flOta 
Kat 'tEpuona 8o;EtEV av nEpatVElv·95 

Carneades may not have introduced £V £KCl into the debate. 
Antipater probably said something like "the archer does every­
thing for the sake of the telos. » Then Carneades could revert to 
Antipater's telos-formula and import the phrase about effort: 
"the archer does everything in his power for the sake of doing 
everything in his power.» Antipater argued that the practice, not 
the result, was the purpose, but he did not argue that the 
practice involved merely effort. Carneades' substitutions within 
the formulae err by omitting the skopos from the formula: the 
archer makes effort for the sake of predicating aiming of himself, 
and the practicioner of virtue makes effort for the sake of predi­
cating virtue of himself. 

One consideration remains, namely how the indifferents actu­
ally did fit into Antipater's conception of the telos and what he 

95 Pluto Mar. 1071B-C: "Observe that the same thing happens to them as to 

those who strive to outleap their own shadow. Their reason does not leave be­
hind, but drags along with it the absurdity furthest removed from the com­
mon conceptions. For if one were to say that an archer does everything in his 
power not for the sake of hitting the target, but for the sake of doing every­
thing in his power, he would be thought to be telling tall tales and speaking in 
riddles." On the use of £<PtTHlt cf Stab. Eel. 2.77.1ff: ()1W1tOV /lEV yap dvat 'to 
b(1(El/l£vvov Oll)la, ot 'tuX£lv £<pl£o8at 'tou; 'tll; £UOat)lOVla; o'tOXa<;o!l1vou;. 
Carneades also mocks 'tunuvw at Mar. 1072E (OU yap 'tou 'tux,ov'to; £o'ttV 
atvtY/la) and 'tuyx,uvw and £v£1l:aat 1071 E (1tuv'ta 1tOtOUOll; £vom 'tOu 'tuX,ctv 
ot 'tuX,ElV ou O£/lVQV ouo!: /laJ(UP10V conv). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

278 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

may have meant by 1tpo<;. At Pluto Mor. 107lA Carneades says 
that it is contrary to common conception that the end of our 
actions and the "reference" (avaq>opa) should be different 
things. By this argument he seems to claim that "reference" 
must be connected with the purpose of an activity, just as he 
linked the external result wi th the purpose in his argument that 
the Stoics have two ends. Antipater would be willing to grant 
that we do everything in our power "with reference to" (1tp0<;) 
acquiring the preferred indifferents (Striker 203). As this is his 
second formula for the telos, he means that this formula is the 
purpose of all one's actions; there is no other purpose. He 
claims that purpose and reference can be separated. Indeed this 
seems the entire point of Antipater's telos-formula. Cicero's dis­
cussion of the difference between Ku-rop8w).lu-ru and XU8'ilKOV­
'tao however, adds a complication. As Ku8'ilKov-ra have the indif­
ferents as their -DATI and apx'il. they can be said "to take their ref­
erence from" the indifferents. On the other hand, Ka-rop8w­
).la'ta take their apx'il from virtue, and Cicero says that they are 
to be judged in relation to the virtuous or unvirtuous disposition 
of the one who performed them (Fin. 3.22 [=SVF III 18],32 
[=III 504]). They also take their -DATI from, and "have reference 
to," the indifferents. So Ka-rop8w).lu-ra have reference to two 
things: the indifferents and virtue. The question remains how 
purpose and reference are related if we do everything in our 
power "with reference to" but not "for the sake of" acquiring 
the indifferents, and if Ku"tOp8w).la-ru are done both "with refer­
ence to" and "for the sake of" virtue. The answer seems to be 
that Ku-rop8w).la-ra. as conceived in Antipater's telos-formula, 
"refer" both to virtue (their apx'il) and to the indifferents (their 
-DATI), but "that for the sake of which" they are done is only their 
apx'il not their DATI. This duality of relation properly expresses 
the status of Ku"tOp8w).la-ra, but it is not necessarily contrary to 
common conception that the telos should be one thing and that 
each action should also have reference to something else. Carne­
ades blurs the distinction between "take reference from" and 
"have reference to" by his use of the phrase "the reference is 
to. "96 

96 Cf the Stoic position (Stob. Eel. 2.46.8f=SVF III 2): Ct£Ao~) [<P' 0 It(lvta to: 
[V to ~l<r 1tpattOIlEva tilv ava<popo:v Aall~avEl with Carneades' Kat Ilil 1tav­
troy coa 1tpattOIlEV £<p' £v tl Y1YVEo8m tilV ava<popav (Plut. Mor. 1071 A). In­
wood's discussion (supra n.66: 547-57) of £~l~ and 8l(i8E(Jl~ is an interesting 
parallel to the dual referentiality of the sage's action. The objections of Mitsis 
appended to Inwood's paper, however, are worth noting. Inwood wrongly 
follows Long (supra n.59) in identifying s kopos with to 1tPOKE1IlEVOV (551, 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 279 

As suggested above, Carneades probably chose to attack An­
tipater through the Stoic definition of skopos because it allowed 
him to attack the telos. Chrysippus' doctrine that the telos is 'to 
'tUX£lV 'tOU OK01tOU and Antipater's 'to TUYXaVEtv in his telos-for­
mula permits Carneades to undermine the telos. Striker (198) 
even argues that Carneades may have introduced the archer­
simile first and that what survives is only Antipater's response. 
The considerable confusion created by Carneades and the unus­
ual response of Antipater make this idea attractive. Possibly 
Carneades set up Antipater just to watch him try to defend the 
Stoic idea of predication: Antipater is forced to use 'tuYXav(() in 
his telos -formula for "to acquire," with the preferred indiffer­
ents as its object (cf supra n.94). The most persuasive evidence 
that Carneades used EV£KU against Antipater is the infinite re­
gress that it produces. From comparison with the circular argu­
ment against Antipater's first telos-argument ( supra n.69), it is 
easy to see that Academic attack consistently exploited a com­
mon Stoic vulnerability of terminology. 

Carneades certainly capitalized on the confusion that he 
created. He proposed two telos-formulae of his own for use 
solely against the Stoa, but committed himself to neither (Cic. 
Fin. 2.42, Acad. 2.131). The first formula is a logical consequence 
of his argument against the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts: 
as we do everything in our power "for the sake of" acquiring 
the primary natural things, the end should be to acquire them 
(naturae primis bonis aut omnibus aut maximis frui, "to enjoy 
the primary natural goods, either all or the greatest ones": Cic. 
Tusc. 5.84f, Fin. 5.20). By this formula Carneades even means to 
exclude virtue (Cic. Fin. 2.35; 5.20, 22). His argument is ob­
viously designed to refute the one Stoic who addressed the 
acquisition of the preferred indifferents. His adaptation of Antip­
ater's 1tPOs to his own EV£KU makes it appear that Antipater 

555), for in katorthomata the sage's purpose resides with his virtue. Inwood 
also argues that the end, happiness, is not what we consciously aim at. True, 
but as the sage's purpose will be judged in relation to his virtue, he will 
consciously do things both with reference to and for the sake of his virtue, 
which, if not identical with his happiness, is what he knows will produce his 
happiness, for his happiness "subsists" in virtue (Stab. Eel. 2.77.18=SVF III 16: 
'tOU1:0 oE U1tclPX£lV £V 'to K(11:' ap£'tl)v Sl1v). Cf Rist (supra n.S 7: 163ff): "virtue 
is sufficient for happiness" (D.L. 7.127=SVF III 49: au'tclPKll 't' dvat au'tl)v 
[5C. ap£'tf)v] 1tpO~ £UOatIlOVtav), the virtues "complete" happiness (D.L. 7.96=III 
107: ano't£AouO"t) and "produce and compose" it (Stab. Eel. 2.72.4ff=III 106: 
anOYEvvwcrt Kat O"Uf.!1tATlPOUO"t). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

280 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

cared nothing for virtue and that man's purpose in life should be 
to strive for "the integrity of body parts, health, properly func­
tioning senses, freedom from pain, strength, and beauty,» the 
prima naturae as Carneades defines them (Cic. Fin. 5.18). Carne­
ades then suggests that the possession of them ought to be 
preferable to the mere effort to possess them. Cicero, referring 
to desertus ille Carneades, confirms that this argument would 
untenable in any other context except debate with Antipater 
(Tuse. 5.87; Fin. 2.38, 4.49). Striker shows, moreover, that the 
entire structure of the divisio in which both the craft argument 
and this formula for the telos occur is comprehensible only as an 
argument against the Stoics.97 

We have only one other Carneadean argument for the telos: 
he once defended Callipho's view of the telos as virtue plus 
pleasure (Cic. Acad. 2.139). The context of this attribution also 
suggests that Chrysippus saw only three views of the summum 
bonum as defensible: virtue, pleasure, or both (Cic. Acad. 2.138, 
Fin. 2.44). Chrysippus apparently regarded freedom from pain 
and enjoyment of the primary natural things as euphemisms for 
pleasure. It might be deduced that Carneades, the probable 
source of this q uotation,98 accepted in another debate the Chrys­
ippean premise that to enjoy the primary natural things is 
pleasure and that virtue plus these things, under whatever name, 
should be the telos. Indeed he argued in a debate on goods and 
evils that to be true to their ethical doctrines, the Stoics need to 

claim these things as necessary if not sufficient for happiness 
(Fin. 3.41).9'1 

The full significance of Posidonius' passage on Stoic formulae 
for the tefos can now be seen (quoted supra 235 with n.16).100 

97 Striker 200f with n.16. She suggests that inconsistencies in the divisio may 
result from the existence of more than one divisia. r~or an analysis of the 
sources and problem of the various divisiones see J. GLUCKER, Antiochus and 
the Late Academy (=ollypomnemata 56 [Gottingen 1978: hereafter 'Glucker'J) 
52-63,391-423. 

98 Glucker (54 n.143, 56 n.151, 60 n.164) argues that this passage describes a 
Chrysippean divisia to which Carneades may be acknowledging a debt before 
developing his own divisia for purposes of argument; see also Giusta II 244. 

99 Glucker 395; G iusta I 156-59. 

100 With Kidd (EK II 679-82), I take W\rtou and m'rtcr (30) to refer to 'to OJlO­
Ao'YOUJl£V(t)~ STlv, Zeno's formula. Rieth (supra n.66: 34-38), Long (supra n.59: 
84f), and Long and Sedley (I 408ff) take them to refer to Antipater's formula. 
The subject of 1tupbtnu t is also unclear: DeLacy's translation (329) supplies 
"those things," which suggests that the understood subject is pleasure and free­
dom from pain; Kidd (EK II (79) supplies "it" and seems to agree with Long, 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 281 

Like Carneades (supra n.20), Posidonius translates Antipater's 
formula for the telos not by 1tp6~ but by £vEKa. Even though 
Carneades wrote nothing and Plutarch is the primary source for 
his views, the arguments are so devastating to Antipater's posi­
tions and so consistent in design that Plutarch must reproduce 
faithfully Carneades' language. Posidonius also translates Antipa-

, ,... I " ..... I " ter s lWV 1tPOT\YODI-U:VWV Kala CPDOlV as lWV 1tPW1WV Kala CPDOlV 
like Carneades (supra nn.20, 81). When he goes on to say that 
this formula is "similar to setting up pleasure or freedom from 
pain as the skopos" and that it "contains nothing about virtue or 
happiness," his argument clearly presupposes Carneades' posi­
tion that La rrpona KaLa CPUOlV do not include virtue (supra 
279f). Finally, his claim that the expression appears to contradict 
itself (Eon Of j.HXXT\V EIlCPalvov Ka1:a au't~v 't~v EKcpopav) reveals 
that his own method of argument is identical to the strategy of 
the Academics: he accepts a Stoic premise for the sake of argu­
ment and tries to demonstrate that the argument "refutes itself." 

Posidonius' method might be summarized as follows. He 
clearly criticizes the telos-formulae of Antipater and Chrysippus 
and represents Antipater's formula in the words that Carneades 
used to attack it. His strategy signifies that Carneades effectively 
refuted Antipater and the debate was lost. He dismisses Antip­
ater's formula by accepting Carneades' premises and conclu­
sions. Moreover, the results of the debate must have been more 
important to Posidonius than whatever flaws existed in Antip­
ater's position, because Posidonius undertakes neither an inde­
pendent refutation nor a sympathetic defense of Antipater's 
actual words (or meaning). 

who supplies the miraculous" Attainment of or efforts to obtain 10. KU10. 
<pUmv and assumes that the entire phrase beginning nav 10 i:v8£XOj.!EVOV is the 
understood subject. The problem is a quotation out of context. Clearly enough, 
Posidonius tries to explain the harmony between his Platonic model of the 
soul and Zeno's telos-formula in what preceeds this passage and criticizes all 
telos-formulae against which Carneades could use his attacks on the Stoic 
definition of the skopos. Thus he seems to understand skopos as "external 
result" like Carneades, i.e., the acquisition of the indifferents or here 1WV 
rcpo:nwv Ka'to. ql\J(Jtv. Consequently I understand "those things," i.e., pleasure 
and freedom from pain, with De Lacy. The translation of ran 8£ j.!aXllv 
£j.!CPUtVOV as "this creates the appearance of contradiction" is difficult, but com­
parison with expressions like 1TJV 1E npo<; 10. crucpw<; cpatVOI!EVU l!aXTlv (EK T 
83) clearly suggests that Posidonius' frequent strategy of "self-refutation" lies 
behind the phrase. See Kidd supra n.9 and EK II 74 ad 10. tvupyw<; 
cpatvOI!Eva. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

282 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

The preceding supports a thesis that Posidonius attacks his 
Stoic forbearers by a striking and deliberate dialectical strategy. 
He accepts Academic representations of Stoic doctrines and the 
conclusions that derive from them. His claim that Antipater's 
formula is liable to Academic aporiai is most revealing, as he 
employs only Carneades' representation of what Antipater said 
and meant. If he was aware of not quoting Antipater properly, as 
I think certain, his strategy was deliberate and circular: by ac­
cepting subtly altered Academic accounts of Stoic premises and 
the aporetic conclusions following from them, he meant to 
show that his Stoic forbearers could not cut through Academic 
aporzaz. 

IV. Posidonius' Attack on Chrysippus' 
Doctrine of the Passions 

If this were the only example of such argumentation, it might 
be dismissed or attributed to Galen's editing, but Posidonius 
proceeds in this fashion throughout the ethical fragments. To 
demonstrate that Posidonius actually employs a consistent and 
subtle dialectical strategy, it will be necessary to consider his 
arguments against Chrysippus and three corresponding 
arguments of Carneades against the Stoics. 

Posidonius seeks to show that Chysippus cannot account for 
the cause (aitia) of passion. He attacks the doctrine that passion is 
simultaneously an "excessive impulse" (1tA£OVa~oucra 0PJli)), a 
"fresh opinion" (doxa prosphatos) of good and evil, and a "deci­
sion" (krisis). To prove that there must be irrational elements in 
man's soul, he treats the concept of excess at great length. First, 
how could reason command an impulse that would "exceed" 
(1tA£OVa~£lV) its own measures (supra n.9)? Posidonius cites a 
Chrysippean exempfum on running: when walking it is possible 
to stop when desired or change speed, but when running this is 
not the case (Galen PHP 4.240.33-42.11). It is a difficult exemp­
fum from which to understand passion, because Chrysippus' 
point seems to be that an excessive impulse is inevitable when 
running (the runner commands his legs to go quickly and some­
how they get out of control). Chrysippus says that "For the 
proper measure of natural impulse is in accordance with reason, 
and only as much as reason deems appropriate (PHP 4.242.8f: 
cruJlJl£'!pia yap fcrn cpucrllcTle; OpJlfte; f] Ka'ta 'tOY AOYOV Kat Ewe; 
'tocrou'tOu, [Kat] EWe; a1)'tOe; a~tot). The implication is that, in pas-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 283 

sion, reason must command the impulse in such a way (sc. with 
insufficiently specified limits) that the impulse automatically 
exceeds reason's capacity to regulate it. The" specified limit" 
should have been appended to the command in the form "but 
only as much as is proper" (£cos 'tOGo\n:ou). Posidonius, how­
ever, shows no interest in reading between the lines to find a 
rationalist explanation. On the contrary, he takes Chrysippus' 
exemplum as proof of irrational faculties: 1tp06T)AOV ODv w~ 
hEpa ns aAoyos fGn buval-lts ai-da 'tOU nAEOVa~EGeal 'tllv 
OPI-lT)v imEp 'ta I-l£'tpa 'tlls 1tpOatp£GECOe; aAoyoe; il ai'tia 'to papoe; 
'tOU GWlla'toe;.lOl By Posidonius' method of argumentation, if rea­
son commanded the impulse and the impulse exceeded the 
measures set by reason, then something else must be the cause 
of the excess in "the excessive impulse," for reason cannot com­
mand anything immoderate, unmeasured, or excessive (supra 
n.9). This is not the monistic view of reason and how it operates, 
and it suits Posidonius' polemic well. But this is not the only 
flaw in his argument. Chrysippus' exemplum is an analogy in 
which reason is compared to the runner's impulse and impulse 
is compared to the runner's legs. The definitions of the larger 
system must be applied to the more limited system, as in the 
comparison of human behavior to animal behavior or in Plato's 
comparison of the operation of a city to the operation of the 
soul: 

£1t1. 8£ 'tWV 'tp£xov't(t)v KUG' OpJ-l1,V Ot)l(E'tl 'tOtou'!ov ytVE'tUt, 

UAAa. nA£Ova~£l napa. 1:~V OPIl~v 1) 1:(J)V OKEAWV Kivllou; 
W(H£ EK<jl£pw8m Kat Il~ ll£m~aAA£lV £1m£l8ws OU1:WS £u8uS 
Evap~all£vwv. atS 011lai 1:t 1tapa1tA'ijcHov Kat E1tl 1:WV 0PIlWV 
yivw8m 6ux 1:0 1:1,V Ka"CcX AOYOV u1t£p~aiv£tv OUIlIl£1:piav, 
wo8' o,av OPIl~ 111, £u1tfl8wS eXflV 1tpOS au,ov, E1tt IlEV ,0D 
6pOllOU "COD 1tAfOvaOllou AryollEvou 1tapcx 1~V oPIl'ijv, E1tt 6£ Tils 
oPllllS 1taprX"Cov AOyoV.1 02 

101 Galen PlIP 4.248.10-13=EK 34.16-20: "Therefore it is plain to see that 
the cause of the impulse's exceeding beyond the measures of reason is some 
other irrational power, just as the cause of the runner's exceeding beyond the 
measures of his choice is irrational: the weight of the body." 

102 Galen PHP 4.242.2-8=SVF III 462: "In the case of runners, this sort of 
thing (Sc. the motion of the legs) is no longer in accordance with the impulse; 
rather the motion of the legs exceeds the impulse so that they are carried away 
and do not change speed obediently (thus initiating the change right away). I 
think that something similar to these (Sc. movements) happens in the case of 
the impulses by their overstepping the symmetry in accordance with reason, so 
that whenever one uses impulse, one is not obedient to it (Sc. reason); in the 
case of running, the excess is said to be beyond the impulse, but in the case of 
impulse, it is said to be beyond reason." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

284 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

The last line shows the complication of the analogy: impulse 
occurs in both parts-as what obeys reason in the functioning of 
the soul, and as what commands the legs in the functioning of 
the whole person. Posidonius ignores Chrysippus' design in the 
analogy entirely and concludes that if the cause of the excess in 
running is irrational (i.e., not caused by reason, occurring apart 
from reason=the weigh t of the body), the cause of the excess in 
the operation of the soul must also be irrational. Chrysippus' use 
of analogy (ale; oll-wl n ITapaITA~<HOV ) from the whole person 
(=reason + the « irrational" bod y) to the soul (=reason alone), 
makes the verbatim application of results from one level to the 
other level improper and illogical. Posidonius is able to make his 
concI usion sound reasonable because Chrysippus' analogy is so 
complicated. These passages demonstrate Posidonius' dialectical 
strategy neatly: to take up the psychological problems most diffi­
cult for monism to explain; to treat monism with hostility, re­
fusing to entertain sympathetic explanations; to deny subtlety to 
monistic definitions and to attack them with arguments cast in 
the guise of common sense; and to construct all arguments with 
a view to demonstrating the existence of irrational faculties. This 
last, a significant purpose of the polemic against Chrysippus, 
directs the structure of many of his arguments. As Posidonius 
considers each approach to the topic of the aitia of passion, he 
tries to demonstrate that rational processes cannot be the cause 
of irrational action. Rather, something else must be the 'mover', 
and reason must expressly not be the 'mover' but the 'moved'. 
To this end, Posidonius uses extensively the active and passive 
of KlV£lV (Plut. Mar. 449c=SVF III 384). 

Posidonius asks whether the excess lies in the act of assent, 
and if so, what causes the element of "excess" ('to EITt ITAfOV ) in 
the daxa or krisis.l03 He offers a possible interpretation of the 
source of the excess when he discusses appwcrT~JlaTa, the 
sickly dispositions of the soul that render it more prone to pas­
sion. Galen introduces this approach to the aitia by quoting 
Chrysippus: 

«OU yap £V ,0 Kp[V£tV o:yaSa fKao,a ,Ol)"(WV AEynUl 
O:ppwo'''J.la,a catHa, O:AAa Kat Ka,a ,0 £71:t 71:AEOV 
£K71:E71:,WKEVat 71:PO~ ,a1:na wu Ka,a <pUO tv." tOW~ 0' <Xv 'lVO~ 
"~V 'nOE 'n P"O£t" AEyonoS "OUK O:71:E0"(EPllKE J.lEV ,ou Kp[OlV 
EiVat ,0 O:PpWOTrlJ.la, ou J.l~V £V au,n yE J.lOVll 'n \lfEUOEl KPlOEt 
,~v y£v£01V auwu ,[8£'a1, O:AAa 71:poo£PX£08al <Pllol ,0 £71:t 

10) Galen PHP 4.248.25ff (=EK 34.33ff), 264.10 (=164.2). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

11:AEOV," £K 1:COV £1tl<P£POflEVWV 1, YVWflll 1:0U Xpuotmwu KU1:U­
cpuVT)OnUl "o8£v OUK uAoywr; yuVatKOflUV£t<; 'ttV£<; AEyOV1:at 
KUt 0pv180flUV£le;. "184 

285 

Kidd (EK II 587) rightly recognizes Ka1:a 'to E11:t 11:AEOV EK11:E1t­
HOKEVUl 11:POC; 'tU1HU 'tOU Ku'ta (jrumv as the key phrase in the 
supposed quotation. This phrase interests Posidonius (whom 
Galen clearly follows: EK II 589), because it suggests an irra­
tional longing for which reason alone cannot account-a longing 
that carries the excess with it. In his view, the "being drawn too 
much" should be the cause of the passion, because errors about 
good and evil alone do not constitute passions, as Chrysippus 
says. Galen reports an anonymous objection (uc;) that attempts 
to explain how this "being drawn too much" may yet have a 
rationalist explanation: 

'AAAa v~ fli' tOWe; UV 1:1<; <PT)O£l£ 'to flUV1COO£S OU Ola ~V uAO­
yov yivw8ul bUvUfltv, uAAa Ola 'to £11:\' 11:Atov ~ npoollK£v 
£~llX8at 1:T)v 't£ KPl01V KUt t~v 86~uv, WS d KU\' OUtWS a£­
y£v, UPPW01:T)llmu YlVWSat KU1:a t~V \jfUX~V OUX (mAwe; 1:0 
\jf£UOCOe; l.ln£lAll<P£Vat 11:£Pl 'ttvwv w<; uyu8cov ~ KUKCOV, uAAa 
'to Ilfyunu VOfl1S£lV uU'tct.· fl1l0E11:W yap UPPWCHllllU 't~V 11:£pt 
1:COV XPllflci'tWV dVUl 86~uv we; uyu8cov, uAAa £nnociv 'tte; 
UU1:a flEY101:0V uyuSov riVUl VOfl1Sn KUt fl1l0£ sllV U~lOV U11:0-
AUfl~civn 1:0 (H£PllStV'tt XPllllci'tWV· £V 'tolncp ya.p OUVlO1:UO-
8Ul 'tT)V 1:£ <plAOXPllIlU1:lUV KUt 't~V <plAupyupiuv UPPW01:T)­
flUtU oUoue;.105 

104 Galen PH P 4.262.34-264.6=SVF III 480: "'For these are not called 
infirmities because one judges each of these things to be goods, but because of 
being drawn to them in excess of what is natural'. If someone should say, 'in 
this passage Chrysippus has not deprived infirmity of its being a judgment, 
however he does not place the origin of the infirmity in the false judgment 
alone; rather he says that excess is present too,' the opinion of Chrysippus will 
become plain from the words that follow, 'whence certain people are not 
illogically referred to as woman-mad and bird-mad'." 

105 Galen PHP 4.264.9-17=EK 164.1-10=SVF III 480: "But someone might 
well protest that madness does not arise through an irrational faculty, but 
because one's judgment and opinion have been aroused beyond what was 
fitting, as if he said as follows, that 'infirmities' arise in the soul not simply by 
supposing falsely that various things are good or evil, but by supposing that the 
same things are the greatest [goods or evils]. The opinion that wealth is a good 
is not yet an 'infirmity', but whenever one considers that it is the greatest good 
and supposes that life has no value for one deprived of wealth, [the opinion is 
an 'infirmity']. For 'love of money' and 'love of wealth', which are infirmities, 
are comprised in this [supposition]." Kidd (EK II 589) comments that it would 
be dangerous to regard this as a "fragment" of Chrysippus, but offers no 
further comment on the implications of Posidonius' dialectical procedure. De 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

286 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Although Galen paraphrases this part of the argument without 
attribution to either Posidonius or Chrysippus, in what follows 
Posidonius shows that he regards the anonymous objection as 
consistent with Chrysippus' views: 

aAAa 'rip 'ratl1:a <pacncovn flocrnowvLOS aV'rtAEywv &0£ 1tWS 
<Pl1crt· 'rOWt)'rwv Of imo 'rou Xpucr(1t1tOU AeyO/l£VWV ota1tOpf)crnEv 
av 'ttS 1tpw'tOv /lEV, 1tWS Ot cro<pOt /l£Ytcr'rCX Kat aVU1tEPi3Al1'ra 
VO/l(SOV'rES dvat ayaSa 'ra KaAa 1tav'ra OUK E/l1taSWS 
KtVOUV'rat U1tO au"Cwv £1tlSU/lOUV"CES 'rf &v OpEYOV'rat Kat 
1tEptXaPEtS ytVOj.lfVOt E1tt 'rOtS aU'tOtS, o'rav 'ruxwcrtV au'rwv. d 
yap 'to /l£YfSOS 'rWV <patVO/l£VWV ayuSwv ~ KUKWV KtvEt 'r0 
VO/llSnv Ku9ftKOV KUt Ku"Ca a~lav dvat 1tUPOV'rWV UU'rWV ~ 
1tapaytVO/lEVWV (£/l1taSWS Ktvftcr9at) KUt /l110EVU AOYOV 
1tpocrlwSm 1tfpl 'tOU aAAWS Of tV U1tO UU'rWV KtvElcr9m, 'rOUS 
aVU1tEPi3Al1W VO/liSovwS dvut 'ra 1tEpt UU'rOUS 'tOlho eon 
1tacrXflv, 01tfP OUX opci'rm ytVO/lEVov. 106 

The beginning of this passage is crucial: "if Chrysippus ... one 
would inquire .... "The argument is plainly hypothetical (Posido-

Lacy (1.263) does not translate £~T1x8al as a passive: "the judgement and the 
opinion have gone beyond what is fitting." It seems clearly an aorist passive 
from £~cqw, in which case it should not admit of middle significance. 
Moreover, as I shall show, it is entirely in keeping with Posidonius' strategy to 

argue that doxa and krisis arc not the cause, so something must have moved 
them. The difficulty of translation has to do with the attribution of the 
passage. If the anonymous objector is Chrysippus (sic v. Arnim ad loc: "ultima 
verba evincunt amecedentia Chrysippea esse"), one will want to make the 
verb's sense active to avoid the implication that something other than reason 
could cause a passion. But if Posidonius imparts a fictitious objection to 
Chrysippus, there is no difficulty with the passive: Posidonius' strategy makes 
Chrysippus seem to entertain causes external to reason, For a general sense of 
how Posidonius wishes to manipulate Chrysippus' occasional use of the 
passive to justify his own doctrine positing irrational faculties, cf. PHP 4. 
276.34-278.9; cf also the passive £K<p£pw8m at 4.242.4, 244.25, 256.8,27. 

106 Galen PH P 4.264.1 7-27=EK 164.11-22: "But Posidonius answers this ob­
jection in the following manner: 'If Chrysippus should make such an argu­
ment, one would inquire first why wise men who consider that all honorable 
things are superlative and unsurpassable goods, are nor moved to passion by 
them, desiring what they seck, and feeling excessive joy over these same things 
whenever they acquire them. for if the magnitude of things which appear as 
good and evil moves one to believe that it is appropriate and in accordance 
with the value of the things which are present or approaching to be moved to 
passion and to accept no reason to the contrary that one ought to be moved 
otherwise by them, then those who think that the goods before them are 
unsurpassed would have to suffer this passion, but one does not see this 
happen'." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 287 

nius uses 'tOto\J1C0V and an optative governing verb), as is its attri­
bution to Chrysippus (his name in a genitive absolute depen­
dent on the optative verb). Posidonius' dialectical stance 
throughout the passage is that he is not making such an objec­
tion, nor is he claiming that Chrysippus actually made it. He says 
only that Chrysippus would make some such response to ex­
plain the origin of the "excess" in an agent's soul. The implica­
tions of Posidonius' response to this 'hypothetical' argument 
merit close scrutiny. 

The key phrase, to ~£y£80<; twv q>atVO~£VC0V ayu8wv 11 KUKWV. 
is vague enough that four radically different interpretations 
might be entertained, depending upon how this argument fits 
with those around it. 

(1) "The magnitude of apparent goods" construed not as 
real goods and evils but those imagined by the fool (<puu­
AO<;). Posidonius would not suggest that the good has magni­
tude or 'incremental value', only that fools may think so in 
error. This argument would fit well with the preceding 
passage, in which passion seemed to result from excessive 
"suppositions" (UTCOATjljlftS), i.e., opinions that are by defini­
tion false. 

(2) "The magnitude of apparent goods," construed as all 
goods. both true and false. This argument would fit well 
with Posidonius' exemplum of the wise man in what fol­
lows. For this exemplum to be appropriate, it must be that 
he discusses simultaneoulsy what fools and the wise man 
respectively call good. 

(3) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," 
construed as a magnitude of good residing in the presenta­
tion. This argument would neatly complete Posidonius' 
larger strategy of searching for excess in each of the powers 
of the rational soul. Posidionius had earlier eliminated im­
pulse, reason and assent as possible sources of excess (PHP 
4.248.25ff=EK 34.33ff). Presentation remains the lone possi­
bility, which Carneades had already exploited in his attack 
on Stoic determinism (supra nn.32, 45). 

(4) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," 
construed as a magnitude of good residing in the thing. This 
argument would, like (1), fit well with the preceding argu­
ment, by which passion results "from supposing that 
money is the greatest good" (1:([> l.tEYl(HU VOlll~£lV ulnu). 
This definition would nearly be "the magnitude of goods 
that are presen ted." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

288 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Definitions (2) and (4) contradict the doctrines of Chrysippus, 
Posidonius, or any Stoic. The good of the wise man cannot be 
compared to indifferents like money as in the anonymous 
objection, and the good does not have magnitude. It differs in 
kind from the indifferents and does not admit of increase or de­
crease (Cic. Fin. 3.4M). Definition (1), very close to (4), violates 
the Stoic doctrine of the good. There is a confusing nexus of 
issues at work here: the good, presentation, and supposition (or 
weak assent)' which is passion. The hypothetical objection and 
response with no dogmatic implications for either Chrysippus 
or Posidonius docs not help. Kidd (EK II 587-90) chooses defin­
ition (3), evident from his repeated references to the "magnitude 
of presentations," but both he and De Lacy (265) translate by 
"the magnitude of apparent goods and evils," without stating 
how these issues should be resolved. The striking ambiguity of 
this phrase, however, compels us to entertain all four of the 
definitions despite their obvious conflict with doctrines of the 
Old and Middle Stoa. It is not necessary to choose one defin­
ition over the others. The anonymous objection is intentionally 
hypothetical and undogmatic. It is important, nevertheless, to 
understand how all four are interrelated and why they might all 
be intended. 

To be consistent with the objection imputed to Chrysippus (ill­
nesses do not arise when money is falsely supposed a good but 
only as the greatest good), it may seem that to Il£YE80<; trov 
CPUlVOIl£VWV o.yu8wv 11 xuxwv should involve an error in the 
estimation of its val ue. But this is not the case, as Kidd argues 
(EK II 589): 

The objection stresses that emotion does not arise simply 
from error of judgement, but from some kind of excess in 
the process of judgement (KptOtl; involves decision as well as 
judgement: Arist. Pol. 1275a23), and this is interpreted in 
terms of magnitude (flEYlO-ra) of the presentation com­
prising the oo1;a. This cannot refer to overJUaluation, for 
that would be mere error of judgement, but to the effect on 
one's 061;a from the magnitude of the external presentation. 
reu80S (re<xOXElv) is affection, being acted upon by an ex­
ternal force. 

Kidd is quite right to preclude "over-valuation." Galen had 
earlier praised Chrysippus for observing the distinction 
between error and passion (PHP 4.242.29-36: 8tOpt~H tWV UIlUP­
TTlllatWv teX 1ta811). The objection makes it appear that passion 
does not occur when one considers something 'good', but it 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOlIN A. STEVENS 289 

does when a degree of perceived magnitude is attached to that 
good, "the greatest good." Kidd is right: for this objection to 
make sense within the context of the entire argument by which 
reason cannot cause passion, this perceived magnitude must be 
due to an extra-rational source of excess. 

A subtle shift in language from "excess" or "too much" (to btl 
1tAEOV) to "the greatest" (10 jlEYWWV), an apparently insignficant 
shift from the comparative to the superlative degree, also 
changes from adverbial modification to adjectival modification. 
Chrysippus had said that the cause of passion is "being drawn to 
things too much" (EK II 587: Ka10: 10 £7tl1tA£OV EK1tE1tHOKEvm). 
The anonymous objection uses jlEYUHOV to modify the external 
good or evil. This move is entirely unnecessary to account for 
passion wi thin Chrysippean monism, because man may enter­
tain any number of hormetic propositions about external things 
of such a form that assent to them (suppositions or opinions) 
results in an impulse excessive by the standard of right reason. 
But Posidonius' refusal to acknowledge this conception of "ex­
cess" leads him to reify it as 10 jl£Yl<HOV, to place it outside 
man's rational processes (suppositions, opinions), and to attach it 
to the external thing. Attention no longer focuses on how or 
why the rational processes behave 'excessively' but on the 
magnitude of the subject matter of the supposition as it appears. 
The problem still remains whether Posidonius means to attrib­
ute this excess to the presentation or the thing. If the source of 
the excess is extra-rational, it seems necessary to place it with 
the thing. But Kidd correctly speaks of "external presentation" 
("1ta80~ [1taaX£lvJ is affection, being acted upon by an external 
force"), at least to the extent that it is "external" to reason, be­
cause (as I shall show) Posidonius understood presentation 
differently from Chrysippus. The anonymous objection im­
puted to Chrysippus betrays many premises more consistent 
with the doctrines of Posidonius. This is but one. As often with 
anonymous objections, neither party could espouse this objec­
tion, which represents the doctrines of neither. Rather, Posido­
nius places in his opponent's mouth an argument close to one of 
his positions that is easily refuted through certain subtle modifi­
cations to its premises (supra n.105). To see that presentation is 
indeed at the heart of the problem, it is necessary to consider 
Posidonius' response to the objection. 

He responds in three parts. In the first (quoted above) he 
accepts the premise that the magnitude of things as they appear 
could "move one to consider" (nvEl 10 vOjlU':Elv) that it is appro-



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

290 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

priate to suffer passion, in effect, that the cause of passion must 
be external to reason. Posidonius transfers the locus of causation 
from the supposition or opinion (i. e., the agent's reason) to 
something else: J..lEy£SO~ 'tWV <patVOJ..lEVWV ayaSwv +1 KaKWV. The 
second part of his argument again states that the "cause" of pas­
sion must "move" the soul. Recognizing that sages and fools 
may react differently to the same thing's appearance, he con­
siders whether "weakness of soul" (aaSEV Eta) might be the 
cause of passion: 

d 'tE 1tpOS 'tep fl.£y£8£l 'toov <pUlV0fl.£VffiV Kat 'tl)V acr8£v£lav 
Tils \jIUXllS al'tlucroV'tat Kat Dux 'tOl)'tO 'tOUS fl.EV cro<pOUS 'to 1tap­
u1tav epoucr1v a1tllAAUx8at 'toov 1ta8oov, 'tOUS DE <pauAous, 
o'tav acr8EvElS rocr1 fl.l) Ka'tu 'tl)V K01Vl)V acr8£v£lav, aAAu 
Ka'tu'tl)V £1tt1tAElOV £ppUllKUlaV, (015), OUDE olS'tffiS A£Amat 
'to ~ll'tOUfl.EVOV. on yup D1U 'tl)V vocrov 'tllS \jIUXllS ev 'tOlS 1tU8W1 
yivov'tat, 1tUV'tES 0fl.0AOYOUcrl· 1toos fl.£V'tOl yE K1V1l8EicrllS Kat 
1tooS K1VOUcrllS, ~ll'tEl'tat fl.£V, OUX l)1tODElKVU'tat 8£.107 

In the last sentence Posidonius clarifies the goal of his inquiry: 
what is "moving" the soul. Only this will meet his definition of 
the aitia. 

Posidonius denies a correlation between the weakness of the 
agent's soul and the severity of the passions he suffers: all ig­
norant men suffer passions both great and small and in such men 
great passions may arise from small causes, and vice versa. 10B 

The last part of Posidonius' argument, however, displays clearly 
that the concept of presentation (<paV'taata) underlies his 
participle <patVOJ..lEVWV: 

DUOlV 'tE 'tl)v au'tl)v acr8£v£lav £XOV'tffiV Kat 'tl)V Ofl.otav Aafl.­
~avoV'tffiV <pavmcrlav aya80u 11 KaKOU 0 fl.EV ev 1tU8£l yivE­
'tat, 0 DE 015, Kat 0 fl.EV ~nov, 0 DE ~aAAov, Kat eVlO'tE 0 acr8Ev-

107 Galen PH P 4.266.30-268.7=EK 164.26-34: "And if they blame, in addi­
tion to the magnitude of the things as they appear, weakness of the soul also, 
and claim that for this reason wise men are entirely free from the passions, but 
that fools, whenever they are weak, not with an ordinary kind of weakness, 
but with one that has become excessive, [are not free from the passions], even 
so, the question is not resolved. For all agree that men fall into the passions 
through sickness of soul; but the question of how the soul has been moved 
and how it moves, this is not yet explained." See Kidd (supra n.18) 111; Origen 
De prine. 3.1.4=SVF II 988; Inwood 78f. 

108 Galen Pl-IP 4.268.7-13=EK 164.34-41; 5.294.38-296.1=EK 163.8-12. Kidd 
(supra n.18: 109) suggests that in Posidonius' his own system he replaces causes 
great and small with his conception of euemptosia. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

ECHEPO<; /lE1~OV U1tOAa/l~UVCOv 'to 1tP007tE1t'tCOKO<; ou KtV Ehat 
Kat 0 au'to<; E1tt 't01<; au't01<; e)'tE /lEV tv 1tU8ECH yiVE'tat, Eonv 
(he b£ OU, KUt o't£ /l£V /lO:AAOV, ()'tE b£ ~'t'tov.l09 

291 

Posidonius' third argument considers two hypothetical monistic 
alternatives to this own doctrine-phantasia and astheneia. It is 
now clear that 'to jlEYE80s 'twv <patVOjlEVWV ayu8wv il KUKWV 

refers not only to "things seeming to be good or evil" but also to 
the technical concept of phantasia. From the context, moreover, 
Posidonius clearly does not conceive phantasia in the Chrysip­
pean sense as inseparable from its interpretative lekton added by 
logos (supra n.32). The following passages illustrate the link 
between the two in Zeno's and Chrysippus' doctrines. 

"En 'trov qJav'taotrov at /lEV flol AOYlKai, at b£ uAoyov AO)'l­
Kat /l£v (Xl 'tWV AOYlKrov ~c{>cov, uAoYOt b£ at 'tWV 
aAoycov . 11 0 

primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos 
esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione ob/ata extrinsecus 
(quam ille qJav'taoiav ... )-sed ad haec quae visa sunt et 
quasi accepta sensibus adsensionem adiungit animorum 
quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. 111 

qJaot b£ ['to] AeK'tOv dvat 'to Ka'tu qJav'taolav AOYlK1,V 
UqJt01U/lEVQV. 112 

109 Galen PHP 4.268.14-19=EK 164.42-48: "Assume that two people have 
the same weakness and that they perceive the same presentation of good and 
evil: one falls into passion, the other docs not, and one is moved more, the 
other less; and sometimes the weaker man who supposes that what has 
befallen him is greater is not moved, and the same person sometimes falls into 
passion over these same presentations and sometimes he docs not, and some­
times more, sometimes less." 

110 D.L. 7.51: "Some phantasiai arc rational, and others non-rational. Those 
of rational beings are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non­
rational. " 

111 Cic. Acad. 1.40=SVF II 187: "[Zeno] first made new statements about 
sense-perceptions themselves, which he considered to be compounds of a cer­
tain blow, as it were, struck from without (which he called a phantasia) ... but 
to these things which are presented and, as it were, received by the senses, he 
adds an assent of the soul, which he would claim is placed within us and is 
voluntary. " 

112 D.L. 7.63: "They [the Stoics] say that a lekton is that which subsists 
within a rational phanlasia." Cf SeXL Emp. Math. 8.70=SVF II 187. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

292 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

1tP0T1"f£L 1: at yup l-j <pav1:aaia, £18' l-j OUXVOla h:AaAll'rlKll U1t­
apxouaa, 0 1taaxn uno 1:11S <pav1:aaias, 1:0U1:O fK<pEpn AOY'll.ll3 

It would be a mistake to take the last passage as evidence that 
phastasiai can be separated from their subsisting lekta, as the first 
passage demonstrates that all presentations of rational beings are 
"rational" (logikai). Posidonius removes entirely the rational or 
propositional componen t from the presentation. 114 His argu­
ment throughout addresses "things as they appear," using the 
participle cpmvoilEvCDV, and when he finally substitutes the noun 
cpcxv'tcxalcx, there seems little or no difference between "things as 
they appear" and "presentations." In his usage, phantasia does 
not denote a "rational product" of the percipient; otherwise Posi­
donius would have to consider the content of the lekton, 
produced by the agent's logos, as a cause of passion. His dis­
cussion of astheneia passes over this problem quickly without 
considering the propositional component of phantasiai as a 
cause. His conception of the term, more Aristotelian than 
Chrysippean, may be uniquely his own.IIS Posidonius clearly 
dissociates phantasia from lekton in the following: 

Oiilat yup 01:l naAal pAEnnE nws 6lU AOYOU fl£V nna8EV1:£S 
KaKOV i:amoLS napELvat il fTl:l<pEpm8at 01)1:£ <poPOUV1:at 01)1:E 
AUnOUV1:at <pavmaias 6£ fKEivwv alnwv Aaflpavovn:s. nws 
yap uv HS AOY'll KlVTJa£l£ 1:0 UAOYOV, fav flTJ nva ava~w­
ypa<pllO"lV npOapaAll1:at aia8111:1l napanAllaiav; OU1:WS youv fK 
6l11YTJa£cOS HVES cis fTl:l8ufliav fKntnWUal Kat fvapyws 
fYKEA£uaaflEVOu <P£UYElV 1:0V fTl:l<P£POflEVOV AEOV1:a OUK 
{MV1:£(; <po~oUvml.l16 

113 D.L. 7.49=SVF II 52: "For phanlasia comes first; then thought which has 
the power of expressing itself, renders in rational language that which it 
receives from the phantasia." 

114 In the current debate over the status of phanlasia and lekton (supra n.32), 
it is often asserted that a phantasia is more than its propositional content, and 
that it should in no way be thought as identical to its subsisting lekton. 
Without disputing these points and with allowance for the distinguishability 
of the two, I wish to maintain only their necessary concurrence in rational 
animals accord ing to D. L. 7.51. 

115 See Arist. De An. 3.3; Inwood 11-17. Kidd's remarks seem to confirm the 
difference between Posidonius' definition and that of Chrysippus: EK II 590; 
cf (supra n.18) 112. 

116 Galen Pl1P 5.330.25-31=EK 162.4-11: "For I am sure that you have long 
observed how those who have been rationally persuaded that they are in the 
presence of evil or that it is approaching suffer neither fear nor grief, but [they 
do suffer these passions] when they receive phantasiai of these same things. 
For how would one move the irrational by means of rcason, unless one places 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 293 

Here Posidonius uses his own psychology of a tripartite soul 
with certain aspects of bipartition (supra n.29). In this model 
phantasiai do not partake of logos; on the contrary, they are asso­
ciated with the irrational faculties: they contrast with "persua­
sion by reason" (oux AOYOU IlEV n£l(J8£v'n:~); and only they can 
stimulate the irrational (to aAoyov). 

Against Chrysippus' hypothetical 0 bj ection, Posidonius 
attempts through his own conception of phastasia to pre-empt 
any demonstration that passion as a nA£Ova~ou(Ja oPllll could 
be caused by a 'rational' soul, and maintains the dictum that "rea­
son would not be able to exceed its own acts and measures" (0 
IlEv yap AOYO~ OUK av ovvat'ro Y£ nA£Ova~£lv napa 'ta £au'tOu 
npaYllata t£ Kat I1Itpa: supra n.9). His premise that something 
external to reason causes the soul to move to excess attacks the 
central truth of Chrysippean monism, that the soul of a man 
moves itself by assent to rational presentations (Origen De 
prine. 3.1.3=SVF II 988 part). If an imperfect logos produces the 
lekta assigned to these presentations, they will necessarily be 
imperfect and may conflict with one another (supra 243 with 
n.31). The soul may then produce an impulse excessive by the 
standard of Right Reason (supra n.10). 

The scope of what Posidonius imputes to Chrysippus is stri­
king. The grammatical structure of the objection attributed to 
Chrysippus occurs in a condition unlikely of fulfillment. With 
this minimal cover he entertains hypotheses that no Stoic could 
accept and creates a sophistic muddle of appearance and reality 
by forming his entire response around the" magnitude of things 
which appear as good or evil." Under this rubric he compares 
real with apparent goods and rational with irrational agents, puts 
indifferents like money and the Stoic good of virtue side by side, 
and places the reactions of fools beside those of wise men. The 
translation of 'twv q>atVOIl£VWV aya8wv il KaKWV should properly 
refer to the concept of phantasia, but it also conveys its cus­
tomary significance of "apparent goods and evils." Posidonius 

a representational image, as it were, before the percipient? So it is that some 
men fall into desire from a narrative and others become afraid, without their 
having seen, when someone has told them vividly to flee a charging lion." At 
PH P 5.320, 18f (=E K 169.72f) Posidonius asks " why pleasure projects the per­
suasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil" (OU1llV TjOOVT] fl£v 
oo~ ayu8{lV, aAYTiOooV Of 00:; l(Ul«lV 1t18uvT]v 1tpO~aAAO\)O'l <j)(Xv'tualuv). As he 
associates pleasure and pain with the irrational faculties, they must clearly be 
the source of the phanlasia: cf n.154 infra. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

294 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

can convey both senses under the same participle because he 
divorces phantasiai from lekta. Without reason a presentation is 
no more than the way something 'appears' in the mind, the 
'appearance' an object gives of itself. Reality and truth are not 
considered. There are only appearances of external objects. 

Posidonius tries to ascertain what causes the belief that it is 
"appropriate and in accordance with the value" of the things 
present (xa8ilxov xat xa'ta. aSi.av ) to suffer passion (supra 254 
and n.l06). Through his own conception of phantdsiai he pro­
hibits consideration of Chrysippus' actual doctrines. Posidonius 
accepts the anonymous objection as signifying that "things as 
they appear" may have an amount-a magnitude-of good and 
evil in them: money is great, greater, or the greatest good. He 
attributes to Chrysippus (albeit in such a condition) the premise 
that both real and apparent goods and evils have "magnitude," 
i.e., that the value of indifferents and the value of the good can 
be compared. Without claiming this or saying that Chrysippus 
claimed it, he attacks this position as if Chrysippus would take it. 
The point at issue is not what Posidonius holds as dogma, nor 
what Chrysippus holds (for the argument is hypothetical), but 
how Posidonius procedes dialectically against a member of his 
own school. We shall see below that Carneades is the ultimate 
source of Posidonius' objection and response, but he also influ­
ences Posidonius' other two arguments against Chrysippus. 

Posidonius subsequently attacks the doxa prosphatos as the 
vital element of Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions. After 
attempting to show that an opinion (doxa) gone to excess must 
itself have another cause, he turns to the word prosphatos. 

dvm flEv o'h ,0 npoaqm,ov <pTjal ,0 unoyuov Kcno. ,OV XPovov, 
a~wL O£ ,'hv CXi,lCXV cxlHip PTj811vm, 8lo. llv ~ ,au KCXKOU 86~cx 
np6a<pCX1:0S flEV o-0acx aU01:EAA£t ,E ,'hv \jIux'hv KCXt AunTjV Epya­
~£1:m, XPOVl08ELaCX O£ ~ OUOE oAros ~ OUK £8' 0flOlroS O"UO"­
,rAAfl. KCXl,Ol ou8£ ,0 np6a<pCX1:ov £XPllv £YK£La8m Ka,o. -COY 
opov, £'tnEp aATj811 ,0. Xpuatnnou. Ka,a yap ''hv YVWflTjV au­
,au flaAAov ~v flEyaAou KaKOU ~ avunoflov~,ou ~ aKap­
,£p~,ou, Ka8anEp au-cos £lro8Ev 6vofla~flv, ,'hv AUnTjV 
dplla8at 8o~av. ou npoa<pa,Qu.117 

117 Galen PHP 4.280.26-33=EK 165.9-17: "Now he [Posidonius] says that 
what is 'fresh' is 'recent in time' and he thinks he deserves to be told the rea­
son why the belief of the evil being fresh contracts the soul and causes grief, 
but when it grows older it does not contract it entirely or no longer in the 
same way. And yet 'fresh' ought not to be in the definition if what Chrysippus 
said were true. For it would be more in accordance with his view to call grief 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 295 

Galen does not indicate in what context Posidoni us defined pros­
phatos as "recent in time." Whether he defined the word in that 
way himself or imputed the definition to Zeno or Chrysippus is 
of no importance to his own position, as he rejects the entire 
doctrine of the doxa prosphatos and the monistic psychology to 
which it pertains. As for his allegation that Chrysippus usually 
called the evil "great," "unendurable," or "intolerable," Cicero 
suggests (Tusc. 3.61) that Chrysippus might have used this turn 
of phrase: opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urguentis 
mali, where urguentis might be suitable Latin for O:VU7tOIlOVTnOU 
and O:Kap1:£pl)'wu (cf EK II 600). It is more interesting that in 
the last sentence Posidonius transfers the adjective prosphatos 
from the opinion to the thing about which the opinion is 
formed, a "fresh evil" (ou 7tPOmpa:wu [Sc. KaKOU]). 

Once again, Posidonius does not say that this was Chrysippus' 
view; rather the force of the contrary to fact condition (Smyth 
12313) seems to carryover from the preceding sentence. Posido­
nius again criticizes what Chrysippus "might have said" to make 
his premises appear contradictory, whereas in reality his doc­
trines contradict themselves only in Posidonius' paraphrases. 
Like Posidonius' interchangeable use of "things presented" and 
"presentations," here "fresh" applies to both things and 
opinions. Posidonius most eagerly shifts the line between inter­
nal psychic and external material events in a constant effort to 
prove that the excess in passion cannot arise through rational 
processes (Chrysippus' actual position). There are only two 
other probable extra-rational causes: internal irrational processes 
(Posidonius' actual position) or an external material event. Posi­
doni us does not consider Chrysippus' actual position; rather he 
presents Chrysippus' views as if he meant that passion has an 
extra-rational cause, then demonstrates that this hypothetical 
position is self-contradictory. It is never clear whether Posido­
nius accuses Chrysippus of considering external material events 
as the cause, but he need not accuse Chrysippus of anything 
more specific than considering some extra-rational cause. 

Finally, if Zeno (as suggested earlier) had the concept of phan­
tasia in mind when he used the phrase opinato malo (Cic. Tuse. 
3.61; cf supra n.4D), Posidonius had a precedent for his move. 
Zeno's followers interpreted his definition of prosphatos to 

an opinion of a great or unendurable or intolerable evil as he usually named it, 
not of a 'fresh' one." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

296 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

mean that the passion will remain" so long as a certain force in­
heres in the supposed evil" (quam diu in illo opinato malo vis 
quaedam insit). In this passage Zeno blurs the line both between 
the opinion and the thing and between the presentation and the 
thing, just as Posidonius tries to do. Nothing suggests that Zeno 
understood phantasiai as separable from lekta, i. e., as separable 
from the rational activity of the soul. But Posidonius, who did 
make such a separation, might rely on such passages to justify 
his argument that Chrysippus spoke of extra-rational causes like 
"presented things" and "fresh evils." 

Posidonius does not mention the subtle implications of Chrys­
ippus' prosphatos. Rather, using his own definition of the word, 
he suggests that a familiar philosophical issue is at stake-the 
problem of "fresh" or "unfamiliar" events that surprise an agent 
(ef [Mag. Mor.] 1203b4f: ~ npoO'q>awS q>aV1:aO'la). Posidonius 
addresses the issue as follows: 

Ku'ta Of 'tOY npwwv EPW't~ 't~v ui'ttuv, ota ~v OUK " 'tllS 'tou 
KUKOU nupoucrtUS 06su 't~v AUnTjV, aAAa " npocrq>u'tOS Epya­
~f'tUt j.lOVTj· Kat q>Tjcrt· oton nav 'to aj.lfAe'tTj'tOV Kat Sf-VOV 
aSpows npocrntn'tov EKnAT]'t't£t 'tf KUt 'tWV nUAatWV E~lcr'tTjcrt 
KptcrfWV, acrKTjSEV OE KUt cruv£SWSEV Kat XPOVtcrav il OUOE 
OAWS EStcr'tTjcrtv, WS Ka'ta naSos KtV£tV, il Ent j.ltKPOV KOj.lt011. 
OtO Kat npo£VOTjj.l£lV q>Tjcrt 'tOtS npaYj.lacrt j.lT]nw 't£ napoucrtv 
olov napoucr t XPllcrSu t. 118 

Just as Posidonius coherently attacked the Chrysippean doc­
trine of the passions, Carneades also interpreted the Stoic doxa 
prosphatos as "an opinion formed about a recent event" and for­
mulated defenses against an "unforeseen and strange" event 
(all£A£'tTl'tov Kat ~EVOV). In brief, he had already devised a co­
herent series of arguments against the Stoa along the same lines 
as those later employed by Posidonius. 

118 Galen PHP 4.282.5-11=EK 165.22-29: "First he asks the reason why not 
the belief of the presence of evil but only the fresh belief causes grief; and he 
asks, 'why everything which is unforeseen and strange falling upon us in a 
rush strikes us senseless and unseats us from from our former judgments and 
why things which are rehearsed and familiar and prolonged either do not un­
seat us entirely and cause passionate motion or do so to a very limited ex­
tent'. For this reason he says that we ought to make ourselves at home with 
future events and to treat things which are not yet present as though they 
were." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

V. Carneades on the Good, the Passions, 
and the Criterion 

297 

We are unaccustomed to consider the passions as a subject on 
which Carneades attacked the Stoa. But a collection of his argu­
ments on goods and evils and on the criterion (which treats 
phantasia) shows how the sum provides an argument against the 
passions. To see how Carneades' arguments underlie the dis­
cussion of the "magnitude of things that appear as goods and 
evils," two implications of Posidonius' hypothetical argument 
must be considered: (1) that apparent goods such as money may 
be compared to the real good, virtue; and (2) that the magnitude 
of presentations or 'appearances' may cause passion. For the 
first problem we must return to Carneades' attacks on the Stoic 
doctrine concerning good and evil (supra n.99). 

Carneades never ceased to argue that the Stoic-Peripatetic de­
bate over the definition of good(s) and evil(s) was a difference of 
words not facts: non rerum controversia sed nominum (Cic. 
Fin. 3.41); he acted as an arbiter, as if the dispute were only 
between Peripatetics and Stoics (Tusc. 5.120). The real dispute, 
however, involved Carneades and the Stoa, as Carneades used 
the Peripatetic conception of goods to reveal weaknesses in the 
Stoic doctrine. When Cicero's character Cato reports Carne­
ades' vehemence in the matter (Fin. 3.41), he says that the prin­
cipal point was whether everything that has value contributes to 
happiness. Carneades seems to have argued that as the wise man 
prefers wealth, we should say that he will be happier with it than 
without it. The value of wealth ought to be assessed by its con­
tribution to the end of happiness, however little it may con­
tribute. On this reading the Stoics and Peripatetics would agree 
that wealth has value. Carneades wants to dismiss the Stoic claim 
that value and happiness are not necessarily related. The argu­
ment that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines on the good are essen­
tially the same is closely allied to Carneades' argument against 
the sclection-formulae of Diogenes and Antipater, in which he 
held that the value of the indifferents must be measured by their 
contribution to the telos ( supra n.69). 

Carneades' argument, however, has further ramifications: as 
Cato says, if wisdom and health are" to be chosen" (expeten­
dum), both must be more "to be chosen" than wisdom alone 
(Fin. 3.44=SVF III 60). This conclusion is the foundation for the 
Peripatetic formula for the telos, which is to have virtue and the 
primary things of nature (Fin. 5.21). If Carneades maintains a 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

298 POSIDONli\N POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Peripatetic conception of the good against the Stoa, he might 
very easily use the Peripatetic telos. The only evidence that he 
did so lies in his vigorous defense of Callipho on the telos (supra 
n.98) and his habitual attacks on the Stoic doctrine that virtue is 
sufficient for happiness (Tuse. 5.83). 

Despite uncertainties about Carneades' precise language and 
thought (supra 237), his arguments against the Stoa have some 
consistency,119 which may derive not from his own dogmatic 
agenda but, on the contrary, from the consistency and interde­
pendence of Stoic doctrine across various ethical topics. Carne­
ades' argument against the selection-formulae concentrate on 
the Stoa's attempts to judge the value of the indifferents indepen­
dently of the end of happiness (supra n.70). His argument against 
the Stoic conception of virtue as a stochastic craft attacks the 
Stoa's dissociation of the purpose of prudent activity from the 
achievement of the external result of the activity (Fin. 3.24=SVF 
III 11). Finally, in his argument against the Stoic conception of 
the good, he blurs the Stoa's distinction between the value of 
indifferents and the value of virtue (Cic. Fin. 3.41-44). These 
three arguments concern different aspects of the Stoa's unitary 
project of placing happiness with the wise man's reach. 

If the wise man will always be happy, he must adopt a a pose 
of indifference towards things that are not in his power and 
direct his purposeful activity to what will unerringly produce his 
happiness. The only activity that could produce hapriness with­
out fail does not depend on anything outside himsel for its suc­
cess. To the extent that activity produces happiness, it must be 
related only to the wise man's role in that activity, i. e., the 
rational expenditure of effort towards the results outside this 
control. The results of his activity are not absolutely indifferent 
to him: indifferent for his happiness but not indifferent for their 
accordance with nature. Things that contribute to happiness, i.e., 
a life of virtue and purposeful rational activity, have an absolute 
value. But things, which do not contribute to virtuous activity 

119 It is very difficult to trace the history of Carneades' argument because 
Cicero, the primary source, draws on multiple sources (Glucker 52 n.135): Car­
neades' defense of Callipho's telos comes from Clitomachus (54 n.143); evi­
dence of the Carneadean dlvisio from Antiochus (Fin. 5.16ff) and another 
source (Tusc. 5.83ff; Glucker 55 n.150); and the argument that the difference 
between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics is non rerum sed verborum discordia is 
attributed to Carneades through both Antiochus (Leg. 1.38, 53ff) and another 
source (Fin. 3.41, Tusc. 5.120). Glucker concludes (394f) that both Carneades 
and Antiochus may have advanced these divergent arguments in different 
subjects of debate. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 299 

but are merely in accordance with nature, have a relative value. 
As the wise man's happiness derives from his rational activity, 
things with absolute value must affect him differently from 
those with relative value. When he is presented with things per­
taining to virtue, he must be affected in a way that is morally 
significant, in that things with absolute value affect the possibility 
of his happiness, whereas things of relative value must not affect 
him in this way because they do not affect his happiness. 12o 

Cato summarizes the significance of Carneades' argument 
(Fin. 3.44=SVF III 60): if Stoic and Peripatetic conceptions of the 
good were substantially the same, wisdom and health together 
would be more "to be chosen" than wisdom alone. The Stoics 
cannot accept this conclusion because it suggests that wisdom 
and health are comparable and should affect man in the same 
way when he is presented with them. Likewise Antipater says 
that acquiring the indifferents is "something to be selected" but 
not "something to be chosen" (supra n.85). The Stoics make this 
distinction between the value of virtue and that of the indif­
ferents in several ways. The good, which cannot be added to, 
increased, or compared with other things, has its own proper 
quality (Fin. 3.34=SVF III 72): the good is compared to the 
sweetness of honey, which is uniquely sweet; the good differs 
by kind, not by amount, from other things of value; things with 
value in the latter sense can be increased in value, but virtue 
cannot. Some examples allude to a comparative evaluation of the 
two kinds of value (Fin. 3.45=SVF III 60): sunlight obscures and 
inundates lamplight; a drop of honey is lost in the magnitudine 
of the Aegean Sea; Croesus' riches obscure the addition of a 
penny. These comparisons blur the general distinction in favor 
of a direct comparison of magnitude. But at the end of his 
similes Cato reiterates that opportunitas (d)KUlplU) is the 
standard by which virtue must be judged. His view may be 
paraphrased: if a shoe is evaluated by how well it fits the foot, 
many shoes would not be perferred to few, nor bigger to 
smaller ones. So virtuous action is not measured by number or 
greatness but how the action fits with nature (Fin. 3.46=SVF III 
524). 

A rational agent's deliberation, however, assesses something's 
value. Although it may appear from Cato's examples that mis­
takes about the difference between virtue and the indifferents 
could never occur, it is not difficult to imagine the circumstance 

120 Inwood 114f, 121,205-15,224-37. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

300 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

of an improper evaluation. Inwood (166) uses this exemplum 
(based on Sen. Tranq. 13.2): a moral progresssor runs for public 
office because he knows that public service, an appropriate activ­
ity, gives him an opportunity to practice the virtue that he has 
learned. He is defeated at the polls. If he regards his defeat as an 
indifferent, it will not affect his happiness; but if he regards the 
purpose of his action to be fulfilled only if he is elected, he will 
have failed and will be unhappy (Inwood 166; Sen. Tranq. 13.2). 
These two reactions show the difference between a sage's right 
actions and a non-sage's appropriate actions (KU't0pSWJlu'tu and 
KUS"KOV'tU). The agent's disposition must evaluate events prop­
erly and in accordance with the distinction between the good 
and the indifferent in a thing. The good in his action consists in 
the virtuous disposition with which he conducts it, whereas the 
result, over which he has no control, is an indifferent. The prob­
lems inherent in 'evaluating' events connect the doctrine of the 
good to the problem of passion. When the moral progressor 
decides that his happiness depends on winning, he has in effect 
decided that an indifferent is a good. When he fails to obtain his 
desire (a false belief that something good approaches), he may 
decide that it is appropriate to feel pain (the false belief that 
something evil has happened or is present): these are passions. 

For the Stoics the moral progressor errs in assigning not too 
much value to victory but the wrong kind of value. An indif­
ferent has value if it accords with nature and disvalue if it does 
not (supra 251). An indifferent may even have a "magnitude" of 
value (e.g. prolonged health has more value than its brief enjoy­
ment: Cic. Fin. 3.47). But virtue has what Cicero's Cato calls 
opportunitas (Fin. 3.46=SVF III 524), a unique, perfect, and time­
less quality that cannot be increased by the addition of anything. 
When Carneades argues that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines of 
the good agree in substance if not terminology, he demands not 
only (1) that virtue is not sufficient for happiness; (2) that the 
indifferents, although not sufficient for happiness, are neverthe­
less necessary; but also (3) that virtue and the indifferents must 
have a value that can be compared; and therefore (4) that virtue 
thas a value that can be measured, in short, a magnitude. 

Three bits of evidence suggest that Carneades applied his argu­
ments on the evaluation of goods to an attack against the Stoic 
doctrine of the passions. Two of the three come from Clitom­
achus and Antiochus through Cicero's Tusculans, and the third 
derives from Plutarch's De tranquilitate animi. These argu­
ments, in turn, involve Carneades' arguments on the criterion, 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 301 

preserved by Sextus. The argument begins at Tuse. 3, where 
Cicero tries to discover the cause of passion and surveys the 
views of Cyrenaics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics. 

Despite considerable controversy on the organization of the 
book, it is clear from 3.28-51 that Cicero is summarizing the 
position of the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans. 121 He argues that 
the Epicureans wrongly criticize the Cyrenaic position that 
unexpected evils cause passion, and that passion can be avoided 
by bearing in mind that evil may befall man at any time. The 
Cyrenaics employ three well-worn exempla: (1) T eiemon, from 
Eur. Andr. ; (2) Theseus (from a lost play), preparing himself for 
whatever sufferings and calamities might befall him in life; and 
(3) Anaxagoras, who, on learning of the death of his son, replied, 
"1 knew that 1 had begotten a mortal» (sciebam me genuisse 
mortalem: Tuse. 3.29). All are designed to show that if life's 
misfortunes do not come unanticipated, they will not cause 
passion. The structure thereafter seems as follows: Cicero, 
having dismissed the Epicureans, turns to a comparison of Stoic 
and Cyrenaic views at 3.52-61 and shows the limitations of the 
Cyrenaic view before launching a comparison of the Stoics and 
Peripatetics (Giusta II 320ff). A final reference to the Cyrenaics 
comes at 3.59. Two quotations from Carneades, embedded in 
this discussion, occur at 3.54, 60 in two very different contexts. 

The reference at 3.54 comes from Clitomachus' book on a 
Stoic topos, whether the wise man will feel grief at the loss of his 
fatherland. The wise man's endurance even of this misfortune 
was a dogma, which Cicero (Acad. 2.135) calls dura sed Zenoni 
necessarium. Ioppolo argues that Carneades actually defends the 
proposition but undogmatically and on the basis of epistemo­
logical arguments. l22 Cicero offers some indication of how 
Carneades argued: Sensim enim et pedetemptim progrediens 
extenuatur dolor, non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit, 
sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, quae sint 

121 See Hirzel (supra n.17) III 414-55; von Arnim, S V F I xix-xxvi; M. 
Pohlenz, "Das dritte und vierte Buch der Tusculanen," Hermes 41 (1906) 
321-55; Glucker 391-96; Giusta II 318-21. I follow A. M. loppow's recon­
struction of the evidence closely: "Carneade e il terzo libra delle Tusculanae, " 
E lenchos 1 (1980: hereafter' loppolo') 76-91. See Plut. M or. 101 F-22A (Cons. ad 
Apoll.) for a portrait of how the Academics might respond to the Tusculans. 

122 Glucker 393f; loppolo 80f, 88, 91, who also suggests (82f with n.22) that 
the passage from Plutarch comes from the same treatise of Clitomachus as 
Tuse. 3.54. Her argument rests on the exempla of King Perseus and the fall of 
Macedon in both texts ( Tuse. 3.53; Pluto Mar. 474F-75A). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

302 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

visa maiora. 123 The wise man presumably avails himself of ratio, 
the fool of usus, with the result that the fool falls into passion. 
Two factors in this explanation derive from Carneades' argu­
ment on the cri terion: (1) to arrive at the proper evaluation of 
something sufficient time is needed; and (2) when the object to 
be evaluated is great, an instant evaluation may be incorrect. 124 It 
is useful to consider Carneades' arguments in more detail before 
returning to the Tusculans and the problem of passions. 

Debate on the criterion developed, broadly, as follows. Zeno 
proposed that presentations may be divided into three cate­
gories according to their reliability: knowledge, a presentation 
that can be "grasped" firmly like a clenched fist covered over 
by the hand; ignorance (the source of opinion), one that cannot 
be so grasped or comprehended (Cic. Acad. 2.145 [=SVF 166], 
1.41£ [=1 60J); and KC('taAllrrnKil q>cxvTCXatCX, one between know­
ledge and ignorance, the merely graspable presentation. The kata­
leptic presentation, clear and distinct, cannot be false, as it arises 
from what is and is stamped exactly in accordance with what 
is.125 The Stoic concept of the kataleptic presentation asserts the 
existence of "cogni tion" (katalepsis), assent to a cogni tive impres­
sion. Nature provides this criterion as a measuring stick of how 
things really are. From these cognitions man develops concep­
tions of things and from these are revealed not only the 
"beginnings" but the "roads" to the discovery of reason (Acad. 
1.42=SVF I 60). 

Arcesilaus argued against the Stoics, particularly Zeno (Sext. 
Emp. Math. 7.150-58), that (1) whatever the wise man appre­
hends will be knowledge and whatever the fool apprehends will 
be ignorance; nothing lies between the two; (2) assent is made 

123 T usc. .3.54: "For step by step grief diminishes as it progresses, not because 
the event itself usually is changed or could be changed, but rather because that 
which reason ought to have taught, experience then teaches, namely that 
things which had seemed very great are really very small." Cicero further 
states that if the book of Carneades' lectures collected by Clitomachus had 
been sent to the captive Corinthians some years after the fall of Corinth, the 
book would be healing only scars. Cicero's statement on the healing effect of 
time probably derives from this same book, so the argument belongs to 

Carneades: 10ppolo 79f. 

124 Ioppolo 79ff, who claims that Tuse. .3.52, a description of the reason 
unexpected events cause passions (primttm quod, quanta sint qttae accidunt et 
qualia, cum repenle accidunl, considerandi spatium non dalttr; deinde, cum 
videtur praecaueri po/uisse, si provisum e sset, quasi cttlpa contractum malum 
aegritttdinem acriorem facit) may be attributcd to Carncadcs. 

125 Cic. Acad. 2.17,77; D.L. 7.46; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.248; on the phantasia 
kataleptike sec Sandbach (supra n.32) 9-2 J. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 303 

not to a presentation but to the proposition that accompanies 
the presentation (supra n.32); and (3) there is no presentation of 
such a kind that it could not be false. These arguments show that 
the kataleptike phantasia does not exist and therefore that the 
wise man cannot give assent. He must suspend his judgment 
and this suspension (£rroXl)) is the logical stance (but not a 
dogmatic te/os) for the wise man (Math. 7.156ff). The Stoics 
responded that such a man would be completely inactive and 
therefore unwise. 126 To the charge of inactivity (apraxia), 
Arcesilaus replied by adopting the standard of the reasonable ('to 
EUAO"(OV), by which the wise man could withold dogmatic assent 
yet allow himself to be moved to impulse by the appearance of 
things as it seems reasonable to him. 

Carneades argued (1) that there is no criterion because reason, 
apprehension, and presentations can deceive (Math. 7.159) and 
(2) that if the criterion does exist, it cannot be separated from 
sensation that is "irrational": /lll8qna<; 8E oucrll<; cpav'tacria<; Kpt'tt­
KTt<; ou8E AO"(O<; (Xv ElT\ KPl'tl)ptov· arro cpav'tacria<; "(ap o-{)'to<;; ava­
,,(E'tat. Kat dxo'tw<;;' rrponov /lEV "(ap 86 cpavTtvat au't0 'to KptVO­
Jl£VOV, cpavTtvm 8£ ou8Ev 8uva'tat xwPt<; 'tTt<; aAO"(ou aicrS"crEw<;. 
OU'tE oily il aAo,,(oc;; cxtcrSllcrtC;; OU'tE 6 AO"(OC;; ~v KPt'tl)pWV.127 Car­
neades also defended the proposition that a wise man, though 
lacking a criterion, might assent undogmatically to presentations 
and therefore" opine" (Cic. Acad. 2.67, 78).128 

Sextus claims (Math. 7.166) that Carneades was compelled to 
propose his own criterion by the same argument from inactiv­
ity. Carneades' redefinition of the Arcesilean EUAO"(OV provides 
three criteria for the conduct of life that may be employed as cir­
cumstances demand. Carneades distinguishes truth from false­
hood, on the one hand, in relation to what creates the impres-

126 Pluto Mar. 1035A=SVF III 177. Long and Sedley (I 455-60; cf supra n.26) 
show that the Epicureans made the argument of inactivity (Mar. 1122 A-F) but 
that Arcesilaus' response adapts Stoic terminology; see also Vander Waerdt, 
"Colotes" 244-47, 260f, who argues that Colotes took over the apraxia 
argument from the Stoics. 

127 Math. 7.165: "And if there is no presentation capable of serving as a criter­
ion, neither would reason be a criterion; for it is derived from presentation. 
And obviously so; for that which is judged must first be presented, and noth­
ing can be presented apart from our irrational sensation. Therefore neither 
irrational sensation nor reason would be a criterion." 

128 Although Arcesilaus seems to have argued that because the wise man 
never opines he must not assent-the reverse of Carneades' argument-both 
men only try to refute Stoic premises. As Long and Sedley show (I 456), it is 
only a difference of dialectical strategy; cf Cic. A cad. 2.77f, 1.41 f with 2.67. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

304 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

sion, the external object (1tpo<; 'to q>uV'tucr'tov), and, on the other, 
in relation to the percipient of the impression (1tp0<; 'to q>aV'ta­
crLOU/l£VOV: Math. 7.168). These correspond to the difference 
between the object as it really is and the object as it appears. A 
presentation 1tpo<; 'to q>av'tacr'tov is either true or false in so far as 
it "is or is not in harmony with" the external object (cru/lq>wvo<; 
or 8uxq>wvo<;: Math. 7.168); but as judgment requires the medium 
of irrational perception, a presentation 1tpo<; 'to q>av'tacr'tov can­
not be the criterion. A presentation 1tpo<; 'to q>av'tacrLOu/l£VOV, 
on the other hand, is "apparently true or not" (q>atVO/lEVT) uAT)-
811<;, ou q>atVO/lEVT) aAT)8~<;: Math. 7.169). What is apparently 
true may be either intensely or dimly apparent, and the dimly 
apparent cannot be a criterion (Math. 7.171ff). Some things that 
seem intensely true may turn out to be true, others false, and 
some both true and false (Math. 7.174f). Therefore even this 
criterion can only be called generally reliable. This "probable" 
(1tl8avov) criterion leaves open the matter of truth and false­
hood (Long and Sedley I 458). When time allows, the probable 
may be confirmed more securely by examining the particular 
qualities of the object as it appears. If none of them appears to 
conflict with the appearance that the presentation is true, the 
presentation can be called both probable and un diverted (1tl-
8av~ Kat U1t£ptcr1tacr'to<;:Math. 7.176-81). The third criterion is 
probable, undiverted, and tested (1tl8av~ Kat u1t£picr1tacr'to<; Kat 
8l£~w8£u/lEVT)): a presentation is tested like a judge's examination 
of testimony. The judge must be competent, just as the senses 
must not be impaired. What is judged must be of a magnitude 
that can be judged and, finally, the medium through which the 
judgment is made must not hinder the decision. There must be 
no cause for suspicion or doubt created by darkness, excessive 
distance, too little time for evalulation, etc. (Math. 7.182f). Carne­
ades concludes that in trivial matters the probable presentation is 
a sufficient criterion; in greater matters the undiverted; and in 
"matters pertaining to happiness" (Wl<; 1tpo<; Eu8at/lovtav 
crUV'tclvoUcrl) the tested is required (Math. 7.184). When time 
does not permit the latter, the probable must be employed 
(Math. 7.185f). 

Plutarch shows the importance of this procedure for the avoid­
ance of passion when Carneades says that "in matters of great 
importance, unexpectedness is the whole and entire cause of 
grief and dej ection" (M 0 r. 474E-F: E1tt 1t paY)la'twv /lcyaAwv ... 
1taV Kat oAov fcr'ttV d<; AU1tT)v ayov Kat u8u/liav 'to u1tpocr8o­
KT)'tOV). This is nearly the Cyrenaic thesis, but Cicero hints that 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 305 

Carncadcs probably upheld this thesis against the Stoics for 
dialectical purposes in a specific dcbatc. 129 

129 My primary intention in this section, a demonstration that Posidonius 
used Carneades' arguments, requires reconstructing the context of Carneades' 
arguments on the passions. A possible reconstruction would be as follows. The 
two occurrences of Carneades' name at Tuse. 3.54, 60 come from different 
sources (Clitomachus and Antiochus) and report his attacks on Chrysippus in 
different debates: 3.54 on whether the wise man will suffer passion concerns 
the aitia of the passions; 3.60 on the utility of consolatio treats the cure of the 
passions (8EPU1tElU). But Cicero also discusses the Cyrenaics. Plut. Mar. 
474 E-F, where Carneades defends the Cyrenaic thesis on the cause of the 
passions, explains Carneades' role in this discussion. Epicurean evidence (Tuse. 
3.28-51) accounts for Carneades at 3.60 on the U cure." In the Epicurean view, 
if a man thinks that he is in the presence of evil, he must necessarily feel grief 
(to the extent that nature demands it: Ep. ad Men. 127; KD 29; Cic. Tuse. 3.28). 
This grief will not diminish in time, nor will it be lightened (after the fact) by 
the Cyrenaic motto" let nothing happen unexpected" (T usc. 3.32). If he dwells 
on this evil or considers that some misfortune may strike at any time, his evil 
will be perpetual. Only a "recall" to the contemplation of pleasures can cure 
his distress: Tuse. 3.32f; J. Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," GRBS 30 (1989) 
145-64; M. Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in 
Schofield and Striker (supra n.22) 31-74; see also Galen PH P 4.282.1-
284.17=E K 165.17-70 on the doxa prosphatos; ef supra n.118. 

After Posidonius asks why the fresh belief causes passion and why unex­
pected events cause it but familiar ones do not, he advocates the Cyrenaic 
position to "let nothing happen unexpected" by proposing that we U dwell in 
the future" (1tPOEV (ill ~£'i v). Then he quotes, after the Cyrenaics, the same 
passages from Anaxagoras and Eur. Andr. (T usc. 3.29f); a quotation follows in 
which Chrysippus ponders why the passions may cease in time although the 
opinion has not changed (supra n.43). This evidence may originally derive 
from a debate between the Epicureans and Cyrenaics on the cause of the 
passions, in which Chrysippus became involved cruse. 3.32; Giusta II 317; 
Fillion-Lahille 168), as we know that the Epicurean Colotes attacked the 
Cyrenaics for rejecting sense-impressions and living according to the pathe 
(Plut. Mar. 1I20c-F; ef. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.190-200)-a debate that also 
involved Stoic arguments to some degree (Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 230ff). 
Chrysippus, I presume, rejected outright the Epicurean position that passion is 
necessary: a Chrysippean di1Jisia shows (Cic. Fin. 2.44; supra n.98) his concern 
to refute the Epicurean teLos-a subject closely allied with the pathe. He would 
have accepted the Cyrenaic position as a correct observation from nature that 
unexpected events do affect us more (and he may even have conceded that the 
passages from Anaxagoras and Fur. Andr. are useful: ef "Fuse. 3.55, 58, 60; 
supra nn.l22f), but he would have disputed the causal link between the 
unexpected and passion (cf. supra n.43). We might deduce that Carneades 
upheld the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus on the cause of the passions, 
but reinforced it by his own arguments on the criterion about the necessary 
conditions (esp. time) for assent (Tuse. 3.54); he espoused the Epicurean thesis 
against Chrysippus' cure of the passions and strengthened it with an argument 
"on goods and evils" ((f "Fuse. 3.60: a connection between a "natural" evil and 
an "amount" of ev il). Posidonius then, aware that Carneades had effectively 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

306 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

How would these arguments on the criterion be applied to the 
Stoic topos of a wise man's reaction to the fall of his city (supra 
n.122)? Carneades proposes that a wise man might use a scien­
tific method to test his presentations. As I argue, Carneades' 
arguments describe a rational process, a ratio, which only a wise 
man could use because it is based on the presumption of undog­
matic assent. 138 The wise man might either withhold his assent 
entirely or assent only to the proposition that his presentation is 
probable, until he could test it. A fool, with only the hard 
teacher of experience to rely on, cannot use this method and can 
hardly be expected to utilize the various kinds of undogmatic 
assent. An average man may, on occasion, instinctively reason 
things out in a calm and scientific manner, but Carneades claims 
only two ways of dealing with disaster: ratio and usus. 

Carneades concludes that the problem is not whether the fall 
of the wise man's city is a great evil; rather, matters of impor­
tance demand time to evaluate the appearance. The 'magnitude' 
of the thing and its 'immediacy' artificially magnify its signifi­
cance: what reason ought to have taught, experience teaches, 
namely that things that seem very great are really very small 
(Cic. Tusc. 3.54: quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, 
quae sint visa maiora; cf supra n.l23). For Carneades to say (as 
in Plutarch) that unexpectedness causes grief in great matters, he 
must be arguing that unexpectedness distorts the magnitude of 
appearances and causes the percipient to evaluate their impor­
tance too highly. The wise man (but not the fool), aware that sud­
den phantasiai appear greater than they are, corrects for the 
effects of distortion. More importantly, however, the force of 
unexpectedness must reside in temporal proximity, or the 
passage of time would not remove it in the fool. 

Indeed, an objector (Cic. Tusc. 3.55) immediately asks "what 
need is there at all for reason or for that consolation we always 
use when we wish to alleviate the suffering of those in grief?" 
(quid ergo opus est, dicet aliquis, ratione aut omnino consola­
tione illa, qua solem us uti, cum levare dolorem maerentium volu­
mus?). The Cyrenaic dictum "let nothing happen unexpected" 

used the Cyrenaic position to refute the doctrine of doxa prosphatos, would 
have defended the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus with Cyrenaic passages 
of which Chysippus had approved. 

130 Even if Carneades suggests a ratio here, it need not commit him to any 
dogmatic stance. See Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 265f for an account of how 
the sceptic might procede. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 307 

cannot, the objector continues, relieve suffering after one has 
submitted to passion, for "this kind of talk subtracts nothing 
from the actual amount of the evil" (haec enim oratio de ipsa 
summa mali nihil detrahit). Although Cicero upholds the Stoic 
view that" unexpectedness" cannot be the entire cause of evil, 
this dictum reminds him that misfortune is natural and not some­
thing that ought to cause grief. Cicero distinguishes recens in the 
Stoic sense of prosphatos ("fresh") from repentina ("sudden") 
and argues that "things seem greater because they are fresh, not 
because they are sudden" (Tusc. 3.55: maiora videntur quia re­
centia sunt, non quia repentina). The Stoics define the freshness 
of an opinion by the ability of the opinion to cause an impulse of 
the soul (supra n.26). Freshness, measured psychologically 
r~ther than temporally, has no relationship to the passage of 
tIme. 

The objection corresponds completely to Carneades' other 
arguments: presentations (visa) have an amount-a perceived 
"magnitude" of good and evil; the point at issue, as Cicero's re­
sponse suggests, is whether the unexpectedness causes grief and 
reason is useless to remove it, i.e., temporal newness, and time 
will heal the wound. 131 The citation of Carneades at Tusc. 3.60 
confirms him as the anonymous objector at 3.55.132 Antiochus 
reports how Carneades constantly chastised Chrysippus' praise 
of a passage from Euripides' Hypsipyle (Tusc. 3.60=SVF III 487; 
Eur. fro 757 Dindorf), where man's lot in life is described in grim 
terms: death and pain come to all according to the law of neces­
sity. If Chrysippus liked the passage for its demonstration that 
misfortune is natural and therefore bearable for human beings, 
Carneades criticizes it because "to be victim to such a cruel ne­
cessity is itself something to be grieved" (id enim ipsum dolen­
dum esse dicebat quod in tam crudelem necessitatem incidisse­
mus). In his view these lines only add to the "amount" of grief 
with which the mourner must contend, as if to say "if things 
seem bad now, just wait; more misfortune is on the way." The 
subject at 3.60, as at 3.55, is whether the dictum "let nothing 

131 Cf Tuse. 3.54, a summary of Carneades' argument: tanta igitur calami­
tatis praesentis adhibetur a philosopho medicina, quanta in iWlJeterata ne 
desideratur quidem ("therefore so great a treatment for a present disaster 
applied by the philosopher would not even be desired in the case of one long 
past"). See Ioppolo 83 with n.23. 

132 Ioppo!o 86: "Mi sembra che ci sia una perfetta concordanza tra !'obbiezi­
one prospettata in forma anonima alia consolazione stoica a! par. 55 e quella 
attribuita esplicitamente a Carneade al par. 60." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

308 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

happen unexpected" will do any good after the fact, i.e., whether 
eonsolatio is beneficial. The anonymous objection, in all likeli­
hood, derives from Carneades' arguments against Chrysippus. 

These various arguments reveal much. Carneades argued not 
only against the Stoic doctrine of the passions and their cure but 
against Chrysippus in particular. He probably attacked the doxa 
prosphatos by defending the Cyrenaic thesis that the "unexpec­
tedness of an event" causes passion; he would also have argued 
both that the temporal proximity of the event increases artifi­
cially the magnitude of presentations, and that consolatio cannot 
alleviate passion unless the actual 'amount' of evil present can be 
diminished. 

Further, these arguments anticipate all the positions that Posi­
donius imputes to Chrysippus. In fact every description of 
Chrysippus' doctrines repeats an argument that Carneades 
made against him. The curious 'to ~Ey£8o<; 'trov . <palvo~Ev(j)V 
aya8wv fl l(al(wv, imputed to Chrysippus (supra n.l06), actually 
derives from Carneades' view on the magnitude of visa (supra 
n.123). Carneades' arguments on the criterion (Sext. Emp. Math. 
7.159-86) explain very clearly Posidonius' muddle of appearance 
and reality in discussing the "magnitude of things that appear 
good or evil." There is no criterion in relation to the thing as it 
exists in reality (rrpo<; 'to <pav'taO''t()v); the only means of judging 
how to react to an external evil is by its appearance to the 
subject (rrpo<; 'to <pav'taO'tou~£vov). As Carneades considers 
only appearances, Posidonius imputes the argument to Chrysip­
pus. Carneades' own claim that phantasiai cannot exist apart 
from irrational sense-perception (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.165, supra 
n.127) finds an echo in Posidonius' association of phantasiai with 
the irrational faculties (supra n.116). Posidonius' definition of 
"fresh" (Galen PHP 4.280.26-33=EK 165.9-17: 'to urroyuov l(a't<x 
'tOY xpovov) and his claim that unexpected and strange events 
cause passion (supra n.118) are all earlier arguments of Car­
neades (Cic. Tuse. 3.54f, 60). 

Despite the lack of evidence that Posidonius quoted Carnea­
des' arguments, it is sufficiently clear how and why Carneades 
used these arguments against Chrysippus (el supra n.129). All 
the very un-Stoic arguments attributed to Chrysippus appear to 
be consistent with Academic dialectical strategy in general and 
with arguments actually attributed to Carneades by Cicero. 
Even with due caution regarding Tuse. 3 as a source, the sym­
metry of argument inspires confidence in a relationship 
between Posidonius and Carneades. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 

VI. The Impact of Posidonius' Dialectical Strategy 
upon his Ethics 

309 

This analysis of Posidonius' strategy against Chrysippus raises 
important questions about his motives. His deliberate attribu­
tion to Stoic forbears of Academic positions is in one case diffi­
cult to dispute (supra nn.16, 20) and credible in many others 
(supra sections IV-V). Further, his support of certain Aristote­
lian positions on the passions used by Carneades against the Stoa 
(supra nn.11Sf; [Mag. Mor. ] 1203b4f) and his model of the soul 
(supra nn.29f) add to suspicions about his allegience to the Stoa 
and his reputation as an "Aristotelizer." 133 His motive for misrep­
resenting other Stoics' views merits an explanation. 

Posidonius' primary concern, as he suggests (supra n.16), is 
that Stoic formulations for the telos were vulnerable to apparent 
aporiai. Moreover, as doctrines on the telos, the pathe, and the 
good are "bound as if by a single cord" (supra n.1S), all Stoic 
ethics were dialectically vulnerable. I argue that Posidonius' 
doctrines on the good and the telos attempt to recast the most 
important Stoic positions in simpler language. All his formula­
tions appeal to common sense (tcX £vapyiD<; CPatvOll£va: supra 
nn.8, 100, 116). 

The Stoa's most potent didactic tool both before and after Posi­
donius was paradox. Indeed its best-known doctrines, "that 
only virtue is good" (on IlOVOV 'to KaAov aya8ov) and" that vir­
tue is sufficient for happiness" (on a1l1apKTl<; il ap£'tll npo<; £:6-
batllovlav) begin Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum (6-19). These 
paradoxes defy common sense and experience, which would 
count health, wealth, and comfort necessary for happiness. Zeno 
says that the wise man, though afflicted by countless misfor­
tunes and tortured on the rack, is "perfectly happy" (beatus: 
Cic. Fin. S.84). His argument that some addition or the subtrac­
tion of any misfortune cannot increase man's happiness expose 
the Stoa's vulnerability to attacks from common sense. Posi­
donius' model of the soul, not strictly Platonic or Peripatetic, 
does not admit that these external things are 'goods'. Using 
roughly their model of the soul, nevertheless, he shows that 
these counter-intuitive Stoic doctrines need not be paradoxical. 
By replacing Stoic paradoxes with his own arguments from com-

133 On 'to aplO"'tOHAii.;;ov see EK T85 (=Strab. 2.3.8), 93a, T 100 (=Simpl. in 
Cae!. 4.3, 310b1), 19, T73 (=Simpl. in Phys. 2.2, 193b23) with Kidd, EK II ad 
loce. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

310 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

mon sense, he demonstrates, as we shall see, a degree of dialec­
tical sophistication surpassing even that used against Chrysippus. 

Carneades attacks most successfully the positions that Posido­
nius addresses. Carneades' attempt to blur the line between the 
value of the indifferents and the value of the good (Cic. Fin. 
3.41-44) allows him to attack (1) Chrysippus' doctrine that the 
passions arise by supposition that an indifferent is a good (supra 
nn.47-53; Cic. Fin. 3.24=SVF III 11) and (2) the doctrine that the 
telos of life should involve the practice of a stochastike techne, 
in which one aims at the acquisi tion of the preferred indifferents 
but achieves one's purpose in the virtuous effort of aiming 
(supra n.85). All Carneades' arguments relate to his attack on the 
good, the doctrine on which Posidionius is unquestionably 
Stoic. The doctrine of the good is in Kidd's words the "distin­
guishing stamp" of the Stoa and what makes a Stoic a Stoic. 134 

Posidonius regards his model of the soul as the starting point 
for his ethical doctrines and grounds his doctrines on the telos 
and the good (i.e., virtue) in his psychology: cruv11<P8at 8£ Kat 
'ti1v 1t£pt 'trov apnrov 8t8acrKaAiav 'tOtHOl(; <Pllcrt Kat 'ti1v 1t£pt 'tau 
'tEAOU<; Kat OAW<; 1tav'ta 'to. 86YJla'ta 't11<; Tj8tKi1<; <plAocro<pia<; wcr-
1t£P £K Jlla<; JlllPiv80u 8£8Ecr8m 't11<; yvwcr£W<; 'trov Ka'to. 'ti1v \jfU­
xi1v 8uvaJl£wv. 135 Posidonius' model of the soul portrays viv­
idly the difference between man's attraction to virtue and his 
attraction to the indifferents. He clarifies how a proper under­
standing of the soul's chief good explains not only man's attrac­
tion to external things and the cause of the passions but also 
man's goal of becoming a sage. 

The aspects of Stoic thought most difficult to explain in monis­
tic psychology are selection (supra nn.54, 58-62), reservation 
(supra nn.47-53), and the status of the indifferents in Ka'top8w­
Jla'ta and Ka8ftKov'ta ( supra 254, 278 with n.96). Doctrines on 
the telos teach how a correct understanding of these issues leads 
to happiness; those on the pathe explain how an incorrect under­
standing causes unhappiness. As monistic psychology can ex­
plain all these doctrines, Posidonius has no justification for adop-

134 1. G. Kidd, "Posidonian Methodology and the Self-Sufficiency of Virtue," 
in H. Flashar and O. Gigon, edd., Aspects de fa philosophie hellenistique 
(=Entretiens Hardt 23 [Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1986]) 8, and (supra n.54) 184. 

135 Galen PHP 4.286.4-7=EK 150a.6-10: "[Posidonius says] that education 
about the virtues and the end are fitted together with these things (Sc. the dog­
mas on the passions and the faculties of the soul), and that in their entirety all 
the dogmas of ethical philosophy are bound as if by a single cord to the recog­
nition of the faculties of the soul." Cf 5.326.12-16=EK 30; supra n.15. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 311 

ting a new psychology on the grounds that monism cannot 
account for the aitia of passion. But Posidonius' psychology 
explains all these issues with a certain graphic clarity; and his 
doctrine on the soul's relationship to the good and the indif­
ferents answers all Carneades' objections against Chrysippus. 
Despite the lack of a definitive statement that this was his goal, 
Posidonius' doctrines do answer Carneades. When Posidonius 
inserts Carneades' arguments into Chrysippus' mouth, this curi­
ous procedure demonstrates not so much flaws in Chrysippus' 
doctrines (for he rarely considers them in context and as they 
were written) as their vulnerability to Academic attack. So too in 
his ethics, Posidonius' sophisticated dialectical scheme has the 
defense of the Stoa against the Academy as its ultimate objective. 

Seneca's lengthy discussion of Posidonius' view of the good 136 

begins with Posidonius' view that riches can be an "antecedent 
cause" of evil (causa praecedens) because they puff up the spiri t 
and tempt it to vice, although they are not evil because they lack 
an "efficient cause" of evil (causa efficiens). Nor does it follow 
that they are not "preferred indifferents" (commoda), because 
riches contain more benefit than harm. As indifferents that can 
be used well or badly, riches are not" goods" in Stoic terms. 

Posidonius specifically designs his model of the soul to uphold 
the Stoic doctrine of the good within a Platonic, tripartite 
framework (cl supra n.29). Each power of the soul has its own 
desires (OpEK1:o.: Galen PHP 5.330.5=EK 161.5)-a part of his 
model similar to Plato's (Resp. 4.441E-42A). The desiderative fac­
ulty (1:0 E1tl8UIlT)1:lKOV ) is drawn to pleasure (1) 1)bovi) ), the spir­
ited ('to 8UllonbEs) to victory (1) VlKTl), and the rational (to AoYlO'-
1'lKOV) to virtue (1:0 KUAOV ). These desires are OlKElOV ("natural 
and appropriate") to their respective faculties (Galen PH P 
5.318.12-24=EK 160). Thus Posidonius connects his Platonic 
model to the fundamental Stoic doctrine of OtKrtO)(Hs, the pro­
cess by which man recognizes his bond with his own nature and 
with the nature and order governing the universe. By this pro­
cess man learns to "habituate" himself to the world in which he 
lives and by which he is drawn to virtue.1J7 Posidonius shows 
that his explanation of human motivation is to be understood by 

136 Ep. 87.31-40=£ K 170. See Kidd, EK II 626-38, supra n.54, and esp. (supra 
n.134) 1- 21. Kidd explains and refutes the evidence (EK 171 [=D.L. 7.103J, 173 
[=7.127f], 172 [=Epiph. De fide 9.46]; EK II 638-43), suggesting that Posidonius 
considered wealth and health «goods." 

137 D.L. 7.8Sf=SVF III 178; Cic. Fin. 3.16,62-68; cf SVF III 340ff. For the 
Stoic doctrine of otKd(o(H~ see Inwood 182-201; supra n.60. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

312 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

the concept of OtK£lOY, a term used by the Stoics and others 
(supra nn.26, 60). 

Posidonius further qualifies his model: what is appropriate to 
the rational faculty is appropriate in a special way. What is OtK£la 
to the rational faculty is "simply appropriate" (a:1tAws OlKEla), 
whereas what is "appropriate" to the irrational faculties is not 
simply so (OUK (mAWs OlKEla: Kidd [1978J 207f; EK II 576£). This 
distinction corresponds to the relationship of the rational faculty 
with a divine nature (OElOY ) to the irrational faculties having that 
of an animal (scpWDll: Galen PHP 5.330.2-6=EK 161.2-7). Posido­
nius compares the rational faculty to a charioteer and the irra­
tional faculties to his team of horses. 138 The virtue of the rational 
faculty is to acquire knowledge of the nature of the universe 
(Ertt<J'tTtJlll 't11<; 'tWV OY'H.t)V cpu<J£w<;), whereas the virtues of the irra­
tional faculties are to become accustomed to obeying the com­
mands of reason (Em~<JOai 't£ Kat 1t£iO£<JOm 'tip AOYl<JJlip ).139 This 
model of the soul is intimately bound up with Posidonius' doc­
trine of good and evil. 

Virtue alone is (mAWs OtKEla; all other things desired by the ir­
rational faculties are either evil or appropriate only with qualifi­
cation. The irrational faculties are drawn to things that differ in 
kind, not in magnitude, from those to which reason is drawn. 
Posidonius' (mAWs indicates that the distinction is beween the 
'qualified' and the 'unqualified'. To be led by the irrational fac­
ulty is to be drawn to something other than virtue and to mis­
take what is indifferent or evil for what is appropriate without 

l 'fi .. d 140 qua I catIon, l.e., goo . 
In Posidonius' system man can fall into passion whenever he 

allows the irrational powers in his soul to have their way. All 

138 See Vander Waerdt (supra n.5: 386£) on the doxographical tradition of 
this image from PI. Ph dr. 253c-54B; Kidd (supra n.18) 111 ff. 

139 Galen PH P 5.324.9-23=EK 31.14-30. The irrational faculties seem to 
accomplish this task by being neither too strong nor too weak, but by assum­
ing the state of an Aristotelian mean: Eth. Nic. 2.5f, 1106a-07a. The virtue of 
the rational faculty does not seem to be a mean. 

HO Cf Galen PHP 5.326.20-24=EK 187.4-9: 'to oil 'twv 1ta8wv al'ttov, 'tou't­
E<J'tt 't11<; 'tl: avolloAoYla<; Kat 'tOD KaKooalllovo<; ~lou, 'tt) Ilil Ka'tu 1taV £1tE<J8at 
'til> £v a\)'til> oa1llOVt <JV¥yI:Vl:l 'tl: ov'tt Ka1. 'tilv 0llolav cpu<Jtv EXOV'tt 'til> 'tOY (lAcV 
1(6<JlloV OtotKODV'tt, 'til> O!: xdpovt Kat SqJolOEt 1to't!: <JUVI:K1(Alvov'ta<; cpEpl:<J8at 
("The cause of passion, that is, of discord and the unhappy life, is that people 
do not follow in everything the divinity in themselves which, in origin and in 
being, has the same nature as that which rules the universe, and sometimes, 
inclining towards the worse, animal-like faculty, they are carried away."). Cf 
D.L. 7.88 on the use of oa11lWV. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 313 

three faculties are drawn to what is appropriate (OiKElOV).141 
These things contribute to the natural life; but it is not appro­
priate that every natural thing without qualification should be 
sought by a complete human being, whose soul moves him with 
three different generic desires (6PEK'tU). The -rex KU-rex q)'UO"lV, ap­
propriate to the several facul ties of the soul, are appropriate for 
the entire man only when reason judges that their pursuit con­
tributes to its own practice of virtue, always appropriate without 
qualification. This model identifies the entire man, in a limited 
sense, with his rational faculty because what is appropriate to it is 
appropriate to the entire man.142 The irrational faculties must 
serve the rational faculty for the soul to be harmonious and free 
from passion. 

Thus the irrational faculties may seek the preferred indiffer­
ents (rrpoTlYll£vU) for their own sake, while the rational faculty 
pursues them only as a means to the telos of virtue. Posidonius' 
model could explain the appearance of two ends-virtue and 
attainment of the preferred indiffcrents-and refute Carneades' 
aporia (Plut. Mar. 1070F). The preferred indifferents would be 
both the VA 11 and the eX pxil of acts as the irrational faculties 
perform them, but only the \lAl1 as the rational faculty performs 
them (supra 254, 278 with n.96). Posidonius does not mean that 
the irrational faculties perform Ku8ilKOV'tU, for he says that 
being led by the irrational faculties constitutes passion (supra 
n.140). But so long as the rational faculty controls the irrational 
faculties, the whole soul pursues rrpol1'YIlEVU harmoniously to 
practice Kcx8ilKOV'tCX (the acts appropriate for both the moral 

141 Kidd says (in Long [supra n.2] 207) that for Posidonius "oikeion is not 
necessarily related to the term good, however relative. Posidonius is not con­
cerned here with 'the preferred' (proegmena), with what has relative worth 
(axia) in a moral context, but with native drives which upset the moral bal­
ance." Although oikeion does not mean "good," I do not entirely follow 
Kidd's contention that Posidonius is not thinking of proegmena when he says 
oikeion. Posidonius explicitly associates pleasure (one of his 'to. OlK:£tU) with 
'to. 1tpilnu Ka-to. <j>UG1V (Galen PHP 5.328.11f=EK 187.27f), an Academic use 
for the Stoic 10. Ka10. <pOOLV (supra n.81). Moreover, Kidd says (supra n.134: 17; 
EK II 635f) that the irrational faculties are drawn to 10. KU10. <j>U<Hv. The psy­
chological importance of man's" native drives" is that man is drawn to the un­
happy life by 'desiring' what he should only 'select', which is a doctrine 
common to all Stoics. 

142 Cf Glibcrt- Thirry 398, citing Sen. Ep. 121.14=SVF III 184: Ea enim parte 
sibi carus est homo, qua homo. This general point, though acceptable to 
Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and others, is clearly one of the inspirations for 
the entire Stoic enterprise. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

314 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

progressor and the sage) and, when this control is perfected, 
Ka'top8wlla'ta (the virtuous acts of the sage). 

This model explains not only the role of the indifferents in Ka't­
op8wlla'ta and the appearance of two tele, but also the cause of 
passion, which the monist would call a "fresh belief" (doxa pros­
phatos) from the lack of "reservation" (supra nn.14, 47-53). 
When reason controls the soul, the proper attitude towards the 
good is preserved and with it man's relationship to nature, di­
vine reason, and fate. In Chrysippus' model, the false belief that 
something indifferent is good or evil and, more importantly, the 
"fresh belief" that passion is "appropriate" (oportet /Ka8ilKov: 
supra 254f) cause passion. Posidonius views the latter part of this 
doctrine as absurd and cites a comic fragment: fa 11' (XJWAEcr-
8at' 'tQ\ytOllOl vuv crull<i>Epn (CAF III 350=Galen PHP 4.270.1= 
EK 164.99). He replaces the paradoxical doctrine of Chrysippus 
with his own common-sense explanation that if one is led by rea­
son, ~e practices reservation. If not, he is liable to the passions at 
any tIme. 

But how is a man to know if he is led by the rational or the irra­
tional faculties? The monistic model suggests two possibilities: 
one may assent to the proposition that passion is 'appropriate' 
either consciously or unconsciously. Posidonius mocks Chry­
sippus as if he held the former, although he certainly intended 
the latter (el supra n.43; Inwood 81-85, 161). Posidonius' solu­
tion omits the problem of unconscious assent. He recommends 
that the rational faculty train the irrational to obey through an 
irrational education of "rhythms, harmonics, and practices" 
(Galen PHP 5.330.7f=EK 168.2f: PU8110l<; alla Kat aplloVlal<; Kat 
E1tl'tT)()EUllacrl). Apparently, just as Chrysippus held man 
accountable for his unconscious assents, Posidonius holds him 
accountable for training his irrational faculties. Interesting, 
however, is Posidonius' treatment of reason's responsibility in 
passion, i. e., the problem of weak will, made famous in Euri­
pides' Medea (1019-80).143 The tripartite model has its own 
paradoxes, which Posidonius fails to admit. He actually inverts 
the Socratic dictum "no one does wrong willingly" (1lT)()EVa 
~ouA611EVOV ci8lKElV) 144 into a common-sense indictment of 
Chrysippus, as in the comic fragment cited above. 

143 On the problems of weak will for monists and dualists, see Inwood 
132-39. 

144 PI. Grg. 5091; cf Meno 77D-E, Prt. 345E, 352A-57E, Ap. 25c-26A. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 315 

Posidonius' model of the soul and his doctrines on the 
passions and the good are the foundation for his telos-formula. 
His language, differing from earlier Stoic formulae (supra nn.S7-
64), requires elucidation. In its proper context his telos, like his 
other doctrines, resolves apparent aporiai: 'to STlY 8EWp01>V'ta 
'tllv 'twv OAWV a.A~8Elav Kat 'taSty Kat crUYKa'tacrK£uasOY'ta 

. au'tl)v Ka'ta 'to Duva'tov, Ka'ta ~T\DEV a.yo~£vov U1tO 101> aAoyou 
J...lEpOUC; 'tTlC; 'VUXTlC;.145 The formula initially describes man's 
relationship to the order of the universe, i. e., the divine logos: 
the first part of his telos is 'to STlv 8£wpo1>v'ta (ef supra n.140; 
Galen PHP 5.326.22f=EK 187.6ff). Kidd observes (EK II 672) 
that "it is difficult to find any passage in the earlier Stoa where 
8Eoopia is given such a fundamental role"146-correctly if he 
means that 8EW p to. is not found in other telos-formulae. 
Comparison with Chrysippus' views of 8£wpta may explain 
Posidonius' usage. 

For Chrysippus, an understanding of justice must begin with 
Zeus and universal nature (Plut. Mar. l035c-D: 1) K01V~ cpucrtC;), 
as must an account (logos) of goods and evils: DEL yap 'tOU't01C; 
cruva'Vm 'tOY 1t£pt aya8wv Kat KaKWV AOYOV, OUK oucrT\C; aAAT\C; 
apXTl~ u{ytwV a.IlElVOVO~ OUD' a.vucpopa~, OUD' aAAou nvo~ £v£­
KEV 'tTl<; CPUcrlKTlC; 8EWptac; IWPUAT\1t'tTl<; oucrT\<; 11 1tpo<; 'tllv 1tEpi 
ayu8wv 11 KaKWV Otacr'racrtv. 147 This passage demonstrates the 
basic Stoic premise that man's logos is akin to the divine logos of 
nature, identical to the mind of Zeus (D.L. 7.87ff). As virtue is 
only possible when the wise man assimilates his reason to that of 
nature, the starting point of virtue becomes contemplation (8£00-
pta) of nature (man's own, universal nature, and the relation­
ship of the two). Cicero clarifies this even more: 

145 Clem. AI. Strom. 2.21.129.5=EK 186.13ff: "To live by rational contempla­
tion of the truth and order of the universe, and by taking part in ordering it to 
the best of one's ability, while never being led by the irrational part of the 
soul." 

146 Kidd rightly observes that Diogenes (7.130) lists three lives: the "theore­
tical (6 e£(j)pTrct1(6~), the "practical" (6 1tpo:J('tl1(6~), and the "rational" ( 6 Aoyt­
~), but does not consider that the same information at Plut. Mar. 1035A 
shows that Chrysippus used 8cwpiu to describe the rational activity of which 
oh(d(j)(Jl~ partially consists. C1 Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.20.1 f, 5, 14ff. 

147 Plut. Mar. 10350: "For the doctrine on good and evil must be fitted to­
gether with these, since these [Sc. good and evilJ have no better beginning or 
reference, and physical speculation must not be undertaken for any other 
purpose than for the discernment of good and evil." 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

316 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

Physicae quoque non sine causa tributus idem est honos, 
propterea quod qui convenienter naturae victurus sit ei profi­
ciscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. 
Nee vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi 
omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et 
utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. 148 

To become a sage, one must contemplate the divine logos and 
accomodate himself to the world in order to complete his 
OiKd(t)(J~. 

Kidd compares 'tl)v 'tWV (SAOJV aA,,8nav Kat 'ta~tv with Posido­
nius' distinction between the philosopher's and the astrono­
mer's observations on the universe (Simpl. in Phys. 2.2, 193b23 
[pp.291.21-92.31 DielsJ=EK 18). The philosopher looks to "the 
creative force" of the universe (dt; 'tl)v rrotTl'ttri)v buvaJ..ltv arro­
~A£rrOJv), which Kidd takes as the logos: "the philosopher argues 
deductively from his fundamental universal principles or axi­
oms; the scientist proceeds in his proofs from the observation 
and calculation of the properties of particular phenomena which 
form his field of study."149 Further, "'ta~tt; not only covers the 
order of the oupavot;, which is part of the proper study of i1 q)'\)­
O"tK" 8EOJpla (F18.8), but the order of everything imposed by 
AO'YO~, providence and Zeus" (EK II 672). Kidd's treatment 
("Criterion" 148) of aA,,8na in Posidonius' doctrine that orthos 
logos should be the criterion (D.L. 7.S4=EK 42) argues that in 
the period between Chrysippus and Posidonius attacks on the 
Stoa's criterion, the phantasia kataleptike, included a distinction 
between a criterion of action and a criterion of "underlying exis­
tence" (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.29f: rrEpt 'tT1t; urrap~EOJt;). Earlier 
Stoics like Chrysippus claimed that both wise men and fools 
may grasp 'to aATl8Et; through katalepsis, but only the wise man 

148 Fin. 3.73=SVr III 282: "To physics, and not without good reason, the 
same distinction is given, because whoever will live in accordance with nature 
must make the entire world and its governance his point of departure. Nor in­
deed can anyone judge truly about goods and evils without first recognizing 
the entire logos of nature and especially of the life of the gods, and whether or 
not the nature of man conforms with that of the universe." Cf Nat. D. 2.37, 39 
=SVF II IlS3, 641: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et 
imitandum.... Est autem mundo nihil perfect ius, nihil virtute me/ius: igitur 
mundi est propria virlus (" But as for himself, man was born to contemplate 
and imitate the universe .... For nothing is more perfect than the universe, and 
nothing finer than virtue: therefore virtue is a characteristic of the universe"). 

149 EK II 131£; on the implications of this fragment see esp. Kidd (1978) 
to-IS. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 317 

may grasp 1) aAil8nu, because only he possesses knowledge 
(Cic. Acad. 2.144f; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.42). In Kidd's view, 
Posidoni us proposed his own cri terion of action based on the 
natural attractions of the faculties of the soul, and orthos logos is 
intended as a criterion of "underlying existence" for the wise 
man: "As in the moral sphere 'appropriate action' (xu8Tjxov) 
becomes in the wise man KU'tOp8WIlU ('perfect moral action') 
through his possession of orthos logos, so in the logic of truth, 
katalepsis becomes knowledge (episteme) through orthos 
logos" ("Criterion" 149). Posidonius' "the truth of everything 
that exists" probably means that part of the telos is to perceive, 
with the firm grasp of the sage's episteme, the universe as it is in 
reality. In other words, the specific implications of this phrase 
for Posidonius agree completely with Chrysippus' general 
principles: OlKElWO'U:;; and progress towards virtue require man to 
observe and understand the divine logos and to make his own 
reason conform to it. Posidonius alludes not only to the process 
of oixdcooLS' but also to its end in which man becomes a sage. 

The first part of this formula refers exclusively to the rational 
faculty. Posidonius has good reason to spell out its particular 
activity, because elsewhere he describes its weakness as a cause 
of passion: 

Kat yap K(Xl 'mu8' 0 OOOflOWVlO<; ~£~CP£'ta1 Kat OElKVUVa1 
TC£lpa1:at TCaowv 1:WV \lI£UOWV \lTCOA:i]\lI£COV 1:0.<; al1:ta<; £V ~£V 
1:0 8£COpT]1:lK0 (010. 1:11<; u~a8ta<; YlVO~£vcov, EV O£ 1:0 TCa8T]­
'ttK0) OUX 111s na8T]'ttKlls oAKlls, npoT]YEto8m of: a\)111s 1as 
\lI£UO£l<; 06l;a<; uo8£vT]oano<; TC£pt 1:~V KPl01V 1:0U AOY101:lKOU' 
y£vvao8cn y(XP 1:0 ('0cr 1:~V op~~v [Vt01:£ ~£V [TCt 1:11 wu AOy­
lCHlKOD KP10El, nOAAaKts O£ tnt "11 KtVT]OEl1:OD na8T]1tKoD.150 

150 Galen PH P 5.320.23-2lkEK 169.77-84: "Indeed Posidonius finds fault 
with him [Sc. ChrysippusJ on this matter too [Sc. the source of error about 
good and evil], and attempts to show that the causes of all false suppositions 
arise in the faculty which contemplates <through ignorance, and in the faculty 
which acts> through the pull of the affections; but that false opinions are the 
antecedent causes of it [sc. the pullJ when the rational faculty has become 
weak in judgment. For impulse is produced in a living being sometimes as a 
result of the rational faculty, but often as a result of the movement of the 
faculty subject to the passions." I give Kidd's text, defended at EK II 620-23. 
Fillion-Lahille (156£) uses this text to argue that Posidonius associates passions 
with" judgments" (86~(lt) and" suppositions" (U1tOAYt\jl£t<;). 'I'h is reading cannot 
be defended: If. supra nn.9, 106, 140, and Posidonius' formula for the telos 
(EK 186), where it is quite clear that in Posidonius' view reason cannot cause 
passion, that he does not accept the Chrysippean doctrine of the doxa 
prosphatos, and that passion consists in "being led by the irrational faculties." 
Given Posidonius' association of phantasiai with the irrational faculties, is this 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

318 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

One assumes that the activity of the rational faculty described in 
his telos-formula averts the weakness described here. False opin­
ions may be avoided by constant contemplation of, and assim­
ilation to, the divine logos. 

The second part of the formula, Kat (JUYKa"Ca(JK£'t)(X~oV'ta au­
'tl)v Ka'tO: 'to 8uva"'Cov, admonishes man to playa part in the or­
dering of the universe and to act in concert with what nature 
demands. Kidd notes (EK II 673) the parallel structure of 8£w­
pouV'ta ... (JuYKa'ta(JK£ua~oV'ta, contemplation and action, and 
suggests that Plato's 6Ilo1w(Jl~ 8£0 Ka'tO: 'to 8uva'tov (Tht. 176B: 
"a likeness to the divine in so far as possible") anticipates the 
sense of Ka'tO: 'to 8uva'tov. More important! y, he claims certain 
ethical implications for "to promote the truth and order of all 
things": "human beings have their part to play both in the mac­
rocosm and in the microcosm of themselves," 151 and concludes 
(EK II 674) that this telos-formula embraces all three branches 
of philosophy: physics, logic, and ethics. . 

In addition to Kidd's numerous insights on the formula and 
Posidonius' wider philosophy, the formula also reflects a 
specific concern to resolve Academic aporiai. Ka'tO: 'to 8uva'tov, 
for instance, could allude to the (J"'COXa(J'tlKl) "'CEXVTt, where the 
goal is effort, not success. Antipater's formula nav "'Co Ka8' au­
'tov nOl£lV (supra n.19) tries to account for the role of the indif­
ferents in the craft of virtue by a highly specific use of npo~: 
man must do everything "with reference to but not for the sake 
of" the preferred indifferents. Posidonius' Ka"'Co: IlTt8£v ayoll£v­
ov uno 'tou aAoyou IlEPOU~ TTl~ 'l'UXll~ preserves the suggestion 
of "effort" and resolves the ambiguity inherent in npo~: man is 
to participate in the ordering of all that exists "while never being 
led by the irrational part of the soul" (el Kidd ad IlEPOU<;: EK II 
674). 

Posidonius appeals to his model of the soul to explain that this 
effort must be rational. To be led by the irrational faculties 
would constitute passion. In Antipater's formula passion also 
plays a role, because "to do everything in one's power for the 

fragment not his answer to the Chrysippean doctrine about the persuasiveness 
of presentations (supra nn.32, 45, 116; nn.153f infra)? 

151 EK 85=Sext. Emp. Math. 7.93; cf Galen De sequel.~ 819f=EK 35.22-27, in 
which Posidonius says that we need not shun the company of inferior men for 
fear that evil be increased in our souls, because the source of evil is not exterior 
but interior. In other words, man may be a more social being under 
Posidonius' account of the cause of evil (based on his model of the soul). 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 319 

sake of acquiring the preferred indifferents" would be a tacit 
claim that they were 'good', and to pursue the indifferents as 
goods constitutes the excessive impulse of passion. Antipater's 
use of 7tPOs rather than EVEKU to govern 'teX KU'teX qn)(Jlv is 
intended to represent reservation: man must make his efforts 
only "with reference to" the indifferents because the arche of 
his action must be virtue (supra 279). Posidonius' model of the 
soul permits him to express the necessity for, and the meaning 
of, reservation in a much simpler fashion. To be led by reason is 
to preserve it, to be led by the irrational faculties is to abandon it. 

Posidonius' formula for the telos, is ideally suited to explain 
the problem of selection to which these other issues are directly 
related. It gives a role to the rational faculty qua rational in the 
first part: by observing the divine logos man not only progres­
ses in virtue, but becomes aware of what is good and evil.152 (Juy­

KU'tU(JK£UU~OVTU of the second part clearly suggests that man 
must not only contemplate the universe but interact produc­
tively with it. The means of this interaction is selection and 
rejection of the indifferents. As noted, the Stoa's growing 
recogni tion of this fact led Diogenes and Antipater to include 
selection in their telos-formulae (supra nn.61-64). The second 
and third parts of Posidonius' formula give the rational faculty 
positive and negative duties in selection: it must expend effort to 
interact with the world (possible only through selections of 
indifferents), but it also has a negative duty to rule the irrational 
faculties, which would, if allowed, pervert rational action into 
passion by pursuing the indifferents as goods. Posidonius 
completely interconnected his telos-formula, his doctrine of the 
good, and his model of the soul (supra n.1S) and designed them 
to combat aporiai that Carncades raised. 

A final way of reading this formula lies within the context of 
action. Posidonius' formula based on tripartition accounts for 
the four primary functions of the monistic soul (<pUVTU(JlU, 'A.oy-
0<;, (JUYKUTU8Ecrt<;, oPllil). The first part of the formula clearly 
alludes to logos and, as Kidd shows (supra 318), aAil8Elu tacitly 
refers to the criterion, i.e., how one deals with phantasiai. 
Whether Posidonius explained the power of logos to create lek­
ta and how his association of phantasiai with the irrational 
faculties (supra n.116) may be reconciled with his demand to 
observe the "truth" of the universe might be resolved through 

152 Cf Cic. Fin. 3.33f=SVF III 72; Sen. fp. 120.3ff, 8-11; Long and Sedley I 
374f. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

320 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

his argument that passion sometimes arises "when the rational 
faculty becomes weak in judgment" (supra n.150). 

If continuous contemplation of the divine logos prevents 
weak judgments, it would also prevent the creation of false prop­
ositions (a~t(oJ.!a'ta), about which a judgment might be made. 
But this is thorny ground: if Posidonius retains the theory of 
lekta, at some point it becomes difficult to distinguish his theory 
from Chrysippus'. Posidonius' model, clearly intended to divide 
phantasiai from their corresponding lekta, has the phantasiai par­
take of the irrational. Perhaps he retains lekta and places them 
under the control of a different faculty, 'to AoYUJ'ttKOV, thus per­
mitting his claim of two causes of passion: the weakness of the 
rational faculty in judgment and the disobedience of the irra­
tional faculties (supra n.150). As Posidonius associated the 
effects of phantasiai on a weak rational faculty with the effects of 
disobedient irrational faculties, he probably claimed that phan­
tasia~ like the irrational faculties, exert a "pull" (rra8Tl'ttKll OAKll), 
which attempts to compel assent. 153 In discussing Chrysippus' 
claim that "the persuasiveness of phantasiai" is one cause of evil, 
Posidonius associates attraction to impressions with the attrac­
tion of the irrational faculties to the indifferents: 

Kat yap (ha 'ti 8EacraflEva Kat aKoucrav'ta 1tapabnYfla Ka­
Kia~ OUXt fltcrEt 'tOl)'tO Kal <pEuyn 'tep flllbEfliav OiK£lrocrtV 
EXEtV 1tpO~ au'to, ect'\)fla~EtV £1tEPXE'tcti flOt. ... 'ti~ yap avaYKll 
'tOU~ 1tatba~ U1tO fl£V 't1l~ ~bovll~ Co~ aya80u b£A.Ea~Ecreat flll­
bEfliav OiKdrocrtv Exov'ta~ 1tpO~ au'tT]v a1tocr'tpE<pEcr8at b£ Kal 
<pEuyEtV 'tOY 1tOVOV, £l1tEP flY] Kal1tpO~ 'tou'tov ~AAmpirov'tat <pu­
crEt; ... epro'tll'tEOV au'tov 'ty]v ahiav, <ha llv ~bovY] fl£v Co~ 
aya8ov, aAYllbwv b£ Co~ KaKov 1tt8avY]v 1tpO~aAAoucrt 
<pav'tacr iav .154 

Posidonius' response indicates that phantasiai derive their effect 

153 Cf similar accounts in the later Stoics: Arr. Fpict. Diss. 2.18.24f; Inwood 
84. 

154 Galen NIP 5.320.4ff, 7-10, 18f=EK 169.55ff, 59-63, 71ff: "It occurs to me 
to wonder why it is that when they have seen and heard an example of vice, 
they do not hate it and flee from it, since they feel no kinship with it. .. What 
necessity is there that children be enticed by pleasure as a good thing, when 
they feel no kinship with it, or that they avoid and flee from pain if they are 
not by nature also alienated from it? ... We must ask him why it is that pleas­
ure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil." 
The Chrysippean phrase is il 7tlea.v6'tT1~ 'twv q>a.v'ta.<HWV at P 11 P 5.320.17=EK 
169.70f. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

JOHN A. STEVENS 321 

from man's "natural attraction" (OlK£lCO(H<;) to the indifferents. 155 

His telos-formula implies that all impressions about the indiffer­
ents must be submitted to the rational faculty, which tests them 
against the episteme acquired through contemplation (8ECOplU) 
of the divine logos. His formula might mean: "all phantasiai 
must be tested by the criterion of truth." In this process certain 
propositions would have to be formed for assent to be given. 
As the word lekton does not occur in Posidonius' fragments, he 

. may have suppressed the concept to avoid explaining how a 
weak rational faculty might produce conflicting lekta and thus 
becoming liable to his own arguments against Chrysippus. 

Posidonius' formula also accounts for impulse and assent. The 
third part, KU'tCx llT]8EV UYOllEVOV uno 'tOU UAOYOU llEPOU<; 111<; 
'l'UX11<;, suggests that impulse (OPlln) must never result from the 
irrational faculty (el supra n.140). Possibly he would identify im­
pulse with the irrational faculties, in which case he might say 
that "man must never live according to impulse." His positive 
account of impulse, embodied in CJUYKU'tUCJKEuo:sonu, may in­
volve a verbal pun: CJuYK(X"C0:8ECJl<;, the technical term for assent, 
and CJKEUO:SCO, the proper activity of man's impulse, may com­
bine as "making impulse conform to assent." Proper impulse 
would follow from proper assent, i. e., the rational faculty's 
'leadership' of the irrational faculties. Improper assent and 
impulse would be synonymous with the rational "being led by" 
the irrational. 

If the preceding represents an over-interpretation of Posido­
nius' intentions, it nevertheless shows the sophistication of his 
response to Chrysippus. Posidonius' telos -formula embraces 
all branches of philosophy and preserves the central features of 
telos-formulae of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Diogenes; it ac­
counts for rational action in terms of the soul's activities and can 
show how man should interact with the indifferents. His for­
mula even preserves under KU'tCx 'to 8uvu'tov the central Stoic 
image of virtue as a tension, which Antipater rendered in the 
efforts of an archer, the stochastike techne. Moreover it accom­
plishes all these through language that is rich and layered yet 
simple. 

155 His model of the soul makes this clear (supra 311). Chrysippus too had 
said that man has a natural attraction to the indifferents in that "God himself 
made me inclined to select them" (supra n.53), but Posidonius might argue 
that it does not follow that this natural attraction can account for the corres­
pon~ing lekton that such things are good, the assent to which would cause 
passIOn. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

322 POSIDONIAN POLEMIC AND ACADEMIC DIALECTIC 

In sum, Posidonius did not undertake a refutation of Chrysip­
pean monism through Chrysippus' expression of these doc­
trines, but attributes to Chrysippus subtly altered representa­
tions of Carneades' views. It was quite simple to show that 
these argumetns refute themselves because Carneades designed 
them for that purpose. Although this complex dialectical stra­
tegy probably cannot be explained with complete satisfaction, I 
have tried to show that Posidonius' own doctrines display an 
even greater dialectical sophistication in that they can account 
for complex and even paradoxical early Stoic doctrines in the 
language of common sense. 

Posidonius' motive may be summarized as follows: the most 
important aspects of Stoicism had to be explained through para­
dox; Carneades and others manipulated these doctrines slightly 
to make paradox synonymous with absurdity and argued contra 
through appeals to common sense; Posidonius portrayed the 
problem of Academic misrepresentations through his curious 
treatment of Chrysippus; and finally, he brought the Stoa into 
the camp of common sense by adopting tripartition. Posido­
nius' ability to explain the very phenomena that Carneades 
attacked so successfully suggests that his principal goal was to re­
spond to Carneades and to render the Stoa invulnerable to fu­
ture attacks. He respects Chrysippus far more than his frag­
ments indicate because he preserves so many Chrysippean doc­
trines in his own model, and he omits entirely any mention of 
Carneades, whom he certainly read carefully (through Clitom­
achus and others). Posidonius' claim to conduct his inquiries 
from aetiology conceals, for the most part, his dialectical enter­
prise. Finally, his claim to begin his investigations from "what is 
plainly evident" ('rex cra<pw<; <PatVOIl£va: supra nn.8, 100, 116) 
more properly characterizes his 'end' to produce "plainly 
evident" arguments. 

In the final analysis, Posidonius wrote in the age of Antiochus 
of Ascalon who, strongly influenced by Carneades, attempted 
to harmonize Stoicism with Platonism. It would be most inter­
esting to compare their enterprises, as well as those of Eudorus 
and Arius Didymus. 156 The result might advance considerably 
our knowledge of the philosophical environment of the first 
century B.C.; others might wish to investigate Posidonius' rela-

156 On the eclecticism of Eudorus and Arius see Stob. Eel. 2.38f, 47£, 89f; 
Inwood 140-43, 189 n.34; A. A. Long, "Arius Didymus and the Exposition of 
Stoic Ethics," in fortenbaugh (supra n.18) 41-65. 



STEVENS, JOHN A., Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades 
upon Posidonius' "Peri pathon" [Greek] , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:3 (1993:Fall) 
p.229 

]OI-IN A. STEVENS 323 

tionship not only to the Stoa but to the arguments of Aca­
demics, Epicureans, and Cyrenaics, of which he was probably 
aware (supra n.129), and to the Peripatos that he clearly admired 
(supra n.133). The most intriguing, perhaps the most produc­
tive, area of investigation would be the extent to which Posido­
nius' doctrines actually reproduce the most important aspects 
of monism within a tripartite psychology, for this would pro­
vide insights into the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus 
Aurelius, where clements of monism and dualism exist side by 
side, seemingly without a loss to doctrine. ls7 

EAST CAROLINA UI\IVERSITY 

August, 1994 

157 This paper, first presented to a colloquium of the Duke University De­
partment of Classical Studies and later to a panel of the Society for Ancient 
Greek Philosophy in 1989, benefited in early stages from the criticism of Pro­
fessors Phillip Mitsis and Roger Hornsby, and in later stages from the detailed 
comments of Professors Ian Kidd and David Sedley, to whom I am most 
grateful. My project has been aided throughout by the constructive criticism 
and scepticism of my friend and teacher, Dr Paul Vander Waerdt. Many 
errors and pro blems of presentation have been avoided through their efforts. 
The final version owes much to the detailed comments and most helpful sug­
gestions of Professor Brad Inwood. To all these must be attributed much of 
what is convincing in this paper, but none of these may be construed to have 
endorsed by their kindness the radical thesis.