STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) Philip A. Stadter KADING THE PENTECONT AETIA is both easy and difficult.1 The narrative runs rapidly, with little of Thucydides' customary density and grammatical strain, yet its prin­ ciples of arrangement and selection have remained obscure. Discussion has centered on two major difficulties: chronology and omissions. A. W. Gomme noted that the Pentecontaetia seems to share the very faults for which Thucydides criticized Hellanicus: it is both 1Ot<; xPOVOt<; OUK aKpt~£<; and ~paxu­ chronologically imprecise and brief.2 Explanations vary: to take two extremes, Russell Meiggs suggested that the excursus was 1 From the enormous bibliography dealing with the Pentecontaetia, the following studies, in addition to standard commentaries and books on Thucydides and on the fifth century, have been most helpful or stimulating in the preparation of this paper: N. G. L. HAMMOND, "The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in Other Parts of Thucydides I," CQ N.S. 2 (1952: hereafter 'Hammond') 127-41; H. D. WESTLAKE, "Thucydides and the Pentekontaetia," in Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History (Manchester 1969: 'Westlake') 39-60 (= CQ N.S. 5 [1955] 53-67); P. K. WALKER, "The Purpose and Method of 'the Pentekontaetia' in Thucydides, Book I," CQ N.S. 7 (1957: 'Walker') 27-38; R. A. McNEAL, "Historical Methods and Thucydides I.103.1," Historia 19 (1970: 'McNeal') 306-25; H. R. RAWLINGS, "Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian League," Phoenix 31 (1977: 'Rawlings') 1-8; and E. BADIAN, "Toward a Chronology of the Penetkontaetia down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias," in From Plataea to Potidaea: Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentecontaetia (Baltimore 1993: 'Badian, From Plataea') 73-107 (=a revised version with new appendix of an article in EchCI23, N.S. 7 [1988: 'Badian (1988)'] 289-320), 125-62 ("Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. A Historian's Brief" [=a revised version of the article in J. W. Allison, ed., Conflict, Antithesis, and the Ancient Historian (Columbus [Ohio] 1990: 'Badian [1990]') 46-91, 165-81]). Badian, From Plataea xii, notes that "these essays have been revised (some of them considerably) for this collection, and they should not henceforth be cited in their original form." For the convenience of the reader who does not have access to the book, I give when possible the prior reference, recognizing that the new version is the authoritative text. 2 A. W. GOMME et. al., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1956-78: hereafter' H CT') I 361; cf Thuc. 1.97.2. 35 STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 36 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA "late and hurried and much less well digested than most of the history,"3 while Ernst Badian, starting from the assumption that Thucydides composed the excursus after the Peloponnesian War" in order to establish his thesis of Sparta's responsibility for the war and the correctness of Pericles' vision," has recently accused Thucydides of gross distortion of the historical record, through cunning omissions, innuendo, and outright falsifica­ tion.4 Meiggs' position represents one version of that taken, more or less strongly, by most studies of the Pentacontaetia, that due to haste, disinterest, or some other reason, Thucydides failed to achieve his purpose in the Pentecontaetia. Badian instead grants that Thucydides achieved his purpose, but argues that the product represents "the perfect skill of the advocate claiming a passion for objectivity,"5 and therefore uses every deceptive trick of advocacy, especially omission and misdirection. An alternative hypothesis, however, is that what we have responds closely to what Thucydides wanted to say, as Badian suggests, and that the narrative as it stands represents accurately the true situation as Thucydides saw it. On this hypothesis, the features of the text were consciously chosen to reflect the clements that in his analysis Thucydides found particularly significant. To test the two propositions of this hypothesis, this article will examine the narrative techniques and principles of organization used in the excursus and relate them to the arguments found elsewhere in the work.6 I hope to show that the structure, chronology, and omissions are neither so unreasonable nor so deceptive as have been argued. In particular, the hypothesis that the ex­ cursus is incomplete as it stands must be questioned. Although the entire History as we have it is evidently unfinished, the completeness or not of the Pentecontaetia can only be deduced after a careful analysis of its internal features and their relation to the rest of the work. 3 R. Meiggs, Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 445; cf Gomme, HCT I 362: "That the excursus is an early essay, provisional, unfinished, and never properly adapted to its present position, is to me clear." 4 Badian, From Piataea 74 (= [1988] 291), cf 125-62. 5 Badian, From Piataea 162 (=[1990] 91). 6 Cf the studies of Thucydides' narrative technique by Hammond, Walker, and McNeal; cf C. J. Dewald, Taxis: The Organization of Thucydides' History, Books II-V II I (diss. University of California at Berkeley 1975). STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. STADTER 37 This reading will be based on indications in the text itself, without preconceptions as to what Thucydides should have written or meant to write. Such a reading is, precisely speaking, impossible, for all scholars carry their own prejudices and assumptions with them; but the effort will, I hope, uncover the rigorous principles underlying Thucydides' selection and pres­ entation. Examination will demonstrate the differences in func­ tion between the two major parts of the excursus that cause their different treatment and will reveal the focus, in the second part, on Athenian power as expressed in sieges and battles; this will place in a new context the lack of chronological precision and the omission of many items we might otherwise expect, and will expose the innumerable ties that bind the excursus to the rest of the work. The analysis does not attempt to present a history of the period (which would require a quite different method), but rather to set forth more accurately what, through inclusion and omission, the narrative conveys. First, however, an observation is necessary on the brevity of the excursus, so frequently cited as evidence of late composi­ tion or haste. In this view the ideal excursus would have been much fuller than what we now possess, maintaining the level of detail found in chapters 90-95 7 and rectifying the omission of major events, such as the transfer of the league treasury to Athens, the peace with Persia, and the ostracism of Thucydides son of Melesias. 8 Some items could have been added in brief compass. If the events of this period, however, had been described in the desired detail, the Pentecontaetia would have become a book, not seventeen pages, but three or four times as long. Thucydides treated the events of 479/478 quite selec­ tively, and still employed four and a half pages (1.89-95). Even at the more rapid pace of two pages per year, the period 479-439 would have required 82 pages. 9 In Book I Thucydides deline­ ated the gathering storm, from the Epidamnian stasis to Athens' decision not to back down, setting the Pentecontaetia as an 7 E.g. Gomme, HCT 1363. 8 Meiggs (supra n.3) 444. Gomme has a list of omissions by categories: HCT 1365-89. 9 Cf Westlake 41. Book I runs to eighty-eight OCT pages. Diod. 11.38- 12.40 (478/477 to 439/438, including the Roman sections) occupies forty-five Teubner pages. Already the Pentecontaetia is second in length only to the Corcyraika (eighteen pages) of the units in Book I. The excursuses on the last years of Pausanias and Themistocles (1.128-38) require eight pages. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 38 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA excursus within this account. The Pentecontaetia could not have been expanded without changing completely the pro­ portions and the character of his treatment and of the history as a whole. Herodotus explicitly took the beginning of his account back to Croesus, creating a richly-textured, multi-generational prolegomenon to the expedition of Xerxes. Thucydides chose a different method, and in referring to the Pentecontaetia as an ekbole indicated that it would be a subordinate unit in the overall structure. 10 I. The Structure of the Pcntecontaetia The major structural units of the excursus are recognizable by the opening and closing off of topics through framing phrases or sentences, by the introduction of new topics with a name or temporal phrase, and by the insertion of authorial comments. 11 The excursus as a whole is motivated by the statement at 87.6 reporting the Spartan decision that the treaty had been broken, which is repeated in modified form at 88. The main narrative resumes with the repetition of this statement at 118.3 12 The explanation for this decision, the Spartan recognition that "they would gain even greater power," is stated generally at 88 and 10 Thuc. 1.97.2. Polybius' two-bookproparaskeue exemplifies a different sort of introductory treatment: there is no indication that Thucydides had any such plan in mind, nor is it suggesed by his critics, who seem unaware of the structural problems expansion of the Pentecontaetia would create. lIOn framing sentences, "consisting of repeated introductory phrases or sentences at the beginnings of sections of the narrative, and of summary ones at the ends," see H. R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus (Cleveland 1966) 12 (from which the quotation), 52-58. They are not quite the same as the thesis-proof-restatement noted by Hammond. Cf also R. Katici(', "Die Ringkomposition im ersten Buche des Thukydideischen Geschichts­ werkes," WS 70 (1957) 179-96. Authorial comments arc direct interventions by the author into the narrative, as at 1.93.2: 1(at &!lAll iJ Ol1(OvOJlta ttl 1(at vuv EO'ttV 1('tA.. 12 Thuc. 1.87.6: iJ OE OlaYVWJlll aihll 'tTj~ £1(1(A.lloia~, 'tou 'ta~ 01tOVOOe; A£AUO- 8at .... 88: E'I'l1q>tOav'to OE Ol Aa1(£OatJlOVlOl 'ta~ o1tovOa~ MAuo8m 1(at 1tO­ MJlll't£a dvat .... 118.3: au'tOle; JlEV 01)V 'tOle; Aa1(£OalJlOviOle; otiyvoxJ'to A£A.Uo­ Sat 't£ 'ta~ 01tOVOO~ 1(at 'toue; 'ASllVatOUe; ciOl1(£lV. References in the text arc to Book I unless otherwise specified. Translations are my own. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 39 restated at 118.2.13 The increase of power that aroused Sparta's fear is thus presented as the subject of the excursus to follow. The excursus itself is introduced by yap (89.1).14 Chapter 88 is prefatory and represents Thucydides' insertion of his own in­ terpretation into his narrative. 15 Thucydides offers a second authorial intrusion into the text, this time in the first person, 16 in a second preface inserted at the transition between its two major sections (97.2). Here he reiterates that the excursus would provide an exposition of how the Athenian arche was es­ tablished. In addition, omission of the period by earlier writers (except for Hellanicus, who mentioned it briefly and without chronological precision) provides an additional justification for the long list of episodes that followsY The excursus is divided into two major units composed in quite different styles, connected by a transitional section. The first unit is devoted to Athens' acquisition of the position in which it was able to grow in power-that is, the hegemony of the Ionians and other liberated Greeks. It is introduced and concluded by the framing repetition at 89.1 and in the first phrase of 96.1. 18 Within this frame Thucydides sets two short narratives, the building of the walls despite Spartan opposition and the acquisition of the Aegean hegemony. The first is framed by the phrases at 89.3, 'tllv 1tOAlV avOtlCODoJ.U:'iv 1tapE­ O'KEUaSOV'to Kat 'to. 'tttXTl, and 93.1, 'tou'tq> 'tip 'tP01tq> Ot 'A8Tlva'iol 'tllv 1tOAlV hElXTlO'av £V OAlyq>. After the insertion of 13 Thuc. 1.88: q>of)oullEVOt 'tou~ 'A911vaiov~ 1l1] bttIlE'i1;ov Ovv119oXHV, 6pwnE~ ai)'to'i~ 'to. 1to')JJx. 'tii~ • EANlOO~ {mOXElpta f\Ol1 Dna .... 118.2 oi 'A911vaiot TItV 'tE apX1]v Eyx:paU(J'tEpav x:a'tE(J'tTtro~ DPE'tO x:at 'tii~ ~vllllaxia~ au'twv ll1t'tOv'to. 14 On Thucydides' practice of introducing excursuses with yap, cf H. P. Stahl, "Speeches and Course of Events," in P. A. Stadter, ed., The Speeches in Thucydides (Chapel Hill 1973) 60-77 at 70. 15 Cf Badian, From Piataea 147 (=[1990] 74). 16 Thuc. 1.97.2: Eypa'Va Oe aU'ta x:at hPOA1]V 'tou A6you E1tOtllO'aIlTlV ]("tA. take Ex:f3oATtV to refer to the whole passage 89-117, not just 98-117. 17 The expression alla Oe x:a\ at 1.97.2 does not introduce an afterthought, but an equal or more important reason: cf 1.25.3,92.1; 2.20.4; 5.33.1; 6.89.4 and Hornblower Comm. ad loc.: the inadequacy of previous accounts is a "sccond­ order reason" for the excursus. 18 Thuc. 1.89.1: oi. yap 'A911VatOt 'tp01tcp 'tOtcpOE ~Aeov £1tt 'ta 1tpawa'ta EV ot~ llu~Tt911O'av ... 96.1: 1tapaAa/3ov'tE~ Oe oi 'A911va'iOt 'tTtv i1YElloviav 'tou'tcp 'tip 'tr01tcp· STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 40 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA an additional statement on the walls of the Piraeus and Themis­ tocles' advice, which includes several authorial comments,19 the framing sentence is repeated in strengthened form at 93.8, 'A81lva'iot JlEV o-ov ou't(o~ E-tEtxl'trov ... XPtlJlata hu~av'to aV't\ 'trov vErov 'to i.1CVOUJlEVOV aVUAffiJla aOl<;, although many others, especially the debate at Sparta, contribute to the reader's understanding. The context of the excursus, coming immediately after the decision at Sparta that Athens had broken the treaty, determines that the relationship of Athens and Sparta will be a major theme. The contrast between Sparta and Athens is ever present in the Pentecontaetia as in Book I as a whole. 27 Sparta before and still at the end of the Persian War was the leader of Greece, the natural hegemon of the Hellenic League, the unchallenged commander at Salamis and Plataea. 28 By 432 the Spartans were put in the position of declaring war against Athens to stop its relentless growth and interference with Spartan allies. The ques­ tion posed by Thucydides after the decision at Sparta is not "how was Sparta bad and Athens good?" or even "who was responsible for the war?" but "how did Sparta lose its previous absolute hegemony and Athens rise to a position where it could challenge the former leader?" Thucydides presents this situ­ ation as the result of Sparta's reluctance and inadequacy in 25 Cf Walker 34. For examples of the archaic use of lists, cf H. Frankel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy (Oxford 1975) 517, index item 3.1 ff. On the power and flexibility of lists and their 'para tactic style', cf Immerwahr (supra n.11) 26ff, 47-51. Note the frequency of Kui as a connective in 105-17. Occasional causal statements occur: cf n.75 infra. 26 Walker, esp. 27-33; cf Westlake 59. 27 Cf H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of Thucydides' History (Princeton 1981) 91. The contrast is seen by Thucydides in terms of political behavior, not of morality, as Badian has argued, From Piataea 130, 132-35 (=[1990] 52, 55ff), stressing the supposed "innocence" of the Athenians and "deviousness," "hypocrisy," and "treachery" of the Spartans. 28 Cf Thuc. 1.18.2: o'i 'tE AUK£{)atJlOVWt 'troY ~\JJl7tOMJl1lcrclV'trov 'EAATtvrov lJY1lcruv'to O\JVclJlEt 7tpoUXOV'tE<;. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 43 addressing changing circumstances and of Athens' extraor­ dinary dynamism and audacity, the very factors remarked by the Corinthians in their speech to the Spartans (1.69). As so often in archaic and classical texts, the account has been postponed until the most effective point.29 Only at the moment of the Spartan decision does Thucydides pause to sketch the previous course of events that led them to their vote. Athenian determination and ingenuity lay the groundwork for their arche, revealed in Thucydides' narrative by four discrete items placed at the beginning of the Pentecontaetia: the siege of Sestos, the rebuilding of the city walls, the fortification of the Peiraeus, and the assumption of the hegemony of the Ionians (1.89.2-95). All these actions are in contrast with or opposition to those of Sparta, the established hegemon and leader of the league against Persia. The Spartans withdrew from the war against Persia (89.2, 95.7). They discouraged the rebuilding of the Athenian city wall and wanted to supply commanders for the fleet operating in the Aegean, but were unwilling to take firm action to achieve either goal (92, 95.7). Because neither Sparta nor Athens desired an open break, both sides hid the power struggle behind fair words,30 although Themistocles insisted frankly, once the height of the walls permitted, on Athenian equality. Thucydides' mode of telling the story-with numerous in­ direct speeches, a dialogue, reports of thoughts, and use of the historical present31-reveals Spartan assumptions and percep- 29 Noted by E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus, Agamemnon (Oxford 1950) I 39, III 805 (App. A) for details within a narrative. Although Fraenkel in the title of the appendix seems to limit this feature to archaic narrative, and apart from Aesch. Ag. 59 and 190 cites only Hdt. 1.110-12, it is also classical, found, e.g., in Xenophon's self-introduction, delayed until Anab. 3.1.4. In Thucydides, compare the late introduction of Pericles as a major protagonist at 1.127. The technique often conveys the surprise of the participants, as at 1.50.5, 2.5.1, or 6.46. 30 Cf 90.2: aU OTJAoUV'tE~; 91.3: Kpucpa, ~KlO"'ta btlo'ivOt'to apto'to oU'to'i~, Cf also 93.3f, 96.1. For apto'to as 'advantageous', cf 6.8.2,26.1. This seems to me in full agreement with the view of Herodotus 8.3.2: "they took Pausanias' arrogance as an excuse (prophasis) and took the hegemony away from the Spartans." The view of «Athens' foundation of the Oelian league as an innocent matter" (P. ]. Rhodes, CAH2 V 47) is distinctly un-Thucydidean. 41 For the meaning of 7tPOOXllf,lO see Rawlings and Hornblower, Comm. ad loco Thucydides expresses the same attitude toward the causes of the Sicilian expedition, an attempt to establish another arche, 6.6.1. 42 The dispatch of Oorcis and the others to the fleet indicates the Spartans' desire to continue as leaders. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. STADTER 47 only confirm allied leanings toward Athens. 43 Thucydides is silent on the discussions at Sparta that must have followed the allied defection, but does indicate some motives for their acquiescence in the loss of their hegemony. Pausanias, their most forceful commander, no longer seemed trustworthy de­ spite his acquittal. His successor Dorcis was rejected by the Greeks. The Spartans did not send others, for fear that duty abroad would corrupt them, as it had Pausanias; and in any case they wished to be free of the Persian war. Finally, they did not believe that Athens was a direct threat to their power. As in the case of the walls, where Thucydides remarks that the Spartans still were friendly to the Athenians at this time (92.1, 1tpocrqaAEl<; QV'tE<; EV 'tip 't6'tE), they thought that the Athenians would be useful to themselves for the present (95.7, (J(piotv EV 'tip t6tE 1tap6v'tt E1tltTl8dou<;). Thucydides implies a note of conde­ scension: they considered the Athenians lxavou<; E~TlYElcr8al. They would discover the truth soon enough. At the same time, Thucydides emphasizes that this was the Spartan attitude "for the present"; if the situation were to change, they reserved the right to reevaluate their decision. 44 The narrative in these chapters is focused on the power bal­ ance between Athens and Sparta at the end of the Persian War. The Athenians' incredible success in rising out of the ashes and laying a basis for their future strength invited elaborate treat­ ment, with frequent indirect quotations and reports of the thought of the actors, as well as authorial observations on the significance on what was done. In the remaining narrative, both Spartan strength and Athenian ambitions were givens: the explicandum was the growth of Athenian power, seen in 43 Consider different possible scenarios. When complaints are heard against Pausanias, the Spartans immediately (a) recall him and send out a new and more gracious commander with a fleet of respectable size to support him; or (b) send Pausanias more ships and men to enforce his will, simultaneously warning the Athenians that any disloyalty will mean an immediate invasion. Under such conditions the transfer of hegemony might never have taken place. Diodorus (11.50) reports sentiment at Sparta to recover the hegemony, by force if necessary, but the notion was soon abandoned. On Spartan reluctance to deal forcefully with Pausanias, cf. also Thuc. 1.128-35. 44 The silence on internal debate in both cities is striking, but of a piece with the rest of the excursus, which does not treat divisions within either Sparta or Athens. See below, section 7. The relation of the whole passage in style and content to 1.126-38 must be reserved for another occasion. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 48 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONTAETIA relation to Sparta. 45 For this reason the focus of the following narrative is on Athens' actions, not intentions, and Sparta appears only in so far as its actions affect or illuminate those of Athens. Only occasional and generally unfulfilled efforts chal­ lenged the growth of Athenian power, as when Thasos and Euboea revolted. Even the great battle of Tanagra, according to Thucydides' narrative, was unintended, forced by Athenian domination of the Megarid and the Corinthian Gulf. The most significant Peloponnesian effort to block Athenian initiatives was the Corinthian invasion of the Megarid, aimed at breaking the siege of Aegina, which ended in disaster, and the invasion of 446, which supported Megara's revolt. Whether from indepen­ dence, fear, or the greed of individual Spartans, the Spartans did not accept Megabazus' inducements to invade Attica while the Athenians were committed in Egypt,46 nor later did they help Sam os when it revolted. 47 Athens' defeats, even when signi­ ficant, as with the Egyptian disaster and the losses of Boeotia and Megara, still do not prevent its exercise of overwhelming force at Samos. In Thucydides' narrative the Pentecontaetia is dominated by a strong, aggressive, and ceaselessly active Athens. 45 Athens' power vis-a-vis Persia is not a major concern in the Pentecon­ taetia. The victory of the Eurymedon, the defeat in Egypt, and the other actions implied by 97.1 (1tpO<; 'tOy IW-p~pov) and 118.2 ('tov ~ap~(lpov ) are pre­ sented in the context of Athens' ability to assert itself against Sparta. This focus on Spartan-Athenian rivalry explains why 1.1S.3, a summary statement, is silent on the fighting against Persia. Does this indicate that the Pentecon­ taetia was composed before 411, or at least before 40S? The role of Persia deserves more attention in the composition debate, but cf. Andrewes, "Thucydides and the Persians," Historia 10 (1961) 1-18 46 Thucydides' report on Megabazus' mission to Sparta is cryptic, but may refer to Spartans taking the money without effecting any change in rolicy. We can only guess. Cf D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 33 , 62 n.S4. 47 Thucydides tells elsewhere that a vote was taken on the matter by the Peloponnesians, 1.40.5, 41.2, 43.1. If indeed the Peloponnesian League fol­ lowed the bicameral model of A. H. M. Jones, "Two Synods of the Delian and Peloponnesian League," PCPS N5. 2 (1952-53) 43--46, supported by de Ste. Croix (supra n.34) 200-03, then Sparta had already decided to act at this time, but was dissuaded by its allies. In any case, as with Thasos, nothing was done. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 49 III. The Exercise of Hegemony Chapters 96-99 present an overall view of the Athenian arche in two segments, the initial dispositions (96) and how they changed (97ff). The latter segment begins and ends with au­ thorial comments on the meaning of the change. In 96 Thucyd­ ides describes how the Athenians as hegemon established their relations to the allies. They assigned48 the allies quotas of ships and money; the Hellenotamiai were established as an Athenian magistracy, which would supervise the collection of tribute;49 and Delos, an island under Athenian protection if not control, was established as the treasury and meeting place. 50 Thucydides does not here describe a league in which Athens was an equal member, but a hegemony in which Athens offered protection and reprisals against Persian territory, and the allies supported Athens with ships and money. 51 He states the sum of the first phoros;52 but unlike other authors, he is silent on the actual swearing of oaths and the role of Aristides in winning over the allies and setting the tribute quotas. 53 48 Thuc. 1.96.1 E-taSav. the standard word for assignment of tribute, and the term used after the subjugation of Thasos (101.3), Aegina (108.5), and Samos (117.3). 49 Note the emphatic repetition 8Elpav 'tae; ltOAAae; 'troy VEroV, a1. 8' EAaO'O'ou<; 8tEq>UYOV ltaAtv. The final sentence reminds us once more that this was an Athenian disaster: "In this way ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies in Egypt." Other major slaughters are also noted, as at Tanagra (q>ovo<; £rEVE'tO cXJlq>O'tEPWV) and Coronea ('tOue; JlEV 8tEq>8npav 'troy 'A81lvatwV, 'toue; 8E ~rov'tae; £Aa~ov). 95 The significant clement of pathos in imperial achievement is perhaps the reason for mentioning the disaster at Drabeskos, even though it seems to have occurred some years after the revolt of Thasos. The suffering of these fifty years, another sign of greatness, points toward the greater suffering of the war.96 The lta8TtJla'ta have a paradigmatic quality, as does so much of this excursus: the Corinthian pathos seems to foreshadow especially the slaughter of the Athenians at the Assinarus (7.84), as the fate of the Egyptian expedition foreshadows that of the expedition to Sicily. In addition, the suffering inflicted and endured by the Athenians was an additional factor behind the Spartan decision in 432. The Corinthian disaster would have dismayed the Spartans and exacerbated Corinthian hostility, while Athenian refusal to curb their activity even after Egypt or Coronea would only have increased Spartan fear. That fear would have made them more receptive to the Corinthian reproaches in the Congress at Sparta. VI. Omissions The review of the contents of the Pentecontaetia and their effect on the reader permits a rather different evaluation of the 95 At Coronea, note also the use of the historical present, EnttiOfV'tal. 96 Herodotus saw this period also as a time of suffering (Hdt. 6.98.2). Pericles' Funeral Speech is a celebration of the choice that the Athenians made in being willing to die for the power of their city (cf esp. 2.42f) and alludes as well to the suffering their actions brought to others (2.41.4). STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. STADTER 63 omissions that are such a significant and often lamented feature of the text. The chief reason for considering the excursus incom­ plete, hasty, and biased is its silence on so many events, often of major importance, which one might expect to be treated even in an abbreviated account of the period 479-432. 97 But in the body of his history Thucydides also omits much that would interest a modern historian: economic and social history, per­ sonal histories of leading figures, etc. Here, however, I shall consider only omissions of categories that Thucydides regularly reported in the body of his work. Because the Pentecontaetia­ especially the second part-is episodic, a list rather than an inter­ pretative account, the very selection of items directs the reader. In the same way, omissions may be seen as defining for the reader the purpose of the narrative. The absence of the fol­ lowing categories helps us delimit more precisely the purpose of the excursus. (1) Chronological Framework. Perhaps the most significant lack for the modern reader is the absence of any internal chron­ ological or conceptual framework in the second part of the narrative (100-17). This is a question of method rather than of individual gaps, in marked contrast to Thucydides' methodol­ ogy in Books III-IV, with its rigid sequence of years, neatly divided into summers and winters. In the Pentecontaetia time references float free, 98 with no relation, as in modern histories, to such entities as the "First Pcloponnesian War" or the "Second Sacred War" to help the reader conceptualize events. The absence of chronological indications is in fact characteristic of the whole first book from the Archaeology on, and not limited to the Pentecontaetia. Thucydides offers no dates for e.g. the stasis at Epidamnus, the battles of Leukimme or Sybota, the events in Potidaea, or the Megarian decrees.99 The only clear date, set relative to the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace, is 97 The omissions have been frequently remarked. See especially the long but still incomplete list compiled by Gomme, !lCT I 365-89. 98 Cf Gomme, HCT I 362: "Between these limits his events float like sticks in water in an oblong bowl, preserving their relative order, but none of them with a fixed position in relation to the ends of the bowl and but few of them relatively to each other," although I do not agree with Gomme that all events are in chronological order. Some of the dates can be established by statements outside the Pentecontaetia, but within the excursus the exercise does not interest Thucydides. Cf Andrewes, HCT V 381. 99 Similarly also the narratives of Cy lon, Pausanias, and Themistocles, 1.126-38. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 64 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA at 1.87.6: the Spartan decision was made in the fourteenth year of the treaty.lOO The standard explanation has been that Thucydides wanted and was able to give a precise chronological framework, but for some reason did not. lOl Another theory, noting the imprecision of oral memory, suggests that he was able to assign dates to very few events, especially before the mid-century, but recorded those that were remembered. lo2 When the war broke out in 431, however, Thucydides was already an interested and sophisticated observer, and it certainly would have been possible for him to construct from the oral memory of the older generation a fairly clear chronological scheme for the fifty years preceding. The fact is, he does not give dates even for events, such as the Corcyraean episode, of which he was a contemporary observer. A more straightfor­ ward hypothesis, and one more in keeping with the evidence of the text, is that Thucydides did not wish to give a precise chronological structure to his account because he considered such a structure irrelevant to or even distracting from the points he was trying to make. lo3 There are only ten precise statements of duration in the Pentecontaetia: two specify the length of the first and last major sieges (101.3, 117.3), three the unusually short intervals between pairs of Athenian actions (105.6, 108.2, 117.1), two the length of time the Greeks were able to hold out against Megabyzus and the total length of the Egyptian campaign (109.4, 110.1), one the length of the siege of Ithome (103.1), and two the intervals of inaction before the five­ year treaty and after the thirty-year treaty (112.1,115.2). Finally, Thucydides gives a round number for the whole period: roughly fifty years (118.2). In none of these cases does Thucydides try to tie these intervals into a larger chronological framework: each is given to reinforce the themes of the 100 The treaty itself is later (at 2.2.1) dated fifteen years before the beginning of the war, but not when it is mentioned at 1.115.1. 101 Comme writes, e.g., that Thucydides intended to write "a succinct, annalistic narrative of datable events" but that "cc. 99-113 are very far from fulfilling that intention" (HCr I 389). If annalistic means "year by year" or "precisely dated by (archon or other) year," there is absolutely no evidence for such a desire in the text. 102 Badian, From Piataea 74 (=[1988] 291). 103 Cf Westlake 42. Note that Herodotus also used a quite different chrono­ logical method for the account of Xerxes' invasion (winter and summer campaigning seasons year by year) from that in the 'preliminary' books on the expansion of Persia. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 65 excursus, as has been indicated above. These certainly are not the only dates or intervals that Thucydides knew (cf Gomme, Hey I 389ff); the presumption should be that they are those that he thought useful to his readers. The narrative is presented in roughly chronological order, as the frequent use of JlE'tU 'ta1)"[a and UO"'tEPOV attests. Other prin­ ciples of order, however, are also at work, as seen in the discus­ sion of the Thasian and Messenian revolts and the analysis of 1.104-10.104 The recognition that some incidents are intro­ duced out of chronological order to keep topics together or to reinforce a point should offer no difficulty (e.g. the disaster at Drabescus and the fall of !thorne). It was undoubtedly Thucy­ dides' intention to improve upon Hellanicus (97.2), but the precise manner in which this was accomplished cannot be deter­ mined in the face of our total ignorance of Hellanicus' treatment of this period. 105 (2) Diplomatic Events, such as Embassies and Treaties. Obvious omissions are the oaths and terms of the Delian League and the treaty between Sparta and Argos, but also lesser items such as the treaties between Athens and Egesta, Leontini, Rhegion, and Phocis, and undoubtedly many other cities. l06 Thucydides refers to the Hellenic alliance continuing from the Persian Wars in establishing the initial relation between Athens 104 Note also the flashback at 93.3 (1tpO'tEPOV) and the anticipation at 98.4 (£1tEt'tU) and references to contemporaneous events at 89.3, 91.3, 95.3, 100.3, 107.1, and 109.1. Cf e.g. McNeal; Badian, From Piataea (ef especially 79f the example from Thuc. 4.50 ) and Lewis (supra n.71) 500. The contrary view is set out most firmly by AT L III 162 that Thucydides' improvement (over Hel­ lanicus' account) "is to set events in proper order. It is our belief that in his excursus Thucydides has done this without any deviation whatever." 105 Only fragments 323a F 28 (Salamis, 480 B.C.), T8 (=F12, Thuc. 1.97.2), and F25f (407/406 B.C.) are securely referable to Hellanicus' fifth-century account. Despite much discussion, no certain conclusion is possible: cf Andrewes, HCT V 381. Thucydides' emphasis on the simultaneity of the Egyptian expedition and the actions reported in 1.105-08, e.g., may be a corrective to Hellanicus. The account would have had to be quite short, perhaps only a few pages, and may have been available to Thucydides-and to others-before it reached its final form. For recent treatments, cf R. J. Lenardon, "Thucydides and Hellanicus," in G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar, edd., Classical Contributions. Studies in Honour of M. F. McGregor (Locust Valley [N.Y.] 1981) 59-70; J. D. Smart, "Thucydides and Hellanicus," in 1. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman, edd., Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing (Cambridge 1986) 19-35. 106 Thucydides knew of the Spartan-Argive treaty: cf 4.14.4. We possess only a fraction of Athens' treaties with poleis within and outside her empire. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 66 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONTAETIA and Sparta (1.89.2), and Athens' decision to withdraw from the alliance and establish alliances with Argos and Thessaly (1.102.4), the beginning of overt differences between the two leading powers. The two treaties between Athens and Sparta are men­ tioned, but with one exception nothing is said of their terms or conditions except how long the treaties were to last. In each case the treaties serve to explain brief periods of Athenian quiet. 10l Further, Thucydides mentions Athens' surrender of Nisaea, Pegae, and Troezen in the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace, not as a part of a full account of treaty terms, but to indi­ cate that Athens was withdrawing from these Dorian terri­ tories, as after Coronea she had withdrawn from Boeotia. Given his silence on treaties, there is no basis for arguing that Thucy­ dides duplicitously suppressed the terms of the Peace of Calli as or of the Thirty Years Peace,108 or that his silence is an argu­ ment against the Peace of Callias or the Congress Decree. 109 The exception to this and the following category is chapters 90- 95, the account of how Athens got the hegemony. The planning and diplomatic maneuvers of both Athens and Sparta on that occasion are set out in some detail, as has been noted. The silence on the Peace of Callias reflects also Thucydides' general disinterest in the role of Persia, and therefore of Athenian relations to Persia, which is a significant weakness of his treat­ ment not only of the Pentecontaetia, but of the whole war down to 411. He consistently sees the period from 479 to 411 in terms of Spartan-Athenian relations, so that even the battle of the Eurymedon, the Egyptian campaign, and the intervention of 107 The treaties at 1.112.1, 115.1; the quiet periods at 112.2, "the Athenians refrained from war in Greece" and 115.2 "in the sixth year .... " The two chronological notices at 1.112.1 and 1.115.2 serve to delimit further the periods of Athenian tranquillity, not to locate the treaties within a temporal grid. 108 Pace Badian, From Plataea 134 (Peace of Callias), 137-45 (Thirty Years' Peace) (=[1990] 57,61-71). 109 Thucydides' silence has made the authenticity of both highly prob­ lematic, yet from the nature of the Pentecontaetia there is no reason to expect that he would have reported them. For recent discussions and references to earlier work, see Badian, "The Peace of Callias," in From Plataea 1-72 (expanded and updated from his article in ]HS 107 [1987] 1-39) and Meiggs (supra n.3) 205-19. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 67 Pissouthnes in the Samian War are seen in terms of Athenian activity, not of the Persian danger.110 (3) Debates on Policy or its Implementation. The only excep­ tion is Themistocles' case for constructing the walls of Athens and of the Peiraeus. We can imagine many debates at Athens, some of which are mentioned by other authors: whether to seize the opportunity to supplant Sparta in the Aegean, or to help Sparta in the 460s, or to aid Inarus in Egypt, or to accept the Thirty Years' Peace. All these serious and difficult q ues­ tions, and similar ones for Sparta and the other cities,111 Thucyd­ ides passes over in silence: the intellectual and emotional factors of war, depicted so vividly for the war and its immediate antecedents, have no place here. ll2 (4) Internal Politics. There is nothing in the excursus on the ostracisms of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, or Thucydides the son of Melasias, on the democratic reforms, or on the build­ ing debate, or on internal politics or debates in Sparta or other states. The reference to pro-Laconian elements in Athens (107.4ff) explains the Athenian decision to confront the Spartans in Boeotia, rather than factional politics at Athens. No mention is made of Cimon's presence at the battle, or the role of the olig­ archic opposition in these years. The Laconian earthquake, with all its disastrous effect on Spartan internal and external policy, is cited simply as the factor that blocked Spartan aid to Thasos and permitted the helot revolt. (5) Imperial Measures Not Involving Significant Military Actions. The Pentecontaetia is silent on individual synods of the League, the movement of the treasury to Athens, minor rebel­ lions and uprisings, special regulations and administrative mea­ sures, adjustments to tribute, and other imperial decisions and actions. Treatment of the empire as such is limited to chapters 96-99, which sketch succinctly two of the instruments by which Athens established its hegemony and broadened its 110 For this reason, and in the light of 1. 90-95, it is probably best to interpret the ufear" spoken of by the Athenians at 1.76, as fear of Sparta, not of Persia. Cf. also supra n.45 111 E.g. consideration of the Samian and Mytilenean requests for aid to their actual or potential revolts (cf. Thuc. 1.41.2,3.2.1). 112 Rawlings (supra n.27: 74) notes that Athenian policy is never explained in Book I, until Pericles' first speech; the reader is given only Athenian actions, though 1.44 and 90-95 arc exceptions to this rule. Strong emotion, especially fear, is however implicit throughout the Pentecontaetia, and in a particular way in the pathos passages already discussed. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 68 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA power: tribute income and the navy. The tribute was admin­ istered by Athenian magistrates, and treaty obligations were rigidly enforced by the navy.ll3 (6) Cleruchies and Foundations of Cities. Thucydides omits the foundations of Brea, Thurii, Amphipolis, and the cleruchies or colonists sent to the Chersonese, N axos, Andros, Sinope, Amisos, and elsewhere. The colony at Ennea Hodoi is men­ tioned as part of the response to the rebellion of Thasos, but the attempt to establish a colony there immediately following the fall of Eion (L ad Aeschin. 2.31) has no place here. The cleruchy to Hestiaea (1.114.5) was part of the punishment of that city. (7) Naval Expeditions That Did Not Have Significant Military Engagements. E.g. Ephialtes' expedition beyond the Chelido­ nian islands (Plut. Per. 19.1,20.1£).114 Thucydides' casual refer­ ence to the two hundred ships "which happened to be on cam­ paign in Cyprus" and were sent to Egypt (104.2) is a reminder of Athens' constant naval operations. Phormio's expedition with thirty ships to Acarnania, which helped the Acarnanians and Amphilochians take and resettle Amphilochian Argos, might have been included but perhaps involved neither a sig­ nificant battle nor direct capture of the city by Athens. (8) Actions of Other Cities That Did Not Directly Involve A thens. This would include the troubles that Sparta had intern­ ally and with its neighbors, especially Argos and Arcadia,115 des­ pite the importance that these held for Sparta's lack of resistance to Athens. The narrative we possess is rigorously selective. After the first section sketching Athens' rise to hegemony, it concen­ trates on actions, not debate, on battles, not treaties. Athenian activity expressed its power and was sufficient explanation for Sparta's fear. The silence on events between the Samian War and the Corcyrean conflict that has so troubled scholars can be in large part explained under the categories listed here, although other factors may be at work as well. In particular, the Samian War represented the most frightening and determined display 113 Thucydides is silent on many other ways by which Athens managed the empire, for which see Meiggs (supra n.3) 205-19. 114 This category would include as well the prior expedition of Cimon to Sparta, if it took place (Plut. Cim. 16.8ff; cf Ar. Lys. 1138-41 and Badian, From P/ataea 89-95 (=[1988] 304-10), and the Athenian contingent at the battle of Oinoe. 115 Cf Thuc. 1.118.2; Hdt. 9.35; Diod. 11.65; Lewis (supra n.71) 104-08, 120. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. 5T ADTER 69 of Athenian strength; nothing that followed could overshadow it or reinforce its import. Thucydides apparently preferred to end his excursus with this dramatic act, rather than trail off in a series of events of lesser significance. The war was waiting to happen. 116 VII. Conclusion The foregoing analysis indicates that the Pentecontaetia is neither incomplete nor poorly thought out, but an organized narrative that effectively sets out the major factors that led to the Spartan decison of 432, reported at 1.87. Different forms of narrative present (1) the decisive Athenian effort in rebuilding their walls and assuming hegemony in the Aegean after the destruction of their city, and (2) their dynamism in the years that followed, displaying their incredible energy, in losses, as well as remarkable successes. The two major sections, 89-95 and 98-117, are markedly diverse in style and degree of detail be­ cause the two parts serve different functions within the excur­ sus, so that the same technique was not suitable for both. The Athenian arche is not in itself the subject of the excursus, but represents the principal means, as set out in cc. 96-99, by which Athens was able to acquire the resources that rermitted and in­ spired this incessant activity. The purpose 0 the excursus, as derived from context and content, is to indicate how the estab­ lishment and increase of Athenian power, seen in terms of their dynamic activity, give the Spartans cause to fear. The omissions are consistent with this purpose and thus cannot be used as evidence of incompleteness or of authorial intention to deceive or mislead. The Pentecontaetia narrative develops and clarifies many of the themes present in the earlier sections of Book I, especially those of the Archaeology and of the debate at Sparta. Its account of Athenian power, based on walls and navy, rclate directly to the analysis of power in the Archaeology and the complex interrelation of surplus wealth, walls, naval strength, and the subjection of weaker communities. 117 First the Kerky- 116 Cf Thuc. 1.44.2 for the Athenian attitude. The Corcyraean and Corin­ thian statements are clearly self-serving: 1.33.3, 36.1,42.2. 117 Cf the summary passage at 1.8.3, but also passages such as 11.1; 13.1, 6; 14.3. Minos, Pelops and Agamemnon, and Polycrates provide earlier instances of the same combination. Cf also de Romilly (supra n.38) esp. 260-73; P. R. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 70 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONTAETIA raika and Poteideatika, then the speeches at Sparta set out the themes of navy, imperial action, hegemonic ambition, and the different styles of Athens and Sparta. After the vote at Sparta, as Connor has acutely remarked (supra n.66: 41), the reader is filled with questions about the previous interaction of Athens and Sparta, and is especially desirous of a fuller account than that presented by the Athenian speakers of Athens' assumption of hegemony and its behavior as a leader.11s The excursus addresses the "truest reason"-the growth of Athenian power that frightened the Spartans-and brings its nar­ rative down to the Samian War, after which, as Walker observes (32), the "account of the formal cause (beginning with the Corcyra episode) can itself, as an account of activity which caused complaint, present the reader by implication with an account of Athenian growth which caused alarm." The excursus also prepares the reader for the war narrative that follows: the ineffectiveness of the Spartan invasions of Attica, the willingness of the Athenians to endure the sufferings of being cooped within the walls and of the plague, and their ability to mount more than one large enterprise simultaneously.119 The Pentecontaetia does not paint a rosy and unrealistic pic­ ture of Athenian nobility and goodwill in the time preceding the Peloponnesian War, in an attempt to justify the war to a genera­ tion disillusioned by the defeat of 404,120 but draws a strikingly clear-eyed, even harsh, picture of Athenian ambition and use of Pouncy, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New York 1980) 45-53. 118 Cf 1.75, the acquistion of the hegemony; 1.76, the natural ambition to rule; and 1.77, Athenian and Spartan treatment of subject allies. Cf Connor (supra n.66) 46: "The Pentecontaetia thus forges a link between the quanti­ tative analysis of power in the Archaeology and the emphasis on national characteristics in the Corinthian speech at Sparta." 119 E.g. Pericles' massive expedition to Epidaurus, while maintaining the siege of Potidaea. 120 Cf on Thucydides' "last redaction" E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides1 (Hildesheim 1960) 113, 133, 157f; Badian, From Piataea 73f (=[1988] 290f), "'Thucydides and the Outbreak," passim. The cursory treat­ ment of Athens' greatest victory against the Persians, at the Eurymedon, the crushing of Thasos and Samos, with no reference to diplomacy or discussion, and the mention of pro-Spartan sentiment at the time of Tanagra hardly seem to support the idea of the excursus as an apologia for Athenian policy: a much better case could have been made. He might, e.g., have been more explict here on the Spartan sense of being in the wrong, indicated only at 7.18.2. STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 PHILIP A. ST ADTER 71 power. Nevertheless, glorification of Athens is a distinct ele­ ment of the excursus. Like the Funeral Speech, it celebrates the energy and self-sacrifice of the Athenian people, at the same time that it permits us to observe the darker side of the imperial­ istic urge. The empire is an object of hate, but also a source of eternal glory, as Pericles reminded the Athenians in his last speech (2.64.5). The reader is invited to wonder at the indom­ itable drive of the Athenians, while noting the horrible casual­ ties and the enslavement of supposedly autonomous states. Like the Funeral Speech, the Pentecontaetia is both glorious and melancholy, for they both share the tragic vision of the human condition that lay at the foundation of Thucydides' view of empire and war. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL September, 1993 TABLE The Episodes of 1.98-117 CHAPTER SUBJECT INTRODUCTORY PHRASE 1. 98.1 Eion 1tp&-tov ~EV 2. 98.2 Scyros £1t Ct1: (1 3. 98.3 Carystus 1tpO~ OE K(1puO'tiou~ 4. 98.4 Naxos N(1~iotl; OE a1toO'tuO"l 5. 100.1 Eurymedon EYEV£1;O OE ~E'to. 1:(1U1:(1 6. 100.2-103.3 Thasos-Ithome XpOvcr OE U01:EPOV 7. 103.4 Megara 1tPOOEXmPTJO(1V OE K(1t 8. 104.1 f Egypt I 'Ivapw~ OE 9. 105.1 a Halieis 'AeTJv(1iot~ OE 10. 105.1 b Cecryphaleia K(1t U()"'tEPOV It. 105.2-106.2 Aegina I-Megarid 1tOAE~OU OE K(11:(101:av- 1:0~ ... ~E'ta 1:W1Ccwv ... STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 72 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA 14. 10B.2b-3b Oenophyta 'A9T)vo.'iot of. O£\)'tEJX;t leO. 1. E Sl1leOatn it /lE pq. 15. 10B.3b Long Walls II 16. 10B.4 Aegina II cO/lOAOyrlOo.v of. leO. 1. ... j.lEtu taut 0. 17. 10B.5 T olmides' periplous leO. 1. lB. 109.1-110.4 Egypt II ol 0' f:V tn Aiy{J1ttCfl 19. 111.1 Thessaly f:le of. 8mao.At(),(; 'OpEa't11~ 20. 111.2f Pericles' periplous j.lEtU of. to.Uto. ou 7tOAAC!> uatEpOv 21. 112.1 five-year treaty uattpov of. OtaAt7tOV- trov £trov tptrov 22. 112.2ff Cyprus lea1. ... f:~ of. Ku7tpov 23. 112.5 Delphi J\aleEOatj.lOVWt of. /lEtU tauta 24. 113.1-4 Chaeronea-Coronea leal. xp6vou f:yyrvollEvOU j.lEtU tauto. 25. 114.1ff Euboea- Eleusis IlftU of. tauta ou 7tOAAC!> UatEpOv 26. 115.1 30-year treaty avaxroPtlaavtr~ ... ou 7tOAAC!> uatrpov 27. 115.2-117.3 Samos EletCfl of. £tft