NOONAN, J. D., Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion , Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 33:1 (1992:Spring) p.37 

Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus and the Scholion 

]. D. Noonan 

I N DESCRIBING THE ORIGINS of the Peloponnesian War, Thu­
cydides asserts that the real explanation for the conflict­
less obvious to contemporaries and discussed less openly 

than the parties' specific grievances-was the growth of Athen­
ian power and the resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians 
that compelled the Greeks generally, i.e., these two opposing 
states and their allies, to go to war (1.23.6): 'tllv JlEV yap aATl8Ecr­
'ta'tTlv 1tpo<pucrtV, a<puvEcr'ta'tTlv 8£ AOYCP, 'tou<; 'A8Tlvuio'\)<; 
11YOU~tat JlqaAo'\)<; ytYVOJl£vo'\)<; KUt <po~ov 1tUP£Xov'tu<; 'tOt<; 
AUKE8atJlOVlOt<; avuYKacrat £<; 'to 1tOAEJlElV' ut. 8' £<; 'to <puv£pov 
AqOJlEVUt ui'tiUl.. .. 1 

1 M. Ostwald, ANATKH in Thucydides (Atlanta 1988) 3ff, following Croiset 
(1886), agrees that there is an ellipse of the direct object of UV cxYKaO"at at 
1.23.6, and that if the object CXU'tou~ were to be supplied, it would refer to both 
Athenians and Spartans. The closest parallel seems to be Thuc. 2.75.3, 
~vaYKcxSov i:~ 'to EPYOV (cf LSJ S.V. UVCXYKUSOl, who would supply an acc. 
pers. in both places). P. J. Rhodes, Thucydides: History II (Warminster 1988) 
133, translates 2.75.3: "the xenagoi (of the Lacedaemonians) ... compelled the 
men to persevere in the work," as if something like cxu'tou~ were left out here 
too. The problem with cxu'tou~ at 1.23.6 is that because the Athenians (acc.) are 
the subject of uVCXYl(UcrCX1, uu'tou~ ought to refer to the Lacedaemonians. 
Perhaps a freer expansion of the text, such as 'tou~ ''EMT)VCX~, should be in the 
reader's mind at 1.23.6. One need only add that Thucydides states at the 
outset (1.1.2) that the two sides included allies from among most Greek 
cities-some of whom joined the hostilities at once, while others became 
involved after long deliberation-and also drew a part of the barbarian world 
into the conflict, which meant that this war affected the largest portion of 
mankind (btl. 1tAl'.tcr'tOV UV8pOl1tOlV). Any object assumed at 1.23.6 surely 
resumes the scope of the thought of the opening chapter. Ostwald maintains 
that the omission of a direct object after UVCXYlCUO"CX 1 creates a pronounced 
emphasis upon it, but he prefers translations that transform the infinitive into 
the noun necessitatem (Valla; this is the point of Dionysius' and the 
scholiast's remark [see further below] or the adjective 'inevitable' [=uvcxy­
KCXtOV: Crawley J). For the meaning of the phrase uAT)81'.O"'tu'tT)v 1tpOq>CXo"lV, 
uq>CXVI'.O"'tu'tT)V OE AOYCP see n.6 infra. 

37 



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38 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

An identical reaction to the style of this passage appears in 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Amm. 2.6) and the scholia vetera: 2 

~oUA£'tat yap bllAOUV, on IH:yaAOt YlYV0/J-£VOt Ot 'A811vaiol 
avaYKllV 1tap£crxov 'tOU 1tOA£/J-OU.3 Modern scholars have 
tended to repeat what they find in this brief explanation;4 and 
the passage is still not well understood, although it continues to 
provoke speculation on Thucydides' concept of metaphysical 
-or at least meta-historical-determinism.5 

2 C. Hude, Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata (Leipzig 1927) 
26. 

3 W. K. Pritchett, Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides (Berkeley 
1975) 90 n.23, observes how freely Dionysius alters the original in his 
purported quotation preceding the comment cited above (''tilv ~fV oDv 
<lA:r18£(J't<l'tl1V ai'ttav. AOYl{l Of cupav£(J't<l'tl1v. 'tou~ 'A811vato\)~ oio~at ~£yu­
AO\)~ YtyvOf.LEVO\)~ <lvay)(uaat £i~ 'to 1tOA£f.L£tV '): yap becomes ODv. 1tpo(jlaat~ 
a ilta, and l)YOUf.Lat oiof.Lat; word order is slightly altered; and the phrase that 
speaks of stirring up fear in the Spartans is completely omitted. G. Pavano, 
Dionisio d'Alicarnasso: Saggio su T ucidide (Palermo 1958) 39n., suggests that 
the difference between Th. 10, where Dionysius quotes Thucydides 1.23.6 
accurately, and Amm. 2.6, where 1.23.6 is altered, occurred because Dionysius 
was relying on memory when he composed the letter to Ammaeus. ]. G. A. 
Ros, Die METABOAH (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides (Nijmegen 
1938) 67, proposes that Dionysius, in composing the letter, had to contend 
with marginal notes in his text of Thucydides; as a result, Dionysius paid less 
heed to the text itself than to the comments on and explanations of the text in 
his notes. 

4 In his discussion of Dionysius' comment on 1.23.6, the distinction made 
by Ros (supra n.3: 56£) between ~£'tapoAfJ and E~aAAayfJ (,departure from 
normal usage') is important, especially because Thucydides usually departs in 
exactly the opposite direction from what we take to be standard usage by 
substituting, or even inventing, nouns for verbs (6vof.Laa'tt1Cl) At~t~). On this 
point, see the introduction to]. Steup's edition of Thukydides, erkltirt 'Von J. 
Classen (Berlin 1919) lxxiii. The analysis of 1.23.6 that originates in Dionysius 
and the scholion and continues in comments like those of Steup and Ros is 
sometimes ignored by those who deal principally with 'historical' questions. 
A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I (Oxford 1956) 152 
n.1, for example, has little to say about uVa)'KUaal E~ 'to 1tOAff.LftV. other than 
to indicate annoyance at Jaeger's suggestion that the "rule of necessity"-an 
amoral rule at that-is involved in Thucydides' analysis of the war's causes. 

5 For W. R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton 1984) 126 nA1, 1.23.6 is "the 
most discussed" passage in the history, yet "poorly understood" for all that. 
What was not apparent to Thucydides' contemporaries, according to Connor, 
and turned out to be the historian's keenest insight was his assertion that the 
pattern of Athenian expansion overwhelmed in importance all the alleged 
rights and wrongs of particular disputes among the Greek states. Connor also 
notes (32 n.31) that the passsage has given rise to many arguments about 
determinism. On the issue of philosophical determinism Connor seems right: 
there is no force or idea transcending human action and human knowledge 



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J. D. NOONAN 39 

Students of Thucydides' manner of expressing himself in this 
crucial chapter claim that he has displayed a characteristic 
peculiarity at 1.23.6 by substituting piUla'ta for DVOJla'ta. They 
point out that in formulating what he calls the aAT\8Ecr'tCl'tT\ 
1tpo<pacrtc; Thucydides has varied his language in a noteworthy 
way by using avaYKacra t and EC; 'to 1toA£J.1EtV instead of the 
nouns avaYKT\ and 1tOAq.l.OC;. 6 But these commentators have 
not, in my view, brought out the full implications of the ancient 
interpretation of the passage. Dionysius and the scholiast clearly 
indicate that Thucydides' judgment about the true cause of the 
war can best be understood by expressing it in simpler Greek: 
«the 1tOA£J.l.OC; came about Ka't' avaYVKT\v," or «this came to be 

that necessitates the war. I question, however, Connor's rejection of the phrase 
"practical inevitability." What the Greek states were doing in 431 B.C., how 
they had acted since the end of the Persian Wars, and the way they judged 
one another's actions (their 1t pa ';nc; and their yv ii) Il u t) made the war 
unavoidable once a certain threshold of distrust and hostility had been 
crossed. Surrender to rival city-states without a fight (which meant that they 
would no longer be £AfU8fPOt but would become {)1t~KOOt) must have been the 
only other choice, and in states that did not view fighting in itself as evil, that 
was no choice at all. 

6 H. R. Rawlings, A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 B. C. ( = Hermes 
Einzelschr. 33 [Wiesbaden 1975J ) 80, gives an exact analysis of the passage 
and shows what an unusual use of the 1tp6cpa<nc; is involved here. As others 
have noted earlier, Rawlings points out that the word, especially in the phrase 
Ko:ta 1tp6<pa<Hv, is often antithetical to to aATl8EC; but here the 1tp6cpa<HC; is 
aATl8fO'tatTl. Further, the etymologies that underlie two distinct 1tpocpaO'ftC; 
(one derived from cpuivoo, the other-in Rawlings' view-from CPTllli) are 
undercut by Thucydides' statement that this 1tp6cpumc; was acpuv£O'tatTl Aoyif>. 
On the question of etymology, L. Pearson, "Prophasis: A Clarification," 
TAPA 103 (1972) 381 n.3, seems right in arguing that 1tp6cpuO'tC;, from 
1tPOCPUiVf0'8ut, can mean nothing but 'explanation' (as a 'showing forth'), 
although an explanation or showing forth will almost invariably give 'the 
reason why', i.e., it will make plain what we call causal factors. An 
explanation of causal factors is easily transformed into 'cause', so that a 
translation of 1tp6cpumc; as 'cause' is not necessarily mistaken. I would also urge 
that the aAT]8fO'tatT] 1tp6cpu<HC; of 1.23.6 involves a play on words in the 
manner of Gorgias. It is the 'most revealing' or 'most noteworthy' explanation 
(aAT]8cO'tatT] from a-privative + Auv8avoo, 'escape notice'), but is simul­
taneously 'least apparent' (acpu v fO'tatT]); the key antithesis is between 
adjectives derived from cpu {VOIlU t and Auv9avoo or Auv8avollu t, and the 
unusual juxtaposition is meant to insure, if words can ever insure the defeat of 
AiJOrl, that this 1tp6cpu<HC; will not escape IlVTJIlT], as does so much historical 
knowledge (1.22.3). The aAT]8cO'tatT] 1tp6<paO'tC;. acpuvcO'tatT] 8i: ')..jyyrp is the ex­
planation that must not be forgotten. 



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40 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

end result of all the preceding events that made the Athenians 
powerful and the Spartans fearful.? 

Did Thucydides avoid a simpler formulation of this idea for 
stylistic reasons? The answer depends of course to some 
degree on how we construe the word 'stylistic'. One result of 
using the simplified phrase 1tOAfJ.WV Kat' uva:YK1lv (with the ac­
cusative following llyouJ.w\.) would have been a rhythmical 
clausula, with two and one-half feet of dactylic hexameter. 
Other alternatives-yiyv£cr8at 1tOAfJ.WV Kat' uvaYK1lv ("that the 
war was coming-to-be through necessity") or 1tOA£J.LOV y£v£cr\.V 
Kat' uvaYK1lv ("that the war was a coming-to-be according to 
necessity")-would produce the same effect. And avoiding 
diction that was distinctly 'epic' in tone or rhythm was 
apparently important to Thucydides. Shortly before this (at 
1.21.1), Thucydides has critized the logographers for the myth­
like element (to llu8&8£s) in their chronicles, an element that 
makes the telling of traditional tales more persuasive to the 
listening audience (1tpocraywyot£pOv tft uKpoacr£t).8 At 1.22.4 he 
acknowledges that the lack of a mythic element (to Ill) llu8&8£s) 
in his own work causes it to be less enjoyable for its audience 
(Es uKpoamv ... ut£P1t£crt£pov). If the connection between what 
is 'mythic' and the pleasure of listening is as close as the author 
himself claims, then clearly his idea that the war arose necessari­
ly out of a shift in power between Athens and Sparta and out of 
Spartan alarm over that destabilizing shift ought not to be 

7 Ostwald (supra n.1: 15f and 53) speaks of the war as the necessary 
consequence of an entire chain of circumstances. ]. de Romilly, "La notion de 
necessite dans l'histoire de Thucydide," Science et conscience de la societe: 
Melanges ... Raymond A ron (Paris 1971) I 127, points out that the word 
uvuY1(ll "respirait la certitude scientifique et tirait de la son attrait"; she also 
remarks (119) that Thucydides' views bear comparison to the mechanical 
outlook of the atomists. P. R. Pouncey, The Necessities of War: A Study of 
Thucydides' Pessimism (New York 1980) 173 n.6, following Guthrie, reminds 
readers that the use of UV<lY1(ll had become a philosophical commonplace and 
that Thucydides' use of the term, even if not strictly philosophical, did convey 
a sense of what can be called determinism. 

8 S. Flory, "The Meaning of 'to /l~ /lu8roo£s (1.22.4) and the Usefulness of 
Thucydides' History," C] 85 (1990) 193ff, emphasizes the connection of the 
word /lu8roo£s with epichoric stories that glorify warlike deeds, but gives too 
little attention to the notion, originating with Dionysius, that the word has 
also to do with the poetic form of myth (19M and n.12). Each occurrence of 
/lu8roo£s is accompanied by an occurrence of U1(poucrts in the very short span 
from 1.21.1 to 1.22.4; the 'shape' or 'form' (doos) of myth has a direct link to 
the listening pleasure of the audience. 



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J. D. NOONAN 41 

ly out of a shift in power between Athens and Sparta and out of 
Spartan alarm over that destabilizing shift ought not to be 
couched in a clausula that evokes hexameter verse, for the idea 
itself is a non-mythic construct.9 

We should acknowledge that neither avuYKl1 nor such ad­
verbial phrases as KO:t' avuYKl1v and U1t' avuYKl1<; were ex­
clusively epic or Homeric, although the history of both begins 
in Homer; they had made their way thence into the vocabulary 
of the cosmologists of the generations that preceded Thu­
cydides. We depend on rather late sources for most of our 
citations and parapharases of the teachings of the pre-Socratics, 
and some details about the early usage of avuyvKl1 may be 
skewed; but the overall picture is unlikely to be wrong. At 
times, those who speculated on the structure or development 
of the universe retain in their descriptions of its workings a 
demonic 'A vUYKl1 derived from myth, but at other times or in 
different cosmologists UVUYKl1 is demythologized and trans­
formed into something like a mechanical principle that governs 
J.l£'ta~oAai in the universe-particularly the growth and/or 
shrinking of the cosmos, of which avuYKl1 is an inherent part. 
Several well-known texts make these points clear. 

When Aetius, following Theophrastus, says that Heraclitus 
taught the doctrine that all things exist Ka8' ttJ.lapJ.l£vl1v, 'tl)v DE 
au'tl)v U1tUPXEtV Kat UVUYKl1V (A 8 Diels-Kranz), and then adds, 
following Posidonius, that ttJ.lapJ.l£Vl1 itself was the ai8£plOv 
crwJ.la that Heraclitus called the cr1t£PJ.la 't11<; 'tOU 1tav'to<; 

9 An anecdote in Quintilian confirms the importance of the rhythmical 
qualities of Greek prose for rhetorical criticism. Declaring that nec aliud potest 
sermonem facere numerosum quam opportuna ordinis permutatio (8.6.64), 
Quintilian recounts the purported discovery of a tablet on which the first four 
words of the Republic had been written in various orders. lW't£~llV X8i:<; d<; 
llEtpata is the actual opening of the dialogue (Resp. 327 A). The other 
possibilities-x8i:<; l((l't£~llV d<; IIEtpata and d<; IIEtpata x8i:<; l(a't£~llv-yield 
fragments of hexameter, provided that the at of IIEtpata may be long (cf Ar. 
Pax 145 and 165). The story may be worth little as evidence for Plato's 
methods of composition, but it does show that Quintilian or his Greek source 
believed that the opening of the Republic was chosen for its prose rhythm 
after the other variations were discarded because of their poetic character. It is 
well known that Quintilian disliked the hexameter rhythm at the beginning 
of Livy's proem, but he nevertheless rejects emendation of facturusne operae 
pretium sim (9.4.74). Cf R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5 
(Oxford 1965) 25 ad Praef 1; and on Plato see now D. Clay, "Plato's First 
Words," YCS 29 (1992) 114 and n.3 and 125ff. 



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42 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

Y£VEO£CO<;, it is difficult to judge whether this "body of ether," 
"seed of the coming-to-be of the whole," and "fated necessity" 
is a divine power or purely natural force. But when Aristotle 
argues in the Metaphysics (=AS) that Heraclitus 1tOtEl O£ Kat 
't~~tV nvu Kat x.povov WptOJlEVOV 't11<; 'tOU KOOJlOU Jl£'tal3oA11<; 
Ka'tU nva £lJlapJlEVTlV o.vuYKTlv, his interpretation of what his 
predecessor taught points to a far greater degree of abstraction: 
Heraclitus' o.VUYKTl measures and controls the pattern and the 
time of cosmic change. Yet what Diels-Kranz classify as a 
paraphrase of Heraclitus' teaching in Hippocrates (cl: 1tav'ta 
y£v£'tat Ot' o.vaYKT1v 9dTlv) returns interpreters and the o.vaYKTl 
under examination to a mythological framework. 

For Parmenides the picture is perhaps clearer. When Aetius 
summarizes his teaching that the cause of motion and coming­
to-be in the universe is a OaiJlova KUI3£PVTt'tTlV Kat KATlOOUXOv 
whom Parmenides calls ~£KTlv 't£ Kat 'AvaYKTlv (A 37), we can 
compare verses of Parmenides himself, in this case B8.30, where 
'A v aYKTl con troIs the sky and the boundaries of the stars. The 
regulator of cosmic change is not a mechanism or principle of 
the universe itself, but rather that divine o.VUYKTl better suited 
to a theogony or cosmogony than to physical speculation. 

If our late sources are generally accurate, then it must have 
been the atomists Democritus and Leucippus who made the 
cosmic o.VUYKTl into something akin to notions of force or 
energy as such terms might be employed in physics. Diogenes 
Laertius' life of Democritus (9.45=A 1 D.-K.) reports that he 
taught that 1tav'ta ... Ka't' o.vaYKTlv y£v£o9at, 't11<; OivTl<; al'tia<; 
ouoTl<; 't11<; Y£VEO£CO<; mlv'tcov llv o.vaYKTlv AEyn. For Democritus 
o.vaYKTl was the name given to the vortex that was the cause of 
the coming-to-be of all things. And Diogenes (9.33=A 1 D.-K.) 
also credits Leucippus with the view that dvat ... OX:J1t£p y£vEon<; 
KOOflOU, OU'tCO Kat au~Tton<; Kat cp9£on<; Kat cp90pu<; Ka'ta nva 
o.vaYKTlv. Leucippus' o.vaYKTl governs not only comings-to-be 
in the universe, but growth or expansion, withering away, and 
destruction as well. 

Scholars have not demonstrated a precise connection 
between Thucydides and the atomists (of whom Democritus is 
generally regarded as the refiner and expounder, during the 
period ca 420 B.C., of Leucippus' teachings), but there is a sense 
among critics that Gorgias, Protagoras, Democritus, the 
anonymous author in Iamblichus, and Thucydides shared in the 



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J. D. NOONAN 43 

same intellectual climate. Io Common stylistic devices and 
patterns of argument can be found,11 and the 'anthropology' of 
Democritus may have influenced Thucydides. 12 In my view, 

10 H. Herter, "Thukydides und Demokrit tiber Tyche," WS N.F. 10 (1976) 
108-28, argues that despite differences created by Thucydides' political focus 
and Democritus' central ethical concern, each author minimized irrational 
factors such as 'tUxrl in the lives of individuals and states (125); Herter con­
cludes (128) that the two shared the outlook of an age that in breaking away 
from belief in non-rational factors looked instead to such factors as yvcO~Tl to 
find the determinants of the happy life and the well-regulated state. E. 
Hussey, "Thucydidean History and Democritean Theory," History of 
Political Thought 6 (1985) 118-38, suggests that parts of Thucydides can be 
understood more clearly if the historian is read as an adherent of the theories 
that Democritus had already formulated about balance in the soul and the 
balance of interests in the state. A. T. Cole, "The Anonymous Iamblichi and 
his Place in Greek Political Theory," HSCP 65 (1961) 127-63, finds both 
Protagorean and Democritean elements (150-56) in the Anonymous. Cole 
believes that the Anonymous relied on a work of Democritus, perhaps the 
ITEpl uvopaya8iac; , and was not himself Democritus (as has sometimes been 
argued); he also claims (143) that the upn" to which the Anonymous devotes 
his attention is not entirely individualistic but is comprised of political 
components. It is the kind of excellence that one finds in statesmen, for it is 
made up of eloquence, bravery, strength, and cleverness; and, for Cole, there is 
a comparable concept in Thucydides. 

11 J. de Romilly, "Sur un ecrit anonyme ancien et ses rapports avec Thu­
cydide," JSav (1980) 19-34, concludes that the Anonymous shares themes, 
methods of argumentation or standards of proof, and ways of expressing 
himself with Thucydides. Earlier (20) she suggests that the texts of the 
Anonymous and of Thucydides cannot be used to show precise links between 
the two authors, but rather that the texts demonstrate that the two men 
emerged from the same intellectual milieu. 

12 C. Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking (Cambridge 1988), for 
whom there is some general progression of thought from Protagoras to 
Democritus and Thucydides (2f), argues that the elaboration of a concept of 
human nature and of an historical anthropology in Democritus are not unlike 
elements of Thucydides' Archaeology (243), but she also points out (263) that 
for Thucydides the shaping of society occurs in the context of political change 
rather than in the pursuit of the individual good, as seems to be the case in 
Democritus' thought. A. T. Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek 
Anthropology (=APA Philological Monographs 25 [Cleveland 1967]) 145, 
points out that the Archaeology relies not solely on 'likelihood' ('to dxoC;) as 
a basis for his reconstruction of the remote past, but on 'tEx~"pla as well. 
(Although Cole does not refer to it, the opening of the tombs on Delos and 
the identification of more than half the burial sites as belonging to Carians 
[1.8.1] seems a perfect example of this procedure.) Cole also notes certain 
passages in Aristophanes, Antiphon the Sophist, and Thucydides to show that 
all three shared the contemporary belief in "human nature" (it uv8pomEla 
<p\xnc;) that is always and everywhere the same in some aspects but is also 
distinct from, though not necessarily at odds with, vo~oc;. 



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44 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

there is an additional area of overlap related to these but 
mentioned less frequently. In defining the Peloponnesian War 
as the greatest lClVTlcrl~ ever to affect the Greeks and even a 
segment of the barbarian world (1.1.2), Thucydides is clearly 
taking a word that had belonged to the realm of physics and 
appropriating it for history. He must mean that 'motion' in the 
physical world and 'movement' (change or coming-to-be) in 
the lives of men and the affairs of their cities are analogous. And 
if Thucydides had an interest in the philosophical terminology 
concerning motion, it is logical to suppose that he also had an 
interest in arguments about the necessity of motion. The 
atomists neither originated nor monopolized such speculation, 
but it must have been particularly crucial in their thinking to 
explore, perhaps even to sort out, the relationships between or 
among necessity, motion, the vortex (OlVTl), and coming-to-be.13 

13 D. J. Furley, The Greek Cosmologists I (Cambridge 1987) 146-51, gives 
an account of the atomists' explanation of motion, culled from the hostile 
testimony of Aristotle, with some attention to the necessity of that motion. L. 
Edmunds, "Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists," Phoenix 
26 (1972) 343, shows quite clearly that the concept of necessity in a key 
fragment of Leucippus explains how things come into being, and also 
demonstrates that necessity and the vortex or whirl were not identical, though 
they are certainly related, in Democritus' thought. The jokes in Ar. Nub. 
373-80 on Zeus' urinating through a sieve (an atomist metaphor for the whirl, 
if Sextus Empiricus [cited by Edmunds 345] is quoting Democritus correctly), 
those about the rolling (lC'\)A.wcS6~EV<ll) clouds that are compelled to be borne 
along (lCavaYlCaoO&<n <pEpEOOat) because they are filled with moisture, hang 
down by necessity (cSt' ava.ylCT]v), and burst open as they fall upon one 
another, and the following joke about Vortex (aiOtpw<; ~tvo<;), who is the 
power compelling (0 avaylCa.Srov) the clouds to move in this way, may 
exaggerate the atomists' theories grossly, but they presuppose familiarity with 
the atomists' vocabulary and the audience's knowledge that cosmologists, 
including atomists, conceived of motion and necessity as linked to the world 
of becoming. A logical connection between the atomists' physical theory and 
the 'anthropology' might well have produced a theory of motion in the souls 
or minds of men in society (G. Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus, 
II," The Philosophical Re'lJiew 55 [1946] 56, suggests as much; cf, contra, 
Edmunds 345 n.47). It seems inadequate to claim that trial and error (1tEtpa) 
on the part of men caught in the grip of necessary circumstances (1: a 
avaYlCata) is the sole cause of any but the most primitive social practices (cf 
Thuc. 1.2.2, where nomadic existence is attributed to the day-to-day search for 
avaY1Cata 1:po(111). If Thucydides 1.23.6 is influenced by the atomists' 
vocabulary, this may be why the historian adds the notion of the fear (<p6~ov 
1tapEXOV1:a<;) among the Lacedaemonians to the idea that the Athenians were 
becoming powerful and considers that the war was necessitated by these two 
factors. This fear was certainly the reaction, the 'motion' (or 'motive' or 
'emotion'), in the souls of the Spartans and their allies that corresponded to 
the increase in Athenian power. J. R. Ellis, "The Structure and Argument of 



NOONAN, J. D., Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion , Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 33:1 (1992:Spring) p.37 

]. D. NOONAN 45 

Thucydides certainly had to be aware of the connotations of 
the word avuYKT} still known to us, and he must have un­
derstood something of the way in which the term had been 
adapted from Homeric usage to denote a power that caused 
change in the universe. It seems obvious that such a develop­
ment would have posed problems for the historian: in 
Thucydides' view it would have been inconceivable that the 
fundamental cause of the war should lie anywhere but in the 
conduct of human affairs. Neither edT} avuYKT\ nor the avuYKT} 
KOcrJlOU could matter in his account of the war's origins, 
although each avuYKT} had had causal power attributed to it. 
Such speculation in epic and the pre-Socratics represented a 
danger for the historian: the events leading to war, and of the 
war itself, occurred not Ka't' avuYKT\v but Ka'teX 'to aVepO)1tlVOV, 
as Thucydides points out in explaining why his history affords 
its audience permanently useful knowledge (the famous K'tl1Jla 
EC; aid of 1.22.4).14 

Dionysius and the scholiast suggest that Thucydides would 
have employed only the nouns uvuYKll and 1tOAEJlO<; if his style 
had been more ordinary and straightforward. But the phrases 
1tOAEJlOV Ka't' avuYKllv and UVUYKT}V 1tOA£JlOU, which can be 

Thucydides' Archaeology," CA 10 (1991) 365, calls the KtVTJOV; of 1.1.2 
"buildup" because both the Spartans and Athenians were (lKllaSOV'W; ... 
7tapaOK£uU. That is certainly' movement', but so too is the war itself and so 
especially is the sorting out of allies to one side or the other. 

14 It may be that the phrase Kmu 'to av9pw7ttvov is a way of alluding to 
another sort of necessity, in a brachyology for Ka'tu 'tTtV 'twv av9pw1twv 
<pUmv. If so, then Thucydides has introduced the avaYKTJ <pvoewc; into his 
history in an indirect way; but a discussion of this issue must be reserved for 
another time. o. Lendle, "K'tlllla tc; aid: Thukydides und Herodot," Rh M 
133 (1990) 235 nn.9f, maintains that a K'tlllla cannot belong to the 
undifferentiated mass of humankind but only to individuals, and that tc; aid 
refers to the tc; aiel. 'tou ~tOU of an individual. Lendle concludes that 
Thucydides had the lifespan of his contemporary audience, not the everlasting 
future of mankind, uppermost in mind when he composed his proem (242), 
and he thus rejects such translations of the phrase as those of Lesky, Classen­
Steup, and Weinstock (231). But even if Thucydides composed his history 
with a view to the immediate concerns of his public, this need not exclude his 
ability to foresee that individuals who lived after his own generation would 
have the same or nearly the same concerns about power and warfare as his 
contemporaries, just as those who had lived before his time had such 
calculations to make, whether under Minos or Agamemnon or during the 
conflict between Chalcis and Eretria. 



NOONAN, J. D., Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion , Greek, 
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46 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

identified as the simple expressions already eXIStIng or with 
existing parallels in the Greek of Thucydides' day, would have 
reminded his audience of epic poetry or of the cosmologists' 
usage. The expression actually used at 1.23.6 avoids such mytho­
logical and cosmological connotations. Stylistic variation is only 
one aspect of the formulation uva'Y1Cuaat E<; 'Co 1tOAEflElV: the 
phrase also ensures that the focus will include nothing beyond 
the Athenians' growing power and its threatening effect on the 
Lacedaemonians as the provocation to conflict. 

After saying so much about the historian's avoidance of tra­
ditional diction, there remains an unavoidable formulaic 
element in Thucydides' expression at 1.23.6. In a number of 
passages, of which this is simply the earliest to occur in the 
history, Thucydides employs what amounts to a conceptual 
formula for the necessity that he discerns in certain occur­
rences. This 'formula' has no metrical shape, but it calls at­
tention to a remarkable regularity in human affairs, a regularity 
that depends on three connected phenomena: a coming-to-be, 
enmity or conflict, and necessity. A few passages will illustrate 
the various ways in which these realities, denoted by a limited 
set of words, are joined together. 1s 

In his speech on the Mytilenian question (3.40.3) Cleon 
remarks that a just man pities those who are like himself and 
does not pity those who extend pity only out of necessity (E~ 
UVUYKT\<;) and have in reality become permanent enemies 
(Ka8Ea'Coyca<; aid 1tOAEfllOU<;). Here, because Cleon claims to be 

15 The number of passages to be examined might be multiplied many times 
by including those in which SEt and XP1l replace o.VUYKT\/o.VUYKUSOO, or where 
the concept of becoming is very loosely defined. dOcvat Sf XPl) Ott avuYKll 
1tOA£lU:tV at 1.144.3 is a tempting expression to try to force into this analysis, 
but only those passages that include all three elements-avuYKT\/avuYKusOO, 
the actual mention of war, enemies, or opponents, and the actual mention of a 
'coming-to-be' (ytyv Eo8u t or related nouns or the intransitive tenses of 
Ku8io'tT\l.lt)-are made part of the discussion. Even some passages, such as 
6.92.2, where the formula is inserted into a speech of Alcibiades as ornamental 
verbiage (oi 'toue; <ptAOUe; avuYKUOUV'tEe; 1tOAEl.ltOUe; YEv£o8at), are not essential 
to the discussion. The reason for excluding passages in which SEt and XPTJ 
convey the idea of necessity is that their semantic overlap with o.VU}KT\/ 
o.VUYKUSOO is slight. G. Redard, Recherches sur XPH, XPHL8AI: Etude 
semantiq ue (Paris 1953) 70, argues that XPTJ "indique bien tentative-in­
tentionelle ou non-d'appropriation" (as opposed to SEt, which, for Redard, 
denotes an obligation outside the subject and a movement opposite that of 
appropriation [56]). S. Benardete, "XPH and ~EI in Plato and Others," Glotla 
43 (1965) 285-98, confirms and extends Redard. 



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J. D. NOONAN 47 

describing those who act with deliberate deceit vis-a-vis their 
opponents, necessity appears to impel the unjust toward 
clement behavior; but enmity for the just has become their 
fixed attitude and condition, and such enmity affords no basis 
whatsoever for pity. Almost the opposite situation is described 
at 7.57.6. Here, long-standing ethnic solidarity is shattered by 
developments that compel even a mother city and its colonies 
to make war on one another. Thucydides notes the adherence 
of the Cytherians and Rhodians to the Athenian side, though 
both were Doric peoples. The Rhodians, in particular, who 
were 'ApYElOl YEVO<;" were compelled to make war (llvaYKaSov­
'to 1tOAqU:'iV) on the Doric Syracusans and even on the people 
of Gela, who were their own a1tOlKOl but had sided with the 
Syracusans (a YEVO<;" as this chapter shows, is no static thing for 
Thucydides, but can be extended by colonization or even 
broken into opposing parts).16 Somehow 'coming-to-be' 
(YlYVE0'8at, YEVEO't<;" YEVOr;) has gone wrong here. The natural 
bond has been broken and political interests based on calcula­
tions about power have compelled war between cities that 
became enemies despite their origin in the same stock. 

At 5.25.2-3 the pattern of affairs described at 1.23.6 is 
repeated. The Lacedaemonians were becoming suspicious 
(U1t01t'tOt EyEVOV'tO) that the Athenians were not living up to the 
truce that had halted military campaigns in each other's territory 
for almost seven years, and the parties were compelled to break 
the peace and returned to open warfare (civaYKa0'8EV't£<;, AuO'at 
'tar; ... O'1tovbar; ... Er; 1tOAqwv ... K(l'tEO''tTlO'(lV). At 4.63.2 Her­
mocrates raises the spectre of a similar situation, one in which 
distrust of each other would mean that the Sicilian cities had no 
collective retaliatory capability but instead, out of necessity, 
would become hostile toward those with whom they ought not 
to be at odds, namely their fellow Sicilians (btaq>opot bE otr; OU 
XpT) K(l't' civaYKTlv ytyvolIlE8a). And at 7.21.3 the very same 

16 The 'living' quality of a y€voc:, is understood by those who look at the 
genealogical catalogues in Hesiod; cf the still basic P. Philippson, "Genealogie 
als mythische Form: Studien zur Theogonie des Hesiod," SymbOslo Suppl. 7 
(1936) 1-37; but there seems to be little appreciation of the 'mythic' aspect of 
Thucydides 7.57-59 beyond Dover's analysis in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, 
and K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides IV (Oxford 1970) 
432ff. Dover argues that a y€voc:, is normally a sort of avaYKl'l, but by contrast 
7.57.6 shows that there exist exceptional avaYlCat stronger than the com­
pulsion to fight for one's race or ethnic group. 



NOONAN, J. D., Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion , Greek, 
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48 THUCYDIDES 1.23.6 

Hermocrates encourages the Syracusans not to fear Athenian 
naval power because the Athenians had historically been a land­
based power, more so than the Syracusans themselves, and 
were only compelled to take to the sea by their enemies the 
Medes (uvayxacr8£V'ta<; imo Mft8rov Va\YrtKou<;; YEv£cr8at). The 
name Medes replaces the common noun 7tOAEJlirov here, and 
the formulation of the idea in this passage is, to be sure, virtually 
identical with the expression used by Herodotus at 7.144.2, 
where he credits the Aeginetan War with saving Greece 
because it forced the Athenians to become a naval power 
(o{)'to<;; yap 6 7tOAEJlO<;; crucr'ta<;; EcrrocrE 'tllv 'EAAa8a uvaYKacra<;; 
8aAacrcriou<;; YEv£cr8at 'A81lvaiou<;;). 

The categories of this conceptual formula are the ideas of 
conflict-particularly war, warlike attitudes, and sharp political 
disagreement-of necessity, and of development or coming-to­
be. And the conceptual formula is justified because it is only the 
representation in words of a regularity in human events them­
selves. This Thucydidean formula is sufficiently flexible that in 
one place in the history it may be used of an enemy or a war 
that is said to compel some new development, such as the 
Athenians' construction of a fleet and becoming adept at 
fighting at sea (7.21.3), while in other passages, where the 
formula is employed in a way not directly parallel to anything in 
Herodotus, it may refer to a new development or a develop­
ment that reaches a new threshold-such as the Athenians' 
growth (1.23.6), the Spartans' suspicions of treaty-breaking 
(5.25.2-3), or the Sicilians' mutual distrust (4.63.2)-that 
becomes a force so great that it necessarily entails open 
hostili ties. 

By comparing the comments of Dionysius and the scholiast 
on Thucydides 1.23.6, we have seen that the simpler Greek that 
might have been used at this point in the text would have 
carried with it unwelcome overtones, either in the rhythm of 
hexameter verse or in the implication that the cosmologists' 
uvaYKll in and of itself was the demonic or mechanistic cause of 
change in the political as well as in the physical universe. But it 
also seems clear that the linkage of necessity, war, and be­
coming that occurs at 1.23.6 and elsewhere in Thucydides' 
account is a development of the earlier poetic and philosophic 
formulas that centered on uvaYKll, and it is evident that the 



NOONAN, J. D., Thucydides 1.23.6: Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Scholion , Greek, 
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J. D. NOONAN 49 

expression used at 1.23.6 has emerged as a permanent idiom In 

historical writingY 

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA 

December, 1992 

17 Even those historians who claim to be creating a historiography that 
looks deeper than the level of events sometimes fall back on the categories of 
Thucydides' conceptualization. In describing the slow pace of technological 
change in the spinning of yarn in the English cotton industry of the late 
eighteenth century, F. Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of 
the Possible, tr. Sian Reynolds (New York 1981) 435, describes a structurally 
repeatable 'battle' between the traditional reliance on homespun thread and 
the innovative mechanical spinning done in factories with such looms. 
Obstacles, such as the inherited social patterns of village life among the 
cottagers or economic ones like falling wages that kept handspun thread 
cheap, are overcome only when there is a crisis and widespread "fear of 
economic failure." Then men turn 'of necessity' to the innovation that takes 
on an aura of inevitability. If these are Thucydidean categories, Braude! 
perhaps acquired them in his courses of Latin and Greek at the Lycee 
Voltaire or from the Greek epigrapher and historian M. Holleaux at the 
Sorbonne. See F. Braudel, "Personal Testimony,» Journal of Modern History 
44 (1972) 449f. 

For several useful suggestions I am grateful to the anonymous reader.