OBBINK, DIRK, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools , Greek, Roman and 
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Diogenes of Babylon: 
The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools 

Dirk Obbink and Paul A. Vander Waerdt 

D IOGENES OF BABYLON, fifth scholarch of the Stoa and flour­
ishing in the first half of the second century B.C. , has not 
been accorded the attention his philosophical and his­

torical importance merits. 1 He receives only passing notice in 
the standard histories of Stoicism, despite abundant evidence 
that he effected a far-reaching revision of Stoic doctrine in such 
fields as linguistics,2 music education,3 philosophical psycho 1-
ogy,4 rhetoric,5 ethics,6 and political philosophy.7 Accidents of 

1 There is no adequate modern study of Diogenes and his work: for 
collections of evidence see C. F. Thiery's Dissertatio de Diogene Babylonio 
(diss.Louvain 1830), esp. 90-96 for evidence concerning his catalogue of 
writings; F. Susemihl, Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur (Leipzig 1891) 
82ff; H. von Armin, RE 5 (1903) 773-76. 

2 Diogenes' handbooks On Voice and On the Dialectical Art are the basis 
for the account of the Stoic theory of dialectic and language in D.L. 7.55-58, 
71 (=SVF III 17-26, pp.212-15); a long quotation on q>(J)vTj from his On the 
Governing Part of the Soul is discussed by Galen, De plac. 2.128.32-132.16 De 
Lacy. For Diogenes' influence on later Stoic linguistics sec M. Frede, "The 
Origins of Traditional Grammar," in R. E. Butts and]. IIintikka, edd., 
Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and 
Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht 1977) 51-79 (=Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy [Minneapolis 1987] 338-59); W. Ax, Laut, Stimme und Sprache: 
Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie (=l!ypomnemata 
84 [Gottingen 1986]), who argues that Diogenes reformulated Chrysippus' 
position in part to take account of Aristotle; and D. M. Schenkeveld, "The 
Stoic 't£XVT} m:p1. <p(J)vilc;." and "Developments in the Study of Ancient 
Linguistics," Mnemosyne SER. 4 43 (1990) 86-108, 298-306. 

3 Diogenes' On Music: texts in D. Dclattre, "Philodeme, De la musique: 
livre IV, colonnes 40* a 109*," CronErcol 19 (1989) 49-143; see also R. Janko, 
"A First Join between P.H erc. 411 + 1583 [Philodemus, On Music IVJ: 
Diogencs of Babylon on Natural Affinity and Music," CronErcol22 (1992) 
123-30, for the first Stoic account of how music education is conducive in the 
training of the passions to the acquisition of virtue. 

4 Diogenes clearly anticipated the modifications in Stoic psychology often 
traced to Panaetius or Posidollius by divid ing the soul into separate parts 
along Platonic lines (cf De mus. IV cols. 56*,57*.40-41,69*.3,74*), a move 

355 



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356 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

transmission have contributed to this scholarly neglect: 
although Diogenes is mentioned in the Index Stoicorum 
(48.3-8, 51.1ff, 42.1ff; cf Index Academicorum 22.24 Mekler), 
the lack of an ancient biography leaves us poorly informed 
about his life and career.8 He participated (with the Academic 
skeptic Carneades and the Peripatetic Critolaus) in the famous 
embassy sent to Rome in 155 to plead for a reduction in the fine 
levelled against Athens for her sack of Oropus (Paus. 7.11.4-8). 
This embassy, celebrated in the Roman literary tradition 9 in part 
because it seemed to illustrate that Greek philosophy 

that underlies inter alia his rehabilitation of music as an important constituent 
in moral education. 

S We hope in a future paper to reconstruct the philosophical motivation of 
early Stoic rhetorical theory with special attention to Diogenes' innovations. 
See also D. Sohlberg, "Aelius Aristides und Diogenes von Babylon. Zur 
Geschichte des rednerischen Ideals," M usHelv 29 (1972) 177-200, 256-77. 

6 Particularly noteworthy are his revision of earlier Stoic doctrine on the 
'tEAo'; (Arius Didymus ap. Stob. Eclog. 22.76.9f Wachsmuth; D.L. 7.88; Clem. 
AI. Strom. 2.21), and his famous debate (ap. Cic. Off 3.49-55; cf 89-92) with 
Antipater over the nature and justification of private property: see most 
recently J. Annas, "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property," 
in M. Griffin and J. Barnes, edd., Philosophia Togata (Oxford 1989) 151-73. 
Both underscore Diogenes' central concern to provide practical moral 
guidance in contemporary society. 

7 For an attempt to show that Diogenes was responsible for important 
changes in the scope of Stoic political philosophy see P. A. Vander Waerdt, 
"Politics and Philosophy in Stoicism," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
9(1991) 185-211 at205-10. 

8 Diogenes' traditional dates are ca 240-150, the dramatic date of Cicero's 
De Senectute, where he appears (7.23) in a list of notables who remained 
productive until an advanced old age: Lucian, Macr. 20, says he lived to the 
age of eighty-eight. But Cicero, who mentions there Diogenes' recent visit to 
Rome in 155, does not actually say that Diogenes was dead by this time, and 
T. Dorandi (Ricerche sulla cronologia dei filosofi elienistici [Stuttgart 1991J 
29f, 61, 69ff, 76), following J. Barnes (" Antiochus of Ascalon," in Griffin and 
Barnes [supra n.6J 51-96 at 68ff, esp. 69 n.76), has recently argued on this basis 
and on the dating of Diogenes' pupils Panaetius, Mnesarchus, and Dardanus 
that Diogenes lived until ca 140, yielding a birthdate of ca 228. Thiery (supra 
n.1) 9-29 provides a survey of what is known of Diogenes' life. Diogenes came 
from Seleuceia-on-the-Tigris in the region of Baby lon-hence his ethnic 
(Strab. 6.1.16; D. L. 6.81). 

9 On this embassy see 389-95 infra. Cicero (A cad. 2.137) knew a book by 
Clitomachus that preserved details of the embassy and showed that 
Carneades argued a position (and attributed it to Diogenes) identical to that 
preserved in the text presented 366£ infra. Diogenes was Carneades' teacher in 
dialectic: Cic. Acad. 2.98 (from Clitomachus). 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 357 

threatened traditional Roman moral culture,10 ensured that 
Diogenes, the first Stoic to lecture at Rome, remained prom­
inent in philosophical circles there well into the next century. 

Another and probably more important factor in explaining 
Diogenes' neglect is that the traditional periodization of Hellen­
istic philosophy, which correlates philosophical with political de­
velopments and marks its end at 31 B.C., has tended to obscure 
fundamental changes that took place in Epicureanism, Stoicism, 
and Academic Skepticism in the mid-second century B.C. ll 

Diogenes' work initiated an important but poorly understood 
period in Stoicism, and provides our best evidence for a period 
in which the school became centrally concerned to develop the 
early scholarchs' teaching so as to enable it to compete with its 
rivals' across the range of philosorhical disciplines. In this transi­
tional period, the proper end 0 Hellenistic philosophy, Stoic 
philosophers embark on new directions as the early scholarchs' 
original attempt to appropriate Socrates' authority, by discred­
iting the directions in which his other philosophical heirs (espe­
cially Plato) had developed his philosophy, gives way to a con­
structive effort to revise the Stoic position in such a way as to 
incorporate the contributions of other Socratics. Diogenes rec­
ognized former rivals-such as Plato and Aristotle, to whom 
the early Stoics were uniformly hostile-as important philo­
sophical authori ties, 12 and he did not hesitate to draw upon 

10 See Pluto Cat. Mai. 22.4-5; Plin. HN 7.112; Cic. Rep. 3.8-12; Lactant. Di7J. 
Inst. 5.14.3ff; for a recent survey of Roman attitudes toward the earliest 
representation of Greek rhetoric and philosophy in Rome see E. S. GRUEN, 
Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy (=Cincinnati Classical Studies N.S. 

7 [Leiden 1990: hereafter 'Gruen']) 158-92. 
11 For a better understanding of this period in the development of Stoicism 

we are indebted to M. Frede, "Philosophy 125 B.c.-250 A.D.," Cambridge His­
tory of II ellenistie Philosophy, forthcoming. An important discussion of 
Diogenes' place in the development of Stoicism appears in M. Schafer, 
"Diogenes als Mittelstoiker," Philologus 91 (1936) 174-96. 

12 Diogenes twice mentions Plato (Philod. De mus. cols. 138, 140) and one 
passage (col. 41 *) contains two quotations from Plato's Laws (2.669B-E, 
7.802c-D); ef Delattre (supra n.3) 54 n.24, and his "Un 'citation' stolcienne des 
Lois (II, 669B- E) de Platon dans les commentaires sur la musique de 
Philodeme?" Re7JHistText 21 (1991) 1-17; for further parallels see Schafer 
(supra n.ll) 180-89. Early Stoic writings against Plato include Zeno's Republic 
(ef Pluto De Stoic. rep. 1034 E-F), Chrysippus' Against Piato on Justice (Plut. De 
Stoic. rep. 1040A [ef H. Cherniss ad loc.] 10400,1041 B; De comm. not.1070E-F), 



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358 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

them in his attempt to develop a practical teaching on subjects 
such as political philosophy, which had been apparently an 
entirely theoretical enterprise for the school's founders (el Cic. 
Leg. 3.13-16; discussed 383 infra). Here as in other fields, Dio­
genes reformulated the early scholarchs' position so effectively 
that his became the orthodox Stoic position during the second 
and first centuries B.C. 13 Cicero's extensive use of Diogenes 
confirms this claim, as does the extraordinary number of 
explicit citations of Diogenes in the Herculaneum papyri-a 
number that vastly exceeds the dozen or so references to 
Chrysippus and makes Diogenes the most frequently cited 
philosopher (after Epicurus) in the philosophical library at 
Herculaneum. 14 

The absence of an adequate modern edition of Diogenes' frag­
ments has also impeded our understanding of his importance 
for the development of Stoicism. Philodemus' lengthy attacks 
on Diogenes in his De musiea and De rhetoriea constitute most 

his Exhortations (a reply to the Cleitophon: Plut. De Stoic. rep. 10390-1040A), 
and Persaeus' reply in seven books to the Laws (D.L. 7.36) 

13 Diogenes is Philodemus' principal opponent in De musica IV (Delattre 
[supra n.3] 54ff) and De rhetorica, and is the last philosopher named in 
Philodemus' doxography in De pietate (P.Hercul. 1428: text in A. Henrichs, 
CronErcol 4 [1974] 5-32), on which Cicero draws in Nat. D. 1.25-41: see 
Diels, Dox. Graee. 121-31,529-50; R. Philippson, SymbOslo 19 (1939) 27-31. 
Cicero names Diogenes at Nat. D. 1.41, and Dclattre (53, 83f) finds extensive 
use of him in Books 2-3; for the claim that Diogenes is the sale transmitter of 
Zeno's syllogisms: M. Schofield, "The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium," 
Phronesis 28 (1983) 31-58. Diogenes' prominence in Philodemus may be due 
in part to his teacher Zeno of Sidon (A. Angeli and M. Colaizzo, "I frammenti 
di Zenone sidonia," CronErcol 9 [1979] 47-133): Philodemus' De pietate is 
based in part on Zeno's lectures or writings (cf p.118.18H Gomperz), which is 
probably why Philodemus' doxography stops with Zeno's contemporary 
Diogenes. But Diogenes was well-known later for the other reasons explained 
above. Best known at Rome seems to have been his work on theology: see, for 
his TI£pt-tllC; 'A9TlvuC; (Philod. De piet. col. 8 in Henrichs 19; Cic. Nat. D. 1,41, 
Att. 13.39.2), A. B. Krische, Die theologischen Lchren der griechischen 
Denker (Gottingen 1840) 482-94; A. S. Pease ad Cic. Nat. D. 1.41 (Cambridge 
[Mass.] 1955) 277f; J. P. Dumont, BullAssBude (1984) 260-78. For Diogenes' 
extensive influence on rhetorical theory at Rome, see Sohlberg (supra n.5) 
263-77. 

14 Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e Latini (florence 1989) I 38ff lists over 
105 identified passages from Diogenes in the I lerculaneum papyri, some from 
works not by Philodemus. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AEROT 359 

of the evidence. 15 The extensive remains of these works, pre­
served in the papyri from the (largely Epicurean) library at Her­
culaneum, have not been edited in their entirety since the late 
nineteenth century, when papyrology was still in its infancy.16 
Lack of a modern critical edition has prevented these often 
lacunose and difficult texts from receiving the study their 
philosophical importance warrants. 

I 

We present here a new text, translation, and commentary of a 
fragment quoting Diogenes' account of the political expertise of 
the Stoic orator: P.Hercul. 1506 col. 8 (Sudhaus II 211=SVF III 
117). This text, we shall argue, provides material evidence to 
settle a debate concerning the the scope and intention of early 
Stoic political philosophy. If our interpretation is correct, Diog­
enes preserves important evidence concerning the early 
scholarchs' conception of natural law, even as he attempts to 
revise Stoic political philosophy so as to make it comparable in 
scope and intention to that of his Platonic and Peripatetic rivals. 

The debate in question centers in part upon the provenance 
of natural law-or, as the early scholarchs refer to it, the KOlVO<; 

15 for Philodemus' polemic against Diogenes in De musica IV see Dclattre 
(supra n.3) 54; for the remainder of the book, A. J. Neubecker's edition in La 
scuola di Epicuro IV (Naples 1986). The sections of Philodemus' De rhetorica 
that pertain to Diogenes include substantial portions of Book VI (J>.JJ ercul. 
1004) and of a liber incertus (P.Hercul. 1506), generally assigned to Book III 
(so G. Cavallo, "Libri scritture scribi a Ercolano," CronErcol Supp\. 13 [1983J 
63; T. Dorandi, "Per una ricomposizione della scritto di Filodemo sulla 
retorica," 2PE 82 [1990J 59-87 at 65ff, 69f, 79-82). New readings of some of 
the papyri of Book VI have been published by M. G. CappclluZ/',o, CronErcol 
6 (1976) 69-76, and of the second half of P.J fercul. 1506 (II 239-72 Sudhaus) 
by J. Hammerstaedt, CronErcol22 (1992) 9-113. 

16 De rhetorica, Philodemus' longest and best-preserved work, has not been 
edited in full since S. Sudhaus, Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica (Leipzig 1902); 
there is a new edition of Books I-II by Francesca Longo Auricchio, 
Philodemou Peri Rhetorikes libri primus et secundus (Naples 1977); for new 
editions of particular columns see supra n.15.; for a survey of the papyri with 
provisional reconstruction of the latter books of the treatise sec Dorandi 
(supra n.15) 59-87. Texts that pertain to Diogenes have not received a critical 
edition since von Arnim included some (fewer than half) of the relevant 
columns in SVF III 91-126, pp.253ff (even fragments in which Diogenes is 
specifically named are omitted: see e.g. Sudhaus II 99 fr. 1, 100 fr. 3). D. Blank 
and O. Obbink are preparing a new edition of Philodemus' De rhetorica. 



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360 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

VOJ.LO<;;, which is identified with the sage's right reason, pre­
scribing conduct in accordance with nature and proscribing the 
opposite. 17 We contend that in the earliest formulation of this 
theory in Zeno's Republic, the founding work of the natural law 
tradition, koinos nomos has a far more restricted application 
than in the later tradition.18 For Zeno, in attempting to develop a 
doctrine on natural justice that avoided the inconsistencies and 
contradictions he found in his Platonic target (d Pluto De Stoic. 
rep. l034E-F), depicts a regime composed solefy of sages, who 
alone possess right reason and therefore the capacity to live in­
fallibly in accordance with the koinos nomos. Two considera­
tions prove that for the early Stoics (including Diogenes, cf 
388f infra) only the sage can apprehend and follow natural law; 
first, the koinos nomos prescribes not merely kathekonta, 
which all mature human beings can at least in principle perform, 
but katorthomata, the 'perfect kathekonta' of which only the 

17 For the identification of koinos nomos with the sage's right reason see 
D.L. 7.88 (citing Chrysippus' On Ends); Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1038 A (natural law 
is "nothing other than the sage's right reason"); Cic. Leg. 1.18f, 2.8. For the 
formula that the koinos nomos is right reason as applied to conduct: Cic. Nat. 
D. 1.36 (citing Zeno); D.L. 7.88 (citing Chrysippus); the exordium of Chrysip­
pus' On Law ap. Marcian Inst. l=SVF III 314; Arius 96.1 Off, 102.5f; Alexander 
Aphrodisias, SVF II 1003.30-34; Philo, SVF III 323; Clem. Al., SVF III 332; 
Cic. Leg. 1.1S£. For reconstruction of the early Stoic theory as first formulated 
in Zeno's Republic see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Zeno's Republic and the 
Origins of Natural Law," in P. A. Vander Waerdt, cd., The Socratic Move­
ment (Ithaca 1993, forthcoming); see also supra nJ. In his account of the 
Golden Age preserved by Sen. Ep. 90 (=Posidonius fr. 284 Edelstein and 
Kidd; cf Kidd's Commentary [Cambridge 1988] II 960-71), Posidonius pro­
vides an interesting adaptation of Zeno's position in explaining the genealogy 
of law: the first human beings and their uncorrupted followers followed one 
man-the sapiens-as leader and law (primi mortalium ... eundem habebant 
et ducem et leges: Ep. 9004); only when vice arose, bringing with it tyranny, 
did there arise a need for positive laws, which originally were framed by 
sapientes. 

18 See Plut. De virt. Alex. 329A-B; for interpretation of this passage see 
Vander Waerdt (supra n.17). M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City 
(Cambridge 1991) 104-11, attempts to discredit this text as a reliable source for 
reconstruction of Zeno's Republic: unjustifiably in our opinion, but details are 
unnecessary here because even Schofield accepts Plutarch's reference to the 
koinos nomos, the only part of his report on which we need rely, as 
"incontrovertibly Stoic." 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 361 

sage is capable;19 and secondly, Zeno restricts citizenship of his 
best regime, which exemplifies the way of life that accords with 
the koinos nomos (Plut. De virt. Alex. 329A-B), to sages.20 All 
who lack the sage's perfectly consistent and rational disposition 
are incapable of living in accordance with natural law and, as 
Zeno remarked controversially, live as enemies to one 
another.21 On this early Stoic view, natural law does not provide 
guidance to non-sages in the form of moral rules, obedience to 
which would constitute conduct of the standard prescribed by 
the koinos nomos. This is not to say that the koinos nomos 
does not in some sense provide a standard of conduct 
prescriptive of what other human beings should do and 
prohibitive of what they should not do. The exordium of 
Chrysippus' On Law (ap. Marcian Inst. l=SVF III 314), no less 
than Cleanthes' assertions in his Hymn to Zeus (S V F I 
537=Powell, Call. Alex. 227ff, from Stob. E c/. 1.2 [I 28 
Wachsmuth]) that Zeus guides by the koinos nomos all things 
(line 2) and all nature's works (line 11]), both imply that his law 

19 See especially the citation from Chrysippus' On Law at Pluto De Stoic rep. 
1037c-D, which explicitly states that natural law prescribes katorthomata: 'to 
](<l'top8wJla q><X<n VOJlO\) 1tPO<H<lYJl<l dvm 'to O£ aJlap'tllJl<l VOJlOU a1t<lyop£UJl<l; 
his argument concerning the unity of virtue in Demonstrations on Justice (ap. 
Pluto De Stoic rep. 1041 A) that "every ](<l'top8wJl<l is a diVOJlllJl<l and 
OW](<l w1tpaY11Jl<l," which clearly renders katorthomata co-extensive with the 
lawful; also Cic. Fin. 4.15; Leg. 2.8, 1.l8f; Arius 96.10-16,102.4-10. Kathekonta 
are actions that reason prevails upon us to do in accordance with nature and 
that admit a rational defense (D.L. 7.107-09; cf Arius 85.12-15; Plut. De 
comm. not. 1069E); katorthomata are 'perfect kathekonta' performed by an 
agent who possesses the sage's rational disposition (Arius 96.18-97.14; cf 
85.18-86.12,93.14-18; Sex!. Emp. Math. 9.200-207): see B. Inwood, Ethics and 
Iluman Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford 1985) 213ff; and, for a convenient 
collection of evidence, see A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Ilellenistic 
Philosophers (Cambridge 1987) I 359-68. 

20 Zeno states that only sages are citizens and that there should be a 
community of women among sages (D.L. 7.33, 131); in his best regime 
citizenship is determined solely by rationality: only the virtuous may belong, 
and the sale basis for ties of kinship, friendship, and so forth is virtue (D.L. 
7.122ff). O. Murray, CR 80 (1966) 369, disarms the apparent problem at Plut. 
De virt. Alex. 329A-B (1tav't<lC; uv8pomouc;): "all" here means 'all sages', a view 
endorsed by J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1968) 64f; A. Erskine, 
The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action (Ithaca 1990) 20, who 
suggests that Polyb. 6.56.10 may refer to Zeno's Republic. Note that Plutarch 
identifies "all" as the morally good at De virt. Alex. 329c. 

21 See especially the criticism of Cassius the Skeptic (D.L. 7.32ff). Schofield 
(supra n.18) 3-21 offers an elaborate hypothesis concerning the doxographical 
lineage of this passage, but its fragility is well exposed by B. Inwood, 
BrynMawrCIRev 3.2 (1992) 208-13. 



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362 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

enjoins conduct at which all human beings should naturally aim. 
But only the godlike sage can attain the standard of conduct 
(katorthomata) prescribed by natural law, since katorthomata, in 
principle inaccessible to ordinary moral progressors, depend on 
circumstances and therefore cannot be codified in a set of 
moral rules or precepts that those without the sage's perfectly 
rational disposition could follow and still act in accordance with 
naturallaw. 22 Accordingly, koinos nomos, as the early Stoics 
understand it, corresponds not to a code of moral rules but to a 
certain mental disposition, namely the sage's perfectly rational 
disposition that enables him to make the exceptions to moral 
precepts required by special circumstances. 23 Thus natural law, 
in the early Stoic view, provides a canon of moral conduct that 
only the sage-rare though he may be 24-can attain and that is 
inaccessible to all ordinary human beings. 

In restricting the provenance of natural law to sages, the early 
Stoic theory differs quite significantly from the traditional 
notion of natural law, according to which natural law pre­
scribes conduct of which all mature human beings are capable 
through a code of primary and secondary moral rules. It is not 
our purpose here to review the philosophical considerations 
that led the early Stoic theory to be transformed into its now 
traditional form. But this transformation already appears in the 
fullest extant account of the Stoic theory. Cicero (Leg. 1) under­
takes to include all mature human beings in the provenance of 
natural law, adapting a series of orthodox early Stoic arguments 
to support the unorthodox position that all human beings are 
capable of living according to the koinos nomos. 25 He has 

22 For the sage's freedom to violate positive laws see D.L. 7.121, 125; Pluto De 
Stoic. rep. 1038A, with B. Inwood, "Goal and Target in Stoicism," Journal of 
Philosophy 88 (1986) 547-56 at 553f. 

23 For the doctrine of special circumstances, see D.L. 7.109; and, for the test 
case of cannibalism, D.L. 7.121. 

24 According to Stoic doctrine, the sage is as rare as the phoenix, with only 
one or two known examples (Alex. Aphrod. De fato 199.14-22=SVF III 658; 
cf Pluto De Stoic. rep. 1048E, De comm. not. 1076B-C; Sext. Emp. Math. 
7.432-35; Diogenianus ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 6.264b=SVF III 668; Cic. Nat. D. 
3.79): hence Zeno's best regime could never come into existence on earth (as 
suggested by Plutarch's "dream or image of a philosopher's well-regulated 
regime"), any more than that of the Platonic Socrates (Resp. 529 A-B, 472B-E; 
Laws 702A-B, 9670-690; Cic. Rep. 2.52); see Vander Waerdt (supra nn.7, 17). 

25 This claim, implicit throughout Cicero's argument, is made explict e.g. at 
1.30: nee est quisquam gentis ullius, qui dueem naetus ad virtutem pervenire 
non possit; and it is supported by an argument in support of the proposition 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 363 

revised (as argued elsewhere) the early Stoic theory of natural 
law to accord with the interpretation of the unity of doctrine of 
the veteres advocated by Antiochus, whom Cicero clearly 
identifies as the principal source for his thinking in Leg. 1.26 

More specifically, Cicero's revision renders natural law a 
standard of conduct attainable by all human beings, not just by 
sages; it is now the prescription not strictly of the sage's right 
reason but of the human rationali ty that all share. 27 These and 
related modifications radically change the orientation of the 
theory of natural law: whereas koinos nomos, as conceived by 
the early Stoics, presupposes an unbridgeable gulf between 
man's natural community, the megalopolis to which only sages 
and gods belong, and all existing communities (see 385 infra), 
the revised theory becomes a practical political doctrine of great 
philosophical resources that provides detailed guidance in the 
form of moral rules to enable all human beings to live in accor­
dance with natural law. 

This interpretation of the early form and development of the 
Stoic theory has not gone unchallenged among those who 
advocate reconstructions that assimilate the early scholarchs' 
position to that of the later tradition. It has been argued that the 
provenance of natural law, even in the early Stoic view, extends 
to all human beings and that it supplies guidance to them in the 
form of moral rules that, in some (rather unclear) sense, con­
stitute the content of naturallaw. 28 This reconstruction, though 

(denied by Zeno: Cic. Fin. 4.56) that all human beings have a comparable 
natural capacity to attain virtue (J.28ff). 

26 See P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Philosophical Influence on Roman Juris­
prudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law," ANRW II.36.6 (Berlin, 
forthcoming). 

27 Although Cicero adheres to early Stoic formulae in his definitions of 
natural law in De legibus, identifying it with the sage's right reason (e.g. 1.18f: 
ea est enim naturae 'Vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae 
regula; cf 2.8; Rep. 3.33), he then argues (1.29f) that there is no difference in 
kind between human beings, thus collapsing the distinction between the 
sage's rational disposition and that of everyone else on which the early Stoic 
positon so crucially relies. 

28 P. Mitsis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Phil­
osophy: The Stoics and their Critics," AN RW 11.36.6 (Berlin, forthcoming), 
claims to to pay close attention to the "particular historical and philosophical 
context" in which the early Stoics formulated their theory, but takes no 
account of its original formulation in Zeno's Republic. Since Zeno's attempt to 
improve the Platonic Socrates' teaching on natural justice provides the context 
in which the theory was first formulated, Mitsis' omission of this evidence, 



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364 OIOGENES OF BABYLON 

consistent with some evidence for Chrysippus' pOSltlOn, rests 
mainly on conjecture and extrapolation from later sources of 
questionable orthodoxy.29 The claim that natural law pre­
scribes a standard of conduct achievable by ordinary human 
beings conflicts with several important testimonia that must 
feature prominently in any dossier concerning the early Stoic 
theory of natural law: (i) Chrysippus' statement (Plut. De Stoic. 
rep. 1037c-D) that natural law prescribes katorthomata, the mor­
ally virtuous actions that only sages may perform (cf supra 
n.19);JO (ii) Zeno's restriction of the citizenship of his best 
regime to sages, who alone can live according to the koinos 
nomos, which the way of life of his best regime exemplifies (see 
supra 360); and (iii) the early Stoic definition of the city as a 
group of morally good human beings united by natural law, a 
formulation that clearly excludes non-sages from the com­
munity of gods and sages founded in rationality and therewith 
from living in accordance with natural law (see 385 infra). The 

which tells strongly against his assimilation of the early scholarchs' position to 
that of later Stoics, seriously jeopardizes his reconstruction. 

29 Mitsis' central texts for the relation of kathekonta to natural law (Sen. Ep. 
94f) and the invariability of certain kathekonta (D. L. 7.108f) do not in our 
opinion reliably report the views of the early scholarchs, though the question 
is complex. 

JO Mitsis' attempt to explain away Chrysippus' statement that natural law 
prescribes katorthomata (Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1037c-D) seems unconvincing: Plu­
tarch purports to quote Chrysippus directly; and although his polemic against 
this position renders some details uncertain, that is no reason to discount the 
statement quoted at the outset. Plutarch's contradictions (pace Mitsis) may be 
explained simply by supposing that, in keeping with the later tradition of 
natural law exemplified in Cicero, he mistakenly includes ordinary human 
beings within the provenance of natural law contrary to Chrysippus' own 
view. Mitsis claims that "the koinos nomos gives other forms of guidance and 
injunctions in addition to prescribing katorthomata," but does not adduce a 
single early Stoic text supporting this conjecture. Moreover, Chrysippus' 
statement that nomos prescribes katorthomata rules out the possibility that 
mere kathekonta may be included in its prescriptions, for the former differ 
from the latter in being performed by an agent whose perfectly rational 
disposition renders his actions infallibly in accord with nature. Since this 
feature of katorthomata is what enables the koinos nomos to serve as an 
infallible canon of moral conduct (as the function of law is envisaged e.g. in 
the exordium of Chrysippus' On Law), it is most unlikely that the koinos 
nomos provides any form of prescription or injunction that docs not meet this 
standard. 



OBBINK, DIRK, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools , Greek, Roman and 
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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 365 

attempt to disarm the implications of (i) fails, and this recon­
struction fails even to consider (ii) and (iii), both of which testify 
to a sharp distinction between sages and ordinary human beings 
that excludes the latter from the community of the wise. 

We wish to introduce here even more explicit evidence from 
Diogenes (perhaps from his treatise On Rhetoric) that clearly 
demonstrates that the early Stoics, in distinguishing between the 
merely conventional political regimes of ordinary human beings 
(the aphrones) and the natural community of gods and sages 
founded in rationality, unequivocally withhold natural law from 
the latter. This testimony has not yet appeared in the debate,31 
perhaps because of the lack of a secure text. A new edition of 
P.Hercul. 1506 col. 8 (Sudhaus II 211) will, we hope, not only 
settle the debate sketched above concerning the scope and in­
tention of early Stoic political philosophy, but also show that 
careful attention to Diogenes' work can throw new light on the 
reconstruction of early Stoic philosophy and its late Hellenistic 
development. 

Some preliminary remarks will establish the philosophical con­
text of Diogenes' discussion. Philodemus aims to clarify in De 
rhetorica the long-standing problem of whether rhetoric is a 
techne. 32 Although it is uncertain whether Epicurus or other 
early members of his school distinguished different species of 
rhetoric,33 Philodemus (Rhet. II, in opposition to another view 

31 Noted by Mitsis (supra n.28: n.45) only as evidence that tells against his 
reconstruction of the Stoic theory; see also M. Isnardi-Parente, "La politica 
della stoa antica," Sandalion 3 (1980) 67-98 at 82ff, 89. 

32 On this debate within the Epicurean tradition see M. Ferrario, "La 
concezione della retorica da Epicuro a rilodemo," Proceedings oj the 
Sixteenth International Congress oj Papyrology (Chico 1981) 145-52; A. 
Angeli, "L'esattezza scientifica in Epicuro e hlodemo," CronFrcol15 (1985) 
63-84 at 73ff; J. Barnes, "Is Rhetoric an Art?" darg Newsletter (University of 
Calgary) 2 (1986) 2-22; D. N. Sedley, "Philosophical Allegiance in the Creco­
Roman World," in Griffin and Barnes (supra n.6) 97-119; F. Longo 
Auricchio, "Frammenti inediti di un libro della Retorica di Filodemo (PI-Icrc. 
463)," CronErcol 12 (1982) 67-83, and "Testimonianze della 'Retorica' di 
Filodemo sulla concezione dell'oratoria nei primi maestri epicurei," CronLrcol 
15 (1985) 31-61. 

33 Philodemus concedes (Rhel. 11= P.Hercul. 1674 col. 34.28-31) that most of 
what the early Epicureans wrote about rhetoric had concerned not sophistic 
rhetoric but political rhetoric, which on Philodemus' interpretation of their 
position is not an art and therefore does not support his case, the difficulties of 
which are well brought out by Sedley (supra n.32: 108-17). 



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366 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

current within this school) argues that deliberative and forensic 
species of rhetoric do not constitute an art, but epideictic­
Philodemus' "sophistic"-rhetoric does (Rhet. 43.26-52.10). To 
support this position, Philodemus rehearses in considerable de­
tail the views of other philosophical schools, among which the 
Stoic has pride of place. Taking Diogenes as the Stoic spokes­
man, Philodemus extensively attacks his views that rhetoric is 
identical with the political art and that only the philosopher who 
possesses certain knowledge and therewith all virtues is the true 
rhetor. 34 Although Diogenes' denial of any independent status 
for epideictic rhetoric presumably motivates Philodemus' po­
lemic, he ranges far beyond this particular point and preserves 
important evidence for Diogenes' position on the moral and 
political problems that the study and teaching of rhetoric raises. 

II 

Text 

The opening lines of the fragment are lost; the subject of lines 
2f must be recovered from the column's internal logic. The 
new text and translation with papyrological and philosophical 
commentary reads as follows (note that a lunate sigma has been 
retained where the reading of sigma is not confirmed by con­
text). 

De rhet. III (i)1tO~VTH.lattKov) col. 8=Sudhaus II 211 (=Diogcnes 
Babylonius fro 117 von Arnim) 

Fontes: P.Hercul. 1506, N, 0+ N 240 fro 11 info 

[ 
.. ]Ee[. . . . .]E[ .. ] Ott 'tOY 1t[ 0-
Al'ttK]OV [a]pXElV ad &[1tClcra<; 
't ]a<; Ka'ta 1tOAlV &[ pxa<;. . .] 

5 ... ]vT\~[ .. . ]a[ ........ 1 

34 See esp. Rhet. II, pp.283f, fr. IV.3-11 Sudhaus; cf SVF III 120, 124, pp.243f. 
Diogenes' position on rhetoric has much in common with the views placed in 
the mouth of Crassus (Cicero's teacher of rhetoric: De Or. 1). The early Stoics' 
unique and distinctive perspective on the art of rhetoric has not (in our 
opinion) been properly understood. C. Atherton, "Hand over Fist: The Failure 
of Stoic Rhetoric," CQ N.S. 38 (1988) 392-427, accepts uncritically the hostile 
perspective presupposed by some later sources. Attention to the evidence of 
Diogenes for reconstruction of the early Stoic position on rhetoric leads to a 
different appraisal of their project. 



OBBINK, DIRK, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools , Greek, Roman and 
Byzantine Studies, 32:4 (1991:Winter) p.355 

D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AERDT 

..... ]ctEV [ .............. ] 

.... hv U1rcWV [ ........... J 
'tWe; 0'0 jlOVOV [ ............ ] 
v[ . ]av <pPOVTlCHV [~[ ....... ] 

10 : V, 0·'08£ jlOVOV aya[S]oe; [a-
LlV '8taAEKLlKOe;' Kat ypajljla'tlKO[ e; Kat 
it·o]TI'til<; Kat PTl'twp Kat 't~[I\,£w<; 
jlESo]8tKOe; {c} KaAOe; En:tn:a-
aa[ t]e; [y] £yov [EV J 'tate; 't£XV [at ]e;, 

15 aA]Aa Kat; n:poe; 'tWt au[~~£­
POV'tt, 'tWV] Ji:oAEwv [0'08£ 'tOte; 
OtKOUat 't]a~ 'ASTlvae; [jlo]vo[v 
11 AaKEj8aljlOVa aUjln:[o]At~d)El. 
a[<pp]oywv yap n:OAte;· [OV·K ·~cr-· 

20 -ttV 0'08£ VOjlOe;, aAAa 'tw[v 
EK· 8EWY Kat ao<pwv auo'tTljla­
'tWV· Kat 'ta[ATlS]£e; dv[at A£­
y£'t(U] Kat a'tpa'tTlyoe; K[at Ka­
't]a y[il]v Kat Ka'ta Sa·Aa[Hav 

25 Ka]l 'tal1lae; Katn:paK't[wp Kat 
't]ae; aAAae; Ka'ta 'tpoiwv [OiKO­
VOjlElV apxae;, En:£l8i) ['tov 
n:OAt'tlKOV [~ avaYKTJe; 
8Et Kat 'tilv Cxn:aV'twv 't[o]u-

30 'twv £X£lV E1tla'tTljl[Tlv.» . 
0'0 jlil[v] a[AA'] d 8Et KAINE[ 
TA TIAP~[ . h.I 8dKVuci[8m . 

367 

1 initio unus quidem versus deest 2-4 0 1506 (vestigia exigua in 
pap., deest N) + N 240 fro 11 inf. 2-3 on 1:0V re[ N 240fr. 11 info 
re[oIAntK]ov SUo 3 ]ov [u]PXEtV u[ 0 1506= ]XEtV ad tl[ N 240 fro 11 info 
a[reacrus Ar. : ad A[£Y£1 SUo 4 1: jus K[ u]1:U reOAtv a[ 0 1506= J KU1:U 
TIOAAA[ N 240 fro (1 inf. (x[PXuS supp!. Suo 5 NIIC 0 : HNf N : NH[ 
pap. 6 JC1:EV 0 : ] .01:E[ pap. : hE[ N inter 7 et 8 ·paragraphus pap. 
9-10 e~[opwcr£1JIEV Su·. 10 1l0VOV emendavit Suo : 1l0VOC pap. 10-11 
ecrl[nv Su., nv pap. 11 ?ltuAEKnKoc sscr. pap. 12 reoJTJ1:~s Suo 
1:E[AElCOs Ar.:·sed spatia longius : 1:E[Aos Suo 13 {c} delevimus 
1l~80]c)tKoS supp!. Suo : JtlIKOCCKAAOC . pap. 13-14 supp!. Suo 14 
cA.[.]EXON[ .. ] pap. 15-18 fere omnia supp!. Suo post reoAEcov Su., post­
POV1:t interpunximus 18 crullre[o]At1:E1)Et Ar.: cUllre[ . ]MI [pap. : 
CYM[ ... ] .. EN 0 : crull[ .. JtllI N : CH)Il[cp"tp£t] ~v Su., qui post o-~ll[cp£P£1 
interpunxi"t inter 18 et 19 paragraphus pap. 19 (x[ cpp ]ovcov Ar.: 
[cptJIA[ocr]o[cp]cov Suo reoAts Longo: reoAtc[ pap.: reOAtcr[IlUn Su., 
spatia longius [OUK] supp!. Ar. 19-20 e(J]ln[v Su., ]1:1\: pap., ]11:[ 0 



OBBINK, DIRK, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools , Greek, Roman and 
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368 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

20 'tw[v nos: 't[ pap., 0 : 't .[, wlo N : 'twIt Ar. : 'to ['t£]I£K Suo 
21-22 OU(HTjj.lai'twv Suo : ouo't[ ... ]I'tw.Kat pap.: ouo't~j.lai'ta 0: 
ouo'tlJj.laln Ar.: 22 m] supp!. Ar. 'ta[ .... ]Ec 0: 'ta[ATj8]fS suppl. 
SUo qui post EC interpunxit 22-23 [AflyE'tm] Ar.: dv[at O£ I 
j.lfAAn] Suo 23-24 [Kai't]a [yil]v Su., ]a'f[ .]v pap. 24 fin. 
8aAa[nav Suo 25 1tpa[K'twp Kat Su., '1tpaK't[ pap. 26-27 
OiKO]lvoj.lElV Suo 27 ['tOY Suo 29-30 't[ou]I'twv Su., 't[ . ]ul'twv pap. 
30 £1tto'tf)j.l[TjV Suo inter 30 et 31 paragraphus pap. 31 ou j.l~[v] a[AA'] 
d Suo 32 ]~ vel]~ pap., 0 oElKVuo[8at Suo 

Translation 

"[gap of 6-8 words] that the statesman always fills all offices in the 
city [gap of 10-12 words] not only [gap of 2-3 words] prudence [gap 
of 2-3 words]. And he is not only a good dialectician and grammarian 
and poet and orator, and perfect in method, having become good at 
all the arts, but also, in addition to (that kind of) practical utility, he 
shares in the government of cities, and not only with those inhab­
iting Athens or Lacedaemon. For among the foolish there exists no 
city, nor any law, but in the confederacy made up of gods and sages 
he is even truly called general and admiral, treasurer and collection 
agent, and he is said to administer the rest of the offices in like 
fashion, since the statesman must of necessity have knowledge of all 
these matters. But even so, if one must point out [text breaks offJ" 

Commentary 

The paryrus is preserved as fragment 8 of P.H ereul. 1506 (for 
details 0 the papyrus, see now Hammerstaedt [supra n.15J 12f). 
For places where the much-corrupted original is deflcient, we 
have the witnesses of the nineteenth-century copies (disegni) in 
N(aples) and Q(xford). An engraved facsimile of N is repro­
duced in Herculanensium voluminum qltae supersunt, Col­
lectio aItera, vol. 3 (Naples 1864) fol. 21. This portion of On 
Rhetoric is also preserved in a second, revised copy (P.H ereul. 
240: see Sudhaus, app. crit. p.210; Dorandi [supra n.15J 79ff), of 
which fr. 11 contains part of the opening three lines of the 
present column. Our text amalgamates the readings of the four 
witnesses, taking the original papyrus of P.Hereul. 1506 fr. 8 as 
our primary control. In the apparatus criticus we report the 
readings of the apographs only when the reading is uncertain 
and the original papyrus deflcient. In general we do not report 
earlier conjectures that are ruled out on palaeolographical 
grounds. 



OBBINK, DIRK, Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools , Greek, Roman and 
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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 369 

It has been conjectured that the fragment derives from Book 
III of Philodemus' DEpt prl'roPlKi1<; (see supra n.15). The general 
context can be ascertained from the immediately preceding 
columns (6-7), which are known to link continuously with the 
present column (S), and the following column (9) that contains 
Philodemus' response. Under discussion are the views of 
Diogenes of Babylon (quoted by name in col. 6) on the roles of 
the philosopher and statesman in the governance of the city, and 
his capacity for expertise in arts beneficial to the city. In the 
present passage (in direct quotation, probably introduced by 
cpacrl in col. 7) Diogenes' views are presented in a negative light 
for his lavish claims that the philosopher is exclusive master of 
all such arts (rhetoric included). Although he may agree in spirit 
or on certain points with Diogenes (lines 31f, and the following 
col. 9 containing Philodemus' response) about the proficiency 
of the wise, Philodemus holds political and forensic rhetoric to 
be the special province of (non-philosophic) politicians, and 
maintains that only epideictic rhetoric is the exclusive province 
of the philosopher and thus systematically teachable as a science. 
This view has already been stated in earlier portions of the 
treatise and is presupposed by the present passage. 

1: One line is missing from the beginning of the column (see 
Sudhaus, app. crit.). Its traces are preserved in P.H ercul. 240 fro 
11, which spans the division between columns 7 and S in 
P.H ercul. 1506. This brings the number of lines in the column to 
a total of 32; the columns of P.H ercul. 1506 vary between 30 and 
33 lines. Diogenes' quotation was probably introduced in col. 7, 
where he is already d irectl y quoted; the remains of lines sff do 
not suggest that a quotation began here and certainly not in Sf, as 
the finite verbs throughout (preserved intact in line 10) render 
indirect quotation unlikely. The position reported must be 
Diogenes': no one else is quoted in the surrounding columns, 
whereas Diogenes is cited by name at col. 1.2S (p.203 Sudhaus), 
6.10 (p.20S), 12.24 (p.216), and views independently attributed to 
him are discussed throughout. 

3: Sudhaus' restoration 'tOY 1tOIAlnK]6v is supported by 
P.H ercul. 240 fro 11, which at this point reads on 'tOY 1t[. This in 
any case rules out von Armin's 'tOY crocp]6v. It it fair to say that 0 
1tOAl'tlK6<; is probably the subject of the predicate nominatives in 
lines 10ff and of Y]£YOV[EV in 14. It must also be the grammatical 
subject of the verb in 22 and the subject (dependent upon 8Et in 
line 29) of OlKO]VOJ.lEtV in lines 2M. By lines 22-27 it has ap-



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370 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

parently become necessary to repeat 6 7tOAt'tlKO<; (in the 
accusative in 28) in order to specify that it is the subject of the 
btEt8ft clause at 27-30. Also relevant in this connection are the 
crOCPOl of line 21. But it is probably the case that for Diogenes' 
purposes 6 7tOAt'tlKO<; and 6 crocpo<; are identical; only the wise 
(crocpo<;) man is truly 1tOAt'tlKO<;, as is directly implied by 19-22 
and 27-30. 

4: [a]pxEtV ad a[1tacra<; t]a<; ... a[pxa<;: a cognate accusative: 
Hdt. 3.80, Thuc. 1.93, and in epigraphical documents. The 
infinitive a] PX£tV is introduced by on in line 2. Philodemus 
often uses on (=quod) with subject accusative and infinitive 
where we would expect the indicative or optative in classical 
Attic: cf Philod. Rhet. 1.39.11; 1.78.4; De oec. col. 9.38, 36.43; so 
also Thuc. 3.25, Xen. Cyr. 1.3.13. P.Hercul. 240 fro 11 preserves 
here ]x£tv ad ~[. If ~ here is (as seems likely on resemblance of 
letter shapes) the mistake of the disegnatore for an original A, 
von Arnim's restoration a[1tacra<; can be retained. The claim 
that the Stoic statesman/sage will hold all offices, although un­
paralleled elsewhere, is supported by lines 13f 7tacra~<; t£XV [m]<; 
and the list of offices in lines 23-27 (clearly intended to 
encompass all offices: lines 2sf Kat I t]a<; aAAa<;); the Stoic ruler 
is to have certain knowledge of all of them: 29f 8£i Kat tl)V 
a1tav't(ov t[o]UtWV £X£tV £1tlcrtft/1[Tlv. This position is a coherent 
extension of the early Stoic claim (attributed to Chrysippus' On 
Zeno's Proper Use of Names: D.L. 7.122=SVF III 697) that the 
sage alone is capable of kingship, and fit to be ruler, magistrate 
and rhetor: OU /10VOV <5' £A£u8EPOU<; dvat wu<; crocp01J<;, aAAa 
Kat ~acrtAEa<;, tTl<; ~a<JtA£ia<; o15crTl<; apXTl<; avu1t£u8uvou, ~'tl<; 
1t£pt/1ovou<; iiv wue; crocpoue; crucrtatTl. Ka8a CPTlcrl Xpucrt1t1tOe; £v 
ton O£pt tOU KUPlW<; K£XPTlcr8at Zftvwva tOl<; Qvo/1acrtv' 
£yvwKEval yap CPTlcrt 8£lV tOY apxovta 1t£pt aya8wv Kat KaKwv. 
/1T18£va 8£ tWV cpauAwv brlcrtacr8at 'taura. 6/10lWe; 8£ Kat 
aPXlKOUe; <5lKacr'tlKOUe; 't£ Kat PTlWptKOU<; /10VOU<; dvm. 'tWV 8£ 
cpauAwv ou8€va. The similarity with the present passage places 
Diogenes' argument in this column firmly in the context of 
early Stoic views on the political expertise of the sage. Cf also 
Olymp. In PI. Ale. p.SS Creuzer, p.37 24f Westerink (SVF III 
618) 6 apxtKo<;, wU't£cr'ttv 6 d<5wc; apX£tv. /10VOe; apxwv £crtlV; 
Procl. In PI. Ale. p.164 Creuzer, p.7S Westerink (SVF III 618) 
/10VOe; apxwv 6 cr7tOU8alOC;, /10VOe; 8uvacrtTl<;, /1ovo<; ~acrtA£Ue;, 
/10VOe; TtY£/1wv 1tav'twv, /1ovo<; £A£u8£poe;, of which the pres en t 
passage may be a summation, in anticipation of the list at 23-27, 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 371 

where apxo.s appears again as an internal accusative in just this 
sense of «offices." 

4: [t las lW,ta nOAlV a[pxo.s: the apograph of P.H ercul. 240 fr. 
11 reads here l(ata nOAAA[, which, given the correspondence 
exhibited in the preceding lines with P.Hercul. 1506 fr. 8, is very 
likely to be a misreading of nOAIN or nOAINA. P.H ercul. 1506 here 
reads K[.] ATA- nOAINA[. 

7: A paragraphos appears in the margin after this line to mark 
syntactical division: cf lines 18, 31. Thus a new complete 
sentence begins here. 

8-9: Sudhaus' restoration [tilv l(ata q>lAoO'oicp(l<:xv CPPovTlO'tV 
seems unnatural (is there another kind of cppovTlO'ts ?). The trace 
preserved on the papyrus is most compatible with N: the first 
upright is clearly visible, followed by the top of the diagonal 
sloping to the right. This suggests a noun ending in -v [(lav. 

9-10: Sudhaus was in any case right that, according' to the rules 
of syllabification followed by the scribe, the word at the end of 
line 9 must be syllabically divisible between two vowels, for line 
10 begins with a vowel and is not the beginning of a word 
(unless line 10 began with the particle av, a possibility suggested 
by D. N. Sedley, though this is not recommended by line 8, 
where ou must negate an indicative verb). The syntax in any 
case is not in doubt: "Not only (does the sage excel) as regards 
CPPovTlO'ls, nor again is he onl y good as x, y, and z (lines 10-14), 
but in fact .... " 

10: The papyrus clearly reads MONoe; Sudhaus first emended 
this reading to the adverb !lovov, which receives some support 
from the parallel construction in lines 8f OU !lovov; cf also 1M 
[ou8£ ... !lo]vo[v. If MONoe is corrupt, it was already so in the 
original papyrus, and it is possible (as suggested by F. Longo 
Auricchio) that the scribe mistakenly corrected an original 
!lOVOV to !lOVOs by attraction to the following nominatives. The 
original reading !lOVOs could, however, be maintained, with a 
slight alteration in emphasis: "Nor (only) is the wise person 
alone a good dialectician, (nor alone) a good grammarian, (nor 
alone) a good poet, but also .... » D. N. Sedley recommends 
keeping !lovos because of the familiar form of the Stoic 
paradoxes, that the sage alone is king, and suggests to us the 
reading ou8£ !l(ovov !l)ovos. as an easy omission accounting for 
the corruption. T. Dorandi (per litteras) also expressed doubts 
over the certainty of Sudhaus' emendation. 

11: 8WAEl(ttl(OS: at first omitted by the scribe, then corrected 
in supralinear. The Stoics regard dialectic as an ars or t£xvTl. an 



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372 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

art or craft pursued systematically, teachable and capable of 
certain knowledge (though only by the Stoic sage). So Alex. 
Aphr. In Arist. Top. p.1.8 Wal. (SVF II 122) Ilovo<; 6 cro<po<; KUt' 
u\nou<; OtaA,EKnKo<;; D.L. 7.83 (SVF II 130) OtaA,£K'tlKOV ~lOVOV 
dvut tOV cro<pov. Dialectic and rhetoric (el 12 pT]tmp) together 
make up the logical part of Stoic philosophy (see D.L. 7.43-48, 
49-83). It is not entirely clear where grammar and poetry fit into 
this division (el 11 YPUIlIlU'tlKO[<;. 12 nO]lltT]<;). The four tExVUt 
catalogued in the present passage (dialectic, grammar, poetry, 
and rhetoric) might be seen as an independent division 
(attributable to Diogenes?) of the logical part of Stoic philos­
ophy, since it is implied in 13f that they are all tExVat in the sense 
just defined. In any case (ayu[8]o<;) OtUA,£K'tlKO<; and ypullllu­
'ttKO[<; (note the absence of the article) are clearly substantive 
adjectives functioning as nouns to indicate technical proficien­
cies of the Stoic sage and parallel the nouns no ]lltT]<; and pT]tmp 
in 12, i.e., "a dialectician" and "a grammarian" rather than, say, 
predicate adjectives with rcrlnv, "trained in dialectic" or "skilled 
in grammar"). 

YPUIlIlU'ttKO[<;: Diogenes' claim that the sage will necessarily be 
a good grammarian (or the only one) is apparently without 
parallel (but ef ad 12 infra, where it is attested that he will be a 
good literary/textual critic: Kpt'tlKO<;). The technical profession of 
the YPUIlIlU'ttKO<; was in any case not as socially opprobrious as 
that of a YPUIlIlUtOOtOacrKuAo<; or 'school teacher', and much 
more highly compensated (R. A. Kaster, Guardians of Language: 
The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity [Berkeley 1988J 
114-23, esp. 119 n.101, shows that the YPUllllu'ttKo<; regularly 
was paid four times as much). But Stoic recognition of grammar 
as a separate discipline to be pursued systematically can be 
doubted, since it does not appear in the standard division of 
Stoic logic into dialectic and rhetoric (D.L. 7.44-48, 49-83). 
Nevertheless, the Stoics clearly engaged in grammatical activities 
and made grammatical observations in the pursuit of various 
other enquiries (e.g. into parts of speech, phonetics, the dis­
tinction between the sign and the signified) and divided dialectic 
into two parts, one dealing with what is (or could be) said or 
meant or signified (the lekton), and another dealing with the way 
the human voice is articulated to say, express, mean, or signify 
things (<pmvT], <ppacrt<;. AE~t<;: D.L. 7.43, 62). Points we would 
regard as grammatical occur under both headings, but grammar 
as a separate discipline is never referred to under either heading. 
M. Frede ("Principles of Stoic Grammar,» in J. M. Rist, cd., The 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 373 

Stoics [Berkeley 1978J 27-57 at 38= Essays in Ancient Philosophy 
[supra n.2] 301-37) argues that in spite of these difficulties 
grammar did in fact exist for the old Stoics as a separate dis­
cipline, or at least that their work in this area comes "sufficiently 
close to such a separate discipline." Diogenes' assignment here 
of the role of ypaJlJla"tlKOs to the wise person provides some 
support for this view (see also Schenkeveld, supra n.2). For 
further traces of Stoic work on grammar see E. Rawson, 
Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London 1985) 
117-21, who greatly overestimates (118) Stoic interest in 
etymology. On the status of grammar, poetry, and rhetoric as 
't£xvat for both Stoics and Epicureans see further Rawson 
143-55; Sedley (supra n.32) 109-17. 

12: [no]T)T!ls: for the claim see Pluto De tranq. animo 472A(SVF 
III 655): 0.')..)..0. Kat prrrwpa Kat nOtT)'ti1v Kat cr'tpa'tT)Yov Kat 
nAoucrwv Kat j3acrlA£a npocrayopEUOJlEVOV; Arius 67.13 (=SVF 
III 654): JlOVOV 8E <pacrl 'tOY cro<pOV Kat Jlav'tlV o.ya8ov dval Kat 
notT)'ti1v Kat pT)'twpa Kat 3laAEK"tlKOV Kat KPt"tlKOV, though 
Arius goes on to state that the sage will not always be good at 
everything: ou nav'ta 3£, bto. 'to npocr3Etcr8m E'tl "tlVo. w{milV Kat 
8£wpT)JleX'twv "tlVWV uvaAT)'I'EWs ("on account of his further, i.e. 
continuing, need for the acquisition of these things and certain 
general principles"). The position here that the sage will be a 
good poet should be contrasted with the Epicurean position on 
this score. 

pT)'twp: the Epicureans certainly did not believe that the sage 
or statesman needed to be a good orator; this is probably the 
main focus of Philodemus' interest in Diogenes' views here; its 
frequent occurrence in Stoic claims for the sage's excellence 
(e.g. D.L. 7.122, quoted supra ad line 4) may have recalled to him 
the present passage. Cj SVF III 594, 622. Later in Book VI 
Philodemus (on which see M. G. Capclluzzo, CronErcol 6 
[1976J 69-76) quotes Diogenes on precisely this point: Rhet. 
1.346 Sudhaus (=SVF III 99). 

'tE[A£Ws: cf in a Stoic context D.L. 7.100 (SVF III 83): KaAov bE 
A£YOUcrl 'to 't£AElOV uya80v ... 11 'to 'tEAElWs crUJlJlE'tpOV. 

13: [JlE80]3lKOs {c} KaAos : the original papyrus reads 
] t.IKOCCKAAOC, which is obviously corrupt. We take ]t.IKOCC as a 
miswriting of a word ending in -3lKOS and delete the repeated 
sigma. Sudhaus printed the emendation 6 KaAos because 
] t.IKorCKAAOC was mistakenly read by N. The restoration 
JlE8oblKOS seems highly probable. It is not necessarily objec­
tionable that Philodcmus never uses this adjective personally, 



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374 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

since he is here quoting from Diogenes. But l.u:SO]ouco<; is not 
an exclusively Stoic term either, and Philodemus is at least 
familiar with the term and uses it in reference to the technicity 
of various arts, often in the expression 'to Il£SOOllCOV 'tyt<; 'tEXVT]<;: 
Philod. Rhet. 1.23.12,25.16,41.8,53.8,62.24; cf 1.24.6: EIl[7t£lP­
ta]v I 'tilv EV 'tOt<; 7tpa[Yllaot]v I Il£SOOtKllV; adverbially Rhet. 
1.2.11,19.6. The general sense is not in dispute, but it is tempting 
to restore av'tiJOtKO<; KaAo<; E7tl etc.: "and has become a 
formidable opponent (or advocate) in all arts"; for av'tlOtKO<; see 
Philod. Rhet. 1.267.9,2.189.10; De ira col. 31.12. 

In any case Sudhaus' 0 KaAo<; is not acceptable because this is 
not a familiar designation for the Stoic sage (usuall y 0 oo<po<; or 
<ppOVlJl0<;). In our text KaAo<; merely reiterates ayaSo<; (line 10): 
"and, being perfect in method, has become good at all the arts." 

13-14: 7taloa[t]<; ... 'tat<; 'tExv[at]<;: the extent of proficiency 
claimed for the Stoic sage in this formulation lends support to 
the restoration of [iX7taoa<;] ... apxa<; in lines 3f. The sup­
plement 7talaa[t]<; [y]£yov[£v] 'tat<; 't£xv[at]<; is due to Sudhaus. 
The papyrus reads nAIc::~.[.]E:~oN [ .. ] (or EXEIN[ .. ]) 'tat<; K'tA., which 
is very close to the reading of O. But N read ] EXO:-..r , and unless 
we assume that some shifting of traces has made the r of 
y]£yov[£v] subsequently uncertain, Sudhaus' supplement adopt­
ed above should be regaded as an emendation of a corruption on 
the papyrus. 

15-16: 'trot OUIl<P£povn must be the neuter substantive, a com­
mon Stoic term often said to be identical to 'to ayaS6v and 'to 
OtKatov: SVF III 558, cf I 558. R. Janko proposes (per litteras) 
oU[Il<P£povln 7tav'tC.ov 7t]OA£WV (translating "in what is to the ad­
vantage of all cities"), but this is slightly too long for the available 
space and renders the following clause anticlimatic. We take 'to 
OUIl<i>EPOV here to refer to "what is beneficial" and following a 
suggestion by D. N. Sedley punctuate afterwards with a comma. 
This has the effect of taking 7tpo<; 'trot oU[Il<i>Elpovn to refer back 
to "benefit" derived from the professions of the preceding list, 
in contrast to service in civic affairs in what follows. Thus 'trov] 
7t0AEWV is locative: "in cities" or "where cities are concerned." 
Sudhaus and von Arnim take 7tpo<; 'trot OU[~l<i>Elpovn with what 
follows and punctuate after 'twv 1 7t0AEWV. 

16-17: [ouo£ 1:Ot<; I olKouatl : the restoration of a controlling 
verb seems to be required by the pair of accusatives 't] a<; 
'ASilva<; and AaK£]oalllova, and is futher secured by the 
parallels at Cic. Nat. D'. 1.154 (Athenians and Spartans) and Rep. 
3.33 (Athenians and Romans); Sen. De otio 4.1 (Athens and 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 375 

Carthage)-though these instances are not limited to the rule of 
the wise, as in the the present passage. In this case the implica­
tion of saying that the sage governs jointly or shares in citizen­
ship "not just in Athens or Sparta" is, of course, that the sage 
does so (at least theoretically) in all cities, or the 'one' (i.e., 'true') 
city-the utopian Stoic megalopolis. The idea is a further 
instantiation of the claims made in lines 3f «muO"uc;] ... apxac;) 
and 13f bd. 1tuIO"uu; '" 't£xv[m]c;. Cf also Arius Didymus ap. Eus. 
Praep. Evang. 15:817.6 (SVF II 528): 'to EK 'trov EVOllCOUV't(OV O"uv 
1toAhutC; O"uO"'tTII.1U (quoted in full on line 21 infra). 

18: For von Armin's O"UI11tOAl't£un there is at least some papyr­
ological support from the combined readings of the papyrus, N, 
and O. The papyrus reads O"ul11t[, while the Oxford apograph 
reads O"UI1 (OM N) followed by a lacuna of several letters in both. 
N then reads 1'111, which may have been a misreading of an 
original AlT. 0 seems then to represent traces of several letters, 
followed by EN at line end (i.e., an upright followed by a short 
diagonal sloping to the right). The discrepancy of the apographs 
indicates disorder in the papyrus at this juncture. Professor F. 
Longo Auricchio reports that the original papyrus bears traces at 
the end of the line that seem to represent I'1H. But these occur 
detached after a break in the papyrus and we do not consider 
them in every respect reliable. The reading printed above 
should be considered a conjectural reconstruction of the traces 
in 0 and N. 

Stoics commonly claimed that the sage rules, and exclusively 
so (usually with the simple form of the verb, and always 
middle), not of course actually as a matter of description but at 
least theoretically: Arius 94.7 (SVF III 611) 'to 1tOAt't£u£0"8m 'tOY 
O"ocpov; D.L. 7.122 (quoted supra on line 4); Sen. Ep. 90.4.7 
(Posidonius' account of the rule of sages during the saeculum 
aureum); cf Stob. Flor. 45.29 (S V F III 694). For O"Uf.!7tOAt't£UEtV 
in this sense with the dative see e.g. Thuc. 6.4, 8.47. The present 
locution is also strikingly paralleled in a quotation from Chrysip­
pus at Philod. De piet. at P.Hercul. 1428 col. 7.21-27 Henrichs 
(supra n.13: 18): (KOO"I10V £vu) O"uV1tOAnl't£u[o]I1EVOV 8wlc; I KUt 
av8pw1totC;; cf on line 21 infra, where the passage is quoted 
more fully, and Philod. De piet. p.8L 19 Gomperz, where O"U 11-
1tOAt't£u£0"8ut (middle) means "to inhabit as a fellow citizen" (of 
the Athenians together with Epicurus). Cf 1tOAt't£u£0"8m in the 
sense of 'rule' at Philod. Rhet. 1.83.4, 199.17 (passive), 235.7; 
2.21.16,25.17,39.11 (passive), 230.35, 278 fr. 19, O"UI11tOAt't£U'tTtC; in 



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376 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

Diogenes of Oenoanda's attack on the Stoics (fr. 18 I 3.5, II 8=NF 
39 Smith). 

19: a[cpp]ovwv (von Armin) is confirmed by the papyrus and 
rules out Stidhaus' [cpl] IA[ ocr ]ocpwv. Moreover, the papyrus 
shows a mark of interpunctuation between lines 18 and 19, in­
dicating that a new grammatical constitutent begins with that line 
(or in 18). By virtue of its initial position a[cpp]ovwv is emphatic. 
acpPOVEe; are not exactly <fools', but rather all non-sages in the 
Stoic view. It is difficult to tell if the genitive is one of possession 
(or possibly of composition), or has a more locative sense 
("among fools," as in our translation). The sense is clear enough: 
non-sages possess no (real) city or law-a strong claim, given the 
rarity of sages. 

ltOAle;: nOAlC is clearly the reading of the papyrus. Sudhaus' 
proposal ltoAi[ crJ.lan is highl y poetic and in any case too long for 
the available space. For the reading rroAle; (virtually eq uivalent to 
rroAl'tda) we are indebted to a suggestion by F. Longo Auric­
chio (per litteras). With rroAle; cf Arius Didymus ap. Eus. Praep. 
Evang. 15.817.6 (SVF II 528): 6 KocrJ.lOe; olovd rroAle;; Cic. Nat. 
D. 2.78: urbem aliquem; Clem. AI. Strom. 4.26 p.324 Stahlin 
(SVF III 33: quoted below on line 21). For the language and idea 
see esp. Philo De Ioseph. 2.46 (S V F III 323): it J.lEV yap 
J.lqaAorroAle; abE 6 KocrJ.lOe; Ecrtt Kat J.ll~ XPTltal ltoAltEiq. Kat 
VOJ.lql Evi; Origen, c. Cels. 4.81 (SVF III 368): cruvEcrtllcrg,vw'tae; 
apicr'tae; rrOAltEiae; Kat 'tae; apXae; Kat tae; itYEJ.lOVlae;, cOV OUbEV 
£V tOte; aAoYOte; £crnv EUPEtV. Cf the metaphorical language in 
Diogenes of Oenoanda NF 39 Smith. 

20-21: tw[ v] 1 £K 9EWV Kat crocpWV (crucrtllJ.la'twv), in an ti thesis 
(20 aAAa)' to the genitive in 19 a[cpp]ovwv (rather than the 
change of case, 'tw[ t, proposed by von Armin); hence our 
restoration of the genitive article tw[v. The antithesis is thus as 
follows: "Among fools there is no city or law, but among 
confederacies (made up of) gods and sages," etc. For the ex­
pression cf Arius Didymus ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 15.817.6 
(S VF II 528): 'to £K 'twv £VOlKOUV'tWV cruv rrOAltale; crucrtTlJ.la, 
OUtw Kat 6 KocrJ.lOe; olovd rroAl<; £crnv £K 9EWV Kat av9pwrrwv 
cruvEcrtwcra (quoted in full below on line 21). See further below 
(377) for the early Stoic restriction of the provenance of natural 
law to the community of sages. 

21: ('tw[v] I EK 9EWV Kat crocpWV) crucrtTlJ.lahwv: Diogenes' 
wording' (for which this is the earliest attestation) is reflected 
rather closely in the doxographical tradition: Arius Didymus ap. 
Eus. Praep. Evang. 15.817.6 (SVF II 528): AEYEcr9al bE KocrJlOe; 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 377 

Kat 'to OlK1l'tT)PWY SECOY Kat aySpW1tWY Kat tCOY EYEKa W{HWY 
YEYOJ..lEyWY crucrTT1J..la. OY yap tP01tOY 1tOAls AEYEtal ()tXCOs to tE 
OlK1ltT)PWY Kat to EK tCOY EYOlKOUV'tWY crUY 1toAhals crucrtTlJ..la, 
OUtw Kat 0 KOcrJ..lOs oloyd 1tOAls ("a kind of city") EcrttY h SECOY 
Kat aySpw1twy crUYEcrtcocra; Cic. Off 1.153; Fin. 3.64; Nat. D. 
2.133, 154 (quoted below); Leg. 1.22; Sext. Emp. Math. 9.131. 
Remarkably close to the present text for its early Stoic wording 
is Philodemus' report in De piet. at P.Hercul. col. 7.21-7 
Henrichs (supra n.13: 18) of Chrysippus' position in On Nature 
3: EY O£ I tCOl tPltWl to'y' K[ocr]IIlOY Eya tCOY <PPOIYlll[w]y, 
crUY1tOAEttEU[O]IlEYOY SWts Kcd aySpW1tOls ("In the 'third book 
he Esc. ChrysippusJ says that the universe of the wise is one, 
jointly governed by gods and humans" or: "citizenship of it 
being held by gods and humans together"; on the translation see 
Schofield [supra n.18J 74 with n.19, who also points out its 
echoes of Heraclitus fro 53). Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.78: rationis 
compotes inter seque (Sc. deos) quasi civili conciliatione et 
societate coniunctos, unum mundum ut communem rem 
publicam atque urbem aliquam regentis, where unum mundum 
translates an original Kocrllos Eva, but urbem aliquam renders an 
original1toAl~ 'tts, comparable to 1tOA1s without the article in the 
present text, as contrasted with the plural ta crucrtT)llata 
(probably a generic or abstract formulation more or less 
equivalent to the singular). So also Clem. AI. Strom. 4.26 p.324 
Stahlin (SVF III 333: Chrysippus): cr1touOatoy yap i11tOAls Kat 0 
OllllOs acrtEtoV 'tt crucrtTlJ..la Kat 1tAllSos avSpw1twy U1tO YOIlOU 
OWlKOUIlEVOY (but cf Philo De Joseph. 2.46 [SVF III 323J: i1 J..l£v 
yap IlEYaA01tOAls OOE 0 KocrllOs Ecrtt Kat J..ll~ XPlltat 1tOAttdct Kat 
YOIl!p (yl). Also related to the locution with the indefinite 
pronoun are those passages in which the universe is said by 
Stoics to be "as it were" (olovd, wcravEt, quasi) a city: e.g. Arius 
Didymus ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 15.817.6 (quoted above); M. 
Aurelius Med. 4.3.2,4.4; Cic. Fin. 3.64; Nat. D. 2.78 (quoted 
above), 154: est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque 
hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque. 

Many, if not most of these passages name humans (not sages) 
and the gods as inhabitants. But there is a lingering idealized, 
utopian quality in the conception of a polity in which the 
inhabitants are thought to share in joint government or 
citizenship with gods. And unlike the present text, none of the 
extant parallel passages (listed above) are ascribed to early Stoic 
authorities or reported in direct quotation, except Chrysippus' 
restriction of habitation to <PpoVlllOl in On Nature 3. It is note-



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378 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

worthy that the present text, one of the two earliest formu­
lations, represents this polity as consisting of gods and sages. The 
doxographical tradition easily conflated the early Stoic (JU(J11lIla 
8Eiov Kat (Jo<pWV (or <PPOvtIlWV) uv8pw1twV into (Ju(J11lIla 8EWV 
Kat uv8pw1tWV of the later tradition. (See Vander Waerdt [supra 
n.26] for some considerations that led Cicero to adopt a similar 
revision of the early Stoic position). The point, in its original 
early Stoic formulation, would be that the multiplicity of political 
organizations possessed by ordinary peoples are for the most 
part ad hoc conventional measures that are at best imperfect ap­
proximations of real government; the only real political insti­
tution that meets the standard explicit in Chrysippus' definition 
of the city (SVF III 333, quoted above) is that which exists as a 
cosmic unity composed of gods and sages. For further 
substantiation of an early Stoic pedigree for the idea see Philod. 
De Stoic. col. 20.4H (Dorandi [n.36 infra] 103: OElV ... Kallln[1]E I 
1t6AlV llYEt(J8al 1l1l0lltav (bv I E1tl(J1(XIlE8a IlnTE v61l0v ("it is their 
[Sc. the Stoic] view that we should not think any of the cities or 
laws we know to be a city or a law"); Diogenianus ap. Eus. 
Praep. Evang. 6.264 B (SVF III 324) addressing Chrysippus: 1tWe; 
O£ 10Ue; KEW£VOUe; v61l0ue; llllap111(J8al <pile; 0:1taV1ae; Kat 1ae; 
1toAl'tdae;; ("How is it that you say that all laws that have been 
posited and all constitutions are in error?"); and Clem. AI. 
Strom. 4.26 p.324 Stahlin (SVF III 333: Chrysippus, quoted 
above): "The Stoics say that the universe is in the proper sense a 
city, but that those here on earth are not-they are called cities, 
but are not really. For a city or a people is something morally 
good, an organization (au(J11lIla) or group (1tA1l80e;) of people 
administered by law that exhibits refinement (U(J1EtOV )." 

21-22: (Ju(J11lJ.laI1Wv Kat: Professor Longo Auricchio reports 
that the papyrus inde'ed reads Tn.KAI at the beginning of 22, thus 
confirming the supplement of Sudhaus (as against von Armin's). 
o read (Ju(J11lJ.laI1a[ .. ]Kat, which is certainly not right, given the 
syntax here. And the parallels listed on 21 indicate that there is 
only one such entity, which suggests that the plural (Ju(J11lIla1a 
here is a generic or abstract formulation common with neuter 
plurals and equivalent to a singular. Possibly it was attracted into 
the plural because of its responsion in the contrast to ~[<pp]6vwv 
in 19. Here (Ju(J11lIla has the sense of 'organization' or 'con­
federacy', but with overtones of its technical epistemological 
sense in Stoicism as a rational and logically interrelated structure 
of parts. Carneades also used the term in reference to his own 
method, as we know from a citation of Clitomachus at Cic. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 379 

Acad. 1.102, where Cicero rendered it as institutio et quast 
disciplina. 

22: La[Alle]E~ (Sudhaus): 'to aAlle,,~ is common in the adver­
bial sense 'in very truth' (e.g. PI. phdr. 102E). In any case, von 
Armin's emendation ~a[crtA]E<U>~ is palaeographically unsup­
portable, for the ommission of the upsilon is left entirely un­
motivated, and the supplement is far shorter than the available 
space; ~acrlAEu<; is of course familiar enough from earlier Stoic 
claims of this sort (ef D.L. 7.122~ SVF III 697, quoted in full on 
4): ou J.lOVOV ()' £AEueEpou~ dvat LOU~ cro<pou~, aAAa Kat 
~acrtAEa~, Lf]~ ~acrtAd.a~ oucrll~ apxf]~ aVU1tEUeUVOU. 

What follows is a list of existing political offices in the cursus 
honorum, no doubt reflecting Diogenes' special interest in 
magistrates as attested by Cic. Leg. 3.13. In each of the offices 
here ennumerated the Stoic sage will exercise his expertise, 
complementing the equally comprehensive catalogue of 'tExvat 
at lines 10-14 in which he is claimed to be expert. The division in 
this passage between the two separate lists (lines 10-14, 23-30) 
may be significant: it is partly due to his expertise in each of the 
LEx,val listed in 10-14 that the sage can claim to hold all 
magistracies. By the early first century B.C. many prominent 
Romans who were generals were also orators; some even had 
poetic aspirations (Cicero, Gallus). Not a few were versed in 
grammar (Caesar, Varro); a select few seem to have taken an 
interest in dialectic (see Rawson [supra ad I1J 132-42). But it is 
difficult to see how any of the disciplines named in line 10-14 
are necessary for, or conducive to, say, a career as a collection 
agent (25: 1tp<h'twp). We would like to know how many offices 
Diogenes named (25f: L]a~ &AAa~) in his work on magistracies 
and what he in fact said about each. The closest parallel to 
Diogenes' catalogue of the sage's 'tExvat is the Posidonian 
account of philosophy's discovery of the artes preserved in Sen. 
Ep. 90 (=Posidonius fro 284 Edelstein and Kidd). Posidonius 
does not broach the subject of civic offices, no doubt in part 
because he holds that the sage ruled without law in man's 
original, uncorrupted condition, but he clearly attributes dis­
covery of such arts as house-building, tool-making, and metal­
lurgy (Ep. 90.7-13) to sages; Seneca's objections to these lavish 
claims (some of which may involve misrepresention of Posi­
doni us' position: see Kidd [supra n.17J 960-71) parallel those in­
troduced by Philodemus in response to this passage of 
Diogenes. 



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380 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

22-23. [AElyE'tat]: von Armin's restoration 1S resonant of 
similar expressions introducing the preeminence of the Stoic 
sage: see e.g. Pluto De tranq. animo 472A (SVF III 655, quoted 
more fully on 23): cHpa'tllYov Kat nAoUCHov Kat ~aalAEa 
npocrayopEuo~EVOV: he will "be called," "be addressed as," 
lending the inflated impression of public and deserved recog­
nition. Such expressions probably reflect an attempt to support 
rhetorically the true basis of the sage's claim to excellence. 

23: cr'tpa'tllYo~: the technicality of generalship, of course, had 
been a point of philosophical dispute as early as Plato's Laches 
and Xenophon's Anabasis. It was now held and now denied that 
being a successful general was an art or skill that could be 
acquired or learned by just anyone, at least in large part. The 
Stoics certainly conceded it to be a 'tExvll in the strict sense, nor 
did they have any doubts about who alone was qualified to 
serve as general: see e.g. Pluto De tranq. animo 472A (SVF III 
655): aAAa Kat pT)'twpa Katnolll'tllv Kat cr'tpa'tllYov Kat ~a(HAEa 
npocrayopEuo~EVOV; Clem. AI. Strom. 1.25f p.104.11-105.14 
Stahlin (S V F III 332): ~ovov youv 'tOY cro<pov Ot <ptAOao<pOt 
~acrtAEa, vo~oeE'tllv, cr'tpa'tllYov, OlKatOV, ocrtOV, eEO<ptA~ 
KllPuHoucrtV. The claim that the sage alone will be general was 
said to be the Stoic Persaeus' favorite Zenonian doctrine: Pluto 
Arat. 18 (5 V F I 223a, cf. 443 [Zeno]: Ucr'tEPOV DE A£ynat 
crxoAa~wv (sc. Persaeus) npo~ 'tOY ElnoV'ta ~ovov au'tcp bOKE1V 
cr'tpa'tllYov dvat 'tOY cro<pov, "aAAa vll eEOU~, <pavat, 'tOU'to 
~aAtcr'ta Ka~oi nO'tE 'tWV ZT)VWVO~ 11 PEcrKE Ooy~a'twv." 

cr'tpa'tllYo~ also=praetor at Polyb. 3.106.6, 33.1.5 (of the praetor 
urbanus); Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.6; Arr. Epict. 2.1.26; IG XIV 
951 (I B.C.): cr'tpa'tllYO~ Ka'ta noAtv. But it is also used alone in 
Greek to designate a Roman consul: Polyb. 1.7.12; Syll.3685.20 
(Crete, II B.C.). 

23-24: (cr'tpa'tllYo~) Ka'ta eaAa['t'tav, i.e., admiral (vauapxos). 
25: 'ta~la<;=quaestor (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.34; 5yll.3 700 

[Lete, II B.C.]), i.e., a treasurer or paymaster, responsible for any 
corporation's expenditures. In contrast, a npaK'twp (=exactor) is 
not a tax-collector but a (government) collection agent or bailiff 
responsible for receipts. So 'ta~la~ Kat rrpaK'twp probably 
should be taken together as a pair in tandem with the pair "both 
general and admiral" (lines 23f). The npaK'twp is especially 
associated with civic debts at the local level: see H. ]. Mason, 
Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and an 
Analysis (Toronto 1974); F. Preisigke, Worterbuch der griechis­
chen Papyrusurkunden IIL2 (Berlin 1929) 144ff with numerous 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 381 

instances from Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. The position is not 
terribly distinguished, nor very high in the cursus honorum. 
The original point (assuming that Diogenes discussed these 
offices) may have been that the 1LOAl'tlKOC; can manage all the 
financial affairs of the city (rerhaps a move against decentraliza­
tion and specialization 0 responsibilities under provincial 
administration ?). 

26-27: [otKo]IYOIlElY apxae;: cf 3-4 a[pXHY ... a[pxac;. As 
political offices, apxui correspond to those Roman honores in 
contrast to the less coveted munera (AEl'toupyim). 

27-28: ['toy]1 1LOAl'tlKOY: Philo De Ioseph. 39 (IV 69f Cohn 
=SVF III 323): 8l' (by llaAl<J'tu 1LUPl(HU'tUl 'tOY ulnoy 
OlKOYOlltKOY 'tE dvm KUt 1LOAl'tlKOY; part of the same discussion 
as the present passage, Philod. Rhet. 2.226 (SVF III 125): WO"'tE] 
moe; 1LOAt['tlKO]C; O[UKj £O"['tuh pl)HOp xw[pt]e; qnA[oO"o]cpiue;; 

III 

This text provides our most extensive account of the Stoic 
sage's political expertise when called upon to rule in inferior 
regimes.35 It significantly augments our knowledge of early Stoic 
political philosophy, while illustrating as well some of the 
innovations Diogenes introduced to make their position com­
parable in scope and intention to that of his Platonic and Peri­
patetic rivals. In the commentary below we attempt to explain 
both Diogenes' argument in this passage and its importance for 
the development of Stoic poli tical philosophy. 

In certain respects Diogenes' argument clearly follows the 
orthodox lines laid down by Chrysippus. Thus Diogenes' lavish 

35 Evidence for early Stoic reflection on the sage's participation in practical 
politics is surprisingly scanty, not least because Plato's Republic is such a 
prominent target for Zeno and Chrysippus. The remains of Zeno's Republic, 
presumably in keeping with its utopian character, are silent on this question; 
Chrysippus holds that "the sage will take part in politics if nothing prevents it 
... for he will restrain vice and encourage virtue" (On Lives I=D.L. 7.121), and 
traces of this account may be found in Arius 94.8-17, 109.10-20, 111.3-9, 
143.24-144.21 (on the rclation of Arius' testimony to Chrysippus' see P. 
Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen [Berlin 1973J I 412ff), as well as 
in SVF III 691-93; see also Cic. Fin. 3.68; Sen. De otio 3.2, Ep. 90.4-7; and, for 
an appraisal of Chrysippus' advocacy of political action, Vander Waerdt 
(supra n.7) 202f. For a very different assessment of early Stoic interest and 
involvement in practical politics, see Erskine (supra n.20) 64-102. All these 
parallels are concerned with the sage's attitude toward politics as one 
alternative among the possible ways of life and do not take up Diogenes' 
subject of the benefits the sage may confer upon actual political communities. 



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382 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

claims for the sage's mastery of the politically beneflcial arts 
(lines 3-18) appear to extend Chrysippus' work vindicating 
Zeno's use of terminology (D.L. 7.122, quoted above on line 4): 
here Chrysippus explicitly states that the sage alone is flt to be 
magistrate, judge, and rhetor. Athough Chrysippus does not 
assign all civic offlces to the sage, this is the fair implication of his 
claim that the sage alone possesses the knowledge of good and 
evil necessary to rule. 36 And it is reasonable to conjecture that 
he advocated this position in a context comparable to Diogenes', 
for Plutarch attests that Chrysippus had treated the Stoic 
orator's political activities in his On Rhetoric. 37 Similarly, 
Diogenes' contrast (lines 16-21) between the conventional 
political communities of the aphrones, among whom there is no 
natural law, and the community of gods and sages governed by 
it, also employs a well attested early Stoic distinction to which 
we shall shortly return. 

Yet there is good reason to doubt that Diogenes' argument 
simply repeats orthodox views: first, although Chrysippus sanc­
tioned the sage's political activity in certain circumstances in On 
Lives 1 (see supra n.35), no early scholarch is attested to have 
offered an account comparable to Diogenes' concerning the 
political benefits the sage may confer upon ordinary political 
communities. Such an argument from silence is hardly decisive, 
but it is considerably strengthened by evidence that Diogenes 
was responsible for introducing important innovations in Stoic 
political philosophy to make it comparable in scope and 
intention to that of its Platonic and Peripatetic rivals. 

The most important testimonium is Cicero's neglected 
account in his discussion (Leg. 3.13f) of the magistrates of his 
best regime, explaining the difference in intention between early 
and later Stoic political writings. When he promises to follow 
"the most learned Greeks" and names in particular Diogencs of 
Babylon as having discussed the subject of magistrates with 

36 The contents of Chrysippus' On Zeno's Proper Use of Terminology are 
not well attested, but D. L. 7.122 suggests that Chrysippus undertook to defend 
some of the more controversial and apparently paradoxical tenets advanced in 
the Republic against criticism of the kind levelled both inside (see Philod., De 
Stoicis, ed. T. Dorandi, CronErcol 12 [1982] 91-133) and outside the school 
(see D.L. 7.32-34 for the criticisms of Cassius the Skeptic). 

37 See Pluto De Stoic. rep. 1 034B: XpUCH1t1tO~ of: naAw £V 'ton IT£pt Pl1't0Pt1cTj~ 
ypa<pc.ov oU'tc.o~ Pl1't0P£UO£lV KUt nOAl1:£uwBm 'tov ao<pOv ro~ KUt 1:OU 1tAou1:01J 
ov'to~ ayuBou !CUt 'tTj~ 06~11~ !CUt 'tTj~ UYl£tU~ .... 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 383 

particular acuity, Atticus asks with surprise whether "even the 
Stoics" have treated these problems. Cicero then says: 

Non sane nisi ab eo [Sc. Diogene], quem modo nominavi, et 
postea a magno homine et in primis erudito, Panaetio. nam 
veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum 
popularem atque civilem de re publica disserebant. ab hac 
familia magis ista manarunt P[atone principe; post Aristoteles 
inlustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum Hera­
clidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone; Theophras­
tus vero institutus ab Aristotele habitavit, ut scitis, in eo 
genere rurum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus 
huic rationi studioque non defuit. 

In assessing this passage it is important to recognize that 
Diogenes is singled out not just for his work on the special 
subject of magistrates, but for an important contribution to the 
field of political philosophy in general. (i) Cicero holds that the 
constitution of magistrates determines the form of regime: nam 
sic habetote, magistratibus iisque, qui praesint, contineri rem 
publicam, et ex eorum conpositione, quod cuiusque rei publicae 
genus sit, intellegi (3.12; c/ 3.15). Since Cicero praises Diogenes' 
work on magistrates, it seems fair to suppose that Diogenes 
took account of the diversity of regimes. The fragments of his 
On Law 1 (ap. Ath. 526c-D) and of his work on rhetoric and its 
relation to politics preserved in Philodemus' On Rhetoric (S VF 
III pp.235-43) amply support this suggestion. And certainly the 
other old Academics whom Cicero names as important sources 
were noted for their general contributions to political 
philosophy. 

(ii) Cicero contrasts his own project with that of the older 
scholarchs by pointing out that their work was not intended to 
be practically useful. Since Diogenes is the first of the two Stoics 
cited as important sources (Panaeti us, the other, was known as 
an advocate of the mixed regime: Cic. Rep. 1.34), he presumably 
departed from his Stoic predecessors in attempting to offer a 
practically useful political teaching. Other texts also contrast 
Diogenes' work with that of his predecessors (SVF III 126, 
p.243; Gal. De plac. 130.7-19, 138.17-29 De Lacy). Thus it 
appears that Diogenes and Panaeti us were the two Stoics who 
provided an antecedent for Cicero's own project of developing 
a Stoic political teaching comparable to Plato's. It is noteworthy 
that Cicero, whose knowledge of previous political philosophy 



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384 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

was extensive, is aware of no Stoic writings concerned with 
practical political questions before Diogenes. Clearly Cicero has 
drawn heavily upon Platonic and Peripatetic traditions in De 
republica and De legibus, and parallels suggest that he may be 
drawing upon Diogenes in this respect. 

Cicero's characterization of early Stoic political writings as not 
intended for practical usc certainly accords well with our 
surviving evidence for Zeno's Republic, which depicts the way 
of life of a community of sages whose practical realization is no 
more possible than that of the Platonic Socrates' "best city in 
speech" (Resp. 592A-B). It also accords well with the early 
Stoics' rejection of the central role their Platonic and Peripatetic 
rivals assign to a teaching on the relative merits of different 
forms of regime as a guide to political practice (see 386 infra). In 
contrast, the early Stoics deny that philosophy may satisfactorily 
guide political practice through such a teaching; only the sage, 
with his certain knowledge of good and evil, is capable of 
infallibly choosing the correct course of action even in excep­
tional circumstances; accordingly, only his right reason-iden­
tified with natural law-may adeq uately guide political practice. 38 

Thus one issue, which later Stoics like Diogenes who wished to 
develop a practical political teaching need to clarify, is the rela­
tion between mankind's two communities. The early schol­
archs distinguish sharply between the megalopolis of gods and 

38 Although the early Stoics wrote extensively on political subjects (Zeno, 
Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Herillus, and Sphaerus all wrote on law or legislation: 
D.L. 7.4, 166, 174, 178), their extant fragments leave unexplained their concep­
tion of how philosophy may guide political practice-in other words, to take 
the terms in which Zeno confronted this problem in the Republic, how they 
reformulated the Platonic paradox of the rule of the philosopher-king in such 
a way as to render unproblematic the sage's participation in politics. It is clear 
that Zeno's teaching in his Republic represents an attempt to disarm this 
paradox: see Vander Waerdt (supra n.19). The comparison to Plato's 
philosopher-king is well attested: Marcus Aurelius is said often to have quoted 
Plato on this point (HA, Marc. 27.7); Cicero compared his proconsulship in 
Asia to Plato's dream (QFr. 1.1.29). That the the Stoics took such a step is clear 
from their claim that the sage will discharge all the social kathekonta, 
including participation in politics when appropriate, incumbent upon moral 
progressors. Yet, while their claim that the sage alone is the true king or ruler 
(D.L. 7.122) commits them to the position that only the philosopher can 
adequately guide political practice, the extant testimonia fail to explain how 
the sage will do so in conventional regimes. The Stoic sage's political aim is the 
promotion of virtue and the restraint of vice, according to Chrysippus (0 n 
Lives 1=D.L. 7.121); and Arius 94.8-11 suggests that the sage will take a special 
interest in a regime progressing towards perfection. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 385 

sages-or, as Chrysippus puts it (On Nature 3), "the cosmos 
comprised of phronimoi [whose] citizenship is held jointly 
among gods and human beings"39 by virtue of their ration­
ality4°-and the conventional political communities to which 
human beings belong by accident of birth. The reticence of our 
sources concerning the relation between these two commu­
nities is no doubt due in significant part to the early Stoics' claim 
that the only true city is the rational community of gods and 
sages that knows no conventional boundaries and in actuality 
exists nowhere in this world. 

The consequence of this claim is that the early scholarchs rad­
ically deprecate political life as ordinarily understood. They hold 
that the conventional political regimes to which human beings 
belong have no natural status, taking their name and character 
soley from the inhabitants' conventional and imperfect employ­
ment of such institutions (Ariston ap. Pluto De exil. 600E=SVF I 
371); these conventional regimes do not meet the standard 
explicit in the definition (shared by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and 
Diogenes) that only a group of morally good human beings 
united by natural law constitutes a city;41 and, as this dehnition 
implies and as other evidence shows (supra nn.17-20), they have 
no share in natural law, hence are not communities in which one 
may attain one's natural end of rational consistency with nature. 
In contrast, the megalopolis is likened to a cosmic city; its 
citizenship is restricted to gods and sages; and they are united by 
their common participation in reason, "which is natural law" 
(KOtV(!)VtUV b' 1mapXEtV npo<;; eXAA:l)AO'U<;; btu 'to AOYO'U 1lE't£XEtV, 
0<;; f<Jn qn)<JEt VOIlO<;;), as Arius says (ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 
15.15.3ff=SVF II 528). 

This formulation fully accords with the early Stoics' definition 
of the koinos nomos as identical with the sage's right reason-a 
definition in which nomos is not law in the conventional sense 
of a body of positive enactments and customs that regulate the 
citzens' social life; it is rather the correct moral reasoning of 

39 De piel. col. 7.21-27 Henrichs (supra n.13: 18), quoted above on line 21. 
40 That this is the standard for citizenship in the megalopolis is made 

unequivocally clear by Cic. Nat. D. 2.78f, 153ff; cf Leg. 1.23; Plut. De comm. 
not. 1 065F with Cherniss ad lac; Arius ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 15.15.3ff= SVF II 
528. Note that some of these parallels take human rationality, rather than the 
sage's perfected rationality, as the standard for inclusion in the megalopolis. 

41 Cf Arius 103.11-23, quoting Cleanthes; Clem. AI. Strom. 4.26; Dio Chrys. 
Or. 36.10-15; Diogenianus ap. Eus. Praep. Evang. 6.246B=SVF III 324; D.L. 
7.122, quoting Chrysippus; Diogenes' text (quoted above) lines 18-21. 



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386 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

sages who, by virtue of their rationality, form a community that 
recognizes no boundaries drawn merely by convention. Since 
natural law requires the eradication of all such boundaries (Plut. 
De virt. Alex. 329 A-B; cf Cic. Rep. 3.33), the Stoic's search for 
happiness, and for the attainment of his natural perfection, must 
take place in the megalopolis. Hence it should come as no 
surprise that the early scholarchs appear to have taken little 
interest in the relative merits of different forms of regime­
none of which, on their original view, would promote a way of 
life that accords with natural law. 42 The Stoic conception of the 
city as a community whose sole criterion for citizenship consists 
in possession of a correct rational disposition leaves the early 
Stoics with little reason to develop the kind of elaborate teaching 
on the relation between the best regime and actual political 
communities that forms the centerpiece of Platonic and 
Peripatetic political philosophy. 

Diogenes' work on magistrates (ef supra 382f) marks an 
important departure from earlier Stoic thinking in its attention to 
specific political regimes and their relative meri ts. Part of 
Diogenes' project of developing a practically useful political 
teaching is reflected in our column, where he undertakes to 
specify the benefits the philosophically informed statesman may 
confer upon actual political communities. More specifically, 
Diogenes undertakes to clarify the relation between man's two 
communities by showing how the sage's membership in the 
community he shares with the gods governed by natural law 
may guide political practice in conventional, actual regimes 
whose citizenship consists largely or entirely of aphrones 
incapable of virtuous action. This is likely to have been a central 
subject in Diogenes' On Law, which is lost apart from one 
valuable citation (ap. Ath. 526 C-D); but it should come as no 
surprise to find Diogenes (following Chrysippus: supra n.37) 
treating it in connection with rhetoric: since the early Stoics 
identify rhetoric with the political art, and maintain that the sage 
alone is the true rhetor (D.L. 7.122; SVF I 216, III 615, 618, 655), 
one central theme of Stoic discussion of rhetoric is the poli tical 
benefit the true rhetor may confer upon actual political regimes. 

<12 No early Stoic text identifies a constitutional preference. Chrysippus 
explicitly holds that all existing political regimes are in error, and that we 
should attach ourselves not to just any regime, but to the right one (Sen. De 
olio 8.1 =SV FIll 695; cf. Ep. 68.2)-a stipulation that only the megalopolis can 
meet. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AERDT 387 

Our column advances the argument that it is appropriate or 
necessary43 for the sage to fill all the city's offices. But in which 
of the two cities mentioned in lines 15-22 will he do so? Will it 
be (i) the conventional political communities inhabited by the 
aphrones, or (ii) the cosmic city of gods and sages? If (ii), then 
Diogenes' argument in this column would form part of an 
account of a hypothetical regime of sages on the model of 
Zeno's Republic; if (i), then Diogenes' argument would illustrate 
Chrysippus' position that the sage will readily take part in 
politics in order to promote virtue. One could construct an 
argument in favor of (ii): since the cosmic city alone provides 
the conditions necessary to live in accordance with natural law, 
the sage has every reason to prefer to assume the burdens of 
office there rather than in conventional political communities. 
But several considerations make (i) far more likely. In the flrst 
place, there is no reason to suppose that the crucr'tT]~a 8£wv Kat 
crocpwv (line 21) has any need of such offlcials as tax-collectors, 
or possibly even generals (lines 23ff). The abolition of such 
merely conventional features of ordinary political life is, after all, 
a well-attested feature of Zeno's community of sages (D.L. 
7.32f), which there is good reason to identify with the 
megalopolis (Vander Waerdt supra n.l7); and it is impossible to 
square the civic offices Diogenes assigns to the sage with the 
early Stoics' conception of natural law as requiring the abolition 
of all merely conventional features of civic life. 

Second and more important, the syntax of Diogenes' argu­
ment in the present column supports interpretation (i). Since the 
sage's capacity to fill all the ci ty' s offlces consti tu tes one respect 
in which he is exceptionally able to beneflt the citizens of 
existing political regimes, as Diogenes claims in lines 15f, the 
argument of our column would appear to form part of an 
account of the beneflts the sage may confer upon ordinary 
political communities. These lines provide the transition from 
Diogenes' account of the sage as perfectly expert in all arts to his 
claim that the sage is best equipped to rule existing regimes (on 
account of his political expertise as detailed in lines 23-30): best 
because he is best able to confer beneflts upon their citizens. 

43 It is conjectural that some such claim introduced the opening of our 
column, but this supposition seems necessary in light of the Chrysippean 
doctrine at D. L. 7.122 that Diogenes is adapting; see above on line 4. 



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388 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

The standard Stoic understanding of justice as benefaction 44 thus 
underlies the substantive "to (JUIHPEPOV (line 15). 

The reasoning behind Diogenes' central claim in our column, 
that the sage is best eq uipped to fill all the city's offices, is left 
somewhat unclear by the lacuna in lines 5-9. Diogenes docs not 
spell out the justification for the sage's all-encompassing rule 
stated in lines 3f, but his preservation of the early Stoic contrast 
between man's two communities in lines 16-21 suggests that he 
would offer an explanation for the sage's unique expertise along 
similarly orthodox lines. In other words, Diogenes would argue 
that the sage, in contradistinction to the aphrones, possesses the 
rational disposition or the knowledge of good and evil that 
enables him to act infallibly even in exceptional circumstances 
and without the compulsion of positive law.45 Diogenes' con­
ception of the sage elsewhere46 supports this conjecture, and it is 
clearly implied by Diogenes' view that the statesman will neces­
sarily have "knowledge concerning all these things [Sc. all the 
various offices of the city]"; the lacuna in lines 5-9 may well 
have contained an explanation of the sage's exceptional virtue 
(note the reference to phronesis: line 9). 

Moreover, although Diogenes does not elaborate on his con­
ception of natural law, the contrast he draws in lines 19ff-with­
holding nomos from the aphrones and assigning it to the com­
munity of gods and sages-suggests that he follows the early 
scholarchs in identifying natural law with the sage's right reason. 
This view, though conjectural, is fully consistent with Diogenes' 
conception of the sage's unique virtue, and provides a clear 
motivation for his argument in our column. Since only the sage 
is capable of acting in accordance with natural law, he alone is fit 
to rule on behalf of the citizens of ordinary political regimes; by 

44 For parallels see above on lines I5f. The Stoics' conception of justice as 
benefaction appears to represent a development of Socrates' position as 
represented by Xenophon: see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Socratic Justice and Self­
Sufficiency: The Story of the Delphic Oracle in Xenophon's Apology of Soc­
rates, " Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 11 (1993, forthcoming). 

45 See e.g. Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1037 c-38A; Arius 99.3-8; Cic. Fin. 4.56, quoting 
Zeno. 

46 Diogenes defends the early scholarchs' sharp distinction between the sage 
and ordinary human beings against current criticism: see his defense of Zeno's 
syllogism ap. Sext. Emp. Math. 9.133; see also Diogenes ap. Philod. Rhet. 2.225 
Sudhaus (SVF III 124), a passage (P.Ilercul. 1506 col. 20.24-30) in close 
proximity to the present text. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AERDT 389 

similar reasoning, he alone can discharge each of the city's 
offices in the most beneficial fashion. 47 

The conclusion that Diogenes' conception of natural law 
follows orthodox lines renders this text important additional 
evidence for reconstruction of the early Stoic theory. Diogenes' 
account does not hint that the conventional political com­
munities of aphrones may share in natural law in some weaker 
sense. 48 To the contrary, Diogenes states unequivocally that 
VOj.lO<; has no place among ordinary political communities such 
as Athens and Sparta, which need the sage's unique expertise to 
provide adequate political guidance. This position clearly re­
stricts the provenance of natural law to sages, so aligning Di­
ogenes' position clearly with Zeno's, who portrays a community 
governed by natural law, the citizenship of which is similarly 
restricted to sages (see supra n.20), and with Chrysippus' explicit 
view that natural law prescribes katorthomata that the sage alone 
is capable of performing (Sttpra n.19). Diogenes does not explain 
in our passage how he conceives of the content of natural law, 
but his restriction of its provenance to sages certainly implies 
that he would follow Chrysippus on this point. 

IV 

Diogenes' claim that VOj.lO<; and rcOA.U; exist only in the cosmic 
city, or an identical claim set out elsewhere, can now be seen to 
form the basis for a passage in Cicero that has long perplexed 
commentators and fostered unnecessary violence to the text. As 
it happens, the passage in question depicts Diogenes of Babylon 
caught red-handed as a proponent of this view in a context that 

47 This interpretation, if correct, implies that Diogenes is not responsible for 
the important modifications in the early Stoic theory that Cicero's account in 
Leg. 1 presupposes. Cicero clearly is following an Antiochean source (see R. A. 
Horsley, "The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero," llThR 71 [1978J 35-59; 
also supra n.26), but it is unnecessary here to to address the complex problem 
of his adaptation of the sources on which he drew for his modifications of the 
Stoic theory of natural law. Suffice it to say that an important difference 
between Diogenes' view and that developed by Cicero is that Diogenes 
restricts the holding of political offices to the Stoic sage (although they may 
benefit others), whereas Cicero does not. 

48 As Mitsis' argument (supra n.28) that the provenance of natural law 
extends to ordinary human beings requires. Diogenes' account in our column 
provides strong additional evidence against reconstructions of the early 
scholarchs' theory like Mitsis', inasmuch as they require natural law to provide 
guidance to aphrones in a manner not specified in any early Stoic text. 



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390 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

is at once decidedly political and urban, in no other city than 
Rome, and datable precisely to 155 B.C. For in that year Dio­
genes appeared in Rome with the Academic Carneades and the 
Peripatetic Critolaus as a member of the famous embassy of the 
philosophers. Drawing upon Clitomachus' book that discussed 
this embassy,49 Cicero tells the following anecdote concerning 
the urban praetor Postumius Albinus (Acad. 2.137): 

legi apud Clitamachum,50 cum Carneades et Staicus 
Diogenes ad senatum in Capitalia starent,Sl A. Albinum qui 
tum P. Scipione et M. Marcella cansulibus 52 praetar esset, 
eum qui cum avo tua, Luculle, consul luit, dactum sane 
haminem ut indicat ipsius histaria scripta Graece, iacantem 

49 Clitomachus (for whom see the edition by H. ]. Mette, Lustrum 27 
[1985]142-48) is Cicero's habitual source of information about Carneades, who 
wrote nothing: see Acad. 2.16£, 78, 98, 102-05, 108f, 139; on the embassy see: 
Cic. De Or. 2.155, Tuse. 4.5,Att. 12.23.2; Gell. NA 17.21.48. P. Rutilius Rufus 
discussed the embassy in his Histories: Peter, HR Rei I 187 fro 3 (=Gell. N A 
6.14.8ff); Polybius (33.2) noted differences in the three philosophers' rhetorical 
and oratorical style; and C. Acilius, Postumius Albinus, and Cato also 
remarked on it: Plut. Cat Mai. 22.2f; Quint. Inst. 12.1.35; Plin. HN 7.112; Cic. 
Rep. 3.8-12 (=Lactant. Di7). Insl. 5.14.3ff), 21 (=Lactant. Di7). Inst. 5.15.2ff). 

50 apud Ciitomachum clearly refers to a book by the amanuensis of Car­
neades, which may be the tiber Cicero has just mentioned (A cad. 2.102), in 
which case it was addressed to the poet Lucilius (though presumably in 
Greek). But Clitomachus was a voluminous author (Acad. 2.16: industriae 
piurimum in Ciitomacho fuit, deciarat multitudo librorum); Cicero (A cad. 
2.98) refers to four volumes de sustinendis adsensionibus, on the first of which 
Cicero says he was principally drawing for this section. Clitomachus may of 
course have mentioned the embassy in more than one place. C. Cichorius' 
argument (Untersuchungen zu Lucilius [Berlin 1908] 11 f, 41) that Clitomachus, 
a Carthaginian, is not likely to have accompanied Carneades to Rome in 155 
and so is unlikely to have been Cicero's real source (followed by ].-L. Ferrary, 
R E L 55 [1977] 155) seems fanciful. Yet A cad. 2.98 (acutus ut Poenus [Sc. 
Ciitomachus]) shows that suspicion lingered. 

51 For the expression stare ad senatum, curiam, etc. (not "waiting attendance 
upon," but "standing around in front of," perhaps waiting to go in or away) 
see Cic. Cat. 2.5 (quos stare ad Curiam), De Or. 2.353 (stare ad ianum). During 
this period the Senate met at varying locations. Cicero is pointing out that the 
Senate on this occasion met on the Capiwl, and not, as later in the Curia in 
the Forum. 

52 Cicero the scholar can be glimpsed at work on the first draft of the 
Academica (of which only the Lucullus, i.e., A cad. 2, survives) in Au. 12.23.2, 
where he asks Atticus to find out who had been consuls in this year. He wants 
additional information as well: the reason for the envoys' visit; had there been 
any notable Epicurean, head of the Garden, at this time; who were the leading 
Athenian 1tOAltl1wl-and tells Atticus where to look to find it. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER WAERDT 

dixisse Carneadi: "ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non 
videor, quia sapiens non sum, nee haec urbs nee En ea 
civitas. " tum ille: "huie Stoico non videris. "53 

391 

The point of the praetor's remark has been grossly misrep­
resented. Postumius Albinus' allegation that Carneades thinks 
he is not a 'real' praetor (insofar as he is not a sapiens) nor does 
Rome really exist as a true urbs or civitas -clearl y presupposes 
a position very similar, if not identical, to that expressed in the 
passage from Diogenes: namely, that the only true city is the 
cosmic city, and that 'there is no urbs or civitas among fools', 
i.e., except among the wise; and that 'only the sage is truly 
praetor'.54 

Understood in the Stoic context that Carneades' reply recom­
mends, Postumius' quia sapiens non sum makes perfect sense 
and should not be excised, on the mistaken claim that it "turns 
on the Academician's doctrine of the uncertainty of all things":55 
if that were so, and if Carneades intended to suspend judgement 

53 "I have read in Clitomachus' book that when Carneades and the Stoic 
Diogenes were standing in front of the Senate House on the Capitol, Aulus 
Albinus-who was praetor at the time, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and 
Marcus Marcellus (he was a colleague of your grandfather, Lucullus, as consul, 
and his own history written in Greek shows him to have been a decidedly 
learned man)-said to Carneades in jest: 'In your view, Carneades, because I 
am not a sage, I am not a real praetor, nor is this a real city, nor its corporation 
a real corporation'. To which Carneades replied: 'So thinks our Stoic friend 
here'." 

54 In the presumed Greek original of Cicero's story, urbs would translate 
1tOAtC; (cf the new text above, line 19); civitas in ea may translate (JU<Hlll.l0:tOlV 
(cf line 21) or something like it; quia sapiens non sum corresponds to a<ppOvOlv 
(cf line 10); with Albinus' office as praetor, cf (J'tPm:llY0C; lCU'tU 1tOAtV line 23 
with commentary. 

55 J. S. Reid, Cicero, Academica (London 1885) 338f, and H. Rackham, 
Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Academica (London 1933) 644 n.d (the phrase is 
retained in Plasberg's Teubner edition [Leipzig 1922]). Reid's claim rests upon 
a basic misunderstanding: for the Academic skeptic is not a negative 
dogmatist who positively denies the possibility of certain knowledge, but 
rather claims that his Stoic interlocutor, given his premisses and canons of 
logic, must suspend assent; among the large recent literature on this subj ect see 
P. Coussin, "Le Stoicisme de la Nouvelle Academic," Revue d'histoire de la 
philosophie 3 (1929) 241-76 (tr. as "The Stoicism of the New Academy," in M. 
F. Burnyeat, cd., The Skeptical Tradition [Berkeley 1983] 31-63), which is the 
foundation of modern research; M. Frede, "The Skeptic's Two Kinds of 
Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge," in R. Rorty et al., 
edd., Philosophy and History (Cambridge 1984) 255-84 (=Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy [supra n.2] 201-22). 



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392 DIOGENES Of BABYLON 

on the external existence of the praetorship and city, why 
would Carneades thcn turn, as he immediately docs, to attribute 
the doctrine to Diogenes? Cicero immediately concludes from 
the story that Carneades was practically a Stoic.56 Diogencs had 
no doubts about the certainty of these things, though he did 
hold them to be restricted to the wise in important respects. 

The answer is clearly that Carneades, faced with the praetor's 
allegation, attributes the doctrine in question, and so shifts the 
blame for holding it, to its putative source: Diogenes. Part of the 
joke thus turns on the scenario in which thc hapless praetor 
puts his question to Carncades, including the possibility of the 
praetor's exercising his administrative control over undesirable 
intellectual influence from foreign parts. Only a few years 
earlier, in 161 B.C., the urban praetor had been charged by the 
Senate to exclude rhetoricians and philosophers from settling in 
RomeY And it was (and still is) widely believed that, apart from 
dazzling learned Romans with eloquence, the Athenian cm­
bassy upset many traditionally minded Romans by purveying 
the enticements of Greek philosophy and culture,58 and that the 

56 Cic. Acad. 2.137f, in keeping with his Antiochean version of the history of 
the Academy: sed ille noster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca 
balbutiens. 

57 See Suet. De rhet. 1.2; Gell. N.A. 15.11.1. In 181 B.C. Pythagorean doctrines 
had been denounced by the praetor as undermining Roman religion: Liv. 
40.29.3-14; Val. Max. 1.1.12; Plin. HN 13.84-88; Plur. Num. 22.2-5; August. De 
civ. D. 7.34; and numerous historians of the late Republic. In 173 (?) two 
Epicurean philosophers, Alcaeus and Philiscus, had been expelled from Rome 
(Ath. 574A; Ael. V H 9.12; De provid. fro 39 Herch. ap. Suda S.V. 'E1ttKOUPOC;). 
Gruen (177), noting that of all the Athenian philosophical schools no Epi­
curean ambassador went to Rome in 155, argues for this expulsion of Epi­
cureans in 154 (both years having a consul named L. Postumius) because the 
philosophic embassy in the previous year will have" caused a sensation." Lack 
of Epicurean involvement in the embassy can have been due to nothing so 
much as the school's position on participation in political life. 

58 Plut. Cat. Mai. 22.4f; Plin. HN 7.112; Cic. Rep. 3.9; Quint. Inst. 12.1.35. 
Yet Cicero (De Or. 2.155) suggests that Carneades and Diogenes left a very 
good impression indeed among Roman nobles. Cf. E. S. Gruen, Th e 
Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley 1984) 257f, who denies 
(341 f) any assault against Roman imperialism by Carneades in his lectures for 
and against justice, on the grounds that such a violation of decorum would 
have jeopardized the embassy's mission before the Senate. This view is main­
tained in his 1990 study (174-77 at 17M): "The event did not betoken a mighty 
confrontation between the cultures. Rather the reverse. The success of the 
philosophers discloses a markedly increased zeal for Greek learning among 
the Roman intelligentsia by the mid-second century. Athens had sent her emi-



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AERDT 393 

censor Cato had sent the ambassadors packing. 59 Cicero has to 
point out that the praetor was only joking (iocantem). 

Why, then, does Postumius Albinus address his joke to Carne­
ades rather than Diogenes, inasmuch as the joke relics on the 
latter's doctrine? The explanation (in light of the actual text of Di­
ogenes discussed above) is that Carneades had quoted or sum­
marized Diogenes' doctrine in public discourse, probably in his 
first speech in praise of justice in which he collected the 
favorable arguments of its proponents (Lactant. Div. Inst. 
5.14.3ff).60 Since Carneades had cast his argument in Stoic terms 
(without, of course, committing to them in his own name: 
Lactant. Epit. SO [55] 5-8), Postumius might well have had good 
reason for thinking that Carneades shared the Stoic views he 
expressed. This interpretation has the advantage, unlike Reid's 
and Rackham's, of motivating both Postumius' question and 
Carneades' reply. 

The envoys certainly did more at Rome than simply lodge a 
formal plea before the Senate. They offered public lectures and 
displays of current Greek philosophy. Most of the attention 
focused on Carneades and involved an encounter with the 
censor Cato. Carneades was particularly remembered for hav­
ing presented a brilliant defense of justice on one occasion, fol­
lowed on the next day by an equally compelling disquisition on 
its irrelevance. The event has often been taken as evidence for a 
clash of Roman and Greek cultural values in the second century 

nent professors in the first instance in expectation that they would get a warm 
reception .... When public business had been concluded, the Athenian 
representatives returned home .... Cato succeeded only, if at all, in speeding 
completion of the senatorial debate. The philosophers had accomplished their 
mission and left in high repute." The embassy was apparently successful, to 
judge from Pluto Cat. M ai. 22.5; Ael. V U 3.17. But the embellished accounts 
from the later period entirely fail to distinguish between successfully 
impressing Romans in rhetorical/philosophical display and obtaining a 
diplomatic concession from the Senate. 

59 In point of fact, all Cato did was to hasten the decison of the Senate on 
the envoys' request: Plut. Cal. Mai. 22.5; PI in. UN 7.112; Gruen 176 ("thus to 
leave them with no further pretext for remaining in Rome"). There was no 
expulsion; it was only customary for envoys to be sent home after conducting 
their business. 

60 Perhaps without specifying its source. Although Carneades seems to have 
attributed most of these arguments to Plato and Aristotle, the "patrons of 
justice," slighting Chrysippus in this connection, almost all the detailed 
argumentation in his second speech is directed against the Stoics. 



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394 DIOGENES OF BABYLON 

B.C. It has also been suggested that Carneades' lectures criticized 
the injustice inherent in Roman imperialism. Gruen, however, 
has recently argued that it is highly implausible that envoys 
should have perhaps undermined the purpose of their mission 
by indecorously denouncing their hosts' foreign policies or of­
fending their political sensibilities in philosophical disquisition. 61 

But the passage from Cicero reveals a complex situation, both 
socially and intellectually, as it radically reshapes our knowledge 
of what was actually articulated during this famous diplomatic 
event. 

First, Carneades, who received the lion's share of attention for 
his displays, argued with characteristic wit the positions of other 
philosophers, including the views of his fellow philosopher-en­
voys: Diogenes of Babylon was more than once the butt of his 
dialectical maneuver (see also Cic. Acad. 2.98), to the certain 
delight of his Roman audiences. His motive was to employ his 
opponents' premises (but never his own) against them-to hoist 
them with their own petard, as it were-though a Roman audi­
ence could, and on occasion did, mistake their views for his 
own. 

Thus we should be wary of the a priori assumption that Car­
neades the envoy would have dared to say nothing as a skeptical 
philosopher that could possibly offend Roman officials, and so 
potentially undermine his mission. 62 Cicero's account and its 
philosophical content demonstrate that the views put forth by 
the philosophers could occasion alarm, at least theoretically, 
among Roman officials. But they need not have been taken with 
complete seriousness. Carneades' encounter with the cultivated 
Hellenophile Postumius Albinus is a remarkable example of 
how the philosophers' an tics could be received by Romans 

61 Gruen 176, drawing on Pluto Cat. Mai. 22.2f: "Romans delighted with the 
idea that the younger generation was partaking of Hellenic culture and 
enjoying the company of such remarkable men .... Rome's principes expressed 
pleasure that Athens had chosen to send the most renowned philosophers as 
her diplomatic representatives and frequently joined the audiences at their 
lectures .... Cato's complaints were swallowed up in the enthusiasm." Gruen 
also places much weight upon Cic. Tusc. 4.5, where it is implied that the 
Athenians would never have dispatched the three philosophers as envoys, if 
there had not already existed considerable positive interest in philosophy at 
Rome (but see 174 n.7I: appointments of philosophers as envoys were 
customary). 

62 A point insufficiently appreciated by Gruen 174-77. 



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D. OBBINK AND P. A. VANDER W AERDT 395 

with a mixture of guarded concern and genuine curiosity. 63 The 
story generously portrays the Roman praetor, in his official 
capacity, as engaging in urbane philosophical banter (if not com­
pletely on top of the argument) in a foreign tongue with dis­
tinguished visiting intellectuals (to which mention of his history 
written in Greek lends some plausibility).64 

Finally, Carneades' apparent use of Diogenes' position in pub­
lic discourse and the story recorded by Carneades' pupil and 
biographer Clitomachus shows that Diogenes' doctrine on the 
subject (treated in Diogenes' text presented above) had passed 
into the literary and anecdotal tradition nearly a century before 
Philodemus quoted it in his On Rhetoric. 

Diogenes' text provides unambiguous evidence that the early 
scholarchs' most distinctive political doctrines-their claims that 
the megalopolis is the only true city, that natural law is identical 
with the sage's right reason, and that only citizens of the megal­
opolis may live in accordance with natural law-persist until the 
end of the Hellenistic period. Although Diogenes' conception 
of the Stoic sage in the city of fools advances his novel project 
of reconstituting Stoic political philosophy so as to make it 
practically useful and comparable in scope to that of the school's 
rivals, it reaffirms the early scholarchs' conception of the 

63 For A. Postumius Albinus (cos. 151) see SEC I 152 (recipient of a Delphic 
decree); Cic Alt. 13.32.3 (recipient of a statue at Corinth); his Annals in Greek: 
IlR Rel I 53f; FCrHist 812; D. Timpe, ANRW 1.2 (1972) 928-48. He was cer­
tainly a Hellenophile (though no friend of the Scipios: Polyb. 39.1), which 
earned him the scorn of Cato (Plut. Cal. Mai. 12.5; Gel\. NA 11.8; Macrob. Sat. 
1 praef. 13-16) and Polybius (33.1.3-8,39.1 with F. W. Walbank, JRS 52 [1962J 
5), who had reason to be biased: Albinus as praetor presided over a senatorial 
hearing on restoring exiles (including Polybius) to Achaea in 155, and 
Polybius thought Albinus' presentation of the motion led to its defeat. But see 
Gruen (supra n.58) 240: the Achaeans received a negative answer at least five 
times between 166 and 154. Cicero (Brut. 81) presents a more favorable view; 
C[. Ac,!,d. ~.137. Polybius curiously says (39.1.11£) that he was in Greece for the 
fi rst time III 146. 

6<1 It is unlikely that Cam cades and the other envoys spoke Latin. Their case 
before the Senate (as opposed to their lectures) had to be presented in Latin 
translation by the senator C. Acilius (Gel\. NA 6.14.9; Plut. Cal. Mai. 22.4), as 
much from practical considerations as because "it was essential to maintain 
the distinction between private ardor for Greek culture and the official 
demeanor of the state" (Gruen 176). A translator could have been similarly 
employed for the interchange reported by Cicero (via Clitomachus). But 
Postumius will have hardly needed one, as Cicero's account shows. 



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396 DIOGENES Of BABYLON 

provenance of natural law, in particular its restriction, as a 
discipline of expertise, to the Stoic sage. Diogenes' account of 
the political expertise of the Stoic orator thus confirms the 
fundamental differences between the political philosophy of the 
early scholarchs and that of their Late Republican followers.65 

BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

AND 

CLARE HALL, CAMBRIDGE 

May, 1992 

65 This article is preparatory to a new edition of the fragments of Diogenes 
of Babylon that we have undertaken in collaboration. We are greatly 
indebted to Francesca Longo Auricchio for readings from the original papyrus 
of P.Hercul. 1506 col. 8 in Naples and for detailed papyrological notes. We are 
grateful as well to Diskin Clay, Tiziano Dorandi, Andrew Erskine, Richard 
Janko, Phillip Mitsis, A. E. Raubitschek, David Sedley, and William Willis for 
very helpful comments on earlier drafts. P.A.V.W. would like to thank the 
American Philosophical Society and Duke University's Research Council for 
their award of research grants in support of this project.