YUNIS, HARVEY, Law, Politics, and the "Graphe Paranomon" in Fourth-Century Athens , 
Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 29:4 (1988:Winter) p.361 

Law, Politics, and the Graphe Paranomon 
in Fourth-Century Athens 

Harvey Yunis 

I N FOURTH-CENTURY Athens, when a dikasterion was convened to 
hear a graphe paranomon, the jurors naturally heard the prosecu­
tor argue that the defendant's decree ("'~«j>Lup.a) was 7rapavop.ov or 

7rapa TOUs voP.OV!;, that is, in conflict with some one or more statutes 
(VOP.OL) of the inscribed law code} The jurors were also likely to hear 
the plea that the decree under indictment was inexpedient (o.UVIJ.­
«j>opov) for the Athenian people, and the defendant ought to be con­
victed for that reason too, in addition to the conflict with statute law. 
If the decree under indictment was a grant of honors or citizenship, 
the jurors were likely to hear the further plea that the person named in 
the decree as the beneficiary of the grant was unworthy (o.va,to!;) of the 
honors or citizenship. This plea too would be advanced as reason to 
convict the original mover of the decree. For the sake of convenience, 
I will call the plea of paranomon the 'legal plea', and the latter two 
pleas, concerning inexpediency and unworthiness, 'political pleas'. In 
this paper I wish to consider the status of these two types of pleas. Are 
the political pleas to be counted among those numerous irrelevant ' 
arguments and considerations, such as the opponent's family back­
ground, that Athenian orators commonly introduced in an attempt to 
prejudice the jurors against the opponent? Or were the political pleas, 
as well as the legal plea, viewed by Athenian pleaders and jurors as 

I Throughout this paper the word 'decree' will be used to translate "'~tpHrp.a, and 
the word 'statute' to translate vop.os, in the senses these words bear in the statutes 
passed in 403/2 following the decree of Tisamenus (Andoc. 1.87): lJ:yp6.tp~ at vop.~ TOS 

apxCts p.~ xpfju8a, p.7JaE 7rEP' (vas. ",~<p,up.a aE p.7JaEV P.~TE fJOVAfjS P.~TE a~P.OV vap.ov 
I<VP'WTEPOV Elva,. Cf J. Triantaphyllopoulos, "Rechtsphilosophie und positives Recht 
in Griechenland," in H. J. Wolff, ed., Symposion 1971: Vortrage zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Cologne 1975) 23-65, esp. 34f; M. H. Hansen, 
"Nomos and Psephisma in Fourth-Century Athens," GRBS 19 (1978) 315-30; F. 
Quass, Nomos und Psephisma (=Zetemata 55 [Munich 1971]), esp. 40-44. The 
following works will be cited by author's name: H. J. WOLFF, 'Normenkontrolle' und 
GesetzesbegrifJ in der attischen Demokratie (Heidelberg 1970); M. H. HANSEN, The 
Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. (Odense 1974; 
catalogue of graphai paranomon indicated by Cat. and number), The Athenian 
Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford 1987), and "Graphe Paranomon against 
psephismata not yet passed by the ekklesia," CIMed 38 (1987) 63-73. 

361 



YUNIS, HARVEY, Law, Politics, and the "Graphe Paranomon" in Fourth-Century Athens , 
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362 LA W ~ POLITICS~ AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

relevant to the case in a graphe paranomon? If they were seen as 
relevant~ what was the relation between the legal plea and the political 
pleas? 

I 

First~ some preliminary considerations. The questions just posed 
are not the product of modem distinctions that would amount to 
nonsense from the perspective of a fourth-century Athenian. There is 
no doubt that Athenian jurors were capable of distinguishing relevant 
arguments from irrelevant ones.2 Nor should we be misled by the 
theatrics of the court orators to underestimate the seriousness with 
which the jurors attended to their task under the terms of the heliastic 
oath.3 

Furthermore~ to investigate the questions set out above, there 
would be no point in seeking out the injunctions of positive law. No 
statute governing the graphe paranomon has survived. There may 
never have been such a statute.4 1f one such existed, it is most unlikely 
that it included a definition of the criteria for condemning an indicted 
decree. Unlike Roman or modem Western law~ neither the Athenian 
law code as a whole nor the individual statutes provided basic inter­
pretation of the law; that is, among other things, the law did not 
provide any definition of what constituted a particular offense. S On 

2 E.g. Antiph. 6.10; Aeschin. 1.175f, 3.205f; [Oem.] 59.5; Lycurg. Leoc. 11-13; PI. 
Ap. 17B6-c5. 

3 H. Meyer-Laurin, Gesetz und Billigkeit im attischen Prozess (Weimar 1965); J. 
Meinecke, "Gesetzinterpretation und Gesetzanwendung im attischen Zivilprozess," 
RIDA SER.III 18 (1971) 275-360. 

4 There is no reference to such legislation in the ancient literature. The statute of 
40312 recorded by Andoc. 1.87 (quoted supra n.1) and frequently repeated by the 
orators (e.g. Oem. 23.87, 218; Hyp. Athen. 22) merely subordinates (p.~ ICvp,t1>TfPOJl) 
the authority of decrees to that of statutes, but does not provide for cancelling (e.g. 
rendering 11.ICVPOJl) decrees found to be in conflict with a statute. Normally, only the 
decision of a jury could cancel a decree; cf Oem. 23.96, 24.30, [Oem.] 47.34, and 
Wolff 74-76. On the basis of Oem. 20.44 and the final clause of an inscribed statute 
of 375/4 (R. S. Stroud, "An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage," Hesperia 43 [1974] 
159, lines 55f), Hansen, "Nomos" (supra n.1: 324f), argued that "a psephisma was 
automatically repealed if it was in conflict with a new nomos." Wolff's discussion is 
still to be preferred; neither of Hansen's pieces of evidence implies the general 
principle he infers. In Oem. 20.44 Oemosthenes is exaggerating and probably 
implying the use of the graphe paranomon to render the decrees Il.lCvpa. In the 
inscribed statute, it was by means of a special provision of this particular statute that 
the grammateus was instructed to delete those decrees that were in conflict with this 
new statute. 

S Triantaphyllopoulos (supra n.l) 55-59. Cf E. Ruschenbusch, "~IKAITHPION 
TIANTON KYPION," Historia 6 (1957) 257-74, esp. 261ff, 266f. A good example of 
this lack of definition may be observed in the law of hybris (Oem. 21.47). With 



YUNIS, HARVEY, Law, Politics, and the "Graphe Paranomon" in Fourth-Century Athens , 
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HARVEYYUNIS 363 

this basis David Cohen has argued that "Athenian theft statutes are 
formulated in such a way that they do not expressly define the rele­
vant concept (e.g. theft, hierosylia), but rather presuppose a definition 
and a conception of the law that, given the nature of the legal system, 
cannot reside anywhere else but in the collective consciousness of the 
judges who happen to be sitting in court on a particular day."6 The 
situation is analogous for the offense of 7rapavojJ.a AEI'EtV: I am at­
tempting to ascertain as clearly as the evidence permits what the 
jurors in a court of the fourth-century Athenian democracy under­
stood to be at issue when they sat in judgment of a graphe paranomon. 

The present investigation is pertinent to an important, basic prob­
lem concerning the role of the dikasteria in the constitution of fourth­
century Athens. The graphe paranomon has been cited as positive 
evidence by proponents of opposing views: that the dikasteria func­
tioned essentially as a political body, empowered and expected to 
render judgment by consulting momentary political considerations 
rather than the demands of the law, 7 and, on the other hand, that the 
dikasteria functioned essentially as a jUdiciary which, for all its ama­
teurism, gave meaning to the Athenian slogan proclaiming the 'rule of 
law'.8 

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the constitutional role 
of the dikasteria. I will argue below that the political pleas were 
relevant, and in fact even necessary, for the jurors' decision in a gra­
phe paranomon. Yet I stop short of the extreme position that the 
political pleas would alone be sufficient to convince the jurors to 
condemn an indicted decree; the legal plea was also necessary. 9 Hence 

respect to the graphe paranomon, compare the undefined terms £vavTlos and £71"1-

T~b(tos in the statute authorizing the similar ypa4>~ V0IA-0V IA-~ £7I"IT~a(lOV O(LVal, Oem. 
24.33. 

6 D. Cohen, Theft in Athenian Law (Munich 1983) 6. 
7 Ruschenbusch (supra n.5) 257-61; Hansen, Sov. 62-65; D. P. Maio, "Politeia and 

Adjudication in Fourth-Century B.C. Athens," American Journal of Jurisprudence 28 
(1983) 16-45. Without citing the graphe paranomon, but referring to the Athenian 
jurors of the fourth century, L. Gemet, Droit et societe dans fa Grece ancienne (Paris 
1955) 67, remarks that "il n'y a pas une distinction absolue entre Ie legislatif et Ie 
judiciaire"; cf among Gemet's citations especially Isoc. 21.18, Lycurg. Leoc. 9. 

8 Cf M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley 
1986) 125ff, 135f, 523f; R. Sealey, The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of 
Law? (University Park [Pa.] 1987) 49f, 97f, 139f, 146f. Cf also Wolff Ilf, 26. For 
further discussion of the literature on this question of the Athenian Gerichtspraxis, 
see J. Bleicken, Die athenische Demokratie (Paderbom 1985) 354ff. For 01 V0IA-01 I<VPIOI 

see Hansen, Ath. As. 106, 180 n.681. 
9 In his numerous publications on the graphe paranomon and the constitution of 

fourth-century Athens, M. H. Hansen has on several occasions briefly expressed the 
view that both legal and political considerations were usually relevant, but that legal 
considerations were sometimes irrelevant and could therefore be omitted: Ath. As. 99, 



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364 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

the conclusions reached here support a view of the dikasteria midway 
between the two extremes just mentioned. On this middle view, the 
jurors were thoroughly responsive to the political issues that the 
leading politicians constantly debated before them in the course of 
prosecuting or defending a graphe paranomon. Yet the jurors were 
loyal to the laws of the democracy, their democracy. They would not 
seriously attend to a politician who, while prosecuting a graphe para­
nomon, did not speak as the defender of the law, or at least recognize 
the authority of the law, by explicitly presenting a case that the 
statutes of the people's law code had been broken. 10 Thus by means of 
the graphe paranomon, law and politics were indeed mingled, but not 
so as to create chaos. Law and politics were viewed as the two 
complementary standards to be consulted by the jurors when they cast 
th . ball t'''' ," ~, " A. ' """" elf 0 : vp.ELS ••• aVTOL Ta uucaLa /CaL Ta UVP.."EpOVTa V7TEP T7JS 7TOI\EWS 

"'7J<I>luau8E. II 

II 

In this section I argue that, to obtain a conviction, the prosecutor 
necessarily had to present a legal plea, and that the political pleas 
would not by themselves make a sufficient case. The prosecutor's legal 
plea usually urged that the substance of the decree was in conflict with 
one or more statutes. In some cases a formal deficiency was also urged 
as the legal plea, viz. that the decree was a7Tpo~ovAEVTOV.12 

175 n.639; Sov. 52, 65; CIMed 71f; "Demos, Ecclesia and Dicasterion in Classical 
Athens," GRBS 19 (1978) 145 n.40. I differ from his view in claiming that the legal 
plea was never irrelevant and was always a necessary consideration for the jurors. 
Furthermore, this paper investigates a problem suggested by Hansen's work, but 
which he has not considered in print, viz. how the various pleas stood in relation to 
one another and contributed to the jurors' decision. My frequent citation of Hansen's 
work will indicate the extent of my debt to him. 

10 Prosecutors in graphai paranomon traditionally assumed the role of the defender 
of the democracy; see Hansen, Sov. 55-61, and, for a conspicuous example, Aeschin. 
3.1-8, 190-202. 

11 Aeschin. 3.260, the final sentence of the speech; cf the very similar final sentence 
of Hyp. Phil. (both are speeches in prosecution of a graphe paranomon). On the 
juncture Ta ~[/Ca,a /CaL Ta (J'vjJ.tPEpovTa, cf n.29 infra. Bleicken (supra n.8: 138-45, 246-
53) considers a wide range of evidence and presents an account of the Athenian 
dikasteria that the conclusions reached here would support. 

12 See [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 45.4. Four cases are known in which the plea of {l.1rpo­
{3ovAfVTOV was advanced. Hansen, Cat. #4: [Plut.] X Orat. (Mor.) 835F, P.Oxy. XV 
1800 frr.6f, ~ Laur. ad Aeschin. 3.195, Max. Plan. ap. Walz, Rhet. Gr. V 343 (~ ad 
Hermog. Stat.); #12: Dem. 22.5-7; #29: [Dem.] 25. hypoth. 1; #35: Hyp. Eux. 15, cf 
Hesych. s. v. aVToTEAES ",.,itP'(J'I-'a. Pace Hansen, Ath. As. 175 n.638, I do not believe 
that a prosecutor's accusation that the defendant had been debarred through atimia 
from the right to move proposals was put forward as a serious legal plea. We know 



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HARVEY YUNIS 365 

In his fundamental study of the graphe paranomon H. J. Wolff 
established the following points. The orators clearly recognized and 
presented the legal question as a distinct issue, demanding treatment 
independent of all other issues. 13 Although the political pleas are 
elaborated at great length, in speeches for the prosecution they always 
follow the carefully arranged legal plea. 14 Among the cases for which 
we have sufficient evidence to judge, only once did the jurors fail to 
convict a defendant when the prosecutor's legal plea was patently 
incontrovertible, viz. in Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon in 330 
for a decree honoring Demosthenes.1 5 One may add to Wolff's analy­
sis of the sophisticated legal argument in Oem. 23.22-9916 that in 
unspectacular, ordinary prosecutions of paranomon, the prosecutor 
would carefully avail himself of the customary, simple procedure of 
7fapaYPcupEu8aL. 17 In this procedure, the prosecutor has a written copy 
of a statute from the official, inscribed law code displayed side by side 
with a copy of the decree under indictment. IS By means of this 
comparison, a direct conflict between the decree of lower authority 
and the statute of higher authority is made strikingly evident, the 
crime of 7fapavoJJ.a 'A.EYELV is clearly established, and the prosecutor's 
case is, in theory, complete. 19 

All these considerations imply that the legal plea was an essential 

that such an accusation was advanced in two cases, Hansen, Cat. #12 (Oem. 22.21-
34) and #lS ([Oem.] 59.5). In the latter, the crucial clause, ws 6>t/>Af TI!> S71P,OO"Lf!>, has 
been transposed from another context ([Oem.] 59.9). All modem editors, however, 
accept this emendation; cf G. L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS S3 (1963) 5Sfwith n.71. 
In both cases the motive and effect of this accusation seem to have been pure 
character-assassination. In both cases there were also proper legal pleas advanced: 
Oem. 22.5-11; implied in [Oem.] 59.4. 

13 E.g. Oem. lS.110: TOVS 7rEP' at,Tov TOV 7rapavop,ov AO')'OVS' O:7roSovval p'f Sf'V. 

Demosthenes then immediately presents his defense against the prosecutor's legal 
plea (110-25). 

14 Wolff 27f. However, as will be discussed below, I do not accept Wolff's 
characterization of the political pleas as "immer nur als Erganzung" (27). 

15 Wolff 13, 46f, 61. 
16 Wolff 50-54, 64. 
17 Cf J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig 1905-15) 392f. 
18 Cf Aeschin. 3.192, 200f; Oem. lS.111, 22.34, 23.51, 63, 215-1S; [Oem.] 5S.46. 

For a similar procedure in a ')'pat/>~ vop,ov p,~ £7r'T~SHOV Of,va" regarding the conflict 
between a newly proposed statute and existing statutes, cf Oem. 24.3S-66. 

19 Cf Wolff 69: "Wir sahen ... wie es bei allem Geschick und aller Neigung der 
Rhetoren, Vorlagen wegen wirklichen oder behaupteten Kontlikts mit allgemeinen in 
den Gesetzen verwirklichten, wenn auch nicht notwendig direkt ausgesprochenen, 
Grundsatzen zu bekampfen, letzten Endes doch immer der positive Einzelnomos war, 
auf den sie ihren Angriff stutzten, wie sie eben auch die verletzten Prinzipien selbst 
aus ihm herleiteten." For the theoretical completion of the prosecutor's case, cf Oem. 
23.S7 and the colorful fiction of the good old days presented (not as fiction) by 
Aeschin. 3.192. 



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366 LA W, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

part of the prosecution of a graphe paranomon. For this reason it 
always demanded and received the utmost attention from the plead­
ers and jurors. Although the graphe paranomon was frequently and 
properly employed in the service of partisan political ends, it was 
never so totally debased as to be argued without the prosecutor 
explicitly urging a legal plea. For all their often amateurish admini­
stration of the law, the Athenians always expected a legal plea in 
graphai paranomon, although, as will be discussed below, they also 
expected other pleas. The legal plea could at most be abused, never 
utterly dispensed with. Two passages, however, might at first seem to 
indicate that a legal plea, at least in certain circumstances, was super­
fluous. Close examination proves otherwise. 

From a passage describing the procedure for granting citizenship to 
an alien ([Oem.] 59.88-91), Hansen has inferred that "a decree could 
be attacked [sc. in a graphe paranomon] on the sole ground that it was 
detrimental to the interests of the Athenians. "20 This inference is not 
justified. 

Apollodorus, the speaker of this part of [Oem.] 59, introduces the 
passage by saying that the Athenian people considered the grant of 
citizenship so honorable and sacred that it imposed statutes on itself 
through which a foreigner could become a citizen (88). After a bit of 
editorializing, there follows a paraphrase of the statute that governs 
the procedure for ensuring that the granting decree is valid (89f). One 
clause in the paraphrase asserts JJ.~ (,ELVaL 1TOL~<Ta<T8aL' A811vaLov, av Av 

\ ~ ,,~ 8' , \ ~ " \ 'A8 ' l! ~ .. '8 ... ' JJ.7J uL avupa-ya &av n~ TOV U7JJJ.ov TOV 7JvaLWV ~'OV ?1 -YEVE<T a& 1TO,,'T7JV 
(89). After further details of the procedure enjoined by the statute, 
Apollodorus continues thus (90): 

fWE'Ta JA-ETa TavTa [i.e., the fairly complex procedure for making a 
valid grant] wapaJl(,JA-wJI "(paq,~JI EwolTJUE KaT' aVTov Tfil {3ovA0JA-'JlqJ 
, A6' \ " , ~6 ' , \ 't ' , l: ~, l: • , TJJla'WJI, Ka, EUT&JI fLUEI\ OJlTa EU' TO u'KaUTTJp&OJl E~EI\E"(~a& W~ OVK 
J! l:" "'t " , ...... \ \ \ , 'A6" , 
~&O~ Eun TTJ~ uwpEa~, al\l\a wapa TOV~ Jl0JA-0V~ TJJla&or "(E"(OJlEJI. 

Finally, Apollodorus asserts that in several instances citizenship de­
crees have been indicted for paranomon, the prosecutor has urged 
that the beneficiary was not worthy of the grant, and the court re­
voked it (91). 

First of all, it is not inexpediency that the prosecutor pleads, as 
Hansen asserted in the quotation above, but unworthiness.21 Apollo-

20 Ath. As. 175 n.639. Hansen adds a reference to Aeschin. 3.50; but I do not see the 
relevance of this passage to his inference, and will discuss its bearing on a related 
point in section III below. 

21 Hansen is correct on the point of unworthiness elsewhere, though he retains the 
claim, under challenge here, that it could form the "sole ground" for revoking a 
citizenship grant (CIMed 72). 



YUNIS, HARVEY, Law, Politics, and the "Graphe Paranomon" in Fourth-Century Athens , 
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HARVEY YUNIS 367 

dorus clearly implies that unworthiness is well recognized as a rele­
vant factor when a court decides to annul a citizenship decree, and I 
do not wish to challenge this implication. It is confirmed by much 
evidence that I shall present below (III). But does the passage imply 
that the nominee's unworthiness could furnish the sole ground for 
indicting or convicting a citizenship decree? It must be appreciated 
that Apollodorus' aim in this passage is to vilify the status of aliens 
who are unworthy of Athenian citizenship and have usurped the 
sacred prerogatives of citizenship under false pretenses. For this is 
what Apollodorus is alleging against Neaera, his opponent in this 
case, and her daughter Phano in the larger section of the speech from 
which this passage comes (74-115). To promote that aim Apollodorus 
indulges in what amounts to an insinuation that misleadingly distorts 
the issue of worthiness in graphai paranomon of citizenship decrees. 

Apollodorus studiously avoids legal precision in his account of 
naturalization. He gives a paraphrase of the statute where a quotation 
was possible though evidently not wanted. After the paraphrase, in 
the sentence that raises the notion of the graphe paranomon (90, 
quoted above), the subject of the verb £7TO{71CTE is not explicit. 0 VOIJ.OS, 
the subject in the paraphrase of the statute (89f), is not the subject of 
E7TO{71CTE. Wherever 0 VOIJ.OS is the subject in the paraphrase, the verbs 
are always in the present tense.22 The implicit subject of E7To{71CTE must 
be 0 OiilJ.os 0 'A871va{wV from earlier in the account (88).23 So Apollo­
dorus is not implying that the naturalization statute specifically auth­
orizes a graphe paranomon against a citizenship decree on the 
grounds of unworthiness.24 Nor when citing examples of citizenship 
decrees that have been convicted in graphai paranomon (91) does he 
imply that unworthiness was the only plea presented by the prosecu­
tor. Finally, a proper graphe paranomon would be formally directed 
against the man who moved the citizenship decree, not the proposed 
new citizen.25 Thus when Apollodorus speaks of the indictment KaT' 

aVTov (90), referring to the proposed new citizen, he is being informal 

22 In 89f: fITTI 1Cf:{P.f:VOS, f~, ICf:A£t)(t. 

23 In 88 it was said that the Athenian people restricted its freedom to confer 
citizenship by creating the statute governing proper procedure; the verb parallel to 
f7ro{1jITf: is tOf:TO, the technical term for vop.o,. It is asserted in 90 that the graphe para­
nomon, like the statute, is another such restriction created by the people. 

24 In his analysis of the law and procedure of naturalization, M. J. Osborne, 
Naturalization in Athens IV (Brussels 1983) 155-68, does not consider the use of the 
graphe paranomon to challenge a grant as an intrinsic part of the procedure. Osborne 
contrasts the statutory judicial scrutiny, which was added to the naturalization 
procedure sometime after Apollodorus, as probably "a replacement for the graphe 
paranomon, making statutory what in the past had been irregular and dependent 
upon private initiative" (167). 

25 Cf, in the analogous case of honors, lCaTa K T1jIT,</J;;WTOS, not lCaTa tl.1jP.OITOEVOVS. 



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368 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

and not reproducing precise legal terminology. And this, of course, is 
in accord with his purpose, to concentrate on the unworthy, false 
citizen, not the mover of the original decree. 

The disingenuous tum of Apollodorus' account is apparent in his 
assertion that the prosecutor in these cases proves "that the nominee 
is not worthy of the grant, but was made an Athenian contrary to the 
statutes" (90, quoted supra)-as if the legal plea (7rapa TOVS v6p.ovs) 
consisted in the plea of unworthiness (OVK lif'os). This is the mislead­
ing insinuation that is convenient for his case. The misrepresentation 
is exposed by the evidence from actual cases, in which the legal plea is 
always clearly separated from the plea of unworthiness, is based 
strictly on legal arguments in which the indicted decree is compared 
to statute law, and is never based on political arguments that the 
nominee was unworthy of the grant.26 Only by ignoring the legal 
precision that could not be avoided before a court involved in such a 
case does he even gain the chance to make the insinuation. The 
insinuation is therefore inaccurate and must be rejected. 

The second passage that might be adduced against the absolute 
necessity of a legal plea is more quickly dispatched. In [Oem.] 58.31 a 
certain Epichares asserts that although his father had been indicted, 
convicted, and fined ten talents (!) in a graphe paranomon, neverthe­
less the jurors thought (vOP.,O'Q.VTWV) that the father's decree and its 
provisions for a benefaction were KaTCz TOVS vop.ovs. Epichares' asser­
tion is hardly short of preposterous. It is unclear how the jurors, as a 
body, could have made known the peculiar position Epichares at­
tributes to them; all they do is vote. In any event, the severe penalty 
that threatens both father and son with atimia (58.2, 33) implies that 
the case is unlikely to have been as subtle as Epichares maintains. The 
context from which this assertion comes is a prosecution by Epichares 
in an endeixis against his father's prosecutor (the sycophant Theo­
crines). Hence, Epichares is seeking to minimize both his father's 
culpability and the justice of Theocrines' successful prosecution in the 
original graphe paranomon. 

III 

We ought to stop short of embracing Wolff's ultimate conclusion, 
that the proper function of the graphe paranomon was to serve as a 
sort oflegal review process ("Normenkontrolle"), and that insofar as 

26 Some of this evidence was presented above in the discussion of the legal plea. 
The rest is discussed below (III). 



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HARVEYYUNIS 369 

political issues were injected into the proceedings, it was abused.27 It 
was Wolff's purpose to determine what substantial legal concepts 
stood behind the enduring idea of paranomon, in contrast to whatever 
momentary political purposes gave rise to a particular graphe parana­
mon. 28 To that end, he separated "das politische und das juristische 
Element" and ignored the former as irrelevant to his purpose (26£). In 
contrast, the political element is central to the purpose undertaken in 
this paper. 

I do not wish to reassert, in response to Wolff's position, the self­
evident fact that each graphe paranomon involved a particular set of 
political issues. Rather, I wish to argue for two claims. First, the 
notions of inexpediency and unworthiness functioned in the political 
pleas in a manner parallel to the notion of paranomon in the legal 
plea. Hence, whenever a graphe paranomon came before a court, just 
as the particular legal issues of the case were measured against the 
communal law code, so the particular political issues were measured 
against the community's best interests and its standards for granting 
honors and citizenship. The only difference, not an insignificant one 
in practice, was that the law code was objectively discernible, whereas 
the community's best interests and standards for grants were not so 
clear. Nevertheless, the orators treated expediency and worthiness in 
principle as essential and objectively discernible standards against 
which the decree was to be measured in just the same way that the 
statutes of the law code constituted a standard for the legal status of 
the decree. Beyond the personal abuse that political enemies such as 
Aeschines and Demosthenes flung at each other while arguing their 
sides in a graphe paranomon, the political pleas stand out, just as 
clearly as does the legal plea, as attempts to persuade the jurors on the 
basis of rational, objective, pertinent arguments. The graphe parano­
mon was legal and political review at once.29 

The second claim is a simpler matter, and practically follows from 
the first. The political pleas were viewed as not only relevant, but in 
fact necessary in order for a prosecutor to secure a conviction.30 Thus 

27 Wolff 15, 60-64. 
28 Wolff 11f ("der Begriff des 'lTapavop.ov"), 47 ("Unser Anliegen ist die Ermittlung 

objektiver Grundvorstellungen vom Wesen des 'lTapavop.ov"). 
29 In the terms of Aristotle's division of speeches into three types (deliberative, 

forensic, epideictic: Rh. 1358a36-b8), speeches in prosecution of graphai paranomon, 
as will be made evident below, were always composed of at least two parts, the 
forensic (aucavucov) and the deliberative (UVP.{JOVAf:VTLICOV), corresponding to the legal 
review and the political review. The former is concerned with TO a'ICa,ov, the latter 
with TO uvp.4>ipov (Rh. 1353b20-27); cf the text quoted supra n.ll. The epideictic 
type of speech is not strictly relevant here. 

30 This second claim was already made by Hansen, and my argument here is an 



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370 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

the legal plea, although necessary, was not by itself sufficient to 
convince the jurors to condemn an indicted decree. 

Indictments of decrees granting honors or citizenship constitute 
that sub-genre of graphai paranomon about which we are best in­
formed. 31 Amid the considerable variety of authors and occasions for 
which there are preserved either fragments or whole speeches in this 
sub-genre, the political pleas are regularly utilized in the manner 
claimed just above. Thus, the use of the political plea in a manner 
parallel and equal to the legal plea is not the habit of anyone orator or 
the consequence of anyone political situation. 

Demosthenes wrote the speech numbered 23 in his corpus for a 
certain Euthycles, who in 35211 indicted Aristocrates for moving a 
decree honoring Charidemus, the Euboean mercenary commander 
recently granted Athenian citizenship (Hansen, Cat. # 14). This speech 
exhibits the tripartite argument clearly and explicitly. Towards the 
end of the exordium, Demosthenes outlines the arrangement of the 
entire speech (23.18): 

" , ( I ", ~! ~ t\ \ t \ \, \ .. I, 'd. ' 
EP. V7rEUXl1P.EVOV TP& E7rLuE~E&V, EV P.EV CdS' 7rapa TOVS' VOP.OVS' TO ",l1.."LUP. 

" I> I !i>'" I '" I' ~ I ~ I 1>" ~ 1.(: ELpl1Ta&, uEVTEPOV u CdS' auvp..."opov EUTL TTl 7rOI\EL, TP&TOV u CdS' av""\.&oS' 
~ • I 

TVXELV <!l YEypa7rTa&. 

The rest of the speech follows true to this plan. In the first section (22-
99) Demosthenes examines a number of statutes, all of which are 
purportedly contravened by the decree. This is the legal plea. The 
arguments contained in this section of the speech and in the parallel 
sections of the speeches discussed below make up the sort oflegal plea 
that Apollodorus suppressed in his account of graphai paranomon of 
citizenship decrees. After the legal plea follow the two political pleas. 
The second section (l00-43), concerning inexpediency, features a 
review of historical precedent in order to show that the Athenians 
would be harming their own interests by honoring Charidemus. In the 

elaboration of a position first staked out by him. For references on this point, see su­
pra n.9. 

31 Decrees of this sort were among the most common types; likewise they figure 
prominently among the known graphai paranomon, making up about fifty per cent of 
the total. Cf Hansen, Sov. 62, Ath. As. 114, 186 nn.725-27. In the fourth century, 
citizenship grants were essentially honorific; see Osborne (supra n.24) 145-50. Hence 
the necessity of treating citizenship decrees and other honorary decrees together. The 
indictment of this type of decree was far from an insignificant maUer. The decision of 
the jurors in a graphe paranomon of an honorary decree was taken as a formal 
decision of policy: Aeschin. 3.254, Oem. 18.222, 226, 228-31; cf S. Perlman, "The 
Politicans in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century," Athenaeum N.S. 41 
(1963) 327-55, esp. 342f, 346. 



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HARVEYYUNIS 371 

third section (144-214), pleading the honorand's unworthiness, De­
mosthenes reviews Chari demus' role in recent history to conclude 
that he has actually hurt Athens rather than helped it, and deserves 
punishment rather than reward. 

In Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon in 330 for a decree honor­
ing Demosthenes with a crown (Aeschin. 3; Cat. #30), the same 
tripartite argument is outlined near the end of the exordium. There is, 
however, an interesting difference in the way the plea of unworthiness 
is presented (3.8): £[£>"E"1[oo KT7IuupWVTa Kat 7Tapavop.a "1£"1pacp&Ta Kat 
",£vaij Kat auvp.cpopa TV 7T&>..Et. The first and third points are clear: the 
legal plea (executed in 9-48, recalled in 203f) displays the statutes 
contravened by Ctesiphon's decree, and the plea of inexpediency 
(executed in 177-202, 245-54) argues that to crown Demosthenes is 
contrary to the interests of the Athenians. 

The second point, that Ctesiphon has moved a 'false' decree, is 
fulfilled in 49-176. After reading from the decree several clauses that 
praise Demosthenes, Aeschines claims he will show that OL KaTa L:l. 71-
P.OU8EVOVS E'7TaLvoL "'£vo£,s (50). To claim as false the meritorious ser­
vices attributed in the decree to Demosthenes and cited therein to 
justify the honors, is to say that Demosthenes is unworthy of the 
honors. Aeschines admits as much. He introduces this argument by 
emphasizing ~ 7TpocpaUts [=Ta "'£vo?]] Ot' ~v aVTov a[tO, uT£cpavovu8aL 
(49). Twice later in the speech this plea is taken as having established 
that Demosthenes is aVa[LOS (188, 205). 

Aeschines casts the plea of unworthiness in this form in order to 
indulge in a legal fiction (50): c£.rravT£s yap a7Ta"1OP£VOVULV 0& V0IJ.0L 
IJ.7IOEVa "'£voij "1palJ.lJ.aTa E"1ypacp£&v EV TO'S 07l1J.0U[OLS "'7ICP[UlJ.a<TL. If all the 
statutes forbid "'£voij "1pap.p.aTa in decrees, clearly no law forbids it in 
so many words. If one did, we may be sure that Aeschines would have 
cited it. If there had been such a statute, and Aeschines had cited it, 
that would have had the effect of turning the falsehood-unworthiness 
plea into a legal plea, i.e., it would be another statute that the decree 
contravened. As it is, the falsehood-unworthiness plea does not rest 
on a conflict with any particular statute, is kept separate from the legal 
plea, and remains a political plea. It consists of an Aeschinean version 
of Demosthenes' role in recent history. In response to this argument, 
Demosthenes aims to establish on the basis of (his version of) the 
public record that Ctesiphon has described his conduct truthfully in 
the decree and that he deserves the crown.32 This accords with all 

32 Oem. 18.53-59 (57, (,'T' a).:q6fj 7r(PI (p.ov ytypat/u KT7IlTt</Jwv ••• E,'T( Kal VtEvafj; 58, 
,I 't J!~" ... ..f.. I ", ') 

HT ~to~ ELP.t TOV ITT('f"avov ••• HTt" Kat P.7I • 



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372 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

other cases of a graphe paranomon of an honorary decree; the plea of 
unworthiness is always based on political, not legal, arguments. 33 

One sentence from a speech by Lycurgus in prosecution of a graphe 
paranomon of an honorary decree has been preserved with no exter­
nal indication of its original context (Hansen, Cat. #36). Yet this 
sentence is instructive. It outlines an argument on precisely the same 
three grounds as the argument outlined in Oem. 23.18 (quoted 
above). This sentence must come from the exordium of Lycurgus' 

h ' , , ./, 'A. 'Il ' ~ ", , , ). ~ speec : KaL 7TapavolJ.ov TO 'Y11."LCTlJ.a €7TLuEL\,OO KaL aCTVlJ.cpopOV KaL aVIA1:,LOV 
TbV l1vopa OOOp€as.34 In the remaining two cases, the same tripartite 
argument can be observed. In Oem. 22 (Cat. #12), not nearly as 
polished as work as Dem. 23 or Aeschin. 3, the legal plea is advanced 
first (22.5-11); this is followed by the plea of unworthiness (12-18), 
which is followed in tum by the plea of inexpediency (19f). The 
remainder of the speech (21-78) essentially descends to character­
assassination of the defendant Androtion.35 The substantial fragment 
that survives from Hyperides' speech in prosecution of Philippides 
for an honorary decree belongs to the very end of the speech (Hyp. 

33 This understanding of Aeschines' procedure is sufficient reason for rejecting as an 
interpolation the indictment recorded in Dem. 18.54f; cf H. Wankel, Demosthenes: 
Rede jur Ktesiphon uber den Kranz I (Heidelberg 1976) 17f, 359f. Aeschines' 
treatment of the unworthiness plea is paralleled in Hyperides' speech in prosecution 
of Demades for a decree honoring Euthycrates of Olynthus with proxenia (Hyp. fr.76 
Jensen; Hansen, Cat. #28). This plea is broached by ostensibly questioning whether 
Euthycrates' services listed in the decree provide TaS o.A718E"is alTlas TijS 7Tpo,Evlas. (A 
second version reports: El To.A718ij 6.71/Joao71s f.{3ovAETO 7TEP' EiJ8vICpaTovs El7TE&V). But the 
issue is in fact whether Euthycrates deserves the grant from the Athenians. Hyperides 
argues that he does not by sarcastically reading a mock decree listing the honorand's 
considerable services in behalf of Philip. A true decree, we are meant to understand, 
would clearly imply that the nominee is worthy of punishment, not reward. 

34 Lycurg. fr.91 Sauppe=57 Blass=vIII.l Durrbach. This fragment is preserved in 
the anonymous treatise T(X. p1JT. 167 ap. Hammer, Rhet. Gr. 381. It is incorrectly 
transcribed in Conomis' edition of Lycurgus (Leipzig 1970), where it appears as 
fr.Ix.l. This sentence could have come from any prosecution by Lycurgus of an 
honorary decree. However, it is a reasonable guess that the sentence comes from 
Lycurgus' prosecution of Cephisodotus for a decree honoring Demades; so N. C. 
Conomis, "Notes on the Fragments of Lycurgus," Klio 39 (1961) 72-152, esp. 126ff. 
Lycurg. frr.Ix.2-4 Conomis and Polyeuctus frr.1f Sauppe certainly come from the 
speeches written in prosecution of Cephisodotus (Cat. #31). In these fragments both 
Lycurgus and Polyeuctus argue that the honorand is unworthy. Polyeuctus stresses 
that Demades has continually acted to help Philip and harm the Athenians. 

35 Part of this attack, however, is presented in the guise of a legal plea, viz. that as a 
male prostitute (21-32) and as a debtor to the state (33f), Androtion was debarred 
from moving the original decree; cf supra n.12. The loose structure of this speech 
might be attributed to its role as a deuterology. L. Pearson, "The Development of 
Demosthenes as a Political Orator," Phoenix 18 (1964) 95-109, esp. 106ff, detected 
other formal characteristics of this speech that indicate its relatively immature stage 
in Demosthenes' development. 



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HARVEYYUNIS 373 

Phil.; Cat. #32). It seems clear that the three pleas were employed. 
There was a legal plea in which certain statutes were read aloud in 
court (4). As in Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon, the plea of 
unworthiness formally urged that the praises of the honorands re­
corded in the decree were false. 36 The speech ends with the plea that 
the indicted decree is only the most recent occasion in which Philip­
pides has undertaken to harm the Athenians (8-12). 

That exhausts our first-hand knowledge of the arguments used by 
prosecutors in graphai paranomon of honorary decrees. However, it is 
worth making a conjecture about one more case. In the aftermath of 
the return of the democrats in 403, Thrasybulus proposed a decree 
granting citizenship to those non-citizens who returned with him to 
Athens from the Piraeus. Archinus indicted Thrasybulus for this 
decree (Cat. #4). Several sources indicate that there was a legal plea 
based on the fact that the decree was G.7TP0{30VA€VTOV. 37 But along with 
such deserving metics as Lysias, some of those included in the grant 
were slaves ([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 40.2). Archinus must have argued that 
the slaves, at least, were unworthy of the grant. Furthermore, in the 
charged political atmosphere of the time, Archinus must have argued 
that so generous and indiscriminate a grant was inexpedient for the 
still fragile, newly-restored democracy. 38 

There is no first-hand evidence to indicate how prosecutors ar­
ranged their pleas in graphai paranomon of decrees that were not 
grants of honors or citizenship.39 Where no grant was at stake, there 
could, of course, be no plea of unworthiness. But the plea ofinexpedi­
ency was always appropriate and relevant. In view of the practice 
observed in graphai paranomon of honorary decrees, I would assert 
that it is a fortiori likely that orators presented the political issues 

36 The honorands are certain proedroi who had allowed a decree honoring some 
Macedonians to go forward: fypaI/Ff.v yap ~V ¥vf.I(a €crn</>&'vwcrf.V TOVS 7Tpotl'Jpovs, 
lillcalocrvV7JS n T~S d!l Tav l'J~p.ov Tav 'A87Jvalwv, KalliloTl KaTa TOVS vop.ovs 7Tpo7Jlipf.VKacrlv. 
(7T' li[~] TaVT' ll.Yf.T' ailrav a7ToAoY7]crOP.f.VOV, Ka, crv, ~ <I>[lAl]7T7Tlli7], lif.ifa!l aA7]8fj f.TVal Ta 
7TEP' TWV 7Tpotlipwv, a v7Tt8ov (V T~ I/F7]</>lcrp.aTl, a7To</>WI'f. (6). Cf also the supplement 
conjectured in fr.10 of this speech: [sc. the proedroi] 7TOAV P.ii[AAOV ll.{l]ol Elcrlv 
['P.'llcrf.'cr8[ <!-l]. 

·37 [Plut.] X Orat. (Mor.) 835F, P.Oxy. XV 1800 frr.6f, 1: Laur. ad Aeschin. 3.195, 
Max. Plan. ap. Walz, Rhet. Gr. V 343 (1: ad Hermog. Stat.). This formal deficiency 
resulted from the fact that the decree was passed during the period of anarchia before 
Euclides took office (X Drat.) and the democratic boule had been reconstituted (1: 
Aeschin., Max. Plan.). 

38 This would explain why Ath.Pol. 40.2 and Aeschin. 3.194f record this action by 
Archinus as a considerable benefit to the state. 

39 The only fragments that survive from speeches in such cases are those from 
Lysias' speech written in prosecution of Theozotides, and they are inconclusive in 
this matter (Lys. fr.vI Gemet-Bizos; Cat. #5). 



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374 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

raised by any indicted decree in the form of a plea of inexpediency. 
There would also be a legal plea. One example will be considered. 

At the time of Philip's hostilities directed against Olynthus (349/8), 
Apollodorus moved a decree that was clearly intended to enable the 
state's surplus revenue (T~ 7TfpU)VTa xp~paTa TfjS a&O"C~O"fWS) to be 
devoted to the military fund (T~ O"TpaT&WT&lCct) as opposed to the 
theoric fund (TCt 8fWP&lCct). After the decree was passed and the surplus 
revenue assigned by vote to the military fund, Stephanus indicted 
Apollodorus for paranomon and won the case ([Oem.] 59.3-8; Cat. 
#18). We know from [Oem.] 59 that Stephanus and Apollodorus were 
bitter enemies, and we have only a meager and very partial account of 
the trial. It is hardly inconceivable that Stephanus prosecuted Apollo­
dorus in pursuit of a private quarrel, just as Theomnestus and Apollo­
dorus openly admit they are using the graphe xenias against Stepha­
nus' girlfriend Neaera to seek redress in this private quarrel (el, e.g., 
[Oem.] 59.1, 8f, 14, 16,43). 

We also know, however, that Apollodorus' decree raised formidable 
legal and political issues. The legal issue involved the relationship 
between the decree and one or more statutes that regulated the dis­
position of the three funds named above. The legal issue inevitably 
surpassed the personal enmity that may have given rise to the trial. 
Apollodorus must have framed his decree in such a manner as to seem 
to avoid breaking at least the letter of the statutes, and Stephanus 
must have displayed these statutes in court and argued that they were 
broken.40 Thus Stephanus must have presented a formal legal plea. 

The political issue was even greater than the legal one: whether or 
not to aid the Olynthians against Philip, and if so, how. Here we can 
cite Demosthenes' Third Olynthiae, delivered before the assembly at 
just about the time of Stephanus' indictment of Apollodorus. Much of 
this speech is devoted to advocating the repeal of certain statutes 
regulating the various funds, and spending these resources on war 
against Philip (el esp. 3.10-13, 18-20, 33-35). Apollodorus' decree 
was intended to advance the same foreign policy advocated by De­
mosthenes in the Third Olynthiae without, however, going through 
the tedious process of repealing the statutes. Thus, in view of the 
momentous political decisions to be made, Stephanus must also have 

40 Cf [Oem.] 59.4, I(fAfVOJlTWJI J.'tv T&)J/ vOJ.'wv, but we cannot trust Theomnestus' 
brief paraphrase of what the statutes enjoin. On the complex legal situation, including 
the report of I ad Oem. 1.1, see CawkweU (supra n.12) 58-61, and M. H. Hansen, 
"The Theoric Fund and the graphe paranomon against ApoUodorus," GRBS 17 
(1976) 235-46. Cf also Demosthenes' reticence even to seem to be moving a 
proposal regarding these funds: Oem. 1.19f. 



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HARVEYYUNIS 375 

presented a formal plea of inexpediency, arguing against opposing 
Philip at Olynthus, or using the funds in the manner intended by 
Apollodorus' decree, or, most likely, both. We can be sure that Ste­
phanus liberally sprinkled personal abuse throughout his speech, 
much as we can see Demosthenes and Aeschines do when they prose­
cute graphai paranomon. This manner of speaking would not have 
diminished the importance and indeed necessity of both the legal and 
the political plea in constructing an effective case. 

IV 

The prosecutor in a graphe paranomon presented both the legal plea 
and the political pleas with the common aim of convincing the jurors 
to cancel the proposal or decree and punish the proposer. Yet despite 
the prosecutor's best effort to make things appear so, there is no 
reason why the legal and political considerations should inevitably 
converge and recommend to the jurors the same decision. It might 
well happen that a decree that was in conflict with the statutes never­
theless tended to promote the best interests of the Athenians. It was, 
of course, always open to the defendant who found himself in a weak 
legal position to argue on this basis, and some did. 

As he opened the political plea in the prosecution of Aristocrates, 
Demosthenes warned the jurors of what he claims is a common tactic: 
the defendant will hardly contest the prosecutor's legal plea, since it is 
incontrovertible, but will base his entire defense on a political plea 
(Oem. 23.100). Because this statement is obviously self-serving (for it 
implies that the defendant has no legal plea worth making), we ought 
not to accept it as literally true. Yet we can detect in some cases a real 
tension between the legal and political pleas. On another occasion, 
speaking for the defense, Demosthenes demonstrated the tactic him­
self. 

In his prosecution of Ctesiphon, Aeschines had presented a clear, 
fairly dispassionate, carefully argued legal plea (Aeschin. 3.9-48).41 In 
reply, Demosthenes acknowledged that he was obliged to respond to 
this legal plea (18.110), and certainly did not venture to omit a legal 
plea entirely; but the few paragraphs he devotes to this response 
contain more bluster than argument (110-25). The vast bulk of the 
speech and the entire thrust of the defense consist in a defense of his 

41 Essentially, Ctesiphon's decree was in conflict with statutes that forbade the 
honorand from receiving a crown while still avv'lTn~evvoS' (9-31) and from being 
proclaimed in the theater of Dionysus (32-48). Wolff categorically asserted that, with 
respect to the legal plea, Demosthenes did not have a leg to stand on; cf supra n.15. 



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376 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

record in order to prove that he was worthy of the honors.42 At one 
point Demosthenes claims that the jurors' proper task is merely an 
Etha(ns T(;W 7TE7TOALTEVP.EVWV and they are to issue a KptU'LS TOt) Til 7TOAEL 

CTVP.4>EpoVTOS (226). This was evidently sufficient for the jurors on this 
occaSIOn. 

There is only one other instance in which we can detect how a 
defendant in a graphe paranomon arranged his arguments, and the 
same tactic was employed with greater boldness and the same suc­
cess.43 In the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea, Hyperides moved 
and secured passage of a decree mandating extreme measures to meet 
the emergency. These measures included the restoration of rights to 
the disenfranchised, the recall of exiles, and the liberation of slaves. 
The decree was prosecuted for paranomon by Aristogeiton (Cat. #27). 
In his defense Hyperides repeated several of the prosecutor's main 
contentions and answered them in tum.44 The prosecutor's legal plea, 
put last in the list of the prosecutor's contentions, was clearly in­
tended to be the most damning. Regarding the statutes with which the 
extreme measures of the decree allegedly conflicted, Aristogeiton had 
asked Hyperides (more or less): leges igitur, quae prohibebant haec, 
nonne legebas? Hyperides responded: non poteram; propterea quod 
literis earum arma Macedonum opposita ojJiciebant.45 In defense 
against the charge of paranomon, Hyperides essentially conceded that 
the decree was in conflict with the statutes, or at least that the point 
was not worth arguing. He claimed, rather, that the state of emergency 
required the extreme measures, even if some statutes were thereby 
broken. Expediency won out over the law, but Hyperides' argument 
gained strength from the palpable emergency. So blatant a disregard 
of the law would not have been acceptable under normal conditions. 

Although Hyperides' defense against Aristogeiton is an extreme 

42 This argument is essentially presented in 9-109, 160-251, 285-323. In most of 
the rest of the speech Oemosthenes impugns Aeschines, esp. 126-59,252-75. 

43 The fragment from Lysias' speech in defense of Phanias against Cinesias, which 
merely attacks the prosecutor's reputation (Lys. fr.v G.-B.; Cat. #6), is useless for the 
present purpose. 

44 See Hyp. frr.27f Jensen=fr.32 Sauppe for the Greek and Latin sources of this 
fragment. The Latin translation by Rutil. Lup. 1.19 provides all the information in 
one continuous fragment; hence it is used here. Aristogeiton fr.5 Sauppe, from his 
speech in prosecution, implies that Hyperides accurately summarized Aristogeiton's 
legal plea. See Lycurg. Leoc. 36-41 for a vivid description of the state of emergency 
in which Hyperides moved the proposal. Cf also [Oem.] 26.11-14, from a speech 
against Aristogeiton, for a partisan recollection of this trial. Hyperides' acquittal is 
noted in [Plut.] X Orat. (Mor.) 849A. 

45 The original version of the end of this response is preserved: f'lr~(TICOT~& 1100& Tl1 

MalCt"aovc.lw l$'lrAa. Cf the further point found only in the original: OUIC fyW TO "'~4>&(Tp.a 
Eypa"'a, ~ a' fV Xa,pC.l)v~lf!. P.c1X1J ([Plut.] Mor.) 849A. 



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example, there is some other evidence indicating that the Athenians 
sometimes viewed expediency as the chief issue in a graphe parano­
mono Lycurgus asserts this outright in comparing the graphe parano­
mon to eisangelia (Lycurg. Leoc. 7): 

<I ,\ \" , d..' ~ 'I': .... , , 
OTav p.£v yap Tas- TWV 7rapavop.wv ypa."as- oL/Ca'l.7JT£, TOVTO p.ovov £7ravop-

Bovn Kat Ta-6T71v TiIv 7rpa,[Lv KwA-6£n, /CaB' ~ITOV Av Tb ",,,cpLITp.a p.tAAT/ 
{J).a7rULV T~V 7rOALV. 

On another occasion, Epichares is attempting to strengthen his accu­
sation of sycophancy against Theocrines ([Oem.] 58.36f). Speaking 
from the posture of one who would be defending certain decrees 
indicted by Theocrines, Epichares claims that whether the courts 
ratify or annul the decrees, the Athenians are neither benefited nor 
harmed. That is, the political plea of the expediency or inexpediency 
of these decrees is redundant. The jurors are meant to infer that the 
indictments brought by Theocrines are frivolous and therefore moti­
vated solely by sycophancy. Epichares says and implies nothing about 
the status of the indicted decrees with regard to statute law. This 
passage makes sense only if the speaker and jurors share the tacit 
assumption that political expediency is the chief issue in graphai 
paranomon. Both Lycurgus and Epichares are speaking before a di­
kasterion, so they are counting on the jurors' implicit agreement. 
Neither passage comes from a graphe paranomon, so there is no 
question of special pleading. 

There was, therefore, a certain degree of tension between the legal 
plea and the political pleas, between law and politics, that was always 
available to the defendant to exploit. 46 This tension arose from the 
dual role played by the graphe paranomon in the fourth-century 
democracy. As claimed above, the graphe paranomon was both legal 
review and political review at once. The task oflegal review was fairly 
straightforward. The graphe paranomon should be viewed in the 
context of the nomothetic reforms instituted at the end of the fifth 
century and advanced during the fourth.47 As a means of enforcing 
the higher authority of statute law over decrees of the assembly, the 

46 Cf the comment of Triantaphyllopoulos (supra n.l) 48: "Zudem erlaubte das 
Konzept des (7rLT~aELOV und CTVP.CPfpOV soziale Momente im Gesetz in Erwagung zu 
ziehen, die gew6hnlich in Gelegenheits- und Notlagengesetzen zu finden sind." 

47 On nomothesia in Athens, see A. R. W. Harrison, "Law-making at Athens at the 
End of the Fifth Century," JHS 75 (1955) 26-35; D. M. MacDowell, "Law-Making at 
Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.," JHS 95 (1975) 62-74; P. J. Rhodes, "Nomothesia 
in Fourth-century Athens," CQ N.S. 35 (1985) 55-60; M. H. Hansen, "Athenian 
Nomothesia," GRBS 26 (1985) 345-71; P. J. Rhodes, "Nomothesia in Classical 
Athens," in A. Giuliani and N. Picardi, edd., L'educazione giuridica V.2 (Perugia 
1987) 5-26. 



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378 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

graphe paranomon helped prevent the assembly from enacting such 
fundamental, statutory measures as the reforms aimed to relegate to 
the more deliberate, orderly procedure of nomothesia.48 Although the 
graphe paranomon predates the archonship of Euclides (40312), only 
after the reforms of that year did the graphe paranomon acquire a 
well-defined legal role.49 

The task of political review was not quite so straightforward, and 
can be understood properly only after a paradoxical but familiar 
feature of democracy is called to mind. Ideally, the political structure 
of the democracy was meant to enable political decisions to be expres­
sions of the will of the demos as a whole. In fact, because a single 
individual, the demagogue (the term is used neutrally), could on 
occasion direct the will of the demos through sufficient persuasive 
power, the democracy sometimes became essentially a tyranny. This 
fact was noted by the three great political philosophers of classical 
Greece: Thucydides on Pericles, Plato in Book 8 of the Republic, and 
Aristotle on democracies where "decrees are authoritative (ICvp&a) and 
not the law."50 In their own way, the Athenians themselves recognized 
this fact: when a policy that had been approved by the assembly 
turned out badly, the politician who had proposed the policy was held 
responsible, often for having deceived (E[a'1TaTav) the people. 5 I 

The graphe paranomon directly addressed this problem. The threat 
of a graphe paranomon inevitably created a check on the power of the 
demagogues in the assembly.52 By invoking the graphe paranomon, 

48 Cf the exaggerated description oflegislative confusion at Dem. 20.91f. 
49 The earliest graphe paranomon of certain date occurred in 41S when Leogoras, 

the father of Andocides, indicted Speusippus for a decree relating to some of those 
accused, Leogoras included, of profaning the Mysteries (Andoc. 1.17, 22; Cat. # 1). 
See the Appendix infra for discussion of the legal plea in a pre-Euclidean case. 

50 Thuc. 2.6S.8f; PI. Resp. 8.S62A-S69c; Arist. Pol. 1292a4-37 (the quotation is 
from a6f). Cf also Eur. Supp. 240-43, Or. 696-703,902-16. 

51 E.g. Hdt. 6.136.1 (Miltiades); Thuc. 2.59.lf (Pericles), 3.36.4f (Mytilene), 8.1.1 
(Sicily); Arist. Pol. 1304blO-15 (the Four Hundred); [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 34.1, Xen. Hell. 
1.7.35 (the Arginusae affair); [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 34.1 (Cleophon); in the fourth century: 
Oem. 22.32, 23.18, 93, [Oem.] 59.91, Din. 1.47; general statements of this phenome­
non: [Xen.] Ath.Pol. 2.17, [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 28.3, Oem. 23.97. The use of the procedure 
of 1I'pOfJOA~ for having deceived the people by making unfulfilled promises seems to 
have been infrequently employed, although Callixenus and (probably) Miltiades were 
attacked by this procedure. On the 1I'pofJoA~, see Lipsius (supra n.l 7) 211-19; A. R. 
W. Harrison, The Law of Athens II (Oxford 1971) S9-64. 

52 This was especially useful in the fourth century when the public speakers 
(fi~TOpfS) less often than previously held magistracies, especially the strategia, and 
therefore were less often subject to euthyna; cf Arist. Pol. 1305alO-lS, Isoc. 8.SS, 
Pluto Phoc. 7.5, and Perlman (supra n.31) 347. The graphe paranomon was certainly 
not the only means available for attacking a politician; there were also the aOICtp.aCTla 
P'T/Tt,PWII (Aeschin. 1.28-32), flCTa-Y-YfAla (cf Hyp. Eux. 8), and a number of other 
procedures suitable for particular circumstances. The advantages of the graphe para-



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HARVEY YUNIS 379 

politicians, concerned citizens, and sycophants could hinder a dema­
gogue in the assembly from turning his advice into official policy. 
When the proposal was reconsidered in court, the demagogue might 
still be able to exert his influence, and the jurors might, of course, 
ratify the decree. 53 But the setting in court was far less amenable to the 
demagogue than the assembly. The prosecutor had a captive audience 
and an allotted time to speak; he prosecuted in the name of the law; he 
could subject the decree to the legal and political scrutiny it may not 
have received in the assembly; the jurors rendered their decision by 
secret ballot; and the mere act of reconsideration might serve to dispel 
the demagogue's influence. 54 Furthermore, the proposer of a decree 
had to hedge his designs against the possibility of a heavy punishment 
in court. 55 A politician could avoid personal liability in the event of 
an indictment by paying someone to act as the formal proposer of his 
decree. 56 But from the standpoint of the demos, if not of the dema­
gogue's personal enemies, it would have been irrelevant who actually 
moved the decree publicly advocated by the demagogue. In the event 
of an indictment, the demos was still saved from an impulsive deci­
sIOn. 

Between the demagogue and the implementation of his advice 
stood the graphe paranomon-and that means, in concrete terms, the 
statutes of the people's inscribed law code, a trial in the people's 
court, and, above all, the sycophants, the Athenian version of the 
people's prosecutor. The sycophants stood ready to use the graphe 
paranomon against public speakers to make money for themselves 
and perform an essential public service. Sycophants could, of course, 
and did, avail themselves of any form of public prosecution; however, 
because they could pose as defenders of the democracy when prose­
cuting graphai paranomon, this indictment was especially attractive. 
For his numerous prosecutions of graphai paranomon Aristogeiton 
earned the nickname KVWV TOt) O~IJ.OV, 'watchdog of the democracy' 

nomon were that it could be invoked on the spot in the assembly with no prior cause 
or preparation, it was always available, and it could be used repeatedly. 

53 The demagogue could be considered to 'deceive' the jurors too; cf Dem. 23.97, 
[Dem.] 59.5. 

54 For example, in Stephanus' indictment of Apollodorus (cited above), the jurors 
reversed what Theomnestus reports as a unanimous decision of the assembly to 
devote the state's surplus revenue to the military fund ([Dem.] 59.5). It is impossible 
to estimate how often such drastic reversals in court took place. Hansen (Sov. 50, 54) 
recognizes, but severely qualifies, the use of the graphe paranomon as a safeguard 
against demagogues. 

55 E.g. Apollodorus ([Dem.] 59.6-8) and Demades (Diod. 18.18.2, Pluto Phoc. 26.3) 
suffered severely after having been convicted in graphai paranomon. 

56 See Hansen, Ath. As. 59f, 68. 



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380 LA W, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

([Dem.] 25.40)! Theocrines is said to have publicly and frequently 
claimed that "he himself guards against those who move decrees in 
conflict with statute law, and that when graphai paranomon are abol­
ished, the democracy is undone" ([Dem.] 58.34, cf 22, 45, 63). Syco­
phants would indict for paranomon insignificant but wealthy citizens 
like Epichares' father ([Dem.] 58.31), or prominent politicians like 
Demosthenes and Hyperides ([Dem.] 26.11-14, 58.35). Demosthe­
nes, recalling the days of struggle with Philip, compared the ease of 
action available to Philip as absolute, despotic autocrat with the 
cumbersome administration of Athenian policy, belabored by syco­
phants and graphai paranomon (Dem. 18.235, 249f). Clearly the 
Athenians preferred their cumbersome democracy, sycophants and 
all. 57 For all the nuisance and shady dealings undertaken by the 
sycophants, in which wealthy citizens primarily suffered, sycophancy 
was, from the perspective of the politeia as a whole, a necessary evil if 
institutions such as the graphe paranomon were to increase stability 
amidst the internal conflict appropriate for democracy. 58 

Leading politicians frequently employed the graphe paranomon 
against one another. This too was meant to serve the public interest. 
In Dinarchus' speech against Demosthenes, the graphe paranomon is 
mentioned as one of the chief weapons used by a "democratic poli­
tician" <P~TWP al1/A-OTLKos) to control harmful demagogues. Demos­
thenes is then censured for having failed to check the pernicious 
influence of Demades by indicting his decrees for paranomon (Din. 
1.100f). Demosthenes used a similar argument to chide Aeschines 
(Dem. 18.222-24, cf 251): if Aeschines is doing the polis a service by 
prosecuting Ctesiphon's decree, why, Demosthenes asks, did he fail in 
his public duty to indict and prosecute a previous decree honoring 
Demosthenes? By enabling the demos to settle conflicts among the 
leading politicians in court, the graphe paranomon served as a more 
refined democratic tool than the fifth-century institution of ostra­
cism. 59 To take an extreme example, as prosecutor against Ctesiphon 

57 It is worth recalling that the Roman Empire developed a precisely similar class, 
supported by virtually all emperors as vital to their survival. 

58 Cf M. I. Finley, "'Athenian Demagogues,'" Past & Present 21 (1962) 3-24, esp. 
19-22. 

59 I am not inclined to view it as mere chance that the first known graphe parano­
mon occurred in 415; see supra n.49. Hyperbolus is the last Athenian known to have 
been ostracized, probably in 416. On the sources and date of Hyperbolus' ostracism, 
see Andrewes, HCT V 259ff ad Thuc. 8.73.3. Although it seems to have fallen into 
disuse after Hyperbolus, ostracism remained on the books through the fourth century 
([Arist.] Ath.Pol. 43.5). We have no evidence concerning when the graphe paranomon 
was created; speculation prevails. I do not consider it credible that it was instituted 



YUNIS, HARVEY, Law, Politics, and the "Graphe Paranomon" in Fourth-Century Athens , 
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HARVEYYUNIS 381 

Aeschines failed to receive his minimum one-fifth of the jurors' votes, 
incurred a heavy fine which he could not or would not pay, and was 
thus forced into exile. At least the demos heard reasoned arguments in 
a regulated setting before casting their ballots, and the exile-to-be, 
having taken his chances, received a hearing before he had to pack his 
bags. 

Under the terms of the graphe paranomon, rivals such as Demos­
thenes and Aeschines or a politician and a sycophant representing the 
people fought for the approval of the people in public and without 
violence. The democracy was bolstered by such verbal combat. The 
policies and personalities of the leaders of the demos were scrutinized 
and held to the standards of the communal law code and the com­
munity's best interests. It was up to that section of the fickle demos 
who were sitting as jurors that day both to decide public policy and to 
guard the authority of their laws. The record, of course, is mixed. Yet 
it is not to be expected that the tension between law and politics ought 
to have been dissolved or that law and politics ought to have been 
kept strictly separate. By means of the graphe paranomon law and 
politics were brought into the same arena in a regular manner. The 
tension between these two communal concerns was preserved, but 
mediated and controlled, taken notice of and directed into an orderly, 
reasoned, democratic forum. For these reasons, it was incumbent on 
the Athenian jurors to consider and take seriously both the legal and 
the political issues raised by the decree before they cast their votes. 

ApPENDIX: The Legal Plea in a Pre-Euclidean Case 

In the only pre-Euclidean case of which we have any substantial knowledge, 
the legal plea does not display the same clear reliance on statute law that is 
displayed in every other case, all from after the reforms of Euclides' year. In 
406 Eurypto1emus attempted to indict the decree of Callixenus directing the 
Arginusae generals to be judged en masse in the assembly (Xen. Hell. 1.7.9-
35; Hansen, Cat. #3). Facing a threat of reprisal, Euryptolemus withdrew the 
indictment and the case never went to court. Nevertheless, Eurypto1emus 
spoke before the assembly against the decree, and, as represented by Xeno­
phon, delivered a speech that resembles what he is likely to have said if 
prosecuting the decree before a court (1. 7 .16-33). Euryptolemus does not cite 
any particular nomos contravened by the decree; perhaps no such statute 
existed at the time. When arguing that the assembly should dismiss Callixe-

long before the first known instance. Thus, I am inclined to follow the speculation of 
Wolff 15-22, who prefers Nicias as the originator sometime between 427 and 415. 



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382 LAW, POLITICS, AND THE GRAPHE PARANOMON 

nus' decree and follow another legal procedure instead (20-29), Euryptole­
mus presents as proper legal alternatives both a psephisma (20f) and a nomos 
(22). By the standards observable in all fourth-century cases, Euryptolemus' 
legal plea would have to be judged utterly inept and especially confused in its 
failure to distinguish between statute and decree. In fact, Euryptolemus 
deserves no such censure because in all probability the standards adhered to 
by fourth-century pleaders had not yet been introduced. 60 

RICE UNIVERSITY 
February, 1989 

60 For reading and criticizing an earlier draft, I am grateful to Michael Gagarin, 
Martin Ostwald, Jeffrey Rusten, Thomas Martin, and John Gibert. Thanks also to the 
anonymous referee of this journal.