BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

Lycurgan Finances 

Edmund M Burke 

W ITH CHAERONEA and the establishment of the so-called 
League of Corinth, Athens suffered absorption into the Mace­
donian hegemony~ 1 with the leveling of Thebes three years 

later, Alexander demonstrated his capacity for reprisal against any who 
would reject that hegemony (Diod. 17.8-15~ Plut. Alex. Ilf~ Arr. Anab. 
1.7f; Just. 11.3.6[). During the Lycurgan period and after,2 it is clear 
that Athens was obliged to live in pragmatic accommodation with Mac­
edon, though the spirit in which that accommodation was endured is 
open to debate.3 Whatever the spirit, the Athenian economy expe­
rienced a singular revival during the twelve years of Lycurgus' as­
cendancy,4 when the city's income increased to a yearly average of 
something like 1,200 talents5-a phenomenon without precedent in 

1 On Chaeronea, the ancient accounts (Diod. 16.85f, Just. 9.3) are of limited value. 
Still standard is N. G. L. Hammond, "The Two Battles of Chaeronea (338 B.C. and 86 
B.C.)," Klio 31 (1938) 186-218; cf W. K. Pritchett, "Observations on Chaeronea," 
AJA 62 (1958) 307-11. On the 'League of Corinth', see esp. Tod II 177, [Dem.) 17 
passim (though note the cautions of G. L. Cawkwell, "A Note on PS.-Demosthenes 
17.20," Phoenix 15 [1961] 74-78), and the general discussion in N. G. L. Hammond 
and G. T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia II (Oxford 1979) 623ff. 

2 Lycurgus' ascendancy is attested for twelve years (Diod. 16.88.1; [Plue] X orat. 
841B), from 338/7 to 326/5, though his 'program' remained in effect until the out­
break of the Hellenic War in 323/2; see F. W. Mitchel, Lykourgan Athens 338-322 
(=Cincinnati Classical Studies 2 [Norman 1973]) 163-214, esp. 174 n.34 and 211-14. 

3 Cj Mitchel (supra n.2), who sees under Lycurgus' direction the implementation of 
a program of patriotic renewal aimed ultimately at resisting further interference by 
Macedon (211-14); W. Will, Athen und Alexander: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der 
Stadt von 338 bis 322 v. Chr. (Munich 1983), argues that the tradition of Lycurgus' 
radical anti-Macedonianism is a fiction (97f), and finds Lycurgus increasingly willing 
to compromise with the reality of Macedonian supremacy, especially after 335 B.C. 
(141ft). Will's study goes too far, I believe, in discounting Lycurgan opposition to 
Macedon; see e.g. 1. Ober, Athenian Reactions to Military Pressure and the Defense of 
Attica (diss.Michigan 1980) esp. 373ff. 

4 On the Lycurgan program generally, see in addition to Mitchel (supra n.2) and Will 
(supra n.3) F. Dlirrbach, L'Orateur Lycurgue (Paris 1890), A. C. Johnson, "Studies in 
the Financial Administration of Athens," AJP 36 (I915) 424-52, and G. Colin, "Note 
sur I'administration financiere de l'orateur Lycurgue," REA 30 (1928) 189-200. On 
Lycurgus as <> bTL Tn BwtK7/<TEL, see most recently P. 1. Rhodes, "Athenian Democracy 
after 403 B.C.," CJ 75 (1980) 309-15. 

5 See [Plue] X orat. 842F: XLAUX BUXKO<Tta TaAavm 1Tpo<ToBov rii 1TOAEt KaTE<TT1}<TE. 
What is meant by this is not altogether clear, especially in light of 841 B: mJJ1a<; yap 
EyE VETO E1TL TPEIS 1TEVmET1)pLBa<; mAaVTWV J..I,VpLwV TETpaKtCTXtALwV, 7j ~ TtVE<; J..I,VPLwV 

251 



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252 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

t4e fourth century. Indeed, that such income was available without 
tribute was a phenomenon without precedent in Athenian history.6 It is 
the purpose of this paper to review generally the Lycurgan budget, in­
come, and expenditures; to argue that commercial revenues comprised 
a quite sizable, though indeterminate, portion of total revenues; and 
finally to suggest that the character of this economic revival served to 
reinforce the bonds of pragmatic accommodation with Macedon. 

A major stumbling block to the analysis of Greek finances is, of 
course, the character of the evidence. Material remains are fragmen­
tary, With few notable exceptions, ancient written accounts are unself­
conscious about even the most important economic matters.7 Detailed 
reconstruction of a Lycurgan budget is therefore impossible; and, as 
M. I. Finley has warned, attempts at quantification in matters of Greek 
economics are hazardous and can be misleading,8 As we proceed to 
examine the Lycurgan budget, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
evidence will allow for generalization at best; when quantification of 
the data is attempted, it is meant to be illustrative, not definitive. 

In the matter of expenditures, however, there are two major areas 
that do allow for at least limited quantification: the regular expenses 
incurred in the general administration of the state and in the building 
program. Though we lack certainty, remuneration of the large num­
ber of state officials was likely the practice in the fourth century, as it 
had been in the later fifth.9 We do know in fact that the state con-

OKTaKWXt.ALwV etaKOUtwV 7TEVrrlKOVTa; cf Plut. Mor. 8528. On the assumption, how­
ever, that [Plut.} is working in rounded numbers, then over a twelve-year period an­
nual revenues of 1,200 talents would square well enough with a total of 14,000. Still, 
reconciling the totals of 14,000 and 18,000+ is a problem that allows of no easy solu­
tion (c! Dtirrbach [supra n.4] 38-46 and Will [supra n.3] 77m. The anonymous reader 
has suggested that the figure of 18,000+ may derive from the tradition glorifying 
Lycurgus and include such items as advances made by Lycurgus' friends, the many 
epidoseis, etc. (for which generally see Mitchel [supra n.2] 195m. These, since they 
were other than regular income, may have been counted twice, once for the annual 
total and once again for the (larger) cumulative total. There is much that is attractive 
in this suggestion. Since all figures cited allow for 1,200T per annum, and since this 
figure can be reconciled generally with one of the estimates for total expenditures, I 
have elected to adopt it, recognizing, of course, that annual revenues would have 
reached this level (and higher) only over time. 

6 See A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II (Oxford 1956) 16-33. 
7 M. M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History oj Ancient Greece 

(Berkeley 1977) 26-28. 
B M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley 1973) 17-34. 
9 See V. Gabrielsen, Remuneration oj State Officials in Fourth Century B.C. Athens 

(Odense 1981) 146-49, who argues plausibly, if generally, against the conclusions of 
M. H. Hansen, "Misthos for Magistrates in Classical Athens," SymbOslo 54 (979) 
5-22, and "Perquisites for Magistrates in Fourth Century Athens," ClMed 32 (980) 
105-25. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
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EDMUND M. BURKE 253 

tinued to pay dicasts, members of the boule, and those in attendance 
at the assembly.lO In all, these expenditures may have amounted to 
something like 200T annually.ll Of the other general administrative 
expenditures,12 some were recurrent and apparently fixed in size, 
such as the maintenance of the sacred triremes,13 others less so, such 
as the maintenance of orphans (see Aeschin. 3.154). There were 
expenditures, too, for religious practices, though the numerous festi­
vals may have been financed when possible-from the private income 
of the temples.14 Finally, there were expenditures for defense, but 
given their potential size, the city sometimes had recourse to raising 
revenues by extraordinary means.15 

In periods of economic distress there was retrenchment propor­
tionate to the distress (c/. Arist. Pol. 1317b35-38; Dem. 39.17); and 
when surpluses were available, they tended to be spent.16 Budgeting 
for surpluses, however, was not state practice,n and since sizable 
surpluses did not occur on a regular basis, we may fairly assume a 
rough correlation between regular annual administrative expenditures 
and regular income secured by internal means. For the latter there is 
evidence to suggest that something like 400T was the norm in times 
of general prosperity. From Thucydides we learn that at the out­
set of the Peloponnesian War all revenues contributed by the allies 
amounted to 600T, and from Xenophon that the total in state income 
amounted to 1,OOOT.18 If both figures are roughly accurate, then 400T 

10 For dicastic pay see Ar. Vesp. 661-63; for the boule and the assembly, Arist. Ath. 
Pol. 62.2. 

11 See A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (New York 1958) 5f; Jones provides 
some theoretical maximums: 26T for the boule and 21 T for the magistrates. His esti­
mate for the number of magistrates is low, however (see Gabrielson [supra n.9] 84 
n.28), so the expense here would have been greater. For dicastic pay, see M. H. Han­
sen, GRBS 20 (979) 243-46, whence totals of between 75 and lOOT per annum; and 
for the ecc/esiasticon, see Hansen, GRBS 17 (1976) 115-34, and GRBS 23 (1982) 
241-49, where 50T + is suggested as the likely annual expenditure. 

12 Systematic review of these is beyond the scope of this study. Perhaps the best 
starting point for such a review is A. M. Andreades, A History of Greek Public Finance 
(Cambridge 1933) 212ft'; the whole issue of Greek public finance is in need of fresh 
review. 

13 See B. Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (= UnivCalPubClSt 13 
[1975]) 153ft". 

14 See Gomme (supra n.6) 19; on Lycurgan practices here, see 255 infra. 
15 See generally R. Thomsen, Eisphora (Copenhagen 1964). On expenditures for the 

fleet during the Lycurgan period, see 256f infra. 
16 Austin and Vidal-Naquet (supra n.7) 118-20. The noteworthy exception is the 

reserve built up by Pericles prior to the war; see Thuc. 2.13.3-5 and Gomme (supra 
n.6) 16ft". 

17 Austin and Vidal-Naquet (supra n.7) 118ft". 
18 Thuc. 2.13.3; Xen. Anab. 7.1.27; see Gomme (supra n.6) 17-20. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
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254 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

would have been the amount raised in 431 B.C. by internal means. 
Nearly a century later, we learn from [Dem.] 10, amid observations 
about the state's financial recovery after the disasters of the Social 
War, that annual revenues amounted to 400T, sufficient to allow for 
a theoric distribution-and thus sufficient, we may assume, to cover 
the normal expenses of the state.19 

There is, of course, too much that is uncertain to allow us to con­
clude that these figures are exact. Still, the general direction they 
indicate is clear: when revenues allowed, annual expenditures for the 
general administration of the state were considerable, and may have 
amounted to something like 400T. Lycurgan revenues certainly would 
have allowed for such expenditures, and there is nothing in what we 
know of the administration of the state during his tenure to indicate 
that an amount significantly less than this would have been spent. 

The building program, too, would have necessitated annual expen­
ditures of some size, though about these we can only surmise. The 
Periclean program, it has been estimated, cost somewhere between 
2,000 and 2,500T .20 The Lycurgan program, though undertaken in 
part in emulation of the Periclean program and often compared favor­
ably to it, was in fact a less ambitious undertaking; 21 the rebuilding of 
the theater of Dionysus and the stadium, the two most impressive 
items in the Lycurgan program, would not have entailed expenditures 
comparable to the Parthenon and the Propylaea.22 Still, the Lycurgan 

19 See [Oem.] 10.35-42, esp. 38. Much to Demosthenes' chagrin, theorika had been 
distributed in the preceding decade when revenues had been considerably less than 
400T. Yet the conciliatory tone of his remarks here suggests that state revenues were 
now sufficient to allow him to endorse their use; for this reading, as well as on the 
authenticity of the speech, see J. J. Buchanan, Theorika (New York 1962) 60-70, 
esp. 66ff. The eisphora for 34211, if a part of Demosthenes' totals, would not have 
amounted to much; see Thomsen (supra n.15) 238ff. 

20 A. M. Burford, "The Economics of Greek Temple Building," PCPS 191 N.S. 11 
(1965) 21-34, based on R. Stanier, "The Cost of the Parthenon," JHS 73 (1953) 
68-76. 

21 See Andreades (supra n.12) 262f, and Mitchel (supra n.2) 190. 
22 From the decree of Stratocles (Plut. Mor. 852) and [Plut.] X orat. 841c-F we 

learn of Lycurgan work on the theater of Dionysus and the Panathenaic stadium, of 
the construction of a gymnasium in the Lyceum and a palaestra, and of work on the 
ship-sheds and arsenal in the Piraeus. Both sources mention the restoration and con­
struction of other buildings, among which are a temple dedicated to Apollo Patroos 
(see H. A. Thompson, Hesperia 6 [1937] 90-115), additions to the heliaia (Thompson, 
Hesperia 23 [19541 32-39), work on buildings in the sanctuary of Eleusis (see IG 112 
1672.23-28, 168-87, 291; 1675), and the sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus (c. D. 
Androutsopoulos, The Amphiareion of Oropos [Athens 1972]), and perhaps the work 
done on the Pnyx (H. A. Thompson and R. L. Scranton, Hesperia 12 [1943] 291-301, 
though Thompson has recently pushed back the date to the mid-340's: Hesperia Suppl. 
19 [1982] 133-47). Also, the outer defenses were repaired and supplemented (see fG 
112 244 and Ober [supra n.31 373ft). For other items to be included generally in build-



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
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EDMUND M. BURKE 255 

program was extensive. Moreover, we need to bear in mind that 
labor and transport constituted the bulk of building costs,23 and from 
the fifth to the fourth century the cost of both, it seems, had 
doubled.24 Given these qualifications, a cost of between 750T and 
1,OOOT should not be a serious overestimate for the entire Lycurgan 
program: i.e., roughly one-third to one-half the lower estimate of the 
Periclean program.25 To be sure, this is only a guess, but the evi­
dence does not indicate that it is an implausible exaggeration~ we are, 
in any case, concerned primarily with a general characterization of 
expenditures. And even if the cost of the building program were 
something close to the larger estimated cost of the entire Periclean 
program, the annual outlay, if apportioned evenly over the twelve 
years of Lycurgus' ascendancy, would have been less than 200T. 

There were, we know, other extraordinary expenditures associated 
with Lycurgus' tenure. The ephebic reforms, for instance, have been 
estimated to have cost 40T per annum~ 26 and the various religious cults, 
new and revived, would have entailed annual expense of some size­
though with these Lycurgus aimed at fiscal conservation through ad­
ministrative efficiency, as indeed he did with the entire program of 
restoration.27 Theoric distributions continued during the Lycurgan pe­
riod, though with the law of Hegemon in 335 (Aeschin. 3.25), these 

ing expenditures, see the excellent survey in Will (supra n.3) 79-93. The Parthenon 
and Propylaea, constructed with more expensive building materials and techniques, are 
estimated to have cost 470T and 200T respectively~ see Burford (supra n.20) 24f. 

23 So Burford (supra n.20) 3 Of; but c/ S. N. Coumanoudis and D. C. Gofas, REG 91 
(978) 289-306, who challenge Burford's view that the cost of building materials was 
negligible. 

24 Costs for labor, skilled and unskilled, certainly had (c/ IG J2 373f and IG IJ2 
1672f). And in his calculations on the cost of the Parthenon, Stanier (supra n.20) 70tT 
holds the same for transport costs. 

25 To gain a ditTerent perspective: this estimate would mean that at fifth-century 
rates, the Lycurgan program would have entailed something like one-third to one-half 
the expense of the Periclean program, less the estimated cost of the Parthenon, Pro­
pylaea (670T), and the chryselephantine statue of Athena (750T; c/ Gomme [supra 
n.6] 24f). Admittedly, some of the items in the Lycurgan program were subsidized 
either through special levies «(f. IG 112 505 for the levy on metics for the arsenal and 
ship-sheds) or epidoseis (c/ Tod II 198 and the discussion in Mitchel [supra n.2] 
195ft), though I have assumed that these were not excluded from the ancient calcula­
tions of income and expenditure. For other features of the Periclean program, see W. 
B. Dinsmoor, The Architecture 0/ Ancient Greece3 (London 1950) 147-215. For some 
estimates of specific costs, see Burford (supra n.20) 23tT. 

26 Cf W. S. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens (London 1911) 10, based on Arist. Ath.Pol. 
42.3. 

27 See e.g. IG 112 333, and W. S. Ferguson, The Treasurers q/, Athena (Cambridge 
[Mass.] 1932) 122fT; on Lycurgus' frugality generally, see the anecdotes in [Plut.] X 
oral. 841F-842D. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
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256 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

likely diminished in frequency, if not in size.28 With one exception, 
there is nothing otherwise in what we know of the Lycurgan program 
that would have required annual expenditures of great size. There 
were, of course, annual surpluses that allowed for the restoration of 
cult objects, most notably the golden Nikai, and for the purchase of 
other gold and silver religious paraphernalia (Plut. Mor. 852). In 
time, these surpluses would have amounted to a reserve of some 
size, though as an annual phenomenon they should not have ex­
ceeded 100T.29 If we assume, then, that these estimates offer a not 
grossly misleading characterization of all major known Lycurgan ex­
penditures, we are left with the need to account for something more 
than a third of the annually expended revenues of 1 ,200T. 

The one exception in all this is the fleet, which in 354 B.C. had 
numbered 300 triremes. By 330/29 the number had increased to over 
400 (i.e., 392 triremes and 18 quadriremes: cj. Dem. 14.13; IG 112 
1627.266-69, 275-78). Since the average life of a trireme was twenty 
years,30 and since the cost of construction amounted to two talents 
per ship,31 then between the Social War and Agis' War the state 
would have expended, on an average annual basis, roughly 30T in 
maintaining and enlarging the fleet. Yet for the state, construction 
would have been the least burdensome of the annual expenses as­
sociated with the fleet. Late in the fifth century the daily wage for 
rowers was reduced from one drachma to three obols, a consequence 
of economic exigency (Thuc. 3.17.4; 8.29.1, 45.2; Xen. Hell. 1.5.4-7). 
Through most of the fourth century, it seems, the wage remained at 
three obols or less32 -though with the prosperity of the Lycurgan 
period and the city's need to remain competitive with Macedon in 
attracting non-Athenian rowers, the wage was probably restored to 
one drachma. If this was the case, then the monthly cost for rowers 

28 See Buchanan (supra n.19) 74fT. The amount expended annually on theoric distri­
butions would of course vary, though even at their peak they probably did not exceed 
90T annually (so Buchanan 83ft); the amounts noted in [Plut.l X orat. 843D-E seem 
clearly an exception since they derive from confiscation, not regular revenues. One 
means by which theorika may have been subsidized as early as Eubulus was through 
the leasing of sacred properties; see M. B. Walbank, Hesperia 52 (1983) 207-31, esp. 
228ff. 

29 To be inferred from the fact that when restored the golden Nikai, certainly the 
most impressive items listed, did not exceed in total value 200T; see D. B. Thompson, 
"The Golden Nikai Reconsidered," Hesperia 13 (1944) 173-209, and Ferguson (supra 
n.27) 91 n.2. 

30 See W. Kalbe, "Zur athenischen Marineverwaltung," AthMitt 26 (1901) 377-418, 
esp. 386-98. 

31 See Andreades (supra n.12) 224. 
~2 At times in the fourth century, pay was reduced to food allowances only: Oem. 

4.28f. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
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EDMUND M. BURKE 257 

and crew would have been one talent per trireme, somewhat more 
for the quadriremes.33 

The function of the Athenian fleet subsequent to Chaeronea has 
received little scholarly attention, perhaps because triremes were ships 
of war, and with Chaeronea the issue had been decided. Yet it is 
remarkable that despite her loss of independence, Athens continued 
to refurbish and enlarge her fleet so that by 330/29 she possessed 
an armada larger by 100 than the imperial fleet.34 While it is pos­
sible that a fleet of such size was meant to serve as a deterrent, 
first to Philip and then to Alexander, it is a possibility that strains 
credulity.35 The Macedonians did not look to the sea for decisive 
engagements, and Alexander's dismissal of his fleet in 334 B.C. may 
give us some indication of the regard in which he held the Athe­
nian fleet as a threat to his plans (el Diod. 17.22.5). Nor, on the 
other hand, is it likely that the otherwise frugal Lycurgus would have 
expended considerable monies on a fleet that was meant to serve 
chiefly as an object of civic pride.36 Doubtless the fleet did serve 
this end, but if it was to do more than sit idly in the ship-sheds, 
then additional and considerable monies would have to be expended 
to keep even token crews trained. Yet the evidence suggests that 
the number of crews kept at the ready was significantly more than 
this. 

With the Hellenic War we have evidence of the city's capacity to 
man a fleet of considerable size. It has been estimated that, in all, 
something more than 230 Athenian ships of war were at sea prior to 
the engagement at Amorgos.37 The war itself was an extraordinary 
moment, one that might have caused the city to hurl every available 
man, trained or untrained, into the fray.38 But given the sense of 
commitment and foresight necessary to build and maintain an armada 
of 400, it is unlikely that the city would not have kept at the immedi­
ate ready crews to man at least a fifth of them.39 Indeed, the surviving 

38 See J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, Greek Oared Ships 900-322 B.C. (Cam­
bridge 1968) 29Of. 

34 Thuc. 2.13.8; though at the outset of the war there may have been an additional 
100 triremes in reserve; see [Xen.] Ath.Pol. 3.4. 

35 Cj.M. Amit, "Athens and the Sea," Lalomus 74 (1965) 94. 
36 See DUrrbach (supra n.4) 55-64, and Mitchel (supra n.2) 198f. 
37 N. G. Ashton, "The Naumachia near Amorgos in 322 B.C.," BSA 72 (977) 1-11, 

esp. 8fr. 
38 A precedent of sorts for rejecting such extreme measures existed from the days 

following Chaeronea; see [Plut.] X oral. 849A. 
39 A precedent for keeping a fifth of the available ships at sea for as much as eight 

months may be found in the Periclean program, even before the war: Plut. Per. 11.4. 
The objections raised against this number by S. K. Eddy, "Athens' Peacetime Navy in 



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258 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

naval inventories for 330129, 326/5, and 325/4 show that at the time 
these inventories were recorded the city actually had at sea between 
forty and sixty ships.40 A review of Lycurgan revenues will suggest in 
fact that naval activity of at least such size was regularly the practice in 
the period of accommodation between Chaeronea and the Hellenic 
War; and if this suggestion is correct, then we will have done much to 
explain the unaccounted portion of Lycurgan expenditures. 

Normally the bulk of the state's regular revenues were secured 
through taxes, direct and indirect, the law courts (chiefly through 
fines), the concessions at Laurium, the rental of state-owned prop­
erty, and regular liturgies. While estimates of the exact amount that 
each of these sources brought to the treasury are impossible to de­
velop, there is general agreement that the principal sources of rev­
enue were the Laurium concessions and the indirect tax on goods 
entering and leaving the Piraeus.41 But in conditions of distress pecul­
iar to each, the Laurium mines and the harbor tax could be rendered 
almost wholly unproductive.42 Moreover, even under what might be 
termed normal conditions the amount of revenue from either could 
not be guaranteed. Investment in each was essentially a matter of 
private initiative and, as Hopper has shown, there was considerable 
variation in the enterprises that attracted the attention of investors at 
different times throughout the fourth century.43 

After the Social War revenues were gradually restored under the 
direction of Eubulus, so that by 34211 they amounted annually to 
400T ([Dem.] 10.38; Ephorus, FGrHist 115F166). The Laurium con­
cessions and the harbor tax were the principal means by which this 
was done. Crosby's reconstruction and Hopper's analysis of the frag­
mentary mining records found in the Agora suggest that in 34211 as 
much as 160T of the 400T in total revenue may have been realized 
from the Laurium concessions: this was in part a result of incentives 
the state was willing to offer to those investing in mining.44 

the Age of Pericles," GRBS 9 (I968) 141-156, have recently been challenged; see 
Jordan (supra n.B) IBf n.71. 

40 IG IJ2 1627.266ff, 1628.481ff, and 1629.783ff; cf Ashton (supra n.37) Iff. 
41 Andreades (supra n.12) 268-305 and Finley (supra n.8) Blff. 
42 E.g. the mines were closed by the Spartan occupation of Decelea (Thuc. 6.91.7, 

7.19.)); and as a result of the Social War, Piraeus revenues were sorely reduced (Isoc. 
8.19; Oem. 20.24, 23.209). 

43 R. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.," BSA 48 (1953) 
248ff. 

44 Hopper (supra n.43) 239, 251 n.376, based on M. Crosby, "The Leases of the 
Laureion Mines," Hesperia 19 (950) 205-25; see also P. Gauthier, Un Commentaire 
historique des POROI de Xenophon (Geneva/Paris 1976) 112-15. 



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EDMUND M. BURKE 259 

In contrast to the city's income from the mines, the realization of 
the Piraeus' potential necessitated extended effort and no small in­
vestment by the state. During Eubulus' administration, expenditures 
were made to improve living conditions in the Piraeus (Din. 1.98; 
Syll.3 1216). Further, as part of the effort to attract greater numbers 
of foreign investors and merchants to the city, legislation was passed 
requiring that dikai emporikai be heard monthly.45 To this same end, 
if indirectly, the city under Eubulus conferred ges kai oikias enktesis 
more liberally than it had before the Social War.46 Admittedly, the 
more liberal practice was aimed at influential xenoi,47 but it is hard to 
imagine that metics and foreigners generally, who played a prominent 
role in investment in commerce,48 would not have seen in the prac­
tice a signal to encourage their return.49 We know that suppression of 
piracy under Eubulus became a matter of special state concern: this is 
explicit in the decree of Moerocles and a clause in the peace of Phil­
ocrates ([Dem.] 58.53; 12.2), and is implicit in Philip's acknowledge­
ment of the Athenian fleet as the police force of the Aegean ([Dem.] 
7.14f). In fact, it seems that Eubulus' efforts to maintain and enlarge 
the fleet after the Social War were aimed in no small measure at 
protecting commercial traffic from the depredations of freebooters 
and others.50 

Despite Eubulus' success in restoring commercial revenues, the 
potential of the Piraeus was not to be realized fully during his admini­
stration. We know that piracy continued to be an impediment to the 
free flow of commercial traffic (Dem. 18.145; 23.166; [Dem.] 7.2; 
12.2-5, 13; Aeschin. 2.12). And despite the state's gradual economic 
recovery during the 340's, the financial resources needed to maintain 
an aggressive maritime police force were limited. The syntaxeis may 
have helped, of course, though after the Social War there is no rea­
son to imagine that the contributions of the allies helped greatly.51 

45 See E. E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts (Princeton 1973) 184ff. 
46 J. Pe~irka, The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscription (Prague 1966) 

137-59~ cf G. Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS 83 (963) 64 n.95. 
47 As observed by Gauthier (supra n.44) 223-25. 
48 Cf H. Knorringa, Emporos (Amsterdam 1926) 79ff, and R. Bogaert, Banques et 

banquiers dans les cites grecques (Leiden 1968) 62ff, though their extreme view that 
Athenian citizens played virtually no role in commercial investment is to be rejected~ 
see W. E. Thompson, "The Athenian Entrepreneur," AntC! 51 (982) 53-88. 

49 Cl Isoc. 8.21~ the city had been abandoned by its metic population as a result of 
the Social War. 

50 See my "Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea," TAPA 114 (984) 111-20. 
51 Oem. 8.24-26~ cf G. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian 

Confederacy," JHS 101 (1980 48, and R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City-States 
(Berkeley 1976) 433. On the syntaxeis generally, see most recently F. W. Mitchel, 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

260 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

But the single largest impediment to the full realization of the com­
mercial potential of the Piraeus was Philip. Throughout the 350's and 
34O's Philip regularly harassed Athenian and allied shipping. We 
know of his seizure of the emporia of the northwest (Dem. 2.I6f) 
and of his raids on Lemnos, Imbros, the Chersonese, and Euboea 
(Dem. 4.34). While the grain supply was his specific objective in 
much of this, it is likely, too, that he sought with these raids to 
undermine security in the Aegean generally and thus to disrupt 
Eubulus' efforts to revitalize Athenian commercial revenues.52 The 
clause in the peace of Philocrates, mentioned earlier, is clear evidence 
of Athens' active concern in the matter. 

Within less than a decade of Chaeronea annual revenues in Athens 
had effectively tripled. Yet in what we know of the Lycurgan recovery 
program there is nothing to indicate that wholly new means were 
discovered to raise revenues of such size. To be sure, there were 
unique features to the program, and these have been discussed else­
where~ 53 no doubt a number of these would have had a salutary 
effect on the economy. But there is nothing to suggest that, as a 
consequence of such innovations, annual revenues of I,200T or more 
could have been realized. We are left then to assume that normal 
means of generating revenues were productive to a degree hitherto 
unrealized, and that they provided the bulk of Lycurgus' I,2ooT. Of 
these resources only the mines and the Piraeus possessed the neces­
sary potential. 

Unfortunately, the amount of revenue generated by the mines in 
the 330's cannot be estimated with confidence. But while the records 
found in the Agora do suggest that there was a decrease in mining 
revenues after 34211,54 there is no evidence to indicate that the 
mines did not continue to be one of the principal sources of the 
state's revenues during the Lycurgan period. At their most produc­
tive, however, the mines cannot have provided more than I60T 
annually. 

Income from commerce, on the other hand, appears to be an 
entirely different matter.55 As we saw, Eubulus' efforts to restore 

"The Assessment of the Allies in the Second Athenian League," Class V 28 (984) 
23-37. 

52 See H. Hauben, "Philippe II, fondateur de la marine macMonienne," AncSoc 6 
(975) 51-59. 

53 See Mitchel (supra n.2) 193ff, and Will (supra n.3) 77ff. 
54 So Hopper (supra n.43) 216. 
55 The thesis offered here-that commercial revenues constituted a large, though 

indeterminate, portion of Lycurgan revenues-is generally consistent, I believe, with 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

EDMUND M. BURKE 261 

commercial revenues had been extensive and had met with a meas­
ure of success. Chaeronea undercut none of this. Indeed, Lycurgus 
saw sufficient merit in the more liberal conferral of ges kai oikias 
enktesis to continue and apparently increase the practice, extending it 
to include foreign investors and merchants.56 The effect, it seems, 
was quite positive. By the end of the century the metic population in 
Athens had grown to perhaps 10,000 (Ath. 6.272c), virtually all of 
whom would have taken up residence in Athens after the Social War 
(and a significant majority, probably, after Chaeronea) .57 

Chaeronea, in fact, proved decisive to the expansion of Athenian 
business interests. With the Macedonian victory the Aegean was 
freed of the major cause of commercial instability-freer than it had 
been at any other time in the fourth century, except perhaps during 
the heyday of the Second Athenian League. The pirates employed by 
Philip and by Ath~ns in the 350's and 340's had lost their patrons. 
For a time, to be sure, freebooters remained active, though Lycurgus 
moved decisively in this regard. Early in his administration we hear 
of a decree proposed by the orator himself to honor the general 
Diotimus for the suppression of pirates.58 So successfully, indeed, was 
the Aegean policed that apart from the pirates employed by Persia 
against Alexander ,59 there is no evidence of other disruptions in the 
flow of Aegean traffic. And it is to be remembered that earlier in the 
century pirates were claimed, if with some exaggeration, to control 
the seas (Isoc. 4.115). 

the views expressed by W. E. Thompson (cl, in addition to supra n.48, "The Athe­
nian Investor," RSC 26 [1978] 403-23, and "A View of Athenian Banking," MusHelv 
36 [1979] 224-41), and opposes generally the position of the economic 'primitivists', 
most recently enunciated in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker, edd., Trade 
in the Ancient Economy (Berkeley 1983). On Lycurgan commerce generally, see Will 
(supra n.3) 77-79. 

56 Pe~irka (supra n.46) 59-61. 
57 On the exodus of the metics after the Social War, see Isoc. 8.21; cl Oem. 23.23, 

21.163, 57.48, 22.68, 24.166, and [Oem.] 25.57, where the presence of metics in Ath­
ens from the late 350's through the 330's is noted as a matter of fact. The evidence, 
however, allows of no precise assessment as to the pattern of their return. 

58 IG 112 1623.276-308; [Plut.] X orat. 844A; cl Tod II 200 on a colony sent to the 
Adriatic in 325/4 to defend against pirates; on the Lycurgan character of the decree, 
see Mitchel (supra n.2) 194 n.I22. 

59 A policy initiated apparently by Memnon of Rhodes (see Arr. Anab. 2.1.2; cl 3.2.4 
and Tod II 191). Amphoterus' mission in 331 B.C. seems to have been aimed in part at 
checking these depredations; see Curt. 4.8.15f. CI A. B. Bosworth, "The Mission of 
Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War," Phoenix 29 (1975) 33, whose character­
ization of conditions in the Aegean generally is exaggerated, as his own subsequent 
observations imply; cl A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (Oxford 
1980) 177ff. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

262 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

The effect of all this on Athenian commercial revenues can only be 
estimated. We need not labor the fact that the Piraeus was a great 
harbor. In the fifth century the port city had been the center for the 
flow of commercial goods from throughout the Mediterranean ([Xen.] 
Ath.Pol. 2.7). At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles could 
boast that every kind of goods from every locale came to the city 
through its port (Thuc. 2.38.2). Early in the fourth century, the harbor 
again became the commercial center of the Aegean. Products grown 
or produced to surplus elsewhere were brought to the Piraeus for sale; 
and for products unavailable elsewhere, people came to the port to 
buy.60 Eubulus' efforts in the 340's, augmented by those of Lycurgus, 
and combined with the enforced peace after Chaeronea, provided the 
conditions necessary for substantial commercial enrichment. 

There are, however, two difficulties in positing that the harbor tax 
of 2% ad valorem produced a sizable portion of Lycurgan revenues. In 
the only explicit reference to revenues produced by the Piraeus, 
Andocides (1.133) notes that in 400/399 the harbor tax was farmed 
out for 30T, and in 399/8 for 36T. Much has been written about 
these figures, none of it decisive, however; we simply lack sufficiently 
explicit evidence for corroboration.61 Yet for a period of even modest 
prosperity these figures seem impossibly low, and the years in ques­
tion were in no way normal. The war had only recently ended; the 
citizen population may have been reduced by close to half of what it 
had been a generation before, and the metic and slave population to 
a fraction unknown.62 Moreover, the farm land of Attica, ravaged by 
war, was only beginning to recover (Lys. 7.6; Aeschin. 2.147), and 
the imperial fleet had been reduced to twelve triremes (Xen. Hell. 
2.2.20). Pirates and Sparta controlled the seas (Xen. Hell. 5.1.1, 
18-24; Isoc. 4.l15). Andocides' figures reflect, I suspect, almost ex­
clusively the revenues secured from the import of grain.63 

60 Isoc. 4.42, though his comments may refer to the fifth century. 
61 For a survey of the major arguments, see Knorringa (supra n.48) 132-39; Andre­

ades (supra n.12) 297-99; 1. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece (London 
1933) 158-68; H. Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece2 (Cambridge 1957) 224-30; 
R. 1. Hopper, Trade and Industry in Classical Greece (London 1979) 71-107, esp. l00f. 
Also of interest are the observations of C. Mosse, "La vie economique d' Athenes au 
IVe siecle: crise ou renouveau?" in Praelectiones Patavinae, ed. F. Sartori (Rome 1972) 
135-44, and E. Erxleben, "Das Verhiiltnis des Handels zum Produktionsaufkommen in 
Attica im 5. und 4. lahrhundert v. u. Z.," Klio 57 (I975) 365-98. 

62 See A. W. Gomme, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. 
(Oxford 1933) 25-27. 

6:1 As the remarks in Lys. 7.6 and Aeschin. 2.147 suggest, Athens' dependence on 
imported grain immediately after the war was great. While we have no direct evidence 
on the price of grain for 400/399 and 399/8, it seems clear enough that prices fluctu-



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

EDMUND M. BURKE 263 

A further difficulty is that harbor revenues of size, earned at a rate 
of 2% ad valorem, would require the coming and going of an enor­
mous quantity of commercial traffic. There is little in the evidence to 
suggest that Athens herself could have consumed or produced for 
export the quantity of goods necessary to raise such revenues.64 The 
Piraeus, however, was not a conventional emporium, either in size or 
in function. As early as the fourth century, as we have seen, the 
harbor served as an entre pot, an intermediary station where goods 
and materials produced in one locale were brought, purchased, and 
shipped elsewhere. The deigma served to facilitate this process. Here 
the banks were located,65 here sample goods from cargo carriers were 
shown. When a sale was transacted, the appropriate tax was presum­
ably levied on the value of the goods in the bay.66 Under such condi­
tions the ad valorem rate would have amounted, in effect, to 4%. 

There is, of course, no way of knowing the quantity of goods that 
moved through the Piraeus in this manner-though common sense, I 
think, suggests that it was not small. Certainly Xenophon (Vect. 3.0 
recognized the harbor's potential, as had Isocrates (4.42) and the 
author of the Athenaion Politeia ([Xen.] 2.7). Other testimony is 
scant, though one piece of evidence is suggestive. In the 350's, rev­
enues from Cersobleptes' Thracian ports annually provided him with 
more than 200 (or possibly 300) talents. These revenues were ap­
parently secured through a tithe imposed on the traffic of what appear 
to be a very few itemsP Close comparison of the Thracian ports to 
the Piraeus is impossible; the differences between them in function, 

ated widely during the first two decades after the war; see Ar. Ece/. 547ff for 392 B.C., 
when grain was apparently available for 3 drachmas per medimnos, though with the 
seizure of grain ships by Antalcidas in 387/6 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28) prices must have 
soared. On the manipulation of prices in the city during this period, see Lys. 22.11-16. 
Harbor revenues of 30T would necessitate the import of 1,000,000 medimnoi of grain 
at 9 drachmas per medimnos. It has been argued that Athens did import such quan­
tities of grain in 355 B.C. The city's population then was probably greater than at the 
turn of the century (see Gomme [supra n.62] 32f); but the city's reliance on imported 
grain in mid-century was probably less than it was immediately after the war. At times 
the price of grain rose as high as 16 drachmas per medimnos, though typically it sold 
for 5 drachmas (see Oem. 24.39; fG IF 1672.287; [Arist.] Gec. 1352bI9). 

M See supra n.61. 
65 Polyaen. 6.2.2: the banks were sufficiently prosperous to invite a raid by Alexander 

of Pherae in 362/1. 
66 See Plut. Dem. 23 for a characterization of the process; for the deigma see Dem. 

1.33, 35.35; Xen. Hell. 5.1.21; Harp. s. v. 
67 See Dem. 23.110 and S. Casson, Macedonia. Thrace and lI/yria (Oxford 1926) 

52-79. There is no compelling reason to prefer a reading of SWKoma to rpwKo(J"w; it 
is done, I think, because 300T seems improbably high. See e.g. R. Whitson, Demos­
thenes II (London 1868) 441. 



BURKE, EDMUND M., Lycurgan Finances , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 26:3 
(1985:Autumn) p.251 

264 L YCURGAN FINANCES 

in tax rate, and in the variety of items moved through them are 
simply too great. Despite these differences, however, it is clear that 
in the fourth century revenues of considerable size were raised by the 
imposition of harbor-taxes; and there is much to suggest that this was 
the case in Lycurgan Athens. 

If the conclusions thus far drawn are correct, then we need to be 
alert to some additional implications, both economic and political. As 
harbor revenues fluctuated, so must other state revenues dependent 
on the volume of Piraeus traffic. Metics, for instance, paid an annual 
head-tax of twelve drachmas for men, six for women.68 There were, 
as well, a tax on all aliens who sold in the Agora (Oem. 7.15) and a 
sales tax on goods sold there (Poll. 7.15). If there was any correlation 
between the volume of traffic to the Piraeus and the volume of trade 
in the Agora, then tax revenues here would not have been slight. 
Moreover, there were the court fines levied through the dikai empori­
kai. In the fifth century the revenues generated by such fines had 
been considerable ([Xen.] Ath.Pol. 1.16); with the legislative reforms 
of the 340's the courts again would have become a profitable source 
of income. 

As a political matter, Athenian prosperity, so dependent on com­
mercial stability, could only serve to reinforce the attractiveness of a 
pragmatic accommodation with Macedon. While originally a condition 
imposed by Macedon, accommodation soon became a necessity of 
economic well-being, if not survival. Successful or not, rebellion by 
Athens from the Macedonian hegemony would have have struck at 
the heart of the Lycurgan recovery program. With rebellion, traffic on 
the Aegean would once again have been virtually halted.69 A variety 
of factors shaped Athenian foreign policy during the Lycurgan pe­
riod,70 but the conclusion suggested by this study is that this policy 
was in no small measure economically determined.71 

COE COLLEGE 

July, 1985 

68 D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (=PCPS Suppl. 4 [1977]) 75f. 
69 On the effects of warfare on commerce in the Aegean see, in addition to lsoc. 

8.21, Oem. 18.241, 23.110. 
70 c.r. Mitchel (supra n.2) 211-14 and Will (supra n.3) 141ff. 
71 My thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities, under the auspices of 

whose Grants for College Teachers the work for this paper was done, and to the anon­
ymous reader of this journal whose criticisms and suggestions have kept me from a 
number of errors, though perhaps not all.