The Speech of Teutiaplus (Thuc. 3.30) Lateiner, Donald Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies; Summer 1975; 16, 2; ProQuest pg. 175

The Speech of Teutiaplus (Thuc. 3.30) 
Donald Lateiner 

I N THE SUMMER OF 427 B.C. the Peloponnesian fleet under the Spartan 
nauarch Alcidas reached Ionia too late to aid the Mytilenaean 
rebellion against the Athenians. At Embaton in Asia Minor the 

commanders discussed their options. Teutiaplus, a commander from 
Elis otherwise unknown, is reported by Thucydides to have urged 
that the fleet sail immediately on Mytilene and surprise the Athenian 
occupation forces. His speech is brief, to the point, and without result. 
How does one explain this 119-word speech in the literary plan of 
Thucydides? Speeches report 'T<X SEov'Tcx-historically important and 
politically instructive material-and are not undigested notes.1 I hope 
to show that Teutiaplus' words reflect the past and analyze a type of 
situation which recurred in the Ten Years War and later. 

Thucydides' interest in human behavior (1.22.4; 3.82.2) often led 
him to reduce to essentials reports of actions, and then to encourage 
his reader to compare reports of other actions.2 Speeches precede a 
battle or a war and are tested by the following narrative. The speeches 
often explore possible strategies; antithetical speeches give ex parte 
analyses of varying accuracy.3 Of three levels of Thucydides' history-

1 See Thuc. 1.22.1-3. I generally agree with the interpretation of Thucydides' speeches 
sketched by J. de Romilly, Histoire et raison cheZ Thucydide (Paris 1956) 236-39: the speeches 
present arguments actually employed but in a manner, style and organization by means 
of which Thucydides clarifies the issues for his reader. The question of historicity in Thu­
cydides' speeches will not be settled for all speeches with but one doctrine. Recent writers, 
stressing the interplay of speech and narrative, do not thereby necessarily impugn the 
author's fidelity to the substance of the speeches. See, for instance, H-P. Stahl, Thukydides 
Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess (Zetemata 40, Munich 1966) passim; 
D. Tompkins, "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades," yes 22 
(1972) 181-215. For further bibliography, consult W. C. West m, "A Bibliography of Scholar­
ship on the Speeches in Thucydides 1873-1970," in The Speeches in Thucydides, ed. P. A. 
Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973), items 1-148. 

2 de Romilly, op.dt. (supra n.l) 123-50, on the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians before 
the battle of Naupactus (2.87-89); 15Q-61 on the Syracusans and the Athenians before the 
last battle in the harbor (7.61-68). See also the stimulating remarks of H. D. F. Kitto, 
Poiesis, Structure and Thought (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1966), "Thucydides" 257-354, esp. 
349-50 on "to-and-fro" references. 

8 cf., e.g., Hermocrates and Athenagoras on the Athenians: 6.33-40. 

175 



176 THE SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS (THUC. 3.30) 

speech, narrative and judgemental analysis-the speeches are the 
most ambiguous. Speeches are proven by the narrative to be partially 
wrong (Archidamus' 2.11.6-8), or mostly wrong (Athenagoras' 
6.36-37), or more or less correct. Thucydides will use a speech to 
convey his appreciation of the factors in a particular situation but also 
to distance himself from the thoughts expressed. A speech, with its 
subsequent narrative, frees Thucydides from explicitly endorsing or 
rejecting the speaker's position. The unusual speech of Teutiaplus 
analyzes a type of military problem an important example of which 
is to be found two years previously. On the advice of the Megarians, 
the Peloponnesians had determined to bring their fleet into the 
Saronic gulf and surprise the Piraeus. They took fright during the 
voyage to the Attic coast and changed their plan; they merely 
attacked an Athenian fort on Salamis and ravaged the countryside. 
When they perceived the Athenians approaching, they retreated to 
Megara (2.93-94). A comparison of Teutiaplus' speech and its context 
with Thucydides' narrative of the earlier, abortive Peloponnesian 
attack on the Piraeus ought to demonstrate that Thucydides' negative 
attitude4 towards earlier Spartan faintheartedness in action receives a 
fuller presentation and a clearer authorial pronouncement only in 
this speech. 

The fleet of Alcidas moved slowly (3.29.1tvSdTp,tPav .•• cXOAatO') 
when there was need of speed (29.1 tv TaXE'). Cnemus' and Brasidas' 
earlier scheme for the Piraeus also required speed (2.93.2 KaTtX Taxoc). 
Teutiaplus' stratagem demanded an immediate attack (3.30.1 
7TAEtV •.• 7TP~V tK7Tt)CTOVC YEvEc8a,) as did Cnemus' and Brasidas' (2.93.2 
7TAEvca, Ev8vc), while still the enemy was unguarded (3.30.2 aC/)1)AaKTOV 
-2.93.1 acpvAaKToc, 93.3 OVTE 7TpocpvAaccov)5 because of Athenian con­
fidence in their naval dominion (3.30.2 KEKpaTTJK6Twv-2.93.1 tm­
KpaTEtv). To attack then (3.30.3 7TPOC7TECO'JLEV-2.93.4 tm7TEc6vTEC), 
suddenly (3.30.3 acpvw-2.93.3 tgamvalwc) and by night (3.30.3-
2.93.4),6 would catch the enemy (3.30.3 KaTaATJcp8ijva,-2.94.1 npijc8a,) 

, Thucydides' judgements are indirect but not infrequent. No one doubts his admiration 
for Phormio and Brasidas or his contempt for Cnemus and Alcidas, although no explicit 
judgements are passed on them (except, perhaps, 4.81.2 on Brasidas). 

53.30.2: &tJ,,1AaKTov, &VlA'IT'CTO', &P.£>.£CT£pOV; the privatives point to lack of forethought, 
not ability. 

6 Thucydides regards night attacks (from their first mention in 2.3.4) as particularly 
risky. See A. W. Gomme et al., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1945, 1956, 
1970) on 4.135 and (K. J. Dover on) 7.44 (a general discussion). 



DONALD LATEINER 177 

at a moment when he had no expectation of attack (3.30.2 aVEA7TLCTO£ 
-2.93.3 7TpocooKla ovoEfkla) and no preparation against one (3.30.2 

&fkE'AlCTEPOV; cf 33.2 &TE£XlcTOV [Ionia]-cf the Piraeus before and after 
Cnemus' and Brasidas' appearance: 2.93.1 aKATlcToC, 94.4 AtfkEVWV TE 

KATICH Kat Tfi aAATJ €ml-'~AdCf). Alcidas should not, Teutiaplus says, 
shirk the risk (3.30.4 fk~ &7TOKV*wfLEV TOV Klvovvov) as Cnemus and 
Brasidas in fear had done (2.93.4 KaTaoELcavTEc TOV KLVOVVOV, 94.1 
KaToKvijca£ ). 

To guard against surprise (3.30.4 TO KEVOV TOU 7To'AlfLov ••. CPVAcXCCO£TO 
-cf 2.94.1, 2, 4 EK7TA1]gtC ••• Oopvf3ct' • •. cpvAaK~v),7 to attempt some 
daring enterprise (3.30.4 €7TLXEtpol1]-Cf 2.93.1 a7T07TEtpacat), leads to 

success (3.30.4 7TAEtCT' av opOOtTO-Cf 2.94.1 07TEP [success] av •.• Pf[-OLWC 
€Y€VETO). In both cases fear (3.31.1 CPOf3EtTeX£, 33.1 oE8tc.oc-2.93.4 KaTa­
SdcavTEc, 94.3 €CPbf3oVV) leads to speedy retreat (3.31.2 OTt TcXXtCTa •.• 
7TcXA£V 7TpocfLEtga£, 33.1 KCl:TIX TcXXOC • •• cpv~v E7TO£EtTO ... KTA.-2.94.3 
KaT<X TcXXOC ••• &7TE7TAEOV), frustrating reasonable expectations of 
success (3.31.1 EA7TLoa 0' Elvat, 33.2 fLEya TO oEoc-2.94.1 07TEP av K'TA.)8 
through surprise (3.32.3 EA7Tlo(X OVO€ T~V EAaxlcT1]v EtXOV ••• vauc 
llEAo7TovV'1}clwv-2.94.1 EK7TA1]~£C ovoEfLtac TWV KaT<X TOV 7TbAEfkoV 
EAcXCCWV). 

The Peloponnesian abstention from the original plan of attacking 
the Piraeus was approved by Gomme,9 who asked, "How much harm 
could they have done to Athens? ... They could have sailed into one 
or more of the Peiraeus harbors (and burnt an arsenal)?" This re­
jection of Thucydides' judgement underestimates the effect of the 
novelty of a Peloponnesian fleet commanding the Piraeus. Thucydides 
considers the morale of each side to be a significant factor in war 

7 The 'opportunity of war', 'T6 K£V6V 'Toii 7ToMp.ov, is the advantage that your enemy's 
mistakes momentarily offer. K£V6V eM: K(nV6V eett.: KOtV6V reee. See Gomme, op.cit. 
(supra n.6) ad loe. With the repeated tag 7TAftCT' (tv op8o'i'TO (5.9.3-4) Brasidas argues that 
surprise in war most harms one's enemies and benefits one's friends; it indicates intellectual 
more than physical incompetence in the enemy. Cf Archidamus, 2.11.4. 

8 The result of ;K7TA7JgtC is Athenian Tapa;rri, eventually 86pv{3oc (2.94.2), very desirable in 
the enemy, but the Spartans wastefully speed home in fear. The Athenians henceforth 
take precautions (94.4 </>vAaK'4v, KA1lCft, J7TtP.fAflq.) and successfully seek ways to surprise the 
Peioponnesians (Nisaea, 3.51; Pylos 4.3ff; Cythera 4.53£1). 

9 Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.6) ad /oe., II 240. This is not the place to question Gomme's 
military evaluation. Sneak attacks are far from unknown in Greek history and could be 
decisive. At Aegospotamoi, Lysander attacked the Athenian fleet with crews in the vicinity 
and won a nearly total victory (Xen. Hell. 2.1.27-29). With the possibility of traitors (e.g. 

Athens in 490), sudden attacks could win an entire city. This was the Athenians' intention 
at Mytilene (3.3.3) and Phoebidas' accomplishment on the Cadmeia in Thebes (382 B.C.). 



178 THE SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS (THUc. 3.30) 

calculations and often reports it.lO The effect of the threat of a Pelo­
ponnesian fleet in the Piraeus produced a fright greater than any 
other €K7TA'I'}gtC of the Ten Years War (2.94.1). Similarly, the Spartan 
invasion of 431 (2.20.2) and the revolt of certain Chalcidian cities 
(4.120.3, 122.5, 123.1) were less important in military or economic 
terms than psychologically. When the Athenians lost the island of 
Euboea (8.96), important both economically and psychologically, 
there was €K7TA'I'}g,c /LeytCT'I'} o~ TWV 7TptV which led to fear, loss of heart, 
confusion (EcpO{3'1'}C€V, -i}(JV/LOVV, E(JOpV{3€t). Thucydides indulges (8.96.3-5) 
in a rare extended "might have been," pointing to the Athenians' 
vivid fear of sudden attack (dJ(Jv . •• 7TA€tV), the Spartans' timorousness 
and inability to act (€l TOA/L'I'}POT€POt ~cav, {3pao€tc, aTOA/LOt), and the 
success (07T€p • .. PCfotwc <Xv E7To{YJcav) which would have attended a 
resolute attempt.H 

The contrast to the Athenians' frightening alacrity (3.16.1-2, 18.3-4) 
could not be more pointed. From the first word of revolt (3.3.1) the 
Athenians acted to forestall (7TpoKaTaAa{3€tv). They immediately 
(Ega7TtVa{wc) despatched troops with orders to fall of a sudden (E7TL7T€­
c€iv acpvw) on the islanders. Forty ships arrived only a bit later (ou 
7ToAAcp VCT€pov) than a lone messenger. Their swiftness placed the 
Mytilenaeans in a very bad military position: a:TT'apaCK€VOt o~ ot Mvn­

A'I'}vaiot Kat E~atcpV'l'}C avaYKac(JlvT€C 7ToA€/L€iv (3.3.2-4.2). 
Teutiaplus underlines the vacillation of the Spartan state as well as 

of individual commanders. At Olympia, the Mytilenaeans indicated 
the need for haste (3.13.2) if the Peloponnesians were to gain the 
Lesbians' large navy and lose their own reputation for being loathe 
to aid rebels from Athens' empire (13.7). The ambassadors' calculation 
(€lKOC, 13.4) concerning the Athenians' ability to fight on two fronts 
is persuasive to the Spartans (7TPO(JV/Lwc TaiJTa €7TpaCCOv, 15.2), but the 
Athenians later demonstrate it to be wrong in fact (16.1). The Spartans, 
now thrown into confusion and doubting everything the Mytilenaeans 
said because of the 7TOAVC 7TapaAoyoc (16.2), leave the Mytilenaeans to 

10 For instance, the Greeks were confounded by the Spartan surrender at Pylos (4.40.1-2), 
the Athenians by the Sicilian disaster (8.1.1). See also Pericles' speeches, reactions to fear 
and excessive confidence. and Thucydides' comments on them (2.65.9). 

11 Alcidas and Cnemus are nearly indistinguishable, but together they are the best foil 
for the bold Brasidas. Phormio's actions also shape a narrative which illustrates Spartan 
slowness and Athenian dash. The account of Phormio reflects Thucydides' concerns, as 
H. D. Westlake argues in Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge 1968) 136 (Alcidas), 44, 59 
(Phormio). 2.94 and 8.96 have many verbal similarities. 



DONALD LATEINER 179 

fight alone until the next spring. Then Cleomenes invades Attica and 
raids the countryside in constant (aiEL, 26.4) anticipation of some action 
in Lesbos by Alcidas' fleet (ibid.). But when nothing happens, the 
army is forced to disperse, and the Mytilenaeans surrender to the 
Athenians. 

Thucydides has indicated the military importance of Lesbos by the 
ambassadors' speech, Sparta's impatient enthusiasm (3.15.2 and 26.4) 

and his own comments (e.g. 3.3.1 /Liya EPYOV; cf 1.116.1, 117.2). The net 
result of the Spartan expedition was but to increase the Athenians' 
wrath.12 

Teutiaplus' speech analyzing its own particular Ka£poc recalls and 
reflects on the earlier event. Concept and spirit are remarkably 
congruent in a way that Thucydides must have intended. Part of that 
which Hobbes called HThucydides' secret instruction," it indicates one 
tactic that Spartans rarely mastered. His criticism of both Cnemus 
and Alcidas is unusually blunt and contemptuous.13 

Teutiaplus' speech does not persuade Alcidas. His uselessness is 
clarified by three subsequent incidents, two of them speeches in­
directly reported. First Ionians and Lesbians in his fleet urge him to 
seize an Ionian city as a base. The advantages mentioned are five 
(3.31.1). He will gain an ally, provide a headquarters for the chafing 
subjects of Athens, deprive Athens of revenues and cause the city 
additional expense. Finally, the aid of Pissuthnes may well be 
gained. Alcidas is moved by these magnificent possibilities no more 
than by Teutiaplus' words. His only act is to kill prisoners-of-war, 
which arouses some exiled Samians to protest (32.2) that he was 
alienating Sparta's friends. Alcidas is persuaded but again thinks of 
nothing else than home. The <lost chance' is underlined by the final 
Ionian event: no one yet expected Peloponnesian vessels in Ionian 
waters, and so the natives sailed up to their ships expecting to find 
Athenians. The account of Alcidas thus closes (33.1) as it began (26.4), 
with reasonable expectations frustrated by Alcidas' inadequacy. The 
former failure of Cnemus, the present shirking of Alcidas, and the 

12 Cf Stahl, op.cit. (supra n.l) 109. 
13 Westlake, op.cit. (supra n.ll) 136, 141,144; if. 146. Alcidas appears again later in Book 

3, with Brasidas there as his adviser (69.1, 76), but he foolishly rejects Brasidas' advice to 
attack the Corcyraeans utilizing the enemy's 1ToMfj Tapaxfj Ka1. <pop<p (79.3) and again retreats 
hastily (81.1 €v8vc KaT(~ TeXXOC ~KoJLl'OVTO). Cf Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.6) II 233-34, on Spartan 
and Athenian characteristics. Spartan hesitancy and lack of daring is significant in 1.70 , 
118.2,132.5; 4.55.2; 5.63.2, 75.3; 6.88.10; 8.96.5. 



180 THE SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS (THUC. 3.30) 

coming energy of Brasidas are illuminated by this programmatic 
fourteen-line speech on military decisiveness. 

Thucydides has reported a number of other exhortations on mili­
tary topics which fail of their intention: Archidamus (1.80ff), Nicias 
(6.9ff), Lamachus and Demosthenes (6.49, 7.42, both indirect speech) 
futilely try to sway a congress or colleagues. They appear to offer the 
reader Thucydides' judgement of the best way to handle their 
respective situations (two complain of resources insufficient for war, 
three [including Teutiaplus] call for immediate attack), and to focus 
attention on the Kutp6c. They point to the road not taken. Their very 
presence in Thucydides' work, because they were ignored, indicates 
the importance the author attaches to them. Furthermore their 
arguments are generally correct. With hindsight, Thucydides ob­
served the accuracy of Archidamus' point of view (and Pericles' 
development of it), the tragedy of Nicias' abused but correct assess­
ment of Athens' chance to master Sicily, the neglected wisdom of 
Lamachus' plan of attack and the misfiring of Demosthenes'. Each 
speech dramatizes an alternative course of action followed not at all 
or without success. These analyses thus serve both historical and 
literary purposes.14 

The relation of speech to narrative and of both to the factual past 
requires comment. The historian selects, but Thucydides' statement 
of purpose (1.22.4)-not a moral but a utilitarian end-leads the 
reader to expect factual accuracy at the least.15 Narrative and speech 
illuminate each other in various ways (agreement, contradiction, 
amplification, etc.). Thucydides' judgements and analyses are in­
frequently explicit because his history by proper selection and 

U Stahl, cp.at. (supran.l) 107-09, develops further the literary function of the incident at 
Embaton. I cannot agree that Teutiaplus' speech is the equivalent of a tragic chorus' 
Freudenlied (108) nor that Thucydides insists on-or even sees-the paradox, that Alcidas 
hat . .. das genaue Gegenteil seiner Mission erreicht (109, Stahl's italics). Stahl too (107, n.6a) 
remarks that the situation and advice of 6.49 and 7.42 is parallel to 3.30. He considers these 
later speeches at length in "Speeches and Course of Events in Books Six and Seven of 
Thucydides," pp.6o-77 in Stadter, op.at. (supra n.1), esp. 72. 

15 The fundamental fallacy of books like V. Hunter, Thucydides, The Artful Reporter 
(Toronto 1973), is that the distortion of historical reality which she perceives makes non­
sense of Thucydides' hope that he will be useful to those who wish to consider that which 
can be known (Td c#c) about the past and which will be likely to happen again. Percep­
tivity becomes no more than solipsistic fiction (see on Brasidas, p.29; Cleon, p.38; Phormio, 
p.45, etc.). The logic of Professor Hunter's false assumptions brings her to conclusions 
conveniently gathered into one choice paragraph (p.l77) on "The Least Objective 
Historian." 



DONALD LATEINER 181 

emphasis can make evident the necessary connections and evaluations. 
Gomme has argued16 that this ineffectual speech by an unknown 

makes it difficult to argue that Thucydides' speeches are <free in­
ventions', or indeed that this advice was given but only by another or 
in a different form. If an <invented' speech of this purport had been 
desired, Thucydides could have economically written it into the 
narrative of the abortive attack on the Piraeus. We can imagine more 
reason to suppress than to invent either Teutiaplus or his speech. 
Speech here gives existence to a non-action. The Peloponnesians did 
not attack. But this non-attack is itself an historical fact, and the 
Blean's speech and the admiral's fear are both significant. Teutiaplus' 
speech singles out this moment, gives it weight in Thucydides' 
history. 

How did Thucydides learn of this speech? Gomme divides Thu­
cydides' speeches into three categories:17 those which Thucydides 
himself heard, those which he did not hear but soon learned of, those 
which he was informed of only long after their delivery. Teutiaplus' 
comments must belong to the third group; here an Athenian, 
strategos in 424/3, reports the words of an enemy war-council. The 
generality of this speech, however, is explained by its function as a 
paradigmatic illustration of Spartan f3plXOV1'~C (see below) as well as 
by the passage of time and the nature of the information. 

The surrounding narrative indicates that Thucydides endorses the 
ideas of Teutiaplus as military advice in a particular adverse situation. 
The welcome reception the Spartans could have found in Ionia (3.31.1) 
and their total unexpectedness (32.3) specifically parallel Teutiaplus' 
statements that the Spartans could hope for help from Athens' 
subjects (30.3 J.LeTct 1'WV EVOOV ••. KlX1'lXA'T]cp8:qVlXt) and that their arrival 

18 Gomme, op.cit. (supra n.6) II 292-93. 
17 A. W. Gomme, "The Speeches in Thucydides," Essays in Greek History and Literature 

(Oxford 1937) 171-72. N. G. L. Hammond, "The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches 
in Thucydides ... ," in Stadter, op.cit. (supra n.l) 49-53, esp. 49-52, argues that Thucydides 
employs subjective criteria and a greater freedom of composition in direct proportion to 
the scarcity of information about the ipsissima verba. T~ 8/ovra are thus "the essentials of the 
situation ... according to Thucydides' own judgment" (49). How one can do this "holding 
as near as possible to the full purpose and purport of the actual words" (1.22.1) is not clear 
to me. Cf Moses Finley, "Introduction" to Rex Warner's translation of Thucydides in the 
Penguin series (Harmondsworth/Baltimore 1972) 26: "There is no way to get round the 
incompatibility of the two parts of that statement [1.22.1]." For a very brief speech, even 
one written up long after delivery, it seems safer to assume accurate reporting than 
authorial fancy. 



182 THE SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS (THUC. 3.30) 

was as yet unknown (30.1-2). This juncture marks the first time, 
Thucydides suggests, that the Spartans had a chance to win some­
thing important and crucial (Lesbos) in their struggle to dismember 
Athens' empire. Alcidas' failure had as important consequences the 
absence for fifteen years of Spartan ships in the East Aegean and the 
rarity of rebellions by Athens' subjects that this entailed. Teutiaplus' 
speech is tactical and ad hoc, if not ad hominem, but it contains advice 
found frequently in Thucydides' history. The Saronic gulf adventure 
had no sufficiently serious and lasting purpose to merit a speech. 
Thucydides, that is, can measure a situation's importance by potential, 
as well as actual, results. 

Spartan failure in the face of Athenian boldness is also evident in 
the Pylos disaster and the authorities' behavior there.Is At the height 
of Athenian success, Thucydides reports on Spartan morale (4.55). 
Their unexpected misfortunes (avEA1TlcTOV) left them afraid (</>o{3ov­
/LEVOL) and made them yet more hesitant (OKV7]pOTEpOL) in the face of 
swift tactics beyond their capacity to foresee (1TOAE/LOV TaXEoc Ka~ 
a1Tpo<f>vA&XTOV). Athenian daring (E1TtX€tPOV/LEVOV) and the vagaries of 
experience (1Tapa AOYOV) stunned the Spartans (EK7TA'T}gtV /-,EylcT'T}V) into 
fear and cowardice (EoEOtCav ... aToA/-,oTEpOL). This collection of 
negative attributes, familiar from 2.93-4 and 3.29-33, helps us under­
stand why the Spartans were the most convenient enemies for Athens 
(8.96; also 3.15-16). Criticisms of Spartan slowness or hesitation 
appear at Sparta in the Corinthians' request (1.71.4 wplcOw v/-,wv <> 

(3paovT~c), the Athenians' taunt (1.78.1 {3ovAEVECOE oW (3paoEwc), 
Archidamus' defense (84.1 Tb (3paov ... /-'.fJ alcxvvECOE) and Sthene­
laidas' decisive plea for action (86.4, let others 1TOAVV xpovov (30VAEVE­
cOaL). Pericles states the principle (2.61.3): OOVAOL yap </>pbV'T}/-,a Tb 
.?-"I.. ,~ " ~ , ,~ \ , \ , l: Q ~ 
""'f'VLOLOV Kat a7TpOCOOK'T}TOV Kat TCfJ 7T1\€tCTCfJ 1Tapal\OYCfJ <:, V/-'fJaLVOV. 

Brasidas' enterprisel9-the sort Teutiaplus had and hopes for in 
others-is antithetical to Spartan character.2o His first appearance 
illustrates his decisiveness (2.25.2). Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis 

18 4.36.2,38.3. The former passage also reflects Teutiaplus' speech: ~K TOV at/;avovc ••• xwplolJ 
lC~L mCTEVCavTEC OUK ~t/;vAaccov ••• ~ga7TlV7Jc ••• Tip aoo,q,.~ ~gl7TATJgE. 

10 It is compared to Teutiaplus' advice by John Finley, Thucydides (Cambridge [Mass.] 
1942) 314 with n.42. 

so Brasidas often made swift yet intelligent decisions: e.g., 2.25.2 (oLaopap.Wv, ~c7Tl7TTEL, 

TOAf'TJf'a), 86.6; 3.79.3; 4.11.4, 79.1, 81 (Brasidas' reputation), 135. Note especially 4.70 (KaTa 
Taxoc, 7TP~V ~K7TlJCTOC yevlc8cu [found in 3.30.1], Aa8wv, 7TELpacaL) and 4.103-04. He was not 
trusted at home, and supervisors were sent to him (4.108.7,132.3; cf. Gomme ad loc.). 



DONALD LATEINER 183 

uses the familiar cluster of words for an intelligently planned surprise 
(4.103-04): >..a(h'iv, cpvAaK1] .•. (3paXE'ia [the Athenians'], eX1TPOCOOK-rJTOLC 
1TpOC1TECdJV, ddJvc, acpvw, 06pv{3ov). Speech, narrative and judgement 
concerning the second battle of Amphipolis conform to each other. 
Brasidas states his intentions (5.9), then Thucydides records the 
battle fought according to plan (5.10.6-8), and in propria persona, he 
states that Brasidas' victory was achieved just as he had expected 
(5.11.2). All three versions mention Athenian disorder (;1,1] eXvT£1Tapa­
TaxBEvToc-eXTagtf[--fL1] i.K 1TapaTagEwc), and sudden fright (cpo{31JBijvaL 
-1TEcpo{31JfLEVOLC, Bopv{31J()ijvaL-1TpOEKcpO{3-rJCEWC); the speech and the 
account both detail Athenian ignorance and lack of preparation and 
the Spartans' speedy and sudden attack. 

Demosthenes'21 successes (and failures) depended on speed, care­
fully executed plans and surprise,22 as in his momentarily successful 
assault against the Syracusan counter-wall on Epipolae (7.43.3-6). 
The reappearance here of Teutiaplus' cluster of concepts (unexpected 
daring, fright, Athenian disorder) owes something to a general simi­
larity in surprise attacks, but verbal echoes suggest that Thucydides 
wishes his careful readers to perceive the similarities of Teutiaplus' 
A6yoc to these €pya. 

As Teutiaplus foreshadows Brasidas and Demosthenes, so Alcidas 
foreshadows Nicias' slowness in Books 6 and 7. From his first speech in 
415 (6.9.1) through the crisis in which Demosthenes lays out his plan,23 
to the spreading of Nicias' OKVOC TLC Ka2 /LE>">"1JCLC (7.49.4) and his /Lov-rJ 
after the eclipse (7.50.4), the old general, still trusting to a virtue and 
military technique no longer viable, is presented as excessively 
fearful and militarily unfit. His unusual prior evaluation (5.16.1) has 
prepared us for such behavior. Like Alcidas in the presence of Teutia­
plus, he has no satisfactory answer to Demosthenes' arguments.24 

21 Thucydides does not evaluate Demosthenes directly. An explanation of this silence 
which depends on Thucydides' full adherence to Pericles' advice (e.g. Westlake, op.cit. 
[supra n.ll] 120-21,276) underrates the historian's independence of judgement. Although 
2.65.6-7 endorses Pericles' strategy, 2.65.11 suggests that a more energetic policy could have 
succeeded. 

II The excursus on Themistocles similarly stresses his mental speed and originality 
(1.138.3 'TWV 'T£ 1Tapaxpfjp.a ••• Kpa.'TLCTOC ')'I'WP.WV Kat TWJI P.£MOJlTWJI .•• apLCTOC £iKacn]c • •.• 

P.dli'TT}C at (3paxVTrJ'TL Kpa'TLC'TOC ••• aVrocX£aLa~£LV 'Til OioV'Ta). 
23 7.42.3-5: nine words for speed and against delay, plus £K1TA~g£t; cf 47.3. 
24 Nor can Nicias answer Lamachus, who had advised him (6.49.1-2): wc 'TaXLCTa -rqJl p.a)(1jJl 

7Totfiic8aL while the Syracusans £'TL £K1T£7TArryp.lvoL and the Athenian army is o£LJI<ha'Tov . ... 

alt/>v{otot O€ ~v 1TpoC1Tl,wCtv ... the Athenians will dismay the enemy. Thucydides' epitaph 



184 THE SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS (THUC. 3.30) 

The subsequent disaster commends the latter's analysis-speed and 
risk, surprise, victory or escape.25 

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

October, 1974 

on Nidas (7.86.5) has often been understood as high praise. K. J. Dover in Gomme, op.dt. 
(supra n.6) IV 461ff, noting that "No one who has read this history up to the present point 
is likely to have formed a very favourable view of Nikias," reduces the compliment 
(71K'CTa 8~ ~wc) to mean something like "least deserving of this particularly ignoble death" 
(-roiho 8VCTVXlac), i.e. "executed in cold blood by the enemy to whom he had surren­
dered." This approach honors the statement that Nidas lived his whole life according 
to Hellenic morality-a morality whose passing Thucydides grieves (e.g., 2.52.3-4, 3.83.1). 

Iii I thank Professors Martin Ostwald, A. E. Raubitschek and Daniel Tompkins for useful 
criticism; any remaining errors are mine.