Hamdard Islamicus 55 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND ITS
INTERNAL CRITICS IN THE
INDO-PAK SUBCONTINENT

DR. HUSNUL AMIN1 and PROF. DR. ABDUL RAUF2

1Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Department of Politics & International Relations,

International Islamic University, Islamabad,
e-mail: husnulamin@hotmail.com

2Professor of Political Science,
Department of Political Science,

University of Peshawar, Peshawar,
Pakistan.

e-mail: abdulrauf@upesh.edu.pk

Recent scholarship on the practices of critique has unsettled the
Eurocentric assumption that critique is something specific to and the
hallmark of secular/Western societies. By implication, Muslim societies
and their various religio-social trajectories by virtue of their location in
traditional-religious environments are unable to develop critique. Based on
TalÉl Asad’s, Saba Mahmood’s and others’ deviant approaches that question
the validity of the stated thesis, this research focuses on an empirical
example of dissident voices within and around MawdËdi’s ideology of
political Islam (and Islamic state). The internal contestants challenged the
internal logic, ideological premises of MawdËdi’s thought. The paper
focuses on numerous examples in the sub-continental Muslim intellectual
tradition, wherein the dominant narrative of political Islam in the modern
Muslim world was challenged by a number of scholars who were once
close believers’ in MawdËdi’s ideology of Islamic revival. Methodologically,
the paper analyses a number of key texts by MawdËdi and his internal
critics within the framework of TalÉl Asad and Saba Mahmood.1

Keywords: Islamic Revivalism, MawdËdi, GhamÊdÊ, Critique, WaÍiduddÊn, Political
Islam.

Introduction

Despite phenomenal growth in academic scholarship on multifarious



Hamdard Islamicus 56 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

dimensions of political Islam, the formidable intellectual responses by
dissident scholarship in the sub-continental Islamic tradition have largely

escaped researchers’ attention. The location of S.A.A. MawdËdi (1903-
1979) as the main ideologue and proponent of a systematic theory and
worldview of contemporary political Islam can hardly be overemphasized.
Hardly, a serious study on political Islam can overlook MawdËdi’s

formidable contributions to theorization and institutionalization of political
Islam.Whereas MawdËdi and his major works on Islamic state and the
ideology of political Islam are well known to the Western academia, the
critique and counter-narrative of a body of scholarship that seceded from

MawdËdi is yet to be fully explored. This paper aims to bring to light the
internal critique developed in the second half of 20th century in India and
Pakistan, and that questions MawdËdi’s ideological premises and its
extension in the modern world.

This research deals with the trajectory and genealogy of a body of
critical scholarship that can be termed as “internal” to mainstream political
Islam, and specifically Mawdudi, the main proponent, theorist and ideologue
of political Islam in South Asia. The linchpin that connects these “internal”

critics is the person2 and ideology of MawdËdi. In one way or the other,
at one point of time or the other, the critics of MawdËdi dealt in this
study were deeply influenced and motivated for social change by his
ideas. Though we are aware of the risks and intricacies associated with

drawing such lines as “internal” and “external”, but we think that location
of intellectuals as internal and external might lead to binaries and
superficiality as well. Yet, while conceptualizing these critics as “internal,”
we borrow from David L. Harvey:

“Critical theory at its most abstract and general level ... begins as
a formal ‘negativity.’ As a dissenting motif, it selects some tradition,
ideological premise, or institutionalized orthodoxy for analysis. As

immanent critique, it then ‘enters its object,’ so to speak, ‘boring
from with in.’ Provisionally accepting the methodological
presuppositions, substantive premises, and truth-claims of orthodoxy
as its own, immanent critique tests the postulates of orthodoxy by

the latter’s own standards of proof and accuracy. Upon ‘entering’
the theory, orthodoxy’s premises and assertions are registered and
certain strategic contradictions located. These contradictions are



Hamdard Islamicus 57 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

then developed according to their own logic, and at some point in
this process of internal expansion, the one-sided proclamations of

orthodoxy collapse as material instances and their contradictions
are allowed to develop ‘naturally`.”3

While identifying the main problem with all kinds of religious

discourses, Edward Said is of the view that these discourses are based
on a “non-deconstructable ground of authority.” Therefore, a religious
discourse “serves as an agent of closure, shutting off human investigation,
criticism, and effort in deference to the authority of the more-than-

human, the supernatural, the otherworldly.”4

The criterion set in this paper for a scholar to be counted as
internal is as follows: the scholar has spent considerable time and energies
in digesting MawdËdi’s ideology of political Islam and has practically

contributed to the establishment of an Islamic state as understood and
formulated by him. The immanent critics then have developed dissent
over MawdËdi’s ideological premise, object of analysis and key postulates.
An internal discussion and debate have taken place to contest the meaning,

structure, fundamental tenets and overall interpretation of content and
strategy. The dissident has expressed his views in written text or spoken
about in a way that is known to us.

The main objective of conducting this research is to solidify and

further strengthen the theoretical contribution by TalÉl Asad and Saba
MaÍmood (2009),5 and specifically IrfÉn Ahmad (2011).6 The main gest
of their academic effort is to invalidate the bold assertion in the Western
academic tradition that critique is secular and to examine that the tradition

of critique is as much internal to Islam, as to any other religious or
cultural tradition. Using Asad’s and IrfÉn’s theoretical formulation, this
research focuses on a very specific empirical example of religious
scholarship in South Asia, that of political Islam. Following IrfÉn,

this research also proposes that critique has a central place within
contemporary Islam. It does so by focusing on the case of Mawdudi’s
ideology, basic premise and fundamental tenets and then how the immanent
critics not only challenged his basic premises but also tried to correct it.

The presence and examination of such an internal contestation within
political Islam questions the validity of a linear, continued, homogenous
and non-changing Islamic tradition. By bringing even another critical





Hamdard Islamicus 59 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

universe, and 5) the historical evidence.13 According to MawdËdi, the
Prophet (œ) not only reveals the message but also implements it.14

A number of scholars have argued that the Islamists’ interpretation “is
not a retreat into traditional interpretations but an innovative and original
reworking of the canonical texts.”15 To address this issue, one should
distinguish between MawdËdi’s hermeneutical approach and his

epistemology. In the former, as art and science of interpretation, MawdËdi
stood more for independent reasoning and ijtihÉd than taqlÊd; in the
latter, he fell back on traditionalism.

MawdËdi’s challenge to the traditional religious authority took many

forms. In his writings, he aggressively criticized the static approach and
role of ‘ulamÉ’ and pÊrs in society. However, he struck a fierce blow to
the traditional authority through his lucid style and “simple language avoiding
scholastic terminology and style.”16 Modern educated public could now

understand religious text and theological debates, once the prerogative of
traditional ‘ulamÉ’. Thus, the intellectual monopoly and hegemony of one
class was severely threatened. According to Nasr, ‘MawdËdi’s significance
does not lie in his scholarly contributions per se, but in creating an

intellectual medium – in the form of a large number of texts – wherein
modern socio-political themes could be discussed and addressed in an
Islamic context’.17

Mawdudi’s Ideology of Islamic Revivalism

For MawdËdi, Islam exceeds the bounds of mere faith and seeks
to change social, political and economic order, invoking “change” of

social order as an aim necessitated a hold on power positions and
infrastructure of the state. This new conceptualization entailed:
1) introducing new meanings for key Islamic notions that distinguishes
them from traditional understanding; 2) instituting new relationships

between concepts underpinning his political programme, and 3) injecting
new energy into the organization of these concepts to equip them for
mobilization of the masses. To understand his state-centric vision and
political reading of Islam, the four conceptual bases of MawdËdi’s

ideology/worldview Ilah, Rabb, ‘IbÉdah and DÊn are discussed.18 An
understanding of these concepts, says MawdËdi, is important because
the central theme of the Qur’Én is constructed around them. Over time,







Hamdard Islamicus 62 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

neighbouring region of Iraq Syria and Iran*. The (Arabian tribal) society
was laden with exploitation, injustices and moral corruption. The first

stage consisted of the inauguration of this movement when the prophetic
leadership overlooked these partial issues in favour of a “total” and
“comprehensive” change. His message touched on the very foundational
issue of the system [the refutation of all system (LÉ) and the affirmation

of Divine rule on earth (Illa Allah)]. In this period, the leader,
MuÍammad (œ), demonstrated Islamic ideals through his moral excellence
and personal character. Slowly and gradually, kind-hearted individuals
gravitated towards him and joined the nascent movement, and thus

inaugurated the second stage of the Islamic movement. This phase was
full of suffering/agony in terms of pain, hardship, imprisonment, hunger
and exile. It proved to be the “training camp of bearing with agonies.”25

MuÍammad (œ) elevated the holy community from their tribal and racial

identities to an Islamic identity. The movement proliferated in Makkah
until the next stage – migration to Madinah arrived. After 13 years of
struggle at Makkah, a holy community of 250-300 individuals was available
to establish and run an Islamic state. In the fourth stage, the Islamic state

was formed. The concretization of abstracted Islamic ideals was made
possible in the fifth stage at Madinah when an Islamic system evolved.
An Islamic political, economic, educational and judicial system appeared
as a complete system of life.26 Finally, in eight years, the boundaries of

this nascent Islamic state extended beyond Madinah to all the Arab
territories. Historically, the contribution made by war in the prophetic
struggle is overestimated. In reality, the expansion was the outcome of
a bloodless revolution, which claimed 1000-1200 lives only, a relatively

small death toll in bringing about such a comprehensive revolution.27

MawdËdi’s conceptualization of the aforementioned terms and the
systemic approach accentuated criticism from traditional Islamic scholars
as well as from his close friends and interlocutors.28 The more technical

and methodical critique came from WaÍiduddÊn KhÉn, in late 1950s and
early 1960s.29 According to KhÉn, “In my view, the interpretation of
religion in MawdËdi’s books has deviated from the true religion. Although,
the ingredients of MawdËdi’s composite explanation of religion are the
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

*It may be noted that the arid desert served as a barrier to the Persian and
Romans (Byzantine) empires which allowed the nascent Islamic movement to successfully
confront Arabian tribal opposition – Ed.



Hamdard Islamicus 63 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

same, but the new relationship invoked in them has deformed religion and
it [Islam] seems an alien thing now’.30

For MawdËdi, the above is the natural way of bringing about a
revolution following cause and effect relationship. It was not a supernatural
phenomenon. This method, if properly replicated today, can produce the
same results. In his lecture at Muslim University Aligarh,31 MawdËdi

rationalized the process of bringing about an Islamic government.
Irrespective of the nature of the government, it is the outcome of the
interplay (dialectics) of historical and psychological forces. The mutual
coordination of a number of initial prerequisites, societal forces and natural

premises contribute to the formation of a specific government. To
MawdËdi this process closely resembles the chemical or physical process.
The logical result or outcome depends on the premises. MawdËdi considers
the desired government an ideological entity, one different from other

forms of governments. The world had not experienced MawdËdi’s
envisioned state, which was realized by Islam [in the city state of
Madinah]. The nationalist/secular state forms “the other” of MawdËdi’s
ideological state, which is rooted in the idea of God’s kingdom. The

kingdom of God thus formed would be unique for being governed by a
corpus of pious individuals down from the clerical positions to the top
brass. The emergence of such an ideal ideological state entails a specific
process consisting of “Islam as a movement and Muslims as a party.”32

Only those workers and leaders would qualify for running the movement
who are ready to be transformed into specifically tailored individuals.
They will propagate this message and a new system of education and
training will evolve producing an alternative Islamic intellectual leadership

consisting of “Muslim Scientists”, “Muslim Philosophers”, “Muslim
Historians”, “Muslim Economists”, “Muslim Jurists”, and “Muslim political
Scientists”. This new leadership then challenges the prevailing system
based on JÉhiliyyaÍ. The ideal moral conduct of this genre would naturally

attract pious elements from all around. In this transformed society, the
“other” system would find it harder and harder to sustain itself. Logically,
the system with best preparation, for MawdËdi, will emerge triumphant. It
seems that MawdËdi’s envisioned Islamization project had a double-

focus: 1) Islamization as a political project, and 2) Islamization of
knowledge as an intellectual project. The latter for Tibi is a “civilizational
project.” In Tibi’s critical reflection, “[t]he Islamist strategy combines the



Hamdard Islamicus 64 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

‘Islamisation of knowledge’ with the Shar‘iÉtisation of law in its
fundamentalist project of a de-Westernisation of the Islamic world and

the world at large.”33 For MawdËdi, the very nature of the Islamic
SharÊ‘ah needs power, “by which he meant, capturing the machinery of
the modern state.”34

Mawdudi juxtaposes his process of Islamic revolution with that of

the French Revolution (1789) inspired by Rousseau, Voltaire and
Montesquieu, the Russian revolution (1917) motivated by the ideas of
Karl Marx, leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, and the German Social
Nationalism inspired by Hegel, Hitler and others. Likewise, Islamic

revolution can become a logical outcome of the pursuance of workers,
who exemplify Qur’Énic ideals.35

“The world is like a train powered by an engine which is fuelled by

knowledge, ideas and research. Its drivers are intellectuals and
researchers. The train and the passengers boarding it are bound to
move in the direction in which the drivers want them to. If a
passenger is not willing to continue his journey into that direction,

he can only turn around inside the train but is unable to change the
direction of the journey. The only one way to change the direction of
the journey is to control/occupy the engine’s driving seat, and drive it
towards the desired course. The people occupying the engine/driving

seat currently have gone astray from the path of God and bereft
of Islamic ideology. Consequently, the train is intentionally leading
the passengers into the direction of materialism and atheism. It is
the time to change the course of the train. Some people from

among the God-worshippers should stand up and strive to seize the
engine from the atheists. Unless the driving seat is not captured, we
are bound to move in the direction taken by the God-unaware
drivers”.36

The above text reveals the following points: 1) knowledge, ideas,
thoughts and intellectuals, as the realm of ideas are inextricably linked to
political power/structure. In a Gramscian sense, there is an “organic link”

between the two;37 2) individuals’ agency/change potential is infinitely
constrained by the structure; 3) a new realm of ideas through knowledge
and research is required to emerge as a counter-hegemony to the existing



Hamdard Islamicus 65 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

hegemonies; 4) ultimate change will be the outcome of grabbing both
positions (the state structure and the realm of ideas), and 5) Islam will

lead state and society in an entirely different direction than Western
materialism.

In the above discussion, MawdËdi’s overwhelming emphasis on
the state and structural constraints on individual’s capacity to bring

about change does not imply that he denied free will and change
potential of an individual. On the contrary, MawdËdi belongs to that
category of reformers in the sub-continent who, to quote Robinson,
“heightened ideas of human instrumentality” and emphasised that “knowing

means doing.”38 In the same quote above, MawdËdi clarified his
position.

One of MawdËdi’s important re-conceptualisations of old religious
terms is his re-activation of JÉhiliyyah – literally “ignorance”. In traditional

usage, “the JÉhiliyyah referred to the age of ignorance before the
revelation of the Qur’Én to MuÍammad (œ).”39 MawdËdi employed the
term to “refer to forces, which corrupted historic Muslim societies, seeing
JÉhiliyyah as a type of counter-revolution which came to dominate

Muslim societies”.40

The turbulent history of the Jama‘at’s has witnessed expulsions/
resignations of a multitude of activists including intellectual-scholars.
MawlÉnÉ NaumÉnÊ’s resignation in 1941 was followed by more than 50

scholars-writers-‘ulamÉ’ from the Jama‘at in the 1950s. Likewise,
Mawlana ‘Abdul RaÍÊm left the Jama‘at in Bangladesh and developed
his own intellectual trajectory. In the 1990s, a number of activists and
‘ulamÉ’ opposed the reforms inaugurated by QÉzÊ ×usain AÍmad – the

then amÊr of the Jama‘at – and formed their own “Islamic movement”
(TeÍrÊk-i IslÉmÊ). Dr IsrÉr AÍmad seceded from the Jama‘at in
late 1950s and JÉved AÍmad GhamÊdÊ in the 1970s. GhamÊdÊ is closely
linked to IÎlÉÍÊ, as he remained under the tutelage of IÎlÉÍÊ. A number

of writers/scholars/activists belong to a category that expected a
Marxist revolution (of creating a society where people enjoy equal
status) in Mawdudi’s envisioned Islamic state. This scholarship was
misled by modern terms (such as revolution) liberally employed by

MawdËdi to communicate his message. An empirical example of this
category is Kaukab ØiddÊq, “a onetime Jama‘at stalwart and translator of
MawdËdi into English.” According to Nasr, MawdËdi did not approve



Hamdard Islamicus 66 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

“ØiddÊq’s openly Marxian rendition of his views.” This resulted into ØiddÊq’s
secession from the Jama‘at41

Another scholar of the FarÉhÊ School, WaÍÊduddÊn KhÉn, developed
a critique of MawdËdi’s Islamist ideology in his classic “Error in
Interpretation” (T‘abÊr kÊ GhalaÏÊ) in the early 1960s. He left the Jama‘at
in 1962. KhÉn, who was an activist in Indian Jama‘at and a member of

its central executive, attacked the very basis of MawdËdi’s revivalist
thought. The statement “political reading of religion” (DÊn kÊ SiyÉsÊ
TashreeÍ) was first used by KhÉn in his methodical critique of MawdËdi
(KhÉn 1995).

Whereas the Jama‘at, its ideology and organisation and its political
struggle has received considerable academic attention, the seceding voices
and their respective intellectual-social trajectories are often neglected. In
what follows, I trace the historical roots of one intellectual trajectory –

GhamÊdÊ and his post-Islamist thought. Beginning with two prominent
scholars whose influence on GhamÊdÊ is substantial and defining.

Internal Dissidents and their Critique

In 1961, a compilation of correspondence between MawdËdi and
WaÍÊduddÊn KhÉn was published. The book named Ta‘bÊr ki GhalaÏÊ
(The Erroneous Interpretation). For almost two decades the book remained

largely unnoticed in the academic scholarship. The book received central
focus in Pakistan when it was brought to limelight by another religious
intellectual who based his critique of political Islam mainly on the lines
provided in this book. We will be discussing the gist of the critique in the

following lines.
MawlÉnÉ WaÍÊddudÊn KhÉn once a leader of the Jama‘at-i-Islami-

i-Hind for 16 years posed some serious criticism on MawdËdi’s whole
episteme. In a treatise, Ta‘bÊr kÊ GhalaÏÊ, he comprehensively dealt with

his case against MawdËdi. His explanation of four terms, IlÉh, ‘IbÉdat,
RÉb and DÊn which in the view of WaÍÊddudÊn KhÉn are the basis of
MawdËdi’s episteme are alien in the light of Muslim historical scholarship.
There is possibility of error in understanding some tenets of religion by the

scholars but there is no chance of misunderstanding of the insight of dÊn
by them which MawdËdi claimed in his book.42 According to KhÉn,
though MawdËdi’s ideological framework encapsulates all essential parts



Hamdard Islamicus 67 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

of religion, still the problem arises due to the misplaced centrality given
to an aspect (i.e., the obligation to impose religion through the state). To

support his claim, KhÉn refers to several empirical examples from
MawdËdi’s works, such as, the obligatory prayers which is an independent
act is translated in MawdËdi’s framework as the training process for the
Muslims for the struggle of establishing God’s rule on earth. Thus

MawdËdi’s reconceptualization of basic religious terms (such as prayer)
and invoking new meaning into it, according to KhÉn, is an attempt to
deviate from the mainstream thinking.43

KhÉn also criticized MawdËdi for conceptualizing Islam as a “system

of life.” For KhÉn, the nature of religion is comprehensive though but it
does not implicate that the essence of religion is a system of life. Rather
this is a relationship between God and His creature.44

MawlÉnÉ AmÊn AÍsan IÎlÉÍÊ (1904-1997) once an  ardent

supporter and second to MawdËdi only in the Jama‘at (JI), also dissociated
himself on the basis of his dissent over the issue of the authority of the
amÊr. Primarily an exegete, IÎlÉÍÊ joined the JI after its establishment in
1941. He remained with MawdËdi and was also appointed as nÉ’ib amÊr

(vice president). His importance in the JI can be gauged from his
contribution towards religious and spiritual training of the JI activists.
IÎlÉÍÊ seceded from the JI in 1958 which was considered as a formidable
loss to JI. Before his exit from the JI, in 1956, during the Maachi Goth

episode,45 a heated debate took place over JI’s participation or otherwise,
in active politics resulting in the resignation of some members and leaders
which is considered as the end of ideology in JI by Vali Raza Nasr.46

MawdËdi responded to internal dissents by making bold assertion that the

pros and cons of the Islamic movement is better understood by the
leader than “others”.47 IÎlÉÍÊ then made it a point of discussion and
writing in a series of essays appeared in different magazines.48 He
evaluated the interpretation of texts, anecdotes and tradition of the

holy Prophet (œ) cited by MawdËdi for justification of his case. IÎlÉÍÊ
asserted that if the gate of changing nature of the Sharʑah and excuses
for setting aside a tenet of Islam is once opened by an Islamic party due
to expediency of the time then there would be no reason to blame the

modernists for the same reason.49 IÎlÉÍÊ vehemently opposed MawdËdi
and evidently asserted that none is authorized to amend the Divine
Sharʑah.50



Hamdard Islamicus 68 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

Another point of contestation was MawdËdi’s use of the word
“leader” for the Prophet MuÍammad (œ). For IÎlÉÍÊ. deployment of

political vocabulary such as “leader”, “party”, “movement,” and “practical
wisdom (×ikmat-i ‘AmalÊ)” will transform religion into a child’ play of
politics.51

The more recent intellectual development in the above mentioned

line of thinking is the one pioneered and inaugurated by a ‘modernist’
scholar JÉved AÍmad GhamÊdÊ. GhamÊdÊ was once an activist in the JI
in the 1970s, and a staunch supporter of MawdËdi’s ideology of Islamic
state. He rose to prominence in the last decade during Musharraf era

when the newly liberated private television channels aired his interviews
and talk shows on various themes relating Islam to modern issues. One
of the key dissents GhamÊdÊ expounded was his staunch criticism over
the use of revivalist vocabulary by the Islamists seeking support from

Islamic sources and Islamic history. There are at least two senses in
which GhamÊdÊ’s reinterpretation of the prophetic career can be
understood. In the very first sense, he might have explored/found a
“stable” reference point/referent from where he really thinks MawdËdi

has deviated in his interpretation. What is that? In the second sense,
GhamÊdÊ like MawdËdi’s political Islam has his own intellectual and social
scheme the focus of which is a reinterpretation of the prophetic career.

GhamÊdÊ strongly asserts that the Islamists’ formulation of

strategy by imitating the Divinely guided life of the Prophet (œ) was a
grave mistake and clear deviation from the Divine rules. This
scheme, according to them, is Divinely monitored and regulated, allowing
no deviation. For GhamÊdÊ, the concept of Messengerhood (RisÉlat) is

a special status of the Messenger (œ) that bestows on him a
transcendental mission  that ends in conclusive argument and
administration of punishment to his opponents and reward for his
supporters. This framework is called by GhamÊdÊ as ItmÉm-i ×ujjat

(final argument). For GhamÊdÊ, the central theme of the Qur’Én is a
biographical account and the narrative of the prophetic admonition. The
Messenger (œ) is sent with an additional responsibility to administer His
scheme of reward and punishment, which is assumed to be held on the

Day of Judgment. In this capacity, the status of Messenger (œ) is an
elevated position with extraordinary responsibility. Out of many prophets,
only about 313 were assigned this Divine task to establish Divine scheme of



Hamdard Islamicus 69 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

reward and punishment on earth. This administration thus becomes an
“historical testimony to the truth of the Final Day of Judgment.”52 The

established Divine practice in this connection is that the Messenger (œ)
and his fellows will necessarily triumph over his nation in the Messenger’s
lifetime. He propagates the Divine message until it becomes conclusive
evidence with no excuse left with the addressees. In order to fulfil this

heavy task, the Messenger’s career is strictly and thoroughly guided
and monitored by Divine authority, and he has no liberty to take key
decisions at his own discretion. All the stages of his career (preaching,
migration, waging war etc) are Divinely ordained and he is only to

administer this whole scheme. It implies that the Messenger (œ) and his
fellowmen are Divine instruments in this project. This Divine scheme is
not to be imitated in the contemporary world as is mistakenly done by
the revivalists. The Islamists have failed to appreciate this Divine

Scheme.53

If compared to MawdËdi’s understanding of the prophetic mission,
which was to establish Divine kingdom on earth and which accordingly
split the prophetic career along organisational stages, GhamÊdÊ categorises

them into thematic/conceptual stages. The common notion that
encompasses these conceptual constructs is da‘wah and naÎÊÍah. The
above re-reading falls in sharp contrast to MawdËdi’s political reading of
the prophetic mission. Using GhamÊdÊ’s re-reading as framework; a scholar

invalidates MawdËdi’s Islamist interpretation of the prophetic career in
the following words:

“MuÍammad at Mecca was reminded time and again that his

responsibilities do not exceed admonition … in this whole period,
MuÍammad was not ordained to enforce religion nor enforcement
of religion was declared the central aim of the Messengerhood ….
As a result of “preaching” and only preaching, without any

“revolutionary struggle”, the Islamic state of Medina came into
existence … for this “revolution”, MuÍammad never erected an
“organisational structure”; he never established a system of
pledging; and never handed over his followers a “strategy” for the

enforcement of religion … The revolution that emerged fourteen
hundred years ago cannot be an “exemplary strategy” for future
revolutions”.54



Hamdard Islamicus 70 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

So by implication of GhamÊdÊ’s thought, the prophetic efforts shall
not be imitable for the Islamists’ political struggle, which is devoid of

appreciation for physical laws as MawdËdi’s assertion was.

“The life of the Prophet MuÍammad (œ) and his fellows is not to
be used as an example in this case [struggle for Islamic revival]

because he was obliged to fulfil the prophetic mission as a first
order. For this purpose he never established a political organisation.
And understandably so, as the Messenger is never meant to struggle
for a political change, rather, he concentrates on purification of

hearts and souls of individuals. His mission is not to become an
actor in the “power struggle” but to preach and imbibe the moral
principles in politics and economy. In the same vein, if one expects
the Prophet to be a successful “banker” and “politician,” then he

is mistaken. He is an inviter … He doesn’t come up with an
“economic program.” He doesn’t bring any revolutionary program …
the “Caliphs” were not essentially ulama but “political leaders” who
were also well-acquainted with religion … if the ulama and religious

groups would redirect their energies towards raising collective
consciousness through preaching, education and exhortation then
none of the current “structures” can stand up to them: neither these
status-quo intuitions; nor the US hegemony in the current form.55

Leafing through his intellectual biography, Ghamidi explains,

“my own [intellectual] condition reflected a pantheon of ideas where

I sculpted ideas and I worshiped them and then I smashed them
down … in 1990, ultimately the ground was ready for laying the
foundations of a new building/construct …. I was turning on 40,
and had acquired clarity of thought to a greater extent … I am

working on my authorial project for the last 17 years now”.56

In short, GhamÊdÊ’s graduation to his current intellectual standing
is rooted in constant ruptures and transformations. His dissatisfaction

with the existing revivalist approaches and the breakdown of the
traditional framework was instrumental in shaping his intellectual
development.



Hamdard Islamicus 71 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

Conclusion

Talal Asad and others have opened an important theoretical
debate on Islam and the secularity of critique. This paper has narrowly
focused on an empirical example of only some of the dissident scholars
whose dissent and critique with mainstream Islamic scholarship can be

analyzed in the light of the immanent critique. As discussed, once close
associates and followers of MawdËdi’s revivalist vision, have not only
attacked the very foundations of his ideology but have also attempted to
come up with an alternative understanding as well. The discussion

that how this reinterpretation can lead to some key implications for
Islamic revivalism in Pakistan and elsewhere is beyond the scope of this
paper. However what is more evident is the prevalence of a body of
scholarship that can be categorized as internal to revivalism, and has

been critically engaged with the main ideologues. It is important to note
that the criticism raised by KhÉn, IÎlÉÍÊ and GhamÊdÊ have also received
critical reflections from internal as well as external circles. For example,
in his research, AsÊf IftikhÉr (2005: 78-79) divided these critiques into

three main categories: 1) those who charge GhamÊdÊ with deviation from
consensus position; 2) criticism on “GhamÊdÊ’s interpretations vis-à-vis
his arguments”, and 3) criticisms from within (that is, critiques posed
by GhamÊdÊ’s current interlocutors and ex-students). For instance,

GhamÊdÊ’s reformulation of sources (the distinction between ×adÊth and
Sunnah, refutation of recognising QiyÉs and IjmÉ‘ as independent
sources) has resented traditional ‘ulamÉ’ everywhere. RafÊq considers
GhamÊdÊ an extension of the late 19th century Modernist trend pioneered

by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and continued by Ghulam AÍmad Pervez and
others. According to Rafiq, GhamÊdÊ is an innovator as well as a denier of
×adÊth because these two are concomitant attributes.57 In his criticism,
RafÊq seems to define diverse intellectual trends in the sub-continent

under one homogeneous category – Modernism. According to RafÊq, this
heresy (modernity) has numerous shades: QÉdiÉniyyat, Perviziyyat,
Maghrebiyyat, Tajaddud, Moderation and Enlightened Moderation. For
him, the following key features constitute modernity (and thus GhamÊdÊ’s

thought),

“promotion of scepticism and wrong interpretation of the established



Hamdard Islamicus 72 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

religious injunctions; denial of the multiple Qur’Énic readings;
refutation of ×adÊth and Sunnah; conspiracy of changing the true

meanings of the religious terms; refutation of Ijmɑ; obedience to
the government despite having intellectual pride; disrespect for the
ulama; the unholy attempt to present Western civilisation in Islamic
terms; denial of veiling for Muslim woman; denial of Shar’ia penalty

for drinkers, and approval of sculptures, music and playing musical
instruments”.58

Likewise, an ex-fellow of GhamÊdÊ has addressed hermeneutics

of post-Islamism in critical terms. Through empirical examples, AnsÉri
has identified the inconsistencies that might erupt due to application of
these hermeneutics. For AnsÉri, the emphasis on monovocality of the
text and application of naÐm theory will lead to another exclusivist

interpretation of Islam. For him, post-Islamists seek to dilute the force
of resistance within Islam. He labelled this discourse as “survivalist
Islam.”59

Critique is thus not limited to secular-western academic tradition.

The practices of critique are as much internal to Islamic scholarship as
may be to any other academic tradition. There is ample room for future
research to study and examine empirical examples and case studies in
the light of TalÉl Asad’s conceptual framework. A good number of cases

could be examined from within the Deobandi Islam for example.

Notes and References

1. TalÉl Asad et al., Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech, The
Townsend Papers in the Humanities, No. 2, Los Angeles, University of California
Press, 2009.

2. For example, see AltÉf Ahamd AzmÊ, IÍyÉ-e-Millat awr DÊnÊ JamÉ‘tain, Revival
of Muslim Ummah and Religious Organizations, Lahore, Dar al-tazkeer, 2002.

3. David L. Harvey. “Introduction” Sociological Perspectives, vol. 33, No. 1, Spring,
1990.

4. Read in Darren E. Dahl, “Criticizing “secular criticism”: Reading religion in
Edward Said and Kathryn Tanner,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses,
vol. 31, Nos. 3-4 (September 2002), p. 360.



Hamdard Islamicus 73 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

05. See TalÉl Asad et al.
06. Irfan Ahmad. “Immanent Critique and Islam: Anthropological Reflections.”

Anthropological Theory, vol. 11, No. 1 (2011), pp. 107-132.
07. Syed Abul ‘AlÉ MawdËdi IslÉmi RiyÉsat (The Islamic state), Lahore, Islamic

Publications, 2000, pp. 268-307.
08. Ibid., p. 282.
09. Syed Abul ‘AlÉ MawdËdi, TanqÊÍÉt, Lahore, Islamic Publications, 1939, p. 182.
10. Ibid., p. 187.
11. Muhammad RiyÉz KirmÉnÊ, BaÎÉ’ir-i-MawdËdi: Tafheemul-Qur’Én main jadÊd

‘ulËm se istifÉdah (Mawdudi’s insights: The use of modern sciences in the
Tafhimu’l-Qur’an), Lahore, Maktabah-i-Ta’mir-i Insaniyat, 1988, pp. 29-40.

12. Ibid., p. 33.
13. Ibid., pp. 18-30.
14. MawdËdi, TanqÊÍÉt, p. 187.
15. Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, Zed Books, n.p., 1997, p. 11.
16. Vali R. Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, USA, Oxford

University Press, 1996, p. 133.
17. Ibid.
18. Asef Iftikhar “Jihad and the Establishment of Islamic Global Order: A Comparative

Study of the Interpretative Approaches and Worldviews of Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi
and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi.”Master’s Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, pp. 23-
24; see also, Nasr, 1996, p. 64.

19. Syed Abul ‘AlÉ MawdËdi, Qur’Én ki ChÉr BunyÉdÊ IÎÏelÉÍain: Ilah, Rab, ‘IbÉdat
awr DÊn, Lahore, Islamic Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2000, pp. 6-13.

20. Ibid., p. 132.
21. Ibid., p. 132; A more systematic organization and politicization of these terms

can be seen in  MawdËdi, Process of Islamic Revolution, Lahore, Islamic
Publication, 1996, pp. 161-200.

22. MawdËdi, Islamic Revolution, pp. 33-34.
23. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
24. See for details, MawdËdi, TeÍrÊk-i ÓzÉdi-i-Hind awr MusalmÉn, vol. 2, Lahore,

Islamic Publications, 1996.
25. Ibid., p. 183.
26. Ibid., pp. 186, 189.
27. Ibid., pp. 186-90.
28. Moez Amjad, ManhÉj-i InqilÉb-i NabawÊ: Aik KhudÉwandÊ QÉnoon say

Ghalat FahmÊ (Strategy of Prophetic Revolution: An Erroneous Understanding
of a Divine Law), Lahore, Danish Sara, 2000; Also see Altaf Azmi, pp. 118-
133.

29. See WahÊduddÊn Khan, Ta‘bÊr kÊ GhalaÏÊ (Error in Interpretation), New Delhi,
Maktaba al-Risala, 1995.

30. Ibid., p. 21.
31. MawdËdi, “Islami ×ukËmat kes ÙaraÍ QÉyem Hoti Hay?” (The process of

Islamic revolution) in TeÍrÊk-i ÓzÉdi-i-Hind awr MusalmÉn, vol. 2, Lahore,
Islamic Publications, 1996, pp. 161-200.

32. Irfan, p. 79.



Hamdard Islamicus 74 Vol. XXXIX, No. 3

33. Bassam Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity, New York, Routledge, 2009,
p. 72.

34. F. Robinson, “Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia,” Modern Asian
Studies, vol. 42, Nos. 2-3 (2008), p. 276.

35. MawdËdi, Islamic Revolution, 1996.
36. MawdËdi, TanqÊÍÉt, p. 182, pp. 21-22.
37. Thomas John Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: a Gramscian Approach to the

Rise of Political Islam,”British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, No. 1
(2004), p. 46.

38. Op cit., p. 270.
39.  Yvonne Haddad et al., The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and

Bibliography, USA, Greenwood Publications Group, 1991, p. 27.
40. Ibid.
41. Nasr, Making of Islamic Revolution, p. 75.
42.  MawdËdi, ChÉr BunyÉdÊ IÎÏelaÍain, pp. 11-12
43. Ibid., pp. 21-22, 258.
45. Ibid., p. 140.
44. See for details, Abdul Rauf, ‘Life and Works of MawlÉnÉ AmÊn AÍsan IÎlÉÍÊ

(1904-1997)’, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, vol. XXX, No.1, 2009,
pp. 183-219.

45. Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamat-i
Islami of Pakistan, London, I.B. Tauris Publication, 1994, pp. 40.

46. MawlÉnÉ AmÊn AÍsan IÎlÉÍÊ, MaqÉlÉt-i IÎlÉÍÊ (Collection of Islahi’s), vol I.
Edited by Khalid Masud, Lahore, Faran Foundation, 1991, pp. 86-88.

47. See for details, MaqÉlÉt-i IÎlÉÍÊ (Collection of IÎlÉÍÊ’s), vol. I.
48.   Ibid., pp. 247-48.
49.   Ibid., p. 90.
50. Ibid., p. 93.
51. See IftikhÉr, p. 83.
53. See, Moez.
54. Ibid., p. 36.
55. GhamÊdÊ’s interview with Saleem Safi, accessed at: http://www.tv-almawrid.org.
56. JÉved Ahmad GhamÊdÊ, MaqÉmaat, Lahore, Al-Mawrid, 2008, p. 27.
57. Shaykh Muhammad RafÊq, JÉved GhamÊdÊ aur InkÉr-e-×adÊth, Islamic Books

Library, 2009, p. 10.
58. Ibid., p. 9.
59. NÉdir Aqil AnsÉri, “Synchronicity of Language”, An Unpublished paper, 2009.