Hamdard Islamicus 7 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

REDICAL MUSLIM FRINGE GROUPS’
RECOURSE TO TAKFÔR

(ACCUSING MUSLIMS OF INFIDELITY)
A CRITIQUE

PROF. DR. THAMEEM USHAMA
Former Head,

Department of Usuluddin and Comparative Religion,
IIUM, Malaysia.

e-mail: thameem ushama (ushama_thameem@yahoo.co.uk)

This paper analyses dogmatic extremism with a special focus on
legal rulings regarding the matter of accusing other Muslims of being
infidels. It defines the Arabic term according to the Qur’Én, ×adÊth
literature, and traditional Islamic dialogues. The study employs a qualitative
content analysis of relevant literature referring to issues relating to unbelief
(kufr), polytheism (shirk), faith (ÊmÉn), accusing Muslims of infidelity
(takfÊr), and legal injunctions holding societal implications. The scope is
limited to the issue of takfÊr advocated by organizations or individuals
without focussing on their historical background. It attempts to correct
misconceptions of Islam as an unjust immoderate religion. It considers
accusations of unbelief made in respect of (i) Individuals who are guilty
of acts of sin and disobedience; (ii) Rulers who do not base their policies
and judgements on the Sharʑah; (iii) The subjects of such rulers who
continue to accept the authority of a ruler who conducts himself in this
way; (iv) and individuals who leave or withdraw from Islamic organizations.
The paper also includes scholarly critiques of extremist views on accusing
Muslims of infidelity and provides intelligent responses based on solid
evidence from the Sunnah, as well from the exegetes.

Keywords: Disobedience, Extremism, Faith, Infidelity, Organization, Sin.

Introduction

Current Muslim life is threatened by extremism/radicalism,
particularly with regard to interpreting religious injunctions and accusing
fellow Muslims of infidelity by radical Muslim fringe groups. Thus, this



Hamdard Islamicus 8 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

discourse focuses on the full range of efforts made by individual Muslims
or fringe groups who accuse other Muslims of infidelity (takfÊr) or

apostasy (irtidÉd). Twentieth century scholars have increasingly discussed
the phenomenon of extremism because it poses an advancing menace to
peace by giving rise to hatred, enmity, hostility and disunity. The Muslim
world restlessly approaches a cross roads posed by the deadly challenge.

According to researchers, extremism manifests in individuals and
organisations due to misunderstandings and misapplications of sound Islamic
injunctions. Strange conclusions and roguish presumptions have been drawn
from the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth. The writer posits that such inferences do

not comply with the fundamental Islamic teachings, and as such, serve
to negate the ultimate purpose of Revelation (maqÉÎid  al-waÍÊ). Many
extremists/radicals enjoy a blind adherence to literal interpretations of
Islamic texts that lack ‘in-depth’ research and analysis. They make little

concerted effort to examine their interpretations to ascertain if they align
with the objectives of Sharʑah (Islamic Revealed Law). Consequently,
they submerge common, uneducated and innocent Muslims in an ocean
of chaos, controversy, confusion, contradiction, deception, delusion and

dissension. This is primarily due to distortions that replace accurate
trustworthy interpretations of the revealed Islamic message.

According to Muslim scholars, extremism/radicalism manifests when
accusing Muslims as infidels or apostates for the reasons: [1] due to

his/her disobedience; [2] a ruler who does not judge according to what
Allah has revealed; [3] followers of such a ruler; [4] a Muslim who
leaves a Muslim organisation; [5] a Muslim who does not migrate; and
[6] for not accusing other Muslims as infidels.

None of these causes fully regards the rules of Sharʑah with
sober and informed consideration. Furthermore, extremism also manifests
as (i) the innovation of arbitrarily halting, affirming or declaring a position
of judgement on someone pending verification or investigation;

(ii) interpreting contemporary Muslim societies as those equivalent with
the era of JÉhiliyyah (pre-Islamic period); and (iii) passing rulings related
to understanding of the concept of DÉr (the Land).1

As the issue in hand is crucial, it is important to understand Arabic

terms used by the extremists in arguments, articulations and religious
exhortations when discussing the issue of charging someone with unbelief
(kufr). Terms such as ÊmÉn (faith) and kufr (unbelief) are widely used



Hamdard Islamicus 9 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

in the Qur’Én and ×adÊth literature. Nevertheless, it is imperative to
understand their true meanings in the light of the Qur’Énic and Sunnatic

perspectives that accord with the methodology applied during the early
Islamic period, and which held a genuine understanding of the Texts.
Generally, a consensus on undistorted teachings has already been reached
which effectively solves all societal problems. Both terms (ÊmÉn and

kufr) are more than sufficiently studied for purposes of highlighting the
implications of employing them in the contemporary Islamic discourse
between moderate and extremist scholars. The term kufr, as used in the
Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth under different contexts, especially requires proper

perspective. Otherwise, detecting the extremist abuse that propels common
Muslims towards devastation by nurturing a culture of subversion that
expels fellow Muslims from the Ummah is nearly unachievable.

This paper analyses verses of the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth. It draws

attention to explanations made by the Companions (R.A.) and scholars
who have studied extensively and have commented on the concepts of
kufr and takfÊr (the charge of ‘unbelief’ and ‘infidelity’). It endeavours
to inform Muslims and non-Muslims of the Islamic worldview and activate

logical cognizance of authentic Islamic injunctions and values, particularly
on the matter of takfÊr. It attempts to correct misconceptions about
Islam as an unjust immoderate religion. The methodology applied is that
of a qualitative content analysis of relevant verses taken from the Qur’Én

and aÍÉdÊth with special reference to accusing Muslims of infidelity.
The analysis is followed by a presentation of positions taken by the
Companions and their Successors (tÉbi‘Ên) (R.A.), as well by the
Qur’Én’s exegetes, scholars and jurists. The scope is limited to the issue

of takfÊr, whether it is advocated by organizations or individuals, and not
to study the historical background of the extremist or radical groups or
their ideologues. Considering limitations, this study provides only a few
examples from early Islamic sources.

Towards Understanding the Meaning of the Term, Kufr

Ibn FÉris mentioned that al-kÉf, al-fÉ and al-rÉ are basic roots that

indicate ‘hiding’ or ‘covering’ something. Kufr is the opposite of ÊmÉn
because it is like hiding the truth.2 The term means, to cover and to hide.
Kufr, kufrÉn and kufur mean ‘to be irreligious’, ‘to be an infidel’, and



Hamdard Islamicus 10 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

‘not to believe in Allah’.3 The term is used in different exegetical and
juristic texts with different meanings, sometimes for the state of unbelief
that expels someone from a community and at other times for the type
of unbelief that does not exile a person from his/her own community. The
term ‘unbelief’ has branches, like ÊmÉn. Each branch of ÊmÉn is called
ÊmÉn as Allah says, “Never would Allah make your faith no effect.”4 In
relation to this, AbË Hurayrah (R.A.) narrated that the Prophet (œ)

said, “Faith has over seventy branches or over sixty branches; the most
excellent of which is the declaration that there is no god but Allah and
the humblest of which is the removal of what is injurious from the path
and modesty is the branch of faith.”5

Among these branches, there are some, that if terminated, cause

ÊmÉn to disappear such as the branch of the shahÉdah (evidence).
There are others that even if people do not act on them, such people
remain in the state of ÊmÉn, such as the last branch (of faith), which is
the removal of harmful objects from roads. Between them are unequal
branches of great divergence.

The same philosophy is applied to kufr, which also has roots and
branches. Some of which charge someone as an infidel and others, if
holding one of them, he possesses a characteristic of kufr. In this regard,
Ibn Sallam conveys that as far as the aÍÉdÊth regarding unbelief and
polytheism are concerned, they do not specifically indicate that those
who have the same attributes as mentioned in these aÍÉdÊth are infidels
or polytheists. However, they also have different indications such as
attributes and ways that are present among the infidels and polytheists.6

Hence, unbelief (kufr) is of two types. The first is major unbelief
(al-kufr al-akbar), which leads to the fire of hell forever. The second
is minor unbelief (al-kufr al-aÎghar), which inevitably threatens a person
but does not lead him to the fire eternally.7 In succeeding pages, types
of unbelief are analysed for the reader’s benefit and comprehension,
thus, rendering true meanings of the term kufr and relevant issues.

Major Unbelief

Major unbelief leads someone to hellfire forever. Islamic texts treat
unbelief as the opposite to faith. Allah says,

“If Allah had so willed, succeeding generations would not
have fought among each other, after clear (signs) had come to







Hamdard Islamicus 13 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

succeed in deceiving some people for some time but they cannot
deceive all people for all times. When such a person is exposed, he

loses all honour once and for all. As to the hereafter, mere lip
service will carry no weight there because it is deeds alone that
matter there.”17

These are some examples of major unbelief that justify one’s
expulsion from the community of believers.18

Minor Unbelief

Minor unbelief brings threats to a person but does not lead him/her
to the hellfire eternally. These include all forms of disobedience (sin), as
sin is one element of unbelief.19 Obedience is recognised as faith; hence,

disobedience is accounted as unbelief. Disobedience is the opposite of
gratitude, as obedience is an act of gratitude.20 About this, Allah says,
“We showed him the way: whether he be grateful or ungrateful (rests
on his will).”21 Allah also says, “If anybody is grateful, truly his gratitude

is (a gain) for his own soul; but if anybody is ungrateful, truly My Lord
is free of all needs, supreme in honour.”22

A few aÍÉdÊth mention unbelief synonymously with disobedience.
We reproduce them for greater clarity and for the purpose of avoiding

conflicts and confrontations. To begin with, ‘Abd Allah (b. Mas‘Ëd [R.A.])
narrated that the Prophet (œ) said, “Abusing a Muslim is FusËq (i.e. an
evil doing) and killing him is kufr (disbelief).”23 Disbelief, as mentioned
in the ÍadÊth, does not mean that it drives someone out of the Ummah.

Scholars reached this inference based on what Allah says, “If two parties
or groups among the believers fall to fighting…”.24 In this verse Allah
does not refer to them (the two parties fighting one another) as
unbelievers; rather they are referred to as believers who fall into fighting.

The induction is that it is inappropriate to call believers infidels merely
because of fighting or disagreement. Disagreements or differences of
opinions cannot form a basis for the accusation of infidelity.

Along this line of thought, al-‘AsqalÉnÊ reiterated that whenever a

believer commits disobedience or sin, he is not regarded as an infidel, for
Allah has recognised him with the category of a believer. Instead of
accusing him of unbelief, an attempt at compromise should take place to



Hamdard Islamicus 14 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

maintain peace and harmony; he should not be driven out of the Ummah
merely due to fighting, nor can there be any unusual judgement.

AbË Hurayrah (R.A.) reported that the Prophet (œ) said, “Two
matters are signs of disbelief on the part of those who indulge in them:
defaming and speaking evil of a person’s lineage and wailing over the
dead.”25 Al-NawawÊ remarked there were different views among scholars

but the most appropriate was (i) to consider these characteristic activities
of infidels and people of pre-Islamic days. He further stated that (ii) these
same characteristics lead a person into a state of unbelief and that
(iii) they indicate ingratitude for Allah’s blessings and compassion.26 Ibn

Taymiyyah interpreted both matters as ‘signs of disbelief”, meaning that
these characteristics are found in people as kufr in that they are like
the actions of disbelievers but without implying that the observer of
one branch of kufr would become a total disbeliever; that is, unless

genuine kufr, as mentioned in the ÍadÊth, is explicitly seen in such a
person.27

Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ drew lessons from the aÍÉdÊth on the permissibility
of employing the word kufr for qualities that do not drive someone out

of the Ummah and for monotheists who are also punished for their
sins.28 Al-NawawÊ remarked that this ÍadÊth provided evidence for using
the word kufr for something in which there is no denial of Allah (such
as being ungrateful to one’s husband or for the favours provided by

Allah), or  His compassion and truth.29 Moreover, what supports this
principle is the classification of unbelief into two kinds, major and minor.
Using this approach, gross misconceptions of those who accuse others
of unbelief evaporate. The ÍadÊth teaching that monotheists will be taken

out of hellfire further supports the argument. Al-BukhÉrÊ infers that sins
are due to ignorance but that a sinner is not a disbeliever unless he
worships others along with Allah.

Examples of unbelief are injustice, sensuality and ignorance, and

these have been divided into two kinds. The first type expels a person
from the Ummah but the second does not.30 This assessment was reported
by the Prophet’s Companions (R.A.), the most knowledgeable in the
Qur’Én; those who knew Islam intimately and fully understood unbelief’s

elements. Muslims who learned from them were/are superior, but later
generations failed to comprehend and eventually became divided into two
groups. One group advocated the exclusion of all those who committed



Hamdard Islamicus 15 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

major sins from the community, and went even further to pass the verdict
of hellfire, forever, for those so condemned. The other group declared

their own status as believers with perfect faith. Hence, one group
exceeded the limits and the other did not. Nevertheless, Allah guided “the
People of the Prophet’s Patterns and the Community” (ahl al-Sunnah
wa al-Jamɑah) by showing them the path of moderation. Hence, there

is unbelief less than unbelief; hypocrisy less than hypocrisy; polytheism
less than polytheism; sensuality less than sensuality; and injustice less
than injustice.”31

Unbelief and its Consequences

According to scholars, there are two significant principles that
encompass the concept of unbelief. The first is that a person can hold

elements of faith and unbelief concurrently. The second is that driving a
person out of the Ummah is dangerous and holds much risk.

First Principle

Good and righteous deeds are called ‘faith’ by Allah when He says,
“Never would Allah make your faith of no effect.”32 On the other hand,

sins (disobedience) are referred to as ‘unbelief’. The Prophet (œ) said,
“Abusing a Muslim is FusËq (i.e. an evil doing) and killing him is kufr
(disbelief).”33 Hence, it is possible that some believers will have a branch
or branches of unbelief or hypocrisy or ignorance. This is what the

Prophet (œ) meant when naming unbelief for some sins while not denying
the faith of the sinner. This significant principle needs greater
acknowledgement as the issue of redeeming sinners from hellfire (not to
abide therein forever) is based on it, and is supported with evidence from

the Qur’Én and Sunnah.

Evidence from the Qur’Én

Allah says, “And most of them believe not in Allah without associating
(others as partners) with Him.”34 Ibn AbbÉs said they have a part of
faith for when they were asked, ‘Who created the heavens, the earth,

and the mountains,’ ‘they say Allah.’ Yet, they associate others with Him
in worship’. Although the verse was revealed concerning Arab polytheists,
it is best to apply the ruling in general.



Hamdard Islamicus 16 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Allah says,

“The desert Arabs say: “We believe.” Say: “Ye have no faith; but

ye (only) say ‘We have submitted our wills to Allah’. For not yet
has Faith entered your hearts. But if ye obey Allah and His Apostle
He will not belittle aught for your deeds: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving
Most Merciful.”35

Here, Allah considers both their Islam and obedience to Allah and
His Prophet (œ) by saying ‘they have no faith.

Evidence from ×adÊth Literature

‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘ÓÎ reported that the Prophet (œ) said,

“Three characteristics make anyone who possesses them a sheer
hypocrite; anyone who possesses one of them possesses a
characteristic of hypocrisy till he abandons it; when he talks he lies,

when he makes a covenant he acts treacherously, and when he
quarrels he deviates from the truth.”36

This ÍadÊth shows that hypocrisy and Islam can be found

simultaneously in one person.37 The inference is that a person remains
a hypocrite until he abandons such acts, also implying he might not
remain a hypocrite forever. Likewise, a liar is regarded as committing a
sin but the moment he stops lying he is no longer a hypocrite. What is

drawn from the ÍadÊth is that not all such acts expel a person from the
Ummah. Hence, decreeing that a person committing such acts is in a
state of unbelief is improper.

Second Principle

Accusing a Muslim of infidelity has severe consequences, so it is
impermissible for a Muslim to pass any judgement against another Muslim
unless there is irrefutable and authentic evidence. Calling a Muslim an

infidel was also disapproved in a ÍadÊth narrated by AbË Hurayrah (R.A.):
“If a man says to his brother O kÉfir (disbeliever), then surely one of
them is such (i.e. kÉfir).”38



Hamdard Islamicus 17 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

This ÍadÊth infers that accusing others of infidelity is not an
insignificant matter but is vitally important. Hence, utmost care should be

taken in passing such a remark or judgement on others. The consequence is
serious, to the extent that an accuser may reach the state of an infidel due
to an unsubstantiated and false accusation. ThÉbit ibn al-ÖaÍÍÉk (R.A.)
reported that … cursing a believer is like murdering him and whoever

accuses a believer of disbelief, then it is as if he had killed him.”39

Obviously, this ÍadÊth does not endorse the concept of accusing a believer
of infidelity, especially since a false accusation of infidelity is equivalent
to murder. Hence, regardless of situations and circumstances, a believer

remains a believer and he shall not be accused as an infidel due to any
kind of sin or disobedience, excepting polytheism.

AbË Dharr (R.A.) narrated that he heard the Prophet (œ) saying,
“If somebody accuses another of fusËq (by calling him fÉsiq i.e. wicked

person) or accuses him of kufr, such an accusation will revert to him
(the accuser) if his companion (the accused) is innocent.”40 Ibn DaqÊq
remarks it is a severe threat to whoever accuses another of infidelity if
the accused is innocent. Some Muslims have fallen into this predicament.

Unfortunately, the phenomenon persists as, compared to times past, present
Muslim society engages in the business of charging other Muslims with
infidelity due to minor differences and disputes. Disagreement in beliefs
and exchanging judgements of infidelity are spreading like a contagious

disease.
The aÍÉdÊth register stern warnings for those who accuse someone

of infidelity. Clear commands for restraint are evident, as the issue is
related to the SharÊ‘ah. As the Qur’Én and Sunnah stipulate solid

principles, such judgements are not to be passed out on mere desire,
whim, fancy, ignorance or bias. One who claims something due to absolute
ignorance goes against the People of Knowledge (ahl al-‘Ilm), and by
opposing them by accusing someone of infidelity, he eventually places

himself among those who go astray. Such an act is the sign of the highest
order of ignorance as there is none greater.41

Without knowing the esoteric sentiments of someone who appears
indifferent and seems to reflect or manifest some dimensions of unbelief,

even then it is not appropriate to accuse him of infidelity. Thus, an infidel
is one who expands his chest wide open for disbelief. The heart of an
infidel is satisfied and at peace with unbelief, especially when due to his



Hamdard Islamicus 18 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

ignorance of what is against the path of Islam. There is no value in any
deed of unbelief by which the doer does not intend to leave Islam and

join a disbelieving community. Likewise, there is no consideration of
words uttered by Muslims reflecting the meaning of disbelief unless they
truly mean it and hold it as a creed.42

UsÉmah ibn Zayd (R.A.) said:

“Allah’s Apostle (œ) sent us towards (the) Huruqah and in the
morning we attacked them and defeated them. I and an AnÎÉrÊ
man followed a man from among them and when we took him

over, he said, LÉ ilÉha illa AllÉh. On hearing that, the AnÎÉrÊ man
stopped, but I killed him by stabbing him with my spear.  When we
returned, the Prophet (œ) came to know about that and he said,
“O UsÉmah! Did you kill him after he had said LÉ ilÉha illa

AllÉh?” I said, ‘but he said so only to save himself.’ The
Prophet (œ) kept on repeating that so often that I wished I had not
embraced Islam before that.”43

This ÍadÊth conveys that if a man confesses “there is no god but
Allah,” then it is unlawful for other Muslims to kill him based on
assumptions, suspicions or speculations. It also shows that the Prophet (œ)
demonstrated grave concern for Muslims who take the law into their

hands based on imaginations and conjectures. Islam does not provide
any room for the judgement of peoples’ actions without authentic
and indisputable evidence. In Islam, justice is one of the noblest
values to uphold. Due to severity of charging a Muslim with disbelief,

even though he may be a disobedient sinner, scholars regard it as
wrongdoing.

No Muslim is allowed to spy on another Muslim, or having spied,
to swear by Allah that he (the sinner) will not be forgiven or admitted

to Paradise. The fate of such a person will be that Allah will send him
to Hell. Even, if an individual is righteous and pious with full of devotion
and good deeds, he will be subject to punishment if he curses by an oath
that a sinner or disobedient person will not enter Paradise.

Al-×anafÊ says that it is a great injustice to testify against someone
that Allah will not forgive him nor bestow His mercy but will enter him
in the fire of hell where he would live forever, for it is a judgement for



Hamdard Islamicus 19 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

an infidel after death.44 The implication of calling a sinner an infidel
is explicit when we know its consequences: [1] his wife is no more

lawful for him and it is prohibited for her to remain with him (including
her children); [2] it is obligatory on a ruler to punish him for changing
religion after he has been declared an infidel; [3] if he dies in this state,
Sharʑah will not be applied; his body will not be washed; funeral

prayer will not be offered and he will not be buried in the Muslim
cemetery; [4] if he dies in a state of unbelief, he will be cursed by
Allah and placed in the fires of hell where he would live forever.45

Because these are the implications of charging someone with unbelief,

great care must be taken in making such a judgement. Those who
make such judgements consciously or unconsciously ought to be advised
of the grave consequences. Organisations, groups, or societies subscribing
to the philosophy of charging Muslims with infidelity for different

reasons should be counselled, educated and exposed to authentic aÍÉdÊth
and edicts from trustworthy scholars who have deliberated such
judgements.

SECTION I

Charging Individuals Who are Guilty of Acts of Sin and
Disobedience with Infidelity

An established principle of ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamɑah is not
to charge someone with infidelity for mere disobedience unless he believes
in the permissibility of disobedience. Al-ÙaÍÉwÊ states that a Muslim

cannot be charged as an infidel for any sin that he commits because he
follows the direction of prayer (ahl al-Qiblah). Hence, he is treated as
a Muslim as long as he does not consider that committing the sin is
lawful. He also held that it is improper to declare that wrongs ‘do him

no harm’ when done by the faithful.46 Al-NawawÊ argues that Muslims
should know the opinions of truthful people and that nobody among those
who follow the direction of prayer should be charged as an infidel due
to sin, nor even those who follow mere desires, including People of

Innovation (ahl al-Bid‘ah). However, whosoever rejects any basic
principle of Islam should be charged as an apostate or infidel, except for
new Muslims or those raised in rural environments who do not have



Hamdard Islamicus 20 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

adequate knowledge of the religion. Such people should be instructed in
the religion first, and if they continue to reject, only then can they be

charged as infidels after exhausting all educational avenues. The same
rule applies to those who admit fornication, drinking alcohol, gambling,
murder and other clearly unlawful matters.47

At the same time, it is important to heed al-ÙaÍÉwÊ ’s teaching that

the People of Truth (ahl al-×aqq) do not regard anyone an infidel due
to sin (meaning disobedience and mortal sin) but without leaving the
pillars of Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah established that when it is said that ‘ahl
al-Sunnah wa al-Jamɑah agreed on the issue of not charging a sinner

as an infidel, it clearly meant disobedience such as fornication and
drinking alcohol. However, as far as the four pillars and testimony are
concerned, if anyone leaves one of them there is disagreement.48 Evidence
in the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth asserts punishment for those who commit

moral sins such as theft, fornication, drinking alcohol and libel. This
demonstrates that they should not be killed but rather awarded prescribed
punishments. However, if they are infidels, then they deserve the
punishment of apostasy.49

Ibn SallÉm articulated reactions to the KhÉrijites’ position that
Allah had disavowed their statement by prescribing punishments such
as cutting the hand of a thief and lashes for a fornicator or accuser.
If sin leads someone to become an infidel, the sinner should not be

given any punishment except death. For the Prophet (œ) said,
“Whosoever changes his religion, kill him.” If they are not regarded
as infidels, then they should be given the punishment of cutting and
lashes.

Ibn Taymiyyah explained that every Muslim knows that the
Prophet (œ) did not regard drunkards, fornicators, accusers or thieves
as apostate. However, the Qur’Én and recurrent aÍÉdÊth mention different
punishments for each instead of the punishment for an apostate: lashes

for accusers and fornicators, the chopping of hands for a thief. However,
if they are apostates, they can be killed.50

Evidence from the Qur’Én

According to al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, al-BukhÉrÊ argued that if a believer
commits disobedience (sin), he is not charged as an infidel because



Hamdard Islamicus 21 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Allah maintained the title of ‘believer’ for him.51 Allah says, “Allah
forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth

anything else, to whom He pleaseth; to set up partners with Allah is to
devise a sin most heinous indeed.”52 Al-BukhÉrÊ further articulated that
sins take place due to ignorance and that such sinners are not disbelievers
unless they worship others along with Allah. This is because of the

saying of the Prophet (œ), “You are a person who still has in him the
remnants of the days of Ignorance,” – also, “Allah forgiveth not that
partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to
whom He pleaseth ...”.

Commenting further, al-BukhÉrÊ stated that the word kufr might be
used metaphorically for disobedience, meaning ungratefulness rather than
denial. This implies a kind of unbelief that does not drive a person
out of the Ummah, unlike the KhÉrijites who believed that those who

committed sins were infidels. The following text clearly refutes the KhÉrijites’
position, “Allah forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but
He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth…”53 Hence, whatever
is less than kufr can be forgiven, meaning that setting partners equal

with Allah indicates kufr in the same manner as the person who denies
the prophethood and mission of MuÍammad (œ) is infidel. Although he
does not set another deity as partner with Allah, there is no disagreement
among scholars that such a person will not be forgiven.”54

Ibn Taymiyyah reiterates that this stipulation does not include
repentance because Allah says, “Say: “O My servants who have
transgressed against their souls! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah. For
Allah forgives all sins: for He is Oft-forgiving, most Merciful.”55 Here

the injunction is general because it means repentance, which is specific
and provisional as revealed in SËrat al-NisÉ’:48,56 which indicates that
whenever a sinner repents and turns to Allah, he/she is forgiven. Allah
willed upon Himself the laws of grace and mercy. If anyone does a bad

deed out of ignorance and thereafter repents and lives righteously, Allah,
the Dispenser of grace, is most forgiving.57

Evidence from Sunnah

There are aÍÉdÊth related to the matter of unbelief that inspire
a true understanding of its meaning. Considering limitations of the



Hamdard Islamicus 22 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

current discourse on the subject, a few aÍÉdÊth are now presented and
explained. To begin with, Anas bin MÉlik (R.A.) reports that the

Prophet (œ) said:

“Allah, the exalted, has said: O son of Adam, I forgive you as long

as you pray to Me and hope for My forgiveness, whatever sins you
have committed. O son of Adam, I do not care if your sins reach
the heights of the heaven, then you ask for My forgiveness, I would
forgive you. O son of Adam, if you come to Me with an earth load

of sins, and meet Me associating nothing to Me’, I would match it
with an earth load of forgiveness.”58

Allah is all-forgiving. The forgiveness of Allah is subject to sincere
prayer, supplication and repentance. Even if sins are huge, it is possible
to be forgiven if Allah wishes; hence, one does not become an infidel due
to sins, as is made obvious in this ÍadÊth.

‘UbÉdah ibn al-ØÉmit (R.A.) narrated that the Prophet (œ) said:

“Whoever amongst you fulfils his pledge will be rewarded by Allah.

And whoever indulges in any one of them (except the ascription of
partners to Allah) and gets the punishment in this world, that
punishment will be expiation for that sin. And if one indulges in any
of them (stealing, illegal sexual intercourse, killing one’s own children,

accusing an innocent person, disobedience to do good) and Allah
conceals his sin, it is up to Him to forgive or punish him (in the
Hereafter).”59

Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ remarked on the ÍadÊth, “And if one indulges in any
of them and Allah conceals his sin, it is up to Him to forgive or punish

him (in the Hereafter),” there is clear refutation of the KhÉrijites’ claim
that those who committed sins and disobedience were infidels.60 The
KhÉrijites were regarded as the extremists of their day for this reason,
among others. Hence, it is necessary to negate and distance their

elucidations, articulations and inferences. Many contemporary Muslims
should learn of their approaches and vain religious exhortations. Observing
the present situation, one can reasonably deduce that numerous Muslims



Hamdard Islamicus 23 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

have embraced the KhÉrijites’ position. The absence of critical thinking
and objective evaluative methods allow such personalities to disseminate

false doctrines without realising the dire consequences, both here and
hereafter.

AbË Hurayrah (R.A.) mentioned a man who drank wine and
was brought to the Prophet (œ). The Prophet (œ) ordered the

Companions (R.A.) to beat him. Some Companions (R.A.) beat him

with their hands, some with their shoes and some with their garments (by

twisting it) like a lash. When they finished the beating, someone said to

the drunkard, ‘May Allah disgrace you!’ On that, the Prophet (œ) said,

‘Do not say so, for you are helping Satan to overpower him.’61The

ÍadÊth shows that the Prophet (œ) forbade the Companions (R.A.) to

curse the drunkard. To the contrary, he regarded him as a brother and

advised the Companions (R.A.) to pray for him. If the drunkard

were an infidel, the Prophet (œ) would not have forbidden his

Companions (R.A.) to curse him. Instead, he advised them to call him

their brother and pray for him. From this, one can infer that a drunkard

is not an infidel but rather a sinner and there is punishment for his sin.
It also implies that a transgressor may have done good deeds during his
life, which will be given to whom he had oppressed in this world on the
Day of Judgement.62

After a careful study of the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth, it becomes evident
that any consideration of disobedience as unbelief is an exaggeration
(immoderation) or religious extremism. Furthermore, it is contrary to
Islamic characteristics such as the ease of religion, facilitation, justice

and holistic mercy. Nevertheless, infidelity by means of disobedience,
as believed and advocated by the KhÉrijites, was one of their principal
dogmas.

Arguments of Ahl al-TakfÊr and Our Response

Kufr, according to ShukrÊ MuÎtafa’s group, is not used in SharÊ‘ah
except to indicate the opposite of ÊmÉn and its denial. Thus, it refers to

a general ruling that embraces many kinds, each with a specific name
such as fisq, Ðulm and khubth. When Allah says, “He has made
non-belief, wickedness and rebellion hateful to you”63, it means that



Hamdard Islamicus 24 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

these three elements are kufr according to the general rule and are
different by names of figures, all-inclusive in the word, kufr. In

substantiating this claim, they refer to the verse 35 of SËrat al-AÍzÉb.
To Shukri Mustafa’s people, all such cited names of different figures

mentioned in the verse denote one rule with one meaning, i.e., referring

to all believers with each having a different name based on the quality

of faith.64 Likewise, according to them, fisq, Ðulm and khubth refer to

kufr.

The ahl al-TakfÊr (people who call others infidels) called it kufr

because of the insistence of disobedience. One may summarize this

belief in the accusation of infidelity by means of disobedience as follows:

[1] all disobedience (sins) is kufr to Allah; [2] the classification of ‘infidel’

cannot be removed from the disobedient except by means of repentance;

and [3] repentance is the renewal of Islam. According to them, if a

person disobeys once and does not repent, it shows persistent disobedience,

hence, he is an infidel.65 They quote al-FurqÉn:43, YÉsÊn:60, al-Nahl:100,

al-An‘Ém:121, al-Jinn:23, al-NisÉ’:14, al-Baqarah:81, al-×ujurÉt:11 and

al-Baqarah:254 to substantiate the argument that sinful people are infidels.

They also quote a ÍadÊth narrated by AbË Hurayrah (R.A.) who reported

that the Prophet (œ) said, “All my followers will enter Paradise except

those who refuse.” They said: O Allah’s Apostle: “Who will refuse?” He

said, “Whoever obeys me will enter Paradise and whosoever disobeys

me refuses (to enter it).”66 However, as we shall demonstrate, this

ÍadÊth is falsely explained to justify the conclusion that sinful or

disobedient persons are infidels.

The KhÉrijites held this understanding with regard to the warnings

(al-wa‘Êd) and argued that a single disobedience is enough to make one

remain in hellfire forever, but to enter the Paradise forever, it is necessary

to perform all obedience. The ahl al-Sunnah wa’al-JamÉ‘ah adopt a

moderate path. Accordingly, the ÊmÉn of a person who commits moral

sins is imperfect: he is a sinner and is driving himself towards punishment.

Nevertheless, it depends on Allah’s grace/will, whether to punish (if he

dies without repentance) or forgive him. Ibn SallÉm remarked that not all

disobedience and sins eliminate ÊmÉn, neither do they impose kufr, but

such activity does deny the actuality of ÊmÉn and sincerity that Allah has
attributed to believers.67



Hamdard Islamicus 25 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

On the position of the ahl al-Sunnah wa’al-JamÉ‘ah, Ibn Taymiyyah
comments that they do not declare that those who pray like other Muslims

are infidels simply due to disobedience and major sin as did the KhÉrijites.

Rather, they state that the concept of brotherhood in ÊmÉn is firm and

quite aside from disobedience. They do not remove elements of ÊmÉn
from the deviant persons totally. They do not believe that they will be in

hellfire forever, as did the Mu‘tazilites. However, fisq is included in the

name of ÊmÉn and does not come under the name of ÊmÉn by any

means. They say, ‘he is a believer with imperfect ÊmÉn’ or ‘he is a

believer due to his ÊmÉn’ but also that ‘he is a deviant due to mortal sins’.

Therefore, he will not be given the name generally, nor will the name
completely removed.68

The ahl al-TakfÊr declare that a person is an infidel by means of
disobedience and they use the Qur’Én as evidence. For example:  “Then

seest thou such a one as takes as his Allah his own vain desire?”69 –
“Did I not enjoin on you, O ye Children of Adam, that ye should
not worship Satan; for that He was to you an enemy avowed?”70

Their interpretation is that whosoever follows his vain desire and

pursues disobedience commits shirk. However, scholars teach that the
verse is specifically addressed to mushrikËn (polytheists) who worship
their own vain desire. Al-ÙabarÊ had a difference of opinion regarding
al-JÉthiyah:23. According to some, it means one who takes desire as his

religion and acts upon whatever he likes (without consulting the Qur’Én
or Sunnah). Such people do not believe in Allah nor forbid what Allah
forbids or permit what Allah permits. His religion is his vain desire, which
he follows and acts out.

The ahl al-TakfÊr advocates that when a Muslim commits a sin
and does not repent, he becomes a disbeliever and will dwell in hellfire
forever. However, this is a false stance because the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth
indicate the lifting of punishment. For example, a believer is forgiven

through repentance and this is consensus, as Allah states, “He is the One
that accepts repentance from His Servants and forgives sins: and He
knows all that ye do.”71

Seeking forgiveness for sins protects a believer from hellfire.

AbË Hurayrah (R.A.), on the authority of the Prophet (œ), wrote:

“If somebody commits a sin and then says, O my Lord! I have sinned,



Hamdard Islamicus 26 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

‘please forgive me!’ and his Lord says, My slave has known that he
has a Lord Who forgives sins and punishes for it, I therefore have

forgiven My slave (his sins).’Then he remains without committing
any sin for a while and then again commits another sin and says,
O my Lord, I have committed another sin, please forgive me, and
Allah says, My slave has known that he has a Lord Who forgives

sins and punishes for it, I therefore have forgiven my slave (his
sin). Then he remains without committing any sin for a while and
then commits another sin (for the third time) and says, O my Lord,
I have committed another sin, please forgive me, and Allah says,

My slave has known that he has a Lord Who forgives sins and
punishes for it, I therefore have forgiven My slave (his sin), he can
do whatever he likes.”72

Righteousness also removes sins. Allah said, “And establish regular
prayer at the two ends of the day and at the approach of the night: For
those things that are good remove those that are evil: be that the word
of remembrance to those who remember (their Lord).”73 The

Prophet (œ) said, “Five (daily) prayers and from one Jumu‘ah prayer
to the (next) Jumu‘ah prayer, and from RamaÌÉn to RamaÌÉn are
expiations for the (sins) committed in  between (their intervals) provided
one shuns the major sins.”74 Furthermore, what the dead have done in

terms of good deeds, such as giving alms, remain. On this, the Prophet (œ)
said, “When a man dies, his acts come to an end, but three, recurring
charity, or knowledge (by which people) benefit, or a pious son who
prays for him (for the deceased).”75

The intercession of the Prophet (œ) and others for sinners on the
Day of Judgement will be another safeguard from hellfire. Anas ibn
MÉlik (R.A.) reports that the Messenger (œ) said, “My intercession will
be for those of my people who have committed major sins.”76 Major sins

are like theft, adultery, drinking, gambling, etc. Such Muslims are sure to
go to Hell because of major sins but will be saved by the intercession
of the Prophet (œ). There is consensus among the ahl al-Sunnah
regarding the intercession of the Prophet (œ) on the Day of Judgement.

However, the KhÉrijites and a group of Mu‘tazilÊtes denied the Prophet’s
intercession. They believed that Muslims who commit major sins will
remain in Hell forever, contrary to the belief held by the ahl al-Sunnah.



Hamdard Islamicus 27 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

SECTION II

Charging Rulers who do not base their Policies and

Judgements on the Sharʑah with Infidelity

The Qur’Én explicitly mentions that the renunciation of the Law of
Allah is an act of disbelief. This is stated in (al-MÉ’idah:44, 45, 47), but
scholars differ in interpretations: [1] some say these verses refer to the
Jews who distorted the Book of Allah and modified the Law; [2] the

word kÉfirËn refers to Muslims, ÐÉlimËn to Jews, and fÉsiqËn to
Christians; [3] kufr is lesser than known disbelief, Ðulm is lesser than
known oppression, and fisq is lesser than known immorality; [4] these
verses, although addressed to the People of the Book, aim at all of

humanity, Muslim or kÉfÊr; [5] the meaning of “whoever does not judge
by what Allah has revealed (hence denying), he is a disbeliever,” i.e.,
who acknowledges both injustice and immorality.77

The verse obviously means that whoever denies Allah as the only

Judge, and also denies His Law, is a disbeliever. There is no exception
for Jews, Christians or anyone else because the address is general:
‘whoever judges without the Law of Allah’ – this includes everyone.
However, the cause of the revelation was particular and not general. It

is known that this insight was due to the broadness of the letter and not
the particularity of the reason. However, ×udhayfah ibn al-YamÉn (R.A.)
rejected the view that it was specifically sent in reference to the children
of Israel. The reality is, therefore, that judgement without the Law of

Allah is disbelief, whether in action or faith, so qualifies.
Ibn AbÊ al-‘Izz al-×anafÊ mentions the condition of a judge who

believes that the Law of Allah is not necessary and prefers an alternative
or an underestimation of the Law, even when knowing Divine Law

comes from Allah. Hence, it is the greatest level of disbelief if he believes
in the necessity of Law, and yet, knowing this, deviates from the truth –
such are regarded as disobedient. Here, kufr is reckoned figuratively as
minor disbelief.78 Concerning matters of Law, MuÍammad ibn IbrÉhÊm

remarked that this verse refers to disbelievers, due to disbelief in both
faith and action.

Disbelief in Faith Varies

Regarding a judge who denies the superiority of the Law of



Hamdard Islamicus 28 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Allah, the denial is no doubt of the basic principles of Islam. This leads
to major disbelief and expels him from Islam. A judge who believes that

laws other than the Laws of Allah are better and more comprehensive
for humanity, in an absolute or relative manner related to the idiosyncratic
issues is, without hesitation, considered a disbeliever, as this demonstrates
clear preference for the law of man over the Law of Allah.

Without preference for the law of man while considering both equal
degrees of truth, also leads to similar consequences because of the
equalization. Hence, such judges contradict al-ShËrÉ:11 and al-A‘rÉf:54.
Believing in the relevance of man-made laws that contradict the Law of

Allah and His Prophet (œ) is another affirmation of disbelief at the most
atrocious of levels, by establishing judgements from various sources while
denying the Law of Allah and His Prophet (œ). Unfortunately, this is a
contemporary trend in Muslim countries.

Making rules and judgements from ancestral customs dating to pre-
Islamic times while turning from the Law of Allah and His Prophet (œ)
is disbelief in action, but does not expel someone from Islam. This is
because judgements driven by motives and desires to judge by something

out of Allah’s Law, even while believing the Law of Allah and His
Prophet (œ) are truth, account him as guilty. Although this does not exile
him/her from Islam, the action is regarded as a major sin, even worse
than known major sins such as fornication, consuming alcohol, etc.,

because what is stated as disbelief is worse than what is not stated or
acted on.

Currently, exaggeration in charging judges of unbelief is obvious.
Concerning this, SÉlim al-BahansawÊ said that the ahl al-TakfÊr are of

the opinion that all Muslim judges are disbelievers and those who are
under their judgement and restrain themselves from changing the situation
by aligning with other groups “on the truth”, are disbelievers, because
their allegiance is to the accused judge.79Two things are now elaborated.

The first is that of charging judges with unbelief without considering
general details. The second is that of charging particular judges with
unbelief without considering causes of ignorance, or duress, or other
valid grounds.

The caliph, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘AzÊz (R.A.), faced hostility and
enmity because he attempted to establish justice and for which cause he
was poisoned. King Negus and his kind are in the bliss of heaven,



Hamdard Islamicus 29 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

although not availing themselves entirely to the Sharʑah due to the inability
of distance and time, they judged according to their capability.80 Hence,

it becomes apparent that a judge can face obstacles/pressures that remove
the law from the domain of major to minor disbelief. Hence, holding forth
the accusation of disbelief for such judges is legally prohibited. Here is
where cautiousness and attentiveness are especially obligatory in order

to reach an acquittal.

SECTION III

The Charge of Unbelief of the Subjects of Such Rulers

People under rulers who do not enforce the Law of Allah have a
different position. These are divided into two groups.

The first group comprises those who obey their rulers and follow
what they believe. These are of two kinds:

(i) People who know that rulers have altered the religion and yet
obey the alteration while believing it is legitimate to accept what Allah

has prohibited, and believing in the prohibition of what Allah has made
lawful – despite knowing that they trespass the injunctions. This group
is regarded as having kufr towards Allah Almighty and Ibn Taymiyyah
called it shirk.81 This circumstance is cited in SËrat al-Tawbah:31.

Regarding this, ‘AdÊy ibn ×Étim (R.A.) reported:

“I went to the Prophet (œ) and on my neck was a golden cross
and he said: O ‘AdÊy, throw away that idol and I heard him reciting

al-Tawbah:31, and said, “They (People of the Book) were not to
worship them but when they allowed something, they would make
it allowed to themselves, and when they would forbid something,
they would forbid it for themselves as well.”82

×udhayfah (R.A.) remarked that as far as they were not fasting
like monks or performing prayers for their sake, yet when monks and
priests allowed something they allowed it for themselves, and when

monks and priests forbade something they forbade it to themselves – this
was their priesthood.83

(ii) The second kind of people are these: in spite of faith and



Hamdard Islamicus 30 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

belief in the proscription of the unlawful and the legitimisation as lawful
by their leader, they obey in disobedience towards Allah like a Muslim

who commits sin while knowing it is sinful. Such people become
encompassed by the law, as do those who commit sin. The Prophet (œ)
stated “obedience is required only in what is good.”84 In another ÍadÊth
the Prophet (œ) stated, “It is obligatory for one to listen to and obey

(the ruler’s orders) unless these orders involve one in Disobedience (to
Allah); but if an act of Disobedience (to Allah) is imposed, one should
not listen to or obey it.”85

On this ÍadÊth, Ibn al-Qayyim wrote that ‘those who obey people

in authority in sin towards Allah is sinful’, hence, no excuse can be
brought before Allah and the sin of disobedience takes its charge, even
if the matter had not yet been committed.86 Nevertheless, even mere
obedience in action does not imply takfÊr, if obedience happens in faith.

Ibn al-‘ArabÊ wrote that a believer who obeys a disbeliever shall become
a disbeliever when such obedience happens in faith and it is the subject
of disbelief and belief, but when obedience takes place in action while
belief in TawÍÊd and faith remains, it is regarded as sinful.87

The second group comprises those who condemn and are displeased
by the circumstance. Based on the aÍÉdÊth, they are not regarded as
sinful, although afflicted by sin caused by withholding their denial despite
the capacity to do so. On this, the Prophet (œ) said:

“AmÊrs (leaders) will be appointed over you and you will find them
doing good as well as bad deeds. One who hates their bad deeds
is absolved from blame. One who disapproves of their bad deeds

is (also) safe (so far as Divine wrath is concerned). However, one
who approves of their bad deeds and imitates them (is doomed).
People asked, the Messenger of Allah: Shouldn’t we fight against
them? He replied: No, as long as they say their prayers.”88

Al-NawawÊ said that whoever hates and is displeased with
abominable acts will get rid of his sin and punishment. This refers to
people who are unable to deny it through action or word but turn in

displeasure within their hearts. The same is evident for whoever is unable
to eliminate such sins when silent, but the sin happens while they are
pleased with it or when not detesting it.89



Hamdard Islamicus 31 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

The Prophet (œ) said,

“Listen, have you heard that after me there will be leaders and
whoever enters upon them, condones their lies and supports them
in their oppression is not from me and I am not from him and he
shall not drink with me from the pool. Whoever does not enter upon

them nor help them in their oppression nor condones their lies is
from me and I am from him and he shall drink with me at the
pool.”90

This ÍadÊth explicitly states that people are not allowed to condone
lies from their leaders or blindly support them in oppression. Hence, it is
clear that Muslims should not help them in oppressive activities. This
implies there should be no support for such oppressors. Extremists,

however, are generally disobedient to the cosmic law because they do
not follow the path of moderation or fairness as shown by the Prophet (œ)
when he dealt with others; as such, they can never be condoned. In the
light of some manifestations of these forbidden characteristics, extremists

can be classified as oppressors because of their gross injustices, unbearable
manipulations, and serious fabrications.

Currently, this is the circumstance when extremists accuse Islamic
groups of infidelity with allegations of obeying leaders who rule without

Islam’s Law. They say a Muslim becomes an apostate when he obeys
whoever does not rule based on Laws revealed by Allah. Nonetheless,
loyalty and obedience do exist separately from action without the
consideration of intention and belief. They also say that someone who

acts when provoked by the one who rules without Allah’s Law, and is
loyal and obedient towards Him, manifestly deifies such a leader.

Circumstances are the same whether [1] a believer falsely believes
that a ruler is implementing the laws of Allah; [2] a believer is conscious

that his/her ruler contradicts the Sharʑah but believes that he cannot
change it; thus, such a believer recognises that his/her obedience to such
a ruler is sinful; or [3] one who realises a ruler contradicts the Sharʑah
but falsely believes this is due to the ruler’s sanctity that sanctions

the legitimizing of prohibitions and the prohibition of the lawful. Hence,
they believe that obedience is obligatory without considering Allah’s
command.91



Hamdard Islamicus 32 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

The evidence for the unbelief of such followers is that Allah says,
“They have taken their scholars and monks as lords besides Allah, and

(also) the Messiah, the son of Mary.”92 These say that devotion towards
monks and their order is without reserve and that this is loyalty. The
verse equalized practical devotion towards monks and deification of the
Messiah – proving that action and faith in the Law are equivalent as both

lead to polytheism. Confirming this position is a verse pertaining to the
children of Israel, without exception and without separating sinner from
non-sinner or believer from non-believer.93

SECTION IV

Charge of Unbelief of those Individuals who Leave or
Withdraw from Islamic Organizations

Extremists have developed a peculiar understanding for the concept

of a Muslim Jamɑah (organization). They stress that the existence of

many Jamɑats (organizations) among Muslims is impermissible. Indeed,

they reach beyond certain bounds to develop an exaggerated theory of

Jamɑah. According to them, the Jamɑah is only one congregation

from which separation or withdrawal is considered an act of disbelief.

What they especially mean is their own Jamɑah; in this case, Jamɑat

al-MuslimÊn, founded by ShukrÊ MuÎtafa of Egypt during the twentieth

century. The definition of separation from a Muslim Jamɑah is timely

for the contemporary Muslim community, which is at a crossroads, being
challenged by extremists and immoderate interpretations.

The definition of separation varies. If due to methodology and

separation from mainstream Islam as a whole, it is regarded apostasy.
Proponents claiming that separatists are apostates (or infidels) quote a
ÍadÊth reported by Ibn Mas‘Ëd (R.A.), that the Prophet (œ) said,

“The blood of a Muslim man who testifies that there is no god but
Allah and that I am the Apostle of Allah should not be lawfully shed

but only for one of the three reasons: married fornicator, soul for
soul, and one who deserts his religion separating himself from the
community”94



Hamdard Islamicus 33 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Ibn DaqÊq says that what is meant by the JamÉ‘ah in the ÍadÊth
is a Muslim society and that separation from it is apostasy from the

religion.95 If separation is not ideological but structural, for example,
denying a pledge of allegiance to an ImÉm (leader), it is generally
not regarded as disbelief, but is regarded a major sin. However, this
view gives rise to another point, because history records that some

Companions (R.A.) refused their pledge to leaders of their age.
Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ reported that Ibn ‘Umar refused his pledge to both Caliph
‘AlÊ and Caliph Mu‘Éwiyah.96 Later, he pledged to Caliph Mu‘Éwiyah
after the latter’s reconciliation with ×asan ibn ‘AlÊ.97 Even so, he later

denied homage to anyone on the matter of controversy until Ibn
al-Zubayr (R.A.) was assassinated and the Caliphate was settled by
‘Abd al-MÉlik ibn MarwÉn, to whom he then pledged allegiance.98 The
clear inference is that no one who does not pledge allegiance can be

considered an unbeliever under similar circumstances.
There are two relevant aÍÉdÊth. In the first, the Prophet (œ) said,

“He who separates from the community within a span takes off the
noose of Islam from his neck.”99 The second is the Prophet (œ) said,

“One who dies without having sworn allegiance will die the death of one
belonging to the days of Ignorance (JÉhiliyyah)”100 Al-NawawÊ says
that ignorance was a chaotic condition without a leader.101 Both of these
aÍÉdÊth are abused by the ahl al-TakfÊr to favour their own theory.

Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ says that the death of ignorance refers to the ‘state
of misguidance’. Death, here, is not that of a disbeliever but of a sinner.
The analogy is this: ‘he dies the death of one who belongs to ignorance’,
although he was not. It is intended as preventative. This view is supported

by the ÍadÊth that states ‘he who separates from the community within
a span removes the noose of Islam from his neck’. If separation or
withdrawal is because of an armed struggle, called bÉghÊ (outrage) by
jurists, it does not bring people to the level of disbelief. Outraged people

are excused by Allah and not branded as infidels. In spite of this, extremists
accuse anyone separated from their organization of infidelity. This is
because of their false analogy that considers their own Jamɑah the
major (only) Jamɑah. This is manifest extremism.

Hence, charging a Muslim with unbelief because of outrage is
clearly inappropriate. Trivial differences in interpretations, approaches
and methodologies do not necessarily lead people to unbelief. Even those



Hamdard Islamicus 34 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

who fight for some causes are treated as brothers. Therefore, if
contemporary Muslims nurture differences ideologically, methodologically,

structurally or technically when approaching doctrinal, legislative or
political issues, in no way can this become a basis for charging someone
with unbelief. These passages clarify such matters by stating that Muslims
remain brothers and that their creed is not volatile; that is, unless an

explicit and conscious confession is made to separate from or reject the
religion.

Ahl al-TakfÊr’s position on apostasy for those separated from their
Jamɑah is based on two false arguments. The first is based on

Él-‘ImrÉn:105-106.  The second aÍÉdÊth states [1] ‘he who separates
from the community within a span takes off the noose of Islam from his
neck’, and [2] ‘the one who dies without having sworn allegiance will die
the death of one belonging to the Days of Ignorance’. These are the

sources abused by extremists for their misguided/misguiding deduction(s).
However, these verses address separation from principles of religion

rather than separation from any group within the Muslim community.
They refer, in particular, to separations that afflicted previous People of

the Book. Ibn KathÊr wrote that Allah forbade the Ummah to resemble
previous nations and communities in disputes and controversies, and in
the abandonment of commanding righteousness and restraining from
viciousness and atrocity.102 He also proposed that the way to avoid

dispute is by adhering to the Qur’Én and Sunnah, and also by clinging
to the Muslim community which is a group characterized as people
gathered in righteousness who keep themselves as Muslims. The Jamɑah
mentioned in the aÍÉdÊth does not refer to a particular group at all – as

falsely claimed and understood – but rather to the Muslim community as
a whole. Separation or withdrawal from a specific group of people (or
tiny Jamɑah), is in no way regarded an act of disbelief. This section IV
clearly unveiled errors used to recruit members for extremist cum terrorist

organisations in the name of Islam. Hence, their quoting of the Qur’Én
and aÍÉdÊth out of context and in isolation, as legitimate claims, ought
to be soundly rejected.

Conclusion

Our discourse allows us to conclude that Islam, under no conditions



Hamdard Islamicus 35 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

whatsoever, advocates extremism/radicalism. Islam’s messages are fair
and moderate and do not allow fanaticism or religious bigotry. However,

some Muslims, due to ignorance and misunderstanding, pursue obsessions
and resort to extremism. Thus, they have become enemies of Muslims,
creating much tension and no end to turmoil. Other contemporary Muslims
even manifest indifference when interacting with those of remarkable

immoderation in words and deeds that are contrary to the faith. Having
analysed their views, interpretations and actions in the light of basic
Islamic sources, the present work makes it clear there is no room in
Islamic doctrine to accuse Muslims of infidelity due to disobedience or

sin. This study provides references to the considerable portions of the
Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth arriving at the right conclusions just cited. Illustrations,
explanations and elucidations based on Qur’Énic evidence as articulated
by honourable exegetes and scholars; logically substantiate Islam’s firm

position, that soundly rejects extremism in religion. Islamic doctrines that
confute extremist positions were comprehensively elaborated and
described for various aspects related to faith, unbelief, the charge of
infidelity and polytheism with various legal implications.

The study has analysed appropriate Arabic terms that allow the more
accurate perspective of exegetes who have dealt extensively with the
subject matter in the light of the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth. We addressed the
crucial matter of unbelief and its consequences to help eliminate

misunderstanding among common and innocent people. The latter easily
become intoxicated by false propaganda and diplomatic machinations
proffered by fanatics and extremists who accuse others to achieve
unilateral objectives in favour of vested interests. This paper discussed

manifest extremism with special reference to [1] charging Muslims as
infidels or apostates due to disobedience and sin; [2] charging a ruler
who does not judge according to what Allah has revealed as an infidel;
[3] charging a follower of such a ruler as an infidel; and [4] charging a

Muslim who leaves an organisation as an infidel. These efforts were
specifically made to help educate people regarding historically documented
forms of extremism, so that current behaviours are more appropriately
understood. For purposes of greater clarity and practicality, the discourse

also focussed on significant aspects and implications of major and minor
unbelief.

Extremist accusing of Muslims of infidelity has been a major issue



Hamdard Islamicus 36 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

in the Ummah during the 20th century, and now extends to the 21st,
serving only to further split and polarizing the Ummah. JihÉdists, Boko

HarÉm, Isis, Al-QÉ’eda, ÙÉlibÉn and other radical groups claim sincerity
as though they are the only ones fighting for truth and the establishment
of Islamic governance. Using this excuse, they justify violence, hijacks,
kidnaps, murders, suicide bombings and all forms of terror. Nevertheless,

this paper makes it robustly clear that all of these factions completely
lack legitimate authority, and it further denies any religious justification
for their actions. Hence, they have no legal or moral validation.

From an Islamic textual perspective, their activities are indefensible,

their claims are unverifiable, their origins are suspicious, and their
knowledge of the religion is truly questionable. Furthermore, they present
numerous ambiguities. Therefore, granting them any sympathy is
unwarranted. Legally, Muslims cannot offer support them, morally or

materially, at any cost. Furthermore, the paper offers clarification for the
contemporary categorization of people, which, unfortunately occurs too
often without the provision of clear answers to questions raised by
common people, as to who is reliable and who is not.

Recommendations

The author now offers some recommendations for further work.

Key issues surround the Muslims engaged in judging others, who then fight
and kill them based on false allegations and ignorant adjudication. These
should rather spend their knowledge and energy in uniting Muslims under
the truer banner of the complete Islamic message. This will enable them

to eliminate hatred, hostility and animosity amidst any people who differ
or who disobey or commit sins. Muslims should focus on social and
educational development to prevent people from falling into extremism,
fanaticism, or militant terrorism.

Institutions of higher learning in the Muslim world should review the
curriculum of the Islamic sciences and develop courses that emphasize
Islamic priorities for the Ummah as a comprehensive development with
absolute cognition of contemporary human needs and realities. Designing

new courses is crucial for students to attain an undistorted message in
the contemporary context, one that enables a properly oriented awareness
of contemporary activities in terms of extremism and terrorism.



Hamdard Islamicus 37 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Muslims must realise that enemies are entrenched within Muslim
society who are not necessarily non-Muslims; and this pertains to women

who look ultra-modern, liberal, disrespect Islamic dress, and even
secularists. Rather, the greatest enemy Muslims have, is their own
ignorance of contemporary realities. Truly, there is a monumental need
for Muslim societies to learn the true message of Islam. Muslims must

learn to respect one another, regardless of differences of opinions regarding
religious views, interpretations, legal, political, cultural or educational
matters. Muslims must reject the blind imitation of unhealthy
fundamentalism infused with obsessive compulsions. Before accepting

any religious explanation or view, efforts must be made to verify sources
of information and authenticity.

Muslims must also uphold excellent ethical principles and values
that support their unity. In other words, the Ummah’s unity should be a

foremost priority. The manipulation of the Qur’Én and aÍÉdÊth by self-
proclaimed theologians, clerics, preachers and exegetes with a warped
understanding of Islam is undeniably real. Such people must be identified
and their shallow religious knowledge exposed via intellectual forums and

healthy discourse. Genuine Muslim leadership must be made even more
aware of their enormous responsibility and obligations. If Islam is to be
respected on a global scale, rather than permanently hijacked by Muslim
extremists, they must to take a clear stand on reforming the interpretation

of scriptural sources by providing dynamic, competent, trustworthy Islamic
leadership with commendable foresight and praiseworthy qualities and
characteristics that inspire trust.

Notes and References

1. Al-LuwayhaqÊ, A.R.M, al-GhulËw fi al-DÊn fÊ ÍayÉt al-MuslimÊn al-Mu‘ÉÎirah
BeirËt, Mu’assasat al-RisÉlah, 2nd Edn., 1992, p. 264.

2. Ibn FÉris, Mu‘jam MaqÉ’is al-Lughah, Iran, DÉr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, n.d.
3. Milton Cowan, Ed., Hens Wehr: A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, London,

Macdonald and Evans Ltd., 1980.
4. Al-Qur’Én, al-Baqarah:143.
5. Muslim, SaÍÊÍ Muslim, Abdul ×amid Siddiqi, Trans., Lahore, Sh. Muhammad

Ashraf, 1987, vol. I, p. 27.
6. Al-Jawziyyah, M.A.I.Q., al-ØalÉh wa ×ukm TÉrikha, Al-QÉhirah, Al-MaÏba‘at

al-Salafiyyah wa MaktabÉtuhÉ, 5th Edn., 1399 A.H., pp. 53-54.



Hamdard Islamicus 38 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

07. Al-LuwayhaqÊ, al-GhulË  fi al-DÊn fi ×ayÉt al-MuslimÊn al-Mu‘ÉÎirah,
p. 253.

08. Al-Qur’Én, al-Baqarah:25.
09. Ibid., 257.
10. Ibid., Ól-‘ImrÉn:86.
11. Al-LuwayÍaqÊ, al-GhulË fi al-DÊn fi ×ayÉt al-MuslimÊn al-Mu‘ÉÎirah, p. 253.
12. Al-Qur’Én, al-Naml:14.
13. Sayyid QuÏb, In the Shade of the Qur’Én, ‘Adil ØalÉÍÊ, Eng. Trans., Leicester,

The Islamic Foundation, n.d., p. 91.
14. Al-Qur’Én, IbrÉhim:10.
15. S.A.A, The Meaning of the Qur’Én, Lahore, Islamic Publications Limited, 7th Edn.,

1984, vol. VI, p. 13.
16. Al-Qur’Én, al-Baqarah:8.
17. MaudËdÊ, The Meaning of the Qur’Én, 1984, vol. I, p. 58.
18. Al-Jawziyyah, M.A.I.Q, MadÉrij al-SÉlikÊn, BeirÉt, DÉr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah,

1st Edn., 1983, vol. I, pp. 337-338.
19. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, I.H, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ  Al-QÉhirah, Al-

Matba‘at al-Salafiyyah wa Maktabatuha, 1st Edn., 1380 A.H., vol. I, p. 83.
20. Al-Jawziyyah, MadÉrij al-SÉlikÊn, vol. I, pp. 337-338.
21. Al-Qur’Én, al-InsÉn:3.
22. Ibid., al-Naml:40.
23. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Trans., Lahore, Kazi

Publications, 6th Edn., 1983, vol. VIII, pp. 43-44.
24. Al-Qur’Én, al-×ujurat:9.
25. Muslim, I.M.H, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, TaÍqÊq wa TarqÊq, Muhammad Fu’Éd ‘Abd

al-BÉqÊ, Al-RiyÉd, R iyÉsah IdÉrÉt al-Buhuth al-‘Ilmiyyahwa al-Ifta’ wa
al-Da’wahwa al-Irshad, 1980, Book 18, Tradition 1578.

26. Al-NawawÊ, SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. II, p. 57.
27. Ibn Taymiyyah, IqtidÉ’ al-SirÉt al-MustaqÊm li MukhÉlafat AsÍÉb al-JahÊm, n.p.,

1st Edn., 1404 A.H., vol. I, pp. 207-208.
28. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. II, pp. 542-543.
29. Al-NawawÊ, SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. II, p. 67.
30. Al-Jawziyyah, MadÉrij al-SÉlikÊn, vol. I, pp. 335-365.
31. Al-Jawziyyah, al-ØalÉh wa ×ukm TÉrikhÉ, pp. 56-57.
32. Al-Qur’Én, al-Baqarah:143.
33. Al-BukhÉri, SaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. VIII, pp. 43-44.
34. Al-Qur’Én, YËsuf:106.
35. Ibid., al-×ujurÉt:14.
36. Muslim, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. I, p. 40.
37. Al-Jawziyyah, al-ØalÉh wa ×ukm TÉrikhÉ, p. 60.
38. Al-BukhÉrÊ, SaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, Vol. viii, p. 80.
39. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 81.
40. Ibid., vol. VIII, p. 44.
41. Ibn Taymiyyah, TalhÊs al-IstighÉthah al-Ma‘rËf bi al-Radd ‘alÉ al-bakrÊ wa

Ma‘ahu al-RÉdd ala al-AkhnÉ’i, Delhi, Al-DÉr al-‘Ilmiyyah li al-TibÉ’ahwa
al-Nashrwa al-Tawzʑ, 2nd Edn., 1405 A.H., p. 125.



Hamdard Islamicus 39 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

42. Al-ShawkÉnÊ, M.A.M, FatÍ al-QadÊr, BeirËt, DÉr al-Fikr, 1405 A.H., vol. IV,
p. 578.

43. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. V, p. 396.
44. Al-×anafÊ, I.I.A.A.M., SharÍ al-AqÊdah al-TahÉwiyyah, BeirËt, Mu’assasat

al-RisÉlah, 1408 A.H., vol. II, p. 437.
45. Al-QaraÌÉwÊ, Y. A, ÚÉhirÉt al-GhulË fi al-TakfÊr, Al-Kuwayt, Maktabat al-ManÉr

al-Islamiyyah, 2nd Edn., 1405 A.H., pp. 31-32.
46. Al-×anafÊ, SharÍ al-‘AqÊdah al-TahÉwiyyah, p. 367.
47. Al-NawawÊ, SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. I, p. 150.
48. Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. VII, p. 302.
49. Al-×anafÊ, SharÍ al-‘AqÊdah al-TahÉwiyyah, p. 367.
50. Ibn Taymiyyah, MajmË’at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. VII, pp. 288 and 482.
51. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. I, p. 84.
52. Al-Qur’Én, al-NisÉ’:48.
53. Ibid.
54. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ SaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. I, p. 85.
55. Al-Qur’Én, al-Zumar:53.
56. Ibn Taymiyyah, MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. VIII, pp. 484-485.
57. Asad, M., The Message of the Qur’Én, Gibraltar, DÉr al-Andalus, 2nd Edn., 984,

p. 713.
58. Al-TirmidhÊ, A.I.M.I, Sunan al-TirmidhÊ, TaÍqÊq, Ahmad Shakir, Beirut, Dar

Ihya‘ al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d., Tradition 3540.
59. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. I, pp. 21-22.
60. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ SaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ,  vol. I, p. 64.
61. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. VIII, p. 506.
62. Al-ÙaÍÉwÊ, A.J.A.A.M.S, Al-‘AqÊdah al-TahÉwiyyah ma‘a SharÍuha li ibn Abi

al-Izz, N.p., n.p. n.d., p. 361.
63. Al-Qur’Én, al-×ujurÉt:7.
64. Zayn al-‘ÓbidÊn, M.S.N, al-×ukm bi Ghayri mÉ Anzala AllÉh wa ahl

al-ghulu, Birmingham, DÉr al-Arqam li al-Nashrwa al-TawzÊ‘, 1st Edn., 1407 A.H.),
p. 161.

65. Madkur, R.M., Al-TakfÊr wa al-×ijrah Wajhan li Wajhi, al-Qahirah, Maktabat
Din al-Qayyim, 1st Edn., 1405 A.H., p. 78.

66. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. IV, p. 284.
67. Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-ÔmÉn, Al-Kuwayt, DÉr al-ArqÉm, n.d., p. 89.
68. Ibn Taymiyyah, MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. III, pp. 151-152.
69. Al-Qur’Én, Al-JÉthiyah:23.
70. Ibid., YÉsÊn:60.
71. Ibid., al-ShËrÉ:25.
72. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. IX, p. 440.
73. Al-Qur’Én, HËd:114.
74. Muslim, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. I, Tradition 209.
75. Muslim, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. III, p. 867.
76. AbË DÉwËd, Sunan AbË DÉwËd, vol. III, p. 1326.
77. Al-ÙabarÊ, JamÊ‘ al-BayÉn an TafsÊr al-Qur’Én, vol. VI, p. 252.
78. Al-ÙaÍÉwÊ, al-‘AqÊdah al-TahÉwiyyah ma‘a SharÍuha li ibn AbÊ al-‘Izz, p. 302.



Hamdard Islamicus 40 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

079. Al-BahansÉwÊ, S., al-×ukm wa QaÌiyyat al-TakfÊr, AmmÉn, DÉr al-Bashar,
2nd Edn., 1985, p. 116.

080. Ibn Taymiyyah, MajmË‘at al-FatÉwÉ, vol. XIX, p. 217.
081. Ibid., vol. VII, p. 70.
082. Al-BayhaqÊ, A.B.A.H.A, KitÉb al-Sunan al-KubrÉ, BeirËt, DÉr al-Ma‘Érif, 1st Edn.,

n.d., vol. X, p. 116.
083. Al-ÙabarÊ, JÉmi‘ al-BayÉn an TafsÊr Ay al-Qur’Én, vol. X, pp. 114-115.
084. Al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. IX, p. 194.
085. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 128.
086. Ibn al-Qayyim, MadÉrij al-SÉlikÊn, vol. III, p. 429.
087. Ibn al-‘ArabÊ, AÍkÉm al-Qur’Én, vol. II, p. 743.
088. Muslim, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. III, p. 1033.
089. Al-NawawÊ, SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. II, p. 243.
090. Al-NasÉ’Ê, A.A.R.A.S.A, Sunan al-NasÉ’Ê bi SharÍ al-SuyËÏÊ wa ×ashiyat

al-SanadÊ, BeirËt, DÉr IhyÉ’ al-TurÉth al-‘ArabÊ, n.d., vol. VII, p. 160.
091. Al-HudaybÊ, H., Du’Éh lÉ QuÌÉh, Al-Kuwayt, Al-IttihÉd al-IslÉmÊ al-AlamÊ li

al-MunazzamÉt al-TullÉbiyyah, 1st Edn., 1405 A.H., pp. 155-156.
092. Al-Qur’Én, al-Tawbah:31.
093. Al-HudaybÊ, Du’ah la QuÌah, pp. 156-157.
094. AbË DÉwËd, Sunan AbË DÉwËd, vol. 3, p. 1212.
095. Ibn DaqÊq al-‘Id, T.D.A.F, AÍkÉm al-AÍkÉm Sharh ‘Umdat al-AÍkÉm, BeirËt,

DÉr al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n.d., vol. IV, p. 84.
096. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. IX, p. 231.
097. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, I.H., TahdhÊb al-TahdhÊb, Hyderabad, DÉr al-Ma‘rifah al-

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098. Al-‘AsqalÉnÊ, FatÍ al-BÉrÊ bi SharÍ ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, vol. XII, p. 202.
099. Al-TirmidhÊ, Sunan al-TirmidhÊ, Traditions 2863 and 2864.
100. Muslim, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. III, pp. 1029-1031.
101. Al-NawawÊ, SharÍ SaÍÊÍ Muslim, vol. XII, p. 238.
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Publications Limited.



Hamdard Islamicus 42 Vol. XXXIX, No. 4

Mu‘jam al-KabÊr, (2nd Edn.), Muhaqqiq, HamdÊ ibn ‘Abd al-MajÊd al-Salafi, al-Qahirah,
Maktabat ibn Taymiyyah.

Muslim.(1987). ØaÍÊÍ Muslim (Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, Trans.), (1987), Lahore, Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf.

Muslim, I.M.H., ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, TaÍqÊq wa TarqÊq: Muhammad Fu’Éd ‘Abd al-BaqÊ,
(1980), al-RiyÉd, RiyÉsah IdÉrÉt al-Buhuth al-Ilmiyyahwa al-IftÉ’ wa al- Da‘wah
wa al-IrshÉd.

MustafÉ, S., Al-TawsÊmÉt, (n.d.), p.: n.p.
QuÏb, S., In the Shade of the Qur’Én, Adil ØalÉÍÊ, Trans., (n.d.), Leicester, The Islamic

Foundation.
YËsuf AlÊ, A., The Holy Qur’Én: Text, Translation and Commentary, (1989), Brentwood,

Amana Corporation.
Zayn al-‘ÓbidÊn, M.S.N., Al-×ukm bi Ghayri mÉ Anzala AllÉh wa ahl al-GhulËw

(1st Edn.), (1407 A.H.), Birmingham, DÉr al-Arqam li al-Nashrwa al-Tawzi‘.

“King Faisal International Prize
for Service to Islam”

FOR THE YEAR 2018

The interested candidate(s) in Pakistan may contact:

President
Hamdard Foundation Pakistan

Hamdard Centre, Nazimabad, Karachi, Pakistan.
Phone: (+92-21) 36616001-4

e-mail: hfp@hamdardfoundation.org

Last date for submission of nominations: 1st April, 2017
For any further information: URL: www.kfip.org