Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     37 

THE INTERPLAY OF IJTIHĀD AND MAQĀṢID 

AL-SHARĪ‘AH IN PRE-MODERN LEGAL 

THOUGHT: EXAMINING THE CONTRIBUTIONS 

OF AL-GHAZALI AND AL-SHATIBI 

ISHFAQ AMIN PARREY 

Guest Faculty, Govt. Degree College,  

Ganderbal, J&K, India 

Email: ishfaqamin88@gmail.com 

Received on: 06-01-2024               Accepted on: 21-05-24 

https://doi.org/10.57144/hi.v47i2.894  

Abstract 
The debate of ijtihād - its meanings, theorization and application, is one 

of the most noticeable debates in the modern Muslim intellectual space. 

In the contested backdrop of ‘closure of the gates of ijtihād’, the process 

of reproduction of ShÉrÊah‘ knowledge, civilizational renewal and 

forming a critical engagement with the socio-intellectual context of 

contemporary times through ijtihÉd gained coinage among different 

strata of Muslim scholarship, developing intra-Muslim conversations 

between traditionalists, modernists and progressives. In this debate, 

maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah as a concept, theory and philosophy has been 

repeatedly invoked by all three points of views, explaining it from their 

distinct positions. In this context, this paper attempts to offer an analysis 

of the pre-modern dialogue between ijtihād and maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah, 

revisions of the traditionally more predominant method of extension of 

law, qiyās, in context of Shāfi’īte four-source theory and employment of 

relatively more utilitarian tool, maṣlahah. Hence, the paper investigates 

the concepts of munāsabah and taḥqiq al-manāṭ vis-à-vis maqasid al-

Shari’ah, employed by two most prominent advocates of maqāṣid 

thought in pre-modern scholarship, al-Ghazali (d. 1111 C.E) and al-

Shatibi (d. 1388 C.E). Finally, the study attempts to locate the common 

ground between traditional theory of ijtihād and maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah, 

to explain the possibility of maqāṣid based ijtihād model. 

Keywords: Islamic Legal theory, uṣūl al-fiqh, maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah, 

ijtihād , munāsabah, ‘illah, ratio-legis. 

mailto:Ishfaqamin88@gmail.com
https://doi.org/10.57144/hi.v47i2.894


38        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

1. Introduction 

Uṣūl al-fiqh discerns the framework to deduce the legal 

rulings from the source material, primary and secondary, regarding 

the practical life. The examination of legal evidences yield knowledge 

of Sharī‘ah rulings in the category of certitude or at least in the 

category of reasonable assumption.1 The principal sources of Islamic 

law do not communicate much about the methodology part in clear 

terms, but is more concerned with the source material for the legal 

judgements and left the methodology part for the human rationale to 

discern and develop. So, uṣūl al-fiqh states the rational procedures of 

legal reasoning such as qiyÉs (analogical reasoning), istiÍsān (juristic 

preference) etc. and the linguistic rules for interpretation of the text 

(dalālāt) and inference making2 to formulate a system of 

interpretation to read into the meanings intended by the Law-giver 

from the primary legal texts and extend those meanings and intents to 

the post-Prophetic times, generally termed as the theory of ijtihād. 

Classically, uṣūl al-fiqh proposes a theory or a set of theories which 

regulate the method of exercising ijtihād to address the new issues 

and their legal status in view of the primary source material, in 

addition to the rules of interpretation to ensure the correct reading of 

the source material.3 The pre-modern models of uṣūl al-fiqh, of which 

the four-source theory of al-Shāfi’ī emerged as the imperial and 

reference theory, inclined more towards literalistic reading of the text, 

reduced the inclusive concept of ijtihād  to qiyās, discouraged the 

usage of more nuanced and utilitarian tools like istiÍsan and most 

importantly abandoned the idea of maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah  or at least 

pushed it to the fringes of the legal discourse. Furthermore, the 

problem of organic evolution of legal discourse vis-à-vis 

developments in Muslim societies and cultures was compounded by 

the development of the institution of taqlÊd vis-à-vis the controversial 

idea of the ‘closure of the gate of ijtihād’.4 Arguably, with all these 

limitations in the pre-modern models and changing socio-political 

and economic dynamics vis-à-vis the advancements in the intellectual 

arena, the potential of uṣūl al-fiqh to translate the revelation into the 

general well-being of humanity was halted. Hence, a call for reform 

in the uṣūl theory, and therefore maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah has been argued 

as the most persuasive reform model. Secondly, in the debate of 

natural law in Islam, between the two major persuasions of hard 

natural law and soft natural law, contended between the ethical 

rationalists and ethical voluntarists, maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah plays a key 

role for the evolution of soft natural law theory.5 Moreover, as the 

maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah restores the paradigm of original thinking, a 

fresh perspective of the correlation between legal theory and legal 

change is desirable. In this context, the paper endeavours to look into 

two authoritative voices of pre-modern maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah thought 

– al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi, their engagement with the traditional 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     39 

theory of ijtihād (equated with qiyās) and the development of 

maṣlaha-based theory of ijtihād.  

2. Statement of Problem  

 As ijtihād is the principal instrument to facilitate the 

continuous evolution of Islamic law with respect to legal change, it 

shapes the connect between the primary sources of the Sharī‘ah and 

the novel issues of the changing world, and invokes a harmonious 

relationship between the revelation and reason.6 Ijtihād is exercised 

in variety of ways, such as qiyās, maṣlahah  mursalah, istiÍsān etc, 

with their own specific set of regulations. In other words, there is no 

single unanimous method for exercising ijtihād.7 In this process, the 

textual evidences of the holy Qur’ān and the Sunnah take precedence 

over all other evidences and is the primary consideration for a jurist. 

If there is no naÎ (an unequivocal text in need of no interpretation) 

available, one may interpret the manifest text (ÐÉhir) of the holy 

Qur’ān and the HadÊth using the principles of the general ('ām) and 

specific (khāÎ), the absolute and the qualified, and other 

considerations as appropriate. The mujtahid may turn to the actual 

(fi‘lī) and tacitly endorsed (taqrÊrī) Sunnah if there is no manifest text 

available, including the holy Qur’ān and the verbal Sunnah. if no, the 

judgement is grounded in ijmÉ‘ or qiyÉs founded in jurisprudential 

literature. In absence of such jurisprudential record, an original ijtihād 

in the mode of qiyās is exercised, turning back to the Qur’ān, the 

hadith, or the ijmÉ‘ for a precedent that has an ‘illah identical to that 

of the far’ (i.e., the situation for which a resolution is required). 

Henceforth, the principle of qiyās is employed to determine the 

necessary ruling.8 In the Shāfi’īte methodology, the jurist first 

examines the nuÎËÎ of the Qur’ān, then mutawātir hadÊths and finally 

the solitary hadÊths. Still deficient in necessary instructions, he should 

hold off on using qiyās until exhausting the Quran's manifest (Ðāhir) 

text. If he comes across a general manifest text, he must decide 

whether it may be made specific using hadith or qiyās.9  However, if 

there is nothing that would limit the manifest text; he can use it as it 

is. In addition, the opinions of the madhāhib should be looked into in 

absence of manifest texts of holy Qur’Én and Sunnah. If there exists 

a consensus among madhÉhib, he must implement it; if not, qiyās is 

employed with respect to the fundamentals of the Sharī‘ah than to its 

supplementary details. If this is not practicable and all other attempts 

fail, he may use the concept of ‘original absence of culpability’ (al-

bara’ah al-aÎliyyah). This process takes place realizing the norms 

that govern the conflict of evidence (al-ta‘āruÌ bayn al-adillah), 

which requires the mujtahid’s familiarity with the strategies used to 

resolve such disputes or, in the event where it is necessary, to 

eliminate one in favour of the other. The ruling so arrived at falls 

under one of the categories of obligatory, forbidden, reprehensible or 



40        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

recommended.10 It is an expression of the theory of bayān, 

summarized in five steps moving from naÎ to ijtihād (qiyās).11 

Regarding the principal of  qiyÉs,12 the most significant of all 

the conditions is effective reason (‘illah).13 The effective reason for a 

ruling may be expressly stated, hinted at by the text, or established by 

consensus (ijmā‘). There is no room for debate when the ‘illah is 

specifically mentioned in the primary source material. Only when the 

‘illah is not mentioned in the sources do differences of opinion 

occur,14 and hence consensus in invoked to determine the ‘illah. In 

absence of explicitly declared ‘illah, ijtihād is the sole method 

exercised to determine it. The jurist thus considers the characteristic 

of the aÎl qualified as appropriate (munāsib) is identified as the ‘illah. 

The mujtahid's method of deductive reasoning under these 

circumstances is referred to as tanqÊÍ al-manāṭ, which is to be 

distinguished from two additional approaches known as takhrÊj al-

manāṭ (extracting the ‘illah) and taÍqÊq al-manāṭ (ascertaining the 

‘illah). This process of inquiry is generally tantamount to what is 

meant by some scholars of uÎūl as al-Îabr wa al-taqsÊm (elimination 

of the improper and assignment of the proper ‘illah to the Íukm). 

TanqÊÍ al-manāṭ suggests that there may be multiple reasons for a 

judgement, and a jurist must determine the correct one (munāsib).15 

In this debate on models of ijtihÉd, employment of qiyÉs as a 

tool for extension of law, within the concept of qiyÉs the debate 

regarding the discernment of ‘illah; the intersection of the theories of 

munÉsabah, manÉt and maqÉÎid al-SharÊ‘ah registered a watershed 

moment in uÎËl history. Meanwhile, Ghazali and Shatibi being the 

champions of this thought process warranted a study to record and 

analyse this conversation between classical four-source theory, 

Ghazali and Shatibi, highlighting the common grounds and 

departures.  

2. Objectives: 

In this study the major objective is to highlight the theory of 

ijtihād as the methodical way to realize the contemporaneous nature 

of the Sharī‘ah pointing towards its relevance to changing contexts. 

Henceforth, in this uÎËli debate ijtihād as a diverse system of 

interpretation and not a monolith has been introduced. In its 

evolution, the distinct methods and definition of the epistemes of 

exercising ijtihÉd are highlighted with special reference to the 

contributions of al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi. These two distinct 

approaches towards ijtihād have contributed in totality towards the 

development of the theory of maqÉÎid al-Sharī‘ah and acts as the pre-

modern foundational sources for the modern uÎËli reform, for which 

Ghazali and Shatibi remain indispensable influences. This study 

charts the shift from conservative understanding of extension and 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     41 

application of the Sharī‘ah towards a libertarian one giving due 

recognition to the realization of public good (maÎlaÍah); marks the 

distinction and common points in this conversation between Ghazali 

and Shatibi vis-à-vis ijtihād.  

3. Literature Review:  

Ghazali and Shatibi have been studied in contemporary 

academy in which Ghazali is more popular as a sufi-philosopher and 

ethicist while Shatibi is popular as the master architect of maqÉÎid al- 

Sharī‘ah. Ghazali is yet to get his due as a master uÎËli and jurist in 

contemporary academy, only Hallaq in A History of Islamic Legal 

Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh, Nyazee in Theories 

of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad, Opwis in Maslaha and 

the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 

4th/10th to 8th/14th Century, Moosa in Ghazali and the Poetics of 

Imagination and few more have examined Ghazali – the legal 

theoretician. While in case of Shatibi, the major studies of the likes 

of Masud in Islamic Legal Philosophy-A Study of Abu Ishaq al-

Shatibi’s Life and Thought, Raysuni in Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of 

Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law and Opwis in Maslaha 

and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from 

the 4th/10th to 8th/14th Century are focussed on the greater project of 

Shatibi, maqÉÎid al-Sharī‘ah. In this perspective, this paper attempts 

to put forward the uÎËli intricate debate revolving around the concept 

of ijtihād and its philosophical undercurrents with reference to 

maqÉÎid al-Sharī‘ah, highlighting the contribution of Ghazali and 

Shatibi with special reference to munÉsabah and manÉt models. 

Consequently, the reception of this debate in modern times is 

evolving into a reformative model and distinct method of 

interpretation and extension of Islamic law, other than the imperial 

traditional qiyÉs-based ijtihād.  

5. Methodology:  

The discussion in this study primarily employs content 

analysis of the primary sources to highlight their perspectives 

regarding their models of ijtihÉd. Secondly, it employs historical 

analysis to locate the milieu and context in which the models of 

Ghazali and Shatibi evolved with reference to imperial four-source 

theory; followed by deciphering the conceptual frameworks and the 

origination of the fundamental concepts. In highlighting the shift from 

four-source theory to objectives theory, the methodological tools 

employed are explanatory and analytical, and at some places the 

method of comparison is exercised with respect to a specific 

conceptual problem faced by the two master uÎËlis. The primary and 

secondary sources are employed to build the argument and 

contemporary academic scholarship is invoked to record the 



42        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

relevance for ongoing debate on uÎËl theory and reform project. The 

study develops the argument by locating ijtihād-qiyÉs equation in 

traditional uÎËl theory, investigates the identification of ratio-legis as 

the most important debate in uÎËli scholarship vis-a-vis munÉsabah 

and taÍqÊq al-manÉt employed by Ghazali and Shatibi respectively; 

placing these procedures in their greater intellectual projects of 

reform, and finally concluding the relevance for modern reform 

project.   

6. Research Outcomes/ Result/ Findings:  

6.1 Identification of ‘Illah through Munāsabah and TaḥqÊq al-

Manāṭ (MasÉlik al-‘Illah):  

Since, the Sharī‘ah rulings are causal (mu‘allal) in their 

nature, both the directive and the legal cause (‘illah) share the 

Sharī‘ah value, hence seek an evidential validity. The evidences are 

invoked to prove the validity of ‘illah and the methods through which 

the legal cause is determined, is studied under masÉlik al-‘illah. The 

methods are divided into major groups: valid/ certain (saÍÊÍah/ aÎl) 

and probable (zanniyyah/ mutawahimmah/ istinbÉÏ). The valid 

methods are further subdivided into naÎ (the text) and 

ijmɑ(consensus), and the naΠhas further two sub-categories of 

explicit and implicit; to mean the ratio-legis (‘illah) is underscored by 

the textual evidence, either explicitly or is inferred from the implicit 

textual evidence, and a third type of ratio-legis is decided by 

consensus; such a ratio was initially assumed; therefore, it has 

probability. However, it ceases to be contingent on consensus and 

becomes as certain as a ratio specified in the texts.16 The probable 

methods are classified into five: munāsabah (suitability), shabāh 

(resemblance), tard (co-extensiveness), dawrān (rotation) and Îabr 

wa taqsÊm (observation and classification). As regards the process of 

tanqÊÍ al manāṭ - taÍqÊq al manāṭ - takhrÊj al manāṭ, Ghazali treats 

them under a separate heading ijtihād  fil ‘illah, while others treat it 

as another category under probable methods of masālik al-‘illah.17 

The uÎūlis acknowledge the variety of modes of legal reasoning, some 

of which fall under the umbrella-word qiyās and others discussed 

under debatable categories like istidlāl, istiÍsān, and istiÎlāh.18 The 

discernment of ‘illah or Íikmah is core concern of these methods in a 

process towards establishing Sharī‘ah value for a new case. Out of 

these probable methods we are here concerned with munāsabah and 

tanqÊÍ al-manāṭ.  

Munāsabah (suitability) is considered by many as the single 

most important method, also termed as maṣlaÍah, ri‘āyah al-maqāṣid 

and takhrÊj al-manāṭ. Ghazali championed this method and used it 

extensively to establish ratio-legis - the method which argues for 

determining of an ‘illah by undisputed rational means. Since, 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     43 

suitability is a rational concept and stems neither from the explicit nor 

implicit meaning of the revealed writings, it cannot be universally 

applied to the law. In other words, reason and its outcomes may not 

always align with legal principles and their conclusions. Since the law 

isn't always interpretable and understandable in rational terms, 

suitability may occasionally be relevant to the law (malā'im) and 

occasionally be irrelevant to the law (gharÊb). No ratio-legis may be 

deemed suitable if it is not relevant, and whichever irrelevant ratio is 

automatically rendered unsuitable, is not subject to further legal 

analysis.19 Therefore, safeguarding public interest (maÎlaÍah) in line 

with fundamental legal principles is the primary objective of 

suitability. However, because the ratio isn't strictly textual, legists 

determine it through suitability, and is consequential of reasoning 

faculties vis-à-vis the spirit of Islamic law. The law is known to 

prohibit harm and to safeguard and enhance what is beneficial. The 

consistent pursuit of benefit and avoidance of harm are the objectives 

(maqÎËd) of the law, and it is to these objectives that the rational 

argument of suitability must adhere. But the law has many different 

objectives, some of which are more essential than others. Ghazali 

devised a tri-layered hierarchical classification; the first of these goals 

includes the essential and indispensable ones (ÌarËrāt), entailing the 

protection of religion, mind, life, property and progeny. It is 

complemented by a group of auxiliary goals that try to uphold and 

improve the primary goals. Any ratio-legis that is determined by 

suitability and falls under this category of legislation must be treated 

with corresponding rules. The second level, which consists of the 

necessary aims (Íajīyyāt), are distinctive for the severe damage to 

darurat if left unattended; whereas their consideration maintains an 

orderly and law-abiding society. The third and least significant level, 

referred by Ghazali as improvements (taÍÎÊn, tawsi'a) enhances the 

application of the maqasid.20 

In conclusion, while suitability is a reasonable principle in 

itself, it must also adhere to the spirit of the law, which establishes 

the conditions and hence probability for ‘suitability’ to be accepted or 

rejected. The distinction between malā’im (relevant) and gharib 

(irrelevant) suitability is explained with reference to this consistency, 

since gharib is also a rational conclusion but irreconcilable with the 

spirit, and hence letter, of the law.21 Ijtihād in terms of discernment 

of ‘illah implies employment of the rational faculties to investigate 

the basis (manāṭ) of the rule. Ghazali, most probably for the first time, 

divided the rational method to explore the ‘illah into three types: 

verification of the basis of the rule (taḥqīq al-manāṭ), refinement of 

the basis of the rule (tanqīḥ al-manāṭ) and derivation of the basis of 

the rule (takhrīj al-manāṭ); priorly the standard method to explore the 

‘illah was through employment of textual implications (dalālāt al-

naÎ), reasoning by literal interpretation (istidlāl) and analogy.22 



44        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

6.2 Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah23  as a Soft Theory of Interpretation: 

Ghazali’s Revisions 

 The four mainstream schools of law represent four different 

persuasions to interpret the legal content of Islam. These four 

methodologies emerged from two trends of classical times, namely 

ahl al-ÍadÊth manifested in the methods of the schools of Malik, 

Shāfi‘ī and Ahmad and ahl al-rÉ’y, the method of the school of Abu 

Hanifa; generally categorized into two broader theoretical models of 

interpretation, viz. manhÉj al-mutakalimūn and manhÉj al-fuqaha’, 

respectively. The major distinctive feature between the two methods 

is that the model of ahl al-rÉ’y is founded on the use of general 

principles while as ahl al- ÍadÊth focused on the literal interpretation 

of the texts. The model of ahl al- ÍadÊth was championed by the four-

source theory of al-Shāfi‘ī.24 In the process, the legal theory of al-

Shāfi‘ī dominated the school of ahl al-ÍadÊth. Some trends within this 

school, of which the standard position of the literal interpretation of 

the text remains its distinguishing feature, pushed towards the 

extreme literalism by the extinct school of Dawud al-Zahiri by-

passing the middle course taken by al-Shāfi‘ī, and to some extent this 

literalistic tendency survived in the Hanbali school. It is this stated 

literalism and the allied problems of interpretation of this persuasion 

from where maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah model of thinking emerged.25 It 

served two purposes for this school, firstly it defined the role and 

scope of human reason in lawmaking process and secondly, it 

contributed towards this school the potential to stay live, avoiding 

formalism and not letting it loose the sight of the emerging issues and 

challenges vis-à-vis the spirit of the law. It was by fifth century that 

the Shāfi‘īte uÎūli-philosopher al-Ghazali came forth with this theory.  

 The theory of al-Shāfi‘ī is generally typified as a ‘strict theory 

of interpretation’ for its emphasis on the methods of strictly literal 

interpretation. From the time of al-Shāfi‘ī until the fifth century, the 

major contributions towards the uÎūl studies in the school of 

mutakalimūn, came in the shape of annotations and explanations upon 

the work of Shāfi‘ī. By the fifth century, al-Ghazali emerged within 

this school with a greater project of revival of the Islamic sciences 

including the legal theory. Al-Ghazali, building upon the views of his 

teacher al-Juwayni, proposed a ‘soft theory of interpretation’ known 

as maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah or the theory of the purposes of the law. This 

theory of interpretation does not follow al-Shāfi‘ī’s theory in its 

totality, but is an original effort to construct a model characterised by 

flexibility, inclusivity and is intricately nuanced (against the simple 

reading of the texts and the issues at hand) than the former.26 Nyazee 

highlights the contribution of al-Ghazali in these words: 

 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     45 

 The only way that the law found in the texts can be extended 

to all areas of human activity is through the general principles of 

Islamic law. These are found in abundance in the Qur’ān as well as 

the Sunnah of the Prophet. Al-Ghazali not only laid down methods 

for the identification of the principles of the Qur’ān and Sunnah, 

principles that ultimately point to the purposes of the law, but he also 

gave a detailed methodology to be used by the jurists for deriving the 

law from these general principles. All this could have been a part of 

al-Ghazali’s grand scheme for the revival of religious sciences.27 

 The method used for the extension of the law to the various 

areas of human activity was qiyās, a strict syllogistic procedure 

practiced by the school of mutakalimūn. Ghazali opened the idea of 

strict analogy and introduced the concepts of maÎlaÍah and maqāṣid 

into the procedure of qiyās. In the illustration of his legal thinking, al-

Ghazali authored some significant works like al-Manqūl, Shifā al-

Ghalīl, al-Mūstasfā and TahdhÊb al-ŪÎūl. Al-Manqūl represents the 

thought processes of younger Ghazali overwhelmed by his teacher al-

Juwayni. Shifā al-Ghalīl and al-Mūstasfā are representative of 

Ghazali’s engagement with uÎËl theory and maps the evolution of his 

thought process; while as TahdhÊb al-UÎūl was lost.28 For the project 

of stating a interpretative theory, he argues in two of his seminal 

works Shifā al-Ghalīl fi Bayān al-Shubh wa al-Mukhayyal wa 

Masālik al-Ta‘lÊl and al-Mūstasfā min ‘Ilm al-ŪÎūl, the last one being 

one of the most important works of the uÎūl studies ever. Mapping 

the progression in legal theory of Ghazali, Hallaq opines existence of 

substantial differences on the theory of ta‘lÊl and other aspects of his 

uÎūl theory in these works.29 

 Ghazali espouses the concept of munāsabah30 in his system 

of legal reasoning to arrive at the legal cause. By munāsabah, it means 

a rationale, an inner meaning or an idea (ma‘na) evidently intelligible 

to the intellect (ma‘qËl ÐāhirÉn fil ‘aql), that can be established clearly 

against the opponent by logical reasoning for the attribute of 

unreasonableness in his expression.31 The suitable reason (al-ma‘āni 

al-munāsibah) are those which point to the various aspects of public 

interest (maÎāliÍ) and to their emblems. The word maÎlaÍah is 

ambiguous since it can mean both seeking benefit (jalb manfa‘ah) 

and avoiding harm (daf‘ madarrah), whereas the word munāsabah 

means taking into account an issue intended to achieve (amr maqÎËd). 

The two categories of the objective (maqÎËd) are religious (dÊni) and 

worldly (dunyāwi), and within each category there are two 

dimensions of acquisition (taÍÎÊl) and preservation (ibqā). A thing's 

discontinuity (inqitÉ‘) is harm, and its preservation (ibqā) is to 

prevent harm. Acquisition is something that is referred to as seeking 

utility, and preservation is something that is referred to averting harm. 

As a result, the comprehensive phrase ‘consideration of goals’ 



46        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

(ri‘Éyah al-maqāÎid) includes preservation (ibqā), avoidance of harm 

(daf‘ al-qawÉti‘) and acquisition (taÍÎÊl).  

 All kinds of suitability return to the consideration of goals. 

Munāsib is something which refers to a goal; hence detachment from 

a goal excludes from being munāsib.32 He then makes a connection 

between munāsib and the five fundamental principles (kulliyāt 

khams) that are taken into account in every religio-legal system. 

According to the argument, there must be objective of lawmaker, and 

its consideration falls under munāsabah in the context of the 

Sharī‘ah. He continues that it is undeniable that the objectives of the 

Sharī‘ah encompass the preservation of life, reason, off springs, 

property and religion.33 In Shifā, Ghazali distinguishes maÎlaÍah 

from munāsabah. The former connoting seeking something 

beneficial, and eliminating what is harmful; while as the latter 

referring to the preservation of an objective. However, he recognizes 

maÎlaÍah with munāsib in al-Mūstasfā. He remarks: 

 Originally maÎlaÍah is seeking utility and removing harm, 

but we do not mean by that by it, for seeking utility and removing 

harm are the objectives of people, and their good lies in the 

acquisition of their objectives. By maÎlaÍah we mean preservation of 

the objectives of the Sharī‘ah , and the objectives of the Sharī‘ah  are 

five-fold. Anything which involves preservation of these five 

principles (uÎūl khamsah) is maÎlaÍah, and that which causes the loss 

of these principles is mafsadah, and removing it is maÎlaÍah. When 

we apply the phrase alma‘na al-mukhil wa’l munāsib in the chapter 

of qiyās, we mean by it this kind.34  

 Ghazali is not confusing maÎlaÍah with munāsabah. He 

clearly differentiates them by stating a sort of ambiguity attached to 

maÎlaÍah. In al-Mūstasfā, he reveals the kernel of maÎlaÍah and 

offers a definition in likeness with munāsib, probably his expression 

is either figurative or is compelled by the degree of likeness between 

the two.35 In Hallaq’s estimate, Ghazali's theory of munāsabah in 

Shifā and al-Mūstasfā differ significantly from one another. In al-

Mūstasfā, he is noticeably less creative and more orthodox, and this 

conservatism appears to permeate every aspect of legal philosophy in 

this work. It is noteworthy that in Shifā he provides a thorough 

examination of the theme of maÎlaÍah and ri‘āyah al-maqāÎid under 

the category of munāsabah, adopting maÎlaÍah as a formally 

acceptable premise. On the other hand, in al-Mūstasfā he drops reason 

as an important factor in defining maÎlaÍah by refusing to discuss it 

under munāsabah and shifts it to the chapter on istiÎlāÍ, where this 

principle is viewed as controversial, and reduced a significant avenue 

of reasoning to the realm of dubious legitimacy.36  



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     47 

 In the methodological part of his theory, the major thesis for 

discernment and extension of the law is the method of munāsabah.37 

The concept of munāsabah is equated with the broader concept of 

maÎlaÍah, to mean accomplishing the good (jalb al-manfa‘ah) and 

repulsion of evil (daf‘ al-maÌarra).38 Munāsabah as a method 

advocates reasoning from general principles of law and is subdivided 

into two authentic processes of extension of law, munāsib mu’athir 

and munāsib mulā‘im, and a disputed one – gharÊbah.39 Munāsib 

mu’athir is the principle stated explicitly in the text,40 employed 

through qiyās al-ma‘ani and qiyās al-‘illah. This part of the theory of 

munāsabah is accepted and utilized by all major jurists who validate 

qiyās as a legitimate legal method, discussed in the books of uÎūl al-

fiqh under the rubric of qiyās. Nevertheless, the principles are stated 

expressly in the text but are limited.41 In case of munāsib mulā‘im, it 

is subdivided into two: mulā‘im and istidlÉl al-mursal.42 In the 

method of mulā‘im, the principles are derived vis-à-vis general 

propositions cum maqāÎid of the law. In this case, the innovative part 

are the conditions to qualify the principles as argued by Ghazali. It is 

through these rules that an unstable cause rooted in Íikmah qualifies 

as more stable and falls in line with the rest of the law. The two 

conditions are: Firstly, the derived principle should confirm with 

maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah, to qualify the principle as munāsib. Secondly, 

the derived principles should not confront the general practices of 

law, to mean they should be consistent with the rest of the law. The 

second part of munāsib mulā‘im is istidlÉl al-mursal. The principles 

are not directly derived from the texts, but are principally identified 

on the basis of their degree of conformity with the universal 

propositions of the law and maqāṣid al-SharÊ‘ah. In addition, there 

are three more conditions to qualify them as munasab mulā‘im and 

prevent them from falling under the rejected category of GharÊb; 

firstly, it ought not be gharÊb; secondly, not clash with the text and 

thirdly, not endeavour to modify the implication of the legal text - the 

general propositions and the principles of the law.43  

 In Ghazalian model, this innovative part devises the 

mechanism that restricts the irrepressible use of human agency of 

Íikmah (rational process), for the derivation of the principles by 

demanding the conditions of munāsabah and mulā‘amah.44 The two 

concepts of mulā‘im and istidlÉl al-mursal are not new in their 

conceptualization, as shown by al-Ghazali, but in the theorization as 

a well-defined methodology of extension of law. In this method,45  al-

Ghazali opines, mulā‘im is an agreed upon method while as istidlāl 

al-mursal or maÎlaÍah al-mursalah are a disputed one, employed by 

the Maliki school and disputed by Shāfi‘ī, majorly. 



48        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

6.3 Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah  and the Theory of Ijtihād  (Discernment 

of the Basis of Ratio-Legis/ ‘Illah):  Shatibi’s Scheme of 

Reconstruction of Legal Theory 

Shatibi’s interest in uÎūl al-fiqh was fashioned by the 

impression of methodological and philosophical inadequacy of 

uÎūl al-fiqh to cope up with the challenge of legal-cum-social 

change.46 Shatibi proposed the concept of maÎlaÍah as the 

essential and common-ground between legal obligations, legal 

and social change, and the method of legal reasoning. Shatibi 

acknowledged the traditional classification of maÎlaÍah but 

questioned the limitations levelled against it . The fundamental 

elements of Shatibi’s concept of maÎlaÍah are: (1) attention 

for the necessities of man, (2) the rationality of legal 

commandments and the responsibility of man, (3) protection 

from harm, and (4) consistency with the objectives of the law-

giver. His elaborations of the concept of maÎlaÍah were 

befitting to his understanding of social-cum-legal change. 

Regarding the change in human societies, he maintained, 

changes are fundamentally a product of human needs . When 

these changes go beyond the provisions of the rules of law or 

become too complicated for the existing law, a jurist is 

compelled to examine the law and legal theory as they relate 

to the changes in question.  

Shatibi defines ijtihÉd in terms of the process of legal 

change, and divides it into four types and arrives at a novel 

conclusion about the principle of ijtihād, as Masud maintains, 

the relation between Shatibi’s legal theory to the problem of 

adaptability of Islamic legal theory as a response to social 

change, not drawing on the tool of murā’at al-khilÉf. In his 

broader scheme, ijtihād offers a method to cater legal change; 

maÎlaÍah gives a basis and direction to change; and the 

concepts of bid‘ah and ta‘abbud defines the limits of social 

and legal changes.47 In Shatibi’s legal theory, maqāÎid al-

Sharī‘ah is a principal concept through which he attempts to 

ascertain maÎlaÍah as the bedrock of maqāÎid theory, and by 

extension of the law itself. In establishing this premise, he 

wrestles with two significant questions of the relativity of 

maÎlaÍah and the relationship of maÎlaÍah with legal 

responsibility. Contradicting the implications of theological 

determinism and relativity of maÎlaÍah, he analyses the 

problem at two levels of the lawgiver and the subject of the 

law. At the first level, it is the Lawgiver who decides what is 

maÎlaÍah, which is not absolute and is exclusive for all times 

to come. While at the level two, the objective of the mukallaf 

is to abide by the maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah . Hence, he categorizes 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     49 

the maqāÎid into two classes: the intent of the Lawgiver and 

the intents of the subject of law.48 

• Intention of the Law-Giver (QaÎd al-ShÉrī‘):49 It consists of 

four aspects: 

 

1. Higher Objective of Instituting the Law: The purposefulness of 

God in revealing the law is to safeguard man's interests, both 

mundane and religious, are divided into three categories: Ìarurāt, 

ÍÉjiyyāt and taÍsiniyyāt. The subject matter is maÎlaÍah, its meaning, 

classification, characteristics and nature. 

2. Higher Objective of General Intelligibility (ifhām) of the Sharī‘ah: 

The Sharī‘ah is comprehensible in its language (the significance of 

Arabic vis-à-vis the idea of ummīyyah). Only in the light of the 

principles, modes of expressions of the language can the ummīyyah 

status of the holy Qur’Én and Sunnah be understood. And if there is 

no norm to guide interpretation of the holy Qur’Én, then whatever 

interpretation is chosen must not be in conflict with any other 

convention or be foreign to Arab customs. The Sharī‘ah must not be 

elitist, but should be comprehensible to laypeople as well. It discusses 

the semantics of the subject of obligation (taklīf), under two sub-

categories of al-dalālah al-aÎlīyyah (essential meanings) and 

ummīyyah (intelligible to commonality).  

3. Higher Objective in Establishing Law to Demand Legal 

Responsibility (taklīf): The law is revealed to demand full obedience 

from the Muslims. However, adherence would not be feasible unless 

the requirements of God’s law were reasonable given what believers 

could handle. The question of taklīf in reference to qudrah (power), 

mashaqqah (hardship) etc. is discussed under this objective.  

4. Higher Objective in Recognizing the Propensity of the Subject of 

Law: Shatibi argues that the upright life cannot be accomplished by 

indulging in personal caprices and desires. It discusses the natural 

drives and instincts of the subjects, huzuz and hawa, with respect to 

following the law, ta‘abbud. Under this objective, Shatibi, argues for 

the universality of the Sharī‘ah, which is inclusive of all the interests 

of the seen and the unseen world. Hence, it obligates the submission 

of humanity before its authority in all respects, to bring happiness of 

both the worlds.  

Objectives of the Legal Subject (QaÎd al-Mukallaf):50 

Under this category, qaÎd al-mukallaf, Shatibi deals with the 

question of intentions and acts of the legal subject, and establishes the 

inseparability of the actions from their intentions as the principle; 

actions holds no Sharī‘ah value in absence of an intention. This 



50        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

implies that legal commands must be carried out in conformity with 

the intents of the Lawgiver. Therefore, the individual's objectives in 

carrying out the law, based on the three universals - Ìarurāt, Íajīyyāt, 

and taÍsiniyāt, should be consistent with God's intentions of 

promoting and maintaining these universals i.e., human interests, that 

a legal subject would be held accountable for. Thus, the person is 

God's representative on Earth and represents God in promoting social 

welfare by confirming His goals. Shatibi believed that he would be 

breaking the law if he attempted application of the law in a manner 

not intended by the Lawgiver. On the negative side of the equation, if 

anybody attempts to achieve the goals other than ones laid down by 

the law through the stipulated obligations, has actually violated the 

law.51 In his framework of maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah  vis-à-vis traditional 

ūÎūli methodology, Shatibi employed the concept of maÎlaÍah to free 

the Islamic legal theory from the rigidity and limitations with relation 

to the extension of the law by re-examining and re-stating the 

conventional premises and inter-play of theology, linguistic rules and 

logic.52   

6.4 Redefining the Process and Scope of Ijtihād: The Shatibian 

Model 

The conundrum remains how do we find a connect between 

the qaÎd of the Lawgiver and the subject of the law in the issues not 

determined by the text. This is where the theory of maqāÎid comes 

into play largely, and specifically the sub-category of Shatibi’s 

maqāÎid based ijtihād, i.e., ijtihād rooted in manāṭ. For Shatibi, 

understanding the theory of intentions (maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah) in its 

entirety is an indispensable requirement for exercising ijtihād . Still 

the question remains, in the mechanics of exercising ijtihad - where 

does a mujtahid employ the theory of maqāÎid to extend the Sharī‘ah 

value. In response to this query, Shatibi engages with the theory of 

tanqīÍ al-manāṭ53 vis-à-vis his theory of maÎlaÍah, one of the 

important methods to discern ‘illah and hence the extension of the 

Sharī‘ah value, generally included under the chapter of masalak al-

‘illah in the books of uÎūl.  

He broadly classifies ijtihād into two main categories: that in 

which ijtihād may be needed continuously and that in which ijtihād 

may come to an end. The first form, referred to as taÍqīq al-manāṭ, is 

unanimously practiced by all jurists in their respective fields. It 

denotes the examination and confirmation of the locus of legal rule. 

This kind of ijtihād can never end because without it, legal regulations 

are reduced to mere theoretical and mental constructs that have 

nothing to do with actual application, which renders the law 

meaningless. TaÍqÊq al-manāṭ is the process of discerning the 

essential character of a case and its execution in the external world. 

The second category of ijtihād that may come to an end is further 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     51 

divided into three categories, the first is known as tanqīÍ al-manāṭ, 

which refers to the identification of the ratio-legis insofar as it is 

separated from characteristics that are associated with it in the texts. 

The second category, referred to as takhrīj al-manāṭ, also referred as 

al-ijtihād al-qiyāsi, studies the texts to draw out what would 

otherwise be an unspecified ratio-legis. The third category is an 

extension of the first major kind, taÍqīq al-manāṭ, being more 

nuanced and precise form of ijtihād. Precisely, it relates to the subject 

of the law vis-à-vis individual and particularized context of the 

subject. It is the job of a mujtahid to examine these particular 

situations and apply the most appropriate law. This third category 

seems to be unique in a way that that it finds no place in earlier uÎūl 

works. Shatibi advances a lengthy discussion in support of this 

category, invoking the Prophetic examples, who provided a variety of 

responses to the same questions with respect to the context of the 

questioner.54  

In the estimate of Masud,55 because of the dependence of 

method of legal reasoning on the legal provision, any new case is to 

be examined with relation to these provisions for their validation or 

otherwise. The provisions may be implicit or explicit; implicit in form 

of general rules or absence of any prohibition. It is this nature of these 

provisions which justify the continuity of ijtihād or otherwise. It is 

explained by showing how the fundamental components of the new 

case correspond with the basis of the legal provision. These legal 

bases, called as manāṭ, are either explicit or are known through 

further application of ijtihād.   

In reference to these manāṭ, Shatibi divides ijtihād into four 

categories: 

1. Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ al-‘Óm56 (General Verification of the Basis 

of the Rule of the Sharī‘ah). 

2. Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ al-KhāÎ57 (Verification of Individualized and 

Particularized Aspects of the Rule). 

3. Tanqīḥ al-Manāṭ58 (Refinement of the Basis of the Rule). 

4. Takhrīj al-Manāṭ59 (Deduction of the Basis of the Rule). 

 

Shatibi maintains that in these four categories, the first one, 

taÍqīq al-manāṭ al-‘aām, is ever continuing, while as the continuity 

of the rest three, taḥqīq al-manāṭ al-khāṣ, tanqīÍ al-manāṭ and takhrīj 

al-manāṭ, depends on their need and novelty of the new issues, and 

this is what justifies the principle of ijtihād.60 While as with reference 

to the legal material required for ijtihād, Shatibi explains three 

processes of ijtihād. First, the process of drawing inferences from the 

scripted legal material (nuÎËṣ), which necessitates the knowledge of 

Arabic language. Knowing Arabic language primarily, Shatibi 



52        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

maintains, does not mean knowing the grammar, syntax etc. but the 

understanding of the Arab usage.61 The second process of ijtihÉd does 

not directly concern the legal text but the law, which necessitates the 

knowledge of ‘ilm maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah. With respect to four 

categories of manāṭ-based ijtihād, this process concerns the taÍqīq al-

manāṭ and takhrīj al-manāṭ. The third is the process of deduction and 

does not require the above-mentioned qualifications. In this process, 

the verified basis of the rule (manāṭ) is applied to the specific case, 

involving two premises: taÍaqquq al-manāṭ (investigation of the 

basis of the rule) and taÍakkum (the judgement). Shatibi explains that 

the process of deduction involved in this category should be seen 

distinctly from the method of logicians.62 Meanwhile, Shatibi rejects 

any requirement of the science of logic, while as reiterates knowledge 

of Arabic language and maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah as the absolute necessity 

for exercising ijtihād .63 In his scheme of extension of law, Shatibi 

accentuates the need to integrate the higher objectives (maqāÎid al-

Sharī‘ah) with the bases of legal judgements (‘ilal) to broaden the 

scope of ijtihÉd vis-à-vis the proper application of the Sharī‘ah. Al-

Raysuni, while corroborating the same, opines ‘if we simply take 

texts literally or at face value, we restrict their domain and diminish 

what they have to offer. If, on the other hand, we understand them in 

light of their bases and objectives, they become an abundant reservoir 

of aid and guidance: the door to qiyās is opened wide, as is the door 

to istiÎlāÍ, and the legal rulings take their natural course in achieving 

the higher objectives of the Lawgiver by bringing benefits and 

preventing harm.’64  

7. Conclusion  

 In context of overwhelming debates in the field of Islamic 

legal theory, the engagement of the academic scholarship with the 

theme of ijtihād vis-à-vis the conceptions of maÎlaÍah in the pre-

modern and modern scholarship, the paper endeavors to analyze the 

attempts to integrate the theory of ijtihād with maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah 

as a stride towards establishing a parallel system of legal thinking to 

replace the strict qiyās based ijtihād in the later part of Islamic 

intellectual history, looking into the contributions of  Ghazali and 

Shatibi. By the 5-6th century A.H, the legal theory had matured to its 

fullest, the contentions about the legal epistemology and 

hermeneutical principles had settled, and each methodological school 

provided an advanced system of inference. So, the scholarly attention 

thus shifted to methods of reasoning, generally subsumed under the 

category of qiyÉs. In articulation of this part of legal theory, Ghazali 

provided some significant insights about ratio-legis, how do we 

conceptualize it, ascertain it from different sources and extend the 

legal norm based on the ratio. Ghazali seemingly did not fiddle with 

the general broader epistemological structure of the traditional uÎūl 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     53 

al-fiqh  to replace it with an independent-cum-libertarian maqāÎid 

model of legal philosophy, rather he attempted advancing the concept 

of ijtihād, defining it in broader terms than just being an equivalent 

of qiyās arguing from the reference of munāsabah-maÎlaÍah 

equation, what may be called as the shift from a strict-theory of 

interpretation towards a soft-theory of interpretation, to bring in more 

nuances in legal thinking. The attempt was to develop a soft theory of 

interpretation but not at the cost of his theological (Asharite) position 

of ethical voluntarism, which informs the fundamental assumption of 

invalidity of human reason to work more autonomously, cementing 

the textual-literalism in traditional uÎūl model. He was more 

concerned about reviving a broader working space for ijtihād than 

just being a tool of syllogism. Therefore, to address the relevance of 

ijtihād to developing world of Islamic civilization, Ghazali 

introduced the concept of maÎlaÍah in the mode of ijtihÉd-exercising, 

albeit he is very cautious about not giving a greater role to human 

reason and hence siding more towards the Shāfi’ī textualism. In his 

maqāÎid based legal theory, Ghazali actually restricted the use of 

reason by denying textually neutral maÎlaÍah an inherently 

independent epistemological value.  

 Although Shatibi is an ethical voluntarist too, but his 

voluntarism is more liberal than the mainstream Ash‘arism or that of 

Ghazali’s, standing more towards employing the argument of 

skepticism against argument of authority of human rational capacity, 

while not choosing the argument of moral relativism. The general 

context he lived in, pushed him to revisit the legal theory at large and 

specifically the concept of ijtihād and its underlying assumptions 

which limited the scope of original legal thinking. Early in his career, 

Shatibi realized the failure of traditional uÎūli model in meaningfully 

addressing the emerging issues of social change and politico-

economic problems. This failure of the uÎūli model, he ascribed to the 

employment of strict text-based analogy (qiyās) for extension of law 

while overlooking the higher objectives of the Sharī‘ah. So, in his 

scheme of the extension of law, Shatibi placed the doctrine of 

maqāÎid al-Sharī‘ah  at the very center of his thesis. To arrive at the 

legal ruling by deciphering the basis of the legal rule, Shatibi used the 

manāṭ-model, taÍqīq al-manāṭ, tanqīÍ al-manāṭ and takhrīj al-manāṭ 

vis-a-via his theory of maÎlaÍah. Shatibi acknowledged the 

Ghazalian classification of maqāÎid but contested the strict textual 

orientation of his maqāÎid theory; Shatibi proved to be more 

libertarian in giving the human faculty of reason a share in legal 

thinking. In the modern era, with the unprecedented assault of 

colonial modernity on the traditional legal institutions, legal thinking 

and production of legal knowledge, the process of reformation to 

reclaim Islamic law started with Muhammad ‘Abduh’s efforts. This 

process of reformation engaged a whole lot of ‘ulama’, jurisprudents 



54        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

and scholars alike including Rashid Rida, ibn Ashur, Jamal al-Din 

Qasimi, ‘Allal al-Fasi, Subhi Mehmasani, Abd al-Wahab Khallaf, 

Abu Zahra, Mahmud Muhammad Taha etc. to re-envision the Islamic 

legal theory and the premises of Islamic law, majorly drawing upon 

the maqāṣid/ maṣlahah theses of al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi. 

Notes and References 

 
 
1 Taha Jabir Al-Alwani, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence (New 

Delhi: Al Ittehad Publications, 2010), 1.  
2 Abu Zahra, Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1985), 3, 7-9. 

Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence 

(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997), p. 1.  
3 Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 11-12. Kamali, Principles, 3.  
4 For a detailed and critical analysis of these developments in the field of 

legal theory, see Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shāfi’ī, Al-Risalah, Tr. Majid 

Khadduri (United Kingdom: The Islamic Texts Society) 295-310; 

Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Issues in the Legal Theory of Uṣūl and the 

Prospects for Reform”, Islamic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1(Spring 2001): 5-23. 

Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Methodological Issues in Islamic 

Jurisprudence”, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1996): 3-33. Dr. 

Younes Soualhi, “The Uṣūli Thought Between Dynamicity and Rigidity-A 

Critical Analysis”, Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. XXIX, No. 3: 57-69. Fazlur 

Rehman, Islamic Methodology in History, (Pakistan: Islamic Research 

Institute, 1984), 149-191. Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 

Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Uṣūl al-Fiqh, (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1997), 16-35.  
5 Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2010), 123-146.  
6 Ijtihād is ‘the total operationalization of jurist’s efforts in order to infer, 

with a degree of probability, the rules of the Sharī‘ah from their detailed 

evidences in the sources.’ It also refers to a jurist’s employment of all his 

faculties, either in inferring the rules of the Sharī‘ah from the sources or in 

employing such rules and relating them to a particular situation. (Abu Zahra, 

Uṣūl, 379. Kamali, Principles, 367). 
7 Kamali, Principles, 379. 
8 Kamali, Principles, 379. 
9 Al-Shāfi’ī, Al-Risalah, 288-294.  
10 Kamali, Principles, 379-380.  
11 Al-Alwani, Source Methodology, 36-38.  

Lowry states the theory of bayān, as the central thesis of Risālah, to mean 

‘the entirety of the law resides in two texts, the Qur’ān and the Sunna, and 

all legal rules are expressed by one of five possible combinations of those 

two textual sources. Those combinations are the following: 

(i) Qur’ān alone. 

(ii) Qur’ān and Sunna together, each expressing the same rule. 

(iii) Qur’ān and Sunna together, whereby the Sunna explains what is in the 

Qur’ān. 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     55 

 
(iv) Sunna alone. 

(v) Neither, in which case one engages in legal interpretation, ijtihad. [see, 

Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muhammad ibn 

Idris al- Shāfi’ī (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 24.] 
12 Qiyās is defined in terms of the extension of a Sharī‘ah value from original 

case (asl) - whose Sharī‘ah value is determined by the primary legal 

indicants directly, to a new case (far’) - whose Sharī‘ah  value is not 

addressed by the primary legal indicants, by invoking the common effective 

cause (‘illah), to establish the legal position (ḥukm). A certain legal text 

governs the original case, and qiyās strives to apply the same textual ruling 

to the new case. The application of qiyās is justified by the fact that the 

original case and the new case share the same effective cause, or 'illah. 

Although a rationalist theory, the textual imports of the divine revelation 

take precedence over the ones reached at by employing human faculty of 

reason (rÉ’y). Finding a shared 'illah between the original and the new case 

is the principal area in which human rational faculty operates in qiyās. Once 

the ‘illah is determined, invoking the principle of analogy requires the ruling 

of the relevant text be followed without any intervention or change. 

Generally, the jurist while utilizing qiyās pays little attention to the maqāṣid 

aspect of the Sharī‘ah, the aspect which is in harmony with reason. Hence, 

any rational approach to the discovery and identification of the maqāṣid 

demands recourse to human intellect and judgement in the assessment of the 

ahkām. (see, Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 218. Kamali, Principles, 197-198).  
13 ‘Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf, ‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Egypt: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 

1996), 61-62. Kamali, Principles, 206-207. 

In the books of usul, it is generally defined as the quality of the asl that is 

consistent, obvious, and has an appropriate (munāsib) link to the legal rule 

of the text (Íukm). The 'illah is also known as sabab, manāṭ al-Íukm (i.e., 

the cause/basis of the ḥukm), and amarah al-ḥukm (sign of the ḥukm). 

(Khallaf, 61-62; Kamali,206-207) 
14 Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 243-245. Kamali, Principles 211. 
15 Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 245-246, Kamali, Principles, 213-214. 
16 Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 243-244.  Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Uṣūl al-fiqh al-Islami 

(Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2015), vol. I, 657. Khallaf, ‘Ilm, 82-83. Hallaq, 

Islamic Legal Theories, 88.  
17 Ahmad Hasan, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence: A Study 

of Juridical Principle of Qiyās (New Delhi: Adam Publishers and 

Distributors, 2009), 232-233. 
18 Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 83.  
19 Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 88-89.  
20 Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 88-89.  
21 Al-Zuhayli, Uṣūl, vol. I, 642-656. Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 90.  
22 Hasan, Analogical Reasoning,354.   
23 For a detailed introduction of maqasid al-Shari’ah and some debates 

revolving around it, see Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, Maqasid Al-

Shari‘ah: Meaning, Scope and Ramifications, Al-Shajarah, ISTAC Journal 

of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2020; Yasir S. Ibrahim, 

‘An Examination of the Modern Discourse on Maqasid al-Shari‘a’, The 

Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 5:1; Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-

Shari’ah: A Beginner’s Guide,  Maqasid al-Sharī‘ah as Philosophy of 

Islamic Law: A System’s Approach (Washington: IIIT, 2008); Mohammad 



56        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

 
Omar Farooq, Towards Our Reformation From Legalism to Value-Oriented 

Islamic Law and Jurisprudence (IIIT, Virginia, 2011); Mohammad Hashim 

Kamali, ‘History and Jurisprudence of the Maqasid:  A Critical Appraisal’, 

American Journal of Islam and Society, 38, nos. 3-4:8-34.   
24 Joseph Lowry contests the theory of four-source attribution to Shāfi’ī and 

argues for the theory of bayan as the central thesis of Risalah, not the four-

sources theory. In his view, it is the theory of bayan that explains the process 

of legal interpretation in five hierarchical steps of discerning the law through 

five modes of Qur’an-Sunnah combinations, which is a two-source based 

theory. See, Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23-46. Joseph 

Lowry, “Does Shāfi’ī have a Theory of Four Sources of Law?” in Studies in 

Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 23-50.  
25 Nyazee, Theories, 147.  
26 Nyazee, Theories, 185-186.  
27 Nyazee, Theories, 190. 
28 George Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazali’s Writings”, Journal 

of the American Oriental Society, 104 (1984), 289-302.  
29 Wael Hallaq, “Uṣūl al-Fiqh: Beyond Tradition”, Journal of Islamic 

Studies, 3:2 (1992), 172-202.  
30 Munāsib means that which proceeds the line of human good (minhāj al-

masālih) in a way that when a rule is attributed to it, it becomes uniform 

(intazama). As an illustration, wine was prohibited for the reason that it 

disturbs the faculty of reason of man which is the basis of legal obligation. 

Thus, intoxication is a suitable (munāsib) quality for its forbiddance. But if 

someone argues that it has been forbidden because it produces foam or is 

preserved in a jar, these qualities cannot be taken as suitable for prohibition. 

[Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Al-Mūstasfā, (Cairo, 1937), Vol. II, 77].  
31 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Shifā al-Ghalīl, ed. Ahmad al-Kubysi, (Baghdad: 

Matba’a al-Irshad, 1971), 143. 

As an example for this method, the Qur‘an forbids wine for its reason of 

affecting intoxication, henceforth incapacitates the mind,  leads to evil 

behavior and neglect of religious duties (2:219, 4:43, 5:90-91). Even, if the 

Qur’an had been silent for the rationale of this prohibition, it would have 

been intelligible to understand the rationale of this prohibition. This is what 

Ghazali argues as the reasoning on the basis of suitability, which can discern 

the harm independently of the revelation. Using the agency of munasabah 

and maqasid al-Shari‘ah (the protection of the integrity of the mind), 

Ghazali would declare all kinds of intoxicating drinks (not mentioned in the 

Qur’an) as prohibited for the rationale of intoxication being the sole rational 

cause of prohibition. (Al-Mustasfa, 1:118) 
32 Ghazali, Shifā, 159. 
33 Ghazali, Shifā, 160.  

34 Ghazali, Al-Mūstasfā, Vol. I, 139-140.  
35 Hasan, Analogical Reasoning, 253-254.  
36 Hallaq, “Uṣūl al-Fiqh”, 172-202. 

Opwis notes this difference in these words, ‘the main difference between the 

discussion of maslaha in Shifa and al-Mustasfá is one of approach. In Shifa, 

al-Ghazali starts out with determining the ratio legis to end up with questions 

of the purposes of the law, whereas in al-Mustasfa he first elaborates on the 

purposes of the law and then explains how to identify these correctly as 

rationes legis of rulings. Apart from use of technical terminology and 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     57 

 
categories, the two treatises also differ in the extent to which decisions based 

on considerations of maslaha constitute valid law.’ (Felicitas Opwis, 

Maslaha and the Purpose of the Law – Islamic Discourse on Legal Change 

from the 4th/10th to 8th/14th Century, Leiden, Brill, 2010, 65) 
37 Ghazali, Shifā, 142-264. 

Munāsib, translated as suitability, is categorized into two sub-categories: the 

concrete propositions (haqiqi ‘aqli) and convincing norms (khayali iqna’i). 

Haqiqi ‘aqli are qualified through an investigative process which determine 

its convincing case for its convincing propositional value and its suitability 

(munāsabah). While as khayali iqna’i during the course of investigation do 

not qualify the qualities of haqiqi ‘aqli, but are qualifying the ethical and 

moral values. With relation to maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah , the haqiqi ‘aqli 

constitute the darurāt and hajat, while as khayali iqna’i constitute the 

tahsinat. (see, Shifā, 172. Theories, 212-214).  
38 Ghazali, Shifā, 159. 
39 Ghazali, Shifā, 158.  
40 Nyazee, Theories, 214. 
41 Nyazee, Theories, 215. 
42 Ghazali, Shifā, 188. Nyazee, Theories, 215. 
43 Nyazee, Theories, 217-218. 
44 Nyazee, Theorie, 216-217. 

Anver Emon states the status of the authority of reason in Ghazali’s scheme 

as, ‘the munasabah both enables and limits the role of reason in al-Ghazali’s 

model of practical reasoning’. (Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories, 

p. 145).  
45 Ghazali, Shifā, 188. Nyazee, Theories, 211-212. 
46 Masud, Mohammad Khalid. Islamic Legal Philosophy-A Study of Abu 

Ishaq al-Shatibi’s Life and Thought, (Delhi: International Islamic 

Publishers, 1989), 101. 

Al-Shatibi took keen interest in the problems relating to Islamic legal theory 

and majorly focussed on the legal procedures used by Maliki jurists to 

address the issue of social change from the reference point of Maliki uṣūl 

theory. One of the legal concepts used, murā’at al-khilaf, admits the 

diversity of opinions as a fact, in terms of the legal device to accommodate 

the novel social practices. But Shatibi equates using this tool equivalent to 

negating the very basis of the law and henceforth he puts forward his 

doctrine of maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah  as the legal mechanism to engage with the 

problem of social change. He assessed the traditional legal theory in light of 

maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah to conclude inefficiency of the methods of qiyās and 

consequent use of murā’at al-khilaf as well. (see, Masud, Islamic Legal 

Philosophy, 317-319).  
47 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 317-322.  
48 Al-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq. Al-Muwāfaqāt, Dar Ibn Hazm, Beirut, 2014, 200-

201. Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 223-224, 233-234. Ahmad Al-

Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of Higher Objectives and Intents of 

Islamic Law (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2006), 

107-134.  Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 181-182. 
49 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 201-378. Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt 107-128. 
50 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 380-440. Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 128-134. 
51 Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 184-185. Al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s 

Theory, 129-130. 



58        The Interplay of Ijtihād and Maqāṣid … 

 
52 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy: 289-290. 
53 Tanqiḥ literally means to purify, whereas manāṭ is another name for ‘illah. 

Tanqiḥ al-manāṭ, in its technical sense, refers to the process of ‘connecting 

the new case to the original case by removing the discrepancy between them’ 

(ilhāq al-far' bi al-asl bi-ilghā al-fāriq). The extraction of the 'illah, or 

takhrij al-manāṭ, comes before tanqiḥ al-manāṭ and is the first step 

examining the identification of the 'illah. The jurist determines the effective 

cause in every instance when the text or ijma fails to do so by examining the 

pertinent causes according to the modes of ijtihād. If he ends up at 

concluding multiple causes, he proceeds to the next stage, which is to isolate 

the correct cause. In takhrij al-manāṭ, the jurist is dealing with a 

circumstance where an 'illah is not identified; whereas, in tanqiḥ al-manāṭ, 

multiple causes are recognised, and the jurist's role is to choose the 

appropriate 'illah. (Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 245-246. Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Uṣūl al-

fiqh al-Islami, vol. I, 657-659. Kamali, Principles, 213-214).              
54 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 674-677. Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 199-

202.  
55 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 308. 
56 Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ al-‘Aām: It means to verify the application of rule of law 

after it has been established by its legal source (mudrak al-Shar’i), i.e. the 

text, consensus and analogy in the subject (mahal) of the law by examining 

its basis in the general sense. Shatibi refers to this type of reasoning ‘absolute 

reasoning by verification of the basis of the rule’ (al-ijtihād al-mutlaq bi 

taḥqiq al-manāṭ). Human actions are never abstract; they manifest in 

specific cases. The obligations of the Sharī‘ah  are absolute (mutlaq) and 

universal (umumat). A Shari’ah rule will not apply to a particular case until 

it is established if the universal rule covers it. It all relies on ijtihād and is 

the reason for taḥqiq al-manāṭ al-‘Aām to continue for all times. If it 

discontinues, the application of rules of the Sharī‘ah  to human acts will be 

impossible, for example, the compensation for killing a game in the state of 

ihram. The Qur’an (5:95) mandates equivalent compensation, but defining 

the species is necessary. Jurists have determined this compensation, such as 

a ram for a hyena, a goat for a gazelle, a sheep for a deer. (Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 

246; Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 308-309; Hasan, Analogical 

Reasoning, 356-359). 
57 Taḥqīq al-Manāṭ al-Khāṣ: It denotes a specific analysis of the rule’s basis, 

different and refined form of ijtihād than taḥqiq al-manāṭ al-‘Aām. In this 

form of ijtihād, a jurist emphasizes more on piety (taqwa) and wisdom 

(hikma) to discern the good from evil. They examine the mukallaf in the light 

of the guiding lines (dala’il al-taklīfiyya) concerning him to make him 

understand the openings of the devil (madakhil al-shaytan), openings of the 

passion (madakhil al-hawa) and immediate pleasure (huzuz ‘ajila), to 

protect him against these drives. This personalized approach places 

responsibility on the jurist to tailor obligations to individuals. This process 

involves specifying general principles according to individual 

circumstances, a task typically performed through general verification. For 

instance, when the Companions asked the Prophet about the best action, he 

responded based on each person's unique situation and capability. (Hasan, 

Analogical Reasoning, 359-361) 
58 Tanqīḥ al-Manāṭ: It stands for refinement of ‘illah from other associated 

qualities, to extend the rule to other related cases. Shatibi, like Ghazali, 

defines it as identifying a relevant quality mentioned in the rule's text among 



Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XLVII, No 2     59 

 
other qualities. Jurists refine, distinguish and separate it from irrelevant 

qualities by exercising ijtihād. Unlike qiyās, this method relies on literal 

interpretation of texts, termed istidlal or dalalt al-naṣ by Hanafis. Tanqiḥ al-

manāṭ focuses on textual indications rather than identifying the 'illah itself, 

but concerns the textual allusions (dalālāt al-tanbih) vis-à-vis refinement of 

the basis of the rule of the Sharī‘ah. For example, when a bedouin broke his 

fast by having intercourse during Ramadan, the Prophet ordered expiation. 

While the obvious cause was intercourse, other factors like the bedouin's 

identity, time, month, or the specific woman involved could also be 

considered as reasons for the rule's application. Hence, this specific rule of 

expiation can be extended to some other situation with these qualities as the 

basis of the voidance of fast. (Abu Zahra, Uṣūl, 246; Khalid, Islamic Legal 

Philosophy, 309; Hasan, Analogical Reasoning, 361-365) 
59 Takhrīj al-Manāṭ: It involves inferring the basis of a rule from text where 

the 'illah isn't explicitly stated.  Jurists, through reasoning and deliberation, 

derive this basis (manat), termed by Ghazali as al-ijtihād al-qiyāsi. Some 

jurists use takhrij al-manāṭ and munāsabah interchangeably to mean 

determination of ‘illah by the quality of suitability in itself, not by text or 

any other source.  For example, intoxication is the rationale for prohibiting 

wine as well as date-wine (nabidh). In the same way, the sale of wheat in 

exchange of wheat at an unequal rate is unlawful and treated as usury. (Abu 

Zahra, Uṣūl, 245-246; Hasan, Analogical Reasoning, 365-366) 
60 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 308-310.  

Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 674-677.  
61 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 707.  
62 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwāfaqāt, 708-709. 
63 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 309-311. 
64 Al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory, 333-334.  

Ascertaining the foundational ground for maqāṣid-based ijtihād, al-Raysuni 

in his analysis and extension of Shatibi enumerates four maxims and lays the 

ground for further investigation in the field. These referred methods were 

employed by various jurisprudents of the past and al-Raysuni explains them 

by citing examples from the fiqh literature and appropriation of various 

positions with respect to higher objectives of the Sharī‘ah , the maxims are: 

i. Texts and rulings are inseparable from their objectives. 

ii. Combining general principles and evidence applicable to specific cases. 

iii. Realizing benefit and avoiding harm.  

iv. Cogitation over outcomes. (see, Al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory, 

336-362.)