Hrev_master
[Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; 2:1839] [page 9]
Did capitation payment reform
make a difference in Chinese
rural primary health care?
Jing Sun,1 Jun Kang,2 Qian Qu,3
Weibin Zhang,3 Yongqian Tan,4
Wenxian Xiang4
1National Institute of Hospital
Administration, National Health and
Family Planning Commission, Beijing;
2Chongqing Medical University,
Chongqing; 3Chongqing Health Bureau,
Chongqing; 4Qianjiang Health Bureau,
Qianjiang, China
Abstract
This paper evaluated the effect of capitation
payment reform in New Rural Cooperative
Medical Scheme designating primary facilities
in Qianjiang 2007-2009. Retrospective admin-
istrative claims were analyzed. Intercepts
changes of cost per visit in facilities started
the reform in different stages and of overall
Qianjiang were compared. Referral rate, pre-
scribing indicators, hospitalization rate,
income of facility and individuals were com-
pared pre- and post- the reform. Growth rate of
cost per visit in health centers was contained
in 2008, kept unchanged in 2009. Cost contain-
ment effect on village clinics was observed in
each starting stage of reforms, but vanished
later on. Except for the fact the proportion of
essential medicines used in health centers sig-
nificantly increased (c2 test, P<0.05), pre-
scription indicators were not improved signifi-
cantly in all facilities. After a slight increase in
2007, the hospitalization rate continuously
dropped. The monthly income and outpatient
revenue continuously increased in 2006-2009.
Cost containment objective of the capitation
reform was achieved immediately following
the reform, but was not sustainable. Provider
behaviors were partially improved with limited
effects on prescriptions behaviors. The reform
brought no financial loss to both the facilities
and individuals.
Introduction
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NRCMS) has been providing basic health
security for rural residents in China since
2003. The longtime constrained medical needs
of farmers have been thus greatly alleviated.1
Efforts have been made to improve benefit
package, which include covering outpatient
services in addition to inpatient services, and
reducing co-payment of enrollees. There has
been an increasing cost containment pressure
on the local governments.2 Fee for service
(FFS) is the key payment method of NRCMS.
Intermixed with other complicated factors, FFS
has been creating perverse incentives in
Chinese health system, driving the preference
of expensive medicines and over prescribing,
and intensifying the surging medical costs.3,4
There has been a consensus in Qianjiang
that, the NRCMS should shift its payment to
designated facilities from resource exhausted
FFS to pre-paid method. The capitation pay-
ment reform in Qianjiang expected to remove
the perverse incentives for expensive medi-
cines and over prescribing, thereby to rational-
ize provider behavior, and to contain the surg-
ing medical cost.5 The reform in Qianjiang tar-
geted NRCMS designated outpatient services
of health centers and village clinics, started in
July 2007 in 2 village clinics. Another 49 village
clinics followed in January 2008. All other vil-
lage clinics and 4 health centers joint in
October 2008. By January 2009, all health cen-
ters and village clinics fully implemented the
reform. Annual payment limits were calculated
for health centers and village clinics respec-
tively. The limits were calculated based on a
set of comprehensive indicators, which includ-
ed number of population covered and density,
scale and equipment of facilities, annual num-
ber of outpatient visit, total cost per visit, reim-
bursement ratio, coefficient to adjust the geo-
graphic differences, administrative cost, and
satisfaction of enrollees. Former reimburse-
ment and inflation factors were considered. In
parallel with the capitation payment reform
since 2007, maximum expenditure per pre-
scription was set and adjusted for each year,
referral and hospitalization criteria were clear-
ly defined and circulated to all NRCMS desig-
nated facilities in Qianjiang.5,6
A comprehensive performance assessment
system was established to conduct quarterly
and year-end evaluations on each individual
facility. Irregular and spot checks were also
organized to examine every aspect of perform-
ance, including management (weighted 31%),
quality of care (weighted 63%), and patients’
satisfaction (weighted 6%). Payment was
made monthly with 80% of the budgeted
expenditure and settled with the other 20% at
the year end. The final 20% payment could be
the full or 20% cut down, based on the results
of various assessment results during the year,
and was kept within the budget expenditure.
There was no compensation to the overruns,
and balance could be kept by individual facili-
ties.6 This study evaluated whether the capita-
tion payment reform helped in achieving the
primary objectives of cost containment, and
provider behavior rationalization (reduction of
antibiotics, steroids and infusions). The study
also assessed if such a payment reform
induced higher referral and hospitalization
rates. Considering that the payment reform
might affect the interests of primary health
workers, the study also explored if it resulted
the facilities and health workers to lose
income.
Materials and Methods
To measure the effect of the reforms piloted
in 4 phases, we targeted all 2 village clinics
which piloted the reform in phase I, and sam-
pled a number of village clinics and health cen-
ters from the facilities which piloted the
reforms in phase II and III respectively.7
Considering that only a very limited number
(4) of health centers out of the total 30 piloted
the reform in advance of others in phase III, we
Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; volume 2:1839
Correspondence: Jing Sun, National Institute of
Hospital Administration, National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 38 Xueyuan Road,
Haidian District, 100191 Beijing, China.
Tel. +86.10.62026607 - Fax: +86.10.82311837.
E-mail: sunjingx@yahoo.com
Key words: payment, physician’s behavior, cost
containment.
Acknowledgements: this work was supported by
the World Health Organization
[11.001.WP01.CHN01,11.5]. We thank the
Qianjiang District Health Bureau for its support
to the field survey and data collection. We also
thank Chongqing Health Bureau for sharing nec-
essary NRCMS data, providing strong support for
the implementation of the study, and allowing us
to publish relevant data of Qianjiang.
Contributions: JS and JK were the key designers
of the study: JK led the data collection and prelim-
inary analysis, JS provided input into the data
analysis and interpretation, wrote the first draft
of the manuscript, and made critical revisions of
the manuscript. QQ and WZ coordinated the data
collection. YT and WX contributed to the data col-
lection, analysis and interpretation.
Conflict of interests: the authors declare no
potential conflict of interests.
Funding: the paper was supported by a World
Health Organization grant: 11.001.WP01.
CHN01,11.5.
Received for publication: 25 July 2013.
Revision received: 15 September 2013.
Accepted for publication: 25 September 2013.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 License (by-nc 3.0).
©Copyright J. Sun et al., 2014
Licensee PAGEPress, Italy
Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; 2:1839
doi:10.4081/hls.2014.1839
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[page 10] [Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; 2:1839]
targeted 3 of 4. The sample size of village clin-
ics was determined to have 10% of 51 village
clinics which piloted the reform in phase I and
II. 2 village clinics (locates in different towns)
who firstly implement the reform in July 2007
were automatically selected. The correspon-
ding 2 health centers were targeted according-
ly. The other one township/community health
center was randomly selected from the other
towns which reformed in phase III. Followed
the principle of 2 village clinics under each
selected township/community health center,
and excluded 2 village clinics automatically
included, 4 village clinics were randomly
selected from the village clinics which reform
in phase II and were under 3 selected health
centers. There were a total of 6 village clinics
(2 reformed in phase I, 4 reformed in phase II)
and 3 health centers (reformed in phase III)
targeted as sample facilities.
The study assessed the effect of the reform
by measuring changes of total cost per visit,
quality of care and income of facility and indi-
vidual. These changes of 3 groups of sample
facilities were compared before and after the
reform, compared with overall Qianjiang, and
with the maximum expenditure per prescrip-
tion during 2006-2009 (major components of
outpatient service cost are for medicines).
Prescribing indicators were used to assess the
quality of care, included proportion of essential
medicines prescribed, and proportion of pre-
scriptions with antibiotics, steroids and infu-
sions. Referral rate helped to assess if patient
selection occurred. Hospitalization rate reflect-
ed if patients were shifted from outpatient to
inpatient care.
Annual average total costs per visit of each
group of sample facilities and overall
Qianjiang were calculated based on the data
directly extracted from Qianjiang NRCMS
management database. It was compared before
and after the reform during 2006-2009, and
compared with overall Qianjiang and the max-
imum expenditure per prescription. Health
centers and village clinics were compared sep-
arately. Quality of care and income data was
obtained from surveys in sample facilities.
Under the support of Qianjiang Health Bureau,
sample facilities were required to track pre-
scriptions, and reported income and revenue.
Referral and hospitalization rates were regular
data collected annually, which were extracted
from the Qianjiang NRCMS management data-
base.
Results
Cost per visit
Health centers
In 2007, no health centers started the
reform. The annual average total cost per visit
of three sample health centers was CNY 16.71,
higher than that of overall Qianjiang health
centers (CNY 15.4). Both were above the max-
imum expenditure per prescription (CNY 15).
Reform in health centers started in four
centers in October 2008, three months before
the end of 2008. The annual average total cost
per visit of three sample health centers
reached CNY 17.6, and the overall Qianjaing
health centers reached CNY 16.85. Both got
increased, and were under the maximum
expenditure per prescription (CNY 18). The
intercept of three sample health centers was
smaller than that of overall health centers
2007-2008: Hsample
07-08(0.89)< Hoverall
07-08(1.45).
Assumed that the contribution of any changes
of three sample facilities (brought by the
reform started in October 2008) to 30 overall
facilities in 2008 could be neglected. Although
reform only implemented three months in
2008, it still gained cost containment effect, as
its growth rate got smaller.
The other 26 township health centers joint
the reform in January 2009. The annual aver-
age total cost per visit of three sample health
centers (CNY19.73) and overall Qianjaing
health centers (CNY19.34) both further
increased and faster in 2009, and the latter
increased faster than the former. Both went
below the maximum expenditure per prescrip-
tion (CNY 20). The intercepts of three sample
and overall health centers 2008-2009 were:
Hoverall
08-09=2.45; Hsample
08-09=2.13.Hoverall
08-
09>Hsample
08-09>Hoverall
07-08> Hsample
07-08. This
implied that: i) cost containment effect of
reform in three sample health centers in 2008
did not continue in 2009. The increasing rate
of three sample health centers in 2009 was
faster than that of overall health centers in
2008; ii) no cost containment effect was
observed on the 2nd group of health centers
which joint the reform in January 2009, its cost
increasing speed was faster than the 1st group
(who joined the reform in October 2008) in
2009 (Figure 1).
Village clinics
Cost per visit of sample village clinics in
2006 was not available. Assumed that there
was no significant difference between the
sample village clinics and the others before the
reform, and contribution brought by two sam-
ple village clinics to 158 overall village clinics
in 2007 could be neglected. The cost per visit of
village clinics in 2006 overall Qianjiang village
clinics (CNY 11.56) was regarded as the base-
line of the sample village clinics, which repre-
sented the 1st group village clinics pioneered
the reform in July 2007, and the 2nd group
joined the reform in January 2008. The annual
average total cost per visit of two sample vil-
lage clinics (CNY 11.29) got a bit lower than
that of the overall village clinics (CNY 11.35)
in 2007. Both decreased and were above the
maximum expenditure per prescription (CNY
10). Larger intercept of two sample village clin-
ics 2006-2007 (H2
06-07=-0.27) than that of over-
all village clinics (Hoverall
06-07=-0.21) was
observed in the negative part of Y-axis, which
implied slight cost containment effect of
reform in 2007 on two pioneer village clinics.
In January 2008, another 49 village clinics
jointed the reform. Both two (CNY 10.75) and
four sample village clinics (CNY 10.97) got
decreased annual average total cost per visit,
and both were lower than the maximum
expenditure per prescription (CNY 12). On the
contrary, that of overall village clinics continu-
ously increased to CNY 12.34. This indicated
cost containment effect in July 2007 contin-
ued, and there was also positive cost contain-
ment effect on the 2nd group of village clinics
which started the reform in January 2008. The
intercepts of two and four sample village clin-
Article
Figure 1. Annual average total cost per visit of health centers 2007-2009. Source: New
Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme management database of Qianjiang Health Bureau.
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[Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; 2:1839] [page 11]
ics 2007-2008 were: H2
07-08=-0.54, H4
07-08=-0.16.
H2
07-08-H2
06-07=H2
06-07
0.05), except that of pro-
portion of essential medicines used in health
centers (c2 test, P<0.05) (Table 1).
Prescribing with essential medicines was
significantly improved in health centers fol-
lowing the reform, but did not have significant
change in village clinics. The other prescrip-
tion behaviors of health centers did not statis-
tically change as well. These enabled us to con-
clude that the overall effect of the reform on
changing prescription behaviors was not sig-
nificant. Steroids, antibiotics and infusions
prescriptions in village clinics were not
assessed due to absence of data. There was no
significant change of referral rate following
the reform, which implied that reform did not
bring unexpected effect, like patient selection.
When there was only two village clinics
piloted the reform, and no health centers start-
ed the reform in 2007, hospitalization rate of
Qianjiang NRCMS enrollees increased from
7.1% in 2006 to 7.81% in 2007. Following an
expansion of reform in 2008 in another 49 vil-
lage clinics in January 2008 and four health
centers in October 2008, hospitalization rate of
Qianjiang NRCMS enrollees dropped to 6.68%
in 2008. When all village clinics and health
centers joint the reform, hospitalization rate of
Qianjiang NRCMS enrollees further dropped to
3.65% in 2009 (Figure 3).
Income
The monthly income of health workers in
Qianjiang kept growing during 2007-2009,
increased from CNY 1683 to 2575 in health
centers and CNY 1220 to 1975 in village clinics.
The increasing government subsidies to pri-
mary care during this period might contribute
to the income growth the most. For example,
Article
Figure 2. Annual average total cost per visit of village clinics 2006-2009. Source: New
Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme management database of Chongqing Health Bureau.
Figure 3. Hospitalization rate of Qianjiang New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
enrollees 2006-2009. Source: Qianjiang Health Bureau.
Table 1. Quality of care in sample facilities 2007-2009. Source: Qianjiang Health Bureau.
2007 2008 2009 χ2 P
Referral rate in health centers (%) 37.16 36.45 36.24 0.018 0.8928
Essential medicines (%)
Health centers 95 100 100 7.6017 0.0058
Village clinics 98 100 100 3.0101 0.0827
Prescriptions with steroids in health centers (%) 3.58 3.19 2.59 0.1616 0.6877
Prescriptions with antibiotics in health centers (%) 24.11 19.93 16.57 1.7573 0.185
Prescriptions with infusions in health centers (%) 13.69 12.92 11.90 0.1427 0.7056
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the secured government subsidy to village doc-
tors increased from CNY 500 per year in 2007
to CNY 1400 per year in 2009. The outpatient
revenue of all the sample facilities kept grow-
ing during 2007-2009. There were no overruns
in all sample facilities in Qianjiang (Table 2).
Discussion
Cost containment
Owing to the aging population and the
strengthened benefict package of the NRCMS,
like most of the other rural areas in China,
total cost per visit in Qianjiang has been con-
tinuously growing. The capitation payment
reform in Qianjiang did not decrease the cost,
but contained its growth rate, and achieved the
maximum expenditure per prescription target.
The reform was implemented in four stages,
which did have cost containment effect on
both village clinics and health centers during
the initial period in each stage (two pioneer
village clinics which reformed in July 2007, 2nd
group of village clinics which started to reform
in January 2008, 3rd group of village clinics
which started to reform in October 2008, three
pioneer health centers started in October 2008,
2nd group of health centers started in January
2009). Except 2 pioneer village clinics, which
continued the cost containment effect in its
second period of reform implementation in
2008, all other facilities were observed with an
inconsistent cost containment effect of reform
in 2009. Such a phenomenon was caused by a
shift of NRCMS management function from
Health Bureau to the Insurance Bureau in
2009. Management and supervision were
slacked in that year.
Quality of care
Overall prescription behaviors were
observed with no significant changes, except
of a significant increase of using essential
medicines in health centers. Prescription
behaviors are complex and are affected by mul-
tiple perverse incentives like pricing system
and others, single capitation payment reform
approach might not be able to make a complete
change of it. Changing prescription behaviors
will need more comprehensive interventions
with multiple approaches.
Unchanged referral rate implied that, under
the capitation payment reform, prescribers did
not simply reduce services, or select patients
with minor illness to avoid comprehensive
treatment. The unexpected effects of capita-
tion payment8,9 were successfully averted.
Comprehensive performance assessment sys-
tem valued workload and controlled revisit rate
for the same symposium within 72 h. A set of
specific and comprehensive indicators with
considerable weights to secure the quality of
care greatly contributed to this success.
Linking the capitation payment with compre-
hensive performance assessment system
secured the quality of care under cost contain-
ment pressure.
Hospitalization rate
A systematic review of hospitalization rate
in China10 conducted a merger analysis with
the 3rd National Health Service Survey (NHSS)
data it found that hospitalization rate of rural
China was 3.82% before 2008. The 3rd and 4th
NHSS gave the age-standardized hospitaliza-
tion rate in rural China in 2003 and 2008,11
which ranged between 3-3.7% for rural areas
with high to low annual net income per capita
in 2003, and 5.9-7.2% for 2008. 2008 hospital-
ization rate was almost twice of that in 2003.
Qianjiang falls into the low income category.
Comparing the hospitalization rate of
Qianjiang NRCMS enrollees in 2006 (4.06%)
with the systematic review data before 2008
(3.82%), we found that they were around the
same level. If there were no effective interven-
tions, we assumed that the significant growth
of rural hospitalization rate at national level
during 2003-2008 should happen in Qianjiang
during 2006-2009 as well. The increasing trend
during 2006-2007 in Qianjing was in line with
this assumption, when the capitation payment
reform was yet implemented in most of the
facilities in Qianjiang (except two pioneer vil-
lage clinics). Qianjiang was at the national
level in 2007 (4.73%), it dropped to 2.87% in
2008, which was far below the rural national
level (3.7%, low income category). This
implied that, expanded reform in all village
clinics and four pioneer health centers in
Qianjiang between January and October 2008
had a strong effect on reducing hospitalization
rate of NRCMS enrollees. The following
increasing trend had it reached to 4.57% in
2009, which was still below the rural national
level (low income category). Rebounded hospi-
talization rate was also in line with the cost
changes in 2009, which was due to the same
fact that, NRCMS management function shift-
ed from Health Bureau to the Insurance
Bureau in 2009, management and supervision
were slacked in that year. To explain a compar-
atively low hospitalization rate of Qianjiang
NRCMS enrollees, we should not forget that, in
parallel with the capitation payment reform,
Qianjiang developed supporting policies which
imposed strict admission standard and
strengthened supervision on inpatient servic-
es of NRCMS designated facilities in 2007.
Hospitalization criteria were clearly defined
and circulated to all NRCMS designated facili-
ties. These were important contributors for
controlling unnecessary hospitalizations
under the outpatient capitation payment
reform in Qianjiang.
Income
The no overruns result and the continuous-
ly increased staff salary of health centers and
village clinics in Qianjiang showed that, maxi-
mum expenditure per prescription, insurance
payment budget limit, and relevant supporting
policies in inpatient services in Qianjiang
secured a steady implementation of the capita-
tion payment reform, and had no negative
impact on the operation of the facilities and
the income of the health workers.
Conclusions
Cost containment objective of the capitation
reform was achieved but were not sustainable
in Qianjiang. Provider behaviors were partially
improved but with limited effect on prescrip-
tions behaviors. Careful development of com-
prehensive performance assessment system
Article
Table 2. Salary, outpatient revenue and surplus of New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme fund in sample facilities 2007-2009 (CNY).
Source: Qianjiang Health Bureau.
2007 2008 2009
Monthly Outpatient NRCMS Monthly Outpatient NRCMS Monthly Outpatient NRCMS
income revenue outpatient income revenue outpatient income revenue outpatient
fund surplus fund surplus fund surplus
Health centers 1683 896,295 38,000 1897 972,968 29,833 2575 1,248,445 35,000
Village clinics 1220 39,763 615 1712 40,442 554 1975 43,517 2395
NRCMS, New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme.
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[Healthcare in Low-resource Settings 2014; 2:1839] [page 13]
and supporting policies were crucial to address
the unexpected effects of capitation payment,
like patient selection and unnecessary hospi-
talization. The reform brought no financial
loss to both the facilities and the individuals.
Limitations
Availability of data
In order to relief data collection workload,
the study heavily relied on administrative data
of Qianjiang Health Bureaus. Data was collect-
ed annually as an average, quarterly or month-
ly data was not available. The assessment was
then a rough trend analysis rather than a strict
interrupted time series analysis.
Quality of data
Data were obtained from Qianjiang Health
Bureaus, and were reported by individual facil-
ities. Although Chongqing and Qianjiang
Health Bureaus organized regular trainings
for lower level health bureaus and facilities,
helped them in conducting appropriate data
collection and reporting, possible quality prob-
lems may still exist. We assumed that the
reported data is true and correct.
Sampling
Reform started in two village clinics in July
2007, and expanded to all primary facilities of
Qianjiang until January 2009. It was imple-
mented step by step in four stages within one
and half year. It was difficult to design a good
sampling model for concise measurement and
accurate revelation of the changes. Annual
average data for Qianjiang covered facilities
which reformed in different time period, which
was affected by the reforms different groups of
facilities. Although the contributors were only
a small number of facilities comparing with
overall Qianjiang, its contribution was weak
and could be neglected, 2007 and 2008 annual
average data of overall Qianjiang village clinics
was not a perfect controller for two pioneer vil-
lage clinics and four sample village clinics.
This was the same case that, 2008 annual aver-
age data of overall Qianjiang health centers
was not a perfect controller for four pioneer
health centers.
Mixed policy effect
Although the payment reform was the most
important reform in Qianjiang during 2006-
2009, there were tremendous policy changes
under the overall health system reform frame-
work during the same period. Other policy
changes might not directly link with the
NRCMS payment, but might indirectly con-
tribute to the effects either positively or nega-
tively. The evaluation drew mixed effects of all
those policy changes, among which the pay-
ment reform contributed the most.
Comparison among different groups of facili-
ties which reformed in different stages helped
to control confounding policies effects.
Patient care and facility indicator
Consultation time, dispensing time,
patients’ satisfaction, patients’ perception on
medicines use, and availability of key essential
medicines are important indicators for com-
prehensive assessment on quality of care.
However, they were not regularly collected and
recorded in Qianjiang. This study did not
include these patient care and facility indica-
tors, instead of focusing on prescribing indica-
tors and referral rate. The aim was to focus
analysis on prescribing behavior changes.
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