Free movement of people and the Brexit


421Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.65.4.9 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 2016 (4)                            421–432.

Introduction

Simon Ross, the chief executive of Popula-
tion Matters, the UK’s leading charity on 
population and sustainability issues, claimed 
that natural resources could not sustain the 
number of people in Britain or on the planet 
indefinitely: “It is imperative that we address 
the factors contributing to increased num-
bers. We are all affected adversely by the rap-
id population growth of recent decades, from 
pressures on housing and public services to 
the environment and climate change,” he 
said.” It’s time we addressed the population 
problem, by improving sex education and 
family planning provision and by increas-

ing public awareness of the strains popula-
tion and consumption growth place on us. If 
we are to live sustainably and happily in the 
long-term, population growth is an issue that 
cannot be ignored.” – he emphasised. 

According to the same medium coverage 
the UK population is projected to reach 70 
million by mid-2027. This mysterious ab-
solute number may function as a threshold 
in the country of isles (Cangiano, A. 2016) 
where there is no chance to extend arable 
lands and the areas overcrowded are eve-
ryday experience for citizens.4 Unlike most 
countries of the European Union with declin-
ing population Britons might not be satisfied 
due to population increase. The old idea of 

Free movement of people and the Brexit

Éva G E L L ÉR -L U K ÁC S 1, Ágnes T ÖT T ÖS 2 and Sándor I L L ÉS 3 

Abstract

This paper deals with the development of free movement of people principle during the initial phase of United 
Kingdom (UK) exit from European Union (EU). Utilising descriptive methods we highlighted the cornerstones 
of negotiations till the deal. The Conclusions adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member 
States on 19 February 2016 laid down a set of arrangements between the UK and the EU that try to find a solution 
for the questions around four problematic areas of EU integration mentioned in the 10 November 2015 letter of 
David Cameron, in order not to make the concerns of the UK so pronounced that it would lead to the exit of the 
country from the EU. The study examines the agreement’s the fourth policy area (immigration) and the British 
concerns attached to the social benefits and immigration aspects of the free movement of EU nationals to UK, 
as well as answers of EU Heads of State and Government and the declarations of the European Commission’s 
will. The analysis covers the abuses experienced by the UK, their legal roots and the possibilities to act against 
them. The contribution places great emphasis on exploring to what extent the future directions of amendments 
could be considered clear, how they could be transformed into EU norms, how they could affect the EU legal 
system and its application. We concluded that the idea of a multi-speed Europe has reached the freedom of 
movement of people principle. Finally, in light of the Brexit referendum, the authors also try to explore disput-
able scenarios of how the results could affect the UK’s relation with the EU in the near future.

Keywords: Brexit, international migration, free movement of people, labour market, integration, European 
Union, United Kingdom

1 Senior lecturer, JOTOKI Postgraduate Law Institute, Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, H-1053 
Budapest, Egyetem tér 1–3. E-mail: drlukacseva@gmail.com

2 Migration expert, Ministry of Interior, H-1051 Budapest, József Attila u. 2–4. E-mail: agnes.tottos@bm.gov.hu
3 Director, Active Society Foundation, H-1094 Budapest, Liliom u. 8. E-mail: dr.illes.sandor@gmail.com
4 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/uk-population-expected-to-rise-by-almost-10-million-in-

25-years. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.



Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.422

rigid physical, geographical isolation is sup-
ported with fresh thoughts of sustainable 
development. 

In fact the United Kingdom is one of the 
most fertile countries in EU with net migra-
tion over 300,000 people a year. Based on an 
official scenario the UK population is project-
ed to increase by 9.7 million over the next 25 
years from an estimated 64.6 million in mid-
2014 to 74.3 million in mid-2039. It is more 
than 10 percent growth.5 Assumed net migra-
tion accounts for 51 percent of the projected 
increase over the next 25 years, with natural 
increase (more births than deaths) account-
ing for the remaining 49 percent of growth. 
Over the 10-year period to mid-2024, the UK 
population is projected to increase by 4.4 
million to 69.0 million. This is 249,000 higher 
than the previous (2012-based) projection for 
that year. The population is projected to con-
tinue ageing, with the average (median) age 
rising from 40.0 years in 2014 to 40.9 years in 
mid-2024 and 42.9 by mid-2039. It means that 
one in 12 of the population is projected to be 
aged 80 years old or over. 6

Free movement of people is one of the basic 
principles of the European Union (EU) (Urry, 
J. 2007; Gellér-Lukács, É. 2011). This basic 
right was originally related only to workers 
(European Economic Community, predeces-
sor of EU), but later it was extended to family 
members of workers like children, economi-
cally inactive adults, retirees, and finally to 
all citizens of the European Union (Gellér-
Lukács, É. 2004; Gyeney, L. 2006). The EU be-
came an area of freedom, security and justice 
without inner borders where free movement 
of people testifies the basic freedom of the 
single market (Illés, S. and Gellér-Lukács, 
É. 2002; Gellér-Lukács, É. and Illés, S. 2003; 
Okulicz-Kozaryn, A. 2014). This general 
principle was disputed (Castles, S. 2014) by 
the UK fuelled by the plan of Britain’s exit 
(Brexit) from the European Union. The rea-

5 http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcom-
munity/populationandmigration/populationprojec-
tions/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/201
5-10-29#tab-Main-points. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

6 Ibid.

sons behind Brexit were mainly supported 
by news on abuses of the principle of free 
move and stay in the UK (Blinder, S. and 
Allen, W.L. 2016).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
separate way aimed by the UK that would 
distant itself from the rest of the EU is in-
deed not the first instance of such kind. 
According to Protocol 21 of the Treaties the 
United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take 
part in the adoption by the Council of pro-
posed measures pursuant to Title V of Part 
Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice), including Article 79 of TFEU 
aiming at developing a common immigration 
policy. Consequently, no measure adopted 
pursuant to that Title, no provision of any 
international agreement concluded by the 
Union pursuant to that Title, and no decision 
of the Court of Justice of the EU interpret-
ing any such provisions or measures shall 
be binding upon or applicable in the UK 
(Peers, S. 2015). Additionally, in the field of 
coordination of social security rights the UK 
has opted out from granting rights for third-
country nationals under the renewed coordi-
nation mechanism (Eisele, K. 2014).

The main objectives of this paper are two-
fold. Firstly and dominantly it aims at docu-
menting the background and negotiation 
strategies of the Brexit process in the field of 
free movement of persons including special 
aspects relevant for Hungary. Secondly, in 
light of the result of the Brexit referendum 
we would like to assess the impact of the 
Brexit deal on future negotiations related 
to the actual split of the UK from the EU. 
Supplementary issues like the role of statisti-
cal evidence or the long-lasting special status 
of the UK in the EU are also tackled upon. 

The new settlement between the EU and 
the UK

On 10 November 2015 Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, put his thoughts into writing regard-
ing the EU membership of the UK, highlight-



423Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.

ing four key areas where the UK was seek-
ing reforms.7 These areas were the economic 
governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and 
immigration. Within the theme of immigration 
the reform plan contained the following. 

– Firstly, it was proposed that free move-
ment will not apply to new members to be 
admitted to the EU in the future until their 
economies have converged much more close-
ly with old member states. 

– Secondly, the importance of the goal of 
fighting abuses of free movement, which in-
cludes tougher and longer re-entry bans for 
fraudsters and people who collude in mar-
riages of convenience, stronger powers to de-
port criminals and stop them coming back, 
as well as preventing entry in the first place, 
and also addressing European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) judgments that have widened the scope 
of free movement in a way that has made it 
more difficult to tackle this kind of abuse. 

– Thirdly, Cameron proposed that peo-
ple coming to Britain from the EU must live 
there and contribute for four years before 
they qualify for in-work benefits or social 
housing, furthermore, that the practice of 
sending child benefit overseas is to be ended. 
The third proposal clearly aims to decrease 
the number of those arriving to the United 
Kingdom by reducing the attractiveness of 
the British welfare system.

On 7 December 2015 President of the 
European Council (EC), Donald Tusk, in-
formed the EC on where the Member States 
stand on the issue of the UK’s proposals.8 He 
emphasised that “while we see good pros-
pects for agreeing on ways to fight abuses 
and possibly on some reforms related to the 
export of child benefits, there is presently no 
consensus on the request that people coming 
to Britain from the EU must live there and 
contribute for four years before they qualify 

7 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_
Tusk_letter.pdf Retrieved: 02.02.2016.

8 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-
releases/2015/12/07-tusk-letter-to-28ms-on-uk/ 
Retrieved: 31. 01.2016.

for in-work benefits or social housing.”9 He 
also envisaged a concrete proposal to be pre-
pared and finally adopted in February 2016.

On 17 December 2015 the General Affairs 
Council discussed the British reform pro-
posals. The Member States confirmed their 
readiness to reflect to the British request with 
the intention to keep the UK in the EU.10

In line with his promise Tusk quickly, al-
ready on 2 February 2016, disclosed the mul-
ti-point package of proposals, which aimed at 
– in case of a positive outcome of the British 
referendum – enacting a number of measures 
handling the British requests in an appropri-
ate manner.11 He set a goal that the package of 
proposals should be adopted by the Council 
of the Heads of State or Government on its 
meeting on 18–19 February 2016. The UK also 
welcomed the package of proposals.

A heated discussion began on the proposed 
text. All information leaked confirmed the 
information of the press so far that the free 
movement of persons is the most controver-
sial topic, and the agreement was practically 
delayed until the evening because of the 
questions of family benefits (the bargaining 
lasted for 40 hours).12 

The negotiations were successful as the 
Heads of State and Government could agree 
and consequently accepted EC Conclusions 
on Brexit (“New settlement”) on their meet-
ing on 18–19 February 2016.13 The document 

9 Furthermore: “All in all it is my assessment that so 
far we have made good progress. We need some 
more time to sort out the precise drafting on all 
of these issues, including the exact legal form the 
final deal will take. We also have to overcome the 
substantial political differences that we still have 
on the issue of social benefits and free movement.”

10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-
releases/2015/12/18-euco-conclusions/ Retrieved: 
31.01.2016. 

11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/02/02-letter-tusk-proposal-new-
settlement-uk/ Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

12 http://www.bruxinfo.hu/cikk/20160220-negyven-
ora-alkudozas-utan-megszuletett-az-eu-brit-
megallapodas.html Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

13 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/ Retrieved: 
10-03-2016



Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.424

contained seven legal texts: the Conclusions 
of the EC (including issues of migration and 
external relations); a Decision of the Heads of 
State or Government concerning a new settle-
ment for the UK within the EU; a Statement 
of the EC containing a draft Council Decision 
on the effective management of the banking 
union and a Declaration of the EC on compet-
itiveness; four Declarations of the European 
Commission among which three are related 
to free movement (migration). Section D of 
Annex 1 (“Social benefits and free move-
ment”) is the most relevant regarding the free 
movement of persons (and therefore will be 
discussed in details in this paper).

It was clear that – in case the UK voted 
for remaining in the EU – the Commission 
would present proposals on the modifica-
tion of the relevant secondary EU law and a 
proposal on a new draft of Directive on resi-
dence rights was to be expected, as well. The 
general expectation was that the Commission 
would present these proposals in line with 
the above mentioned EC Conclusions and 
the Commission’s Declarations.

Background of the family benefits and 
immigration issues

After the global financial crisis the net inflows 
from EU countries to UK grew significantly 
(Wadsworth, J. et al. 2016). An estimated 
number of about 300,000 EU citizens arrived 
to the United Kingdom who wanted to work, 
study or reunite with family in 2015. The UK’s 
social welfare system seems to be quite attrac-
tive: anyone who works for a minimum wage 
can receive 6,000–7,000 pounds extra from ’in-
work’ benefits per year.14 Leaving aside the spe-
cial characteristics of these benefits it should be 
stressed that these benefits are only available 
for low wage earners. They can be claimed by 
those whose annual income does not exceed 
15,000 pounds, but the amount varies stepwise. 
The maximum support is available at a yearly 

14 Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit and Universal 
Credit. 

income of 8,000 pounds, but then it starts to 
decrease, and at the 15,000 pounds threshold 
it ceases. In fact, this ‘in-work ‘ benefit is a 
supplement, which guarantees a minimum of 
15,000 pounds annual income for the person 
concerned. This is considered as a sort of mini-
mum subsistence level.

In an international comparison it should 
be emphasised that the other two major 
migration destination countries (Germany 
and France) do not per se link such benefits 
with low-paid jobs. The UK classifies itself 
the fourth most generous country in Europe 
on the basis of benefits paid after Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Ireland.15 Nor should it 
be overlooked that non-EU citizen workers 
cannot be employed in the United Kingdom 
as unskilled labour (for ‘low-skilled jobs’)16 
meaning that these jobs are available – in lack 
of available British workers – mostly for EU 
citizens. Indeed, it may be therefore that a 
major limitation of the benefits would affect 
the financial motivation of potential migrants 
with regard to migration to the UK.17

Obviously, theoretically speaking, a huge 
burden can fall by the amount of these ben-
efits on the British budget, when each year 
hundreds of thousands of workers arrive 
and some of them also apply for benefits. But 
what is the proportion of those applying for 
benefits in practice? 

In 2015 10 percent of people born in the 
UK and 12 percent of those born in other EU 
countries applied for benefits.18 In the area 
of non-work-related benefits, however, the 
share of benefit receivers among citizens 
of other EU countries was only 2.2 percent 

15 http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-
paper/284 Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

16 https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-general/overview Re-
trieved: 11.03.2016.

17 http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/
LIVE?id=22825&page=PressReleases# „Restricting 
these in-work benefits would make a huge dif-
ference to potential migrants’ financial incentives 
while allowing free movement to stand.” Retrieved: 
12.03.2016.

18 http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/
commentary/pulling-power-why-are-eu-citizens-
migrating-uk Retrieved: 10.03.2016.



425Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.

(and among those of working age, 6.8%). 
Moreover, if British citizens and citizens of 
the EU-10 countries are compared in terms 
of getting social housing, it can be seen that 
mobile workers from EU-10 countries have 
much less recourse to social housing.19

Further data support what is also described 
in a recent material of the Oxford University 
Migration Observatory, namely that the pri-
mary motivation of EU citizens for migration 
is not to get welfare benefits, but to work (78%) 
and these are followed by pursuing studies, 
and by family reunification. According to a 
survey conducted in 2015 the fastest growing 
group of workers is formed by citizens of EU-
10 countries, among them the employment 
rate is high, 90 percent for men and 75 percent 
for women, both figures are higher than the 
rate of UK citizens.20 Table 1 shows the actual 
numbers of top sending countries.

According to Table 1 out of the six most 
dynamic sending countries three are situ-
ated in East-Central-Europe. In absolute 
term Poland (White, A. 2014) is leading both 
for volumes and dynamism. The number of 
Polish migrants grew from 615,000 to 818,000 
people during the investigated five years. The 
change was the highest with 203,000 more im-

19 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1546en_3.
pdf Eurofound (2015), Social dimension of intra-EU 
mobility: Impact on public services, Publications Office 
of the European Union, Luxembourg. Retrieved: 
10.03.2016.

20 Ibid.

migrants which means ca. one-third increase. 
The most dynamic increase was produced 
by Romania with 150 percent growth which 
equals to 136,000 net surplus. From an East-
Central-European angle Hungary has the 
third place in absolute terms. The number of 
Hungarian immigrants staying in the UK was 
50,000 in 2011, while this number increased 
to 96,000 by 2015. The growth was nearly 100 
percent within five years. In addition, lots of 
migrants arrived to the UK from other coun-
tries of East-Central-Europe as well in the 
examined five year period. 

Data on the number of Hungarians liv-
ing in the UK vary greatly. According to 
the data of the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) on population and community in 2015 
there were 82,000 Hungarians living in the 
UK.21 At the same time the overall number 
of Hungarian nationals who were registered 

in the National Health Service amounted to 
210,000 until mid-2016. The differences be-
tween the two data-set are noted by the ONS 
in its explanatory document,22 namely that 
the latter statistic contains also those who 

21 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcom-
munity/populationandmigration/internationalmi-
gration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdomby-
countryofbirthandnationality. Retrieved: 10.06.2016. 
There is a 13,000 condience limit foreseen.

22 https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcom-
munity/populationandmigration/internationalmi-
gration/articles/noteonthedifferencebetweennation-
alinsurancenumberregistrationsandtheestimateof-
longterminternationalmigration/previousReleases. 
Retrieved: 10.06.2016.

Table 1. Six most dynamic sending countries regarding EU migrants in the UK in 2011 and 2015

Origin country
2011 2015 Change

1,000 migrants
Poland
Romania
Spain
Italy
Hungary
Portugal
EEA total
Six most dynamic sending countries
Ratio of top six countries in all EEA, %

615
87
63

126
50
96

2,580
1,037

40

818
223
137
176
96

140
3,277
1,590

49

203
136
74
50
46
44

696
553
79

Source: Migration Observatory analysis of LFS data, quarterly averages, all ages. http://www.migrationob-
servatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/pulling-power-why-are-eu-citizens-migrating-uk Retrieved: 10.03.2016.



Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.426

have already left the country. Unofficial esti-
mates on the number of Hungarians living in 
the UK oscillate between 80,000 and 150,000. 

The conclusion to be drawn is that if the UK 
aims at achieving savings, it is not worth lim-
iting the kind of benefits that are not necessar-
ily taken by the migrants (non-work-related 
benefits) but those which are granted to them. 
That is why the UK wanted to reach a solu-
tion on the basis of which it became entitled to 
restrict access to in-work benefits for newcom-
ers during a four-year-long period. However, 
neither the term of ’newcomer’ nor that of 
’four-year period’ is clear. While it is believed 
that the newcomers as primarily East-Central-
European guest workers, during the negotia-
tions there was no distinction made amongst 
EU nations. However, the most sensible reac-
tion came from the Polish side.

Abuse I – Family benefits

If we talk about the coordination of family 
benefits, it is important to be aware of further 
statistical data. Already in the beginning of 
2013 the amount of child benefits paid over-
seas was discussed in the UK.23 At that time 
– based on data from 2012 – there were child 
benefit awards in respect of 40,171 children 
who lived in another country (overwhelm-
ingly in Poland). Prime Minister David 
Cameron started elaborating on the topic 
and in January 2014, speaking to BBC1’s 
Andrew Marr show he said: “I don’t think 
that is right and that is something I want to 
change.”24 He referred to Polish workers and 
the benefits paid to them and their families. 
Poland’s foreign minister has soon reacted 
and criticised David Cameron for judging 
the export of benefits as a ‘wrong’ thing. Ra-
doslaw Sikorski accused the Prime Minister 
of ‘stigmatising’ Poles by singling out the 

23 http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-
paper/288. Retrieved: 10.06.2016.

24 Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2534738/Poland-hits-Cameron-plan-stop-
child-benefit-exported-EU.html#ixzz45ViZrb9A. 
Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

nation’s migrant workers in his comment. 
Mr. Sikorski posted via the Twitter that: ‘If 
Britain gets our taxpayers, shouldn’t it also pay 
their benefits? Why should Polish taxpayers sub-
sidise British taxpayers’ children?’25 This inci-
dent clearly gave a hint that this topic would 
be on the sensible political agenda for long. 
And so it happened. In the spring of 2014 
the British media began spreading numbers 
about exported family benefits. The Daily 
Mail newspaper e.g. wrote that “UK taxpay-
ers are spending £30 million-a-year sending 
child benefit to families who live abroad 
across the European Union” and “UK tax-
payer funds payments to 20,400 families with 
34,268 children”.26 Published data showed 
that almost two-thirds of the benefits were 
sent to Poland (22,000 children), followed 
by Ireland (2,500), Lithuania (1,700), France 
(1,400) and Slovakia (1,200). Latvia (1,091) 
and Spain (1,020) also exceeded 1,000 chil-
dren, all the other countries were lagging 
behind (e.g. Hungary with 196 children). 

The exact magnitude of the problem was, 
however, not entirely clear. The above figures 
were published everywhere with slight chang-
es, but a more serious search was necessary to 
find how these figures related to all British 
child-care expenditure. A parliamentary re-
search report27 showed that the above figures 
should be compared to 7.9 million benefici-
aries (families), meaning that the 20,000 EU 
families amount to a total of 0.25 percent of all 
the beneficiaries. Official comparison can be 
found from the early 2016 according to which 

25 Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2534738/Poland-hits-Cameron-plan-stop-
child-benefit-exported-EU.html#ixzz45ViZrb9A ’If 
Britain gets our taxpayers, shouldn’t it also pay their 
benefits? Why should Polish taxpayers subsidise 
British taxpayers’ children’. Retrieved: 12.03.2016.

26 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2632914/
Child-benefit-worth-30million-paid-Britain-families-
EU-Cameron-admits-impossible-stop-it.html ’UK 
taxpayers are spending £30million-a-year sending child 
benefit to families who live abroad across the European 
Union” and “UK taxpayer funds payments to 20,400 
families with 34,268 children’ Retrieved: 17.03.2016.

27 http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/
SN06955/SN06955.pd pp. 17. Retrieved: 17.03.2016.



427Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.

the rate is 0.26 percent, while the House of 
Commons states that 0.26 percent of total UK 
child benefit claims are paid to EU migrants 
whose children live in another EU member 
state (a mass of 13 million children is entitled 
to be compared to the 35,000 children who do 
not live in the British Isles). 

It can be seen first, that the number of ex-
ports – 20,000 families annually – cannot be 
considered outstanding compared to the UK 
population and the number of families (i.e. 7.9 
million) living there. Secondly, regarding the 
absolute number of entitled children, it can be 
seen that the numbers are clearly decreasing, 
from 40,171 in 2012 to 34,268 in 2015 (i.e. 15% 
decrease). Considering the diminishing trend 
we can say that the problem is tiny unlike the 
political attention that was given to it and the 
debate fuelled in the UK till in/out referendum.

David Cameron has admitted in the above-
mentioned Marr interview that according to 
existing EU law it is impossible to stop pay-
ing benefits across the borders to the family 
members of migrant workers. It is clear that 
he already wanted to change the scope of EU 
law in order to tackle this issue, although in 
light of the previous figures prioritization of 
this issue cannot be fully understood. 

An important conclusion can be drawn, 
even if – as indicated – the actual impact will 
be seen in light of the specific solution given 
to the problem later, namely that Cameron 
strongly stressed that he wanted to abolish 
(to decrease) the export of child benefits, even 
though the magnitude of the issue (0.26% of 
the families involved and 25 million pound an-
nual savings) does not seem to be paramount 
for the fifth biggest economy of the world.

Abuse II – Immigration issues

The right to free movement and residence 
has never been unlimited (Wiesbrock, A. 
2010; Kotef, H. 2015; Ahrens, J. et al. 2016), 
even though Member States are obliged to 
act against abusive exercises of this right. The 
primary purpose of this restriction is not the 
sanction as such, but to reduce abuses for the 

purpose that the mobility bona fide EU citi-
zens and their family members could have 
positive effects in the most comprehensive 
way on both the migrants and the Member 
States concerned. The EU system of intra-
EU mobility presupposes the Member States 
trust towards each other and is intended to 
enhance mutually beneficial nature of this 
mobility to all stakeholders. In case this trust 
is disrupted as a result of the abuse, it risks 
the uniform and effective enforcement of the 
entire system (Tóth, G. et al. 2014).

The UK is, therefore, aiming at regaining 
the freedom, rights and competences, trans-
ferred to the EU in the area of free movement 
of persons, the freedom which the UK already 
enjoys in the area of immigration of non-EU 
nationals (Wiesbrock, A. 2010). The UK al-
ready used its freedom to focus heavily on 
managing migration to a great extent. In its 
2005 paper Controlling our borders: Making 
migration work for Britain – five year strategy 
for asylum and immigration, one of the goals 
set out was to uphold an immigration system 
which responds to public concerns.

From an immigration perspective, that is 
from the point of view of the rules of entry 
and residence, rules of procedure and sub-
stantive conditions and limitations regard-
ing exercising the right to free movement 
the Brexit settlement identifies future steps 
in two respects. One area of law concerns 
the prevention of the abuse of rights or 
fraud, which was set out by Point c) Section 
D of Annex I and in the Declaration of the 
European Commission in Annex VII. In this 
area the expressive purpose of the Union is 
to act against the use of false documents, 
the prevention of marriages of conveni-
ence (Töttős, Á. 2015) and reducing bogus 
intra-EU mobility (not sufficiently genuine 
residence in another Member State) used for 
invoking the Free Movement Directive in the 
EU citizen’s own Member State. 

Even though the Member States have al-
ready received guidelines regarding how to 
ensure proper implementation regarding the 
general application of the Directive as well 
as actions against marriages of convenience, 



Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.428

the Brexit settlement has envisioned further 
actions against the abuse of rights. While the 
plan to act against the use of false documents 
has only been mentioned in the documents, 
the plans on the fight against marriages of con-
venience and bogus intra-EU mobility have 
been set out in more details in the documents. 

Viewing the Brexit settlement from the per-
spectives of EU peripheries it can be conclud-
ed that the idea of multi-speed Europe has 
reached the area of free movement of people 
principle, as well. While the UK already had 
an opt-out from harmonisation concerning the 
migration rules valid for non-EU nationals or 
the Schengen acquis, now the political cooper-
ation in the interest of freedom of movement 
has also become fragmented. Furthermore, it 
is done in a way that as a result of the political 
bargaining process with one single Member 
State has resulted in providing an opportunity 
for all the Member States to withdraw from 
the results achieved so far.

From a legal perspective we cannot hide 
the fact that the plans set out in the Brexit 
settlement means a clear step back from the 
rights ensured by the free movement rules 
so far. We can therefore observe a unique 
phenomenon: the legal development that 
was primarily brought forward by the ECJ 
not only comes to a halt, but a step back is 
expected compared to the present achieve-
ments. Consequently, while other areas of 
EU legislation are usually characterised by 
including the results of jurisprudence, now 
limitations contrary to EU case law are about 
to be expressively set out by EU legislators.

As for the future of free movement, the 
wish of the UK, according to which this right 
would not be automatically be extended to 
the newly accessing Member States, will 
most probably come true.

The results of referendum and its short-term 
outcomes

The Remain/Leave referendum (in which 
72.2% of registered voters took part) was held 
on Thursday 23 June 2016. 51.9 percent voted 

in favour of leaving the EU and 48.1 percent 
voted in favour of remaining a member state 
of the EU, thus, the Leave option won. The 
final results showed clear geographical pat-
tern. England and Wales voted for Brexit (to-
gether 53.4%), while Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted predominantly against (62% 
and 55.8% respectively).The results of the 
regions mirrored the general pattern except 
for the London region (Figure 1) where the 
majority supported the Remain option. 

Unfortunately, academic research results 
have not been published yet since the ref-
erendum due to the relatively short time 
period. But we can hypothesise with great 
probabilities that retirees favoured Brexit 
in contrast of youngsters who preferred the 
Remain option (Hobolt, S. 2016). The aca-
demics with low absolute number compared 
to others segment of society said no to UK 

Fig. 1. Brexit referendum results by regions in the UK. 
Source: Electoral Commission



429Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.

exit (Cressey, D. 2016a,b). The residents 
of dynamic cities and their surroundings 
wanted to stay in the EU in contrast with 
declining towns and/or peripheral rural ar-
eas. In general voters of local districts with 
significant immigrant population preferred 
the Remain option against Leave.

David Cameron resigned and Theresa May 
became Prime Minister on 13 July 2016. Well 
in advance pound had been devaluated by 
the financial market, with all consequences on 
other markets. It was interesting that the sub-
ject of media news of migration focused more 
on the potential emigration of the employees 
of the City rather than the return of the former 
East-Central-European newcomers.

“Should European Union nationals already 
living in the United Kingdom be allowed to 
stay after Brexit? According to a new poll, 84 
percent of Britons think they should. Based 
on the findings of the survey, which was 
carried out by ICM for think-tank British 
Future, the 84 percent includes those who 
voted in favour of the UK leaving the EU in 
the June referendum. As reported online by 
The Week, this is a most surprising finding, 
given that immigration was the cornerstone 
of the Leave campaign. In fact, 77 percent of 
those who voted for Brexit and 78 percent of 
Ukip supporters agreed EU nationals cur-
rently in the UK should be free to remain. 
Although 62 percent of those polled wanted 
to see a reduction in the number of unskilled 
migrants coming to the UK, a majority (in-
cluding Leave voters) did not want to reduce 
the influx of highly-skilled migrants, such as 
engineers and doctors.”28

Medium-term consequences of referendum 
– scenarios

We depicted the short-term outcomes of the 
referendum with its numerical results in 
the previous section. Based on these facts 
we tend to conclude that the referendum 
strengthened tendencies of uncertainty and 
28 https://www.neweurope.eu/article/majority-brits-

want-eu-migrants-stay/. Retrieved: 19.07.2016.

disintegration in Europe (Welsh, M. 2014; 
Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J.D. 2016; Tab-
ernero, J and Ciardiello, F. 2016), discrimi-
nation in Britain (Fow, J.E. et al. 2015) and 
polarisation and socio-spatial peripheralisa-
tion in East-Central-Europe (Lang, T. 2015). 
It reinforces regional disparities in terms 
of political opinion of residents with urban 
and rural background in the UK (Hobolt, 
S. 2016). Moreover, it makes the separatist 
movement in Europe and the rest of the 
World stronger (Montanari, A. 2012) and 
also fortifies the separation of the nations 
in the UK (Hudson, R. and Williams, A.M. 
1998). It fuels the idea and reality of multi-
speed EU (Carmel, E. 2014). It strengthens 
the global nuclear status quo originating 
from the Cold War period (Cohen, J.H. and 
Sirkeci, I. 2011).

In the following we try to make some mid-
term Brexit scenarios based on relevant litera-
ture. Obviously, we are aware of the uncer-
tainty of projections for the future in general, 
what overlaps with other sorts of uncertainty 
stemming from Brexit (Vaughne, M. 2016). 
International comparisons are also necessary 
to collide ideas, conceptual frameworks and 
results which tend to explain, contextualise 
(Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J.D. 2016) and 
conceptualise (Kagarlitsky, B. 2016; Pettifor, 
A. 2016) this particular event in Europe and its 
potential consequences.29 Academic, business 
and policy debates on the relationship be-
tween the free movement of persons (Kotef, 
H. 2015) and the free movement of workers in 
particular (Buckley, M. et al. 2016) are neces-
sary to explore the multi-layered outcomes of 
the Brexit phenomenon.30

29 The most recent legal disputes on the constitutional 
requirements of the UK for making the decision 
to withdraw from the EU are, however, not 
considered among the scenarios. 

30 The method used in this study to analyse the 
subject matter is highly descriptive. This method 
can be used in other papers and thus enables 
future comparative studies. Nevertheless, for such 
studies, comparable and reliable data sources and 
well-founded analyses are needed to be developed 
at national and international levels.



Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.430

When making the mid-term scenarios we 
have chosen the analyses of Commerzbank 
(Germany), which provides a system of sce-
narios with numerical probabilities on each 
version of projection.31 In our view there are 
four probable scenarios worth mentioning 
which are enumerated below starting with 
the less probable outcome:

– Scenario 1. Our odds: 0.01. The probability is 
one to one hundred on ’hardBrexit’ which would 
imply a sudden and strict separation from the 
EU. This scenario would affect the country’s 
relationship most negatively; therefore, we give 
almost no probability to its realisation. (As a 
reference also Commerzbank value is shown in 
every case, for this scenario: 0.2). 

– Scenario 2. Our odds: 0.09. The probability 
of ’adoption of existing Norwegian or Swiss models’ 
(Tálas, P. et al. 2016) is nine times higher than 
the hardBrexit. (Commerzbank value: 0.5).

– Scenario 3. Our odds: 0.30. The probabil-
ity is three to ten on a ’peculiar Brit solution’ 
(Pisany-Ferry, J. et al. 2016). This scenario has 
below average chance nowadays. It depends 
mainly on the interference of Cameron’s pre-
vious deal and May’s future activity under 
the umbrella of British voters and as things 
now stands also the British Parliament. (There 
is no Commerzbank value for this case).

– Scenario 4. Our odds: 0.60. According to the 
authors’ subjective judgement the ’postponing 
Brexit’ scenario might function in the near fu-
ture with the highest probability. This option 
is built on the idea of a long transition and pro-
vides the biggest arena for stakeholders both in 
the context of the EU and other international 
organizations (Commerzbank value: 0.30).

Conclusions

International comparisons are necessary to 
conceptualise Brexit and its potential conse-
quences (Scott, S. 2013; Bachmann, V. and 
Sidaway, J.D. 2016; Kagarlitsky, B. 2016; Pet-
tifor, A. 2016). Academic, business and policy 
31 http://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/milyen_brexit_

harom_honap_alatt_semmi_nem_tortent.237749.
html Retrieved: 31.10.2016.

debates on the relationship between the free 
movement of persons (Kotef, H. 2015) and 
the free movement of workers in particular 
(Buckley, M. et al. 2016) are necessary to ex-
plore the multi-layered outcomes of this par-
ticular event in Europe. We argued in this 
paper that the principle of free movement of 
persons – one of the most sensitive issues in 
Europe – was put to a test through the Brexit 
process, and albeit the settlement symbolised a 
certain political compromise, it did not satisfy 
British public concerns. As a result, a new set-
tlement becomes necessary. In our view, the 
basis of the forthcoming settlement could be 
very similar to the first settlement because the 
trends behind the Brexit process remained un-
changed and the only compromise text avail-
able is the Brexit deal itself. No real room for 
manoeuvre seems to exist and this difficult 
situation supports to a great deal our clear 
vote for the ‘postponing Brexit’ scenario. 

Hungarian literature to date analysed the 
mobility of Hungarian citizens to UK as part 
of the general emigration process (Gödri, I. 
et al. 2014; Hárs, Á. 2014; Moreh, C. 2014) 
relating mostly with the special groups of 
highly skilled workers and low skilled work-
ers (Eke, E. et al. 2011; Balázs, P. 2012; Juhász, 
R. 2014; Irimiás, A. and Michalkó, G. 2016). 
The added value of this paper is that it high-
lights the cornerstones of the development 
of the principle of free movement of people 
during the initial phase of Brexit. Statistical 
evidence stresses two basic facts (Schwanen, 
T. and Kwan, M.P. 2009) on the Brexit debate 
from a Hungarian perspective:

– Less than 200 children receive British ’in-
work benefit’ per year in Hungary.

– Between 2011 and 2015 the increase of 
immigrants of Hungarian origin was the fifth 
greatest in the UK in absolute terms.

Typical news in the British media was in 
August 2016: “Poland has overtaken India 
as the most common non-UK country of 
birth for people living in the UK, Office for 
National Statistics figures show. … India and 
the Republic of Ireland have traditionally 
been the sources of the UK’s largest foreign-
born groups. The latest net migration figures 



431Gellér-Lukács, É. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 421–432.

show a slowdown in the numbers settling in 
the UK from Poland and seven other former 
Eastern bloc countries – but that was offset by 
an increase in net migration from Bulgaria and 
Romania, which hit record levels of 60 000.”32.

The UK is clearly aiming at regaining the 
freedom, rights and competences, trans-
ferred to the EU in the area of free move-
ment of persons, the freedom which the UK 
already enjoys in the area of immigration of 
non-EU nationals (Wiesbrock, A. 2010). The 
UK already used its freedom to focus heav-
ily on managing migration to a great extent. 
Already in its 2005 paper “Controlling our 
borders: Making migration work for Britain 
– five year strategy for asylum and immigra-
tion”, one of the goals set out was to uphold 
an immigration system which responds to 
public concerns.33 The only question remains 
how this system will look like and how it 
will influence competitiveness of the UK and 
East–West migration patterns.

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