4_Dobysh.indd 51Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.68.1.4 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 2019 (1) 51–64. Introduction Social networking sites (SNS) are new battle- fields of different political beliefs and prefer- ences, geopolitical narratives and imagina- tions, attitudes towards conflicts and politi- cal and social contradictions. In Ukraine, the revolutionary events of 2013–2014 (known as Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity) and armed conflict in Donbas resulted in many new public pages and groups in Vkontakte, Facebook, Odnoklasniki, and Twitter. Despite the opportunity to get a variety of informa- tion sources and directly communicate with opposing side of the conflict, which might have mediation and democratization effects, the practices of using SNS resulted in polar- ization of the society and formation of more profound cleavages. Public pages and open groups, which were covering events on the Maidan in Kyiv during the Revolution and later Russia-backed armed conflict in Don- bas, were producing not only news reports. They started to propose a broader vision of the conflict, geopolitical narratives about en- emies and friends (the US and NATO, Eu- ropean Union, Russia), new division lines between “Us” and “Them”, legitimating and delegitimating narratives about political centres (Kyiv and Moscow) and relations to them, and geopolitical picture of the world. Moreover, Russian Federation involvement in the conflict was also supported by active information campaigns in SNS discrediting Ukraine as an independent state, de-legiti- mating new Ukrainian government, and promoting separatist movements within the country. It resulted in a ban of Russian SNS (Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki) in Ukraine as well as many other Russian websites in 2017. Euromaidan and conflict in Eastern Ukraine in social networking sites: Territorial differences of pro-Russian subscriptions in Ukraine Mykola DOBYSH1 Abstract Securitization of cyberspace is of great geopolitical concern. Behaviour on the Internet is not diminishing the influence of existing borders but can polarize society along territorial divisions. The paper explores territo- rial differences in the subscription to public pages and open groups in social networking sites (SNS), which emerged as a reaction to revolutionary events in Ukraine (known as Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity) in 2013–2014 and Russia-backed armed conflict in the East of the country. The findings show differences in subscription to such pages in Vkontakte (the most popular SNS in Ukraine before a ban in 2017) among citizens of Ukraine and Russia, regional centres in Ukraine, cities in uncontrolled by Ukrainian government territories, reclaimed by Ukrainian army territories, territories of Lugansk and Donetsk regions which were not under substantial control of Russia-backed separatists, and peripherial cities of the neighbouring Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhya oblasts. The paper also analyzes the geopolitical narratives of pro-Russian public pages in Vkontakte and shows how SNS could be used as a geopolitical tool. Keywords: securitization of cyberspace, Euromaidan, conflict in Eastern Ukraine, social networking sites 1 Department of Geography, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Glushkova Avenue 2A, Kyiv, Ukraine. E-mail: mpetrovych@gmail.com Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.52 The use of SNS as a geopolitical tool of- ten results in polarization of the society and raises a question about securitization of cy- berspace. Such polarization has its territo- rial dimension. The intensity of the conflict in Ukraine strengthened not a nation-wide network of connections in SNS but regional (Duvanova, D. et al. 2016). The paper focuses on the manifestation of Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 and armed conflict in Donbass in SNS and aims to reveal territorial differences in the spreading of Russian geopolitical narra- tives and pro-Russian position in the conflict as well as differences between social net- works in the representation of the events. In the first part, it shows the current state of research on political behaviour in SNS. The second part presents the methodology and data of the study. The third and fourth parts analyze territorial differences of choosing in- formation sources in SNS in Ukraine, and the fifth part is dedicated to the content analy- sis of geopolitical narratives by pro-Russian public pages in Vkontakte. Political behaviour in social networking sites The use of the Internet brings new challenges to political geography research. Friedman, Th.L. (2005) states that in such conditions space is concerning place, which could be understood as making places obsolete and erasing territorial differences in political and social phenomena. However, Goldenberg, J. and Levy, M. (2009) empirical study sug- gests that new technologies are not under- mining the uniqueness of places and influ- ence of distance but even could emphasize them. Moreover, seemingly uncontrolled communications on the Internet are of geo- political concern (Pinkerton, A. et al. 2011). One of the cases of this absence of control is the inability of nation-states to control the flow of information within their borders (especially in conflict situations). However, the ban of Russian websites and Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki SNS in Ukraine in 2017 is an example of how state government could impose control over the information space of the country. The paper argues for the ex- amination of these “emergent arenas of se- curitization” (Bernazzoli, R.M. and Flint, C. 2009). Moreover, SNS are increasing their role in “popular production of geopolitical knowledge” (Pinkerton, A. and Benwell, M. 2014), which should be reflected in political geography studies. On the one hand, SNS open access for the broader population to the same sources of geopolitical narratives (passing existing ter- ritorial borders) and contribute to bottom-up participation in their shaping. On the other hand, geopolitical actors receive a power- ful instrument to spread their geopolitical imaginations and frame social and political issues in their interest. In such a case, politi- cal beliefs and geopolitical imaginations of particular places can be shaped by the poli- tics of interested geopolitical actors – still, the question what territories are more vulnerable to such influences and why remains open. Current research on political issues in SNS is focused on active use of them in electoral campaigns in different countries of the world (Kasmani, M.F. et al. 2014; Kruikemeier, S. 2014; Steenkamp, M. and Hyde-Clarke, N. 2014; Frame, A. and Brachotte, G. 2015), political mobilization of population for the action and participation in politics (Nam, T. 2012; Park, Ch.S. 2013), and correlation between online membership and offline en- gagement (Conroy, M. et al. 2012). However, it is essential that not only SNS change po- litical behaviour but also places shape peo- ple’s behaviour on the Internet and the use of social networking sites (Wang, D.M. et al. 2016). For instance, existing empirical stud- ies reveal that Twitter networks are depend- ent on the geographical distance between users (Takhteyev, Yu. et al. 2012) and SNS users cluster themselves in politically homo- geneous networks (Borondo, J. et al. 2014). Jackson, L. and Valentine, G. (2014) assume that such computer-mediated communica- tion is a new way of doing politics through its absence and presence at the same time. Therefore, SNS are a new political and geo- 53Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. political instrument of influence, and, at the same time, their use is framed by the existing territorial differences. We suggest that SNS not only work as reg- istration of reality but also produce it and are a form of symbolical violence as Bourdieu, P. (1998) stated about television. Lippmann, W. (2017) suggests that social media influence on public opinion has two crucial aspects: (1) filtration of reality, and (2) focus of attention on prepared facts, which are understood as worked out by political actors, media, opin- ion leaders and other subjects engaged in and interested to influence public opinion. In case of public pages and open groups in SNS that emerged as a reaction to revolutionary events in Ukraine in 2013–2014, they were not only focused on prepared facts but also produced fake news and manipulated infor- mation for the sake of one side of the conflict. Consequently, SNS did not bridge political divides in Ukrainian society but polarize them further during the conflict (Duvanova, D. et al. 2015). Social media and social networking sites also became part of soft power and public democracy strategies by geopolitical pow- ers (Simons, G. 2015). As a seemingly uncon- trolled channel of information, SNS became essential tools in the formation of alternative geopolitical narratives of conflicts, geograph- ical imaginations about particular places and regions and their relations to political cen- tres, a geopolitical picture of the world and relations between countries. Social media operations are an essential part of Russian propaganda in Eastern Europe (Helmus, T.C. et al. 2018). Russia was using social network- ing sites in Ukraine to frame its geopoliti- cal messages (Gaufman, E. 2015). Historical myths, regional identity, and images of the enemy were exploited by the Russian Federation in spring 2014 in the Donbas re- gion to escalate conflict (Osipian, Al.L. 2015). Therefore, territorial differences of the use of SNS in Ukraine during 2013–2014 revo- lutionary events and later during the armed conflict in Donbas are not only caused by in- ternal factors and known regional differences in political preferences and voting behaviour in Ukraine (Liber, G.O. 1998; Birch, S. 2000; O’Loughlin, J. 2001; Barrington, L.W. and Herron, E.S. 2004; Clem, R.S. and Craumer, P.R. 2008; Osipian, Ar.L. and Osipian, Al.L. 2012; Peisakhin, L. 2013; O’Loughlin, J. et al. 2016), but also external involvement and mobilization of the population of Ukraine to reach geopolitical goals. Therefore, the paper is mainly focused on Russian SNS, subscrip- tion to pro-Russian public pages, and geopo- litical narratives produced by them to exam- ine territorial differences of the consumption of that content. Data and methodology Data was collected using publicly available information in Vkontakte, Facebook, Od- noklasniki, and Twitter SNS. Using search option for these SNS we found the number of public pages and groups, which have used such words as “Euromaidan”, “Antimaidan”, “Ukrainian Revolution”, “Novorossiya”, and “ATO” (Anti-terrorist operation) in their names, which shows their dedication to the revolution in Ukraine in 2013–2014 and armed conflict in Donbass. A number of subscribers/members was also received from publicly available information in search en- gines. Vkontakte was chosen as a case study for territorial differences in choosing informa- tion sources because it was the most popular SNS among Ukrainians in 2015 (11.8 million of individual user profiles in 2015 according to Gemius) and most politicized and polar- ized according to our preliminary study. Vkontakte has a built-in instrument of filters, which gives the opportunity to filter subscribers of chosen public page or group by location, age, education, gender, image status, and other parameters filled in per- sonal account settings. Some of the param- eters are filled in the process of registration (hometown, age, and gender); therefore, all profiles have that information. It is important that location in Vkontakte is not presented as the user’s current place of living but as a Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.54 hometown, which is a matter of choice by the user itself. Vkontakte has security settings, where the user can make information una- vailable for the public. However, hometown and gender are open for filter instrument. For the purposes of this paper, information about the number of subscribers to top-5 ideologi- cally opposite public pages and groups was collected for Ukraine and Russia in general, administrative centres of Ukrainian oblasts (regions), and for the case study cities in the conflict territories and neighbouring regions in Eastern Ukraine. Vkontakte search instrument also allows filtering profiles by hometown. This feature was used for the second part of the study, which focuses on the conflict territories and neighbouring regions in Eastern Ukraine. For the research purposes we identified four different areas in the Eastern Ukraine: (1) uncontrolled by Ukrainian government, (2) reclaimed by military actions after occupa- tion, (3) territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, which were not under substantial control of Russia-backed separatists, (4) pe- riphery of the conflict zone in the neighbour- ing regions. For each of these areas we chose two (in case of neighbouring regions three be- cause three oblasts are neighbouring Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts) comparable cities. For each of them, we used systematic sampling with gender quota. In the search window filtered by location, each randomly defined n-profile from general sample k was chosen to reach the quota of 25 male and 25 female profiles. Data about gender composition of the Internet audience of the chosen cities was unavailable; as a result, the equal number of males and females was chosen, which we should admit slightly differs from the actual composition of the population of the cities. Consequently, in nine cities sample of 450 profiles was selected for the analysis of the behaviour in SNS: posts and reposts of politi- cal content, subscription to public pages with political content, membership in groups ded- icated to political issues. Political issues were narrowed down to the Euromaidan revolu- tion, the annexation of Crimea, and conflict in Donbass. Due to personal security settings, not all information was publicly accessible. Subscription to public page information was available for all the profiles, while informa- tion about membership in groups and posts and repost was limited only to those profiles, which did not make that information private. Our study revealed that in 30.4 per cent of cases (134 out of 450) people make the list of the groups they are members unavailable for the public. The third part of the research was based on the data from two of the five most popular Antimaidan, pro-Russian, and pro-separatist public pages and groups: “Antimaidan” and “Russkie online – Novorossiya”. The first one appeared as opposition to the revolutionary events in Ukraine in 2013–2014 and the second one as a promotion and support for the sepa- ratist movement in South-Eastern Ukraine. 1053 news posts from “Antimaidan” and 756 posts from “Russkie online – Novorossiya” were chosen for the content analysis. These posts include all, which were made on these pages in Vkontakte from March 10 to March 25, 2015, following a military escala- tion in January, Second Minsk Agreements in February, and the start of the positional armed confrontation. The content of all posts was coded into four groups: (1) about Ukraine, (2) in relation to Russia, (3) about the US and EU, and (4) Other. It was also de- cided to include armed conflict news posts as a category in the group “in relation to Russia” because they were done from the Russian perspective and often addressed the Russian government. Within these four groups, mes- sages and framing of political events was cod- ed into subgroups, which are presented and discussed in the last part of the paper. We are aware of the limitations of the paper. It is focused only on the sources of the information people chose in Vkontakte during Euromaidan and conflict in the East of the country, which in some cases might not represent that people share geopoliti- cal narratives and political beliefs of those public pages and open groups. However, the share of subscription to ideologically oppo- 55Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. site public pages in the total subscription to sources of information about Euromaidan and conflict reveals biased predominance or overweight of subscription to one of the sides of the conflict in particular areas. The paper has no examination of public pages, which had balanced position covering con- flict events because it was one of the effects of SNS – emerged public pages and groups were emphasizing differences and not build- ing bridges. Moreover, the data was collected after the period of the escalation of the con- flict in February 2015, which should be taken into consideration interpreting the results of the study. The focus of the paper is on pro- Russian public pages and their geopolitical narratives because Russia is increasing its ge- opolitical presence in the world using SNS as geopolitical tools. The paper uses a concept of territorial differences, and we are cautious that obtained data is for particular cities. Territorial differences in support of the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in SNS In November 2013, president of Ukraine, Vik- tor Yanukovych, refused to sign the Associa- tion Agreement with the EU during Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius despite public pressure in Ukraine. It caused protests and polarization of society. Subsequent events show the fundamental foreign policy cleav- age in Ukraine, which supports Lijphart, A. (see Johnston, R.J. et al. 1990) complementa- tion of the classical Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) model. Two main social movements emerged as a reaction to the events in Vilnius and Kyiv: Ukrainian revolution (Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity) and Antimaidan. In the course of events, the annexation of Crimea and Russia-backed armed conflict in Donbass resulted in the additional line of confrontation in society: pro-Ukrainian sup- port of sovereignty versus the pro-Russian support of separatists, Novorossiya concept, and unity with Russia. However, in Ukraine, foreign policy cleavage is complicated by ac- tive Russian involvement. The manifestation of the “Euromaidan” revolu- tion and war in Donbass in SNS As the Euromaidan and Antimaidan move- ments started in 2013, they were actively discussed in social networking sites. Figure 1 shows that thousands of public pages and groups emerged to report news and opin- ions on the ongoing conflict. Public opinion was divided into two camps: (1) supporters of the Euromaidan, and (2) opponents. SNS also followed that line of divide and pages where information was presented only from one of the points of view were created and actively promoted. Russian propaganda was also actively engaged in the process. For in- stance, two Russian social networking sites, Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki, were platforms were most of the pages criticizing Ukrainian pursuit for European integration and later supporting separatist movements and annex- ation of Crimea emerged. At the same time, only Odnoklasniki is dramatically one-sided in the number of pages and subscribers for Antimaidan and pages supporting separa- tism and unity with Russia. Facebook is in the opposite pole, with most of the popular pages and their subscribers being pro-Ukrainian and pro-European in the coverage of the conflict. Twitter is less popular in Ukraine and had a balanced number of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian pages. Numbers show that despite many channels of information created to spread the pro-Russian view of the conflict; they were not so popular. Vkontakte is the most polarized SNS among analyzed. Top-5 public pages with pro-European and pro- Ukrainian stances have near two million subscribers and members, while top-5 pro- Russian pages have one million and a half. Vkontakte also was the most popular SNS in Ukraine and the most representative of the the Ukrainian internet audience in 2013-2017. In 2017, Vkontakte, as well as Odnoklasniki and many other Russian media, were banned in Ukraine as a part of the measures to coun- teract Russian aggression and propaganda (Figure 1. and 2). Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.56 Moreover, the politicization of the citizens of the Russian Federation and their engage- ment in an online confrontation over the Euromaidan, lately annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine are vivid. All the top-5 pro-Russian, Antimaidan, and pro-separatist pages and groups have the majority of sub- scribers from Russia, not from Ukraine (Figure 3). At the same time, top-5 pro-Ukrainian sources of information in Vkontakte have 99 per cent and more subscribers from Ukraine. Therefore, the conflict manifestation in Vkontakte shows that it was not only within Ukraine but had a clear Russian involvement. Territorial differences of subscription to ideolo- gically opposite public pages and groups in Vkontakte Until Vkontakte was banned in Ukraine in 2017, it was the most popular SNS. It is the most representative of the polarization of po- litical views among Internet users in Ukraine. In Donetsk, Lugansk, and Simferopol sub- scribers to pro-Russian, pro-separatist, and Antimaidan pages dominated pro-Ukrainian (more than 83 to 17). Only in Kharkiv and Odessa in South-Eastern Ukraine they had a substantial share in the total subscription to top-10 ideologically opposite public pages and groups (38% and 33% correspondingly). In Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhya, and Dnipro, regional centres of South-Eastern Ukraine, the shares of subscribers to pro-Russian sources of information were only from 15 per cent to 24 per cent. 8 per cent of pro-Russian subscriptions in Kyiv stands out of Central Ukraine. While in Central and North-Eastern Ukraine pro-Russian sources of information in Vkontakte had only 2–6 per cent share. In Western Ukraine, pro-Ukrainian sources of information in Vkontakte totally dominated (98–99% of subscriptions) (Figure 4). Consequently, easy access to different viewpoints and sources of information on the Internet does not erase territorial differences in political beliefs. Moreover, it creates pre- Fig. 1. Number of groups and public pages in popular social networking sites dedicated to the Ukrainian revolution of 2013–2014 and war in Donbass by keywords used in the name. Fig. 2. Number of subscribers and members of top-5 ideologically opposite public pages in popular social networking sites in Ukraine, 19 February 2015. 57Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. Fig. 3. Number of subscribers and members of top-5 ideologically opposite public pages/groups in Vkontakte by country of origin, 19 February 2015. Fig. 4. Territorial differences of subscription to top-10 ideologically opposite public pages/groups in Vkontakte, 19 February 2015. conditions for polarization and territorially framed preferences for information sources. For such powerful geopolitical actors as Russia, it opens the door for the information- al involvement in the creation of symboli- cal reality and geopolitical imaginations of people in foreign countries. Primarily this is the case in the neighbouring countries where there is no language barrier, and a shared history could be used as an instrument for unification under one centre position and disunion with the other. Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.58 Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and territorial differences of political behaviour in SNS After the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine, the Internet us- ers and Vkontakte members faced the ques- tion of reliable sources of information about the events. However, it turns out that the question was rather about suitable sources of information or those that arise due to social- ization in particular geographic places. Our study of Vkontakte shows that assumption that space is conquering a place in the era of new technologies (Friedman, Th.L. 2005) is not the case in choosing sources of informa- tion about conflicts. Four studied areas in Ukraine show differences in sources of in- formation about Euromaidan revolution and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In uncontrolled by Ukrainian government territories subscription to top-5 pro-Russian public pages and groups prevailed. Subscription to top-5 pro-Russian public pages is 26.9 per cent in Yenakiieve and 16.3 per cent in Kadiivka (Stakhanov), while a subscription to pro-Ukrainian pages is only 0.70 and 0.85 per cent, respectively (Table 1). It was predominant in the reclaimed territories of Bakhmut (Artemivsk) in Donetsk oblast and Lysychansk in Lugansk oblast but with lower numbers of subscription (12.0% and 9.7% respectively). In territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, which stayed under Ukrainian government control during the conflict, the numbers of subscription to top-5 pro-Russian public pages and groups was even lower (9.7% in Pokrovsk [Krasnoarmiysk] and 8.0% in Starobilsk), while the use of pro-Ukrainian sources of information was higher (2.5% and 2.7% respectively). In the periphery of the neighbouring regions, subscription to top-5 pro-Ukrainian public pages and groups was already higher than to top-5 pro-Russian (ex- cept Izium city in Kharkiv oblast were it was almost equal). The second part of the study of the con- flict territories of Eastern Ukraine sources of information about the conflict included a sample of 450 profiles from studied cities and not only subscription to top-5 ideologi- cally opposite public pages from each side of the conflict, but also other groups and pages and reposts of the information on personal pages feed. As shown in Figure 5, the numbers of people who used polarized sources of information about the conflict were even higher, but patterns of the information sources in four studied territories of Ukraine were the same. In profiles from uncontrolled territories, the use of pro-Russian sources of information was predominant; in reclaimed territories, they were substantially lower; in the areas where there was no armed conflict, pro-Ukrainian sources of information were more widespread; and, in the periphery of the neighbouring regions, they already domi- nated the pro-Russian sources of information. As a result, Internet users in those territo- ries received a very different message about the understanding of the causes and conse- quences of the conflict as well as attitudes towards Kyiv or Moscow as centres or even broader geopolitical imaginations of interna- tional relations and Russia’s role in the world politics. Geopolitical narratives of pro-Russian public pages and groups in Vkontakte Despite Pinkerton, A. et al. (2011) assump- tion that the Internet is of geopolitical con- cern due to uncontrolled and uncontrollable communication, Russian-Ukrainian conflict and representation of the events in Vkon- takte show that SNS are of geopolitical con- cern also because of possible manipulations and controlled messages. Our study shows that in Russian SNS public pages and open groups there are no platforms for communi- cation and exchange of ideas, but these are places of passive communication, where the source of information is just spreading mes- sages to receiving subjects. On the one hand, they have no geographical barriers, but on the other, they are territorially bounded in- formation spaces. For instance, pro-Russian pages and groups bound together people in 59Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. Russia and Donbass, while gradu- ally separating Donbass from other South-Eastern, Central and Western Ukraine. Bourdieu’s understanding of television (1998) as symbolical vi- olence could also be used for public pages and groups in SNS as engaged in symbolical violence. Antimaidan, pro-Russian, and pro- separatists as a group of information sources for Russian speaking people of Ukraine were imposing specific geopo- litical visions of the world and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Content analysis of two of the five most popular pro-Rus- sian pages in Vkontakte posts in 2015 shows that they were creating image of Ukraine as the Other, of South-Eastern Ukraine as a part of greater Russia, of the US and NATO as the main villains, and contradicting image of Europe: (1) negative, as “morally degrading” (in case when it was about Ukrainian inspirations of European integra- tion), and (2) positive, as supporting annexation of Crimea and separatist inspirations in Donbass (mainly about particular positions of right, far-right and sometimes far-left political lead- ers) (Figure 6). Narratives of Ukraine were orient- ed to discredit it as a state (notions of failed-state, oligarchs’ domination, and weak and illegitimate govern- ment) and to accentuate its status as the Other for territories of the armed conflict (“karateli” [chasteners] image and notions of human rights viola- tions). Use of “karateli” as a descrip- tion of Ukrainian forces and almost everything connected to state appara- tus was a crucial element of Russian propaganda in SNS. Important is an appeal to World War 2 memories be- cause it is of high symbolical value for Russian and Ukrainian people. “Karateli” is a word that was used to describe Nazis and their Ukrainian col- laborators who were killing local peo- Ta bl e 1 . S ub sc rip tio n to to p- 5 id eo lo gi ca lly o pp os ite p ub lic p ag es /g ro up s i n Vk on ta kt e a m on g Vk on ta kt e u se rs o f s tu di ed ci tie s, Fe br ua ry 2 01 5 St ud ie d te rr ito ri es Su di ed c iti es To ta l po pu la tio n in 2 01 5 N um be r of V ko nt ak te pr ofi le s N um be r o f s ub sc ri pt io ns to to p- 5 pr o- Ru ss ia n pu bl ic p ag es a nd g ro up s pr o- U kr ai ni an p ub lic p ag es a nd g ro up s Fe m al e M al e To ta l Sh ar e, % Fe m al e M al e To ta l Sh ar e, % U nc on tr ol le d te rr ito ri es Ye na ki ie ve 10 7, 81 7 23 ,5 66 3, 05 4 3, 29 1 6, 34 5 26 .9 2 68 98 16 6 0. 70 K ad iiv ka (S ta kh an ov ) 90 ,1 33 18 ,2 40 1, 25 9 1, 72 2 2, 98 1 16 .3 4 73 82 15 5 0. 85 Re cl ai m ed te rr ito ri es Ba hm ut (A rt em iv sk ) 10 2, 59 4 15 ,9 92 83 7 1, 08 3 1, 92 0 12 .0 1 14 5 18 1 32 6 2. 04 Ly sy ch an sk 11 5, 91 6 20 ,6 24 90 4 1, 09 6 2, 00 0 9. 70 19 6 21 0 40 6 1. 97 Pa rt s of D on et sk a nd Lu ga ns k ob la st s* Po kr ov sk (K ra sn oa rm iy ks ) 75 ,3 48 17 ,2 31 70 9 95 4 1, 66 3 9. 65 19 9 22 5 42 4 2. 46 St ar ob ils k 17 ,1 53 7, 10 2 22 4 34 7 57 1 8. 04 93 97 19 0 2. 68 Pe ri ph er y of n ei gh - bo ur in g re gi on s Iz iu m 49 ,7 44 11 ,7 40 20 8 28 7 49 5 4. 22 19 5 27 6 47 1 4. 01 Pa vl ov gr ad 10 9, 56 6 34 ,0 69 33 0 39 4 72 4 2. 13 1, 11 4 1, 31 2 2, 42 6 7. 12 Be rd ia ns k 11 7, 50 9 42 ,0 18 44 1 58 1 1, 02 2 2. 43 1, 14 2 1, 33 6 2, 47 8 5. 90 *T er ri to ri es s ta ye d un de r s ta te c on tr ol . Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.60 Fig. 6. Content analysis of “Antimaidan” and “Russkie online | Novorossiya” public pages in Vkontakte, 10–25 March 2015. Fig. 5. Sources of information in social networking sites of Internet users from conflict territories and neigh- bouring regions. 61Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. ple in times of World War 2. Therefore, it was a strong emotional discrediting of Ukraine and the creation of Russia’s image as a stronghold in a war with the enemy in the eyes of sub- scribers of Antimaidan and pro-separatist pag- es. Moreover, continuous appeal to Kyiv au- thorities (“Kievskie vlasti”) as illegitimate and oppressing local populations in South-Eastern Ukraine was developing the image of Kyiv as the Other, while Moscow was portrayed as a centre, which can protect local populations from the violence of Kyiv authorities. Narratives about Russia were complicated. First, armed conflict news were given not from neutral or only pro-separatist perspectives. They were following lines of official Russian Federation positions in the conflict. Second, the legitimization of Russian involvement in the conflict was often supported by the nar- rative of Slavic unity and Russian greatness. It supports conclusions of Kasamara, V. and Sorokina, A. (2012) about imperial ambi- tions of the Russian population of different social statuses. The studied public pages in Vkontakte were creating particular geopoliti- cal imaginations of Ukrainian territories in their connection to Moscow as a centre. For instance, Crimea annexation legitimization practices were built on notions of “reunifica- tion” and historical justice as well as stories of social and economic success after the an- nexation. South-Eastern Ukraine territories were described using the concept of historical “Novorossiya”, which was undermining the role of Kyiv as a legitimate political centre for the region and accentuating its historical and cultural connections to Moscow. Moreover, these narrative lines were sup- ported by messages about Russian great- ness, which included notions of a mighty army, reach natural resources, reach cultur- al heritage, influence on geopolitical scene, and ability to resist such world powers as the US, which was portrayed as the biggest enemy of Slavic people and “Russkiy mir”, undermining post-Soviet space unity, and its economic and political capacities, pro- voking conflicts in Russia and its “sphere of interests”. Geopolitical image of NATO was constructed using the same narrative. Notions of NATO and the US were used in- terchangeably, while the image of Europe in pro-Russian public pages in Vkontakte was constructed ambiguously. On the one hand, a number of messages in the analyzed con- tent were criticizing Ukrainian inspirations for integration with the EU by portraying European states as “morally degrading”, which in the narrative of pro-Russian pub- lic pages in Vkontakte means domination of liberal values which are contradicting tradi- tional values of Russians and more broadly Slavic people. At the same time, they were developing a positive narrative of Europe us- ing statements of European far-right, far-left, and pro-Russian politicians and activists. Conclusions and discussion Public pages in Vkontakte, which emerged as a reaction to the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine and later armed conflict in Don- bas, were producing broader geopolitical narratives and imaginations of different ter- ritories. For example, the image of Crimea as historically Russian land, South-Eastern Ukraine as “Novorossiya” culturally closer connected to Moscow than Kyiv, which was undermining the sovereignty of Ukrainian state and legitimation of Kyiv as a political centre for these territories. Second, these public pages were not just informing people about the conflict, but also suggesting a geo- political vision of international relations. The United States and NATO were presented as main villains who caused armed conflict by interfering in Ukrainian politics, and Russia image was developed around its greatness as a prerequisite to oppose these enemies. Ukrainian government was discredited using “karateli” concept with the emotional appeal to World War 2. The consumption of above described geo- political imaginations and narratives in SNS had clear territorial differences in Ukraine. Subscription to top-5 ideologically pro-Rus- sian public pages and groups in Vkontakte Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.62 was predominant to the subscription to top- 5 pro-Ukrainian only in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Simferopol regional centers in Ukraine. In Odesa and Kharkiv, for each one subscription to pro-Russian pages were three subscriptions to pro-Ukrainian. Internet users in such cities of South-Eastern Ukraine as Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhya, and Kherson (whose voting behaviour in years of independence of Ukraine was mainly shifted to the pro-Rus- sian side) in times of armed conflict in Donbas were predominantly using pro-Ukrainian sources of information in Vkontakte. It fol- lows electoral behaviour patterns in 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, which support the thesis that exist- ing territorial differences in political beliefs are preconditions for the homogenization of subscription to information sources in SNS. The study of the conflict zone Internet us- ers information sources preferences reveals the influence of the emerged borders and ad- ministrative divisions. Cities in the occupied area and reclaimed by the Ukrainian army were using pro-Russian sources of informa- tion in Vkontakte more often than other cit- ies in Donetsk and Lugansk regions where was no armed conflict and where Russia- backed separatists were not controlling ter- ritory for substantial time. At the same time, administrative borders between Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts on the one side, and Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhya on the other are vividly visible in the number of subscribers to pro-Ukrainian public pages and groups in Vkontakte. On the one hand, existing territorial differ- ences in political views frame behaviour of the users on the Internet. On the other hand, SNS as geopolitical tools could be used to polarize society along existing or imagined borders, mobilize people in conflict areas, and spread specific geopolitical narratives. Existing administrative divisions, phantom borders revealed by electoral campaigns, emerged borders of conflict zones frame Internet users’ decisions about informa- tion sources on SNS. It corresponds with Borondo, J. et al. (2014) findings that Internet users cluster themselves in homogeneous groups. However, homogeneity could be based on conformity to a similar vision of the region or place regarding centre-periph- ery relations, causes of conflict, and a geo- political picture of the region and the world. Takhteyev, Yu. et al. (2012) findings that so- cial ties in Twitter networks depend on the geographical distance between users and are stronger in similar metropolitan areas could have external validity for other SNS and cov- erage of conflicts in SNS. The paper’s findings show that people living in the same administrative regions of Ukraine and within newly emerged conflict zone boundaries use different sources of in- formation about the conflict. Moreover, those sources of information are not only about agenda setting and coverage of the events but also spread broader geopolitical narra- tives about actors involved, centre-periphery relation, legitimation of the authorities, and a geopolitical picture of the world. However, we should admit that it does not suggest that all places within administrative borders are homogeneous. Intraregional variability is also of great interest to study in the context of the sources of information preferences in SNS, but it was not in the focus of this paper. In the case of the post-Soviet space, where the Russian language is understood or even native for populations in the countries neigh- bouring to Russia, information distributed on the Internet is a powerful tool to promote pro-Russian geopolitical orientations among the local population. Territorial differences of such information consumption depend on existing territorial divisions. However, the reasons why some territories are more vul- nerable to specific geopolitical narratives is still under question. These questions in the time of the increased importance of the secu- ritization of cyberspace are of great interest for further geographical research. 63Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. REFERENCES Barrington, L.W. and Herron, E.S. 2004. One Ukraine or many? Regionalism in Ukraine and its political consequences. Nationalities Papers 32. (1): 53–86. Bernazzoli, R.M. and Flint, C. 2009. 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