East–West dichotomy and political conflict in Ukraine – Was Huntington right? 99 Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 63 (2) (2014) 99–134. DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.63.2.1 East–West dichotomy and political confl ict in Ukraine – Was Huntington right? Dávid KARÁCSONYI1, Károly KOCSIS1, Katalin KOVÁLY2, József MOLNÁR3 and László PÓTI4 Abstract In his work the Clash of Civilizations S.P. Huntington classifi ed Ukraine as a “cleft country.” In our view, the current discord in Ukraine is rooted in the political divisions that have fre- quently characterised the post-communist countries. In Ukraine, owing to a history of divergent socio-economic development in the various regions, these divisions are strongly regional. The dichotomic socio-economic framework refl ects not only ethnic and religious diff erences but also such factors as urbanisation, economic development, and even natural elements. The resulting political divide in Ukraine may be traced to the dichotomy of its national identity. The dividing line is between east and west, urban and rural, and Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine. Politically, it is between “Maidan-Ukraine” and “Anti-Maidan-Ukraine”. The divide runs along the Uman’–Kharkiv line between the forest zone and the steppe. In the 18th century the steppe – which had once been a corridor for the nomadic peoples – became a frontier territory for the Ukrainians and then for Tsarist Russia. The Russian ties of cities in the region were further strengthened by industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries and by Russifi cation in the Soviet era. The Soviet-made famine (Holodomor) and the events of World War II (the actions of the UPA) heightened Ukraine’s political dichotomy. Since independence Ukraine’s political elite has failed to address the problem in an adequate manner. The recent escalation of the confl ict is due to a lack of political cohesion in the young state and the gravitational eff ect of the major powers rather than primarily to some kind of civilizational diff erence. By accentuating Ukraine’s economic and fi nancial diffi culties, the global crisis has made the country even more vulnerable. Keywords: Ukraine, dichotomy, Uman’–Kharkiv line, etnicity, society, confl ict, Huntington 1 Geographical Institute, Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. E-mails: karacsonyi.david@csfk . mta.hu, kocsis.karoly@csfk .mta.hu 2 Eötvös Loránd University, Doctoral School of Earth Sciences, H-1117 Budapest, Pázmány Péter sétány 1/C. E-mail: kovaly.katalin@gmail.com 3 Ferenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, UA-90202 Berehovo, Kossuth sq. 6. E-mail: jozsi@kmf.uz.ua 4 Hungarian Institue of International Aff airs, H-1016 Budapest, Bérc utca 13–15. E-mail: l.poti@hiia.hu 100 Introduction In his much-cited work, the Clash of Civilizations Huntington classifi ed Ukraine as a “cleft country” (Huntington, S.P. 1993a). Some may regard the events of the spring of 2014 as the fulfi lment of his “prediction”. The main line of argument in Huntington’s work concerns the fault lines between the major civilizations, which, in Huntington’s view, are determined primarily by religion and culture. Adding to this idea, we note the following in connection with Ukraine: although, at the time of the last census in 2001, only 66.3% of Ukraine’s inhabitants self-identifi ed as Ukrainian native speakers and 77.8% as ethnic Ukrainians (Bochkovs’ka, A. et al. 2008), it is also true that 97.2% of the population spoke one of the East Slavic languages (www.ukrcensus.gov. ua) and three-quarters were Eastern Orthodox or Greek Catholic Christians (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002). In other words, these people are part of the same (Slavic-Orthodox) major civilization. Ukraine’s 3.2 million Greek Catholics constitute the largest religious minority (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002); they are concentrated in Galicia and in Transcarpathia (Zakarpatt ia). Meanwhile, the country’s 8 million ethnic Russians do not form a majority apart from Crimea and several raions (districts). The main fault line, therefore, is not religious affi liation or ethnicity, but arises from an interaction of factors that we seek to identify in this study by exploring the historical, social and political processes and the spatial and geographical contexts of the present confl ict. The current discord in Ukraine is rooted in the political divisions that have frequently characterised the post-communist countries and have been accentuated by the global economic crisis. Owing to divergent socio-economic development in the various regions of Ukraine, these divisions have deep historical roots and are strongly regional. This regional aspect is not seen in the other post-communist countries. This socio-economic divergence is basically historical in origin, but alongside ethnic and religious aspects we can also identify such infl uencing fac- tors as urbanisation, economic development, and even natural elements. In the more than two decades since independence, the political elite of the young independent state has failed, in general, to mitigate the regional diff erences and strengthen the unity of the country. Indeed, Ukraine’s unity has been due al- most exclusively to the interests of the major powers (The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 1994) rather than to domestic socio-political cohesion. The absence of socio-economic reforms, policies promoting the Ukrainian language and centralised government rather than regionalisation, and tensions arising in the wake of the global economic crisis have strengthened separatism. In this process the actions of the major foreign powers have been a contributory factor. Ukraine has thus been incapable of responding eff ectively to the centrifugal forces created by the major powers (NATO/EU vs. Russia). At regular intervals and even amid the 101 discord of 2014, a majority in Ukrainian society – in both the eastern and western parts of the country – have expressed the demand for an independent and united Ukraine. At present, however, Ukrainian identity means something very diff erent to people in the West Ukrainian L’viv (Galicia) and to their fellow citizens in the East Ukrainian Donets’k (Donbas) (Hryzak, J. 2002; Haran, A. 2002). The aim of this study is to present the Ukrainian dichotomy and then to explore, from a historical perspective, the processes that have led to the cur- rent impasse and their eff ect on the dichotomy, which relates to identity and to such societal factors as ethnicity, language, culture and urbanisation. We seek also to investigate the political dimensions of the dichotomy as refl ected in the election results and in the current politico-military confl ict. In the course of our analysis, we made reference to historical sources as well as to census and elec- tion statistics. Further, when examining the spatial aspects of the present con- fl ict, we performed a media analysis, based on which we compiled a regional database and thematic map of events in Ukraine between November 2013 and May 2014. When collecting the spatial-specifi c information, we explored not only the classical printed and electronic Ukrainian, Russian and international sources, but also the so-called social media, including place-related news sto- ries shared on Facebook or on Twitt er (e.g. #euromaidan) and Tumblr. These latt er sources not only play an increasingly important role in mass media, but also, through their reporting, they themselves oft en become shapers of events, as we saw at the time of the so-called Arab Spring (DeLong-Bas, N.J. 2013). Following the publication of our atlas Ukraine in Maps (Kocsis, K. et al. 2008), it is not our purpose in this article to off er a comprehensive account of the historical development of Ukraine, the ethnogenesis of the Ukrainian people, or the social, ethnic and economic processes underway in the country and its spatial divi- sions. Rather, we focus on the causes of the regional dichotomy and, within these confi nes, take into account only those factors that infl uence this dichotomy. Ukraine as a state and the Ukrainians as a nation Ukraine’s regional diversity (the East–West dichotomy) has three interrelated causes: (1) On the present territory of Ukraine, there was, in essence, no unifi ed and independent country in the longer term until the mid-20th century. The Ukrainian- Russian boundary began to emerge in the early 1920s under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and the country’s present territory was formed by 1954. Further, Ukraine won independence only in 1991 (Wilson, A. 2002; Yekelchyk, S. 2007). (2) Owing to the territorial fragmentation, the term Ukraine had a rather broad meaning until the early 20th century. Ukraine was fi rst mentioned in 1187, in the so-called “Chronicle of Ipaty”, but the territory to which the au- 102 thor was referring is still disputed even today (Pivtorak, H.P. 2004). According to some commentators, the very name of the country – u-kraina – means bor- derland, periphery or frontier region. Other authors, however, have claimed that u-kraina means “in/inside the country, domestic land” (Sklyarenko, V. 1991; Pivtorak, H.P. 2004). (3) Refl ecting the fragmentation and the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the term Ukraine, identity also exhibits dichotomic features (Khmelko, V. and Wilson, A. 1998). According to a survey conducted in L’viv and in Donets’k in 2000, 78% of the population of L’viv self-identifi ed prima- rily as Ukrainians. Meanwhile, in Donets’k, 45% of respondents self-identi- fi ed as Soviet citizens, with only 23% self-identifying as Russians and 26% as Ukrainians (Hryzak, J. 2002). In the eastern half of the country – and especially among the ethnic Russian population – the terms “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” are connected in people’s minds with Russia’s periphery. In contrast, the inhabitants of western Ukraine generally possess the strongest Ukrainian national identity (Haran, A. 2002). In that area, Ukraine means a nation and a country that is distinct from Russia in terms of both identity and language. The origins of this inde- pendent national consciousness can be traced all the way back to the Kievan Rus. Meanwhile, the Russians are regarded as a people that developed subse- quently, having diverged from the European path of development under Tatar rule. This sharp diff erentiation from the Russians is also a result of the diff erent path of historical development taken by Ukrainians aft er the disintegration of the still united East Slavic state, the Kievan Rus. It was this ethnogenesis that gave rise to the independent Ukrainian nation (Magocsi, P.R. 1996). Historical and geographical roots of regional diversity in Ukraine Steppe and the forest zone, as the dichotomic arena of societal development The natural landscape of Eastern Europe, including that of Ukraine, exhibits a fundamental duality. The forest steppe and forest region lies to the north- west of the Uman’–Kharkiv line, while to the south-east of this line we fi nd the steppe zone (Karácsonyi, D. 2006) (Figure 1). The forest zone is the ancient homeland of the early Slavs who were tillers of the land (Isaev, D.V. red. 2012a). It was here that the East Slavic Empire of Kiev (Kyiv) arose, to be followed by Muscovy to the north-east. In contrast, the steppe zone to the south was the home of the nomads, sometimes forming part of a great empire stretching from Central Asia to the Carpathian Basin – the Hunnic Empire and the Golden Horde – and sometime becoming 103 a “highway” for nomadic peoples. The great nomadic empires managed to extend their power to the Slavs living in the forest zone for shorter or longer intervals, but they could not retain control of the forests in the long term. Until the 18th century, the Slavs were similarly unable to control the steppe, as they were preoccupied with their domestic batt les – with the break up of the Kievan Rus and with Tatar domination – and then with the rivalry between Poland (Poland-Lithuania) and Russia. It was at this time that the diff erentiation of the Eastern Slavs began, whereby Ukrainian and Belarusian in the Polish-Lithuanian territories became separated from the Russian language and culture which domi- nated the areas ruled by Muscovy (the Russian Empire) from its growing base in Moscow (which was a Tatar vassal for some time). This cultural separation was ac- centuated by the Union of Brest (1596), at which the Orthodox Christians living un- der Polish rule recognised the authority of the Pope in Rome. During the Lithuanian and later Polish-Lithuanian supremacy (from the 14th century) the Ukrainians were enriched by progressive western European ideas (Smolyi, V. 2008). Fig. 1. Physical-geographical divisions of Ukraine 104 Ukrainians in a power triangle By the 16th century, the central area of present-day Ukraine had become a mar- ginal zone in the struggle between the power triangle of Muscovy, the Polish Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), and the Ott oman Empire with their Crimean Tatar vassals. The historical evolution of Ukrainians is fundamentally punctu- ated around this time (Smolyi, V. 2008). On the margins of the steppe, in the “Wild Plains”, there arose a free, semi-military peasant group. Having escaped serfdom, this group – the Cossacks – became a prerequisite and a means for the conquest of the steppe. With the west-east migration of this group, the Ukrain- ian ethnic territory reached the margins of the steppe in the east between the mid-16th and mid-17th centuries (Loza, Y. 2005a, 2005b) (Figure 2). The balance of power between Muscovy, Poland and the Ott oman Empire gradually broke down in the course of the 17th century. At that time, the Russian Empire, which had become increasingly powerful, started to push the Poles out of Eastern Europe. In this long process the most important develop- ment in relation to Ukraine was the decision of the Cossack state of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to break away from the Poles and form an alliance with the Russian Tsar (1654, Pereiaslav Agreement) (Figure 3). Although some historians – e.g. Hrushevskyi, M. (1904), the time-hon- oured Ukrainian historian – trace the emergence of the Ukrainians as far back as Halych, and even to the Kievan Rus, the Cossacks were the fi rst ethnic com- munity that came to refl ect the characteristic features of the Ukrainians as an ethnically independent society. They were the only force who would spar with neighbouring states in the name of the Ukrainians, fi ghting for their right to an existence and economic and spiritual development. In the political fi eld, the Cossacks established a new era of Ukrainian nation-building (Smolyi, V. 2008). The Treaty of Andruszów / Andrusovo (1667), which sett led the fate of the Cossack territories for a good hundred years until the partition of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795), conserved the east-west division of Ukraine along the Dnieper. The right-bank of the Dnieper (Pravoberezhzhia-Ukraine) remained under Polish rule, while the left -bank (Livoberezhzhia-Ukraine), the Hetmanschyna (Hetmanate), came under Russian control. Following the fi nal partition of Poland (1795), Ukraine became the Russian Empire’s western borderland. In 1772, the central parts of present-day Ukraine and then, in 1793, the entire coun- try apart from Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, which had become part of the Habsburg Empire, were integrated into the Russian Empire (Figure 4). Despite being integrated into the Austrian and Russian empires, the Ukrainians managed to signifi cantly develop their culture. The result of this was a phenomenon of cultural and national revival in the middle of the 19th century that further stimulated the development of a national movement at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Smolyi, V. 2008). 105 Fi g. 2 . C ha ng e in th e U kr ai ni an e th ni c te rr ito ry , 1 6t h – 20 th c en tu ry 106 Fig. 3. States on the present territory of Ukraine, 1000–1654 107 Fig. 4. States on the present territory of Ukraine, 1700–2014 108 Russian colonisation in the steppe During the reign of Catherine the Great, the Russian Empire “defeated” the steppe by the end of the 18th century, put an end to the last autonomy of the Cossacks (1775: devastation of Zaporozhian Sich) and advanced as far as the Black Sea (1783: occupation of Crimea), thereby achieving a strategic aim of its expansion. In the newly unifi ed region, the way was open to the colonisation of a sparsely populated part of the steppe that had lain outside the control of the central (former Polish, later Russian) authority (Figure 2). The region was organised into a governorate known as New Russia (Novorossiya) (Magocsi, P.R. 1996). The Tsarist authorities invited hundred of thousands of sett lers to the newly conquered territory. Migration was not spontaneous, as it had been to a lesser or greater extent at the time of the Cossacks (Subtelny, O. 2000). Until the beginning of the 19th century, successive waves of migrants – Ger- mans, Serbs, Czechs, Bulgarians and Greeks – arrived in the region, but the Ukrainians and Russians were clearly the largest groups of sett lers. The coastal region became an integral part of the Russian Empire much sooner than did the steppe, which turned into an internal periphery. The late 18th century saw the foundation of Sevastopol, Odesa, Kherson and Mykolaiv on the Black Sea coast and of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. These towns be- came bases for the expanding Russian navy and their role in commerce also grew. It was then that the fertile Chernozem soils of the Ukrainian steppe were ploughed to produce grain for export (Magocsi, P.R. 1996), resulting in a booming trade in grain. This led to the rapid development of Odesa as the principal grain port in the steppe zone. Due to colonisation and the founding of new cities, the southern regions of present-day Ukraine increasingly became, in the course of the 19th century, a frontier region for Russians. The increase of population of the four governo- rates in the steppe zone (formerly “New Russia”) surged aft er the conclusion of the Crimean War (1856) and the Russian emancipation of serfs (1861). There was a wave of migration from the inner central regions of the Russian Empire to the peripheral areas, including the governorates of New Russia (Magocsi, P.R. 1996). Kyiv and the major cities already had a Russian majority during the census of 1897 (Chornyi, S. 2001). The population of the Black Sea Coastal Lowland (including Odesa and the other major seaports) increased nine-fold between 1810 and 1910, while the inner steppe zone (Kharkiv and Katerinoslav governorates) saw a fi ve-fold population increase (Karácsonyi, D. 2008). The process of industrialisation, which began on the territory of present- day Ukraine at the end of the 19th century, added to the regional polarisation, as the territorial distribution of mineral resources in the country is unequal. The coal and salt of Donets Basin (Donbas) in the East, the iron ore of Kryvyi Rih and Kerch and the manganese ore of Nikopol were the raw materials on which 109 a signifi cant industrial base could be built. By the end of the 19th century, the increase of population of the coastal governorates began to decline, while the industrialising inner steppe regions moved ahead in terms of the rate of popu- lation increase (Karácsonyi, D. 2008). In the eastern half of the steppe region, heavy industry underwent rapid growth. Since industrialisation had begun earlier in the Ural Mountains (Russia, 17th century), Russians from that region were overrepresented among arrivals in Ukraine’s industrial regions and they made up the skilled workforce (Subtelny, O. 2000). Consequently, the share of the Russian population increased further in the early 20th century. The shaping of Ukraine within the Soviet frame Aft er a short-lived period of independence (Ukrainian People’s Republic, 1917–1920 and Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Galicia, 1918), most of Ukraine’s present territory became a part of the Soviet Union (1922) under the terms of the Treaty of Riga (1921). Galicia and Volhynia were a part of Poland until 1939, while North Bukovina (today Chernivtsi oblast) belonged to Romania until 1940, while Transcarpathia was a part of Czechoslovakia in the period 1919–1939 and then again a part of Hungary until 1944. Ukraine began to emerge in its current form in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. In 1922, the country offi cially became a “founding” member of the Soviet Union and its precise borders with Russia and Belarus were set out. Concurrently, as a result of the relatively liberal Soviet ethnic and linguis- tic policy characteristic of the 1920s (“Korenisatsia”), Ukrainian culture and literacy began to undergo a Renaissance, and the authorities att empted to eradicate illiteracy in the entire population. In the Ukrainian countryside the NEP (New Economic Policy proposed by Lenin, 1921–1928) off ered a brief interval for social advancement, but the ru- ral middle class that prospered as a result of this policy (and generally the total peasantry) was destroyed physically by Stalinist terror during the Holodomor (man-made famine, Hunger-extermination) (1932–33). About 3–8 million peo- ple died due to an artifi cially engineered famine, particularly aff ecting the Ukrainian peasantry (Kulchitskyi, S. 2008; Franco, J.E. and Cieszynska, B. 2013). The greatest population losses occurred in the central zone of the coun- try, the Dnieper area, where Ukrainian peasant society, which had considerable political potential and was determined to resist enforced collectivisation, was almost completely liquidated (Kulchitskyi, S. 2008; Vallin, J. et al. 2009). Whereas rural society was threatened by political and physical destruc- tion, from 1928, with the commencement of the First Five-Year Plan, industry recovered (“second industrial revolution”). In consequence, there was unprec- edented urban population growth in the 1930s in the eastern steppe areas. The 110 major industrial centres – constituting social support bases for the Soviet Union – took on their present form during this period. The four centres in the proc- ess of industrialisation were Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih and Donets’k (Stalino). Between 1926 and 1939, the population of Kharkiv doubled to 840,000. This was due not only to industrialisation, but also to the fact that until 1934 the city was the capital of Soviet-Ukraine. On the eve of World War I, rural inhab- itants had accounted for around four-fi ft hs of Ukraine’s population. Between 1913 and 1939, the number of urban dwellers doubled, as millions of peasant farmers, fearing collectivisation and the man-made famine (Holodomor), fl ed to the growing Soviet industrial cities where they soon lost their rural roots. The country experienced massive immigration of Russians in the frame of Soviet industrialisation. The Ukrainian-Russian ethnic changes were control- led by the migration fl ows and assimilation processes arising as a product of the ethnic policy in the Soviet Union. "Ukrainisation" in the early Soviet period (1921–32) had led to an increase in the ratio of Ukrainians from 72% to 74.8%. The following period was characterised by the persecution of Ukrainians and "Russifi cation" (Bochkovs’ka, A. et al. 2008). The Russian minority’s share of the population increased from just 8.1% in 1926 to 22% in 1989. Most of the increase was due to inward migration, and a smaller part to the Russifi cation of Ukrainians and to the ethnic homogenisation that occurred in the 20th century (World War II, Holocaust, deportations), whose principal victims were Jews, Poles, Tatars and Germans (Figure 5). From the 1950s until the 1980s, Russifi cation exerted a lesser or greater ef- fect on ethnic relations (Eberhardt, P. 1994). The urban population ratio reached 50% in the mid-1960s. The 1960 and 1970s witnessed an annual increase of half a million in the population of the block of fl ats-cities (“Khrushchyovka-cities”), which lacked all forms of social cohesion. The urban population grew until the 1989 census, when it peaked at around 34.8 million. By the 1980s, apart from in western Ukraine, the most advanced cities tended to be Russian-speaking, while the more backward countryside continued to be Ukrainian-speaking. Such rural areas experienced a fall in population, caused by emigration and – from the 1970s onwards – by the low natural increase rate of an aging society. The struggle among interest groups in the independent Ukraine Aft er Ukraine left the Soviet Union, the centralised structures began to fall apart. In the early 1990s, the various regions sought to decouple themselves from the central government in Kyiv along the dividing lines in public administration. During this period, some were already arguing that the newly independent Ukraine needed to become a federal state like Germany (Haran, A. 2002). Cen- tralising traditions, however, rendered this impossible. The secessionist aspira- 111 Fi g. 5 . C ha ng e in th e et hn ic c om po si tio n of th e po pu la tio n on th e pr es en t t er ri to ry o f U kr ai ne , 1 92 6– 20 01 112 tions of Crimea culminated in a political confl ict with Russia. In the end, the peninsula received broad autonomy, becoming the only autonomous republic within Ukraine. Similar ambitions were a factor in the east (in the oblasts (re- gions) of Donets’k and Luhans’k), in southern Ukraine and also in Transcar- pathia (Haran, A. 2002). In 1991, the “Democratic Union of New Russia” set out its goal of reviving the former New Russia (Novorossiya) and achieving independence from Ukraine (Haran, A. 2002). Donets’k, Odesa, L’viv and Sim- feropol became regional power centres alongside the central government. In post-independence Ukraine, regional “clans” controlled by the so- called oligarchs became a peculiar element in the country’s regional structure. The clans were in fact business interest groups (Haran, A. 2002; Åslund, A. 2005) that had established their economic and political infl uence in the course of the privatisation process. Their impact was felt on the politics of the vari- ous regions, and they dominated the economy. Such groups were “in charge” in the Donets Basin as well as in Dnipropetrovs’k and in Kyiv (Åslund, A. 2005). The east-west division of Ukraine has become particularly acute since the country’s Orange Revolution (2004) (Table 1). East–West dichotomy today – an ethnic, lingusitic, religious, cultural, economic or political dichotomy? Ethnic Ukrainians versus Ethnic Russians? The titular nation of the country, the Ukrainians (37.5 million) constituted 77.8%, the Russians (8.3 million) 17.3% of the total population in 2001. Only in the Au- tonomous Republic of Crimea did their ratio remain below 50% (24.3%) (Figure 6). Aside from the Russians, Ukraine’s other minorities add variety to the ethnic mix, but they do not infl uence the country’s regional divisions (Molochko, V.V. 2003). The Russian-Ukrainian ethnic boundary cannot be precisely drawn, as there is no clear separation between the two groups (Khmelko, V. and Wilson, A. 1998; Wilson, A. 1998). The Russian share of the population decreases steadily from the south-east to the north-west. Indeed, ethnic Russians live mainly in the industrialised eastern regions of the country (Haran, A. 2002). Their ratio is especially high in Crimea, the only region of the country where Russians form an absolute majority (58.3%). Urban dwellers account for 86.8% of the Russian minority population. Russians are present in every Ukrainian city, but their share within the urban population ranges from 5–8% in Western Ukraine to 25–40% in Eastern Ukraine. More than half of the urban dwellers in Donets Basin and in Crimea are Russians. In rural areas, the Russian presence is limited almost completely to the steppe region, where the share of Russian population in certain raions (districts) makes up 20–30%. 113 Ta bl e 1 . F ra m ew or ks , c ha ra ct er ist ic p ro ce ss es a nd d im en sio ns o f r eg io na l d ic ho to m y of U kr ai ne in v ar io us h ist or ic al p er io ds Pe ri od Fr am ew or k C ha ra ct er is tic p ro ce ss D im en si on U nt il th e 15 th ce nt ur y N at ur e - s oc ie ty Sp on ta ne ou s pr oc es se s re fl e ct in g th e op po rt un iti es p re se nt - ed b y th e na tu ra l e nv ir on m en t: no m ad ic p as tu re fa rm in g on th e st ep pe , a gr ic ul tu re in th e fo re st z on e Sl av s in th e fo re st – N om ad s on th e st ep pe 16 th ce nt ur y Re lig io us p ol ic y, ge op ol iti cs U ni on o f B re st (1 59 6) – G re ek C at ho lic is m Em er ge nc e of U kr ai ni an id en tit y in th e pe ri ph er al re gi on s Po lis h (W es t) – Ru ss ia n (E as t) 17 –1 8t h c en tu ri es G eo po lit ic s Th e fi r st s ta te fo rm at io n of th e U kr ai ni an p eo pl e liv in g in th e co nfl ic t z on e be tw ee n th e po w er tr ia ng le o f P ol an d, Ru ss ia a nd th e O tt o m an E m pi re , t he n th e Ru ss ia n co nq ue st of th e Ea st E ur op ea n an d st ep pe a re as , t he a im o f w hi ch w as to s ec ur e ac ce ss to w ar m w at er p or ts a nd a ch ie ve th e de fe at /p ar tit io n of P ol an d, a tt e m pt s to im po se b on da ge o n th e fr ee p ea sa nt fa rm er s of th e st ep pe O ld , S la vi c ar ea s – ne w st ep pe a re as M id -1 8t h t o m id - 19 th ce nt ur y G eo po lit ic s, ur ba n an d ec o- no m ic p ol ic y Es ta bl is hm en t o f p or t c iti es o n th e co as t a s m ili ta ry b as es or tr ad e ga te w ay s, th e m ai n pe ri od o f S la vi c co lo ni sa tio n of th e st ep pe s – fo un da tio n of C os sa ck (R us si an /U kr ai ni an ) st an its as , G en er al is si m o Su vo ro v (P ri dn is tr ov iy a) O ld , S la vi c ar ea s – co nq ue st of th e ne w s te pp e ar ea s M id -1 9t h c en tu ry to 1 91 7 Ec on om ic a nd in du st ri al p ol ic y In te gr at io n of th e re gi on in to th e ca pi ta lis t e co no m y, s pr ea d of c om m od ity -b as ed a gr ic ul tu re (w he at ), tr ad iti on s of a fr ee pe as an tr y go b ac k m uc h fu rt he r i n U kr ai ne th an in R us si a (1 86 1, 1 90 6) , p ro sp ec tiv e m in in g in in ne r s te pp e ar ea s, c oa l of D on et s Ba si n – ar ri va l o f R us si an in du st ri al is ts fr om Ru ss ia ’s ol de r i nd us tr ia l r eg io ns , r is e of U kr ai ni an id en tit y in A us tr ia -H un ga ry (G al ic ia ) a nd in R us si a – or li m ita tio n of th is in R us si a (U kr ai ni an =L itt le R us si an ) O ld , S la vi c ar ea s – n ew st ep pe a re as W es t– Ea st 114 Ta bl e 1 . c on tin ue d Pe ri od Fr am ew or k C ha ra ct er is tic p ro ce ss D im en si on 19 17 –1 92 8 Ec on om ic , cu ltu ra l a nd la n- gu ag e po lic y Po la nd (P ol on iz at io n) a nd C ze ch os lo va ki a vs . S ov ie t U ni on (K or en is at si a – U kr ai ni za tio n, s tr en gt he ni ng th e U kr ai ni an cu ltu re ), es ta bl is hm en t o f S ov ie t b or de rs o f U kr ai ne W es t– Ea st 19 28 –1 93 9 Ec on om ic (i nd us - tri al ) a nd e th ni c po lic y Po la nd (P ol on iz at io n) – S ov ie t U ni on (R us si fi c at io n, 1 93 1- 32 H ol od om or , H un ge r- ex te rm in at io n vs . F ir st a nd S ec on d Fi ve -Y ea rs P la ns , i nd us tr ia liz at io n in th e Ea st – c on tin uo us Ru ss ia n im m ig ra tio n W es t ( ag ra ria n) – M id dl e (d is in te gr at in g ag ra ria n) – So ut he as t ( be co m in g in du st ria liz ed ) 19 39 –1 94 5 M ili ta ry p ol ic y U PA (U kr ai ni an In su rg en t A rm y) v s. S ov ie t P ow er (m ili ta ry op po si tio n) W es t– Ea st 19 45 –1 99 1 C ul tu ra l, la n- gu ag e an d ur ba n po lic y In te gr at io n of re gi on s in to th e So vi et U kr ai ne , R us si fi c at io n of c ha ng in g in te ns ity , i nd us tr ia liz at io n an d in te ns iv e ur - ba ni za tio n 19 54 – a nn ex at io n of C ri m ea fr om R us si a to U kr ai ne R ur al W es t – In du st ria liz ed , ur ba ni ze d Ea st U kr ai ni an v ill ag e – R us si an c ity 19 91 –2 00 4 C ul tu ra l, la n- gu ag e an d ec o- no m ic p ol ic y U kr ai ni za tio n of v ar yi ng in te ns ity , s lo w tr an si tio n, c ri si s of ea st er n in du st ri al a re as , t ra ns fo rm at io n cr is is , i nd ep en de nc e as pi ra tio ns , t he s tr ug gl e be tw ee n in te re st g ro up s R eg io na l a m bi tio ns c la sh w ith c en tra l a ut ho rit y 20 04 –2 01 4 C ul tu ra l, la n- gu ag e an d ec o- no m ic p ol ic y G ro w in g do m in an ce o f t he e as t-w es t s pl it, p er m an en t p ol iti - ca l c ri si s, g lo ba l e co no m ic c ri si s W es t– Ea st 115 Despite the large population number, the share of Russian minority is not of such magnitude to explain the east-west dichotomy that characterises Ukraine. A further nuance, however, is that in view of their cultural proximity the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups have historically intermixed with one another. The Russian minority’s share within Ukraine’s population fell from 22% to 17% between 1989 and 2001, owing in part to assimilation and in part to people repatriating to Russia. As a result of the measures taken by the state (e.g. declaring Ukrainian to be the only offi cial state language), masses of Russians, people of mixed (Russian–Ukrainian) origin and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the eastern and southern parts of the country (excluding Crimea) began to assume a Ukrainian identity (Bochkovs’ka, A. et al. 2008). Native Ukrainians versus Native Russians? The relation of the native language to ethnic affi liation is an important indi- cator of ethnic–national development. The percentage of Russian speakers in Ukraine is signifi cantly higher than the Russian ethnic ratio. The percent- Fig. 6. Ethnic composition of the population in Ukraine, 2001 116 age diff erence stems from the fact that 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians (22% of urban dwellers and 3% of rural inhabitants) identifi ed Russian as their native language (mother tongue) in the 2001 census. In the eastern regions and in Crimea, the percentage was much higher: 50–60% of ethnic Ukrainians in the Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts and in Crimea identifi ed Russian as their mother tongue (Figure 7). Although Ukrainian is the offi cial state language in Ukraine (Constitution… 1996, Law… 1989), the share of Ukrainian native speakers increased by only 2.8% between 1989 and 2001 (whereas the Ukrainian ethnic ratio increased by 5.1% in the same time interval).5 Russian was indicated as the mother tongue by 29.6% (14.3 million) of the population. Only 67.5% of the country’s inhabitants declared Ukrainian 5 The status of Ukrainian as the national state language was confi rmed by the Language Law of 2012, a piece of legislation that was much criticised by Ukrainian nationalists. The pretext for the scandal was the “regional language status” granted by the Language Law to the languages of the national minorities, as well as some associated rights. An exaggerated concern for the future of the Ukrainian language led some people to interpret the measures as statutory backing for Russifi cation eff orts. Fig. 7. Native language of the population in Ukraine, 2001 117 as their native language in 2001. Native Russian speakers account for half of the population to the East of the Uman’–Kharkiv line and as much as three- quarters of the population of the Donets Basin, the coastal region of the Sea of Azov, and Crimea. The dominance of Russians in the eastern oblasts (regions) is concentrated almost exclusively in the major cities, which diff er signifi - cantly in demographic terms from the surrounding, dominantly Ukrainian speaking, sparsely populated, rural areas. In the eastern regions, therefore, we fi nd Russian-speaking cities surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking rural ar- eas, whereas in the western half of the country Russian is spoken as a native language mostly by the Russian minority in the major cities (Figure 8). Ukrainian is used less frequently in the southern and eastern regions among Ukrainian native speakers. Following 1991, large amounts of the Russian-speaking population of mixed ethnic origin declared Ukrainian as a mother tongue, even though remaining practically Russophone (Bochkovs’ka, A. et al. 2008). In the regions dominated by Russophones (Crimea, Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts) a continuing decrease in the ratio of Ukrainian native speakers could be observed. The linguistic picture is rendered more complex by the use of various mixtures of Russian and Ukrainian – the Surzhyk sociolects – in everyday life (Bernsand, N. 2001; Bilaniuk, L. 1997). Surzhyk has low prestige; its speak- ers tend to be poorly educated with insecure identities (Bilaniuk, L. 2004; Csernicskó, I. 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Fodor, Gy. and Csernicskó, I. 2013). It is the primary language of 10–15% of Ukraine’s population (Khmelko, V.Y. 2004), with the highest ratio of speakers in the central-eastern part of the country. Kyiv versus Moscow Patriarchate? Depending on geographical location, historical development, and the socio- demographic structure of the population, there are striking diff erences in the religiosity between the western and eastern regions of the country (similar to the ethnic features and political att itudes of the local population). The share of those who identifi ed themselves as believers is 86.6% in the West, whilst this fi gure is only 50.5% in the East (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002). The higher degree of religiosity (and lower degree of secularisation) in the western territories incorporated into Soviet-Ukraine between 1939 and 1945 can be att ributed to the shorter period of aggressive and atheistic Soviet authority over these territories (ca. 45 years vs. 70 years in the East), and it also refl ects the massive presence of the centralised and particularly active Catholic churches in the West. This religious-geographic diff erence (together with the ethnic, cultural and political factors) is one of the major determinants of the future of Ukraine (Figure 9). 118 Fi g. 8 . R us si an n at iv e sp ea ke rs in th e di st ri ct s of U kr ai ne , 2 00 1 119 Fi g. 9 . R el ig io us a ct iv ity a nd d en om in at io ns in U kr ai ne , 1 99 8 120 The overwhelming majority (68.8%) of Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians. In 2002, out of the Orthodox population polled, 53.2% declared itself “simply Orthodox”, 23.8% as affi liated with the Kyiv Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 14.8% with the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and 2.4% with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002). Before 1990 all Ukrainian Orthodox communities were united in the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. Its legal successor, the Moscow Patriarchate, which remained linked with the Russian Orthodox Church, has the allegiance of two-thirds of the Orthodox communities and controls the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox religious infrastructure. The “heartland” of the pro-Russian Moscow Patriarchate is the eastern and southern, mostly Russophone part of the country. The most important hinterlands of the Ukrainophone Kyiv Patriarchate are the western (fi rst of all, Volhynian) territories with their dominant eth- nic Ukrainian character. The majority of the adherents to the relatively weak Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church live in the areas mentioned above (mainly in Galicia). The Greek Catholic churches were also closely related to the Ukrainian national and independence movements. Following their reha- bilitation they remained as regional churches with their main hinterlands in Galicia and Transcarpathia. Urban versus Rural Ukraine? The line Uman’–Kharkiv is not only a divide between steppe and forest, east- ern and western Ukraine, but also between urban and rural Ukraine (Kará- csonyi, D. 2009). The rural population distribution is uneven: 65% of rural inhabitants live in the western part of the country, where the share of rural population is 44%. An even more nuanced picture emerges if we exclude Kyiv’s 2.8 million inhabitants. In this case, urban dwellers account for only a half of Western Ukraine’s population. In contrast, urban dwellers account for 78% of the population in the eastern part of the country. In regions comprising the major industrial centres, for instance, in the Donets Basin, the inhabitants live almost exclusively in urban areas (Figure 10). In the East, the development of the sett lement network has only im- pacted the higher levels of the sett lement hierarchy, in particular those cit- ies founded in the 18th and 19th centuries by Russian sett lers on the sparsely populated steppe. In contrast, in western Ukraine – mainly in Galicia – the sett lement hierarchy is much more balanced, because in this area the dense network of small towns and villages was formed over the course of centuries as part of an integral development (Dnistrianska, N.I. and Dnistrianskyi, M.S. 2013). 121 Fi g. 1 0. M ai n ur ba n ce nt re s an d th e ru ra l p op ul at io n in th e di st ri ct s of U kr ai ne , 2 00 1 122 Industrial East versus Agrarian West? The western part of Ukraine is a region dominated by agriculture and forestry, whereas the eastern part is well known for its industrial specialisation and is characterised by mining and heavy industries. Western Ukraine was not greatly aff ected by industrialisation, because there was a lack of mineral re- sources that would have been needed to achieve signifi cant industrialisation. Moreover, the industrialisation of the region and the development of its in- frastructure was neglected for strategic reasons – the proximity of the western border. Here, traditional Ukrainian rural society could survive until the most recent times (Skryzhevska, Y. and Karácsonyi, D. 2012). During the economic crisis of the 1990s, the eastern part of Ukraine experienced the most dramatic decline in population and quality of life compared to other regions. The trans- formation was survived more easily by the industrial area near the Dnieper and the environs of Donets’k City. The industry of the cities upon the Dnieper is high-tech (missile and aerospace technology – Mrinska, O. 2004). There are multiple links with the Russian defence industry within the framework of technological cooperation among production plants. Donets’k has become the economic-fi nancial and political-administrative centre of the region. Most Russian investment has come to this city. Ukraine’s most developed regions lie in the eastern part of the country, and this is linked with urbanisation. It is the reverse of what we see in other parts of Eastern Europe, where the level of economic development generally decreases from West to East. Yanukovich versus Maidan? Ukraine’s population is regionally divided not only in terms of ethnic ties, religious affi liation, the urbanisation rate, and economic development. The regional factor is also a strong determinant of political activity and party affi li- ation (Kubicek, P. 2000). In the 1990s, Ukraine moved inexorably towards the political division that has been a feature ever since the presidential elections of 2004. In fact, this division could be observed as early as the 1994 presiden- tial elections (Kravchuk and Kuchma) (Tihomirov, D.I. 2013). In the elections of December 2004, the western part of the country supported Yushchenko, the presidential candidate seeking an alliance with the West. In Galicia more than 90% of voters gave their support to the “Orange Revolution”, while in the west-central region the corresponding fi gure was 70%. Meanwhile, in southern and eastern Ukraine – excluding Crimea and Donets Basin – 60% of voters supported the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich. In Crimea and in the oblasts (regions) of Donets’k and Luhans’k, the pro-Russian side received 90% of the votes (Åslund, A. 2005). 123 Indications of Ukraine’s social, political, and geographic divisions were also apparent in the results of the 2010 presidential elections and of the 2012 parliamentary elections. The spatial distribution of votes cast for the two candidates in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections (Yulia Tymoshenko – 45.5% and Viktor Yanukovich – 49.0%) shows a clear decrease in support for Tymoshenko from northwest to southeast, and a clear increase for Yanukovich (Figure 11 and 12). The percentage of votes cast for Yanukovich correlates – at the level of the regions (oblasts) – more closely with the share of Russian native speakers (according to the 2001 census) than with the percentage of persons of Russian ethnic affi liation (the correlation coeffi cient of the former is 0.896, while that of the latt er is 0.812). An even closer correlation (r = 0.927) could be observed, how- ever, between support for Yanukovich at the regional (oblast) level and the share of urban dwellers with Russian native language. This latt er trend underlines the signifi cant role of cities – among other factors – in shaping political opinion. At the level of the raions (districts), the correlation between native language and the election results was less striking: for instance, the correla- tion coeffi cient between Yanukovich voters and the Russian native speakers was just 0.715. A far stronger correlation was observed for cities of oblast (re- gional) signifi cance (r = 0.871) than for predominately rural raions (districts) (r = 0.655). In the raions of Transcarpathia, Chernivtsi oblast (North Bukovina) and Odesa oblast (South Bessarabia), inhabited also by non-Russian minorities (Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians etc), a higher proportion of votes were cast for Yanukovich, the candidate with a more permissive stance on the language issue. Evidently, the close correlation merely indicates that native language was a factor infl uencing the election results; it does not show that people voted on narrow ethnic lines. In the knowledge of the census data on native language, we can see that Yanukovich needed the votes of many non-Russian- speaking Ukrainians in order to win the election. This was especially so in the mostly Ukrainian-speaking rural raions of the south-east administered by Russian-speaking oblast centres. In the southeastern (steppe) areas of Ukraine, there are historical traditions of Russian social dominance. In the Tsarist era, the majority of local nobility was Russian native speaker, as were the Orthodox priests in these areas. In the Soviet era, the same Russian dominance charac- terised the Bolshevik and Communist Party elites. The country’s northwest–southeast division could also be observed at the time of the 2012 parliamentary elections in the regional distribution of votes cast for parties committ ed to the Ukrainian national ideal and for parties with a Russian or ex-Soviet orientation (Tihomirov, D.I. 2013). The geopolitical division highlighted by the election results has been a constant underlying factor in Ukraine’s domestic political crisis of 2013–14. 124 Fig. 11–12. Results of the second round of the presidential elections of 2010 in the regions and districts of Ukraine 125 Geography and space in the current confl ict The East–West division, which has been evident in all Ukraine’s parliamentary and presidential elections since 2004, led to armed confl ict in 2014. In Novem- ber 2013, protests began in Kyiv (Euromaidan) in response to the Ukrainian leadership’s decision – taken under Russian political and economic pressure – to withdraw from an association agreement with the EU just one week before its planned signature. For some time the confl ict was concentrated in a narrow area, the Maidan (Maidan Nezalezhnosti – Independence Square), a central square in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan became, aft er the Orange Revolution of 2004, a symbolic place of Ukrainian protest culture; the demonstrators prepared for a long and peaceful struggle for their goals. From the end of November 2013, the authorities tried on successive occasions to end the initially peaceful protest with its limited demands. These actions led ultimately to overt armed violence. In late February 2014, President Yanukovich left the country, and on 21 February an interim political coalition took control of Ukraine. A survey6 conducted by the Fund "Democratic Initiatives of Ilka Kucheriv" together with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology gauged the social composition of the Maidan protestors. The proportion of people not affi liated to any political party was 92%, while 61% of the protestors had been spurred to action by violence on the part of the authorities. The fi ndings showed a strikingly high proportion of non-Kyiv residents (88%) among the protestors in the capital city. The regional distribution of arrivals from other regions reveals both the country’s division in terms of political activity (West Ukraine 55% and Central Ukraine 24%) and the fact that all parts of the coun- try were represented at the epicentre of the confl ict (East Ukraine 21%). The linguistic data support this impression: 59% of the demonstrators at Maidan were Ukrainian-speaking, while 24% were bilingual. In January the confl ict began to spread to western Ukraine (Lviv) and central parts of the country (Automaidan). In a symbolic break from the Soviet past, dozens of Lenin statues were toppled (the so-called Leninopad) in the sec- ond half of February. The toppling of statues took place mainly in central parts of the country, because in West Ukraine the statues had been removed back in the early 1990s, while in East Ukraine local counter-demonstrations (e.g. in Kharkiv) now prevented their removal – apart from some smaller towns (Figure 13). Aft er Yanukovich’s fl ight, the direction of the confl ict changed (Figure 14). In late February, the “epicentre” of the confl ict switched to the dominantly Russian-in- habited Autonomous Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, a part of Ukraine 6 http://euro-revolution.org/news/novini-gromadskogo-sektoru/the-maidan:-what-has-changed-from- december-to-february 126 Fi g. 1 3. G eo gr ap hy o f t he c on fl i ct in U kr ai ne , 2 1. 11 .2 01 3– 21 .0 2. 20 14 127 Fi g. 1 4. G eo gr ap hy o f t he c on fl i ct in U kr ai ne , 2 2. 02 .2 01 4– 25 .0 5. 20 14 128 only since 1954. Concurrently, a counter protest group launched intense pro- tests in the south-eastern half of the country (Anti-Maidan). In March, events in Crimea transformed a domestic confl ict into an international one. Following a Russian-supervised referendum on 16 March and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, the confrontation turned into armed confl ict in April and continued in the south-eastern part of Ukraine, in the Donets Basin. Odesa was also the scene of deadly clashes. In April, based on the Crimean model, people’s republics were declared in Donets’k, Luhans’k, Kharkiv and Odesa. On 11 May, the two former regions (oblasts) held “inde- pendence referendums”, which were followed by what the Kyiv authorities termed “anti-terrorist” actions. These self-proclaimed state formations have not been recognised by any other states, including Russia. Questions surround the extent and popular acceptance of their power. The traditional west–east “gradient” is evident once again in the voter turnout fi gures for the Ukrainian presidential election, held on 25 May 2014, and in the percentage of voters supporting Petro Poroshenko, the candidate who won the election (Fig. 15, 16 and 17). The low turnout in the southeast refl ects primarily the decision of former Yanukovich supporters to stay away. Fig. 15. Results of the presidential elections of 2014 in the regions of Ukraine 129 Fig. 16–17. Results of the presidential elections of 2014 in the districts of Ukraine 130 The eff ect is magnifi ed in the Donets Basin, where separatists prevented, in some places, the proper functioning of the various election committ ees and the vote took place in a general atmosphere of intimidation. The armed confl ict in Ukraine has deepened to an unprecedented extent the discord between the east- ern and western halves of the country, but the fact that Poroshenko won in all of Ukraine’s regions – albeit by a diff erent margin of votes – indicates a possible reduction in the divide. Perhaps this development may be viewed as the emer- gence of an east–west consensus on the desirability of a peaceful solution. Conclusions Ukraine’s east-west divide does not stem from a confl ict between ethnic Rus- sians and ethnic Ukrainians or between Orthodox and Western Christianity. Rather, the country’s divisions exhibit a multilevel regional structure formed in the course of a long historical development and refl ecting the nation-forming att itudes of Ukrainians. It is important to distinguish between the separatist ambitions of the Russian minority (e.g. Sevastopol, the towns of Donets Basin) and the dichotomy of Ukrainian identity, coupled with the associated confl ict. Eastern Ukrainians believe that they diff er both from western Ukrainians and from Russians: they view the West with suspicion and look to the Russians as partners. Even so, they do not want to accede to Russia at any cost. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any desire for such a move. The escalation of the confl ict is due to the lack of domestic political cohesion (refl ecting Ukraine’s youth) and to the gravitational eff ect of the major powers rather than primarily to some kind of civilizational diff erence. Several authors have sought to criticise Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington, S.P. 1993a) based on a quantitative analy- sis of events in the recent past (Russet, B.M. et al. 2000; Henderson, E.A. and Tucker, R. 2001). Huntington had argued that the complexity of the post-Cold War world order could best be described in terms of the fault lines between civilizations (Huntington, S.P. 1993b), but the critics showed mathematically that the number of inter-civilizational confl icts had actually decreased since the Cold War (Gurr, T.R. 1994). We now see that most of the confl icts in Europe in the early 1990s (the confl icts in Yugoslavia, Karabakh, Abkhazia) were rooted in ethnic tensions that had remained unresolved in the Cold War. These confl icts did not presage some kind of global struggle between civilizations. Seen from this angle, the confl ict over Crimea was the belated confl agration of a trouble spot. We may apply Henderson’s argument (Henderson, E.A. 1997) – which is diametrically opposed Huntington’s – to Ukraine: ethnic and linguistic similarities (!) also increase the potential for strife between countries. In his opinion (Henderson, 131 E.A. 1998), the form of government (democracy vs. dictatorship) and the dis- tance between or proximity of states are far stronger explanatory factors in international confl icts than religious or ethnic diff erences. Both fi ndings are borne out by the Ukrainian-Russian confl ict. Ukraine will not split of its own accord, but the extent to which it be- comes a batt leground for the major powers in the short term will depend on whether the current confl ict deepens and whether the long-term damage can be reversed. It is crucial for Ukraine to strengthen domestic political cohesion and to create an eff ective and functional state. In place of forced centralisation, the means for this may be a policy of regionalisation that respects regional diff erences. A historical opportunity for such a policy could arise aft er the presidential election in May. Acknowledgement: The study was supported by the „Post-socialist social and economic transformation in the urban and rural areas of Hungary and Ukraine” mobility project of the MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and NASU (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) /No. SNK-25/2013/. REFERENCES Åslund, A. 2005. The Economic Policy of Ukraine aft er the Orange Revolution. Eurasian Geography and Economics 46. (5): 327–353. Bernsand, N. 2001. Surzhyk and National Identity in Ukrainian Nationalist Language Ideology. Berliner Osteuropa Info 17. 38–47. Bilaniuk, L. 1997. Speaking of Surzhyk: Ideologies and Mixed Languages. Harvard Ukrainian Studies 21. 93–118. Bilaniuk, L. 2004. A typology of Surzhyk: Mixed Ukrainian-Russian language. International Journal of Bilingualism 8. (4): 409–425. Bochkovs’ka, A., Kocsis, K. and Rudenko, L. 2008. Ethnicity, Language and Religion. In Ukraine in Maps. Eds. Kocsis, K. et al., Kyiv–Budapest, Institute of Geography, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 53–63. Bochkovs’ka, A.I. (Бочковська, А.I.) 2005. Формування етнiчної територiї. In Географiя України, Атлас для 8–9 класiв. Київ, Iнститут Передових Технологiй, p. 28. Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002. Religiosity of Ukrainian society: the level, character, and specifi cs. National Security & Defence (Razumkov Centre) No. 10. 14–21. Chornyi, S. (Чорний, С.) 2001. Національний слад населення України в XX сторіччі. Київ, Картографія. Constitution of Ukraine of 28.06.1996 (Конституція України від 28.06.1996) № 254к/96-ВР 1996. Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1996, № 30. 141. Constitution of Ukraine of 28.06.1996 (Конституція України від 28.06.1996) № 254к/96-ВР 1996. Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1996, № 30. 141. Csernicskó I. 2013. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages by Ukraine. Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis 2. 127–145. 132 Csernicskó, I. 2011a. The linguistic aspects of the Ukrainian educational policy. ESUKA – JEFUL 2–1, 75–91. Csernicskó, I. 2011b. Ukrainian educational policy and the minorities. In Magyar nyelv és kultúra a Kárpát-medencében. Ed. Szoták, S., Dunaszerdahely (Dunajská Streda) – Alsóőr (Unterwart), Gramma Nyelvi Iroda – UMIZ – Imre Samu Nyelvi Intézet, 11–23. DeLong-Bas, N.J. 2013. The New Social Media and the Arab Spring. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Retrieved: 02.05.2014. htt p://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/focus/es- say0611_social_media.html Dnistrianska, N.I. and Dnistrianskyi, M.S. (Дністрянська, Н.І., Дністрянський, М.С.) 2013. Дуже малі міські поселення Львівської області. Львів, ЛНУ імені Івана Франка. Fodor, Gy. and Csernicskó, I. 2013. Language Policy and Minority Rights in Ukraine. In Ukraine at Crossroads: Prospects of Ukraine's Relations with the European Union and Hungary. Eds. Balázs, P., Mytryaeva, S. and Zákonyi, B., Budapest–Uzhgorod, Lira, 52–60. Franco, J.E. and Cieszynska, B. 2013. Holodomor – The Unknown Ukrainian Tragedy (1932–1933). CompaRes – Grácio Editor. Gurr, T.R. 1994. Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical confl ict and the changing world system. International Studies Quarterly 38. 347–377. Haran, A. 2002. Der regionale Faktor in der ukrainischen Politik. In Die neue Ukraine. Hrsg. Simon, G., Köln–Weimar–Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 99–126. Henderson E.A. 1998. The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989. International Studies Quarterly 42. 461–484. Henderson, E.A. 1997. Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Confl ict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of Interstate War, 1820–1989. Journal of Confl ict Resolution 41. 649–668. Henderson, E.A. and Tucker, R. 2001. Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Confl ict. International Studies Quarterly 45. 317–338. Hrushevskyi, M. (Грушевський, М.) 1904. Історія України-Руси. Т. 1. До початку ХІ віка. Видання друге, розширене. Львів, Друкарня Наукового Товариства імені Шевченка. Hryzak, J. 2002. Die kommunistische Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart. In Die neue Ukraine. Hrsg. Simon, G., Köln–Weimar–Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 29–50. Huntington, S.P. 1993a. The Clash of Civilisations? Foreign Aff airs 72. (3): 22–49. Huntington, S.P. 1993b. If Not Civilisations, What? – Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World. Foreign Aff airs 72. (5): 186–194. Isaev, D.V. (Исаєв, Д.В.) red. 2012a. Атлас Історія України, 7 клас (Historical atlas of Ukraine, 7th class). Київ, Картографія. Isaev, D.V. (Исаєв, Д.В.) red. 2012b. Атлас Історія України, 8 клас (Historical atlas of Ukraine, 8th class). Київ, Картографія. Isaev, D.V. (Исаєв, Д.В.) red. 2013. Атлас Історія України, 10 клас (Historical atlas of Ukraine, 10th class). Київ, Картографія. Karácsonyi, D. 2006. A társadalmi tagoltság és a régiók eredete, arculata Ukrajnában (Origin of social division, spatial structures and characteristic features of the regions in Ukraine). Földrajzi Értesítő / Geographical Bulletin 55. (3–4): 375–391. Karácsonyi, D. 2008. A kelet-európai sztyeppe és a magyar Alföld – mint frontier terület (The East European steppe and the Great Hungarian Plain as frontier zones). Földrajzi Értesítő / Geographical Bulletin 57. (1–2): 185–211. Karácsonyi, D. 2009. Ein Versuch der Typologie der ländlichen Räume in der Ukraine. Europa Regional 17. (1): 34–50. 133 Khmara, L.B. (Хмара, Л.Б.) red. 2013. Атлас Історія України, 9 клас (Historical atlas of Ukraine, 9th class). Київ, Картографія. Khmelko, V. (Хмелько, В.) 2004. Лінгво-етнічна структура України: регіональні особливості та тенденції змін за роки незалежності. www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles_HVE/16_linguaethnical.pdf. Khmelko, V. and Wilson, A. 1998. Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine. In Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation. Ed. Kuzio, T., London, Armonk, 64–76. Kocsis, K., Rudenko, L. and Schweitzer, F. 2008. Ukraine in Maps. Kyiv–Budapest, Institute of Geography, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 147 p. Kubicek, P. 2000. Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour. Europa-Asia Studies 26. (1–2): 197–221. Kulchitskyi, S. (Кульчицький, C.) 2008. Голод 1932–1933 рр. в Україні як геноцид: мовою документів, очима свідків. Kиїв, Наш час. Law of the Ukraine „On the Principles of State Language Policy” (Закон України "Про засади державної мовної політики") 2013. Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2013, № 23. 218 p. Law of the Ukrainian S.S.R. „On Languages in the Ukrainian S.S.R.” (Закон УРСР "Про мови в Українській РСР") 1989. Відомості Верховної Ради УРСР, 1989 № 45. 631 p. Loza, Y. (Лоза, Ю.) 2005a. Україна – історичний атлас, 9 клас (Ukraine – historical atlas, 9th class). Kиїв, ТОВ Видавництво Мапa. Loza, Y. (Лоза, Ю.) 2005b. Україна – історичний атлас, 10–11 клас (Ukraine – historical atlas, 10–11th class). Kиїв, ТОВ Видавництво Мапa. Magocsi, P.R. 1996. A History of Ukraine. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 784 p. Molochko, V.V. (Молочко, В.В.) 2003. Карта етнічного складу населення України (1:1,500,000). Київ, Картографія. Mrinska, O. 2004. Regional disparities in Ukraine – consequences of transitional period. Kyiv, National Taras Shevchenko University, 22 p. Pivtorak, H.P. (Півторак, Г.П.) 2004. Походження українців, росіян, білорусів та їхніх мов: Міфи і правда про трьох братів слов’янських зі «спільної колиски». 2-ге вид., доп. Київ, Арістей, 180 p. Russet, B.M., Oneal, J.R. and Cox, M. 2000. Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjá Vu? Some Evidence. Journal of Peace Research 37. (5): 583–608. Sklyarenko, V. (Скляренко, В.) 1991. Звідки походить назва Україна. Україна 1991. 1. 20–29. Skryzhevska, Y. and Karácsonyi, D. 2012. Rural population in Ukraine: assessing reality, looking for revitalization. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 61. (1): 49–78. Smolyi, V. 2008. Specifi c features of historical evolution. In Ukraine in Maps. Eds. Kocsis, K. et al. Kyiv–Budapest, Institute of Geography, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 19–24. Stotskyi, J. (Стоцкий, Я.) 1999. Релігійна ситуація в Україні: проблеми і тенденції розвитку (1988–1998 рр.) Тернопіль, Видавн. Астон, 248 p. Subtelny, O. 2000. Ukraine, a history (3rd edition). Toronto–Buff alo–London, University of Toronto Press, 736 p. Tihomirov, D.I. (Тихомиров, Д.І.) red. 2013. Атлас Історія України, 11 клас (Historical atlas of Ukraine, 11th class). Київ, Картографія. Vallin, J., Mesle, F., Adamets, S. and Pyrozhkov, S. 2009. The great famine: population losses in Ukraine. Demography and social economy 12. (2): 3–11. 134 Wilson, A. 1998. Redefi ning ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine: Indigenes, set- tlers and Russophone Ukrainians. In Nation building in the post-Soviet borderlands: The politics of national identities. Eds. Smith, G. et al., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 119–138. Wilson, A. 2002. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (2nd edition). New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 380 p. Yekelchyk, S. 2007. Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation. New York, Oxford University Press, 280 p. << /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Dot Gain 20%) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Tags /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails false /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams false /MaxSubsetPct 100 /Optimize false /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments true /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts true /TransferFunctionInfo /Apply /UCRandBGInfo /Preserve /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 300 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages true /ColorImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /ColorImageResolution 300 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages true /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages true /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >> /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 30 >> /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict << /K -1 >> /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None) /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False /CreateJDFFile false /Description << /ARA /BGR /CHS /CHT /CZE /DAN /DEU /ESP /ETI /FRA /GRE /HEB /HRV (Za stvaranje Adobe PDF dokumenata najpogodnijih za visokokvalitetni ispis prije tiskanja koristite ove postavke. Stvoreni PDF dokumenti mogu se otvoriti Acrobat i Adobe Reader 5.0 i kasnijim verzijama.) /ITA /JPN /KOR /LTH /LVI /NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken die zijn geoptimaliseerd voor prepress-afdrukken van hoge kwaliteit. De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.) /NOR /POL /PTB /RUM /RUS /SKY /SLV /SUO /SVE /TUR /UKR /ENU (Use these settings to create Adobe PDF documents best suited for high-quality prepress printing. Created PDF documents can be opened with Acrobat and Adobe Reader 5.0 and later.) /HUN >> /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ << /AsReaderSpreads false /CropImagesToFrames true /ErrorControl /WarnAndContinue /FlattenerIgnoreSpreadOverrides false /IncludeGuidesGrids false /IncludeNonPrinting false /IncludeSlug false /Namespace [ (Adobe) (InDesign) (4.0) ] /OmitPlacedBitmaps false /OmitPlacedEPS false /OmitPlacedPDF false /SimulateOverprint /Legacy >> << /AddBleedMarks false /AddColorBars false /AddCropMarks false /AddPageInfo false /AddRegMarks false /ConvertColors /ConvertToCMYK /DestinationProfileName () /DestinationProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /Downsample16BitImages true /FlattenerPreset << /PresetSelector /MediumResolution >> /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [2400 2400] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice