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IHiS (Indonesian Historical Studies) 7 (1), 77-92 © 2023 | E-ISSN: 2579-4213  

Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order, 1967-1969                         |  77 

Received:  
November 9, 2021 
 
Revised:  
June 20, 2023 
 
Accepted:  
June 21, 2023 

Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order 
1967-1969 

 
Mahmud,* Dewi Yuliati, Alamsyah 

Master Program of History, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Diponegoro 
Jl. dr. A. Suroyo, Tembalang, Semarang, Central Java - Indonesia 

 
*Corresponding Author: mahmud@students.undip.ac.id 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14710/ihis.v7i1.12720 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intoduction 
The development of Indonesian politics after President Soekarno enacted the 
Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, showed an authoritarian attitude with the 
dissolution of parliament because it was considered responsible for various political 
disputes in the preparation of the Constitution. The situation became increasingly 
uncertain after the Masyumi Party (Masyumi), which had an Islamic basis, was 
disbanded due to accusations of participating in an attempted rebellion against the 
Indonesian government (Karim, 1983, p. 132). This condition makes the Nahdlatul 
Ulama Party (Partai Nadhlatul Ulama/ PNU) the only remaining Islamic political 

Abstract 
 

This study discusses the resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Partai 
Nadhlatul Ulama/ PNU) towards the New Order government from 1967-1969. 
This study analyses the process of PNU's resistance to the New Order from 
1967-1969. This study uses historical research methods, which consist of four 
stages of historical research methods, namely: heuristics, source criticism, 
interpretation and historiography. Using the historical method, this study 
answers questions regarding the form of PNU's channel of resistance against 
the New Order and the results achieved against the government during the 
1967-1969 period. This study uses the farming community-based resistance 
theory developed by James Scott. Resistance theory is used to explain the 
PNU's resistance to the New Order through various existing political channels. 
The New Order government began to show signs of being anti-democratic by 
imposing political policies that put pressure on political parties and 
intervening in the PNU organization's internal realm. PNU's resistance to the 
New Order government was a reaction to various government interventions 
and actions that attempted to minimize the role and influence of the PNU. This 
research resulted in an analysis of PNU's resistance to the New Order, which 
had a more solid institutional structure through various existing political 
channels. The PNU's resistance is understood as a self-defence effort against 
multiple interventions by the government on the PNU's political institutions. 
 
Keywords: Nahdlatul Ulama Party; The New Order Era; Political Policy. 
 



 
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force. PNU simultaneously appears so unique as an interest group and a pressure 
group. 

Soekarno's tendency to be close to Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia/ PKI) did not directly make PNU take a stand against the 
President. Under the leadership of Rois Syuriah Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, PNU got 
closer to President Soekarno and supported every decision taken by the government. 
PNU supports Soekarno's conception of Nasakom by placing its cadres in government. 
Idham Chalid, Kiai Ahmad Dachlan and Kiai Masykur were three PNU cadres in 
government. 

Beyond the ranks of Idham Chalid's leadership, young figures such as Subchan 
Zaenuri Echsan, Zamroni, Imron Kadir, and Mahbub Djunaidi represented PNU's 
critical voice against Sukarno's PKI-inclined policies. Subchan and his friends received 
support not only from organizations under the auspices of PNU and clerics in several 
Islamic boarding schools but also from army officers and youth organizations outside 
PNU (Fealy & Borton, 1997, p. 38). The agenda brought by this group was obvious, 
namely eliminating the influence of the PKI in the government. 

The declining physical condition of President Soekarno further complicated the 
national political constellation. The increasingly chaotic political situation and 
requirements prompted the military (Army) entry into the political scene (Reeve, 2013, 
p. 221). The Army, which has long been opposed to civilian politicians running the 
country, was gaining momentum with the conflict between political parties in the 
government. 

In the early hours of October 1, the army generals were kidnapped, a dark event 
known as the September 30th Movement (Gerakan 30 September/ G30S) tragedy. The 
G30S incident made the political situation worse and more complicated and 
immediately reduced President Soekarno's authority. The decline in President 
Soekarno's power after the G30S tragedy forced him to transfer power over state 
security to General Suharto, who then acted quickly by accusing the PKI of being the 
mastermind behind the various disturbances that occurred. 

The G30S incident completely changed the Indonesian national political 
constellation. President Soekarno, previously seen as having a strong influence, began 
to doubt his leadership. In the end, opposition groups emerged from youth 
organizations supported by the Army by carrying out actions demanding the 
dissolution of the PKI and holding the President accountable. At the General Session 
of the People's Consultative Assembly on June 22, 1966, the President's Nawaksara 
accountability speech was rejected by a majority of parliamentarians because it did not 
mention the G30S issue, which was a national issue that concerns presidential policies 
(Firdausi, 2020). Parliament took more severe steps by dismantling presidential 
powers one by one, culminating in Soekarno's removal as President and the 
appointment of General Suharto as acting President on March 7, 1967. The 
appointment of General Suharto as acting President marked the birth of the New 
Order era. 



 
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At first, the PNU leadership was divided in its attitude by showing an attitude of 
indecision in the face of rapid political change. Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, as the syuriah 
rois appealed to PNU to address this situation by not taking excessive attitudes and 
actions. Meanwhile, the youth under the leadership of Subchan urged PNU to take a 
firm stance by declaring that the G30S tragedy was an act of the PKI. Subchan even 
went so far as to form the Action Committee to Suppress the Thirtieth September 
Movement (Komite Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan September Tigapuluh/ KAP 
Gestapu). Even so, the two groups agreed to urge President Soeharto's officials to 
speed up the election (Fealy & Borton, 1997, p. 38). 

To quell this criticism, the Soeharto government, with strong support from the 
army, moved swiftly to engage the bureaucracy and technocrats. The government also 
mobilized international support through financial and technological assistance 
(Mas’oed, 1989, pp. 166–175). Some supporters of the New Order believed that the 
future of Indonesia should be free from ideology-based politics. The government 
looked at previous experiences when political parties' domination and ideological 
diversity only resulted in prolonged political conflict and instability. The New Order 
government directed political management to a political system that was relatively 
free from the domination of political parties and the ideology they carried (Haris, 1991, 
p. 34). 

PNU, in the view of the New Order authorities, was seen as an Islamic political 
force that had to be "tamed". In the XXIV Muktamar in Bandung on July 4-9, 1967, the 
government supported the reshuffle of the PNU leadership from Idham Chalid to 
another figure who had the spirit of the New Order (Crouch, 1999, p. 295). Idham 
Chalid, the party's general chairman, was also considered very close to Soekarno 
(Machfoedz, 1982, p. 291). Even so, the strong influence of Kiai Wahab Hasbullah as a 
syrian rois made the congress participants re-elect Idham Chalid as chairman. Kiai 
Wahab also continued to support Sukarno by re-nominating Soekarno in the elections 
made by the government, the time of which had yet to be determined (Feillard, 1997, 
p. 87) 

In the end, the government acknowledged Muktamar's decision. It began to take 
a different approach to NU while including two PNU representatives, Idham Chalid 
and Achmad Dachlan, in the Development Cabinet (Arsip Keputusan Presiden No. 
183 tahun 1968). Idham Chalid, as party leader, tends to want PNU to be 
accommodative and avoid confrontation by not criticizing the government directly. 

 
Metods 
 
This research on PNU's resistance to the New Order uses historical methods. 
According to Kuntowijoyo, historical research methods are based on the stages of 
selecting topics, gathering sources, verifying, interpreting, analyzing and 
synthesizing, and writing (Kuntowijoyo, 2000, p. 91). This study emphasizes the use 
of primary and secondary sources in the form of archives, newspapers, magazines, 
books and interviews with relevant figures. Some of the archival sources were 



 
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obtained from the archive collections at the NU Astranawa Gayungsari Museum in 
Surabaya, the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (Arsip Nasional 
Republik Indonesia/ ANRI) Jakarta, and the private archives of the collections of 
several local PNU figures. Apart from that, this research also uses newspapers and 
books related to PNU which are very abundant to support this research. Interviews 
were conducted with informants know about events. After obtaining historical facts, 
interpretation is carried out, namely the activity of interpreting and determining the 
meaning of facts and the relationship between facts in the context of the events studied. 
The results of this interpretation are then compiled into works of historiography. 
 
NU Support in the Formation of the New Order 
 
The political crisis in Indonesia throughout 1965 was a tragedy for President 
Soekarno's power. Soekarno was very dependent on his political legitimacy as the 
great leader of the revolution, increasingly being dragged into the current political 
polarization between anti-communist forces and those supporting communism. The 
balance of political power he played with the PKI, the Army and PNU also began to 
falter. Even though PNU and the PKI both supported Soekarno's government, in 
practice, these two political parties were often involved in a psychological war down 
to the grassroots level in the regions. 

The killing of army generals in a series of events known as the 1965 the September 
30th Movement (G30S) became the momentum for rapid political change in Indonesia. 
The killing of 6 generals and one mid-level army officer, apart from causing security 
chaos, also led to a void in the army command. The increasingly heated situation 
paved the way for the military to come to power—Commander of Kostrad, Maj. Gen. 
Suharto was appointed by President Soekarno as the holder of the Order of Eleventh 
March (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret/ Supersemar) to stabilize conditions and order. 
Suharto moved quickly by declaring that the PKI was responsible for planning the 
G30S and killing the army leaders (Dewi, 2020). 

Major General Suharto temporarily took over command of the Army. Suharto 
saw the power of Sukarno's fanatical supporters and the remnants of communist forces 
as a real threat to his newly acquired political power (Mun’im, 2013, pp. 132–139). 
Efforts to gain legitimacy for political actions brought army officers together with PNU 
leaders known to be anti-PKI. Yusuf Hasyim was the leader of the NU youth 
organization wing. On October 1, the Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda 
Ansor/ Ansor) issued a statement accusing a group of PKI of being the mastermind 
behind the G30S incident (Mun’im, 2013, p. 105). Yusuf Hasyim coordinated with 
Subchan Zaenuri, urging the Pengurus Besar Nadlatul Ulama (PBNU) to state that the 
PKI and its underbouw was the sole mastermind behind the G30S incident. On 
October 5, the NU leadership held a meeting at the PBNU office on Jalan Kramat Raya 
164 Jakarta. The meeting resulted in an official PBNU statement stating that the PKI 
was responsible for the G30S incident. The statement was then signed by Kiai Masykur 
representing the Syuriah Council, M. Dachlan and Achmad Syaikhu representing 



 
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Tanfidziyah (NU Party), Yusuf Hasyim as Chair of Ansor, Zamroni as General Chair 
of Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/ 
PMII, and followed by all top leaders of the autonomous PNU body (Mun’im, 2013, 
pp. 107–110) 

After the October 5 statement condemning G30S, the NU leadership, represented 
by Kiai Masykur, Syah Manaf and Idham Chalid, held a meeting which decided the 
party's leadership in Jakarta was temporarily led by Subchan (Feillard, 1997, p. 78). 
Subchan was chosen as the party's interim leader because he was anti-communist. 
Apart from that, he was still 34 years old, and his position was single and not married. 
He has an extensive network with student activists and organizations outside PBNU, 
especially his closeness to General Nasution and several army generals. The election 
of Subchan as the interim leader of NU was also supported by old kiai, such as Kiai 
Asad Syamsul Arifin and Kiai Maksum Lasem, who from the beginning did not like 
PNU's actions and joined Dwikora Soekarno's cabinet together with the PKI. 

Subchan's appearance was inseparable from the condition of General 
Chairperson Idham Chalid, who did not immediately decide because he was still 
waiting for clarity on President Soekarno's attitude towards the G30S incident. Said 
Budairy, a PMII activist, stated that Subchan was the leading actor in the birth of 
important decisions taken by PNU.  

“... Yesterday, October 4, 1945, Mas Subchan, Deputy Chairperson IV of PBNU, 
chaired a general meeting at Taman Sunda Kelapa, Menteng, Jakarta. The general 
meeting demanded that strict action be taken against the movers and actors of 
the G30S” (Budairy, 2008). 
Subchan moved quickly by inviting PNU youth figures such as Nuddin Lubis, 

Djamaludin Malik, Imron Rosyadi, Zamroni and Hasyim Latief to build political 
power within PNU to trap the PKI. He instructed PNU cadres in the regions to be 
prepared to face the development of an uncertain political situation, primarily 
regarding the movement of PKI cadres in the regions (Mun’im, 2013, pp. 112–113). 

Subchan's closeness to high-ranking army officers accelerated his steps in making 
strategic decisions with the full support of the military. Subchan quickly formed KAP 
Gestapu by collaborating with Islamic youth organizations and nationalists and 
becoming anti-communist youth associations. In the following days, a wave of 
demonstrations from KAP Gestapu demanded the dissolution of the PKI and the 
organizations under it (Feillard, 1997, p. 79). 

This large-scale demonstration movement supported by the army leadership 
caused panic and shock at the elite level. Protests from the demonstrators and pressure 
from the army leadership succeeded in cornering Soekarno, so March 11, 1966 (Surat 
Perintah Sebelas Maret/ Supersemar) Order was issued, giving General Suharto 
authority to restore public order and security. On March 12, 1966, General Suharto 
dissolved the PKI and purged the government of elements of the PKI and its 
underbouw organizations  (Isnaeni, 2016). 

Suharto's statement that the PKI was responsible for the G30S incident provided 
enthusiasm and motivation for NU institutional elements in the regions to consolidate 



 
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themselves and coordinate with the military apparatus to destroy communist forces in 
the regions. In Situbondo, Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin blessed the movement to crush 
the PKI in the Situbondo area and its surroundings. Kiai As'ad supported the 
formation of the Pancasila Front and ordered his students to form the Pancasila Front 
in Situbondo (Anshari, 2016) 

The socio-political situation in Indonesia in the following months became 
increasingly chaotic. The people's distrust of Sukarno's leadership and the government 
led to negative behaviour and disinformation at the grassroots level, resulting in 
people being incited to commit anarchist acts. Political disputes and violence from 
September 1965 to the end 1966 triggered large-scale tragedies in various regions, 
especially in East and Central Java. 

In early February 1967, PNU politicians, Nuddin Lubis and Djamaludin Malik 
organized a vote of no confidence in President Soekarno in parliament. They 
demanded that parliament strip all powers attached to Sukarno. Nuddin became the 
first member of parliament to urge Soekarno to be dismissed as President. At the same 
time, H. Djamaludin Malik gathered strength in the Provisional People's Consultative 
Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/ MPRS by launching the name 
General Suharto as a presidential candidate (Anam, 1999, pp. 321–322). 

In the General Session of the MPRS on March 12, 1967, the MPRS stipulated TAP 
MPRS No. XXXIII, which revoked President Soekarno's powers and appointed 
General Suharto as acting President. General Suharto was then sworn in as Acting 
President at the parliament building by the Chairman of the MPRS, General A.H. 
Nasution. General Suharto's success in crushing the 1965 G30S coup attempt made him 
more recognized by NU youths than other army generals. Apart from that, support 
from Deputy Rois Aam and Kiai Bisri Syansuri for Soeharto helped speed up the 
transition process to his New Order government (Feillard, 1997, pp. 99–102) 

Suharto then appointed the general chairman of PNU, Idham Chalid, as Minister 
of People's Welfare, and Kiai Achmad Dachlan was appointed Minister of Religion. 
Harmonious relations with the New Order government were also followed by the 
appointment of PNU cadres in the regions to occupy strategic positions in the 
government and the legislatures in the regions. In Central Java, H. Imam Sofwan, who 
was the Regional Leader of PNU Central Java, received support from PNU and Golkar 
to become Chair of the Central Java DPRD, and Maschun Sofwan was reappointed as 
the District Head of Temanggung (Interview with Ibnu Hajar Pranolo, September 12, 
2020). 

According to Ibnu Hajar, for Idham Chalid, entering the government could 
maximize PNU's role and support all actions needed during the transition period. 
PNU could influence the running of the cabinet and strategic decisions whose results 
could be directly enjoyed by PNU people below. Meanwhile, if PNU was outside the 
government, it would only become a "moon" and a political game tool that would 
impact PNU cadres at the grassroots level (Interview with Ibn Hajar Pranolo, 
September 12, 2020). 



 
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In a parliamentary plenary session on March 22 1968, the spokesman for the PNU 
Party, Hartono, stated: "For development, it is necessary to reform the government 
structure first. So that parliamentary approval is needed to appoint General Suharto 
as full president, so that the government's performance becomes more effective" 
(“Pembitjara Setudju Djend. Soeharto Presiden Penuh,” 1968). Suharto was later 
confirmed as Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia. In his speech at the 5th 
General Session of the MPRS on March 27, 1968, Suharto, as Acting President and 
recipient of the MPRS mandate, gave remarks about his views on running the New 
Order government as follows:  

".. from the beginning, the struggle for the New Order had two main themes: first, 
filling independence by increasing the welfare of the people at large; and second, 
upholding constitutional life, including restoring a healthy democratic life and 
improving democratic tools. Upholding constitutional life is a tool that is a 
sufficient guarantee so that the authorities hold no abuse of power. Hence, from 
the beginning, we have also seen that improving people's welfare and upholding 
constitutional life are not contradictory but that carrying out these two major 
tasks must be harmonized. …” (ANRI No. 291). 
 

Idham Chalid's support for Suharto must be understood primarily as a tool for political 
policy to establish good relations with the legitimate government. Idham's good 
relationship with the government can create a conducive political climate and access 
to various government institutions. Idham has played a game without pragmatic rules. 
 
Resistence of PNU towards the New Order 
 
New Order Intervention at the 24th Bandung Congress in 1967 
The transition from Soekarno's government to Soeharto's New Order government, 
which was supported by the military forces of the Army, initially received support and 
support from most elements of PNU. There was an alliance between PNU and the 
Army in destroying the PKI movement, which was considered a threat to the country's 
religious and political authority. PNU and the New Order government provided 
mutual support to jointly build social, political and religious influence over Indonesian 
society. 

This situation changed when the New Order government began to place the 
military, especially the Army, to dominate Indonesian political and economic affairs. 
The domination of the military occurred because of the views of the New Order rulers 
that the problems in Indonesia were caused by the life of political parties, which 
tended to be in conflict and could not be controlled (Reeve, 2013, p. 293) so that the 
New Order rulers began to interfere in the internal realm of political parties to limit 
the influence of political parties. 

Developments in the political situation under the New Order government 
created anxiety and suspicion among the PNU political elite. Subchan ZE as a young 
NU politician, offers the idea of renewal within the PNU body by rejuvenating and 



 
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modernizing the party in the face of the dynamics of political change that were so fast, 
as well as intervention from the government. His idea of organizational renewal 
sparked controversy within PNU. Most of his young leaders saw Subchan as the 
correct figure to lead pNU because of his success in consolidating the organization 
during the difficult times of 1965-1966 amidst the political conflict with the PKI. 
Meanwhile, Rois Aam Syuriah, Kiai Wahab Hasbullah, still doubted Subchan's loyalty 
because of his close relationship with General Nasution and high-ranking army 
officers (Interview with Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017).  

Subchan, who previously fully supported the New Order, became an opponent 
of government policies which, according to him, were anti-political parties. On one 
radio show, Subchan stated that the principles of the New Order had begun to blur 
and were no longer the basis for the struggle of all components of the New Order 
(Marijan, 1992, pp. 95–96). 

Subchan then consolidated his power in parliament and garnered support from 
PNU clerics in the regions, especially Central and East Java, to oppose the New Order. 
Subchan criticized the policies of Idham Chalid, who tended to remain silent when he 
saw PNU's internal affairs being manipulated by the authorities. Idham Chalid himself 
believed that direct confrontation with the New Order authorities would only harm 
the NU organization and cadres. Even so, Idham agreed that the government's 
interference with PNU was intolerable (Interview with Amir Abdullah, November 18, 
2020). 

The various political events became a severe concern for PNU in holding the 24th 
Muktamar in Bandung from 4-9 July 1967. A total of 338 branch representatives and 
23 regional delegates, and NU sympathizers in various regions attended as Muktamar 
participants. Senior Kiai also participated in the congress from the PNU extended 
family from all over Indonesia (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV Bandung 
Tahun 1967). 

The Muktamar agenda was carried out with great care, mainly in discussing 
political issues because of concerns that the government would classify PNU as a 
revolutionary organization. The agenda for political discussion was only about the 
composition of President Soeharto's Ampera cabinet, the issue of general elections, and 
the proposed membership composition of the DPRS and MPRS (Anam, 1999, pp. 308–
309). 

The lack of a portion of the discussion in the political field seems to be related to 
the existence of security from the military apparatus in the Congress arena. The 
presence of the military apparatus was not only to secure the course of the congress 
but also to secure the direction of PNU's political policies, which was the most 
significant political Islam after the dissolution of Masyumi by the previous 
government (Interview Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017). 

The army's intervention was seen in the general chairman election agenda. 
Harold Crouch noted that several high-ranking army officers at the time tried to 
persuade the congress participants not to elect Idham Chalid and Achmad Syaikhu to 
return to the positions of general chairman and general secretary and to transfer the 



 
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support of the congress participants to Subchan and Imron Rosyadi, because of their 
services in forming KAP Gestapu when the G30S riots (Crouch, 1999, p. 295). Even so, 
the army's support for Subchan was not optimal because some of his officers 
considered Subchan a critical and unruly person (Interview with Choirul Anam, 
January 25, 2018). 

The emergence of Subchan as a candidate for general chairman at the Bandung 
Congress was inseparable from the support of the clerics on the Java coast, especially 
Kiai Maksum Lasem as the elder and Mustasyar of PBNU, who did not really like 
Idham Chalid's leadership. According to Kiai Maksum, Idham's leadership character 
tended to bring PNU closer to power, both when the government was still in the hands 
of President Soekarno and when General Suharto was entrusted with becoming a 
presidential official (Interview with Abidin, Agustus 21, 2020). The conflict over the 
general chairmanship entered its final phase after Kiai Wahab Hasbullah and Kiai Bisri 
Syansuri intervened in the forum by publicly declaring their support for Idham 
Chalid's return as chairman. 

The support of Kiai Wahab Hasbullah and Kiai Bisri Syansuri was a significant 
factor in Idham Chalid's victory. Kiai Wahab's open support, even in a congress forum, 
inevitably made the congress participants, predominantly from East and Central Java, 
also express their support for Idham's re-nomination. Kiai Wahab, who is known to be 
an admirer of former president Soekarno, will even nominate Soekarno again as 
president in the elections to be held by the New Order (Feillard, 1997, p. 87). Of course, 
Suharto, who heard these statements, began to doubt the available intervention made 
by army officers in the field. Suharto then instructed his military officers to change 
their approach to be more grounded so that the party would not be critical of 
government policies (Interview with Choirul Anam, January 25, 2018). 

Suharto's New Order government then included two PNU representatives, 
Idham Chalid and Achmad Dachlan, in the Development Cabinet in 1968. Idham 
Chalid was the Minister of Social Welfare, while Achmad Dachlan was appointed 
Minister of Religion (Naskah Sambutan Presiden Soeharto Saat Diangkat Menjadi 
Presiden Ke-2 RI pada Sidang Umum Ke-5 MPRS Tanggal 27 Maret 1968, ANRI, Pidato 
Presiden Soeharto 1966-1998 No. 291., 1968). Soeharto eventually used Idham Chalid's 
victory at the Bandung Congress to rid the military of officers who disagreed with him. 
Soeharto also saw Subchan's criticism of the government as a tendency for Subchan's 
closeness to General Nasution (Interview with Choirul Anam, January 25, 2018). 

Although in the end, he lost in the struggle for the leadership of the party, 
Subchan managed to sit as Deputy Chair I through a straightforward selection process 
from the participants of the Muktamar (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV di 
Bandung Tahun 1967). Subchan also succeeded in placing his people in strategic 
positions in the ranks of the Tanfidiyah board. The dominance of the Subchan group 
in decision-making at plenary forums, apart from the support from the older kiai in 
Java, was also influenced by many university graduates so that they had more 
knowledge in formal meetings than other delegates with no background of university 
graduates  (Buku Daftar Riwayat Hidup Anggota Partai NU). The results of the XXIV 



 
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Nahdlatul Ulama Conference in Bandung appointed Kiai Bisri Syansuri as Rois Aam 
and Idham Chalid as chairman  (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV Bandung 
Tahun 1967). 

An interesting decision in the Bandung Muktamar was that the appointment of 
Kiai Bisri Syansuri as Rois Aam Syuriah was only part of a formality to avoid further 
intervention from the government. The meeting was under the direction of Kiai 
Wahab. Even so, Kiai Bisri was not pleased, and he stated in a particular forum that 
the designation of his name as Rois Aam was only a formality. Kiai Bisri and Kiai 
Wahab were close friends because they were both students of Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari. 
The bond between the two became stronger because Kiai Bisri married the younger 
brother of Kiai Wahab (Interview with Kiai Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2020). 

Because of the tendency for divisions within PNU, which were more influenced 
by external factors, Idham and Subchan agreed to decide special requirements for 
members from elements of the government. The goal was obvious: to protect the PNU 
from interference by using PNU members from the government. Another decision 
made at the Muktamar was a recommendation that there be intense communication 
and coordination between the central and regional leaders to avoid control from the 
government and the military  (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV di Bandung 
Tahun 1967). 

The party's desire to minimize external intervention was realized by 
recommending the establishment of a body tasked with examining the tendency of 
party members to take advantage of their position or even to abuse party authority 
and facilities. In the recommendation, it was stated that the research body formed 
would consist of 7 regional representatives, namely: West Java, Central Java, East Java, 
South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, and Aceh, whose 
membership would rotate with South Sumatra. The research agency was tasked with 
examining indications that members of the NU party board deliberately sought 
personal gain by using the facilities of PNU (Arsip Keputusan Muktamar NU Ke-XXIV 
di Bandung Tahun 1967). 
From Discussion on Political Sector Law Packages to Postponement of Elections 
 
The process of transitioning power from Soekarno's government to General Suharto 
was marked by the commencement of deliberations on the Provisional People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPRS) on a package of laws in the political field concerning 
general elections (elections), political parties, mass organizations and functional 
groups, as well as rules concerning the composition and position of the Assembly. The 
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the People's Representative Council (DPR) 
created a more democratic political system than the previous administration 
(Puspitasari 2005). 

The General Session of the MPRS IV in 1966 resulted in a stipulation that the 
government and parliament completed the political law packet on January 5, 1967, and 
instructed the holding of elections to be held no later than July 5, 1968 (Ali Murtopo, 
1984: 178.). In discussing the political law package in parliament, the PNU faction 



 
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rejected the substance of the political law package proposed by the government 
because it has the potential to give the president full power to dissolve political parties 
if they were deemed not following the national ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution (Fealy & Borton, 1997, pp. 46–47). 

According to PNU, the draft law package on politics also mentions changes in 
the composition of the balance of power in parliament. This was related to 
implementing an electoral system based on proportional representation and awarding 
a quarter of the total number of seats to the armed forces (Arsip Deklarasi Tentang 
Demokrasi Pancasila yang ditandatangani tanggal 10 Juli 1967 di Bandung). 

The draft law on politics proposed by the government was an act of Suharto's 
arbitrariness as an official. Soeharto wanted to maintain his power by appointing 
himself directly through the MPRS, where most of the members would be produced 
through the direct appointment without going through a democratic election process 
(Interview with Kiai Sholeh Qosim, January 7, 2017 ). With a proportional 
representation system combined with a list system, parliamentarians feel less loyal to 
those who voted for them because they were more bound to their parent organization. 
If this system is approved, PNU can potentially lose most of its seats in parliament 
because the most extensive base of influence is in East and Central Java (Jamiluddin, 
2018). 

In its implementation, the MPRS's decision regarding the elections, which were 
planned to be held on July 5, 1968, was again postponed unilaterally by the 
government. This delay is based on the argument that the law used as the basis for 
operational law has yet to be finalized because it is constrained by the slow political 
process in parliament (Suryadinata & Priyono, 1992, pp. 36–48). The government 
proposed postponing the election for five years so that the election would be held by 
1973. According to Minister HMS Mintaredja, who also concurrently served as 
chairman of Parmusi, the performance of the political parties in parliament could have 
been faster in deciding legal products related to the election. It is similar to repeating 
the performance of parliament during the Guided Democracy period, where the old 
political parties in parliament only focused on the interests of their group without ever 
seeing the substance and benefits of the laws proposed by the government 
(“Penjerdehanaan Kepartaian,” 1971; Arninanto, 1999, 81). 

Mintaredja's criticism regarding parliament's slow performance in deciding on 
political laws was rebutted by Ahmad Saikhu, Deputy Speaker of the DPR and an PNU 
politician. According to Saikhu, Mintaredja's criticism was an attempt to discredit 
PNU as part of a group that was seen as slowing down parliamentary work. The 
production of laws was carried out jointly with the government so that the speed of a 
law is determined by the seriousness and synergy of the two institutions. As a 
representative of PNU in parliament, Saikhu supports putting forward a consensus 
deliberation system which is the party's line of struggle. However, if the consensus 
deliberation system was deemed too difficult to implement on a national scale, causing 
the law's ratification to drag on, then PNU agreed to hold a vote (“Sjaichu: Bisa Sadja 
untuk Tjari Kambing Hitam,” 1971). 



 
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In January 1968, President Soeharto held a meeting with the leaders of the 
political parties at the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. This was done to overcome the 
political impasse in the polemic over the discussion of the package of laws in the 
political field which needed to show clear spots. At the meeting, PNU was represented 
by Idham Chalid, Subchan Zaenuri, Djamaluddin Malik, Jusuf Hasyim and Nuddin 
Lubis. The meeting temporarily quelled the polemic regarding the draft law package 
in the political field. Chairman Idham Chalid, in a statement to the press after the 
meeting, stated that he would consider the suggestions and solutions provided by 
President Soeharto regarding the problems of the law on politics proposed by the 
government (“Refreshing DPR Djadi Pembitjaraan Hangat,” 1968). 

In a separate forum following the meeting with the President, Subchan expressed 
his frustration at the outcome. According to Subchan, the government needed to push 
PNU more to agree to the proposed draft law package on politics. Subchan also 
deplored the option of postponing the elections made by the government because the 
situation and conditions were not possible, as well as the main reason for the lack of 
funding being the main factor. According to Subchan, the government's unilateral 
postponement of elections because the situation and conditions were not possible, was 
irrelevant because Indonesia's socio-political conditions during the transition to 
President Soeharto were very conducive and stable (“Konsultasi Presiden Dengan 
Parpol2,” 1969). The government has also opened a lot of foreign capital assistance to 
Indonesia. Subchan's statement, as quoted in the Kompas daily, October 5, 1969, is as 
follows: 

”That election financing does not need to cost Rp. 20 billion, as the President said. 
The amount of expenses required can be less than Rp. 10 billion. Consequently, 
there is no need to postpone elections if only based on financial considerations 
(“Subchan: Biaja Pemilu Dapat Kurang Dari Rp. 10 Miljard,” 1969) 
 
On October 14, 1969, President Soeharto held a meeting with the leaders of the 

PNU and PNI political parties at the Merdeka Palace. PNU was represented by Idham 
Chalid, Subchan Zaenuri, Djamaluddin Malik, Kiai Masykur, Imron Rosyadi, Jusuf 
Hasyim and Nuddin Lubis. Meanwhile, the PNI was represented by Isnaeni, 
Hadisubeno, Abdul Madjid, Hardjanto, Usep Ranawidjaja, Budi Dipojuwono and 
Abadi. The meeting reached an agreement between the government and political 
parties on the issue of the law on politics proposed by the government. The meeting 
resulted in an agreement between the government and political parties regarding the 
draft law on politics impacting the election schedule. The New Order government also 
agreed to reschedule the election by moving it forward from 1973 to July 5 1971 
(“Konsultasi Presiden dengan Parpol2,” 1969). 

According to Harold Crouch, Suharto's concern for the legitimacy of his power 
was a determining factor in accepting the pressure from PNU and its political parties 
to speed up elections (Crouch, 1999, p. 248). The pressure from the PNU leadership 
received support from other political parties in parliament, thus forcing Suharto's New 



 
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Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order, 1967-1969                         |  89 

Order government to review its policies regarding the draft law on political parties 
and the conduct of elections. 

The consequence of agreeing to accelerate the holding of elections was that PNU 
must support a package of laws on politics that regulate the composition and position 
of members of the MPR and DPR, namely Law No. 6 of 1969 in the political field law 
package. The substance of Law No. 6 was the appointment of members of parliament 
from the creative element through a direct appointment mechanism by President 
Soeharto. A few days after the meeting with President Soeharto, the PNU leadership, 
represented by Djamaluddin Malik and Mahbub Djunaidi, signed a statement 
supporting the appointment of members of parliament, which was seen as refreshing 
parliament by the results of meetings between Islamic parties and the government. 
Even so, according to Mahbub, PNU has provided notes so that refreshing in 
parliament stays consistent with the constitution and applicable laws and does not 
change the balance of party forces in parliament. According to Mahbub, varies to the 
balance of party power in parliament can only be carried out through a democratic 
election mechanism and according to the mandate of the applicable law (“Refreshing 
DPR Djadi Pembitjaraan Hangat,” 1968) 

Subchan saw the statement of attitude from the PNU leadership that approves 
Law no. 6 as an act of "playing it safe" for the party elite, which has the potential to 
destroy NU (Interview with Kiai Abidin at his house, Jalan Musholla al Wahdah 
Dusun. Sumberbendo, Sidomulyo Village, Kec. Wates, Kediri Regency, August 21 
2020.). Subchan termed UU no. 6, which regulates changes to the structure of members 
of parliament by redressing (improving) but intends to destroy the strengths of 
political parties. According to Subchan, Law No. 6 was indirectly an "obsolete" legacy 
of Soekarno's government, which has positive and negative impacts on PNU. The 
positive impact was meant by the loss of PKI elements and, simultaneously, the 
negative mentality of the parliament that the Soekarno government inherited. 
Meanwhile, the negative impact was the reduced political power of PNU in parliament 
due to the increasing dominance and role of the military in parliamentary institutions 
(Laporan Pertanggungjawaban Subchan Zaenuri Ekhsan dalam Muktamar ke-XXV di 
Surabaya tahun 1971). 

The impact of the approval of Law No. 6, which regulates the composition and 
position of MPR and DPR parliament members, makes the power balance map of 
political parties in parliament that were not directly affiliated with the government 
(Golkar) getting weaker and weaker. Subchan said Law No. 6 was very inconsistent 
with the "mandate" of the Constitution and Pancasila, so that it can cause the 
democratic strength of political parties becomes increasingly fragile. Before the law on 
the structure and position of parliament was passed, political parties in the DPR still 
held two-thirds of the votes. Meanwhile, in the MPR institution, 21 of 26 regional 
delegates had political aspirations that tended to side with Islamic groups (Laporan 
Pertanggungjawaban Subchan Zaenuri Ekhsan dalam Muktamar ke-XXV di Surabaya 
tahun 1971). 



 
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Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order, 1967-1969                         |  90 

The political power of the New Order increasingly gained legality in power with 
the formation of a new form of politics with the enactment of Law No. 6 of 1969 
concerning the composition of the membership of the DPR and MPR. With the 
approval of Law No. 6 of 1969, the total members of parliament became 460 people, of 
which 360 people were elected through general elections. As many as 100 people were 
appointed directly by President Soeharto. Of the 100 members appointed directly by 
the president, 75 were appointed from the military element based on a proposal from 
the Minister of Defense/Armed Forces Commander. As many as 25 people came from 
organizational or individual parts of Article 10 Law No. 6 of 1969 concerning the 
Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD. Thus the group composition 
in parliament only consisted of 11 factions, including NU, PNI, IPKI, Murba, PSII, Perti 
(temporarily suspended), Parmusi, Parkindo, Catholic Party, Golongan Karya 
(Golkar), as well as the Karya ABRI and Karya non-ABRI (Anam, 1999, p. 331). 

 
Conclusion 
This study uses the resistance theory framework developed by James Scott. As with 
James Scott's theory of resistance from the farming community, PNU's resistance to 
the New Order government was all actions taken by subordinate people or groups to 
reduce or resist the pressure exerted by superordinate parties or groups on these 
subordinate groups. 

The resistance by Idham Chalid and the ranks of the Syuriah Council against the 
New Order government was an open form of resistance. Covert resistance takes the 
form of passive disapproval, more of the same massive silent evasion, which was often 
far more effective because the participants were joined in conspiracies that appear to 
be conspiring. Subchan and his supporters fall into the category of closed resistance 
by rejecting government policies detrimental to NU. Consistently, Subchan's closed 
resistance was carried out actively and often turned into short and powerful emotional 
outbursts openly with considerable risk after a prolonged struggle in various fields, 
which later gave birth to a radicalization of the movement, which was quite massive. 

The intervention by the New Order authorities towards PNU at the Bandung 
Congress became a turning point that influenced the decisions of this organization in 
its relations with the state. The decisions of the Muktamar taken in Bandung were still 
bold enough to oppose the government, although they were not confrontational. 
Idham Chalid and Subchan agreed that there must be an alternative solution in dealing 
with the New Order government. The New Order government's internal interference 
made most of the young NU politicians who previously fully supported the New 
Order become opponents of government policies, which he said were anti-political 
parties. Subchan Z.E, a key young PNU figure, organized open resistance by 
consolidating support from NU clerics in the regions, especially Central and East Java. 
Idham Chalid acknowledges that direct confrontation with the New Order authorities 
will only harm the organization. Subchan and Idham agreed that the government's 
interference with PNU was intolerable. 



 
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Resistance of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party towards the New Order, 1967-1969                         |  91 

The New Order's political policies received a response from several NU youths 
who thought that the New Order was starting to show anti-democratic symptoms by 
imposing policies that put pressure on political parties. In turn, this policy discourse 
has become a different dynamic within PNU. Despite fighting, friction and internal 
competition, as a political institution, PNU has been fragmented into several factions 
from the start; PNU has remained solid in the face of pressure from outside. PNU has 
played a role by raising groups that support the government on the one hand, but on 
the other hand, it also raises groups that were critical of government policies. 

The PNU resistance made many contributions to the renewal of its organization 
in the following years. The conversion of several PNU officials who launched 
resistance to the New Order rulers resulted from various government political 
interventions in PNU institutions. Regardless of the nuances, PNU's resistance can be 
understood from the perspective of the struggle for ideas in forming a government 
that upholds democracy. Resistance can also be understood as a self-defense effort 
against various government interventions against PNU's political institutions. 
 
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