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Defending Indonesian Sovereignty through Mass Media: Radio Rimba Raya in the Revolutionary War      | 1 

 

Received:  
March 9, 2022 
 
Revised:  
June 3, 2022 
 
Accepted:  
June 4, 2022 

Defending Indonesian Sovereignty through Mass Media:  
Radio Rimba Raya in the Revolutionary War 

 
Habibi Muttaqin1, Sabil Mokodenseho2*, Febby Widjayanto3 

1Master Program of Islamic Cultural History, Faculty of Adab and Humanities,  
Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta 

Jl. Ir. H. Juanda No. 95, Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten – Indonesia 
2Graduate School for Islamic Studies, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta 

Jl. Ir. H. Juanda No. 95, Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten – Indonesia 
3Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,  

Universitas Airlangga 
Jl. Dharmawangsa Dalam, Surabaya, East Java - Indonesia 

 
*Corresponding Author: sabil.mokodenseho@gmail.com  

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14710/ihis.v6i1.13821 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Radio is one of the media, which plays an important and strategic role in the delivery 
of information to the public. In addition, radio can be a propaganda medium (Salata, 
2020; Barber & Miller, 2019; Goody, 2018). The power of radio propaganda lies in its 
ability to produce affective hearing, the intensification of one sense (listening) 
produces physical and emotive responses to the presence of sound (McHugh, 2016). 
In addition to being easily accessible, the news conveyed can vary, namely, news that 
is in accordance with the facts or otherwise, news of provocations, which can divide 

Abstract 
 

Radio as a medium of information plays an important role in the history of 
Indonesia's struggle. This study was conducted because of the previous studies on 
the movement to defend Indonesia's independence, only a few uses radio as a 
means of struggle. Radio Rimba Raya (RRR), which was established in Aceh. The 
aim is to analyze the role of RRR in defending Indonesian Independence, 
especially during the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 1948 and the General 
Offensive on March 1, 1949. Using the historical method, this study found that 
RRR became an important medium for nationalists to communicate orders and 
information, as well as providing an opportunity for Indonesia to thwart 
propaganda and dismiss Dutch provocations. Due to the importance of RRR in 
Indonesia's struggle, it can be concluded that one of the media for Indonesia's 
struggle and success against the Dutch was RRR with its messages that crossed 
the vast expanse of the contested area. The messages of struggle that were 
broadcast through the RRR were an important part of Indonesia's political 
strategy, both in dismissing Dutch propaganda and provocations and in guarding 
the agendas of Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy so that they were known to the public 
at home and abroad.  
 
Keywords: Dutch Military Aggression; Dutch Propaganda and Provocation; 

Indonesian Independence; Radio Rimba Raya. 
 



 
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unity and threaten the stability of a country.  
In the beginning of Indonesia's independence, Radio was used as one of the mediums 

of struggle, especially in building the modern Indonesian nation. The history of 
broadcasting in Indonesia reveals something about the indigenous and national character, 
as well as the way and breadth of absorption of ideas from two foreign cultures (Dutch and 
Japanese) that dominate the archipelago in modern times (Wild, 1987). Before the existence 
of Radio Rimba Raya (RRR), Indonesia had a radio called Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) 
(Puguh & Mufidah, 2020; Puguh, 2017). When RRI was founded on September 11, 1945, 
Indonesians who understand the media, who have studied its effectiveness as a 
propaganda tool, and who can operate it technically. There are many radio devices to 
ensure that a message will reach a point in each community when it can be spread word of 
mouth, as well as a tendency to listen wirelessly and to give some credence to its message 
(Wild, 1991). 

Through the RRI broadcast, Sukarno delivered the news of the Proclamation of 
Independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. Indonesia managed to seize 
its independence from the previous invaders, the Dutch and Japanese. However, the 
Netherlands does not recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty and seeks to re-establish its power, 
both through diplomatic and military channels. From this the role of radio becomes 
important in Indonesia’s struggle, especially to disseminate information in various 
diplomacies conducted between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Diplomacy ultimately 
leads to resistance and battle. 

The first diplomacy of the Netherlands-Indonesia is through the Linggardjati 
Agreement to agree on the de facto territory of the United States of Indonesia (RIS). The 
agreement was agreed and signed on March 25, 1947 (Soebandrio, 1948). However, the 
Dutch had a different interpretation and reneged on the agreement. The Dutch then carried 
out an attack, known as the First Dutch Military Aggression on July 2I, 1947 (Van Der Kroef, 
1953). Because it still leaves the dispute between Indonesia-Netherlands, the Renville 
Agreement (December 8, 1947, to January 17, 1948), the contents of which include; The 
Netherlands only recognizes Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Sumatra as part of the territory 
of the Republic of Indonesia. After the agreement was agreed, the Dutch declared a federal 
government in Sumatra. In fact, part of Sumatra is a territory of Indonesia. The Dutch, who 
had benefited from the Renville Agreement, reneged on it, then launched the Second Dutch 
Military Aggression offensive on December 19-20, 1948. 

Indonesia felt that they were harmed in some of the agreements made, while the 
Dutch benefited. On the contrary, the Dutch who benefited from the agreement did not feel 
satisfied, and in the end, launched an attack on Indonesia. Indonesia-Netherland’s relations 
continue to warm as a result of the absence of common ground in various diplomacy 
conducted earlier. Indonesia's reaction to the Second Dutch Military Aggression led to an 
event, known as the General Offensive of March 1, 1949.  The purpose of this attack is to 
prove to the international community that the Indonesian National Army (TNI) still exists 
and is strong. 

The period 1948-1949 was the most important period in the Republic of Indonesia. 19 
December 1948 known as the Second Dutch Military Aggression (Heijboer, 1998), until the 



 
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General Offensive of March 1, 1949, as Indonesia's reaction to various attacks launched by 
the Dutch. Indeed, during the First Dutch Military Aggression, Indonesia was not 
successfully controlled by the Dutch, but at the time of Second Dutch Military Aggression, 
almost all of Indonesia such as Java, Madura, and Sumatra were affected (Kahin, 1952). The 
Dutch also arrested several Indonesian figures, among them, Sukarno and Muhammad 
Hatta as well as other important figures, who were considered to threaten their existence. 
As a result of the Dutch aggression and expansion of Indonesian territory made the territory 
of Indonesia becomes smaller. 

As a result of the Dutch attack on Indonesia, radio transmitters including RRI, starting 
from the center of Yogyakarta, whose job it is to broadcast the voice of independent 
Indonesia to the rest of the world, cannot move. Communication devices, bombed and 
burned. Therefore, the news of the Second Dutch Military Aggression attack was circulated 
only by word of mouth (Sufi et al., 2010). Instead, news of Dutch provocations over their 
radios was transmitted from Batavia and Medan. The Dutch claim was also broadcast by 
Radio Hilversum (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1948). 

The study of the existence and role of radio in Indonesia has been widely studied by 
scholars and researchers before, especially those reviewed from historical approaches such 
as Witte's (1998), Mrazek (1997), (Wild, 1991, 1987), and Kementerian Penerangan, (1953). 
However, the studies conducted have not touched all radios in Indonesia, so their studies 
cannot be said to be comprehensive, and still require further research in filling the gaps. The 
study of radio continues to be the focus of scholars in the field of social sciences, especially 
in the New Order and Reformation era as did McDaniel (1994), Lindsay (1997), Sen & Hill 
(2001), Samuel (2002), and Jurriëns (2009). 

Thus, the study reveals the role of the RRR in defending Indonesia's sovereignty from 
Dutch news of provocation and propaganda. The stimulus-response theory, pioneered by 
Ivan P. Pavlov, was used to analyze the study. A stimulus is an event that occurs in the 
human body that causes a change in behavior. Through stimulus theory, messages received 
by communicants over radio elicit responses or effects in the form of various actions, 
reactions, or answers, which can change the opinion, behavior, cognition of communicants. 
The response depends on the stimulus or is the result of the stimulus. The stimulus in this 
study was a provocation broadcast delivered by Radio Hilversum Netherlands, while the 
response was the RRR's reaction in countering the provocation of Dutch Radio. In addition, 
time communication theory is used to see how communication occurs through RRR 
broadcasts. Radio communication according to DeFleur (2010)  is a linear process by which 
professional communicators use media to design and disseminate messages widely, 
quickly, and sustainably to evoke desired meaning in a large, diverse, and selective manner. 
 
Method 
This article was compiled using historical methods consisting of four stages, namely 
heuristic, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Moustakas, 1990; 
Renier, 1961). Data sources related to Radio Rimba Raya (RRR) are taken from written 
literature in the form of archives, research reports, and relevant historical documents.  
Written literature is important because history can only be brought by historians 



 
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through various publications (Jenkins, 1997). In addition to written literature, 
information was obtained from Mr. Tukiran as one of the living witnesses of Radio 
Rimba Raya. The information the author got when observing the RRR Monument in 
Rimba Raya Village. According to Albulescu (2018), empirical data through 
observation can confirm or invalidate the theory. 

After reading on various sources, criticism of the source is carried out. Along 
with the discovery of historical sources, as well as the validation test of sources, which 
in historical writing is known as historical criticism, namely external criticism to 
ensure authenticity or authenticity of sources, and internal criticism to find out the 
credibility of sources, both archives and other supporting documents. Data and 
sources are tested for validity to find authentic sources, then interpreted. The 
interpretation of historical facts is very important, especially in reconstructing the 
realities of the past and providing a reinterpretation of the relationship between facts 
and data.  Interpretation in historical studies is also called historical analysis, whose 
purpose is to synthesize facts recovered from historical sources. The facts are 
organized together with the theory into a comprehensive interpretation, both analysis 
of data, and separating data according to information, or synthesizing data between 
one source with the source that is design, in order to know the combination of the two. 
Finally, the stages of historical writing, which include the way of writing, exposure, or 
reporting history in accordance with the chronology of history. 
 
The Role of Mass Media in Conveying the Ideas of the Nation's Struggle 
On the first day of the Second Dutch Military Aggression, the Dutch fielded military forces 
at the airbase, which started from Maguwo to Yogyakarta. In overcoming these problems, 
the Indonesian government represented by Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Agus Salim 
on December 19, 1948, held a Cabinet Meeting (Talsya, 1960), then took an important 
decision regarding the course of the struggle for independence, namely "We, the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia informed that on Sunday, December 19, 1948, at 6 am, the 
Netherlands had begun its attack on the city of Yogyakarta. If in these circumstances the 
government cannot carry out its obligations anymore, then we authorize Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara (Minister of Prosperity of the Republic of Indonesia) to form an Emergency 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) in Sumatra" (Talsya, 1990; Kahin, 1952). 

News about the fall of Yogyakarta city on December 19, 1948, only reached Aceh in 
the afternoon. After receiving the news, A. Gani Mutyara as Officer and Head of 
Information TNI Division X Sumatra reported to Tgk. M. Daud Beureu'eh (Military 
Governor of Aceh). After that A. Gani Mutyara and Osman Raliby (Head of Aceh Regional 
Information Office) gave a speech at RRI Kutaraja Studio, which contained an explanation 
of the situation at hand and the steps to be taken. The next day, the Aceh Military Governor 
gave a passionate speech addressed to all the people, soldiers, and guerrilla forces in the 
area (Alfian, 1982). The Military Governor advocates and invites all elements that the attack 
that has begun, carried out with a victory.  

One of the most necessary means by a country in times of war is the availability of 
communication devices such as radio transmitters (Hodge, 1995; Hale, 1975). With this 



 
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radio transmitter, people easily know the situation and developments that occur in a 
country that is precarious. Communication tools such as radio have their own advantages, 
are easy to hear with a wide distance and range, and cannot be done physically except 
through broadcasts in the form of important messages. Therefore, the newly independent 
Republic of Indonesia urgently needs communication tools such as radio in order to 
broadcast news, both from home and abroad.  

The fighters and people of Aceh rely on communication networks between regions 
through radio transmitters. Of the several radios that play a role in maintaining the 
existence of Aceh territory and state sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia is Radio 
Rimba Raya. This radio is located in Bener Meriah precisely in Rimba Raya, which had 
previously experienced several displacements due to reconnaissance from the Dutch side.  

When Radio Batavia and Radio Hilversum reported that the Republic of Indonesia no 
longer existed because Yogyakarta had been controlled by the Dutch, then the RRR firmly 
broadcast and dismissed all news that could harm the Republic of Indonesia, including 
Aceh in the eyes of the international community. RRR at that time became the only radio 
mouthpiece that denied Dutch radio by broadcasting news of the fact that the Republic of 
Indonesia still had territory and leaders (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1948). 

The New Order period was also the subject of scholarly study. Lindsay (1997), who 
focused her attention on private radio and local identity in an Indonesian context, was 
interesting to take into consideration. Lindsay departs from his view that radio 
broadcasting in Indonesia has a strong tradition as a local community activity. Lindsay 
noted that in 1977, there were 700 private radio stations, all of which were commercial out 
of a total of 898 radio stations in Indonesia. This indicates that radio plays an important role 
for the people of Indonesia. However, his study only focused on private radio, whose 
studies were long after Indonesia's independence. While the discussion related to the 
existence and role of radio in the early days of independence as played by Radio Rimba 
Raya in dismissing Dutch propaganda news, escaped its study. 

The existence of radio in Indonesia was also researched by Samuel (2002). His research 
focused on Indonesian radio broadcasting, particularly examining the changes brought 
about by the New Order and the Reformasi era. Similar studies can also be found in some 
parts of the book by Jurriëns. In general, Jurriëns (2009) provides a working definition of the 
Reformation and addresses a number of cultural-historical factors that contributed to 
radio's role as a medium of socio-political reform. Then, it provides a conceptual analysis of 
the Reformation and explains how or why radio journalism has contributed to the 
Reformation. Jurriëns (2009) concluded that Indonesian radio has become an efficient 
medium for disseminating people's thoughts and feelings as a result of some of its techno-
cultural features, such as the oral and aural character of radio broadcasts and the relatively 
low cost of production, transmission, and program acceptance. However, his writing has 
focused more on change and continuity in journalism since the fall of Suharto in 1998 and 
the start of a process of social and political reform known as Reformasi. In contrast to the 
study to be studied, the author wants to see how the role of one of the radios that once 
existed in Indonesia, known as Radio Rimba Raya in defending the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Jurriëns' writings focus on the role of radio in the Reformation era in 



 
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response to New Order monologueism and social issues of the Reformation period. While 
this study limited its study from 1948 to 1949 in the Old Order era, where one of Indonesia's 
radios (RRR) played a role in dismissing news of Dutch provocations. 

Much has been written about the movement in seizing and defending Indonesia's 
independence. For example, studies conducted by Sulasman (2017), Siong, (2001), and 
Gouda (1997), but little analysis focused on strategy, particularly radio as an information 
medium, used in the international diplomatic lobby that accompanies guerrilla resistance, 
both at the local and national levels. This paper is not a detailed history of the media of 
Indonesia's struggle to achieve and maintain independence, but it attempts to reveal the 
role of the RRR, which is linked to that struggle. It specifically analyzed how the RRR's role 
was in dismissing Dutch propaganda news in the events of the Second Dutch Military 
Aggression of 1948 and the General Offensive of March 1, 1949, as part of Indonesia's 
strategy of struggle and defense. In the last section, this paper presents the factors 
supporting RRR involved in maintaining Indonesia's independence. 
 
Existence of RRR:  Smuggling and Transfer of Radio Device 
The state of Indonesia in the early days of independence cannot be said to be stable 
and safe from colonial interference. Dutch Military Aggression I and II greatly 
disturbed Indonesia, which has just gained independence. The aggression made the 
public and freedom fighters aware of the importance of radio in dismissing Dutch 
propaganda news. On July 23, 1947, the Army’s X-Division force successfully brought 
into Indonesia a radio transmitter from Malaya (Nasution, 1979). Aceh became a 
storage area for a radio transmitter because it was considered strategic and safe from 
Dutch supervision. Efforts to bring in radio transmitters are not achieved easily, but 
full of obstacles, although finally, Indonesia succeeded. The landing of a radio 
transmitter from Malaya to Aceh came amid a cordon and a Dutch police blockade of 
Indonesian territory (Talsya, 1990). Smuggling is one effective way to escape such 
intense Dutch surveillance. 

 The smuggling of radio devices was carried out to escape the Dutch blockade, 
which was on guard in the waters of the Strait of Malacca. The smuggling of these 
radio devices took 12 victims, all of whom were soldiers of TNI Battalion B, under the 
leadership of Nip. Karim (Dailanu, 1986; Sitompul, 2017). The death of TNI soldiers 
from being shot dead shows how hard the struggle is to get a radio transmitter to 
defend Indonesia’s independence. 

 It should be noted that in conjunction with the attempt to obtain a radio 
transmitter, known as the Great Jungle Radio, the “cunning” and shrewdness of the 
strategy played by John Lie. The transmitter was brought in by John Lie through Dutch 
forces who were watching the ships, through the Strait of Malacca. John Lie used two-
speed boats, which contained groceries and food (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Speed boats 
carrying food and food are used as fishing rods if there is a chase from the Dutch side, 
who are on guard in the waters of the Strait of Malacca.  

When John Lie’s troops were in the middle of the ocean-facing the Dutch troops, 
the speed boat containing food and food was used as bait by increasing the speed of 



 
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the speed boat. Then they split up and separated from the speed boat containing radio 
devices so that the Dutch patrol was fooled as if the speeding speed boat was running 
away from Dutch police checks. These tactics and strategies provoked Dutch police 
patrols so that a chase was inevitable (Syam, 2015). Dutch police managed to disable 
the speed boat, which was used as a fishing rod. Finally, the speed boat carrying the 
radio device managed to escape the Dutch police patrol. The radio device was taken 
to the coast of Sumatra by TNI forces, then landed in the Yu Tamiang River, East Aceh 
(Syam, 2015). This radio transmitter is the forerunner of the RRR, which is obtained 
through the struggle of life and death. 

After arriving in Aceh, the radio transmitter was first installed in Krueng Simpo, 
Bireun (about 19 Km from Bireun City, North Aceh) by W. Schulz and assisted by 
Lieutenant Sajuddin, Lieutenant R. Abdullah, Lieutenant Syarifuddin, and Ramli 
Melayu, who were also employees in the Postal and Telegram/Telephone Service. The 
Krueng Simpo area became the first installation site for security reasons, away from 
Dutch supervision. Moreover, at that time, Indonesia’s condition was not stable so it 
was not possible if the newly obtained radio transmitter, was brought to Kutaraja 
(Banda Aceh). While the city of Bireun became the place where the radio studio was 
built (Zulfan et al., 2009). 

After the condition has improved, and due to political considerations, as well as 
on the orders of Tgk. M. Daud Beureu’eh as the Military Governor of Aceh, the radio 
transmitter was transferred to Kutaraja. Political considerations are intended so that 
with the radio transmitter, the information conveyed can reach abroad. In addition, it 
is easier for the Aceh Military Governor to convey political policies for the sake of 
struggle, and facilitate the entry and exit of information related to Indonesia’s struggle 
(Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Until in Kutaraja, radio transmitters were installed at Cot Geeu, 
precisely at the foot of Mount Seulawah because it is suitable in terms of geography 
and safety (Zulfan et al., 2009). If at any time known by the Dutch, the radio transmitter 
can be easily moved to Mount Seulawah through Peukan Bilui in Sibreh, then to 
Seulimum (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Although the transfer, the Dutch attack on 
Indonesia is not over, which is marked by a blockade and propaganda played. 

At first, radio broadcasts were conducted in Kutaraja, between the studio and the 
transmitter connected by a cable that was about 8 km away. Broadcasting is done using 
signal calling, a wave officially used by RRI in Kutaraja, which is emitted on waves of 
19 meters. While the other transmitter waves, using signal calling RRR and Army 
Radio Division X. Radio broadcasting in Kutaraja is managed by the Army Division X 
Lighting Section, headed by A.G. Mutyara (Zulfan et al., 2009). 

The existence of RRR in Kutaraja did not last long. The day after the Second 
Dutch Military Aggression on December 20, 1948, on the orders of Tgk. M. Daud 
Beureu’eh (Military Governor of Aceh) radio transmitters were forced to be moved to 
other areas, which were safe from the Dutch range. Initially, the radio was to be moved 
to the Burni Bius area near Takengon but failed due to unsafe circumstances. Seeing 
these conditions, the Aceh Military Governor invited all civilian, military, and 
community leaders to attend a special meeting, held in Kutaraja on December 19, 1948. 



 
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On that night, the Aceh Military Governor instructed that the radio transmitter at Cot 
Geeu be immediately brought to the mountains of Central Aceh. Immediately, the 
special forces of Division X brought a radio transmitter to Rimba Raya, as far as 260 
km from the city of Cot Geeu. On December 20, 1948, RRR resumed operations with 
its broadcast, which contained the instructions of the Aceh Military Governor on the 
implementation of general mobilization of all Indonesians who had grown up in Aceh. 

The transfer of radio transmitters from Kutaraja to Rimba Raya was pursued by 
Dutch military forces, causing trucks carrying the devices to infiltrate and take shelter 
in the forest. The fertile forest in Central Aceh became a hideout for troops carrying 
radio transmitters from attacks, so the Dutch lost track. Due to consideration of the 
situation, strategic analysis, and technical calculations, as well as advice from Colonel 
Husein Yusuf (1912-1978) and W. Schulz, presented to the Aceh Military Governor, 
the planned installation of radio transmitters in Burni Bius, Central Aceh, was 
canceled. Thus, the radio transmitter was transferred to Rimba Raya Village, Central 
Aceh. 

The installation of radio transmitters encountered several obstacles, namely the 
absence of electrical connecting devices and the lack of cable availability making the 
broadcasting process disrupted. Considering that the electric machine is the main key 
to live radio broadcasts, the search for power connecting devices and cables is sought. 
The search was carried out by Ummi Salamah (wife of Colonel Husein Yusuf), who 
started from Bireun area, then to Lampahan, but failed because both places did not 
have electricity supplies. A new electrical connecting device was found, in the Kuala 
Simpang area. After being found, the device was immediately taken to Rimba Raya 
village, until the radio was operational again. 
 
RRR Broadcasting Structure: Schedule and Content 
RRR is led by Indonesians, especially those living in Aceh. Among them was Colonel 
Husein Yusuf (1912-1978) (Builder and editor) (Inawati et al., 2016), Tgk. H. Affan 
(Builder), Abdullah Syarif (Builder and Acehnese editor), and Lieutenant Syarifuddin 
(Vice-Chairman, and broadcasters in Indonesian-Netherlands). However, the RRR 
broadcasters are not limited to Acehnese but are also assisted by people from outside 
the region such as Ambon and Manado, as well as foreigners. 

 The broadcasting schedule by Radio Rimba Raya is carried out starting at 16.00 
pm. In addition to using Indonesian, RRR broadcasts also use foreign languages 
(English, Indian, Arabic, Chinese), as well as regional languages according to the 
birthplace of an announcer such as Acehnese, Ambonese, and Manado. In 
broadcasting, the radio transmitter with a power of 1 Kw uses signal calling voice of 
the Republic of Indonesia, Signal calling Suara Indonesia Merdeka, RRR, Radio 
Division X, and RRI (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). 

 In general, RRR broadcasts are divided into five broadcast schedules. At 16.00–
18.00 WIB, RRR conducted telegraph relations with guerrilla transmitter stations 
inside and outside the Dutch-controlled city to find out the state and development of 
the Indonesian struggle on the battlefield. At 19.00–21.00 WIB, RRR held a special 



 
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domestic special for the benefit of the Indonesian people using signal calling votes of 
the Republic of Indonesia. At 21.00–23.00 WIB, RRR held a special broadcast abroad 
for the struggle of diplomacy by Indonesian envoys abroad, as well as informing the 
international community that the Republic of Indonesia still exists. At 23.00–24.00 WIB, 
RRR conducted a special broadcast to the front-line using signal calling of The Free 
Indonesia voice. At 24.00 WIB-morning, RRR held a telephone relationship with 
several Indonesian representatives abroad (Jakobi, 1995; Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). 

Exchange of information through RRR broadcasts between Indonesia and 
Indonesian representatives abroad is intended to know the domestic situation, the 
progress of the struggle abroad, and the problems faced by Indonesia, at home and 
abroad, including the availability and needs of war, needed by Indonesian fighters. 
The information submitted by RRR to Indonesian representatives abroad uses 
symbolic language so as not to be suspected, for example, “hello, send us butter, milk, 
and rice”. The language of "food" is merely a symbol, but what is meant is actually the 
need for struggle, as the tools of war (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Thus, the existence and 
role of the RRR to bridge information from within to abroad are needed. Indonesia’s 
information to get abroad can only be done through Aceh as the establishment of RRR 
because, in other areas, almost all of them are controlled by the Dutch. 

In general, RRR broadcast content contains a message of Struggle and 
Independence of Indonesia and concerns community activities or activities such as 
social, cultural, literary, artistic, and religious (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). However, in a 
period of upheaval between Indonesia and the Netherlands, broadcasts related to the 
Indonesian struggle became a priority. The broadcast of independence did not escape 
from things, which are closely related to the politics of government. The purpose of 
the message of struggle was broadcast in order for Indonesia to gain power, thus 
gaining the right and authority to rule and lead the country. In this context, broadcasts 
containing messages of struggle as part of Indonesia’s political strategy can be 
understood as the process of exercising and maintaining the power they have. That 
means, in gaining power, the information media in this case radio, plays an important 
and strategic role. 

Radio as an information media plays an important and strategic role in 
Indonesia’s struggle. When the Dutch actively conducted political propaganda over 
the radio to bring down Indonesia on the international scene. Indonesian fighters also 
did the same, broadcasting news over the radio to dismiss news of provocations and 
propaganda by Dutch radio, which disrupted the struggle, both physical and mental 
of Indonesian fighters (Alfian, 1982). Through RRR broadcasts, rebuttals to Dutch 
propaganda can be minimized. The RRR also broadcast emergency government calls 
to listeners, both at home and abroad, particularly on messages that could stir guerrilla 
fighting. 

Since the Second Dutch Military Aggression until the establishment of the 
Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI), RRR acts as a media 
linking information between PDRI and Indonesian representatives abroad. The RRR 
broadcast guerrilla messages widely and intensively, launched by the TNI and the 



 
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Indonesian people, so that the Dutch could not deceive the eyes of the world against 
their claims of power to Indonesian territory. 

Radio Rimba Raya also takes part in efforts to raise funds from the community 
for the needs of the struggle. In accordance with its function, RRR became an 
information media and handler of propaganda news broadcast by Dutch radio. RRR 
invites people throughout the region to help Indonesia’s struggle (Alfian, 1982). In the 
economic field, RRR broadcasts news about Indonesia’s economic activities and 
circumstances for war preparation, both in the form of income from the public and 
funds from abroad (Polim, 1996). This information is important as a form of openness 
and accountability to donors on the one hand and motivates contributors on the other. 
Balance sheet information is very helpful for freedom fighters in terms of regulating 
financial use for war readiness. 

In addition, RRR content also contains information on socio-cultural activities of 
the community, especially in awakening the spirit of the nation’s struggle and as the 
frame of Indonesia’s independence struggle. For example, the broadcast of ceremonial 
events, which are rooted in the religious values of the community, such as the 
commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s Maulid to gather Muslims and increase 
the spirit of struggle of Muslims (Polim, 1996). The author argues that the event aims 
to awaken the fighting spirit of figures and Muslims on the battlefield in the fight 
against the colonials in order to gain success in defending Indonesia from all Dutch 
threats, propaganda, and provocations.   
 
RRR in Countering Dutch Provocation News  
The capital city of Yogyakarta has an important role in the struggle to maintain 
Indonesia’s independence from Dutch Military Aggression. When Yogyakarta was 
successfully controlled by the Dutch on December 20, 1948, all facilities including the 
transmitter of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), were taken over. The area that was not 
affected by the Dutch Military Aggression attack was Aceh as the area where RRR was 
established. This area became a defense base in strategizing Indonesian resistance 
against the Dutch. However, after Yogyakarta was successfully overrun by the enemy, 
the attack on Aceh became the next Dutch destination. attacks in the form of bombing 
and fire from the sea were repeatedly carried out by Dutch military forces. 

 The Dutch attack on Aceh made this area unstable. The precarious situation 
experienced by Aceh received attention and was immediately responded to by the 
Aceh Military Governor as well as regional officials and community leaders. The 
people of Aceh have a strong commitment to maintaining the unity of the Aceh region 
and Indonesian sovereignty. The commitment can be seen in the role of the Aceh 
Ulema Association (PUSA) which was established on May 5, 1939 (Yusuf, 2007). PUSA 
fought on the front lines against the Dutch, which can be proven by the edict of 
scholars inviting all Acehnese people to fight to defend Indonesian independence 
(Ibrahimy, 1982). 

 In a vacuum situation, precisely on December 20, 1948, after the Second Dutch 
Military Aggression, the RRR broadcast delivered its messages using a Division X 



 
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Defending Indonesian Sovereignty through Mass Media: Radio Rimba Raya in the Revolutionary War      | 11 

radio calling signal that worked at a frequency of 19.25 with a transmitter force of 1 
Kw at an altitude of 61 meters (Tim Koordinasi Siaran Ditjen Kebudayaan, 1998). RRR 
denies that the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh region still exist. There is still 
emergency management of the Republic of Indonesia led by Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Then there are the Army of the Republic 
of Indonesia and the people of Indonesia including the people of Aceh (Melayu, 1995). 
Tukiran (2018) said that this news continues to be broadcast by the RRR during the 
day and night during the condition of Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia is still 
precarious until sovereignty is successfully recaptured by the people. The news was 
relayed by several radios such as RRI Kutaraja and All India Radio, as well as radio-
radio liaison in Bukittinggi and Java Island. Thus, news broadcasts are heard all the 
way to Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, and Europe. Through the RRR 
broadcast, the international community recognized the existence of Aceh and the 
Republic of Indonesia which was eventually recaptured through negotiations and 
diplomacy known as the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference (KMB), which 
took place on 23 August until 2 Nov 1949.  

RRR broadcasts its news using several languages, namely Indonesian, Dutch, 
Arabic, English, Chinese, and Urdu. Broadcasting news of the struggle in various 
languages is very helpful for the People of Aceh in fighting for diplomacy abroad for 
the unity of the Aceh region and to get recognition of the Republic of Indonesia from 
the international world. In addition to fending off propaganda news broadcast by 
Dutch radio, RRR also played a role in providing important instructions on the 
situation and condition of Aceh to the leaders and soldiers of the Emergency 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia. This can be seen at the time of the transfer 
of Syafruddin Prawiranegara from West Sumatra to Kutaraja, which at that time was 
delivered directly through RRR broadcasts to Indonesian representatives abroad. 

News of domestic struggles and developments becomes the basis of 
policymaking by foreign diplomats, both related to the progress of the struggle 
physically and diplomacy. The news results were broadcast by RRR regarding the 
situation and conditions of Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia. L.N. Palar (1900-1981) 
at the United Nations meeting declared to the international community that Aceh was 
still united under the rule of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Republic of Indonesia 
remained intact. 

RRR in counterattacking the provocation of Dutch radio led by Colonel Husein 
Yusuf (1912-1978) and Captain A.G. Mutyara. Then there are several foreign nationals 
involved as broadcasters and technicians, Lieutenant Abdullah (radio announcer in 
English), Lieutenant Candra (radio announcer in Urdu), Wung Fei (radio announcer 
in Chinese), Lieutenant Nargis, and W. Schulz (Chief radio technician). 

Information on the Dutch invasion of Indonesian territory was very quickly 
received by the international community and the United Nations. One of the factors 
that make this information spread very quickly did not escape the news by Dutch 
radio. Information on the attack on Indonesia was also clarified by the report of the 
Three Countries Commission (KTN) to the UN Security Council. The commission also 



 
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reported to the United Nations that the Netherlands violated the Renville Agreement, 
which had been agreed and signed between the two sides. The Dutch attack on 
Indonesia led the countries of the world to condemn the attack, one of which was India. 

Nasution (1979) said one of the most valuable moral supports for Indonesia for 
the Dutch military aggression was the initiative of India and Burma to gather 
representatives of countries from 19 in Asia and Arabia to meet simultaneously at the 
Asian Conference in New Delhi. During the conference, India through Pandit Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that what the Dutch did had violated the results of 
the Renville Agreement. Strictly speaking, the Indian representatives decided 
unanimously that the Dutch army should leave Indonesia immediately because what 
they did was considered to make the Indonesian people more miserable. India’s 
concern for Indonesia can also be seen moments after the Second Dutch Military 
Aggression, India’s representative at the United Nations urged the Security Council to 
quickly resolve the Indonesia-Belanda dispute. 

The broadcasts delivered by RRR are relayed by All India Radio and Australia 
Broadcasting. Because of the torrent of information abroad and thanks to the persistent 
struggle of Indonesian diplomats abroad, the opinions of Asian countries sided with 
the Republic of Indonesia. When the Asian Conference took place on 20-25 January 
1949 in New Delhi, it was opened by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) as Prime Minister 
of India (Mukherjee, 2018). An important point resulting from the conference was that 
Yogyakarta should be returned to Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch army 
should be withdrawn from Indonesia, and the Indonesian leaders held captive should 
be released. The representatives of Indonesian diplomats who attended the Asian 
Conference were Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo (1917-2001), Sudarsono (1911-1976), 
H.M. Rosyidi (1915-2001), Utoyo Ramelan, and Alexander A. Maramis (1897-1977). 

The representative office of the Republic of Indonesia in India at that time was 
located in Aurhubzob (New Delhi). From there Indonesia through RRR broadcasts 
news twice a day about the development of the struggle of the Indonesian people 
during the Second Dutch Military Aggression. The development of Indonesia’s 
struggle was also conveyed by the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia at the 
conference. News of Indonesia’s struggle was also quoted by All India radio, then 
spread to other regions. 

The results of the Asian Conference for Indonesia held on 20-25 January 1949 in 
New Delhi encouraged the Round Table Conference (KMB), held in The Hague, The 
Netherlands, from 23 August to 2 November 1949. To control the news in this 
conference spread to all corners of the country, the RRR’s working hours were 
extended considering the amount of news that must be sent to Indonesian 
representatives in the conference. The busyness of RRR broadcasts is most felt at 21:00 
until the morning, which is when broadcasting special broadcasts abroad. The Round 
Table Conference finally paid off, namely the Netherlands ceded sovereignty to the 
United States of Indonesia. RRR continued to play a role in maintaining territorial 
unity until the time of the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia 
by the Netherlands on December 27, 1949, in Jakarta as a result of the Round Table 



 
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Conference in The Hague, The Netherlands. 
The role of the RRR not only refuted the provocations of Dutch radio but also 

participated in the events of the General Offensive of 1 March 1949. This attack was 
led by Lieutenant Colonel Suharto and the people’s army forces who at that time 
stormed and blockaded the headquarters of Dutch troops in Yogyakarta (Abdullah, 
2015). This attack has been prepared since the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 
Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948. 

On Tuesday, March 1, 1949, Yogyakarta began to be attacked from various 
directions by the Guerrilla Army of the Republic of Indonesia by mobilizing the RRR 
as a means of communication and command. Sub Wehrkreise (SWK) 102 attacked 
from the south, SWK 103 troops from the West, SWK 104 troops attacked from the 
North, and SWK 105 from the east as well as tasked with expelling Dutch troops 
coming from Tanjungtirto (southward) and cornering Dutch troops in the Maguwo 
area to prevent any assistance and flight activities (Djumarwan & Pratiwi, 2016). The 
General Offensive of 1 March 1949 was unbeknownst to the Dutch. Guerrilla forces 
emerging from the south were able to infiltrate the area around the Post Office and 
Benteng Vredeburg and the northern square until it managed to knock out three tanks 
and mines, they installed (PUSSEMAD Indonesia, 1965). 

The Offensive of 1 March 1949 attack lasted for an hour. The people's guerrilla 
army of the Republic of Indonesia managed to paralyze and isolate the city of 
Yogyakarta for six hours from the Dutch side. But after that, the Dutch began to 
prepare themselves inside the headquarters of Major General D. R. A van Langen 
(1898-1983) and brought troops from Magelang under the leadership of Colonel J.  
Adrianus van Zanten (d. 1964). The Dutch then carried out a counter-attack on 
Indonesia by land and air. The guerrillas were forced to withdraw due to the 
unbalanced force of the weapons compared to those of the Dutch. This situation is used 
by the Dutch to control strategic areas. As a result of the retaliatory attack, the victims 
from the Indonesian side including civilians reached  300  people (PUSSEMAD 
Indonesia, 1965). 

The General Offensive of 1 March 1949 was disseminated by the RRR and several 
other radios, which were in the mountainous areas of Java. The news was relayed by 
All India Radio until it was heard abroad including the UN Council. In its broadcast, 
RRR reported the chronological General Offensive of 1 March 1949 carried out by the 
guerrilla army of the Republic of Indonesia in controlling the city of Yogyakarta for six 
hours. This news aims to convince the world that the Republic of Indonesia still exists. 
This news is widespread in various countries including India. L.N. Palar (1900-1981) 
as a diplomat of the Republic of Indonesia in India explained the situation and 
conditions on March 10, 1949, in a United Nations forum to let the world know that 
Indonesia still has defense and remains sovereign. RRR also broadcast statements 
delivered by L.N. Palar (1900-1981) at the UN Council until the news spread to various 
countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, New Delhi, and several other countries in 
Europe. After the news, the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia is still recognized 
by the world. 



 
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Defending the Sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia 
RRR had strong commitment to broadcasting news of the struggle in defending Aceh 
territory and the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia from the Second Dutch 
Military Aggression (Jakobi, 1995). The basic values of the RRR are contained in the 
“Tri Prasetya Pledge”, which is: (1) We must save the radio broadcasting device from 
anyone who wants to use it to destroy our country. Defending the device with all the 
soul of the body under any circumstances and with any effect. (2) We must drive the 
RRR broadcast as a tool of struggle and a tool of revolution throughout the Indonesian 
nation, with a purely national spirit, a clean and honest heart, and a loyal mind full of 
love and loyalty to the homeland and nation. (3) We must stand above all streams and 
beliefs of parties or groups by prioritizing the unity of the nation and the safety of the 
country and holding on to the soul of the Proclamation (Saifullah et al., 2017). 

Another factor is the edict of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo. Before the Second Dutch 
Military Aggression, in June 1948, President Sukarno visited Bireuen city, North Aceh, 
to give a speech in a giant meeting held in Cot Gapu square (Zulfan et al., 2009). The 
content of Sukarno’s speech was essentially to unite and gather strength and invite the 
people of Aceh to defend the unitary territory of Aceh and the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Indonesia from Dutch intervention This meeting was attended by about a 
hundred thousand people from various regions (Zulfan et al., 2009). 

 In addition, the appeal of Acehnese scholars for young people to join the jihad. 
On December 23, 1948, the scholars held a meeting and issued the same fatwa as 
delivered on October 15, 1945, the ‘Sabil War’. Acehnese Ulema Tgk. H.M Hasan 
Krueng Kale said that the law of the ‘Sabil War’ against the Dutch invaders is 
‘obligatory’ for every Muslim as is the duty of prayer, while those who help the enemy, 
both in deeds and words, are considered traitors, and deserve to be punished. Ulema 
who participated in the meeting included: Tgk. Sayed Abdullah Kajhu, Tgk. H. Ahmad 
Hasballah Indrapuri, Tgk. H. Makam Gampong Blang, Tgk. Mohd. Ali (Tgk. Lam 
Pisang Krueng Kale), Tgk.M. Daud Beureu’eh, and Tgk. Abdul Wahab Seulimum 
(Jakobi, 1995). The ulema mentioned are fighters in defending the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Conclusions 
Radio Rimba Raya (RRR) was established with the aim of supporting the Indonesian 
government's programs, namely as a medium of struggle responsible for broadcasting 
victory news and trying to counter the news of Dutch provocations containing "The 
Republic of Indonesia no longer exists". Such efforts were to safeguard the country's 
sovereignty from the Dutch colonial who wanted to reclaim Indonesian territory.  In 
the early days of Indonesian independence, the RRR served as a funnel of information 
and a connecting media in broadcasting important information to the authorities of 
the Republic of Indonesia including when Indonesia formed an emergency 
government due to the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 1948. Not only that, RRR 



 
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Defending Indonesian Sovereignty through Mass Media: Radio Rimba Raya in the Revolutionary War      | 15 

was able to become a spokesman for independence during Indonesia-Netherland’s 
negotiations and diplomacy, until the return of the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Indonesia. RRR also participated in broadcasting news about the condition of 
Indonesian territory at the time of the General Attack of March 1, 1949. The influence 
of the RRR is not only in the context of defending Aceh territory but for the return of 
sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Through its heroic broadcasts, RRR has the 
support of leaders and fighters of the Republic of Indonesia including scholars and the 
people of Aceh.  
 
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