




































What Do They See? 

           A Look at the Appeal of IS to Young Muslim Women Raised in the United Kingdom 

Rebecca Davis 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract 

This scholarly research investigates the recent recruitment of young British Muslim 

women by the Islamic State (IS) in an effort to determine the appeal of said group upon this 

demographic. Noting that such recruitment falls under the foreign fighter complex, which is 

usually male oriented, this research seeks to understand why IS is able to extend its appeal to 

young women. In so doing, many of the preexisting theories for extremism are examined and 

found to be irrelevant to this particular demographic. Thus, I am arguing that it is not poverty, 

lack of education, or other economic determinant as is commonly believed to be the roots of 

radicalization/extremism but rather a search for a personal identity these women feel is lacking, 

growing up as Muslims in an immigrant context in a non-Muslim country. 

 

 



About the Author 

Rebecca Davis is a senior, graduating with a dual degree in Global Studies and Spanish 

and a certificate in Global Security. Throughout her work in Global Studies, she has focused on 

understanding the nature of and root issues behind terrorist behavior and especially the 

motivations for the foreign fighter complex. She will be continuing this research at the School 

for International Service at American University in Washington, D.C. in the Fall of 2016. 

Introduction 

In February of 2015, newspaper headlines covered the story of three young British 

Muslim women who had gone missing while on holiday and were suspected to be en route to 

Syria. These girls were Amira Abase and Shamima Begum, both fifteen, and their classmate, 

Kadiza Sultana, sixteen. The three girls were outstanding pupils at London’s Bethnal Green 

Academy in Tower Hamlets, a rapidly growing community with a heavy concentration of 

immigrants. Family members described the girls, detailing their favorite TV shows and hobbies 

and speaking of their high academic achievements. While not the first of such recruits, the trio 

quickly became the face of the new recruitment efforts by IS. Since their arrival in Syria, at least 

two of them have been married to IS fighters (Dodd and Khomami, 2015). Amira is the most 

vocal of the trio, using social media to post updates glorifying life under IS and trying to recruit 

more girls like herself. 

Since the departure of these girls, experts have tried to understand their radicalization 

process, examining the possible explanations of radicalization by a relative, the school, or an 

outside contact. According to the principal of the school, it was impossible that the girls were 

radicalized there, stating that access to social media is blocked on school property (“Syria girls: 

Trio 'not radicalised' at Bethnal Green Academy.”, 2015). However, concern has been voiced 



over some of the school staff and their ideological affiliations, noting that some have been 

involved with radical organizations within the UK and abroad. There are also reports that 

Shamima contacted a well-known woman from IS who had also left the UK for Syria about a 

year and a half prior (“Syria girls: Trio 'not radicalised' at Bethnal Green Academy.”, 2015). This 

was shortly before the trio left the country, and suggests that a peer network may have been 

influential in their radicalization. In addition, another friend and classmate from Bethnal Green 

had also left for Syria just a few months before. 

Given the example above, this research seeks to answer the why question by examining 

three related areas. First, pre-existing radicalization theories are evaluated to decide if they 

accurately account for the involvement of female foreign fighters. Second, possible motivations 

are investigated for why these young women are leaving their homes in the United Kingdom to 

join a movement in Syria, even though many have no prior connections to the country. Third, the 

appeal of  IS and their ideologies on this demographic is examined. 

Literature Review 

Before delving into an overview of the theories, a clarification of terminology is 

requisite. Fundamentalist Islam will be defined as the “the belief or advocating of a conservative 

adherence to literal or traditional interpretations of the Qu'ran and the Sunnah” (Collins 

Dictionary, 2015). This may lead to extremism-adoption of a position that lies on the fringes of 

the ideological spectrum. Extremism may or may not lead to extremist acts of terrorism. 

Terrorism, as referred to in this research, will utilize the definition provided by the United States 

Department of State, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 

noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 

an audience.” (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003, 120). The term, noncombatants, refers to not only 



civilians but also “military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in 

a war zone or a war-like setting.” (Legislative requirements and key terms, 2005, 9). When 

combined with an Islamic religious perspective, this is the definition of salafi-jihadism . This is a 

fundamentalist approach to practicing Islam with an aspect of violence, advocating for the 

overthrow of all governments that are not adhering to the teachings of the Prophet and Sharia law 

(Stern and Berger, 2015, xii-xiii). It is important to note that abiding by an extremist ideology is 

not necessarily correlated with committing acts of terrorism. One merely becomes more 

vulnerable to committing such acts in an effort to bring about the desired changes. 

A new dimension to this extremist problem is the foreign fighter complex, a phenomenon 

that has existed for centuries, though mostly focused on male participation. Even though foreign 

fighters are often associated with jihadists such as the mujahideen, they are not strictly an Islamic 

phenomenon, as demonstrated by Malet (2010). In his research, Malet (2010) cites several 

examples of American heroes who would also be considered foreign fighters, people such as 

Davy Crockett who left the United States to fight in the Mexican territory of Texas 

(Malet,  2010, 99). Adding complexity to this issue is the emerging recruitment of female foreign 

fighters by IS from the Muslim immigrant community in the UK It is a unique and concerning 

phenomenon, one that cannot be explained by conventional theories on extremist recruitment.  

Existing Theories on Extremist Recruitment 

In counter-extremism studies, there are four theories that attempt, with varying levels of 

success, to offer explanations for why individuals adopt extremism and go on to commit terrorist 

acts, namely Poverty, Illiteracy, Cultural Alienation, and Transnational Ideology. The first two 

are the most prevalent in official foreign counter-extremism programs; the latter two are newer 

theories which are more applicable to this case study. 



 

Poverty as a Push Factor 

The first of these theories is predominant in counterterrorism. It sees extremist 

movements as arising from the impoverished masses. As J. Brian Atwood states, there is a 

“strong correlation between the absence of material well-being and the prospects for violence” 

(Atwood, 2003, 160). Quoting research done by the World Bank, he goes on to say that the 

material divide in a country can lead not only to political instability within a nation state, but can 

also create animosity between developed and developing countries (Atwood, 2003, 160). 

However, terrorism as a direct result of poverty is more difficult to substantiate than merely the 

existence of a higher probability of incidence of violence in poverty conditions. Regardless, it is 

known that terrorist organizations frequently recruit their manpower from this demographic 

(Atwood, 2003, 161), using economic benefits as leverage. Thus, instead of viewing socio-

economic inequality and lack of access to resources as the causes of terrorist activity, they should 

be viewed as two of several factors that can increase a population’s vulnerability to their appeals. 

As stated by Asef Bayat, “the poor cannot afford to be ideological” and “to be ideological 

requires certain capacities (time, risk-taking, money) that the disenfranchised often lack” (Bayat, 

2013, 201).  

Lack of Education as a Push Factor 

The second theory for extremism holds that a lack of education can make a population 

vulnerable to its appeals. This common view is held by many, including those in government. 

Colin Powell once stated that “that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where 

there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives.” (Berrebi, 

2007, 3). John O. McGinnis writes that “Ignorance and poverty are the greatest friends of the 



terrorist, because the ignorant and impoverished are easy prey for the conspiracy theories and 

millennial religious visions that are staple of the Islamic fanatics.” (McGinnis, 2003). However, 

one of the main drawbacks for this theory is that statistics do not support it. Multiple studies have 

shown that terrorists tend to be educated. For instance, in research conducted by Hassan among 

Palestinian suicide bombers, all were educated and none were impoverished (Hassan, 2001). 

Other studies surveyed terrorists from a variety of national backgrounds, including several 

European countries and Turkey, and found that they all shared a tendency to possess high levels 

of formal education (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, 141). Other researchers see terrorism as a 

mode of political participation, albeit a violent one. Political participation, they argue, is a 

common trait among educated individuals and terrorism is simply another expression of it 

(Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, 142).  

Cultural Alienation of Immigrant 

While the previous theories attempt to explain the radicalization and involvement in 

foreign fighting, they fail to explain why many extremists are neither poor nor illiterate. 

Furthermore, they do not explain why a poor, uneducated individual with no prior ties to a 

country, its struggle or its dominant ideology will join an extremist movement. This policy 

response vacuum can be filled by a relatively underutilized theory of foreign fighter recruitment 

that focuses on the cultural alienation of the immigrant.  

Once an individual adopts an extremist viewpoint, they may become radicalized enough 

to seek deeper involvement which may involve foreign fighting. However, Malet (2010) argues 

that in order to be a foreign fighter, one must be recruited from outside of the country in which 

the conflict is taking place. Thus, there has to be an underlying motivation to join which takes 

the form of a shared transnational identity, linking the foreigner with the fighters in the conflict. 



Motivations to join can be encouraged through a shared religious affiliation (Malet, 2010, 99-

100) of the country in conflict and the foreign recruit. Thus, while radicalization may not directly 

cause an individual to leave their home to join in a conflict, foreign fighter recruitment could 

also attract people who have held those beliefs for a long time. Diaspora communities are 

particularly vulnerable to this, due to their shared ethnic, ideological, and religious ties that 

transcend the physical borders of the state.  

Transnational Religious Ideology 

The final reason is the presence of a transnational religious ideology. This is perhaps the 

most applicable theory to this case study. Adherence to a transnational religious ideology can 

provide a personal identity that individuals may feel that they are otherwise lacking, especially in 

an immigrant community. Taking part in a shared religious faith can provide this identity and 

help them to define themselves in a country where they may feel othered by the citizens of both 

the sending and receiving countries. This hypothesis derived from records of interviews with 

former radical Muslims from the UK and research done in a fundamentalist Islamic group, Hizb 

ut-Tahrir  (HuT), which has a strong presence in the UK. Malet (2010) also hints at it in his 

research, quoting former jihadists who describe the appeal of fundamentalist Islam in their lives. 

One of these men states that they were ‘‘Men who had no home. Men reviled in the West 

because they were not white and Christian, and reviled at home because they no longer dressed 

and spoke like Muslims.” (Malet, 2010, 109). In the context of recruitment, he also says that 

“Transnational ideological affiliation was a highly salient identity because immigration and 

modernization had destroyed other communal ties and produced isolated, embattled individuals” 

(Malet, 2010, 109). Alienation, which can make them vulnerable to the appeal of radical 

ideology (Richardson, 2006, 69), can play a key role in these diaspora communities.  



These are just a sampling of the theories for why some people become radicalized or 

assume a position of extremism. There is also significant variation in the process of choosing to 

become a foreign fighter; they can pursue different paths but they all have a common thread. 

Each path involves radicalization at some point. The first two theories say that radicalization 

stems from a social or educational disadvantage. The third theory posits that foreign fighter 

involvement comes from an appeal to a shared transnational identity. This could be religious 

(radicalized or not), ethnic, or otherwise.  However, none of these theories fully applies to the 

case study at hand. Thus, the fourth option is the most applicable here. While it is true that none 

are mutually distinctive, I argue that it is more of a matter of reordering the pieces. Whereas the 

first two theories posit that it is poverty and ignorance that can contribute to someone turning to 

extremism, I contend that it is a search for personal meaning and identity. This identity can then 

become a transnational one, which can lead to foreign fighter recruitment as described by Malet. 

I posit that this is what is taking place in the case of the young female British recruits to IS.  

The Role of Religion and Alienation in the Extremist Appeal  

Religion, and in this case, Islam, can provide a unifying force for extremist groups. As 

Richardson states, “it provides a unifying, all-encompassing philosophy or belief system that 

legitimizes and elevates their actions.” (Richardson, 2006, 63). Religious extremist groups have 

the tendency to be more violent as well, as they can claim divine permission for their 

behavior(Richardson, 2006, 61). Changing the existing government from secularism to one of 

Islamic principles is usually among the goals of Islamic fundamentalists. To this end, they prey 

upon the alienation of Muslims by promising a better future once the new government is 

achieved (Richardson, 2006, 67). Thus, while Islam is not culpable for causing terrorism, it can 



be the vehicle for creating transnational ties that can motivate a person to leave their home and 

take sides in a foreign conflict (Richardson, 2006, 68).  

This alienation can also lead to a cultural reactionary push back. Experiencing rejection 

from the receiving nation’s culture can lead a population to be vulnerable to the appeal of ultra-

orthodox teachings and can result in a complete rejection of the host country’s culture. Instead of 

gradually assimilating into the receiving culture, they instead create a parallel culture, based 

upon either their heritage or the perceptions of that heritage. This is seen occurring in Muslim 

migrant communities within the UK. One example is Tower Hamlets, the hometown of the 

Bethnal Green trio. Termed “Jihadi Cool” by the popular media, it is a complete rejection of 

everything Western and is the latest cultural youth trend. The more devout one appears, the more 

‘in’ they are. Ironically, though, some of the strongest proponents of this “rejection of all things 

deemed Western” utilize the latest fashionable social media platforms to target their audience 

(McCaul, 2014). They also are co-opting other facets of pop culture to spread their message, 

posting jihadi rap videos to YouTube and distributing t-shirts with slogans glorifying jihad 

(Chumley, 2014). Thus, it is clear that at least part of the allure of “Jihadi Cool” is a form of 

cultural self-redefinition that occurs in other cultures as well. However, in this situation and with 

a militant form of Islam, the result is more threatening than in other cases.  

Data and Methods 

To examine whether the aforementioned religious appeal and cultural alienation theories 

apply to female foreign recruits, I collected and analyzed data on young British Muslim women 

who have left or been detained in attempting to leave the UK to join IS. Whereas it is much more 

common to see men joining foreign military movements, the participation of women as foreign 



fighters has had little historical precedent. The UK has been selected for this study as it has 

experienced an alarming and significant number of such cases.  

This research consists of a media review, examining the issue of this recent recruitment 

trend. The data is collected from newspaper editorials published in news sources including the 

BBC, The Washington Times, The Atlantic, The New York Times, and the Guardian. These 

sources span the ideological spectrum, offering differing perspectives on the same topic or case 

and avoiding the distortion of political viewpoints in reporting. Some of these online newspaper 

articles included embedded video footage and commentary on the women, which proved helpful 

as well. Through the use of such sources, I sought to construct an idea of each young woman’s 

life, economic status, ethnic background, and path to radicalism. I also incorporate published 

interviews with the remaining family members of these girls.  

In collecting and examining these resources, I analyzed them for any common themes 

that could give clues to their paths to adopting extremist views and acting upon them. These 

themes include criteria such as age at time of departure, ethnic background, and degree of 

observed religiosity. These were noted for each of the subjects and were of particular importance 

as they provided the necessary evidence to counter the radicalization theories discussed 

previously. Commonalities within the data were noted and efforts made to draw accurate 

conclusions. I also attempted to determine any common individuals, institutions or alternate 

sources that these women have taken to reach the point of radicalization. For example, through 

using available sources, I sought to determine methods of radicalization/recruitment and whether 

there was a common peer network or a radicalized family member involved. 

The results of this media review were then compared and contrasted to the arguments in 

the literature review. These results gave insight to an under-examined element of the foreign 



fighter phenomenon - the engagement and experiences of women. This was in order to determine 

whether the prominent theories in the field of anti-terrorism research were applicable here. 

Preliminary Argument/Hypothesis 

I am arguing that the preexisting theories on radicalization and adopting extremist 

ideology are not applicable to the case of the young British Muslim women that have responded 

to the appeal of IS. Examination of the data corroborate this idea. Popular ideas offered for 

adopting extremist views include poverty and a lack of education, among other things. This has 

not been the case for these women. At least several of them have been young women with 

exceedingly bright futures ahead of them; young women who were attaining high academic 

achievements and had promising opportunities for advancement. These findings are substantiated 

by research done by other terrorism experts such as Hassan (cited above) and Horgan (2014) 

who  found that those who adopt extremist views often have at least completed high school 

education (Horgan, 2014, 67). However, it is true that these findings can vary geographically.  

My argument in the current case is that the young women are turning to the form 

of  Islam that is  espoused and glorified by IS in an effort to create an identity that they feel they 

are lacking, growing up in an immigrant context. I posit that this type of faith is leaving them 

vulnerable to the appeal of IS and is what differentiates them from the thousands of other law-

abiding, peaceful Muslims residing in the UK. It is not an issue of Islam itself, but rather how it 

is practiced that can become dangerous. I further contend that the appeal of IS to these women 

comes from the current societal culture in which these women are growing up. It is a culture that 

rejects everything associated with Western ideology and sees pure Islam as “cool”. This leaves 

them especially vulnerable to the ideological appeals of an organization that is calling for the 

reestablishment of a pure Islamic caliphate. 



Presentation and Analysis of Data 

In the process of the collection of the data for this research, it has been interesting to note 

both the existence and lack of certain trends. By this, I mean the commonalities that group them 

together as a subject group and the differences that at the same time cause them to retain their 

humanness and uniqueness. While many of them share an immigrant background, there are a 

few, such as Sally Jones, who would be termed ethnically British and are not acting from an 

immigrant context. Thus, it is clear from the beginning that the appeal of IS is not limited to 

those who have grown up as first or second generation British. There are also various 

nationalities represented among the data, as subjects come from Sudan, Somalia, Bangladesh, 

Pakistan, and Ethiopia.  

Economic Background 

Economic deprivation does not seem to be a push factor for radicalization or departure to 

Syria.  Instead, the opposite seems to be true. As in the case of Aqsa Mahmood, a high profile 

recruiter from Glasgow, her family was described as “comfortably middle class” (Randall, 

2014). Financially prosperous, her family lives in a reputable neighborhood in an expensive 

house and sent Aqsa to a prestigious private girls’ school for a number of years (Dettmer, 2014). 

Another girl, Lena Mamoun Abdelgadir, also came from a well-to-do family. Similar to Aqsa, 

Lena’s family also sent her to an expensive girls’ school for years until she graduated and 

entered medical school (Farmer, 2015). Lena has since accompanied a group of eight other 

medical students and graduates from a medical school in Sudan on a trip to Syria. Their 

motivations are unclear. While it could be entirely humanitarian in nature, it is known that some 

of those in the group had at least been exposed to radical teaching while at the medical school 

(Bennhold, 2015).  



Degree of Religiosity 

Of the nineteen women and girls on whom data was gathered for this study, most were 

Muslim by familial background. Of the group, there were two who are known to be recent 

converts to Islam. These women are Sally Jones and Kadijah Dare. The first woman, Sally Jones, 

is an outlier in many ways to the rest of the women who have left Britain to join IS. In her mid-

forties and ethnically British, Jones is neither young nor was she raised with an immigrant 

Muslim background. For a number of years in the 1990s, this single mother of two played guitar 

in a female rock band, flaunting miniskirts and blond hair. This is a significant departure from 

the black burqa and gloves that she now wears in her Twitter photos. Her neighbors described 

her behavior as erratic, recalling her male friends and the bizarre things that she did, including 

the instances in which she believed she was a witch. Then she met online and fell in love with 

Junaid Hussain, the young computer hacker from Britain who was charged with murdering 

James Foley (Greenwood, 2014). Hussain, who was young enough to be Jones’ son, had left the 

UK to fight for IS. Jones followed some time later in 2013 (Whitehead, 2015). They were 

married after her arrival and lived together until a drone strike specifically targeted her husband 

in August, 2015. She has been very active on IS social media, frequently tweeting messages 

about the glories of her husband’s martyrdom and her desire to behead Christians with a “dull 

knife” (Whitehead, 2015). Currently, there are fears that she may be preparing to become a 

female suicide bomber for IS, given a recent threat that she made in her Twitter feed (Newman, 

2015).  

Kadijah Dare, the other convert to Islam, is not as extreme as Jones. The daughter of 

Christians, she had migrated from Nigeria to the UK as a child. She was a devout Christian until 

her college years, when she began attending a mosque and converted (Styles, 2015). In 2012, she 



left for Syria, taking her young son with her. Shortly after arriving, she married a Swedish IS 

fighter known as Abu Bakr, who has since been killed (Piggott, 2016). MI6, the British 

intelligence agency, views her as one of the biggest threats emerging from IS, on account of her 

popularity and hostility in her social media posts (“White British girl who's now a 'celebrity 

jihadi'”, 2014). For instance, after the beheading of James Foley, she famously tweeted requests 

for another foreign journalist for her to behead, desiring to become the first woman in IS to 

execute a “UK or US terrorist” (Halliday, 2014).  

Aside from these two cases of converts, the remainder of the women investigated for this 

study are Muslim by background. However, their levels of religiosity varied. In the case of 

Shamima Begum, for instance, she is reported to not even have known how to pray (Ferguson, 

2015). Others did not even wear a hijab, the Muslim head scarf, until shortly before leaving the 

UK. This was true in the instance of Sharmeena Begum, the first girl from the Bethnal Green 

Academy to leave for IS-controlled territory (Sinmaz and Reid, 2015). 

Ethnic Background 

The nineteen subjects for this study were found to be from six different countries. Three 

of the women’s ethnic background could not be determined due to lack of information. However, 

the remainder came from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the United Kingdom, 

and Nigeria, with the majority being Somali. All had spent at least part of their lives in the UK 

and had existing ties to the country at the time of their departure to Syria.  



 

 
 

Ethnicity is crucial to note as it cannot be argued that they have national ties to the 

country since none of the young girls and women were originally from Syria. Indeed, none of 

them even came from the Middle-Eastern countries surrounding Syria. Neither do they have any 

direct ethnic stake in the establishment of IS. Nevertheless, they are all immigrants in a foreign 

society and occupy a position that is relatively vulnerable to exploitation by the same societal 

structures that  IS is ideologically opposing. This shared link then explains the solidarity with a 

conflict that is not their own.  

Occupational Background 

At the time of each individual’s departure, the majority of the females were enrolled in 

school and performing well academically. Some forty percent were schoolgirls, with another 

twenty percent attending a university or medical school. This statistic is reflective of their age 

(discussed below). 



 

 
A brief look at their occupations further strengthens the argument that these women were 

educated and relatively well-off. Their motivations to join IS cannot be adequately explained by 

either lack of education or the inability to enjoy a certain lifestyle or provide for basic needs. It 

follows, therefore, that there must be some non-economic factors providing the impetus for their 

decision to join. 

Age of Female Recruits 

At the time of departure, the majority of the females in the subject group were found to 

be between the ages of fifteen and twenty. A total of eleven of the subjects, over half of the 

group, were under the age of 25. This is an important fact to note as this age is often associated 

with a great deal of searching for a personal identity. 



 

 
 

While it is normal for young people to go through a period of self-searching and 

redefinition, it is not normal for them to become involved in dangerous extremist activities as 

sponsored by IS. In the case of these young women and girls, they desire to fit in with the culture 

but the culture does not completely accept them. Thus, they create their own culture in a 

reactionary move against the mainstream culture. While not a new phenomenon, what is 

different in their case is that they are forming their counter-cultural identity in a militantly 

conservative form of Islam and in a radically militant movement associated with it.   

Recruitment Network 

Many of the women and young girls who left for Syria were friends of one another and 

did not travel alone. As in the example of the Bethnal Green schoolgirls, the three left together, 

sometime after their fourth friend had also left. This friend, in turn, is suspected to have been 

groomed for recruitment by Aqsa Mahmood (Randall, 2014). Now, of the Bethnal Green trio, 



Amira Abase has been trying to recruit girls through her social media. This is an example of a 

peer recruitment network.  

Often times, sisters would become radicalized and leave together. This was the case for 

the Dawood sisters-Sugra, Zohra, and Khadijah. All three left the UK in May, 2015, with their 

nine children under the pretext of traveling to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes. They 

disappeared on the return trip and have since been reported being smuggled into Syria. It is also 

alleged that a brother had already left and was fighting in Syria. This is another example of how 

the recruitment network operates (“Bradford Dawood family 'split to cross Syria border'.”, 2015) 

and is similar to the case of the twins, Salma and Zarah Halane. Originally from Somalia, these 

sixteen-year-old girls were high achieving students until they ran away from home in June of 

2014, in route to Syria (Glendinning, 2014). Here, there could be two causes for their 

radicalization. Like the Dawoods, it is alleged that the twins’ older brother had already joined IS 

(Wagner, 2014) and there are rumors that Aqsa Mahmood could have been involved too 

(Randall, 2014).  

Conclusions 

This research has focused on the recruitment by IS of young British Muslim females 

growing up in an immigrant context. It looks at several of the explanations and theories of 

foreign fighter involvement including becoming radicalized and committing extremist acts. 

Specifically, it evaluates the theories that material deprivation and poverty and a lack of 

education cause an individual to adopt extremism. These theories have been proven to be 

inapplicable here, as the majority of the subjects were highly educated and did not appear to be 

suffering from the effects of poverty. Thus, alternative theories were offered to explain their 

motives for joining IS. Drawing upon research done on the foreign fighter complex, it suggests 



that the motivating reasons stem not from a lack of material resources or attainment of education, 

but rather a transnational identity based in some shared identity- religious, ethnic, or ideological. 

I argue further that these women are grasping this opportunity to develop their sense of identity 

by participating in an international group. By so doing, they are taking this shared identity, 

religious in this case, and by participating in it, creating their own personal identities. Thus, 

adherence to, and participation in, some style of an orthodox form of Islam constitutes the basis 

of their personal identity and provides them with the impetus for joining a foreign conflict.  

The data gathered for this research seems to corroborate this. Most of the subjects were 

young at the time of departure, an age at which it is common to question and to struggle to define 

one’s personal identity. They also were mostly of immigrant backgrounds, either being first-

generation Britons or moving there during their childhood. Sixty percent were pursuing some 

type of educational degree, most with excellent school track records. With the exception of Sally 

Jones, none appear to have been on economically difficult times. These two findings rule out the 

relevance of the first two theories for explaining the causes of extremism.  

Therefore, I argue that it is instead a search for a personal identity that is propelling these 

girls and young women to join IS. Growing up in an immigrant context, they identify fully with 

neither their country of origin nor the country in which they grew up. Hence, they turn to other 

alternatives to find their identity, in this case an ultra-orthodox form of Islam. This imperils them 

to the appeals of radical extremist groups such as IS. 

         

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