












































Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security


IJOIS Spring 2019, Volume V 
Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security 

 
 

49 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later 

Paisley Ann Meyer 

University of Illinois Urbana Champaign 

 
 
 
 

 

 

 

Abstract 

The annexation of Crimea and continued Russian aggression into Ukraine’s eastern border 
directly defied the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Under this agreement, Ukraine was given 
sovereignty and territorial assurances, and in return, it gave back its nuclear arsenal to Russia. 
This paper explores why this decision was made and explains how this action benefited Ukraine. 
It explores Ukrainian relations with Russia and Western democracies in the early 1990s, and it 
shows how Ukraine was economically dependent on the continued support of these states. The 
purpose of this paper is to counter the argument some Ukrainian politicians and numerous 
journalists began making following Crimea’s annexation, stating that Ukraine would have been 
better off relying on nuclear deterrence than international agreements.   



Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later 
Paisley Ann Meyer 
 
 

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In 1991, Ukraine became independent from Russia and inherited thousands of nuclear 
warheads. In 1994, Ukraine signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) as a 
non-nuclear state, and by 1996, it had returned the last of those warheads to Russia, upholding its 
commitments to the NPT (Nuclear weapons timeline, 2017). The state with the third largest 
stockpile of nuclear weapons at the time had been convinced to completely disarm in just five 
years.  Ukraine giving up strategically advantageous technology like nuclear weapons suggests 
that, in some circumstances, the benefits of becoming a non-nuclear state must outweigh the 
security benefits of keeping its stockpile. In this paper, I explore why Ukraine decided to become 
a nuclear-free state and how these “benefits” now relate to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
Because Russian actions have violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, many Ukrainians now 
believe the decision to disarm ultimately proved counterproductive to maintaining Ukrainian 
security; however, the belief that nuclear deterrence instead of disarmament would have 
protected the state from military incursion is misguided and flawed. 

 
A Brief Historical Overview of Early Nuclear Treaties relating to Ukraine 

Ukrainian relations with Russia have been complicated since Ukraine declared its 
independence. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 15% of its nuclear arsenal was in the hands of 
the newly-formed Ukrainian state, enabling it to become a nuclear power if Ukraine created new 
launch codes. Despite arguments that the weapons were necessary to protect Ukrainian 
sovereignty, the government was persuaded to return them to Russia (Umland, 2016). Ironically, 
Ukraine continued to find itself subjected to Russia’s dominating presence. Russia’s belief that 
they are responsible for protecting Russian speakers outside their border conflicts with Ukraine’s 
assertions that as a sovereign state it alone holds a responsibility for people within its borders. 
These conflicting policies meant the Budapest Memorandum was ultimately too little support for 
this ideological issue (Turbokav, 2001). 
 Relations between Russia and Ukraine had to be clarified by extending some of the 
former treaties between the USSR and the US to cover issues that involved former bloc states. 
The Budapest Memorandum came from negotiations with Ukraine for the Lisbon Protocol to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1992. START was an arms reduction treaty 
originally signed in 1991 by the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). After the USSR 
collapsed, an addition to this treaty (the Lisbon Protocol) was needed to extend this treaty to the 
new states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Lisbon Protocol called for them to give up 
the nuclear weapons in their possession “in the shortest possible time and shall begin 
immediately to take all necessary action to this end” (Protocol to the Treaty, 1992).  These 
nuclear weapons were to be returned to Russia, the successor state of the USSR. By signing the 
Lisbon Protocol, these states were also agreeing to become non-nuclear states under the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  

However, Ukraine hesitated to ratify the treaty without reassurances that it would 
maintain its national sovereignty.  According to Turbokav (2001), Senior Fellow and expert on 
Russia, Ukraine, and European relations at Uppsala Universität in Sweden, the concept of 
independence was almost brand new to Ukrainians when the Soviet Union fell, but the issue of 
sovereignty quickly became the focal point. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum was created to 
address these concerns and provided Ukraine with the assurance it needed to sign onto the 
Lisbon Protocol. The memorandum gave Ukraine guarantees from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia that they would uphold the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of 



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Ukraine, only using weapons against the state in matters of self-defense. With these promises, 
Ukraine followed through with becoming a denuclearized state and signed as a non-nuclear 
weapons state to the NPT (Memorandum on Security Assurances, 1994). 

Adding Ukraine as a party to the NPT was a victory for diplomacy and international 
cooperation. Created in 1968 and extended indefinitely in 1995, the NPT separates the world into 
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapons states, making the development and procurement of 
nuclear weapons outside of the US, the UK, France, China, and Russia illegal under international 
law (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968). Despite the illegality, several 
states have refused to sign the treaty and developed their nuclear weapons programs. Given the 
fact that some states have openly defied international law to obtain the perceived security 
benefits of nuclear deterrence, Ukraine’s willingness to disarm despite tensions with its nuclear 
neighbor, Russia, was no small diplomatic victory.  

The original premise of the NPT was to stop both the horizontal and vertical proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, ending the development of new nuclear weapons programs and limiting the 
growth of existing stockpiles. The nuclear weapon counts from 1968 to the present day give 
credibility that the treaty has reduced the global nuclear threat. In 1968, there were just over 
39,000 nuclear weapons in the world between six states. As of 2010, this number was estimated 
to be around 18,000 across eight states. Since the signing of the treaty, nuclear weapon counts 
have been halved, but the total number of nuclear weapons in 1968 was far from the peak. 
Weapons counts peaked at 70,000 in 1986, but by the time Ukraine became independent from 
Russia, the total number of nuclear weapons was starting to finally see significant declines 
(between 1991-1994 total counts dropped from 55,000 to 41,000). The Cold War had ended, and 
the nuclear era seemed to be ending (Norris & Kristensen, 2010).  
 
Security Strategies: Nuclear Deterrence or Nuclear Free 
Applying Game Theory to Nuclear Disarmament 

As the Stag Hunt model (see Jervis 1978 for full explanation of the model) demonstrates, 
the preferred course of action for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was for them to cooperate 
and to sign on to the NPT, rather than independently developing their own nuclear programs. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the last thing the world wanted was for these states to keep 
their nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear weapons and disarmament are a classic example of a security 
dilemma and a breakdown of the Stag Hunt concept. In an ideal world, all states would sign the 
NPT and work towards being nuclear weapons free. A nuclear-free world (the stag) would 
provide all states with the benefit of not needing to expand their nuclear stockpiles in 
competition with other states. However, diversion (the rabbits) from this objective by some states 
leads to nuclear arms races (the US and USSR during the Cold War). Those who chose to 
cooperate and work towards a nuclear-free world are left with the commitment to never develop 
an entire class of weapons (Jervis, 1978). Partial cooperation is not enough for the Stag Hunt to 
succeed, and if deviations from the NPT’s original objective of reducing nuclear stockpiles 
persists, non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states will continue to operate under the threat of 
nuclear war.  
 



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52 
 

 
 
 
Ukrainian Economy and European Dependence 
 At the time of its independence, Ukraine was one of the poorest Soviet bloc countries, 
with a GDP per capita of $1307 and a shrinking economy according to Sutela (2012), a senior 
associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Until 1996, the country was 
facing negative growth rates of around ten to twenty-two percent, causing hyperinflation and 
halving the total GDP by 1994. It was not until 2001 that Ukraine’s economy began to show 
improvement. This growth could be attributed to rising global metal prices, a major export for 
Ukraine, and continued cheap oil prices from Russia (Sutela, 2012). 
 Unlike some former Soviet bloc countries, Ukraine did not cut ties with Russia, and 
Ukraine’s debt grew tremendously as it continued to rely on Russian gas and oil. This 
dependency was used by Russia as political leverage against the state. Needing to separate itself, 
Ukraine began “walking the line” between Western democracies and Russia, creating relations 
with both camps was viewed politically in Ukraine’s national interests (Turbokav, 2001). 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian exports and its desire to integrate with Western European 
countries—noting that that European Union was created in 1993—meant that the inherited 
nuclear arsenal could not be kept if interstate relations were to be created.  
 The more realistic reality is that if Ukraine had chosen to keep its nuclear weapons, it 
would have likely faced economic sanctioning from rather than expanded trade with, the West. If 
it had refused to give the nuclear weapons back to Russia, it likely would have faced serious 
economic sanctions, facing consequences like those faced by India, Pakistan, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and others. In the case of 
the ROK, economic sanctioning was successful in stopping further nuclear weapons 
developments. For India and Pakistan, sanctions were lifted respectively for the following 



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reasons: becoming a major economic power and aiding in the fight against terrorist 
organizations. The DPRK has been operating under extremely harsh sanctions as it continues to 
develop its nuclear program, a choice that has led to a crippled economy that relies heavily on 
domestic production (Ichimasa, 2017). The notable exception to this pattern was that Israel 
obtained nuclear weapons in 1967, making it the sixth nuclear power and the first to not be 
recognized by the NPT. However, it did not face economic retaliation. This can most aptly 
attribute to two things: the NPT was still being acceded by many countries in this year, and Israel 
pledge to the US not to use the weapons as a diplomatic tool. With the acceptance of the US and 
their very early development, economic retaliation from major world powers never occurred, 
though many Middle Eastern countries today use Israel’s nuclear arsenal as reasoning for their 
own economic restrictions on Israel and her citizens (Johnson, 2010). By the 1990s, the NPT had 
been in place for decades, and no major power at the time was willing to turn a blind eye to 
Ukraine’s keeping a third of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. The pressure from the 
international community to sign the NPT and return those weapons would have been too strong. 

As seen in the analysis of its economic health in the early nineties, Ukraine was not in a 
position of power economically. Had economic sanctions been applied to Ukraine, the state 
likely would have fallen to the same pressures the ROK did in the 1970s. Ukraine did not have 
any political or economic leverage that would encourage sanctions to be lifted. It also was also 
too economically dependent on Russia for energy; cutting off economic ties with Russia would 
mean cutting off 90% of its oil and gas usage (Sutela, 2012). For a state that was aspiring to one 
day become further integrated with the West and seeking an end to the hyperinflation and 
economic declines of the early 90s, maintaining the nuclear arsenal would have been a politically 
and economically suicidal move. 
 
Effectiveness of Deterrence 
 Ukrainian disarmament is an instance used to illustrate that international cooperation 
towards nuclear disarmament is possible, but deterrence rather than disarmament continues to be 
the strategy held by nuclear weapons states. Some would argue that the practice of nuclear 
deterrence has saved the world from WWIII, but Meyer and Sauer (2018) counter that this is not 
provable and can be more justifiably attributed to global economic interdependence and the 
memory of the horrors brought on by WWI and WWII. In 2014, some Ukrainian politicians 
began to call into question Ukraine’s decision to disarm. These politicians and numerous new 
sources questioned the empty promises in the Budapest Memorandum rather than utilizing the 
fear of nuclear retaliation to deter future Russian incursion. One politician and his supporters 
believe that had Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, Russia would have never been able to take 
Crimea or promote rebels in the Donbas region (Zurcher, 2014). What is largely ignored in this 
argument is that deterrence does not guarantee the protection and stability it implies, and to some 
it appears to promote destabilizing and suicidal philosophies like Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD), which could harm the conflicting states in conflict and the rest of the world (Zurcher, 
2014). An escalation of nuclear-level tensions can result in the destruction of the world, and 
deterrence only works for so long. When deterrence between states fail, it will be the people who 
suffer the most. 

To further discredit the idea that maintaining a nuclear arsenal would have guaranteed 
Ukrainian security, Meyer and Sauer’s (2018) point to conflicts like the Yom Kippur War, the 
Gulf War, and Pakistan’s Kargil incursion as instances when having nuclear weapons technology 



Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later 
Paisley Ann Meyer 
 
 

54 
 

did not automatically protect states from conflict. In each of these instances, states involved had 
nuclear weapons, but deterrence did not protect them from conventional warfare. This calls into 
question whether deterrence is an entirely effective means of protecting a country.  

One area where nuclear deterrence has shown little benefit is in the digital realm, with 
Russia being an international threat regarding Information Warfare. Research conducted by the 
Center for Research Analyses explained that Ukraine represents one of the first major areas 
where Russia used strategic cyber and information warfare to undermine state’s authority and 
communications abilities within both the political and military sphere. Beginning with smaller 
cyber-attacks through phishing, distributed denial of service (DDoS), or malware, Russia was 
able to disrupt Ukrainian telecommunication, and the state’s critical infrastructure has been 
further undermined by cyber-attacks to the power grids (Connell and Vogler, 2017). These 
attacks have allowed for Russia to create confusion and disorder within Ukraine without the use 
of conventional military operations. These kinds of attacks also make it difficult for deterrence to 
effectively protect Ukraine if it had maintained the nuclear weapons arsenal. Even major nuclear 
weapons states recognized by the NPT, like the United States, have been subject to Information 
Warfare tactics. The controversy over the extent Russia’s disinformation campaign aided US 
President Donald Trump in winning the 2016 election is still a major point of concern. Having 
used Ukraine as a testing ground, Russia has been able to utilize its experiences to target major, 
more powerful international players like the US (Polyakova and Boyer, 2018). If these methods 
of disruption were able to potentially undermine a nuclear power like the US, then deterrence 
plays little to no role in protecting a state in the cyber sphere. With cyber and information 
warfare being the primary aspects of Russia’s strategy in creating divisions in Ukraine, a nuclear 
arsenal would not have been an effective safeguard.  
 
Ukraine’s Decision with 20+ Years of Hindsight  

The illusion that the Budapest Memorandum would protect Ukraine broke in twenty 
years. Russia showed it had no intention of respecting any of those promises as it annexed 
Crimea in 2014. By breaking this treaty and taking aggressive actions that directly violate the 
memorandum, Russia has hurt the likelihood of diplomatic nuclear disarmament being used 
successfully in the future. Non-nuclear states are not, however, ready to back down. The world is 
moving away from an era of accepting nuclear weapons as a form of security for a few states. 
Ukraine would not have been more secure if it kept its nuclear weapons, but looking at past 
treaties and the timing, one can understand that disarming was the more attractive option. As a 
new state, Ukraine needed international support to combat Russian influence, and the NPT is an 
attractive treaty in theory. However, Russian actions against Ukraine will continue to destroy the 
complacency states’ have historically held towards the status quo on nuclear weapons, and this 
event will be used by other states to call into question why they should not only start a nuclear 
weapons program, but to ignore diplomatic solutions that may result in empty promises. The 
crucial take away from the violations to the Budapest Memorandum should not be that states 
would be better off with nuclear weapons to deter aggression, but that states should be held 
accountable when in violation of international agreements.  



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	Empty Promises: The Denuclearization of Ukraine and its Effects Twenty Years Later



