































IJOIS Spring 2021, Volume VIII Program in Arms Control &
Domestic and International Security

On Private Military Companies and Hybrid Warfare

Norman De Castro

Sciences Po - Paris

Abstract

This paper analyses how the growing role of Private Military Companies PMCs has flown
largely under the radar of the international community, even as dangerous legal loopholes and
ambiguities come to light. From a strategic point of view, PMCs in general offer both benefits
and new forms of risk for individual actors and international organizations. This paper focuses
on two main aspects related to Private Military Companies: how they are the newest and most
versatile tool in the “hybrid war” and shadow-war arsenal and how they are the byproduct of
decades of misguided and ill-fated proxy warfare. We also discuss one of the most controversial
PMCs: the Wagner Group, the technically inexistent but actually Russian state-backed military
organization. Hybrid warfare, as employed in modern grand-strategy, is an ever-evolving
concept with borders as shadowy and grey as the actors used to deploy this type of
strategy.Through the prism of the private military world, we will see how the new shape of our
conflicts has solidified the waging of war as a business, a lesser-known but equally significant
precedent. Furthermore, as we see warfare taken out of the public spotlight and away from
congressional oversight, the need for clear and strict legal frameworks to the world of warfare
becomes even more apparent.

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IJOIS Spring 2021, Volume VIII Program in Arms Control &
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As the world evolves, so does the world of warfare. In the past century, the planet saw two
world wars and a myriad of conflicts that fall under the umbrella of the “Cold War”. One of the
lasting legacies of this age of proxy warfare is what is called “hybrid warfare”. Through hybrid
warfare, countries seek to achieve strategic goals by employing military, economic, political, and
informational assets, with more regard for their interest than regulations and laws governing war.

In recent years, clear examples of hybrid warfare have come to light. While this concept applies
to any nation, recent trends show Russia employing a wide spectrum of hybrid techniques to
achieve its strategic and economic goals. This has been particularly effective in areas with high
levels of instability, allowing Russia to employ less conventional practices with less fear of
reprisals. Throughout this paper, we will describe the uses of hybrid warfare and non-linear
warfare. Seeing as how recent Russian and Western academic definitions of hybrid warfare
differ, we will base our work on the definitions employed by NATO and put forward by Frank G.
Hoffman, research fellow at the INSS Center for Strategic Research, who defines hybrid warfare
as warfare incorporating “a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and
coercion, and criminal disorder.” Throughout this paper, however, we will refer to Russian30

definitions of hybrid warfare, as we believe these serve their tactical and political objectives
best.

One of the main tools in the hybrid warfare toolkit are Private Military Companies (PMCs).
These firms provide a wide array of security and security-related services, from logistics and
transportation to intelligence gathering and special forces operations. There are different
categories of companies involved in private defense and security. These include General Service
contractors that offer logistical assistance, Private Security companies that offer strategic,
operational, and organizational support, and Private Military Companies, that offer all of the
former, with the added capability of engaging in direct combat, going as far as directing
airstrikes and special forces operations.
This last category, through its impact on the world of hybrid warfare, will. Private military
companies have made themselves the perfect cover for states to claim plausible deniability while
engaging in questionable behavior. Furthermore, the lack of accountability these firms display in
the current international system makes it so that they can operate with a dangerous degree of
autonomy.

As we mentioned earlier in our paper, the Cold War brought along with it an age of proxy and
indirect warfare, the impact of which we’re still evaluating today. For years, countries with
territorial ambitions employed proxy campaigns and information tactics to achieve strategic, and
political goals. In more recent years, however, countries such as Russia and Iran have adopted
the use of “non-linear warfare” as part of their overarching strategic objectives. In simpler
terms, this means that they employ means outside the strict realm of the military to better

30F. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies,  Virginia, 2007, pp. 7-8.

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IJOIS Spring 2021, Volume VIII Program in Arms Control &
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achieve their geostrategic goals. These two regimes in particular, have evolved their toolkits to
achieve their goals in a world where the international community is more wary and observant of
nations with ambitious geopolitical strategies. These strategies then have needed to develop an
added layer of legal protections, insulating official policymakers and military members from
some of their operations, to at least maintain plausible deniability of the aspects of hybrid
warfare that might fall in grey or illegal areas. The proxy conflict and political strategies laid out
during the Cold War, by both great powers and smaller, regional hegemons, helped establish the
tactical groundwork for the hybrid war strategies we see today. On the other hand, the military
upheaval brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union, offered potential defense contractors
the opportunity to begin employing former soldiers from a noticeably enlarged workforce, a
development aided by the increased circulation of formerly used military equipment. Finally, we
can also conjencture how the political developments of the late 1980’s and 1990’s encouraged
decision-makers to explore possible responses that would allow states to achieve military and
strategic goals whilst reducing exposure and investment of their own armed forces, thus
reinforcing the need for private military contractors to expand their offer of service to
governments and Defense ministries.

There are three key aspects of the role that private military companies play in hybrid warfare:
first exploring how PMCs are a way to wage war in the dark; afterward analyzing the
consequences of the Vietnam Syndrome in the way that policymakers have adopted PMCs and
finally focusing on the Russian scenario. This last part is particularly pertinent as Russia has
been a major employer of PMCs in some of their recent battle scenarios, and their particular
brand of shotgun diplomacy is still unique to them.

Private Military Companies, as corporations operating (in most cases) at the behest of State or
Defense ministries, offer a particular skill set with obvious drawbacks, but also clear benefits.
These are particularly pertinent to policymakers and politicians. The more clear of these is of
course the fact that private employees, formally contractors, can be deployed with far less
caution than traditional soldiers, or even special forces operatives. Politically speaking,
deployments of armed forces members are always riskier than charging private soldiers.
Governments are not directly responsible for casualties regarding private contractors, and the
public is less likely to be influenced by these: in most cases, “contractor” casualties attract less
media and Congressional oversight, particularly in areas where US military involvement is kept
out of the public spotlight. This aspect is pertinent in countries where transparency between the
armed forces and the political leadership is strictly enforced, such as the United States. The use
of troops is strictly controlled by Congress, who see themselves as the voice of the voting
public. Contractors, however, can be quickly and discreetly deployed at the behest of the Defense
or State departments, without fear of reprisals. Flaws have arisen in this way of operating,
however, when private operatives have superseded their authority or committed illegal acts
while under contract for the US government. After the peak of US Forces involved in the second
Iraq War , for example, the ratio of military personnel to contracted personnel was about 1:1.31

On one hand, this meant that far fewer US uniformed lives were being used and put at risk. On
the other, this allowed the DOD to have a fighting force less accountable to Congress, yet more

31 Jeremy Scahill, « Bush’s Shadow Army », The Nation, 15 March 2007, 2

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accountable or at least more subordinate to White House. But as the events of the 2004 Fallujah
Ambush and the 2007 Nissour Square Massacre so violently illustrated, an elevated presence of
private military contractors entails a heightened risk for these companies and their personnel, as
well as a dangerous lack of oversight from the DOD that could lead to both human and political
crises. As the future of hybrid warfare seems inextricably tied to a decrease in transparency32 33

for foreign operations, it becomes evident that the role of PMCs will have to be revisited and
better regulated.

Hybrid warfare is also a resource for countries wishing to achieve geostrategic goals at a cost
lower than traditional troop deployments. By hiring corporations whose main goals are to make
a profit and cut costs, it becomes evident that PMCs offer the possibility to drastically reduce
costs for the countries involved. This makes them particularly appealing to both authoritarian
and democratic regimes. The former will probably attempt to maximize their return on
investment, particularly if their aims are more long-term and aimed at destabilization, or if They
are financially motivated. For the latter, this is a useful tool to decrease the likelihood of political
interference, as accountability towards taxpayers comes  into play.

We must also consider the long-term impact of the “Vietnam syndrome,” the notion that has34

permeated the foreign policy establishments of many countries that wars cannot be fought
without clear objectives, overwhelming military force, and the support of the public and elected
officials. While born in the US, this has influenced how other countries direct their military
goals. As hybrid strategies can be deployed at both small and large-scales, solutions allowing for
the use of force without calling for full-scale war become increasingly valuable. This is
especially evident when we consider that the last time a major power declared war was in1945
when the US declared war on Japan and Germany.
Private military companies fit perfectly into this narrative. As policymakers and heads of state
worry more about their image domestically and abroad, the use of PMCs and special forces
operating clandestinely rises, as cost-cutting solutions to geostrategic objectives. This is the
same logic that has led to a rise in the use of combat drones, allowing for cleaner warfare
without putting the lives of members of the armed forces at risk.
Furthermore, the end of Vietnam saw major powers move away from unilateralism and drifts
toward more multilateral deployments. PMCs, by offering forces outside the military and at a
lower cost, offer countries the possibility of building their own “coalition of the billing”
whenever they see fit, without creating much publicity and most importantly, without having to
validate their objectives and methods in front of the international community. Thanks to this,35

countries with the power to hire PMCs no longer need to rely on their allies, as was once the
norm in warfare. If we view this through a hybrid warfare perspective, PMCs offer a perfect
gateway from which to deploy as many forces as needed without the need for Congressional or
Allied oversight, and most importantly, in a variety of roles. PMCs such as the Wagner Group,
which we will study more closely in the next section, offer their clients the capacity to handle

35 https://www.wired.com/2004/07/coalition-of-the-billing/
34 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/22/its-called-the-vietnam-syndrome-and-its-back/
33 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html
32 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3585765.stm

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intelligence, disinformation, and broadcasting services, helping both lead combat and political
operations.

We cannot forgo the Russian case, in this case, exemplified by the Wagner Group. This
corporation, whose organizational structure and ties to the Russian Intelligence and Defense
forces are intentionally murky, identifies as a PMC, primarily serving the Russian government
and its allies.
Formally created in 2014, the Wagner Group presents itself as a traditional PMC, offering the
usual benefits to governments and non-state actors interested in hiring them. Upon closer
analysis, however, experts have described the group as a mostly self-funded unofficial
paramilitary arm of both the Russian GRU and of Putin’s closest allies. The Wagner Group’s
deployment in Ukraine and Syria, particularly, have illustrated how this PMC serves the
Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy perfectly.
Through them, the Russian government gains a layer of plausible deniability especially useful in
politically risky scenarios, such as the annexation of Crimea or the fight against Syrian rebels.
The relation between this organization and the Kremlin is both close and foggy, however,
granting Russian authorities what many have called “implausible deniability,” implying that the
use of the Wagner Group offers Putin deniability so thin and difficult to believe that it almost
defeats its purpose. Formally, the Wagner Group is funded by its founder, Evgeny Prigozhin,36

and its operations, much like any formal, independent company. A closer look illustrates how the
company has benefited from lucrative deals in exchange for their services, such as those they
performed in Syria, that saw them officially  profiting from oil fields they liberated.37

As Putin’s foreign objectives expanded in the past 5 years, so have deployments of the Wagner
Group which has now been identified as having contracts in Venezuela, CAR, Libya, Syria,
Madagascar, and Sudan. Under the assumption that the Wagner Group is simply a cover for38

Russian foreign operations, we can understand how the benefits brought by their creation serve
Russian geostrategic goals in the fields of war, intelligence, political influencing and financial
gains.
This last point can also be explained by the tenuous nature of the group. Its contracts and
concessions in foreign countries also point to the organization serving the private goals of
Russian oligarchs and their corporate interests, further fusing the Wagner Group to Putin’s
personal objectives, many of which can be completed thanks to hybrid warfare strategies.

From a legal standpoint, the Wagner Group serves to exemplify the risks the international
community faces from the legal vacuum in which PMCs can operate today. Although individual
countries have enacted legislation applicable to or aimed towards regulating PMCs, the lack of
enforceable international conventions regulating the use of such forces poses a series of legal and
ethical dilemmas. The lack of universally accepted definition for what PMCs and39

Privately-Employed Defense Contractors are pose a significant challenge if legal or jurisdictional

39http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20PMSC%20Article,%20US,%20Kevin
%20Lanigan,%20Final.pdf

38 https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/diplomacy-and-dividends-who-really-controls-the-wagner-group/
37 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries syria.html
36https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954

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issues where to arise. This poses a threat to the legality of conflict today, as the use of
non-regulated forces poses significant risks for all involved parties, as well as the legitimacy of
existing statutes surrounding warfare. It would therefore be necessary to enact enforceable
conventions, separate or annexed to existing laws surrounding war, in order to fully regulate and
transparentize PMCs and their employers.
This would also serve to both address humanitarian concerns involving the deployment of
private forces and help enforce financial transparency vis-a-vis these firms. This latter suggestion
goes beyond the tributary and would help enforce the formal chain of leadership and financing
for firms operating in the sector. Finally, enacting such regulations as conventions would give
them the legal backing to be enforced by international organizations and tribunals, thus further
protecting civilians and other combattants in theaters of operation involving PMCs.

In conclusion, we can say that as the world moves toward embracing and adopting hybrid
warfare, albeit to varying degrees, private military companies see themselves in a privileged
position of being able to fulfill, or at least supplement, many foreign policy objectives of their
employers. Strengthening legal frameworks surrounding these firms would also facilitate their
employment and use by states who might otherwise be discouraged by the lack of adequate legal
standards and definitions regarding their use and deployment.
Hybrid warfare seeks to pursue objectives through a variety of means and on different fronts,
and the versatility of private militaries is perfectly suited to this.

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IJOIS Spring 2021, Volume VIII Program in Arms Control &
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