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In Support of an Independent Kurdistan 
 

Jake Sepich 
 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 

 
 

Abstract 

Since the end of World War I, ethnic Kurds have been denied a sovereign, independent state 
despite repeated assistance provided to the West. Because of this, and features of their state such 
as promotion of democratic values, the United States should actively support an independent 
Kurdistan from a minimum of the territory held in Iraq to as large as the total territory which 
could have been gained under the referendum promised in the Treaty of Sevres. This paper 
examines first the historic background since 1921 which has led to how the situation currently 
stands. Next, it examines the aspects of an independent Kurdistan which would be beneficial to 
the United States and Western Society at large. These are shown through the political and 
economic work that has been undertaken in Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq. Finally, it is 
worth considering possible issues behind support of such a policy for the United States and thus 
the major issues are laid out for consideration. While no decision has been made, there is 
certainly room for movement, especially with the election of a new Biden administration. When 
discussing improving relations with United States allies, it bears considering a shift in view of 
the Middle East to bring the Kurds into the fold of close U.S. allies. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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The area that would make up an independent state of Kurdistan lays across four 
countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Today, there are approximately 30 million Kurds 
throughout the world (The Kurdish Project) with many of them living outside of this area. 
Because of this, the Kurds are one of the largest, stateless, ethnic groups in the world. The 
United States should support an independent Kurdistan despite the opposition from other 
countries in the region due to the economic, security, and strategic benefits which could be 
gained subsequently. Kurdistan’s benefit as an economic partner is primarily based in the energy 
sector with their large oil reserves. They are currently renovating their economy away from one 
that is oil-based to one that includes an emerging private sector and use of the vast quantities of 
arable land, which was overtaken by Saddam Hussein’s urbanization project.  

On the security front, the Kurds have fought alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF) and have been a vital ally in the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
because of the territory they have held and the support they have provided. They were the first 
ethnic group to react and fight against ISIL and were a necessary partner. Finally, the Kurds can 
help the United States reach its strategic goals of promoting democratic goals and norms 
throughout the region both by example and as a close ally of Israel. The Kurds have also shown 
their ability to do this through a history of following democratic norms and promoting diversity 
within their own territory.  

 
History of Kurdistan from the end of WWI - Present 

Following World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Sevres was 
negotiated to split up the Middle East (Sansal). In this Treaty, the Kurds were promised a 
referendum to determine whether or not to create an independent Kurdistan under the British 
sphere of influence. However, three years later nationalists overthrew the Sultan of Turkey. The 
new Turkish government did not recognize the Treaty of Sevres and renegotiated it to become 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which denied a Kurdish homeland.  

Despite the setback in efforts to create a Kurdish state, resistance groups attempted to 
make progress. General Mullah Mustafa Barzani led most of these revolutionary attempts until 
his death in 1979. His first attempt was in 1943 when he attempted to fight the Iraqi government 
with a small force. After this failed, in 1945 he fled to the Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iran. In 
large part due to support from the USSR, the Kurds were able to successfully fight the Iraqi 
government. In the end, support was receded from the Kurds and the Iranian government 
attacked Barzani and his forces, ending this stage of resistance. Barzani returned to Iraq in 1958 
when the Free Officers, an underground military organization, overthrew the monarchy and 
established a new government that recognized Kurdish national rights. Despite this, the KDP, or 
Kurdistan Democratic Party, now led by Barzani, staged a revolt against the new government in 
1961 with the assistance of local tribal groups. The government eventually put down the revolt 
and dissolved the KDP, but offered an autonomy agreement in 1970. This agreement was not 
seen as providing enough authority to the KDP, and ultimately resulted in a final failed revolt by 
General Barzani. In this revolt, the United States provided weapons to the Kurds in hope that 
they would defeat Iraq, but would not take an official stance (Smith). In 1975, the US broke off 
all support for the Kurdish rebels after the Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran because 
they did not view Iraq to be as large of a threat. Thus, the Iraqi Army pushed the Kurds back and 
the United States allowed General Barzani to live out his final days in the U.S. 

In the 1980’s, the KDP and another Kurdish rebel groups, called the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), came together with Iran to fight against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. As the war 



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with Iran came to a conclusion, Saddam sent his brother, along with the Iraqi military, to put 
down any semblance of resistance. His brother, Ali Hassan al–Majid, proceeded to use chemical 
weapons on both rebel targets and civilian towns. Between chemical weapon attacks and other 
humanitarian atrocities, it was believed that up to 90% of all Kurdish villages were destroyed 
(Johns, 2006) in the Anfal Campaign, or Anfal Genocide. In 1990, President George HW Bush 
called upon Iraqis to help throw Saddam out of power. After Operation Desert Storm and with 
Saddam still being in office, he began to take revenge on the Kurds who had helped the United 
States. In response to the defeat of Saddam Hussein by the United States and Allied forces, the 
Kurds began an insurgency attempt in 1991. Saddam Hussein proceeded to use chemical 
weapons (Air Force Historical Support Division, 2012) to suppress the insurgency. As a 
consequence of the burgeoning humanitarian crisis, the United States instituted a no-fly zone in 
Northern Iraq. This was led by the United States, United Kingdom, and France to prevent 
another genocide like the one that occurred in Anfal in 1988. This allowed the Kurds to take over 
large swaths of territory, establish an autonomous region, form the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). The KRG is a power sharing agreement between the PUK and KDP, but the 
peace did not last long and a civil war erupted from 1994-1998.  

The U.S. invaded Iraq five years after the conclusion of the civil war in 2003 and the 
Kurds assisted in overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Following the overthrow, the Kurds continued 
to work towards achieving increased levels of independence. In 2009, the KRG attempted to 
begin oil exports but were blocked from doing so by the Iraqi government in Baghdad. The PKK 
also continued to use coercive measures against other states, such as Turkey and Iran, in attempts 
to gain independent territory from these states.  

Soon after these attempts by the PKK to gain territory, the region was shaken by the 
invasion of Iraq by ISIL and the occupation of vast swaths of territory. While the Kurds were the 
first ethnic group to join the fight against ISIL, and were invaluable in counterinsurgency 
measures, they did not stop fighting for their independence at the same time. In 2015 a suicide 
bomber killed 33 people (Who are the Kurds?, 2017) in a Kurdish town near the border of ISIL 
territory. The PKK accused the Turkish government of “complicity” with the bomber and 
attacked Turkish soldiers and police. Consequently, Turkey launched a “synchronized war on 
terror” (Who are the Kurds?, 2017) against the PKK and ISIL. Turkey has also begun to more 
widely oppose Kurdish groups. Turkey now claims that the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) and 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD) share the PKK’s goal of secession through armed struggle. 
Throughout the entirety of counterinsurgency efforts, Kurds were fighting ISIL and taking back 
land in Iraq for themselves, including the oil rich town of Kirkuk. This land was called the 
“disputed territory” until 2017 at which point Iraqi Kurds, under the KRG, held a secession 
referendum regarding both the agreed upon autonomous region and the disputed territory. 
Baghdad declared the referendum illegal (Iraq Supreme Court Rules Kurdish Referendum 
Unconstitutional) and moved in with its military to retake the disputed territories.  

The referendum could have succeeded despite a lack of support from Baghdad except for 
a few key factors. There was, and is, no superpower who will be an advocate for Kurdish 
independence. Israel supports an independent Kurdistan, but 90% of Arabs surveyed in the 2017-
2018 Arab Opinion Index viewed Israel as a threat to the security of the region. Other powers 
will not support the Kurds because of reasons such as their view of regional instability in the 
wake of the Islamic State, and Iran’s attempts to move in as a regional hegemon. After the 
decade of the 2010s which revolved around regional instability, it appears as if the Middle East 
is finally returning to a state of calm. Uprisings from the Arab Spring have finally ended, 



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including the winding down of the Syrian Civil War. ISIL has been defeated and territory is 
being returned to the states who previously had sovereignty. The United States appears poised to 
remove troops from the Middle East. No major powers want to risk these factors being disrupted 
and causing a war over land disputes to give the Kurds their own country. These states also 
remember the civil war of 1994, which occurred very shortly after global powers helped the 
Kurds establish an autonomous region. They are hesitant in their support of a new or expanded 
state given how the independence process went the first time. Arable land is still being recovered 
from explosives used in this conflict to expand the agricultural economy (Ministry of Planning, 
2013). Despite this conflict, there has been no Kurd-on-Kurd political violence since the civil 
war ended in 1998 and major progress has been shown when the KDP and PUK combined to 
create the majority party in the most recent KRG. Both of these are signs that there would be a 
functional government which could work across party and long-standing familial lines.  

Despite the crushing loss to the central government in Iraq, a positive light shined out of 
Syria for the Kurds. President Bashar al-Assad had been vehemently opposed to the Kurdish 
occupation of Syrian land and claimed that he would take back all of Syria. Nonetheless, the 
Syrian Foreign Ministry stated in September 2017 that they are open to negotiations with the 
Kurds. Additionally, in early 2019 the Turkish government stated that they were willing to create 
a 20 mile “safe zone” for the Kurds (Syria War: Turkey Ready to Create 'Safe Zone' for Kurds - 
Erdogan, 2019). This opened the possibility of negotiations between the Kurdish population in 
Northeastern Syria and the Syrian government. Despite hopes for improving relations, they 
quickly deteriorated during Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring during which time they invaded the 
Kurdish populated northeastern area of Syria. President Erdogan claimed this operation was 
undertaken to “neutralize terror threats against Turkey and lead to the establishment of a safe 
zone, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees to their homes” (Kirby).Turkey undertook this 
invasion of Kurdish-populated territory because they are afraid of the connection between the 
SDF and PKK and wished to establish a buffer by moving Syrian refugees back into the territory 
previously held by the Kurds. This was precipitated by the United States removing their troops 
from Syria and Iraq despite Turkish threats of invasion. The operation did establish a safe zone, 
but it has not been as successful as was hoped. President Trump has left the Kurds without any 
support from the United States and it is unknown if this status will change anytime soon. 

 
Reasons to Support an Independent Kurdistan 

The primary reason to support the Kurds is that they have a history of helping the United 
States promote their strategic goals in the Middle East. In 1991, they assisted the United States 
by rising up against Saddam Hussein when they did not need to and they were punished for 
doing so. The U.S. did not provide any support during this time and did not work to prevent the 
Anfal Genocide from occurring. Then, after having failed at gaining independence from Iraq 
once already, it decided to help the United States again in 2003 when they invaded Iraq. The 
Kurds proceeded to assist in the fight against ISIL throughout the entirety of counterinsurgency 
efforts. Kurdish forces were in fact the first to fight back, and held a 600-mile line for three years 
(Boteach). The United States continued to arm and support the Peshmerga, the military unit of 
the Kurdish region, to fight with the Syrian Democratic Forces during this period. This continued 
support bolstered the Kurds ability to defeat both remaining ISIL cells, and other security forces. 
From the invasion by the United States until they began fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria, 
Kurdistan was the only sector of Iraq where no terrorist attacks by ISIL occurred (Frantzman). 
While no terror was undertaken by ISIL, the PKK, a group considered terrorists by Turkey and 



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the United States, and YPG, often conflated with the PKK by Turkey, continued to use coercive 
measures.  

Another major goal for the United States is curbing Iran’s influence in the region. While 
the Kurds have allied with Iran before, most of these alliances ended with Iran backing out, such 
as when Iran revoked their support for the KDP in the 1970’s as a result of the 1975 Algiers 
Accord. This was called the most cruel betrayal in Kurdish history (Taleblu and Tahiroglu, 
2017). Iran has also historically persecuted the Kurds and attacked groups such as the 
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, and the PKK. The 
leader of the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) also recently claimed that Iran is the Kurds and 
democracy’s greatest enemy (Aziz, 2019).  

Despite this all, Iran has been attempting to improve economic ties with the KRG. 
Improving the United States’ relationship with the Kurds will help to prevent Iran from 
spreading its influence further through the region. Iran has the benefit of providing Kurdistan 
with a land border that they could permanently move goods across. However, tensions over 
territory have risen in recent times. In September 2020, Iran and Turkey signed an agreement to 
coordinate efforts against “armed Kurdish groups” (Menmy, 2020) in both Turkey and Iran. Iran 
has an incentive to work with the Kurds, especially if other Western powers are not. Iran and the 
United States have had major issues over the past several years. In January 2020, the United 
States assassinated General Soleimani and then in November 2020 Israel assassinated Mohsen 
Fakhrizadeh, the head of Iran’s nuclear program. This comes as the United States has withdrawn 
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and is looking to rejoin the agreement 
early in 2021. Despite this attempt to revitalize relations between the two states, the United 
States is still looking to prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemon. This is where the 
Kurds would become extremely useful. They would be able to work with Israel and other 
countries who have normalized relations with them in recent times to counter Iranian aggression 
and provide pressure to rejoin the JCPOA. 

The Kurds have also shown a willingness to support Western values more than other 
states in the region. Despite the fact that they are not an independent state, Kurdistan has a well-
functioning democratic system. The KRG has had peaceful transfers of power since the end of 
the civil war between the KDP and PUK in 1998. In the KRG, there are requirements for female 
and minority representatives (Jones). The government is also a champion of religious neutrality 
in schools (Mansfield) despite the territory being 94% Muslim. These freedoms are unseen in 
other states throughout the Middle East, even in our strategic allies. The KRG also supports a 
free press, which is a vital cornerstone of democracy that is oftentimes difficult to establish. The 
secession referendum, with results showing 93% of Kurds who voted supported secession from 
Iraq (McKernan, 2017), presented a devotion to democratic values as well.  

Another reason for the United States to support Kurdistan is that they are viewed 
favorably by the state of Israel. In 2013, 96% of Egyptians (Beauchamp, 2014) who were polled 
viewed Israel’s influence as mostly negative. This is not an uncommon view throughout the 
Middle East. Despite this, the Kurds and Israel have a good relationship. Prime Minister 
Netanyahu has called for international support of their independence (Sobelman). So far, Israel is 
the only state to explicitly state their support for an independent Kurdistan. Kurdistan may also 
provide a continuance of normalizing relations with Israel in the region. While President Trump 
did succeed in having normalization agreements be agreed upon between Israel and Sudan, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, Kurdistan would provide an effective state to continue 
these agreements in the beginning of a new Biden administration. Israel is the strongest supporter 



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of the United States in the Middle East. This could allow the Kurds to work bilaterally to 
improve relations between Israel and other Arab states. If successful, the United States would 
have two strong democratic allies in the region to work with while providing Israel with 
increasing numbers of normalized relationships in the region. This would be critical to regional 
stability. 

An independent Kurdistan would finally provide the US an economic foothold in the 
region through both investment in the Kurdish government and the creation and improvement of 
a private sector in Kurdistan. This has already begun with initiatives like the United States – 
Kurdistan Business Council which “seeks to highlight the unique opportunities for companies to 
invest in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and to make it easier for companies to secure their 
investments and be successful” (United States-Kurdistan Business Council.). As of 2018, more 
than 20% of all Kurds ages 18-34 were unemployed (van Wilgenburg, 2018). While this is not 
promising for an independent state, it provides ample opportunity for American business to come 
in and have workers readily available. As of 2013, 50% of Kurdistan was 20 years old or 
younger, and it was projected that 1.1 million new jobs would need to be created by 2033 
(Ministry of Planning, 2013). To do so, the private sector will have to step in to help provide 
between 43,000-54,000 jobs per year (Ministry of Planning, 2013). On top of this, Kurds are 
looking for work in the private sector. While there is high unemployment, more than 17% of 
those who have a job are underemployed (Ministry of Planning, 2013). Despite the high rate of 
youth unemployment, 93% of Kurds 18-24 years old can read and write (Benaim, 2018). The 
KRG, led by Masrour Barzani, has spoken about its desire to professionalize the KRG. These 
two factors are vital to the success of a strong, modern economy. Advances in the private sector 
funded by the United States will also open up availability for domestic private business to thrive. 
The KRG has also been making attempts to improve relations for foreign direct investment. This 
primarily has been undertaking major portions of the Kurdish economy. It is also important to 
acknowledge the abundant agricultural sector which is available to Kurdistan. Vast quantities of 
arable land were harmed by Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapon attacks and explosives used in 
subsequent conflicts. This land has not been available to Kurdish farmers since the attacks 
because of the expense in terms of both time and money to bring it back to functional levels. 
Once the recovery process is complete, 28 percent of the land controlled by the KRG will be 
arable (Kerr, 2012). This vast quantity of arable land, combined with a focus on improved 
agricultural production by the Kurdish government, will allow them to take advantage of this 
available resource. 

 
Opposition to U.S. Support for an Independent Kurdistan 

The primary reason to oppose supporting an independent Kurdistan is the negative 
relationship the landlocked state would have with its neighbors. Kurdistan imports an estimated 
80-90% of all goods (Dziadosz, 2017) from their neighbors and other states in the region. It 
would be devastating to the Kurdish economy and its ability to move goods if any of those states 
decided to cut them off. The Kurds export many of their goods for their GDP. Luckily, oil can be 
moved by pipelines, but other sectors of the economy that they are trying to move into can not be 
moved so easily. Agricultural goods require a land or sea access location to move their goods out 
of what would be an independent nation. All of their neighbors have, at some point, threatened 
economic sanctions or to close their borders on Kurdistan if they attempt to become independent. 
Be that as it may, given the current situation in Syria, it is unlikely that they would be unable to 
move goods or services through their borders. Additionally, territory in Turkey that is largely 



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populated by ethnic Kurds, as well as historically possessed by the Kurds, has access to the 
Mediterranean Sea. These facts create doubt in the idea that their neighbors could block 
necessary goods from arriving, especially if Kurdistan had Western support. 

Should the United States choose to support an independent Kurdistan, it would also be 
choosing an expensive undertaking. The cost would not just be economic, but also require 
manpower and political capital. It would also be difficult to nation-build with the potentially 
violent opposition of the Kurds’ neighbors. Given the defeat of ISIL and winddown of the Syrian 
Civil War, stability has been becoming more of a reality in the region, and some leaders believe 
that efforts to create a Kurdish state could upset chances at long lasting stability. However, there 
is rarely more political capital than at the beginning of a new administration. The political cost 
would not be so dire if they undertook a process of supporting this proposal early on in the 
administration. In terms of economic costs, while the COVID-19 pandemic will decrease the 
quantity of funds available for any projects outside of rebuilding the country, support for the 
Kurdish government could provide valuable economic stimulus. As previously mentioned, the 
developing Kurdish private sector would provide ample opportunity for American investment. 
This investment would provide ample opportunity for revitalizing the economy in the wake of 
the pandemic. In terms of manpower, the United States would need to work multilaterally with 
other major powers to determine and utilize best practices for nation-building because of their 
history of failure in this regard. 

The United States would also have to find a way to handle the fears of Turkey, an 
important ally to both the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Turkey, and its leader President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have previously vowed to crush Kurdish 
rebels and groups they consider to be sympathetic to the Kurds. A central reason for this is that 
the Turkish government considers the Peshmerga to be a terrorist organization. This continues to 
be the case, despite the Peshmerga and PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, fighting against ISIL. 
Turkish Kurds have attempted to secede in recent time, but Turkey believes that if Iraqi Kurds 
succeed then it is only a matter of time before their Kurdish minority attempts to secede as well. 
Even if the Kurds’ state did not involve Turkey or Turkish land, Turkey has been clear that it 
will not support the state. President Erdogan stated that if American troops leave, “we will curse 
them as traitors” (Barkey, 2019). Turkey has also cracked down on Kurdish political leaders, 
even those without outspoken secessionist desires. An example of this was when the leader of the 
main Kurdish political party in Turkey was imprisoned. The United States would have to either 
convince Erdogan and his government that there is not a threat of their Kurdish minority 
seceding, or potentially lose a critical ally. Turkey also has enormous control over Kurdistan’s 
economic stability. They recently allowed Kurdistan to build the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, a $1 
billion oil pipeline (Dziadosz, 2017) through their country which is critical to their economy. 
Turkey also threatened to stop buying oil (Dziadosz, 2017) from the Kurds. Iran has been more 
welcoming to the idea of an independent Kurdistan, especially in regards to economic 
coordination with the KRG. They do not want the Kurds in their own country to have autonomy 
or to rise up against them, but do not oppose the KRG. 

Finally, despite the Kurds overwhelming support of independence for their own state, the 
United States has a history of opposing secessionist movements. The Kurdish representative in 
Washington expected opposition because, in a situation that was believed to be similar to their 
own, they claimed that if the US policies of the 1990’s had its way then the “[Baltic States and 
Croatia] would still be part of the eastern bloc” (Calamur, 2017). Because of this, they believe 
that they had to move forward with the referendum in 2017 despite widespread opposition, 



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including harsh statements to not move forward with the vote from the United States. Even more 
recently than with the Baltic States, the United States did not support Catalonia in its recent 
attempt to break away from the rest of Spain. It would contradict the majority of post-Revolution 
American history to support the Kurds in their attempt to gain sovereignty. 

 
Conclusions 

Since the rise of ISIL in 2014, Kurds have shown why they could be a valuable ally in the 
region if given proper support. Their vast quantities of oil, as well as the infrastructure which is 
already in place, provides a stable economic base which many fledgling countries have not had. 
This would provide them time to reinvent their economy and make it more sustainable while 
supporting a currently almost nonexistent private sector. These changes would be mutually 
beneficial to the Kurds and the United States. The Kurds have also helped the United States 
promote their military goals since the mid-1970s. This would be critically important to have in 
an ally, especially with the defeat of ISIL approaching and the attempts by Iran to become a 
regional hegemon. Finally, the Kurds can help be a city on the hill in a region where the United 
States and its allies are traditionally not viewed well. The Kurds’ promotion of democratic norms 
is critical as a potential launching ground for spreading democracy throughout the Middle East.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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