contents the ethics of cyber warfare .......................................................................................................... 5 opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto ...................................... 21 failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states ................................................................ 33 planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states ..................................................................... 41 the global crisis in syria............................................................................................................. 59 compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world ........................................................................................................................ 67 re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing ............................................................................ 77 program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the university of illinois library with the support of the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief caleb weiss senior editors chase bloch john hall editors elaine sine justin tomczyk sonam kotadia corbin kakac nakita pradhan madeleine hubbard director of external relations jason williams web developer chris szul program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the third issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our third issue, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. in “evolution of russian military force since 1979,” christopher chappell explores the different ways that russia has engaged in military conflicts over the last half century. shifting focus to europe, sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk, in their paper “picking up the pieces: the eu and populism,” look at the rise of populism in europe and analyze how this may affect the future of the european union, despite the loss of several populists in major elections in 2017. moving to the united states, stuart polen gives a detailed historical account of the start i treaty in his paper “start i: a retrospective.” lastly, we go back to the middle east where caleb weiss conducts a comparative case study of chechen/north caucasian and central asian fighters to analyze the question of how local terrorist movements transform into transnational organizations. these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! caleb weiss and chase bloch program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2016, volume i program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, i would like to thank you for reading the inaugural issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our first issue, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. “redefining deterrence: nuclear forensics and administration spending priorities” argues that nuclear forensics can be used to trace recovered nuclear material to its source and prevent terrorists from acquiring it, thus serving as a more effective deterrent than the traditional definition of deterrence which holds that mere force parity is sufficient. “what do they see? a look at the appeal of is to young muslim women raised in the united kingdom” examines the recruitment of young muslim women raised in the u.k. into the islamic state and the reasons for is’ appeal to this demographic group. “how us joint ventures are playing a political role in us-cuban relations” provides a unique perspective on how relations between the u.s. and cuba began to thaw and, with a primary focus on the us-cuban tourism industry, demonstrates that economic interests played a role in this thaw. “disruptive element: frozen conflicts and the cdrn,” focuses on the four separatist territories that make up the community for democracy and rights of nations and how frozen conflicts within these territories have derailed western alignment, as well as the role that russia plays in this process. “south asia: after the bomb” investigates whether the presence of nuclear bombs has impacted the ability to resolve territorial disputes between nations in south asia. finally, “american foreign policy towards the islamic state” examines the obama administration’s efforts against the islamic state, and posits that operation inherent resolve acts as a blueprint for battling the new paradigm in world terror, the islamic state, and breaks free from the foreign policy axioms that hindered effective decision-making in the past. these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! jonas murphy editor-in-chief program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 contents explaining middle east participation in the convention against torture……………………………………………………………………………………………………...5 derek hoot drones: a projection of force abroad……………………………………………………………………32 james holevas the current state of the us nuclear arsenal…………………………………………………………….45 maxx villotti atomic dragon: chinese nuclear weapon development and the risk of nuclear war…………………………………………………...…………………………………………..……….54 gabriel wacks jabhat fatah al sham’s implication on the syrian civil war and beyond……………………………………………………………………………………………………73 john bolis program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2016, volume i program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed academic journal founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief jonas murphy senior editors caleb weiss rahul raju editors chase bloch daniel levin gabe wacks john hall kyle kent morgan johnson rebecca davis director of external relations jason williams director of online strategy arianna harris program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, i would like to thank you for reading the second issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our second issue, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. in “explaining middle east participation in the convention against torture,” derek hoot walks us through why middle eastern states actually comply or agree to comply with the convention against torture. largely keeping with the middle east, james holevas looks at the pros and cons of the use of drone strikes in iraq, yemen, and in the afghanistan-pakistan region in his paper “drones: a projection of force abroad.” moving to the united states, maxx villotti explains the continued relevance of the us nuclear arsenal in “the current state of the us nuclear arsenal.” in gabriel wacks’ submission, he looks at the chinese nuclear arsenal and if a nuclear conflict is ever a possibility in “atomic dragon: chinese nuclear weapon development and the risk of nuclear war.” lastly, we go back to the middle east with john bolis taking a look at the syrian civil war and the official al qaeda branch there in “jabhat fatah al sham’s implication on the syrian civil war and beyond.” these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! caleb weiss editor-in-chief about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the program of arms ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 control & domestic and international security (acdis) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a cross-disciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief caleb weiss senior editors chase bloch gabriel wacks editors john hall morgan johnson elaine sine justin tomczyk sonam kotadia corbin kakac director of external relations jason williams program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 contents evolution of russian military force since 1979………………………………………………………...5 christopher chappell picking up the pieces: the eu and populism………………………………….……………………….13 sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk start i: a retrospective…………...……………………………………………….…………………21 stuart polen transformative networks: the case of north caucasion and central asian jihadist……….….…37 caleb weiss program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 73 jabhat fatah al sham’s implication on the syrian civil war and beyond john bolis university of illinois abstract the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the history, organization, and activities of jabhat fatah al sham, formerly the al nusrah front, the official al qaeda branch in the syrian civil war. this group will be analyzed through predominately economic and western securityoriented lenses to show that ultimately jabhat fatah al sham is following the larger trend of al qaeda-led islamic insurgencies around the world. this is important to note within the context of the competition between al qaeda and the islamic state, its offshoot, for the reigns of the global jihad movement. about the author john bolis is a senior at the university of illinois at urbana champaign studying economics and political science. he aspires to work in investment banking and is very passionate about the financial sector in general. john also likes studying foreign policy, politics, and institutionalengineering. introduction as the current civil war in the syrian arab republic wages on with no clear end, it is important to analyze, evaluate, and speculate on the broader implications of this brutal conflict ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 74 on both current events and the current order. as it pertains to this research, it is absolutely imperative to understand the hierarchy and observed tactics of an al qaeda branch named jabhat fatah al sham (jfs). in particular, one needs to understand this terrorist group’s history and attempt to project a reasonable academic and scientific picture of the path that this organization is taking to realize its salafi-jihadi goals both nationally and globally, by highlighting what makes them such a dangerous and persistent insurgency. background on jabhat fatah al sham it is important to recognize that jabhat fatah al sham is the syrian-based branch of the world-wide terror organization al qaeda. much like the islamic state, al qaeda is a salafi-jihadi organization that aims to spread jihad around the globe in, hopes of destroying the decadent and overly-materialist western culture along with replacing it with an extreme version of islam. currently, the islamic state and al qaeda are competing to determine who will ultimately shape and lead this global salafi-jihadi movement. despite this competition, the continual presence and action by both of these umbrella groups pose serious threats to western values and the way of life most embodied by america and europe. delving deeper into the study of jfs, that this al qaeda branch is a very well organized and patient organization which is following a very conservative and long-run pursuit of the their endgame replacing the western liberal order with salafism. located mainly in the idlib governorate of syria with additional cells throughout the country, the hierarchy governing jfs is currently comprised of religious scholars, seasoned military veterans, scientists, phd holders, and other intellectuals. thus, it is easy to see that such intellectuals, such as emir abu ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 75 mohammed al julani, deputy emir sami al-oraydi, the late abu firas al suri, and abu maria al qahtaini, are formidable both in the field of battle and at the negotiating table. jabhat fatah al sham officially came into the scene of the syrian civil war in january of 2012 after branching off from the iraqi franchise of al qaeda. their geographical presence does not reflect their influence: they have a relatively small land area under their control, but pose an enormous network of revolutionary groups opposing bashar al-assad. this key geographic difference amongst jfs and the islamic state illustrates just how well jabhat fatah al sham has permeated other revolutionary factions. additionally, it shows how they have tried to isolate their competitor (islamic state) by painting an increasingly “extremist” portrait of them. a prime example of this is the extensive publicizing of the barbaric acts the islamic state carries out against fellow muslims, which is prohibited by the qur’an. consequently, it is accurate to say that jfs is an important player in the greater al qaeda “insurgency.” al qaeda and the islamic state are not mere terrorist groups, but highly organized insurgencies aiming to overthrow governments in the muslim world in order to establish a set of home bases from which to “spread their ideology to all of humanity” (american enterprise institute). strategy narrowing the focus of this finding, one can see that jabhat fatah al sham has pragmatist this strategy effectively by occupying foothold within syria (idlib) and is waiting for the effective disillusionment of the current assad regime. it is likely that from that point onward, jabhat fatah al sham will be able to utilize its network in a way that will greatly benefit it in terms of legitimate governmental authority in transitional syria. moving past jabhat fatah al ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 76 sham’s long-run strategy, one can see that they are poised to be the great victor of the transitional period in syria when (or if) it occurs. the islamic state seized expansive swathes of territory in both syria and iraq, making it prone to attacks mainly by the united states and other actors such as turkey. thus, one can see that maintaining too great of a profile may lead to much greater resistance and opposition from one’s enemies – something that jfs has not yet have to deal with. from this, it can gleaned that in the longrun, it is more important to win hearts and minds rather than expansive territory, merely because territory can be acquired later once a stronger foundation of popular support has been built. even more important than an expansive network and a modest international profile is the fact that jabhat fatah al sham is strategically attacking the west in unprecedented ways. jfs’s strategy indicates that it sees the benefit in attacking its opponents on a philosophical and moral front in addition to traditional political and military avenues. this is clear in that this group openly applauded physical terrorist attacks such as the san bernardino attack and paris attacks. given this, one can clearly posit that jfs is clearly at odds with western values, and that they are plotting to use political and military means to achieve their respective vision. thus, through its sporadic attacks, jfs et al systematically attempts to force the west to disassemble its civil rights and liberties, to fear its partners, and act in a xenophobic and oftentimes irrational manner during the most trying of times. frankly, jfs seeks to neutralizing their “decadent” opponent as threat by provoking a slow, yet consciously, relinquishment of liberties in hopes of being “more secure.” this is reflected in the all too current debate regarding the balance of liberty and security. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 77 jfs’s stated goal has been to “fight the near enemy” and replace the assad regime with an institutionalized sharia-based judicial system, ultimately culminating in a fundamentalist islamic state. in early 2015, al qaeda leader ayman al-zawahiri told the jabhat fatah al sham front to pursue a set of goals including: 1) to achieve even greater integration among local inhabitants and the syrian revolution, 2) to coordinate more closely with other militant groups (non-islamic state aligned), 3) to contribute to a nation-wide sharia legal system, 4) to build systemic al qaeda strongholds within strategic parts of syria, and 5) to temporarily pause activities and attacks aimed at the west as to allow for what al zawahiri believes will be a further legitimization of jfs and a prime opportunity to network with forces that may prove to be influential in a post-civil war-syria. once that occurs, as one can deduce from both the studies done by the institute for the study of war (isw) and the critical threats project (ctp) at the american enterprise institute, a greater expansion and diversified style of globalized jihad will follow. it is this phenomenon that will be most threatening to the current global order and way of life. structure regarding the structure, motives, and style of operation of jabhat fatah al sham, one can infer that jabhat fatah al sham is in fact much more dangerous than its more famous counterpart islamic state. through setting up strategic strongholds within syria, jabhat fatah al sham’s plan is to effectively utilize these areas as training grounds and indoctrination camps for its fighters and their affiliates. it seems that they plan to use these strongholds not only as a bargaining chip in the local syrian civil war but also as bases of terror exportation and radicalization. a prime product of these types of bases include jabhat fatah al sham special sniper divisions and its ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 78 explosives-manufacturing operations, which undoubtedly affect their efficiency, lethality, and influence altogether. this organizational structure called a “threat node” by many scholars further highlights jfs’ organizational complexity. these nodes also serve an integrative function, in that they allow the group to further embed themselves into the local population in a distinctly al qaedalike fashion making them much harder to target and root out than groups such as the islamic state. implications for the west an important question must be raised: how does the west protect itself, its values, and its way of life embodied by the current order when groups such as jabhat fatah al sham are trying to replace them with their own perception of radical salafi-jihadi values? in the american case specifically, it is important to note that the united states is not just a geographic polity inhabited by a group of culturally-western individuals; america is much more. much like europe and other regions that hold democratic and enlightened values dear, america needs to view the salafi-jihadi threat as embodied by jabhat fatah al sham, as something greater than a guerilla-style military campaign. essentially, jfs’s opponents will need to realize that jabhat fatah al sham is pursuing a broader goal of replacing the enlightened liberal democratic order with its own constructed reality. once this is realized, an amalgamation of solutions and strategies may develop, which all need to be considered to ultimately counter this fundamentalist threat. this by no means is an excuse for the united states to press forward with the notion that other countries and regions of ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 79 the world must conform to its standards; it is a wake up call in order to defend and uphold the enlightened and democratic ideals shared by most of the developed world. as one can effectively glean from various news articles as well as the reports aforementioned by working groups of the american enterprise institute, as well as the isw, in order to defeat this blatant plot against their way of life, countries that are characterized by the liberal democratic order will need to reevaluate the threats posed by jfs et al. without identifying too closely with the demeanor of many, it seems that a patient, passive, and indifferent attitude will ultimately increase the propensity of these attacks and the rate of our collective demise. ideology although no one has a complete plan of how to effectively defeat this threat, it seems logical that those who oppose jfs should start at the root of the problem. salafi-jihadi insurgencies emerge and gain strength in an environment of internal chaos, seen in failed states such as syria, iraq, and libya. these insurgencies win the hearts and minds of the locals by operating schools, hospitals, food banks, and libraries as well as offering social services. if these insurgent groups are denied such a desperate population they will be unable to obtain a foothold in their respective localities. another point worth mentioning is the wide array of salafist groups. strategically, it may be more than appropriate to divorce militant salafi-jihadists from other factions of the salafist umbrella – mainly the quietist and political salafists. by doing this, jabhat fatah al sham could potentially be denied access to various political opportunities and much needed funding. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 80 in order to further unpack this concept, one must understand what basic salafism is. generally speaking, salafism is the belief in a pure and orthodox version of islam. salafists believe that islam became decadent over time and that it has “strayed off the righteous path.” the aim of general salafism is to return to a more authentic version of islam, in which the teachings of the prophet muhammad and his closest companions are strictly followed. although salafism itself does not include violent tendencies many radical islamists seize opportune moments to bend and fold salafism into a more jihadi-centered movement. there are three distinct factions of salafism. these include the quietists, the political salafists, and the jihadi salafists. of these three, fredrick w. kagan and kimberly kagan identify only the jihadi faction to be a great danger to citizens and military installations around the globe. the other two factions are typically peaceful and focus on the interpretation of geopolitical events, philanthropic activities, and political activism when it is deemed necessary. a prime example of this may be found in the egyptian political party the muslim brotherhood (mb) although it was formerly openly violent and it is likely that the mb may be related to the recently formed and violent liwa al thowra and hasam organizations. given this clarification, one can see that it is important to keep the quietist/political faction of salafism separate from the violent jihadi faction of salafism. if allowed to merge, they may feed each other and fuel violence and radical fundamentalism. this merger would allow for the exploitation of the greater salafist network and would direct it toward serving extremist purposes. however, the continued separation of these different factions of the salafist umbrella is not the only strategy needed to effectively neutralize jihadi efforts. conclusion ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 81 equally important is the effective recognition of jihadi “threat nodes” and their systematic removal. strategic actions such as these although admittedly difficult to carry out can prove to be enormous setbacks for insurgent activities while effectively saving a large amount of lives in the short to medium run. by targeting these “nodes,” bases from which these various militant cells operate, the salafii-jihadi threat in its most current form can be combatted. as events continue to unfold, one can see that the fight against jabhat fatah al sham and the greater salafi-jihadi umbrella will not be easy. in the interim, there will be continued chaos, fear, and distrust. moving forward, however, jfs’s adversaries will be able to evolve and improve the situation against these threats. to win both on paper and in reality, the specific opponents jsf are plotting against may need to reinforce their democratic and free-market foundations. if the salafi-jihadi threat or any other for that matter succeeds in coercing them to give up freedoms, opportunities, and their ways of life jfs will have ultimately achieved their objectives. this concept is important regardless of whether one lives in a nation that is traditionally western, or in a region of rural syria. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 82 references mccants, w. f. (2015). the isis apocalypse: the history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the islamic state. new york: st. martin's press. kagan, f. w., kagan, k., cafarella, j., gambhir, h., & zimmerman, k. (2016). al qaeda and isis: existential threats to the u.s. and europe (rep. no. 1). washington d.c.: isw program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 45 the current state of the us nuclear arsenal maxx villotti university of illinois abstract the us nuclear arsenal has reached a critical point in its existence. approaching the end of their service lives, the weapons that make up the current arsenal must either be upgraded or replaced in order to maintain their effectiveness as deterrents. nuclear deterrence is still necessary to prevent other states from deploying nuclear weapons, and the arsenal in its current state will not be able to serve this purpose in the near future. to create a long-term, reliable nuclear deterrent, it is recommended that the current weapons in the us nuclear arsenal be replaced with a reliable replacement weapon. current life extension programs are short-term solutions that do not guarantee the united states will have a modern, reliable nuclear force well into the twenty-first century. about the author maxx villotti is a sophomore studying nuclear engineering at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, with a focus on nuclear power, safety, and environmental impact. his interests in the field include waste storage and clean-up as well as nuclear national security. maxx is also a teaching assistant for the university’s course on nuclear arms and arms control. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 46 introduction since the fall of the soviet union, the state of and the need for the us nuclear arsenal has been a topic of debate. because there is no longer a daily threat of total nuclear annihilation to the american public, the necessity of the nuclear arsenal has become unclear. the need to spend large amounts of money on weapons that are unlikely to be used is hard to justify to the american taxpayers. this paper will explore the need for a nuclear arsenal in the twenty-first century and why the current arsenal should be modernized. the focus will be on ongoing modernization programs, such as the life extension program, and the proposed reliable replacement weapon program to replace the current arsenal. the need for a nuclear arsenal the threat of a nuclear attack on the united states or its allies has not vanished with the fall of the soviet union. although the cold war has ended, there are still high tensions between the united states and two nuclear armed states: the russian federation and the democratic people’s republic of korea (north korea). russian military action in eastern europe strained the relations between it and the us. in 2014, russia annexed the crimean peninsula, a ukrainian territory of strategic value in controlling the black sea. although this did not escalate into a major war between russian and nato forces, this conflict was evocative of the cuban missile crisis, where a regionalized situation greatly affected global stability. if a war between russia and nato were to occur, it is possible that the russian military would deploy either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. jacek durkalec, a research analyst for the polish institute of international affairs, explains that “russia’s nuclear brinkmanship has strengthened the presumption that any hypothetical conflict between nato and russia would ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 47 involve russian nuclear threats, implicit or explicit” (durkalec, 2015). by maintaining a nuclear deterrent, the united states is dissuading the russian military from deploying nuclear weapons due to fear of retaliation. the situation is similar with north korea: although their nuclear program cannot currently mass produce nuclear weapons, the state still maintains the ability to attack japan or south korea with nuclear weapons (cha & kang, p. 27). the fear of retaliation from the united states under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction keeps the north korean military from launching such an attack. in his article “modernizing nuclear arsenals: whether and how,” eugene miasnikov puts forward the idea that a nuclear force will be necessary until every nuclear power in the world disarms itself (2015). however, worldwide simultaneous nuclear disarmament is an unlikely event; therefore it is advisable to the us to maintain a capable nuclear arsenal to deter a nuclear strike. by maintaining a worldwide nuclear deterrent, allies of the united states do not have to create their own nuclear arsenal. in a 2008 speech, former secretary of defense robert gates noted the importance of the nuclear arsenal in defending us allies (garwin, 2008). the united states discourages its allies from creating their own nuclear weapons programs, instead guaranteeing protection under the us “nuclear umbrella.” the nuclear umbrella promises its signatories that the united states will treat any attack against one of its allies as an attack against the us itself. this policy grants smaller states the protection of a deterrent force without having to create and protect their own nuclear weapons. this policy also limits the ability for terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons or material by reducing the amount available worldwide. by preventing the creation of new weapons programs, the us is preventing the creation of new, nascent nuclear weapons programs ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 48 and new nuclear weapon states, two main points to preventing nuclear terrorism proposed by graham allison, a harvard professor specializing in nuclear terrorism research. with its nuclear deterrent force, the us is protecting its allies while simultaneously limiting the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, making nuclear terrorism more difficult. just as it stops us allies from creating nuclear arms, a strong nuclear deterrent force discourages the development of nuclear arms by states that may be hostile to the us and its allies. in his paper “missions for nuclear weapons after the cold war,” ivan oelrich, the senior fellow for the strategic security program at the federation of american scientists, argues that a strong nuclear arsenal can be used to discourage the creation of another nuclear arsenal (2005, p. 34). if the us maintains a nuclear arsenal that is easily capable of annihilating a state’s new nuclear arsenal, then there is almost no advantage to having created the arsenal in the first place. the argument put forth by oelrich is that any state planning to create a new nuclear arsenal would realize this and would not invest the time, money, or resources in such a futile effort. this argument can be expanded to cover the creation of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. this idea of developmental deterrence relies entirely on the us maintaining a nuclear arsenal strong enough to launch an attack that would render a state’s nuclear production line inoperable. this could involve the destruction of multiple independent and reinforced structures, such as breeder reactors, enrichment facilities, and weapon assembly plants. if it were possible that a few enemy weapons were to survive the us strike, then the hostile state may continue with its weapons program. therefore, another reason that the united states must maintain a highly capable nuclear deterrent force is to deter the creation of new nuclear weapons programs. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 49 why the current arsenal needs modernization the current nuclear arsenal is not optimized for the threats, strategies, and missions of the twenty-first century. the us military’s conventional forces have evolved over time to meet the demands it faces today; since the threat of thousands of soviet tanks rolling across eastern europe has been replaced with that of insurgency and terrorism the equipment and tactics of the military are now developed and deployed with this new threat in mind. however, the us nuclear arsenal is still deployed with one goal: the annihilation of any state that launches a nuclear attack against the united states or its allies. although this idea of brinkmanship was effective during the cold war, the weapons created to support it do not meet the needs of today. in a report for congress titled “nuclear weapons: the reliable replacement weapon program,” national nuclear security administration administrator linton brooks argues that current nuclear weapons are too high in yield and do not allow for precision strikes (medalia, 2005, p. 21). this is a major problem for the us military, which has focused on limiting collateral damage as much as possible in the recent years. with the deployment of small yield and precision guided conventional munitions, it follows that the us nuclear force would be upgraded to minimize collateral damage. brooks also argues that nuclear weapons could be tailored to maximize the output of certain capabilities, such as the electromagnetic pulse released when a nuclear device detonates (medalia, 2005, p. 22). this pulse would give the us the ability to destroy electronic equipment while limiting civilian casualties. by upgrading it to meet the demands of today, the us arsenal becomes a more effective and diversified worldwide deterrent. upgrades to the us arsenal are currently underway in the form of life extension programs (leps). leps are defined by the nnsa as “programs to repair or replace components ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 50 of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements” (2016). these programs allow weapons that are approaching the end of their service lives to continue to serve in the us nuclear arsenal. to do this, individual components of current weapons are upgraded to maintain their initial function capability. for example, the arming systems in all w88 warheads, used in trident ii submarine launched ballistic missiles, are currently being replaced with an up-to-date system (2016). although these programs allow nuclear weapons to function an estimated additional thirty years, leps are expensive and do not provide a long-term solution to the aging nuclear arsenal. after thirty years, the entire arsenal will need to be quickly replaced to maintain a nuclear deterrent, an expensive undertaking. if the modernization of the nuclear arsenal began immediately, the money that would be spent extending the service life of twenty-year-old weapons could be spent developing and deploying a new nuclear weapon that would have a significantly longer service life. how to modernize the nuclear arsenal a reliable replacement weapon (rrw) would supplant the current arsenal and increase the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal. one advantage of creating an entirely new weapon is that it would make use of modern, cutting-edge technology. instead of spending money replacing individual parts of an old weapon in order to maintain its ability to function, a new weapon could be designed with the intention to incorporate these new technologies. this would allow for higher reliability and a longer service life for all new weapons. in a report for congress titled “nuclear weapons: the reliable replacement weapon program,” jonathan medalia, a specialist in national defense at the congressional research ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 51 service, explains that an rrw could allow for replacing the current nuclear arsenal with a longer lasting, smaller one medalia, 2005, p. 4-5). because of the reliability of the new weapon, fewer spare warheads would need to be produced. by reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the us arsenal, the nuclear complex that creates and maintains these weapons could also be reduced, increasing safety and security by allowing more oversight over fewer facilities. a smaller, more modern nuclear arsenal would save money and maintain proper worldwide nuclear deterrence. by investing in an advanced, reliable nuclear weapon, the us government could produce fewer weapons. the current mission of the us nuclear deterrent force could be carried out by an arsenal a fraction of its current size armed with the high reliability and modern capabilities of the reliable replacement weapon. there would no longer be a need to launch multiple weapons at a single target in fear of one not functioning properly. this reduction would allow the us government to save money on the production and maintenance of the weapons, as well as the facilities that service and house them. in his los angeles times article "to save money, look to nukes," michael o’hanlon argues that a smaller nuclear force and smaller weapons production facilities could save the us government between $30 and 35 billion over a ten-year period (o’hanlon, 2011). with its newly modernized nuclear arsenal, the united states could maintain a strong nuclear deterrent while reducing military expenditures. conclusion this report has shown that even in a post cold-war world, it is in the best interest of the united states military to develop and maintain a modern nuclear arsenal. this arsenal would be better suited for modern conflict than the aging stockpile the government is trying to maintain ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 52 with costly life extension programs. given its commitment to global peace through strength, the us military has both the fundamental interest and strategic imperative it needs to create a modern, long-term, cost-effective nuclear arsenal. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 53 references cha, v.d. & kang, d.c. (2003). nuclear north korea: a debate on engagement strategies. new york: columbia up. durkalec, j. (2015, october 30). nato must adapt to address russia's nuclear brinkmanship. european leadership network. garwin, r.l. (2008, december 4). a different kind of complex: the future of us nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons enterprise. arms control today. kroenig, m. (2015). why us nuclear modernization is necessary. bulletin of the atomic scientists. medallia, j. (2005, july 20). nuclear weapons: the reliable replacement weapon program. congressional research service. miasnikov, e. (2015, january 7). modernizing nuclear arsenals: whether and how. bulletin of the atomic scientists. national nuclear security administration. life extension programs. retrieved from https:// nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/lifeextensionprograms oelrich, i. (2005, january). missions for nuclear weapons after the cold war. federation of american scientists. o'hanlon, m. (2011, november 16). to save money, look to nukes. los angeles times. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 evolution of russian military force since 1979 christopher chappell university of illinois urbana-champaign abstract this paper aims to show the evolution of the russian military through the wars in afghanistan, chechnya, georgia, and ukraine. each conflict provides a lesson in army organization, strategy, and tactics to the russian military. the section on afghanistan details the strategy of the soviet invasion. rough terrain as well as too much emphasis on holding critical routes drew attention away from creating positive interactions with the local population. only protecting critical routes allowed the mujahideen to operate freely and harass soviet helicopters. the section on chechnya argues that the russian military learned that contracted, professional soldiers in conjunction with special forces were more effective than conscripts. the conflict in georgia broadened warfare to include cyber, economic, and political attacks. the final section about ukraine argues that through the gerasimov doctrine, russia is able to use ambiguity to achieve its foreign policy goals in countries of the former soviet union. evolution of russian military force since 1979 chris chappell introduction russia is no stranger to armed conflict—a large amount of their patriotism and cultural identity stems directly from the hard fought battles and eventual victory of world war ii. military theorist carl von clausewitz famously said, “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” referring to the point after diplomacy has broken down or perhaps even sidestepped altogether. in a period defined by multinational coalitions and cooperation, russia has largely remained true to a doctrine of unilateral problem solving that put it at odds with much of the western world. in its multiple instances of armed conflict, russia has been accused by experts of breaching international laws and customs. due to this, russia is seen as an outsider in the predominantly euro-centric and americentric international systems. russia is still a major player in the international community, as evidenced by its new emphasis on foreign intervention. this may be due to russia’s independence and simultaneous resistance of globalist trends, or residual tensions from the cold war period. by isolating the reasons why the russian federation uses conflict, we may better understand its foreign policy and how it approaches problems such as international terrorism, regional issues, and other players in the international system. more importantly, it will provide a conceptual framework to extrapolate upon to see how it will interact in these areas in the future. as of april 2017, russia is generally viewed as a diplomatic obstacle which presents a high degree of difficulty in un security council proceedings and decisions. this paper aims to show situations in which russia has used military force to achieve foreign policy objectives in the past and also to show situations where it would be likely to use force in the future. as a broad topic that encompasses a variety of information, each of the following case studies of afghanistan, chechnya, georgia, and ukraine will be divided into three subsections: international politics, regional politics, and evolution of military strategy components. the most crucial evolutions in russia’s use of military force and strategy occurred during the invasion of afghanistan in 1979. specifically, this conflict saw changes from a strictly regimented army into one capable of fighting an asymmetric war. this conflict set the stage for future military development and huge political ramifications like the rise of islamic terrorism. the invasion’s prologue was rather complex;, as the soviet’s favored leader, muhammad daud, began to grow closer to international islamic factions in 1975. the shah of iran, who was loyal to the united states for intelligence and economic reasons, offered support for daud’s efforts. daud, along with numerous other islamic forces, unified the people’s democratic party of afghanistan and became the ruling party of afghanistan in 1977. while the chaotic events of the following year are ambiguous in terms of cause or blame, the result was the revolt organized by soviet-trained afghan army and air force officers against the daud government. this ended not only in the removal of said government, but the members of the government were killed. because the soviet-trained agents were involved, it is fair to assume that moscow played a role in orchestrating the revolution. afghanistan held strategic importance in its capacity as a buffer zone between the pro-west iran, pakistan, and to a lesser extent, india. khrushchev allocated millions of dollars in military, humanitarian, and infrastructural aid to the afghan government. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 even this aid did not halt resistance against the new ruling party, however, as rebel groups organized “assassination squads conducting house-to-house searches” for russian nationals, killing them, then desecrating their bodies. in response, soviet advisors and soviet-trained elements brutally attacked even loosely-affiliated villages, causing the situation to spiral further out of control and ultimately resulted in more “advisory” forces being sent into afghanistan. to address the concerns of the international community, the soviet government insisted that its military intervention was requested by the afghan government, a claim that would later be proven false. the invasion itself followed conventional lines: secure urban centers and vital routes of transportation, and then spread out to secure the countryside. alex alexiev, author of “the war in afghanistan: soviet strategy and the state of the resistance,” detailed the soviet war plan explaining that military, economic, and political planning focused more on influencing the local populations than controlling the terrain. military operations involved using a relatively small force (which constituted roughly two percent of the entire soviet military) to take control of the afghan “logistics networks” and to terrorize or intimidate local villages into selling out the resistance fighters or, at the minimum, stop supporting them. the economic aspect focused on food supply and denying mujahideen access to food as well as strangling any commerce outside that which was controlled by the soviet military. alexiev reports that the soviet military units destroyed crops with “napalm and...planting anti-personnel mines in the fields.” soviet forces also disabled irrigation systems, caused artificial price inflation at local markets, and gave farmers incentives to submit to soviet rule. the afghan terrain made the latter half of the battle plan difficult to achieve, which explains why the war devolved into a quagmire. a possible reason why this strategy was pursued over holding territory is the importance of depriving the mujahideen of material support from sympathetic parties. since the true feelings of the soviet politburo have been lost due to self-censorship, one can only speculate on the larger strategy. in his article “the use of force in soviet foreign policy: the case of afghanistan,” joseph collins argues that the larger strategy was to counter the western influences in the middle east and especially iran. in this way, the two previous articles are in agreement: both imply that the invasion contained a certain degree of theater, or, in other words, a broadcast of intent. each large offensive was widely reported and information was disseminated to intimidate both the fighters and people of afghanistan. throughout the later, counterinsurgency stage of the war, several key issues became apparent: guerrilla warfare was not strictly territorial, us aid to the mujahideen grounded all but the most vital of helicopter missions, and that the soviet military alone was not enough to police the nation of afghanistan. these realities, along with an increasing annual expenditure and domestic protests, forced the soviet union to withdraw from afghanistan. that is not to say nothing could be salvaged from the experience, however, as many lessons were learned; arguably the most important being the inadequacy of soviet forces. whether it be due to relatively low troop count or the ingenuity of the mujahideen, the soviets were never able to cut off supply lines to the resistance. foreign aid to resistance fighters further compounded the evolution of russian military force since 1979 chris chappell problem for soviet planners, especially because support came from the united states, pakistan, and numerous wealthy private benefactors. the soviet union came to know that winning the hearts and minds, or at the very least securing the obedience of local populations was necessary to success in an invasion and that heavy handed tactics that constitute nothing less than a terror campaign did more to motivate local populations against them. roughly the same situation would arise five years later during the first chechen war. immediately after the fall of the soviet union, the chechens tried to declare independence, but the process would not be completed until 1993. this prompted boris yeltsin’s government to send in troops “to restore constitutional order.” this is important because like afghanistan, the russian government did not want to appear as the aggressor. the first chechen conflict is succinctly described by former russian military analyst, pavel felgenhauer, who describes the situation as a “strategic improvisation.” both chechen wars would expose critical flaws in the organizational structure of the russian military as well as issues with the conscripts filling out the ranks along with the tactics they used (or forgot to use). russian action in chechnya began years before formal military intervention in december of 1994. federal security service (fsb) operations aimed to arm and supply mercenaries for opposition groups against the new dudayev regime in chechnya. felgenhauer goes on to outline the fundamental problems with the russian military during the initial stages of the invasion and the war. there was a massive amount of disorder among ground units as well as resistance to the order to move to combat areas brought on by the combination of troops from all different types of units. due to the combination of factors, morale among russian internal troops was dangerously low and had adverse effects on combat performance. operational struggles were exacerbated by poor tactics and strategists forgetting lessons learned in afghanistan. the intervention itself was modeled on the u.s. led coalition’s invasion of iraq during the first gulf war, but the russian interior troops did not have the coordination, organization, training, or numbers to achieve the same result. russian forces did capture the chechen capital of grozny, but intense fighting and heavy losses forced moscow to appeal for a ceasefire and eventual peace treaty. ultimately, this conflict led to war crimes accrued by excessive artillery usage and engagements of undisciplined units. a key weakness in the russian military was exposed during this conflict: the lack of professionalism and poor quality of a conscription based military. the 1999 apartment bombings in russia reopened these wounds. to build a case for war, russian officials were quick to blame the bombings in buikansk, moscow, and volgodonsk on a chechen insurgent group. a fourth bomb was set to explode in ryazan, but when police apprehended fsb officers with the same make and model of bomb used in the other bombings in the vicinity of an apartment complex, skeptics raised even more questions as to who was truly culpable. regardless if this attack was a false flag event, russia went to war over it. the battle plan was much like the initial strategy for afghanistan in that the primary focus was on urban areas. the lessons from afghanistan and the first chechen war were applied during this time: more soldiers were brought in a more organized fashion with better equipment and tactics. the russian army took its first step toward a professional military akin to western models by ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 invading with up to forty percent of ground units enlisted under contracts (contractniki). the russian strategy as a whole can simply be described in three stages: the invasion, counterinsurgency, and finally the period of self-policing. the first stage succeeded just as it had during the first chechen war. the second marks another change in the soviet strategy: use of special forces or spetsnaz operators in conjunction with contracted soldiers to form the bulk of the offensive forces in counterinsurgency operations. although a step in the right direction, these tactics were not as effective as modern counterinsurgency operations. the final stage was enlisting the aid of local chechen confederates to self-police and maintain stability of the region after military occupation was no longer necessary. the russian federal government placed its faith in ramzan kadyrov to use his paramilitary forces to perform this task. kadyrov and his forces were particularly brutal however, with several alleged violations of human rights occurring under his command. the most significant changes to the russian military during the chechen wars was refinement of their tactics and taking the first steps toward a professional, modern army. heavy use of spetsnaz and contractniki led to a successful counterinsurgency campaign so that later use of local confederate paramilitary groups were able to assume control. russian military formations were better prepared for the latter conflict as well, because they were trained and underwent regular drills. these moves increased effectiveness of ground forces as well as ushered the russian military toward a professional military with a higher retention rate of servicemembers than the conscription system. the 2008 conflict with georgia marked the next change in russian foreign policy. russian activity included a theatrical element for the international community along with unorthodox tactics to weaken the georgian position. the war with georgia is significant for two reasons: it expanded the use of power to outside a strictly military capacity, much like afghanistan and also it serves as a model and a warning about former soviet states looking to grow closer to the west. the prelude to the war contained a series of diplomatic slights and military skirmishes. during this time russia engaged in cyber, economic and psychological warfare. the cyber attacks were part of a broader scheme to paint russia as something other than the aggressor. ariel cohen of the strategic studies institute says that russia’s coordinated cyber attack was designed to hamper georgian communications so that the russian narrative would be the only narrative of events. however, when it was discovered that georgian government officials were reliant on personal email servers instead of official ones, russia’s cyber exploits were revealed to the international community. the violence was short lived and ended with russia claiming small portions of georgia. cohen argues that the implications from this conflict are the us/nato affiliation was not a direct deterrent to attack, especially within such short range of the russian border. the russian goal was to install a pro-moscow government, granting russian citizenship to nationals within the country in order to provide a pretext for invasion and annexation. the 2008 conflict highlights the lack of power the un and international actors could bring against russian aggression. evolution of russian military force since 1979 chris chappell in light of the continuing proxy war in ukraine this transfers well to the current situation in ukraine since many of the same factors existed in the prelude to the conflict as well. within the russian government there existed a desire to reclaim the former soviet sphere of influence over former soviet countries. when the “little green men,” armed and uniformed like russian troops, occupied crimea it seemed that russia was acting on that desire by standing watch over the crimean referendum. in his address to the world concerning the crimean crisis, vladimir putin constantly stressed that the wishes of the people should be honored but also implied that russia was the true owner of sevastopol and crimea proper from the beginning which leads us to believe that the conquest of eastern ukraine is one of reclamation. in the military respects, the conflict in ukraine is the culmination of lessons learned in previous wars. the war in afghanistan taught the soviet military how to wage war in difficult terrain and without helicopters. the chechen wars reinstituted urban and positional warfare tactics as well as use of special forces along with a trend toward professional soldiers. and the georgian war expands the scope of the conflict to outside a strict military definition. what the conflict in ukraine adds is a layer of ambiguity, or what mary connell and ryan evans of the cna corporation calls the ‘gerasimov doctrine’. they offer this definition “the term applies in situations in which a state or non-state belligerent actor deploys troops and proxies in a deceptive and confusing manner— with the intent of achieving political and military effects while obscuring the belligerent’s direct participation.” with the well documented supply convoys originating within russia and ending up at pro-russian separatist camps, it is clear that russia is participating in the conflict, yet denies any involvement even after many un member states imposed sanctions on several members of the russian government. as for the future evolution of the use of force, connell and evans make it clear that the russian strategy components carefully planned and are specifically made to former soviet states where ethnic russians reside. it appears that the gerasimov doctrine exists as a circumvention of the nato treaty so that russia may still pursue its immediate, regional foreign policy without directly drawing nato into a war. conclusion in conclusion, the evolution of use of russian military force has gone through distinct periods of change. the war in afghanistan forced the soviet union to learn how to fight unconventional and fourth generation wars, akin to the us experience in vietnam. these lessons were then applied to the wars in chechnya. due to resistance within the ranks, a heavier emphasis was placed on professional soldiers and special operations forces, especially to run counterinsurgency missions. the war in georgia expanded the scope of war beyond combat arms to include cyber and economic warfare. and finally, the conflict in ukraine takes all of these lessons into account but places them under the gerasimov doctrine of ambiguous warfare. in terms of future conflicts, if previous conflicts may be used as a blueprint, the next targets of russian military force will be former soviet states suffering from political division. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 references alexiev, alex. "the war in afghanistan: soviet strategy and the state of the resistance." rand.org. november 1984. accessed april 24, 2016. coffey, michael. "military learning between the chechen wars." sras.org. october 24, 2006. accessed april 24, 2016. cohen, ariel, and robert e. hamilton. "the russian military and the georgia war: lessons and implications." strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. june 2011. accessed april 24, 2016. collins, joseph j. "the use of force in soviet foreign policy: the case of afghanistan." conflict quarterly, 1983rd ser., spring (1983): 20-27. accessed april 24, 2016. connell, mary ellen, and ryan evans. "russia’s “ambiguous warfare” and implications for the u.s. marine corps." cna.org. may 2015. accessed april 24, 2016. felgenhauser, pavel. "russian strategy in the chechnya wars." bundesheer.at. accessed april 24, 2016. herpen, marcel van. putin's wars: the rise of russia's new imperialism. lanham, md: rowman & littlefield, 2015. p.239-244. leff, carol. “chechen wars.” soviet & post-soviet foreign policy lecture. class lecture, university of illinois urbana-champaign, champaign, il. february 2016. putin, vladimir. "address by president of the russian federation." speech, the kremlin, moscow, april 24, 2016. letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the fourth issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. our fourth contains a culmination of seven papers that have been formed over the last year into exceptional papers covering a wide range of security and foreign policy topics. beginning with issues that pertain primarily to the middle east, zachary cleary summarizes the evolution of the academic literature and findings on targeted killings in his paper “re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing.” human rights issues in the syrian civil war are highlighted in dylan hyams’ paper: “the global crisis in syria”. several of the papers in this edition focus on international agreements and norms including caitlin mclain’s paper, “compliance and consequence”, covers the ctbto and whether or not it can continue to be successful moving forward. similarily, zishen ye discusses why an arms embargo on china is failing. with regards to international law and norms, lina dayem writes a very interesting and relevant paper on when cyber attacks can constitute an act of war in her paper: “the ethics of cyber warfare”. other great papers included in this edition are justin tomczyk’s comparison of the capabilities and strategies of the csto’s and nato’s rapid response forces in his paper: “opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto”. and finally, zach wherli provides an original analysis on the link between agricultural development and state fragility in his paper: “planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states.” these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! chase bloch how us joint ventures are playing a political role in us-cuban relations hannah m. jarman university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract with a primary focus on the us-cuban tourism industry, this paper seeks to determine how economic interests served to thaw relations between the us and cuba by analyzing the influence of corporate lobbying, specifically how joint ventures in cuba have influenced the us and cuban governments’ decision making. for the us, both internal and external influences played a large role in the recent decision to develop a rapprochement strategy toward cuba. this research seeks to analyze those influences through the lens of shifting bilateral relations. about the author hannah jarman is a junior at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign studying global studies and communication. her specialization in governance, conflict, and resolution and focus on latin america brought her to havana, cuba in january 2016 with the university of illinois department of political science ps 300 course. her research is supplemented by primary source observations from her trip abroad. she extends a special thanks to acdis for awarding her the undergraduate travel scholarship research grant to aid in this research. introduction: the history of us-cuban relations cuba in the 1950s was characterized by extravagant nightlife, a glamorous music scene, and mafia-run business ventures. the united states had its economic influence in cuba through several industries including sugar. these ties began in 1884 when cuba faced a collapse in international sugar prices and the us quickly made its way to the country to modernize the technology and develop direct economic ties in one of cuba’s largest industries (brenner et al, 2015, p117). in addition to this overwhelming investment, the cuban government under former leader jose batista welcomed mafia influence, eventually developing a large network of casinos throughout the country. when fidel castro and the revolution occurred in 1959 in an effort to overthrow the batista regime, relations with the us began to crumble. us relations with castro and the revolution did not improve after the expulsion of the american mafia and the us sugar industry. rather, us-cuban politics reached a new age of divergence. in 1960, castro nationalized all foreign assets as one of his first actions in power, expelling most foreign business from the country. castro’s government aligned with the soviet union, instilling fear throughout the west and motivating the initiation of countermeasures by the us government. cuba’s steps towards socialism provoked the us during the cold war to institute an embargo to stop trade to and from the island. in 1960, president john kennedy was elected and inherited the eisenhower administration’s plans to invade cuba and unseat castro. the bay of pigs invasion in 1961 heightened tensions beyond the termination of diplomatic relations with cuba that would characterize the next 55 years. as sanctions were established in 1962 by the us and as cuba began nationalizing its economy, the political and economic ties between the two countries became more strained. until recently, the thought of joint ventures in cuba was a distant possibility for us business. countries around the world have increasingly found economic opportunity through the establishment of joint ventures in cuba. with the thawing of relations, the us is now at the brink of re-establishing its own joint ventures on the island. consequently, the tourism industry has evolved to include more reputable partnerships than those from the 1950s. tourism produces a strong economic, internal drive for both the us and cuba. with the hope of tapping into this untouched multi-billion dollar market on the horizon, us ventures are anxious to lobby powerful committees and individuals for a complete lift of the embargo. this research will show that us business interests are the medium by which the political thawing of relations between the us and cuba has been possible. without business interests submitting influence, the rapid economic changes currently occurring in cuba would not exist. this, in turn, creates domestic incentives in cuba to liberalize the economy. from the perspective of the us, this economic influence is more effective than using sanctions to try to reverse the revolution’s ideologies. now more than ever, active lobbying by us business has given president obama the opportunity to embrace a foreign policy initiative in the national interest of the us and cuba on both a foreign and domestic level. this paper will analyze the effects of the us sanctions on cuba in terms of an evolving economic environment, the current international interests present on the island that have further influenced economic liberalization while prompting a response from the us, and the lobbying efforts of us businesses to open relations completely. through this analysis, a holistic image of the current economic situation facing cuba and the us will be presented that will help in understanding why this change occurred. effects of the sanctions in 1963, the us enacted the cuban assets control regulation act (cacr) in conjunction with the 1917 trading with the enemy act (twea) to create an embargo against cuba as a policy tool against communism (spadoni and sagebien, 2013, p79). the helms burton act of 1996 codified these interests by making it necessary that both an executive order and approval by congress were needed to end the embargo. when the economy was nationalized in 1960, all us property in cuba was nationalized by the cuban government (renwick, 2016, n.a.). notably, a large land grant owned by harvard to study tree species became a part of the cuban economy and now serves as an open arboretum where tourists flock to see the wide array of tree species, both native and foreign to the island. this economic model functioned until the economically-crippling effects of the us embargo took hold after the collapse of the soviet union. the 1990s in cuba were given the title of the “special period” by the cuban government when cuba witnessed a large economic downturn after the fall of the soviet union. tourism, such as the aforementioned example, appeared to be cuba’s answer to this “special period.” as their primary trading partner and source of foreign aid, the soviet union’s fall left cuba struggling to compensate for its lack of international, political and economic support. in 1987, approximately 87% of cuba’s trade was with the soviet union while loans totaling almost $11.6 billion streamed out from behind the iron curtain. (benzing, 2005, p70). as the us simultaneously experienced an economic upturn, foreign relations involving cuba dropped down the priority lists of policymakers. cuba was reluctant to resort to joint ventures to save its economy. however, foreign investment became the fundamental solution to escape economic recession. this led to a 1992 constitutional amendment in cuba that opened the country to joint ventures. initially, foreign investors could only own 49% of any given business such that the cuban government had majority control (benzing, 2005, p71). because european and canadian tourism was so high, the number of european and canadian partially-owned businesses in the country began to increase. investing in cuba’s foreign direct investment (fdi) is risky, however, as cuba does not publish annual data on its capital inflows and outflows (feinberg, 2013, p14). historically operating under a veil of secrecy, the cuban government’s disinclination to release the flows of capital within their country is problematic as businesses are unaware of how or where their assets would be allocated. even so, as the tourism industry continues to grow, foreign investment in cuba is making the country’s tourist sector one of the most competitive in the region. this liberalization of the economy officially began under the shifting policies of raul castro in 2008. influence of international joint ventures cuba’s opening of its markets to foreign ventures was not politically and economically expedient. nevertheless in 2013, foreign investment accounted for 7% of the new cuban economy, and 34,000 cuban jobs were a direct result of joint ventures in the country (feinberg, 2013, p16). this stems from the “240 joint ventures in cuba, involving 57 countries in 40 different areas of the economy” that characterized foreign investment in the late 1990s when law 77 was passed (baumolh, 1997, n.a.). enacted in 1995, law 77 offered protection to foreign investors and gave some industries 100% ownership of their investments in cuba (benzing, 2005, p71). canada was one of the countries that took advantage of these economic opportunities despite the divergent political interests of the us. canada’s fdi remains one of the highest in cuba, and canada was cuba’s fourth largest bilateral trade partner in 2009 (spadoni and sagebien, 2013, p82). canadian joint ventures across different industries include cerbuco/lebatt (beer company), leisure canada (tourism), ym biosciences (medical engineering), and sherritt international (oil, nickel, agriculture). canada took advantage of cuba’s economic growth in the early 2000s when us business could not. however, at the transition of power from fidel castro to his brother raul castro in 2008, accusations of corruption amongst these joint ventures rose to the surface. in 2011, cuban authorities authorized a shutdown of canadian joint venture tokmakjian group, an ontariobased company that renovated car engines in havana on accusations of fraud (spadoni and sagebien, 2013, p81). the cuban government grew wary of international business, and subsequently initiated a campaign against corruption in foreign investment. the impact of this campaign placed higher scrutiny on big business in cuba. in 2002, over 400 joint ventures were established; however, the cuban government eliminated almost half of these ventures when it discovered that the economic advancements that had originally been touted did not fulfill expectations (feinberg, 2013, p15). as a result of these changes, businesses found it incredibly difficult to operate successfully under the cuban government’s scrutiny. in 2013, the cuban government established the mariel special development zone that epitomizes cuba’s economic evolution since the early days of the revolution. despite being weary of international joint ventures and capitalism, the cuban government recognized the importance of developing a commercial port given the island’s strategic geopolitical location. on november 1, 2013, the cuban government released the rules and regulations for the mariel free trade zone as it is commonly known. this zone is geographically located 28 miles from havana and is intended to become a hub of foreign investment. with an intention for commercial entities to take advantage of the newly-expanded panama canal, cuba saw an opportunity to expand economically. in stark contrast to the 1992 constitutional amendment that allocated only 49% ownership of the shares to foreign investors, foreign business will now be able to have 100% ownership, with up to 50 year contracts, and a 10 year period before having to pay 12% taxes on profits (frank, 2013, n.a.) in the mariel zone. the national bank of economic and social development in cuba and the developmental bank of brazil, another country who has ambitions of foreign investment in cuba, partnered with the cuban government to contribute $900 million to the infrastructure of the port (davalos leon, 2013, p168). although this was a significant stride towards liberalization of the economy by a fervently socialist government, there still exist strict limitations on commercial activities and a tough acceptance process to be a part of the mariel zone. the dutch-british company unilever has been one of the first and most influential to be accepted into the mariel zone (frank, 2016, n.a.). unilever is expected to open a factory by 2018 that will bring thousands of jobs to cuba. as cuba seeks foreign investment to develop its economy, has seen the benefits of offering majority ownership to the businesses as an incentive to set up shop. these economic developments are important in the context of thawing relations between the us and cuba in the past eight years. without this liberalization, momentum for meaningful policy reform in washington d.c. with regard to cuba would not have materialized. future of us joint ventures in cuba the us department of treasury’s office of foreign assets control (ofac) amended the cacr to lift specific sanctions regarding us business and travel activities in cuba on january 16, 2015 (spiliotes et al, 2015, p1). specifically, certain exports can be sent to cuba and certain business-related activities are now permissible for travel through amendments to the exports administration regulations. although the entire embargo has not been lifted, there are more business opportunities for us companies. us businesses have been anxiously waiting almost 50 years to begin legally investing in the cuban economy through joint ventures. while there has not been an official end to the us embargo, foreign companies are excited about the attractive market opportunities that will become available when us relations with cuba have been completely normalized. in order to understand the political process behind the decision to normalize relations, it is important to analyze three key factors-international pressure, cuba’s slow economic liberalization, and political lobbying efforts. international pressure comes from the un general assembly. the un has signed a resolution every year for 22 years asking the us to lift its trade embargo on cuba (renwick, 2016, n.a.). the only two counties that have consistently opposed this resolution are the united states and israel. human rights activists and international leaders have spoken out against the us embargo as an exhibition of oppression, but for 22 years has not inspired action from u.s. politicians. most importantly, the lobbying efforts in washington dc have played a role in all conversation involving us-cuban relations. the sunlight foundation is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization devoted to the establishment of open government through dissemination of transparent information. through their online database, they have logged lobbying efforts based on the lobby group, the client, and the general issue at hand. although this database only logs surface level data about certain lobby efforts, the research is extensive and provides 2,560 pages of categorized lobby information. from this database, it is evident that us business plays a significant role in the actions of the government. specifically, the cuban lobbying effort has grown significantly to reach all domestic political outlets with the power to shift the foreign policy conversation towards advancing the thaw. without these business interests pushing to the forefront, the conversation on cuba would continue to be a quiet one. in 2015, the us department of commerce authorized business transactions in cuba to be worth up to $4.3 billion, a 30% increase from the previous year (renwick, 2016, n.a.). in september of 2012, travel agency, insight cuba, lobbied the senate banking and foreign relations committees as well as the house appropriations committee to help license renewal to continue sending tour groups to cuba. gephardt group, a lobbyist group “enabling countries to compete in the global marketplace”, was the primary lobby group for insight cuba (gephardt group, 2016). similarly, alcohol product producer and distributer barcardi limited is filed as having lobbied in may 2009. their efforts have focused on everyone from the us ambassador to the un to the entire us house of representatives and the counsel of the president for reanalysis of us policy towards cuba. the list of companies lobbying for open trade and investment with cuba is diverse and extensive. in 2014, the number of companies and organizations pushing for a complete thaw in relations skyrocketed due to hope for progress during president obama’s discussion of conducting dialogue with castro. the engage cuba coalition, which includes corporations such as viacom, choice hotels, the havana group, p&g, comcast nbc universal, and honeywell, stemmed from this hope. these powerful corporations are lobbying to end the trade embargo completely. before president obama’s trip to cuba in march, 2016, engage cuba utilized ties to the white house to provide an agenda for the business-oriented discussion during obama’s trip. while netflix, verizon, and air b&b have already opened business in cuba, the process is slow and selective (npr, 2016, n.a.). however, the cuba lobby is only growing. akin gump, the country’s largest lobby firm, is making plans for their trip to cuba to represent agricultural producers and distributors within the upcoming year (ho, 2016). lobbying efforts to end the 55-year-old embargo are intensive. while manufacturers and agricultural industries have played a role in the lobbying efforts, tourism, leisure, and telecommunications have had the most leverage in the attempt to convince congress to open trade barriers with cuba. while tourism services are not the only us businesses pushing for the thaw, tourism’s impact on the cuban economy has been an increasingly influential one. cuba has achieved progress toward its economic liberalization; however, the cuban government still publically abides by the same policies and values established during the 1959 revolution. nevertheless, through the mariel port project and the introduction of international business into cuba’s economic sphere, the us has witnessed a small step towards the progress it hoped the embargo would promote. this economic progress plays a significant role in discussion by policymakers about the future of diplomatic relations. analysis: larger international security implications much as the american mafia brought both infrastructure development and political corruption to cuba, joint ventures and a growing tourism industry could bring similar advances and vices. today, cuba operates on a dual economic system in which two different currencies exist. this utilization of both the national peso and the cuban convertible peso (cuc) complicates matters. while those working in the tourist industry make significantly more money by earning the internationally competitive cuc, the non-tourist sector workers fall further behind on the economic playing field. a taxi driver can earn up to 20 cuc for a single car ride. comparatively, an agricultural worker or urban employee often earns, as the national average, roughly 408 pesos for an entire month (brenner et al, 2015, p195). the cuc is worth 25 times more than the national peso (the economist, 2013, n.a.). with most consumer goods being sold in cuc, this creates a problematic dual economy that has prompted the cuban government to rethink economic strategies domestically. this dual currency system creates counterproductive systematic inconsistencies for the running of a socialist state. one of the largest negative internal implications of allowing tourism-centered foreign joint ventures is the increase of wealth inequality in the country - unless cuba standardizes its currency. this requires a deeper consideration of how foreign investment will interact with the socialist economic system by a cuban government that is looking to reform its economy. in addition to internal struggles, cuba is conscious of its position on the world stage. once priding itself as the “leader of the third world,” cuba does not receive the same cold attitude from the rest of the world as it does from the us. in 2015, many leaders, notably the presidents of chile and ecuador, in the organization of american states (oas), refused to come to the seventh summit of the oas unless cuba was included in the conversation. cuba had its membership taken away in 1962 under us influence in the organization. additionally, the un general assembly has voted several times against the us embargo on cuba. giving cuba a voice that had been muted for years in regional organizations is important to the political alignments that exist today. opening up relations with cuba has the potential to shift the political environment of the western hemisphere. cuba was removed from the us state sponsor of terrorism list in may of 2015, which is one of the obama administration's most noteworthy steps in the rapprochement process. cuba received this designation during the cold war because of alleged repressive political ideologies and communistic actions. now that cuba is no longer nominally an enemy to the us and its economy is liberalizing out of both necessity for modernization and sustainable solutions to economic stagnation, cuba has an important decision to make. over the past 15 years, cuba has created an economic and political interdependence with its close ally venezuela. despite strained economic conditions for both counties, their relationship comes from a close alignment of political ideologies between the castro family and venezuelan president maduro. venezuela depends on cuba for human capital in the form of doctors, teachers, and military advisors. mutually, cuba depends on venezuelan oil (piccone and trinkunas, 2014, n.a.). although both nations would benefit from an ease on economic interdependence because of increasing internal instability within each country, this is not probable to occur unless both countries diversify their international trading partners and allies. as venezuela faces a huge economic downturn caused by low oil prices, cuba made the strategic decision to accept the opening of political relations with the united states. this shift is not just politically expedient but is also a push for economic survival in the global economy. simultaneously, the united states has powerful self-interests as well as an external reputation to uphold. the us must begin to question whether its policy toward latin america is sufficient. with increasing hostility from south america by countries such as venezuela and ecuador, it may be beneficial to continue liberal political thought in the maintenance of relations with other actors in latin america. finding mutually beneficial partnerships and avoiding parasitic ones may be the next step for american foreign policy in the region in order to avoid breaches of international security. however, the us is also in a race with china to secure economic relationships in the region before the chinese market has gained dominance in latin america. chinese economic influence is growing in the region exponentially. as a global trade competitor, the us has an interest in not only maintaining ties in latin america but bolstering them as well. external interests to open relations were evident in both the us and cuban agendas. these economic needs and desires have the power and potential to play the most important role in political decisions. ultimately, the tourism industry has become the first true revelation from both the us and cuba to analyze their policies toward one another; the us risks losing a growing tourist industry and economic influence in latin america while cuba risks an economic downturn. the us-cuban relationship has the potential to be mutually beneficial, and despite the risks, it is clear that us politicians have begun to realize this fact. conclusion as the prospect of us joint ventures in cuba becomes more potent, an interesting relationship emerges between policy creation and corporate interests. not unlike other policy sectors, business interests and politics intersect strategically to establish wide scale political change. that is not to say that certain obstacles do not remain such as property claims in the country. nonetheless, the influence of the tourism industry can be illustrated through this emerging relationship between two countries once categorically established as enemies. recognizing the larger implication of this research is key to understanding both the us and cuban role in the international sphere. as long as business interests exist, foreign policymakers will be pressured to view the foreign relations process through an economic lens. in the case of us and cuba, diplomacy and foreign investment are not mutually exclusive foreign policy tactics. rather, their purposes intertwine to create a new interpretation of economic alliances. references baumohl, b. (1997). checking into cuba?. time international (canada edition), 150(8), 32. http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth& an=9709081288&site=ehost-live benzing, c. (2005). cuba--is the "special period" really over?. international advances in economic research, 11(1), 69-82. doi:10.1007/s11294-004-7169-6. brenner et al. (eds). (2015). “chapter sixteen: poverty and vulnerability in cuba today.” the revolution under raul castro: a contemporary cuba reader. london: rowman and littlefield publishing group, inc. cuba overview. (2013). congressional digest, 92(7), 2-32. http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h& an=90050152&site=ehost-live davalos leon, l. (2014). el regimen juridico de la zona especial de desarollo mariel en cuba. actualidad juridica (1578-956x), (37), 167-175. davis, j. h. 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(2013). foreign investment in the new cuban economy. nacla report on the americas, 46(1), 13-18. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&an=87050767&site=ehost -live frank, m. (2015, september 23). cuba bids to lure foreign investment with new port and trade zone. retrieved march 1, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-investmentidusbre98m12h20130923 frank, m. (2016, january 11). unilever returns to cuba in joint venture with state. retrieved february 1, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-unileveriduskcn0up2jx20160111 gephardt group. (n.d.). gephardt group, llc : enabling companies to compete in the global marketplace. retrieved march 20, 2016, from http://www.gephardtgroup.com/ godfathers of havana: cuba, castro, and organized crime. (n.d.). retrieved march 26, 2016, from http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/fidel-castro/videos/godfathers-of-havanacuba-castro--organized-crime ho, c. 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(2014, june). the cuba-venezuela alliance: the beginning of the end? retrieved march 26, 2016, from http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-picconetrinkunas renwick, d. (2016, march 16). u.s.-cuba relations. retrieved march 20, 2016, from http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 spadoni, p., & sagebien, j. 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(2015). shifting course: expanding the scope of permissible cuba transactions. venulex legal summaries, 1-5. http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth& an=102444412&site=ehost-live sunlight foundation. (n.d.). influence explorer. retrieved march 20, 2016, from http://influenceexplorer.com/about timeline: u.s.-cuba relations. (n.d.). retrieved march 15, 2016, from http://www.cfr.org/cuba/timeline-us-cuba-relations/p32817 http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=102444412&site=ehost-live http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=102444412&site=ehost-live http://influenceexplorer.com/about http://www.cfr.org/cuba/timeline-us-cuba-relations/p32817 south asia: after the bomb amrutha prasad university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the effect of nuclear weapons has long been debated. some argue that these weapons have a stabilizing effect on already volatile regions and rivals, while others fear that it will only further escalate tensions. in their book debating a nuclear world, waltz and sagan take opposing positions on the effect that the atom bomb had on the territorial issues india has with its neighbors pakistan and china. the case of south asia and the bomb is unique in the sense that while they are all ancient civilizations, their current regimes are all the same age. we are thus offered a cocktail of ancient civilizations, young regimes, territorial conflict, and history’s most lethal weapon. this paper seeks to discover if the presence of nuclear bombs has impacted the ability to resolve territorial disputes between these nations. after looking at the foreign policy of each country and the history of their development of nuclear weapons, i find that, yes, possessing nuclear weapons has delayed the resolution of this territorial issue. about the author amrutha prasad is currently wrapping up and undergraduate degree in political science, along with minors in french and global studies and a certificate in arms control, domestic, and international security. her interests include war and peace studies, security studies, and american foreign policy. as an undergraduate, she worked extensively with the acdis security studies group, where she served initially as vice president of academic affairs and is just ending her time as vice president of social affairs. in fall 2016, she will begin a master's in foreign policy at the elliot school of international affairs. introduction the presence of nuclear weapons in south asia has created a thoroughly unique situation. although each of the societies there (indian, chinese, and pakistani) has been long established, their current regimes are about the same age. india gained independence in 1947, pakistan was created that same year, and china was proclaimed a people's republic in 1949. we are thus offered a cocktail of old civilizations, young regimes, territorial conflict, and history's most lethal weapon. what effect have nuclear bombs had on bilateral relations between india and china and india and pakistan? specifically, has the possession of nuclear bombs impacted the ability to resolve the territorial disputes between these nations? while recognizing that it is exceedingly difficult to understand the thought processes of decision makers, this paper hypothesizes that the possession of nuclear weapons makes territorial disputes even more difficult to resolve. in order to answer these questions, this paper will draw upon research in deterrence theory, which allows us to consider questions related to how likely a state is to be attacked if it possesses nuclear weapons. additionally, the countries will be analyzed in terms of motivations to proliferate. following an analysis on the impact of nuclear weapons on each country's foreign policy and their respective behaviors during conflict with each other, the paper will look at each country at the supranational level, in order to determine long-term policies towards nuclear weapons. in order to draw conclusions, evidence will be presented from other academics that investigate the effectiveness of thermonuclear weapons, commonly known as "hydrogen bombs", as tools to keep peace, as well as looking at the statistics for the number and outcomes of bilateral interactions that india has had with both pakistan and china. lastly, based on these conclusions, the paper will investigate the ability to make policy predictions for other countries. almost since the time of pakistan's creation and india's gaining independence from the united kingdom, the two neighboring countries have been engaged in conflict over the rule of kashmir, a region to the north of india and to the northeast of pakistan. in an attempt to settle the dispute, they established a "line of control" (loc) in 1972, effectively dividing it into india's jammu and kashmir and pakistan's northern areas. in addition, india also has a territorial dispute with china over aksai chin on the western front of kashmir, as well as india's northeastern state of arunachal pradesh, claimed by china as the tawang district as a part of south tibet. these disputes led to a war between the two states in 1962, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for india. lastly, in 1963 pakistan ceded a portion of the kashmiri lands to china, adding to the amount of disputed lands between two of asia's largest powers. (the economist 2012) a few scholars have advanced the argument that kashmir is irredentist in nature. irredentist questions are those of pan-nationality involving territories that are currently administered by other states but that share ethnic or cultural ties to the state laying claim to these territories. as shown by vasquez in "the war puzzle revisited" territorial conflicts are those most likely to lead to war until they have been resolved. thus, as far as conventional engagement goes, peace is impossible until there is a clear victory and territories are firmly established (vasquez 2009). two theories of particular importance are deterrence theory and nuclear peace theory. in direct contrast to the results put forth by vasquez, deterrence theory hypothesizes that the possession of nuclear weapons automatically makes any potential conflict so disastrous that they never involve themselves in any. nuclear peace theory takes this idea one step further and argues that nuclear weapons have the potential to induce stability. thus, these theories both posit that in introducing weapons with major potential for destruction potential and by making a situation more unstable, nuclear weapons may actually contribute to peace and security (waltz 2013). these two contradictory positions put china, india, and pakistan in a unique position. on the one hand, war is inevitable because of the questions of territory and irredentist claims. on the other hand, war is arguably impossible because each of these states is a nuclear power and the damage inflicted on any other parties would be too great to risk significant conflict. notably, possessing nuclear weapons has not prevented conflict between the parties; despite testing in 1998, india and pakistan fought the kargil war in 1999, fought using entirely conventional weapons. further, while the indo-china border dispute has not escalated to all-out war since 1962, there is regular military activity on that border (pandit 2014). recent advances in nuclear weapons technology have enabled states to select strategic targets such as military command bases to avoid laying waste to cities. an example of which are intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms). china developed icbms in 1975 and india tested the agni v in 2012 and 2013 (cia 1976). these reduce the risk of nuclear war and make limited and controlled conflicts possible. even more reassuring in the case of sino-indian border disputes is that both states have adopted no-first use (nfu) policies towards nuclear weapons, swearing not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. thus, if the conflict manifests as a war once more, it is most likely to be settled by means of a conventional conflict. pakistan's approach to nuclear weapons is slightly different. while they have a range of ballistic missiles, they are yet to develop icbms. unlike india and china, they have opted to use nuclear weapons only defensively rather than choosing a no first use policy. this does not necessitate that they first be attacked with nuclear weapons before proceeding to use theirs, but that nuclear weapons can be used in case of conflict. this is worrisome as if pakistan were ever in a war, it could escalate into nuclear war. further, india has both a higher military capability and higher defense spending when compared to pakistan; this serves both as a potential threat and driving force in pakistan's refusal to adopt a no-first use policyso that they have a deterrent and a credible force with which to counter attacks (global firepower 2013). of the many reasons states proliferate, the idea of prestige and/or status come into question. according to sherrill, one of the many reasons states proliferate is the prestige attributed to a nuclear weapons state (sherrill 2012). this idea is useful in predicting the mentalities of nations and their decision makers. nuclear weapons help states assert dominance in a states region. china proliferated in response not only to protect against american aggression but also to assert dominance in the region. india did so in response to china as it did not want an unfriendly neighbor to dominate the continent, and pakistan proliferated in order to show greater military parity with india (miller 2014). this theory can also be applied to interpreting why these territorial disputes are proving difficult to resolve. territory is such an essential part of a state that if one were to relinquish a portion of it, it is interpreted as weakness while nuclear weapons are seen as a symbol of power and dominance. territory is equated to resources and so if they are weak enough to relinquish something as important as territory, then they could be viewed as too weak to have a voice in international forums. these are only some of the issues raised as to the actual power of a country in the case of territorial disputes, added on to the perceived prestige of being a nuclear weapons state. merely because they are nuclear weapons states, each of these countries has more prestige and status to lose than they otherwise would. fear of the loss of status or prestige does not preclude states from trying to cooperate so as to avoid conflict. a large part of the peace between india and china was the panchsheel or five principles of peaceful coexistence, which was signed in 1954 (ganguly, pardesi 2009). these principles were mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. although this agreement deteriorated eight years later with perceived indian interference in tibet, the panchsheel regained its status of importance in the 1970s (panchsheel 2004). sinoindian relations soured once again when india tested nuclear weapons but since then relations between the two states have improved. additionally, as garver argues, sino-pakistani understandings do not prevent cooperation between china and india (garver 2001). although each country monitors the others' alignment with the united states for fear of their power, they are better able to come to agreements and bridge diplomatic divides on a regional and/or bilateral level. thus, the more two countries are economically tied together the less likely they are to fight each other, as put forth in democratic peace theory. mitra and thompson also find that recent rhetoric between india and china has improved, and is reflective of each looking at the other as more of a partner than an adversary (mitra, thompson 2005). in a significant shift, india and china signed agreements in 2005 during the chinese premier's visit to india in which india recognized china's claim to tibet and china recognized india's claim to sikkim, a himalayan state. this is not to say that their territorial disputes have been resolved but as a result of discussions and diplomacy, these questions seem to be moving towards resolution. of further importance are trade relations between india and china which developed as a result of india's economic liberalization in 1991. these trade relations play a key role in softening tensions between the two states and ensure that any skirmishes do not get out of hand. it is possible that a similar course of action could be used with regards to pakistan, by not only deepening cultural, diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, but attempting processes of reciprocity in terms of recognition of territory. as mentioned by taneja et al in their 2011 paper, despite an unfavorable political climate, india and pakistan have not diminished trade relations (taneja et al 2011). however, indo-pakistani trade relations take place erratically with nationalism soon overtaking a sense of economic pragmatism. further, if this trend of nationalism overtaking other interests continues between india and pakistan, it will continue to reverse any thawing between the two parties and no real progress will be made on any front for the foreseeable future. despite having achieved "nuclear maturity" in the aftermath of the kargil war and the 2001-2002 standoff, matters tend to remain tense on the line of control with both parties continually preparing for an attack from the other. thus, the indo-pakistani economic climate is often a function of the climate on the border. juxtaposed with this view, there is the dynamic between india and china, as countries aspiring to become fully developed economies. they cannot afford to have the sword of a territorial dispute constantly hanging over their heads. the aforementioned research has highlighted nuclear deterrence and irredentism supplying us with contrasting theories for predicting events in south asia. however, before launching into a discussion of deterrence theory as is applicable in this region, it must first be defined. this theory states that the possession of nuclear weapons will stop or prevent an attack on the state that possesses them either for fear of annihilation (if the attacking state does not possess them) or for fear of mutually assured destruction (if the attacking state does possess them). the idea of mutually assured destruction is that if two nuclear powers strike each other with their nuclear arsenals, in attacking the other party with their nuclear arsenals, they are both doomed, or their destruction is mutually assured. thus, nuclear war is highly unlikely, if not impossible. it is in south asia that this theory will truly be put to the test. as established in the previous section, the territorial issue that sits between china, india, and pakistan is not one that will be easily resolved. so how does deterrence theory apply here? india and china went to war in 1962 and ended in a conclusive chinese victory, two years before china tested their first nuclear weapon, in 1964. on the other hand, india and pakistan have continued to have serious confrontations on their border, most notably the kargil war, after developing nuclear weapons. thus, perhaps deterrence theory can only be applied on a case-by-case basis. here, it can be applied to the sino-indian conflict as neither party has engaged the other in a significant form since china developed a nuclear arsenal. added to this is the fact that both of these countries have signed onto no first use policies, meaning that even if their dispute were to escalate into another war, the likelihood of it becoming a nuclear war is very low. while the historical approach taken by vasquez shows us that territorial issues are most likely to lead to war, and thus the most probable course of action for the asian powers to solve their territorial conflicts, it is most likely to be a limited conflict on a conventional scale similar to the kargil war (vasquez 2009). contrarily, deterrence theory does not apply in the case of india and pakistan. as evidenced by the aforementioned kargil war, these two countries are able to engage each other in a limited war, using conventional tactics alone. thus, while deterrence could, theoretically, be applied to the case of india vs. china as both countries adopted the policy of nfu, it could be argued that it does not even exist in the case of india vs. pakistan as neither country is afraid to engage the other. this is a clear violation of the tenets of deterrence theory. however, the matter gets sticky when one begins to consider whether nuclear weapons are even in the picturethat is, why are india and pakistan comfortable engaging on a conventional level, but not comfortable with escalation. perhaps their wariness of escalation is proof of deterrence theory being applied in this case, for they fear that if one uses a nuclear weapon against the other, it dooms them both. so what does the outcome of deterrence look like in the case of india and pakistan? in the case of indian and chinese deterrence, we saw increased trade and diplomacy. however, in the case of india and pakistan, increased dialogue is showing signs of helping the two nations work more closely. for instance, when the indian parliament formed a new government in 2014, pakistani prime minister nawaz sharif was invited to new prime minister narendra modi’s swearing-in ceremony. both states have also been known to employ something known as “cricket diplomacy”. while it may seem trivialas though importance is being detracted from diplomacy and undue importance is being given to a sport, such cultural ties have the ability to strengthen ties between the two countries. as can be surmised by the name, cricket diplomacy is simply using cricket as a tool to either better or weaken diplomatic relations between the two countries. since both india and pakistan are former colonies of the british raj, cricket is a common cultural thread between them. this form of diplomacy was recently exercised between these two parties in 2011 when indian prime minister manmohan singh invited his pakistani counterpart yousuf raza gilani to watch the cricket world cup semifinal in which both countries had qualified. on a deeper level, relations between india and pakistan seem to be improving. despite the 2008 terrorist attacks in india that disturbed relations on a political level, their economic cooperation and exchange remained largely unaffected by it. notably, this trade stability is relatively recent as the rise in political tensions halted almost all trade until the early 1970s, when both countries began to build an economic relationship. with the establishment of the wto in 1995, pakistan was granted “most favored nation” status by india soon after (de 2013). this status is important as it allows for non-discriminatory trade between two countries. however, the strength of relations between south asia’s two largest economies, india and pakistan, seems irrelevant when in 2011 their trade with each other accounted for less than half a percent of india’s total trade and 5.4% of pakistan’s (de 2013). until quite recently, one of the most important economic breakthroughs between these two countries was the 2005 joint communiqué produced by a meeting between pervez musharraf and manmohan singh (khan 2009). this communiqué rang of optimism and the promise of greater economic integration between the two neighbors. of even more significance is pakistan’s agreement to work towards granting india mfn status as india work towards doing away with their “negative lists” or lists of items that could not be bought and sold from the other (taneja et al 2013). hence, it is clear that india and pakistan are potentially headed down the same path as india and chinaone of increased cooperation and diplomacy that promises to bring unprecedented development, stability, and prosperity to south asia. it would also fundamentally alter everything currently known about the dynamics of south asian politics, diplomacy, and the like, turning the region into a hotbed for growth. as relations improve, each of these countries would become more powerful on the international scale and increase india and china’s status as emerging powers. it could perhaps even make them the leaders of the brazil-russia-india-china bloc of countries. as mentioned previously, one thing to guard against would be any growing antagonism between these two powers. while it is undeniable that this vision of the future has a bipolar distribution of power, this bipolarity has the ability to be amicable and stable or antagonistic, frayed, and volatile. alternatively, one cannot help but recognize the potential relevance of the stabilityinstability paradox. this idea states that there can be greater stability in a system of two opposing nuclear powers as they automatically become more wary of fighting each other while there is increased instability on a lower level as there are more proxy war among smaller, less powerful states. this idea could come into play as india and china ascend the international ranks and become increasingly important players in the international arena. however, which states would become the proxy states is yet to be seen. further, it is not yet known whether this could be applied to india and pakistan. on the other hand, this theory need not only apply to international powers, but nuclear powers as well. in that case, lower level proxy wars are a possibility between india and pakistan as well, although the states that would partake are undetermined. the cold war can serve as a model of the stability-instability paradox for india and pakistan. the story reads the same; two volatile nuclear powers that could spark a war between them at any given moment. yet, even during the cold war, the united states and soviet union had created their own stabilityby never outright fighting each other but allowing smaller proxy wars. there are some very important differences to be noted here, though. for one, the sheer difference in the total number of warheads that the two cold war powers had (which was near 70,000 at the height) and the total number of warheads that india and pakistan possess (currently estimated at 120 each for a total of 240) (isaacs). secondly, the closest the cold war powers ever came to actual nuclear war was during the cuban missile crisis. however, india and pakistan have already gone to war. thus, as shown by s. paul kapoor, the cold war can’t be used as a model for nuclear south asia as conditions in the latter are not derived from the stabilityinstability paradox as much as they are from a combination of escalatory tactics and diplomacy (kapur 2005). what can be garnered from this cold war model for south asia is the way in which the cold war powers cooperated, that is, through the salt treaties. the two salt treaties or, strategic arms limitation talks were the product of two rounds of trilateral talks that led to the start or strategic arms reduction treaties. these treaties were centered on arms control and reducing the number of nuclear warheads that each country possessed. due to the nature of the way that south asia proliferated, these talks would need to be trilateral. further, the total number of nuclear weapons possessed by china, india, and pakistan together is less than what either of the cold war powers currently have (cnn). thus, even if they were to sit down for trilateral talks, the scope for the amount of progress they can make is limited by their possession of fewer nukes. however, the potential impact of china, india, and pakistan even having such talks is quite important. if, for example, they were to make a strategic offensive reductions treaty, such as the one made by the us and ussr, this alone would help contribute to the continued non-use of nuclear weapons in south asia. lastly, there is more to indo-pakistani cultural ties than just cricket. before 1947, they were one country. during the violence of partition, a part of india was cut off and turned into another country, leading to a lot of displacement of people. recently, there have been an increasing number of grassroots movements seeking to reestablish contact between or unify families that were separated and lost during partition. thus, while india and pakistan may have a significant religious difference between them, they have many cultural ties, shared history, and to some extent, a shared population. this strong “bottom-up” type of association reflects a potential ability for both countries to come together and overcome their differences. the current situation of the world shows little likelihood of there being another case similar to the relationships between china-india-pakistan. these cases cannot be considered a model of how nuclear-power dynamics can take place, but there are some broader lessons from the behavior of these three states that could potentially be applied to other cases. while there are no other nuclear powers that also seek to resolve a territorial dispute, the evidence presented in this paper shows the importance of economic relations and diplomatic ties. these are both important in terms of ways to collaborate and, perhaps more importantly, ways to punish each other without directly escalating a conflict to war. perhaps the most important conclusion that this paper has made is the cross between the conflict of nuclear deterrence and irredentism. based on the evidence provided above, it can be safely deduced that the irredentist movement will take precedence but the fear of nuclear war will definitely play into the dynamic. thus, as in the cases of india-china and india-pakistan, states with a territorial conflict between them attain nuclear weapons are more likely to pursue peaceful methods to resolve their dispute. these peaceful methods may not necessarily work, either these cases or in those in the future, but they cannot be faulted for trying. references compare world military powers results. 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http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/05/indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-china-set-to-end-16-day-chumar-stand-off-by-saturday/articleshow/43467644.cms http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-china-set-to-end-16-day-chumar-stand-off-by-saturday/articleshow/43467644.cms taneja, n., mehra, m., mukherjee, p., bimal, s., & dayal, i. “normalizing india pakistan trade.” indian council for research on international economic relations. 2014 u.s. central intelligence agency. prc defense policy and armed forces. national intelligence estimate 13-76. nov. 1976. vasquez, j.a. “the war puzzle revisited.” cambridge: cambridge university press. 2009 program in arms control & domestic and international security table of contents letter from the editor………………………………………………………………………….….ii about the illini journal of international security………………………………………………...iii the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories…….1 a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan………....17 a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it……………………………………………………………………….38 empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later……….49 the paradigm shifts in intelligence: from 1800 to present……………………………………..56 human trafficking as a national security issue……………………………………….………..65 table of contents american foreign policy towards the islamic state derek hoot university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract as the islamic state evolved, so did american foreign policy and the obama administration’s ability to counter threats such as the islamic state (is). the administration’s strategy is comprehensive and utilizes the entire capacity of the us government, its partners, and its membership organizations. the nine core elements are distinct, and each one has ratified national and international policies to demonstrate the proactive pursuit of each line of effort. in looking at statements and resolutions drafted by the un and g-7, it is clear that the united states is driving the foreign policy discussion in the fight against is. it is also clear that the policy-makers behind operation inherent resolve have broken free from the foreign policy axioms that hindered the bush administration officials from engaging in effective decision-making. instead of superimposing liberal democratic ideals on iraqi institutions, the united states is supporting effective and inclusive governance. additionally, the united states is no longer of searching for american interests within american values. the us government views the fight against is to an issue of regional and global security and enlisted its partners in the middle east, nato, and the united nations to support its mission of degrading and ultimately destroying the islamic state. this paper examines how the united states’ failed iraq policy facilitated the rise of a radical sunni insurgency, analyzes the united states’ foreign policy towards the islamic state, and offers criticism of american strategy. about the author derek hoot is a junior in the department of political science honors program. he is also an arabic studies minor. introduction on june 6, 2014, a convoy of pickup trucks entered the two-man checkpoints in the city of mosul, a city in the northern iraqi nineveh province. two days later, despite the efforts of four divisions of the iraqi security forces and air support from western and gulf nations, the second-largest city in iraq fell to is, a jihadist group recently divorced from al qaeda. throughout northern iraq and nearby syria, scenarios that american involvement in iraq were intended to have prevented were occurring. the democratic, liberalized iraq that the bush administration had envisioned was never actualized. the sequence of steps taken by the provisional government had robbed the iraqi state of its ability to effectively administer services and provide security for their people, aggrevating of sectarian conflict. the obama administration quickly became cognizant of the scope of the islamic state and its evolution from an al qaeda affiliate to a territory-holding terrorist organization with a concrete hierarchy and a hold on a stockpile of weapons and petroleum. under president obama, the administration devised a nine-point strategy that culminated in operation inherent resolve, a comprehensive plan to degrade and ultimately destroy is. the neoconservative strategy the problematic nature of american foreign policy in iraq can be traced back to the factors surrounding the invasion of the iraqi state in 2003. in his book overreach: delusions of regime change in iraq, michael macdonald offers multiple hypotheses to why president george w. bush ultimately called for the invasion of iraq and the removal of saddam hussein in favor of a democratic regime. he argues that hussein’s iraq was on the american governmental agenda since the late 1970s, given its strategic importance as a buffer zone between revolutionary iran and israel, a source of oil, and a springboard for american influence in the middle east. macdonald identifies three groups of supporters for the war in iraq neoconservatives, neoliberals, and liberal hawks, all of which ascribed to foreign policy axioms that would fail in iraq. this broad base of support, including deputy secretary of defense paul wolfowitz and senator hillary clinton, believed that american values and american interests were one and the same. they also believed, just as incorrectly, that american values were universal (macdonald, 2014). when american-led coalition forces took baghdad in 2003, paul bremer was appointed to the position of coalition provisional administrator. as cpa, bremer was the top civilian administrator and chief executive in iraq, and could rule by decree. his role in occupied iraq has been compared to general macarthur in japan and the general lucius clay, who was in charge american zone in germany after world war ii. republicans and democrats debated on the issue of how how to govern the new iraqi state. many stood behind the “fire the coach and keep the team” method, which entailed deposing saddam hussein and maintaining the administration and civil service which could be of use under new leadership. bremer, however, got rid of a majority of the 'team,' disbanding the military and 'de-ba’athifying' the state by dissolving hussein’s arab socialist party, all with the intent of democratizing iraq. the ba’ath party, led by hussein and composed of socialists and arab nationalists, had dominated iraqi politics since 1968. this “disband, de-ba’athify, democratize” approach weakened the administrative ability of the iraqi state beyond its already crippled condition due to us-led sanctions (al-ali, 2014). the specter of democracy in shi’a-majority iraq inspired fear in the sunni minority, former ba’athists, and former military officers. local sunni sheiks who had exercised local authority through political deals with the hussein regime were also wary of changes in the composition of the iraqi government. this fear of reprisal, combined with a history of violence between factions and the decreased utility of central authority in baghdad prompted a sunni insurgency to form, with increased intensity in the tribal areas of the northern anbar province. meanwhile, foreign fighters began to flow into anbar province. these fighters were part of tawlid al jihad (unity of god and jihad), later tanzim qaedat al jihad fi bilad al rafidayn, or al qaeda in iraq. they were led by abu musab al-zarqawi, a jordanian sunni radical who had been trained in afghanistan and was granted a $200,000 loan by osama bin laden himself (weiss, 2015). counterinsurgency under petraeus in response to the influx of foreign fighters in the anbar region, general david petraeus bolstered the counterinsurgency capacity of the american military. first, he ordered the publication of a counterinsurgency (coin) manual to be distributed to the united states marine corps. then, he evaluated and exploited the political situation in anbar province, co-opting the anbar sheiks and allying against al-qaeda in iraq (aqi), the group that would later become the islamic state, who had overstepped and alienated the local sunni sheiks (macdonald, 2014). aqi was terrorizing the shi’a population and bombing religious sites, sparking sectarian reprisals that necessitated protection in tribal areas. the sheiks in the anbar province joined petraeus’s campaign against al qaeda in what became known as the anbar awakening. petraeus's coin campaign paved the way for counterinsurgency successes and the reduction of violence in the beginning of 2007. however, the coalition-anbari sheik alliance may have contributed to what would become isil’s “us against the world” mentality, as it separated radical foreign fighters from the indigenous sunni communities and the tribal networks they claimed to protect. meanwhile, the insurgency was evolving in response to leadership changes and death. on june 7, 2006, two us f-16 fighters dropped two 500-pound laser and gps-guided bombs on alzarqawi’s safehouse in baqubah, which resulted in his death (roberts, 2006). since the death of al-zarqawi, a number of emirs (leaders) have succeeded zarqawi as emir of aqi and its evolved forms. these include abu ayyub al masri, abu omar al baghdadi, and current emir abu bakr al baghdadi. they all remain committed to aqi’s objectives of expelling the us from iraq and turning iraq and the surrounding region into a sunni caliphate, but have operated under different names. in october 2006, internet messages circulating between aqi and several smaller insurgent groups referred to the establishment of the islamic state of iraq (isi) in western and central iraq. eight groups in total, calling themselves the mujahideen shura council, collectively established isi (weiss, 2015). under al baghdadi’s leadership, militants were sent to engage in the syrian conflict, eventually expanding the mission of the organization and prompting isi to become isis (the islamic state in iraq and syria) or isil (the islamic state in iraq and the levant). in 2014, al qaeda general ayman al zawahiri disavowed the islamic state, denouncing any affiliation with baghdadi’s organization (weiss, 2015). since that divorce, the us government saw isil as a distinct threat, an umbrella organization that captured much of the radical sunni fighters that emerged in the aftermath of the iraq war. in june 2014, baghdadi declared his insurgency a “caliphate,” dropping all previous acronyms and becoming the islamic state. the administration’s strategy three primary sources were used to determine the objectives of us foreign policy related to is in iraq and syria – g-7 statement on joint action against is released by the us department of state, president barack obama’s address to the nation on the is threat, and the administration’s official strategy on countering the islamic state. all three sources contain similar language and address overlapping policy objectives. the most detailed strategy for countering the is threat is the administration’s strategy, which alludes to nine “core elements” or “lines of effort” that work in harmony towards the destruction of is. these core elements include supporting effective governance in iraq, denying is safe haven, building partner capacity, enhancing intelligence collection, disrupting is’s finances, exposing is’s true nature, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, protecting the homeland, and providing humanitarian support (white house, 2015). manifested in policy form, these nine objectives amalgamate into operation inherent resolve, a $5.6 billion program implemented by the department of defense and the department of state with the goal of destroying is. in this section i will detail how the united states intends to accomplish each of these regional objectives. winning the material war the first core element mentioned in the administration’s strategy is supporting effective governance in iraq. american and coalition support for the iraqi government is evident in almost every document pertaining to counter-is efforts. for example, in the g-7 statement, which was drafted by the member states and the high representative of the european union, the ministers “affirm [their] support for the new iraqi government and encourage prime minister al abadi to rapidly develop and implement his government’s national program as well as an inclusive policy which unifies the country by representing and defending the interests of all iraqi men and women” (embassy of the united states, 2015). the white house fact sheet states that “[the united states is] supporting the new iraqi government on efforts to govern inclusively and effectively.” in president obama’s address to the nation on the is threat, he states that he “insisted that additional us action [depends] on iraqis forming an inclusive government.” inclusivity in iraqi politics is a major focal point that the current administration is rightfully concerned with given the incidence of sectarian violence in iraq and tensions between sunnis, shia, and kurds. after the violent treatment of sunni communities by former prime minister nouri al maliki, fears exist that al abadi, a shi’a prime minister, will continue this anti-sunni policy. iraqi security forces are also overwhelmingly shi’a and work with shi’a militia from iran. thus, fostering inclusivity in both politics and the armed forces will calm fears of reprisal from the shi’a majority in iraq. perhaps the most costly line of effort in the administration’s counter-is strategy is the commitment to denying is safe-haven. in his address on is, president obama asserts, “a core principle of my presidency is that, if you threaten america, you will find no safe-haven” (obama, 2014). to accomplish this, the administration calls for a “systematic campaign of airstrikes,” spanning both iraq and syria (white house, 2014). according to kenneth katzman, a specialist in middle eastern affairs, the goals of the campaign have evolved from “stopping the advance of islamic state forces” and protecting american personnel and religious minorities, to supporting military operations. presently, the airstrike campaign provides support for iraqi ground forces and also works to destroy is’s 'logistical and operational capability.' for example, on april 21, 2015, alone, coalition military forces conducted 22 airstrikes within iraq using fighter, bomber, and 'remotely piloted aircraft'. these airstrikes were used to destroy is artillery weapons, vehicles, fighting positions, tactical units, heavy machine guns, buildings, excavators, mortar systems, staging areas, and an ied factory (department of defense, 2015). conceivably, is’s 'safe-havens' are located in larger cities like mosul and fallujah. the largest planned offensive in place is a plan to retake mosul, which fell to is forces in june 2014. the first phase of the liberation, known as “fatah” or “conquest,” has begun, with the 15th iraqi army division working side-by-side with kurdish forces in makhmour to take back neighboring villages and push islamic state rocket teams further away from american and iraqi bases. since january of 2015, the city has been surrounded by kurdish forces with the intent to box in militants and disrupt supply routes. american airstrikes have been carried out against infrastructural and military targets, including bunkers and armored vehicles (department of defense, 2015). building partner capacity is a longstanding strategic goal in the broader middle east region, but is an especially salient one in the battle against is. the united states relies on military and paramilitary forces both on the ground and in the air to compliment its military strategy. for example, jordan is assisting in launching airstrikes in iraq; while in syria its regional partners include jordan, bahrain, saudi arabia, and united arab emirates. on the ground, the united states depends on iraqi security forces, shi’a militia, and kurdish forces to regain territory while providing air support. the program that best demonstrates the united states’ commitment to building partner capacity is the $1.6 billion iraq train and equip fund (itef), which provides for training sites, supplies and equipment for twelve iraqi brigades. the administration’s strategy contains provisions specifying to “[provide] the resources to help reconstitute and develop security forces” (white house, 2015). this includes sending 475 american service members to iraq to train security forces, as well as to set up national guard units. president barack obama ensures that “these american forces will not have a combat mission…but they are needed to support iraqi and kurdish forces with training, intelligence, and equipment” (obama, 2014). the g-7 statement by foreign ministers employs more passive language. in it, the ministers “welcome all contributions to improve security, including by means of training and equipment” (embassy of the united states, 2015). despite this difference, the influence of the administration’s strategy on joint documents is glaring. one criticism of how the united states builds partner capacity involves the entities accepted into the security coalition. in iraq, the united states is training peshmerga militia fighters loyal to the kurdistan regional government who have only temporarily set aside their separatist grievances against the iraqi government to fight the is threat. the central intelligence agency has even been granted permission to funnel weapons and equipment from the iraqi security forces to kurdish forces (katzman, 2014). in syria, the administration has considered co-opting what president obama calls the “moderate” opposition, and what rear admiral john kirby refers to as “vetted syrians”. what was once a 3-year program to train and equip 5,400 members of the syrian opposition, using regional partners like turkey, saudi arabia, and qatar to “host program activities,” has been stalled. however, the syrian democratic forces and the new syrian army remain in the program. the united states is arming and training multiple rebel militias with arguably little promise that they will remain loyal to the united states once the is conflict is resolved. one of the major challenges facing the united states and the entire anti-is coalition is the task of disrupting their financing, which, unlike other jihadist groups, is not primarily funded by foreign donations (johnson, 2015). in contrast, is’s main revenue stream comes from selling oil. according to the congressional research service, the united states is pursuing a three-pronged approach to disrupting their financesattacking revenue streams, restricting their access to the international financial system, and imposing sanctions on is officials and their external financial backers. again, the united states turns to their regional partners, the united nations, and the military to accomplish these objectives. first, the united states is pushing partners to draft legislation targeting cross-border smuggling networks. unfortunately, these laws are often unenforced. military strikes on petroleum collection points and refineries, however, have reduced is oil revenues from one million dollars a day to several million dollars a week (katzman, 2014). the united states also aims to curb is access to iraqi banks, and works with the iraqi and international financial community to limit is’s ability to store and transfer money. in september 2014, the united nations security council passed resolution 2178, which worked to prevent the flow of funding to is. lastly, the us department of treasury identifies and sanctions individuals involved in is’s funding and recruiting efforts. through this three-pronged approach-unilateral, regional, and international financial disruption, the united states is constraining is’ funding and supplies. winning the rhetorical war beyond material war, united states is also waging a psychological battle against the islamic state. three of the nine core elements will be referred to as the heart of the administration’s strategy namely, exposing is’s true nature, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, and protecting the homeland. these objectives are all concerned with the hearts and minds of potential jihadists, and winning the rhetorical war against radical islam. the united states has expressed their commitment to working alongside partners within the muslim world to “highlight is’s hypocrisy and counter its false claims of acting in the name of religion” (white house, 2015). president obama has emphasized is’s “un-islamic” nature in multiple speeches, and secretary of state john kerry has ceased to refer to is as the islamic state, preferring the arabic acronym da’esh (dawla islamiyya iraq wa al-sham). delegitimizing is’s message is a critical step in stemming their efforts, which have brought their casualty-to-replacement ratios “close to equal” (katzman, 2014) the white house describes is as an organization that is “wellresourced and has demonstrated an ability to recruit and radicalize through social media” (white house, 2015). the islamic state has published its manifesto online, is active on social media sites like twitter, and is estimated to have recruited 20,000 foreign fighters globally-3,400 of those from western countries (white house, 2015). the brookings center for middle east policy estimates that there are no fewer than 36,000 twitter accounts supporting is (berger, 2015). in response to these efforts, the united states has facilitated the creation and adoption of united nation security council resolutions 2170 and 2178. unscr 2170 calls upon all member states “to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign fighters…” while unscr 2178 requires member states to prevent the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of [foreign fighters]” (katzman, 2014). additionally, robert bradtke of the state department works with partners in europe, north africa, and the middle east to curtail the flow of foreign fighters from their respective countries (katzman, 2014). curbing the surge of combatants from western countries is related to the most abstract objective cited within the nine “core elements,” which is that of protecting the homeland, the united states. the primary rhetoric in all documents that have referenced the islamic state released by the us government is that “if left unchecked,” is could potentially stage an attack on the united states or its allies. for example, the administration strategy fact sheet states, “if left unchecked, [the islamic state] could pose a growing threat to the united states and others beyond the region.” it also articulates fears about foreign fighters returning to their place of origin. the us government is “[concerned] that these trained and battle-hardened fighters will try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks” (white house, 2015). the islamic state has, in fact, referred to an invasion of the united states, and created images of the jihadist black flag flying atop the white house. they have also referred to the 'fall of rome.' whether this refers to the actual italian city, the 'american empire,' or the general western world is largely unclear. while it is also uncertain whether is has the resources to organize such an attack, the american intelligence community coordinates with source, transit, and returnee destination countries to monitor threats (katzman, 2015). stemming the crisis lastly, the united states is committed to providing humanitarian aid to assuage the refugee and displaced persons crisis in iraq and syria. since the invasion in 2003, the united states has paired its military efforts in the region with humanitarian aid. between 2003 and 2012, the us provided 31% of all humanitarian assistance to iraq, a total of $36 million (global humanitarian initiative, 2015). in the fight against the islamic state, the need to provide food, water, and supplies to iraqis is just as immediate. in august of 2014, as american forces carried out airstrikes on amirli, a farming community 105 miles north of baghdad that had been besieged by is, coalition forces also dropped 10,500 gallons of fresh water and 7,000 mres (meals ready to eat). in erbil, another city in northern iraq, ethnic yazidi refugees under the protection of kurdish forces received 5,300 gallons of drinking water and 8,000 mres (griffin, 2015). much of the aid provided to iraq is coordinated through the united nations. a strategic response plan, initiated by the united nations in 2014, requested $3.7 billion in aid (global humanitarian initiative, 2015). the united states is also the single-largest donor of humanitarian aid for those affected by the syria crisis. usaid estimates that 7.6 million syrians are internally displaced, and 3.9 million syrians are displaced to neighboring countries. since fiscal year 2012, the us government has provided syria over $3 billion in humanitarian assistance (usaid, 2015). displaced populations also put pressure on the lebanese, jordanian, and turkish governments. the infrastructures that are in place are inadequate to accommodate the thousands of refugees in neighboring countries’ schools and hospitals. although the united states is a leader in providing humanitarian support to both nations, donor countries have failed to keep up with what usaid calls “the biggest humanitarian emergency of our era.” conclusion as the situation in iraq deteriorated, it became clear that the missteps of the coalition government led to a burgeoning sunni insurgency that preyed on the populace’s fears of western imperialism and ethnic reprisal. from the ashes rose abu bakr al-baghdadi’s self-declared caliphate, and in response, the obama administration has forged a comprehensive strategy to counter the islamic state. the nine core elements of operation inherent resolve seek to broaden the anti-is coalition and foster regional cooperation. they draw upon american resources both inside the government and around the globe, and seek to destroy is’s capacity to recruit, reap profits, and secure territory. in an effort to learn the mistakes of neoconservatives and the coalition government, there is an emphasis on political stabilization within the iraqi state. operation inherent resolve has drawn criticism from those who believe the administration should not “cut deals” with opposition and separatist elements, however, it ensures that our allies possess local knowledge that coalition forces from the united states and europe do not. through pragmatism, and fighting terror for the sake of global security rather than installing democracy, operation inherent resolve acts as a blueprint for battling the new paradigm in world terror, the islamic state. references al-ali, zaid. the struggle for iraq's future: how corruption, incompetence and sectarianism have undermined democracy. new haven, ct: yale up, 2014. print. al-amin, hazem. "deciphering daesh-origins,impact and future sociological challenges to understanding daesh and its incubators." al jazeera center for studies, n.d. web. 21 feb. 2015. berger, j. m., and jonathon morgan. "the isis twitter consensus: defining and describing the population of isis supporters on twitter." center for middle east policy at brookings, 05 mar. 2015. web. 27 apr. 2015. cockburn, patrick. the rise of islamic state: isis and the new sunni revolution. n.p.: verso, 2015. print. "embassy of the united states." g7 foreign ministers' joint statement on fighting isil. n.p., n.d. web. 21 feb. 2015. epstein, susan b., united states. cong. fy2015 budget requests to counter ebola and the islamic state (is). cong. rept. n.p.: n.p., n.d. print global humanitarian initiative iraq. global humanitarian initiative, n.d. web. 26 apr. 2015 griffin, jennifer. "us airstrikes, humanitarian aid for iraqi city under isis siege." fox news. fox news network, 31 aug. 2014. web. 26 apr. 2015. hoffman, bruce. "a first draft of the history of america's ongoing wars on terrorism." studies in conflict & terrorism 38.1 (2015): n. pag. psycinfo database with full text. web. 24 feb. 2015. johnson, patrick b., united states. cong. house. house financial services committee. countering isil's funding. 113th cong. h. doc. rand office of external affairs, 13 nov. 2014. web. 21 feb. 2015. katzman, kenneth. united states. the "islamic state" crisis and u.s. policy. 113 cong. cong. rept. n.p.: congressional research service, createspace, 2014. print. khatib, line. islamic revivalism in syria: the rise and fall of ba'thist secularism. milton park, abingdon, oxon: routledge, 2011. print. lewis, jessica d. "the islamic state: a counter-strategy for a counter-state." institute for the study of war (2014): n. pag. proquest pais international. web. 24 feb. 2015. macdonald, michael. overreach: delusions of regime change in iraq. cambridge, ma: harvard up, 2014. print. miller, zeke j. "obama authorizes air strikes, humanitarian aid in iraq." time. time, 7 aug. 2014. web. 26 apr. 2015. obama, barack h. "president obama addresses the nation on the isil threat." washington, district of columbia. 10 sept. 2014. speech. "operation inherent resolve." map of countires supporting the proliferation security initiative. department of defense, n.d. web. 26 apr. 2015. pollack, kenneth m. "isis is losing in iraq. but what happens next?" the new york times. the new york times, 03 feb. 2015. web. 27 apr. 2015. rand, dafna, and anthony vassalo. "bringing the fight back home: western foreign fighters in iraq and syria." center for a new american security (2014): n. pag. proquest. web. 24 feb. 2015. roberts, joel. "what's next after zarqawi's death?" cbsnews. cbs interactive, 8 june 2006. web. 27 apr. 2015. stansfield, gareth. "the islamic state, the kurdistan region and the future of iraq: assessing uk policy options." international affairs 90.6 (2014): n. pag. web. 26 feb. 2015. the islamic state of iraq and syria: the history of isis/isil. n.p.: charles river editors, n.d. print. usaid, crisis in syria | u.s. agency for international development. united states agency for international development, 31 mar. 2015. web. 26 apr. 2015. weiss, michael, and hassan hassan. isis: inside the army of terror. n.p.: n.p., n.d. print. white house, "facts on u.s. strategy to counter isil | embassy of the united states." fact sheet: strategy to counter the islamic state of iraq and the levant (isil). office of the press secretary, 10 sept. 2014. web. 21 feb. 2015. program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 explaining middle east participation in the convention against torture derek hoot university of illinois abstract the study of international regimes has largely concentrated on two central questions: 1. why do states sign and ratify international regimes?; and 2. do states comply with international regimes? these questions are deeply intertwined, as lack of compliance signals either state helplessness or ulterior motives for ratification behavior. in this paper, i will focus on those ulterior motives, mainly aid-seeking behavior and the desire for trade benefits. this paper seeks to demonstrate the relationship between middle eastern states' participation in the convention against torture (cat) and the acquisition of economic benefits. additionally, it examines the significance of conflict in determining ratification behavior. about the author derek hoot is a senior studying political science and arabic studies. he is interested in international human rights law and the implications of geopolitics on human rights. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 introduction for the purposes of examining motives for middle eastern cat compliance, the “middle east” includes egypt, syria, jordan, lebanon, israel, iraq, iran, qatar, bahrain, united arab emirates, oman, yemen, saudi arabia, and turkey. in order to demonstrate the changing state of human rights, specifically with regards to torture, the cingranelli-richards (ciri) human rights database's variable on the practice of torture was used. the ciri database defines torture as the “purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials” (cingranelli, 2014). the ciri database primarily draws from state department data and is used by over 400 organizations worldwide. each country-year is independently coded by at least two coders to ensure reliability. data on political terror, physical integrity, and armed conflict was used, which is described at length under “variable operationalization.” ratification theory in oona a. hathaway's 2007 paper “why do countries commit to human rights treaties,” she describes what she calls the “collateral consequences” of committing to a human rights treaty. hathaway asserts that “the decision to commit to a treaty… has collateral as well as legal consequences. these collateral consequences arise from the reactions of domestic or transnational actors to the state's decision to commit to the treaty” (hathaway, 2007). this paper will focus on the transnational consequences, which according to hathway, “may come about through the linking of foreign aid, trade, or other transnational relationships to the state's decision to ratify.” ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 other political scientists hold that a state's decision to ratify can also be influenced by domestic factors such as conflict, political instability, and uncertainty. in his paper on the origins of human rights regimes, andrew moravcsik claims that “governments seek to establish reliable judicial constraints on future non-democratic governments or on democratically elected governments that may seek (as in interwar italy and germany) to subvert democracy from within” (moravcsik, 2000). he goes further to say that “[a state's] willingness to tolerate sovereignty costs increases insofar as the costs are outweighed by the benefits of reducing domestic political uncertainty” (moravcsik, 2000). this implies that states in conflict are more likely to be ratifiers because they have a greater stake in reducing political uncertainty. however, just as political uncertainty and domestic strife can increase a state's likelihood of ratification, conflict is believed to have a negative effect on human rights realities. the united nations states that “serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are common in many armed conflicts. in certain circumstances, some of these violations may even constitute genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.” that said, it also acknowledges the complex relationship between human rights and conflict. the united nations system staff college in turino, italy, which trains united nations personnel, cites the cape town centre for conflict resolution, stating that “[the relationship] is two-fold: conflict can lead to human rights violations, and the sustained denial of human rights can lead to violent conflict” (parleviet, 2002). this paper will focus on the first relationship: countries in conflict are more susceptible to human rights violations. beyond the tangible benefits of aid, trade, and decreased political uncertainty, ratifying states may seek to participate in the “window dressing phenomenon,” that is, they simply wish to appear “good” to the international community while continuing noncompliant behavior in private ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 settings. this is an international phenomenon, but it is much stronger on a regional level. hathaway contends that “if a country lies in a region in which human rights norms are highly valued, it will seek to demonstrate its commitment to these shared norms and thereby smooth relations with other countries in the region” (hathway, 2007). i chose to analyze the middle eastern countries because of the complex nature of human rights, conflict, aid, and trade in the middle east. although the “middle east” is a eurocentric term and its boundaries are largely considered arbitrary, i chose the definition is concurrent with the state department's definition of the “near east” and “middle east” in 1958 (with the exception of yemen and the united arab emirates, which were established in 1971 and 1990 respectively, and iran, which i considered because of its geographic location and its relevance to the study of the effects of conflict and exports on ratification) (the new york times, 1958). in studying the ratification of human rights agreements, i focused my efforts on countries' ratification behavior in relation to the convention against torture. in this paper, i seek to explain why middle eastern countries, especially those that ultimately fail to comply with the convention against torture, ratify it anyway. i hypothesize that middle eastern countries who ratify the cat will experience “rewards” in the form of increased foreign aid despite stagnating or decreasing human rights conditions in their countries post-ratification. i also hypothesize that conflicts with a domestic dimension will increase the the likelihood of cat ratification. variable operationalization ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 9 in explaining cat ratification behavior, i divided my independent variables into three major categories: human rights realities, economic variables (transnational collateral consequences), and conflict variables (domestic collateral consequences). i chose to describe human rights realities in middle eastern countries by using purdue's political terror scale [pts], and cingranelli-richards human rights data set torture [tort] and physical integrity [physint] variable. i chose the purdue pts scale in particular because it provides insight into the more visible state behaviors that do not comply with the cat. its coders are also specifically trained to ignore their personal biases and give states the benefit of the doubt while analyzing human rights reports. purdue researchers’ political terror scale (pts) uses evaluations of torture, rule of law, civil and political rights, and political murder from both the state department and amnesty international. for my pts variable, i averaged state and amnesty findings, which range from zero to five. level one implies that the state in question is “under a secure rule of law, [where] people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional.” (gibney, 2016) in contrast, in level five countries, terror has expanded to the whole population – there is no limit on the means or thoroughness in which the leaders of level five societies pursue personal or ideological goals. the pts variable works in tandem with the torture and physical integrity variables to show whether human rights conditions improved in middle eastern societies post-ratification. however, it also shows the value the society in question places on its international image. if a state is attempting to “window dress” by signing onto human rights agreements, they may or may not continue to practice torture but will attempt to reduce overt forms of political terror. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 10 the cingranelli-richards (ciri) data set defines torture as the “purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials” (cingranelli, 2014). the torture variable ranges from zero to two, with zero meaning “torture did not occur” in that given year, one meaning “torture was practiced frequently” and two meaning that torture was widespread and/or systematic. my last human rights-related variable, physical integrity (physint), is an additive index constructed from the torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, and political imprisonment. it ranges from zero to eight (no government respect for these four rights and full government respect for these four rights, respectively) (cingranelli, 2014). in order to determine whether countries were motivated to ratify the cat for economic benefits, i employed two variables, representing “aid” [faid] and “trade” [expo]. both of my data sets were from the world bank database. in operationalizing aid, i took year-by-year data of foreign aid from 1981 to 2011. in operationalizing trade, i took year-by-year data of the percent of the state's gross domestic product that was composed by exported goods and services. faid is in us dollars and expo is a percentage (world bank, 2015). i also wanted to capture the effect of armed conflict, specifically armed conflicts with a domestic dimension, on cat ratification. i hypothesized that conflicts with domestic consequences would increase political uncertainty and therefore correlate with a higher likelihood of ratification. for my armed conflict variables, i used the ucdp/prio armed conflict dataset (uppsala conflict data program/centre for the study of civil wars, international peace research institute, oslo). because the nature and intensity of armed conflicts ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 11 could potentially affect state ratification behavior as well as forms of government repression, i used ucdp/pro's disaggregated conflict variables as well as their intensity variable. ucdp/prio defines an armed conflict as a “contested compatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (uppsala university, 2016). armed conflicts in the dataset are separated into four categories: extrasystemic conflicts, interstate conflicts, internal conflicts, and internationalized conflicts. extrasystemic conflicts occur between a state and a non-state group outside of its own territory, like the american mission to destroy al qaeda. interstate conflicts occur between two or more states, internal conflicts occur between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states, and internationalized internal armed conflicts occur between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides. i coded this “nature of conflict” variables as binary/binomial variables. for example, if a state experienced an extrasystemic conflict in 1984, it would receive a score of one for the extrasystemic [extrasys] variable for that year. the conflict intensity [intensity.level] variable ranges between one and two, with a score of one describing a “minor” conflict in which between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths occurred in a given year, and a score of two describe a “war” in which at least 1,000 battle-related deaths occurred in a given year (uppsala university, 2016). to account for some countries experiencing multiple conflicts during the same year, the conflict intensity variable is additive. for instance, if a state experiences two wars and a minor conflict in a single year, that year receives an intensity level score of five. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 12 results first, i wanted to examine the human rights conditions in middle eastern societies post ratification of the convention against torture to see whether they improved. out of the twelve ratifying countries, political terror increased in eight (two-thirds) of them. likewise, eight countries experienced a decrease in physical integrity post-ratification. only four countries experienced an increase in torture. “improvement,” however, is not the international standard. out of the twelve ratifiers, all but two (one being iraq, which has no torture data postratification) experienced years where they practiced “frequent” torture. additionally, qatar, which signed in 2000, experienced widespread and systematic torture for the majority of its postratification years. the only truly catcompliant state from ratification in 2004 to 2011 is syria, a state which has since descended into civil strife and resorted to bombing and deploying chemical weapons on its own citizens. next, i wanted to get an idea of whether cat-ratifying countries were experiencing increased aid and trade post-ratification, to see whether they were seeking transnational collateral consequences, and being rewarded. two-thirds of ratifying countries experienced increases in foreign aid post-ratification. likewise, eight ratifiers, or two-thirds of ratifying countries, experienced an increase in exports as a percentage of gross domestic product. lastly, even though nearly every single ratifier was in one way or another non-compliant since ratification, every single ratifier experienced either aid or trade benefits.* figure 1.a. – comparing compliance and transnational collateral consequences ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 13 *that is not to say that there were not countries that temporarily or completely phased out torture in the years following ratification: syria and turkey phased out torture completely post-ratification (until 2011) and yemen phased out torture for the next five years. still, in all cases, there existed post-ratification years in which torture was practiced frequently. **bahraini political terror decreased post-ratification but then experienced backsliding ***israeli torture did not increase for four years post-ratification ****saudi foreign aid increased briefly post-ratification in order to empirically test this phenomenon, i designed a logit model describing the effects of foreign aid, exports, and the various conflict variables (nature and intensity) on cat ratification. logit, or logistic regression models are used to estimate the probability of a binary response variable based on one or more predictors. in this case, state compliance with the cat is ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 14 the binary response variable. model code and summary of fit are included in the appendix i, and time-series describing trade and aid variables are included in appendix ii. two variables demonstrated significance: internationalized conflict and foreign aid. internationalized internal conflict had a p-value of 0.0268 and foreign aid had a p-value of 0.0714. this means that given the data, there is a 7.14% chance that the null hypothesis, that internationalized internal conflict has no effect on cat compliance, is true. likewise, given the data, there is a 2.68% chance that the null hypothesis, that foreign aid has no effect on cat compliance, is true. the [internat] variable had a negative coefficient, implying that the more internationalized conflict that a society experienced, the less likely they were to ratify the cat. in contrast, foreign aid had a positive coefficient, implying that the more foreign aid a state received, the more likely they were to ratify the cat. this first finding seems counterintuitive: it would seem likely that a state experiencing any kind of internal conflict, however internationalized, would be pressured into trading increased political certainty for decreased sovereignty. however, i argue that, out of all the conflict types, internationalized internal conflict is the most threatening to state sovereignty. in that case, a regime will do everything in its power to avoid taking actions that will further reduce or threaten state sovereignty. this includes the active avoidance of international human rights agreements, including the cat. the second finding reaffirms my hypothesis about transnational collateral consequences. countries exhibit aid-seeking behavior when deciding whether or not to ratify the cat. the data provides dramatic examples. turkey, qatar, lebanon, and egypt all experienced 100%+ ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 15 increases in foreign aid in the first five years after ratification, with egypt almost quadrupling its aid numbers from $1.6 billion to $6 billion from 1986 to 1990. discussion in examining motives for ratifying the convention against torture, only internationalized internal conflict and foreign aid had a significant effect on state ratification behavior. there are several potential reasons as to why other conflict variables and the trade variables did not have a significant effect. for the three insignificant conflict variables, two possible explanations exist based on the literature. one explanation is that these conflicts affect a state's sovereignty profile and political uncertainty profile. therefore, in some conflicts, trading sovereignty for political certainty is not feasible because both are threatened to a relatively equal extent. in other conflicts, political certainty is paramount, but there is no discernible pattern that implies that internal armed conflict, extrasystemic conflict, or interstate conflict influence state ratification behavior one way or the other. another explanation for the insignificance of these three conflict variables is that ratification only decreases political uncertainty for certain regimes in conflict, particularly fledgling democracies. most middle eastern countries, according to the polity project, are autocracies and anocracies (marshall 2013). therefore, these are not “governments [seeking] to establish reliable judicial constraints on future nondemocratic governments or on democratically elected governments that may seek...to subvert democracy from within,” nor are they working to prevent “democratic backsliding,” as moravcsik posits. moravcsik’s reasoning supports the findings: conflict-involved states with lower polity scores are rarely ratifiers. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 16 for the trade variable (exports as a percentage of gross domestic product), there are also opposing elements that may influence ratification behavior in ambiguous ways. intuitively, countries that demonstrate rent-seeking behavior will ratify human rights treaties to maximize trade benefits. however, rentier states often experience rampant human rights violations due to lack of accountability. demeritt and young argue that “repression is less costly where states do not rely on their citizenry for generating revenue, so that these states are more likely than others to use indiscriminate violations of personal integrity rights as a policy tool” (demeritt and young, 2013). that is not to say that non-compliant states never ratify, but that repressive states may avoid agreeing to human rights treaties to deny dissenters any sort of legitimate legal framework. for some states, hathaway's “legal consequences” may outweigh any positive collateral consequences. with the presumption that internationalized internal conflict discourages ratification, let us examine iraq, lebanon, and yemen, all of whom experienced internationalized internalized conflicts during the 19812011 time period. iraq, which experienced iic from 2004 onwards, did not ratify the cat until 2011, the exact year that the conflict deescalated from “war” status to “minor conflict” status on the ucdp/prio scale. lebanon, which experienced iic in 1983 and 1984, did not ratify the cat until 2000. yemen, which experienced iic from 2009-2011, ratified the cat 18 years prior, in 1991. it would be interesting to see, had yemen not ratified the cat yet, how long this conflict would postpone their government's ratification decision. lastly, what about the “window dressing” argument? do regimes use ratifying as a tool to conform to regional or international norms? as noted in the results (figure 1.1), the majority of ratifiers experienced increased political terror post-ratification. these are largely overt acts of violence that violate international human rights norms. considering that pts data comes from ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 17 the state department and amnesty international, these acts are largely visible to state and nonstate actors. one argument is that by ratifying the cat, regimes temporarily distract from their human rights malfeasance. another factor is that countries only care about the regional norms to which hathaway refers, and thus may not strive to meet the international standard if it is significantly more difficult to conform to than the regional norm. limitations if i were to examine the role of trade, aid, and conflict in human rights agreements again, i would operationalize my variables much differently to minimize the number of binary and lowrange, discrete variables in my regression. for example, instead of having a conflict intensity variable that ranges from one to two, i would have a variable describing the number of battlerelated deaths in the conflict. this would better capture the wide range of conflict intensity within and between middle eastern states, and perhaps provide a more detailed picture of how conflict intensity affects compliance behavior. to further improve upon this analysis, i would also collect country aid data to determine the primary sources of foreign aid post-ratification. distinguishing specific aid types, such as military aid, would also provide useful information. it is possible that ratifiers are seeking specific types of aid. placing all aid types in a single variable makes it difficult to unpack what motivates ratification behavior. seeking out specific types of aid could skew the results because certain states may receive significantly larger amounts of military or humanitarian aid than others. in addition, there are obviously other factors beyond ratification that lead to increased exports and foreign aid. humanitarian disasters, free trade agreements, resource discovery, and ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 18 other factors can influence these economic variables. controlling for these events would greatly improve further studies. with these added controls, researchers could more accurately discern the “reward” effect that causes countries to exhibit aid-seeking behavior and pursue trade benefits. lastly, examining this phenomenon in other regions could shed some light on why middle eastern governments behave the way that they do. do regions with more diverse economies exhibit the same aid and rent-seeking behavior? do regions with more established human rights norms ratify human rights agreements at faster rates than regions without those norms? by broadening the study, researchers could glean more information about economically driven and normative behavior. conclusion across the middle east, repressive regimes that are unable to fully comply with the convention against torture ratify the cat to obtain foreign aid benefits. when experiencing internationalized internal conflicts, however, middle eastern countries avoid ratification to preserve their threatened sovereignty. other conflict types do not affect ratification behavior, perhaps because of ambiguous effects on sovereignty and uncertainty profiles, or perhaps because these regimes have no interest in bolstering the judicial means of future democracies. transnational collateral consequences matter. when countries see non-compliant ratifiers in their region rewarded, they pile onto human rights agreements regardless of their capacity to comply. not only does this reward aid-seeking behavior, it undermines the legitimacy of the international human rights regime and harms the very citizens it claims to protect. furthermore, the sovereignty-certainty calculus matters. countries that feel that their sovereignty is threatened are unlikely to agree to human rights treaties, and therefore are unaccountable to ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 19 human rights norms. in countries where the government feels its sovereignty is compromised, little can be done to push a human rights agenda. policy implications are two-fold: first, foreign aid benefits should be explicitly contingent on compliance, not ratification, especially if military aid is involved. this should not discourage ratification because it is still a prerequisite for compliance. second, interventionist countries should reevaluate their approach to promoting human rights internationally. for example, by dismantling iraqi sovereignty, the war in iraq postponed the iraqi ratification decision by a number of years. thus, iraq's road to human rights compliance was lengthened considerably. in the future, commitment to preserving a state's sovereignty in the long run may persuade them to concede some sovereignty to the international human rights regime in the short run. this commitment can be stated explicitly during negotiations, referred to as an upside of ratification (i.e. recognizing human rights provides an extra layer of legitimacy), and communicated through state and supra-state organization behavior. for example, states and international organizations pushing the cat should limit intrusive military actions and be wary of statements that challenge the legitimacy of potential ratifiers. with this approach in mind, the international human rights regime can move to encourage middle eastern participants to act on the cat. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 20 references cingranelli, david l., david l. richards, and k. chad clay, the ciri human rights dataset, 2014, 2014.04.14 demeritt, jacqueline hr, and joseph k. young. "a political economy of human rights: oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress." conflict management and peace science 30.2 (2013): 99120. gibney, mark, linda cornett, reed wood, peter haschke, and daniel arnon. 2015. the political terror scale 1976-2015. hathaway, oona a. "why do countries commit to human rights treaties?." journal of conflict resolution 51.4 (2007): 588-621. marshall, monty g., and ted robert gurr. "individual country regime trends." the polity iv project. the center for systemic peace, 2013. web. moravcsik, andrew. "the origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar europe." international organization 54.02 (2000): 217-252. "'near east' is mideast, washington explains." the new york times 14 aug. 1958: 8. print. "net official development assistance and official aid received (current us$)." data. world bank, 2015. web. 06 may 2016. parlevliet, michelle. "bridging the divide. exploring the relationship between human rights and conflict management." track two 11.1 (2002): 8-43. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 21 "ucdp/prio armed conflict dataset prio." ucdp/prio armed conflict dataset prio. department of peace and conflict research, uppsala university, centre for the study of civil war at the international peace research institute sweden, n.d. web. 06 may 2016. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 22 appendix i: figures explained. figures 2.a.-2.p. are time-series describing the human rights conditions of each middle eastern country from 1981-2011. they include the political terror scale (pts) variable (in gray), the physical integrity (physint) variable (in black) and the torture (tort) variable (in blue). the vertical red line represents the year that the country in question ratified the convention against torture. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 23 figures 3.a-3.o are time-series describing the fluctuation in foreign aid in each middle eastern country from 1981-2011. the vertical red line represents the year that the country in question ratified the convention against torture. figures 4.a-4.o are time-series describing the fluctuation in exports (as a percentage of gross domestic product) in each middle eastern country from 1981-2011. the vertical red line represents the year that the country in question ratified the convention against torture. appendix ii: ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 24 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 25 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 26 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 27 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 28 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 29 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 30 ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 31 disruptive element: frozen conflicts and the cdrn justin tomczyk university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the focus of this paper is on the four separatist territories that make up the community for democracy and rights of nations and how they derail the western integration efforts of their parent states. this piece touches on the major geopolitical players in the former soviet union, the origin of four frozen conflicts and the bureaucratic complications caused by the separatist regions. about the author justin tomczyk is a junior at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign studying political science with minors in russian language and informatics. he is a flas language fellowship recipient and has spent considerable time in eastern europe. introduction relations between russia and the western world have deteriorated rapidly over the past decade. policy makers have found themselves at odds with the russian federation over numerous issues – from political developments in the middle east to concerns over human rights and civil liberties. among the many topics that divide russia and the western world, the eastern expansion of nato and the european union remains one of the largest. as of today, four countries within the former soviet union have expressed deep interest in joining both nato and the eu. while different in culture, language and religion they share one common trait: the presence of frozen conflicts within their borders. in this piece i will be examining the way that frozen conflicts have complicated and delayed the eu and nato integration procedure for these countries and the role that russia plays in this process. bloc politics when studying political developments in the former soviet union it’s critical to understand the role of intergovernmental organizations (igos). igos are a vehicle for cooperation between independent states and can cover a wide variety of policy areas, from collective security to economic cooperation. membership in an igo also indicates a greater alignment to a set of ideas or practices. nato/eu the european union and nato are important players in the former soviet union. the eu and nato cover different policy areas but feature a large overlap in membership. nato is a defensive alliance created during the cold war. over the past 20 years, nato has gradually evolved its mission of collective security to include components of peacekeeping and counter terror operations. the european union is the product of decades of cooperation between western european countries. the eu functions as a monetary union, a single economic market and a tool for united european foreign policy. membership in the eu or nato shows a conformity to western values and cooperation with western leadership. as of now, the european union and nato have expanded to include almost all former members of the warsaw pact, three former members of the soviet union and several yugoslav republics. eeu the eurasian economic union is an organization similar to the european union. like the european union, the eeu seeks to form a single market among its members and coordinate both economic activity and foreign policy. where the eeu and eu differ is in their leadership and the dynamic between their members. the eeu is composed of four countries armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, and russia. when looking at these four countries we can see russia’s absolute advantage over the other members. russia is not only the largest in terms of size and population but also in economic and military might. in comparison, power is much more evenly distributed throughout european union -while germany may lead the group in economic strength, france and the united kingdom have a larger foreign policy influence. guam officially known as the “guam organization for democracy and economic development”, guam is a regional igo of states aspiring for eu and nato membership. the name is an acronym of its members georgia, ukraine, azerbaijan, and moldova. guam’s function is similar to the visegrad 4 and baltic council to promote regional cooperation during western integration. an example of guam cooperation would be the establishment of the transcaspian trade route. all members of guam are pursuing eu-associate status. eu association is not full membership (nor is it a guarantee of future membership) but rather an elevated diplomatic status. eu associates are considered a component of the eu’s united foreign policy and are compatible with the eu customs standards and industry regulations. cdrn the cdrn is one of the lesser known igos in the former soviet union. it’s membership is made up of unrecognized breakaway states locked in frozen conflicts. conflicts are deemed frozen when there is no discernible end in sight yet the intensity of combat has significantly decreased. because the cdrn’s members are not recognized by the united nations and have no formal diplomatic ties to any country the organization acts as the only avenue of international cooperation. examples of cooperation between cdrn members includes the establishment of a visa regime for cdrn citizens and joint declarations of mutual defense in case of attack. it’s worth noting that all members of the cdrn are locked in frozen conflicts against guam members. conflicts in context the frozen conflicts that created the breakaway states of cdrn began during the turbulent years during the collapse of the soviet union. the main players in these frozen conflicts are the newly created post-soviet states, the ethnic minorities within them and the russian federation. abkhazia abkhazia is located in the northwest part of georgia. it is flush with the russian federation’s border and is on the eastern half of the black sea. abkhazia is the home of the abkhaz people and spent much of its time in the soviet union as an autonomous oblast. the first conflict between the georgians and the abkhazians began between 1992 and 1993. after years of tensions between georgians and abkhazians, abkhaz separatists declared themselves independent and began organizing themselves for armed rebellion with the intent of creating an independent abkhaz state. georgia responded with a counter-attack and planned to retake the territory. georgia struggled to regain the separatist lands and eventually called upon the osce and international community to mediate some sort of ceasefire. while officially neutral in the conflict, human rights watch has found significant evidence that shows unofficial russian support for abkhaz separatists in the form of weapons and russian irregular volunteers (hrw). as of now, abkhazia is considered an autonomous region of georgia with its own functioning government in sukhumi. south ossetia south ossetia is located in the northernmost part of central georgia. it is inhabited by native ossetians and russians. the territory known as “north ossetia” is located in the russian federation. south ossetia was considered an autonomous oblast during the soviet union but was administered by the georgian ssr. in 1990, south ossetia declared it’s independence from georgia. georgia refused to recognize any sort of independence from the region and considered such a declaration to be an infringement of its sovereignty. while the ussr (and later russian federation) proclaimed neutrality during the conflict, some georgian reports show overt signs of russian intervention in support of the ossetian separatists. eventually, a ceasefire was brokered between the georgians and south ossetians with a status of semi-autonomy granted to the contested territory. part of this deal included the creation and deployment of a multinational peacekeeping brigade in south ossetia. during the 2008 surge of fighting between the georgian military and ossetian fighters, the russian federation intervened in support of the ossetians and launched a counterattack against georgia. nagorno-karabakh unlike the other breakaway states of the cdrn, nagorno-karabakh does not border russia nor does it contain a significant amount of russian speakers. nagorno-karabakh was an autonomous oblast located within azerbaijan with an armenian majority. it’s separated from armenia by a thin strip of azeri territory. while autonomous the area was considered a part of azerbaijan. during the dissolution of the soviet union, nagorno-karabakh declared itself independent from azerbaijan and voiced its intent to integrate into armenia-proper. azerbaijan refused to recognize this declaration. after months of mounting tensions, the armenian military launched an offensive to connect nagorno-karabakh with armenia. the following war between armenian-backed separatists and azerbaijan nearly escalated into an interstate conflict. eventually, the osce brokered a tense ceasefire and a peacekeeping mission was established. while low-level skirmishes continue along the border with azerbaijan, nagorno-karabakh enjoys limited autonomy and good relations with armenia. transnistria transnistria is a small strip of land located in moldova’s eastern half. the area runs vertically along the moldovan-ukrainian border and has a population of approximately 500,000 people. transnistria was part of a larger moldavian autonomous soviet socialist republic within the soviet union. this autonomous entity covered what is today transnistria and parts of moldova and ukraine. during the collapse of the soviet union, many ethnic russians within moldova were concerned about the future of russian language and identity in the newly formed republic. russians living in moldova felt threatened by the formal establishment of romanian as the national language. after months of increasing tensions between moldovan and russians living in moldova, the residents of transnistria declared themselves the “pridnestrovian moldavian soviet socialist republic” (“pmr”) and established tiraspol as their capital. initially there was little response from the moldovan government. it wasn’t until moldovan authorities began clearing barricades and roadblocks set by the pmr that small-scale conflict between separatists and moldovans. the conflict was mostly limited to skirmishes and minor clashes with police. while the official stance of the ussr was neutrality towards the conflict, extensive evidence and personal accounts attribute the 14th soviet guards army to collaborating with the transnistrian separatists. the 14th army was stationed near odessa and provided material support and training to the separatists in addition to engaging moldovan forces in combat. as of today, transnistria remains in a state of limited sovereignty and contains a joint ukrainianrussian-transnistrian peacekeeping force. methods of disruption border uncertainties as a result of these separatist conflicts, georgia and moldova have had significant trouble in securing the integrity of their borders. this is a particular problem in areas along the russian federation. these separatists states have become conduits for human trafficking, arms smuggling and other black market trades (e.p 2006). this is due to the inability of proper authorities to enforce the law (c.e.u 2000). many eu members have voiced concern that the inability for moldova and georgia to limit black market activity within their borders shows that they are unfit for eu associated status (e.c 2014). to further complicate things, recent events have shown that the borders of these areas are fluid. separatists have gradually moved the abkhazian and south ossetian borders further and further southward since the ceasefire (elleson). this past summer, sections of a bp pipeline in georgia fell under control of separatist forces. separatist citizenship and passports many guam members are in the process of negotiating a visa-liberalization plan with the european union. this would minimize the need for visas and document checks when traveling to and from the eu. such an agreement would also open the possibility of visa-free travel throughout the european union. unfortunately, the existence of separatist and semiautonomous states has complicated this process. this is due to the unclear citizenship status of people living in separatist areas and an ongoing debate whether or not the visa regime would apply to them. there are three types of passports held by cdrn residents: 1: soviet passports it’s very common for elderly residents of separatist areas to hold documents issued by the soviet union. in many cases it is unclear which country their citizenship would be transferred to. if man living in abkhazia holds a soviet passport with “georgian” marked as his nationality, who holds liability over him? it is worth noting that almost all soviet passports are currency considered invalid. 2: separatist passports all four members of the cdrn have issued their own form of passport. they are almost entirely invalid for international travel (civil.ge). this is due to both the unrecognized status of the countries issuing the passports and the lack of counterfeiting prevention in the document. the main use for separatist passports is for travel within the cdrn. many holders of separatist issued passports are considered stateless persons (hewitt). 3: foreign passports it's very common for cdrn residents to hold passports issued by foreign countries. the most common foreign passport among cdrn residents is a russian passport. passports issued by guam members are also used by those living in separatist regions. the exception to this is nagorno-karabakh, where armenian passports are the norm. russian media and influence while russia pledged neutrality during the separatist conflicts its support for the cdrn's break-away governments is undeniable. russian influence is visible at many levels. the lowest level is in the day to day interactions of cdrn residents. russian language is the mother tongue of a majority of cdrn citizens. while this makes sense in a location like transnistria, this trend is even visible in areas like south ossetia where majority of the residents identify as “ossetian”. russian language is also used in schools and governments across the cdrn (including the cdrn secretariat's website). the most accessible and available form of media in the cdrn comes from russian sources like rt, sputnik and tass. when we look towards the functions of governments within the cdrn, russia's influence persists. many politicians in the cdrn, such as former president smirnov of transnistria, have extensive ties to russia's political system (oleksy). this includes the financial operations of breakaway states. the russian federation's monetary support for the members of the cdrn ranges from financial assistance and loans to the subsidization of pension programs and social services (puiu). the most visceral display of russia's influence over cdrn members is its military presence. while officially part of peacekeeping operations, russia has used its peacekeeping brigades for its own gain. we've seen the mobilization of peacekeeping forces as a sort of deterrent towards russia's neighbors. during the 2008 russian-georgian conflict, most of the russian offensive was conducted by military units stationed in breakaway territories (deibert). over the past two years, russia has issued mobilization and readiness drills to its forces stationed in transnistria in response to the escalation of the ukrainian conflict (day). the usage of peacekeeping brigades in national defense policy questions the true motives of russia's military presence in the cdrn. the future the future of the cdrn is uncertain. there have not been any serious efforts to push for international recognition of separatist independence nor is there a strategy to reintegrate breakaway states. a recent surge in fighting between nagorno-karabakh and azerbaijan has raised questions about the long term sustainability of these frozen conflicts. many predict that as the conflict in eastern ukraine gradually winds down that a semi-autonomous region may form in donetsk and luhansk. while it's difficult to say what the future holds for these pseudo states, it will be impossible for georgia, azerbaijan, and moldova to integrate into the eu or nato as long as the current frozen conflicts continue. references civil.ge. tskhinvali begins issuing south ossetian passports. civil.ge. 2006 cooley, alexander. “engagement without recognition: a new strategy toward abkhazia and eurasia’s unrecognized states.” washington quarterly. 2010. day, matthew. "pro-russian 'republic' transnistria calls up reservists as east-west tensions flare." the telegraph. telegraph media group. 22 june 2015. deibert, ronald. cyclones in cyberspace: information shaping and denial in the 2008 russia–georgia war. security dialogue. 2012 elleson, brian. russian grand strategy in the south ossetia war. demokratizatsiya. 2011 hewitt, b.g. abkhazia: a problem of identity and ownership. central asian survey, 12:3, 267-323, doi: 10.1080/02634939308400819. 1993 human rights watch. violations of the laws of war and russia’s role in the conflict. human rights watch/helsinki vol 7, no 7. 1995 oleksy, piotr. "transnistria: it is more complicated than you think." new eastern europe. n.p., 09 dec. 2015 puiu, victoria. "can russia afford transnistria?" eurasianet.org. n.p., 18 feb. 2015 web. wolff, stefan. a resolvable frozen conflict? designing a settlement for transnistria, nationalities papers, 863-870. 2011. the council of the european union. implementing joint action 1999/34/cfsp with a view to a european union contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in south ossetia ,official journal of the european communities. 2000 the european commission. implementation of the european neighbourhood policy in the republic of moldova: progress in 2013 and recommendations for action, swd(2014) 93 final. 2014. the european parliament. european parliament resolution on the situation in south ossetia, official journal of the european union p6_ta(2006)0456. 2006. the european parliament. european parliament resolution on moldova (transnistria), official journal of the european union p6_ta(2006)0455. 2006. redefining deterrence: nuclear forensics and administration spending priorities leah matchett university of illinois at urbanachampaign abstract the obama administration’s budget for fiscal year 2017 included a like-for-like replacement of all legs of the us nuclear triad. this huge expenditure represents a reinforcement of traditional notions of deterrence between superpowers, without an analysis of whether or not these reflect the most pressing threats to national security. this paper will deal with several potential nuclear threats before turning to the current us responses to them in the context of deterrence theory. particularly, the threat of nuclear terrorism is widely acknowledged by both scholars and high-ranking members of the administration. nuclear forensics can be used to attribute recovered nuclear material to its source, and prevent terrorists from acquiring it. however, the administration’s budget request focuses on updating capabilities useful only in a traditional definition of deterrence that requires force parity between the soviet union and the united states, without expanding investments in nuclear forensics. about the author leah matchett is a senior double major in global studies and geology, graduating from the university of illinois at urbana-champaign this august. she focuses on east asia and global security. she has lived, worked, and traveled in both taiwan and china, and has just completed a senior thesis on energy security in taiwan. she has had two internships at the us department of state, one at the bureau of international security and nonproliferation in washington dc and one in the political affairs office of us consulate guangzhou. she currently works in hydrology with the us geological survey, and is a co-founder and previous president of the acdis security studies group. in the fall she will be headed to the university of oxford to pursue an mphil in international relations as a marshall scholar. introduction many scholars have pointed to nuclear deterrence as the structure that held apart the two great nuclear arsenals of the soviet union and the us during the cold war. for years, national security was primarily defined in terms of mutually assured destruction and force parity. however, after the fall of the soviet union and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, security analysts have begun to reevaluate the role of deterrence in the united states’ national security. on february 9, the obama administration has released its fiscal year 2017 (fy2017) budget request, which included a like-for-like replacement of all legs of the us nuclear triad. a like-forlike replacement involves replacing each system with a system of same or greater capabilities. despite a wide range of scholars and politicians who have recognized the need to redefine deterrence to reflect current threats to the united states, the current nuclear modernization plan is in opposition to these analyses and the administration’s own previously stated policy. nuclear threats in a modern world before examining the obama administration’s fy2017 budget to analyze whether it addresses the most pressing nuclear threats to the united states, it is necessary to first examine these threats. while there is an immense diversity of threats posed by nuclear weapons, these can be divided into two major categoriesthe threats of a great power nuclear exchange and the threats posed by sub-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons. the types of nuclear force modernization that address each of these provisions are fundamentally opposed. those policies that help to avert a great power nuclear conflict will increase the chances of a sub-state actor acquiring nuclear material. in a time of limited financial outflows, it is important to examine each of these threats to determine which should be emphasized in force modernization expenditures. great power nuclear relations the threat of a great power nuclear conflict has defined us nuclear policy since 1949, when the soviet union tested its first atomic bomb. policy makers believed that they could only protect the united states if it maintained a significant nuclear superiority over the soviet union. as relations between the countries eroded after world war ii, their relationship became one of deterrence, rather than trust. deterrence relies on a country’s ability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack, so that if either country launched a nuclear weapon, it was assured of a nuclear strike in return. this policy later became known as “mutually assured destruction” (mad). this was also the birthplace of the nuclear “triad”, which refers to the three platforms for the delivery of a nuclear weapon (bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles) that the us and soviet union used to ensure a second-strike capability. as the relationship thawed at the fall of the soviet union and the end of the cold war, both sides reduced their nuclear arsenals through various arms control agreements (most recently newstart). russia in recent years has become more aggressive internationally, and is pursuing a nuclear modernization program that many us scholars see as a continuation of the threat of great power nuclear conflict. new appeals to russian nationalism and a recent conventional military buildup have led many western scholars to view russia as an adversary. in 2012, at a time of high oil prices, president putin announced that if he were re-elected he would instigate the largest arms buildup in russia since the cold war (nti, 2012). the plan called for $772 billion (usd) to replenish the russian arsenal, including building 400 new intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), and 8 new nuclear capable submarines (nti, 2012). the overall russian military budget has expanded significantly (over $11 billion from 2014 to 2015), and there are ambitious plans to modernize over 70 percent of the military by 2020 (einhorn et al, 2015). the motivations behind this military buildup are beyond the scope of this analysis but several common interpretations are relevant. many analysts cite growing russian nationalism as a key cause for its rearmament. the desire to be viewed as a superpower and to exert the influence on the world that it did as the soviet union leads to a reassertion of russia’s role as a nuclear power (pfier, 2015). in addition, despite these modernization efforts, russia’s conventional forces remain behind those of nato. emphasizing its nuclear capabilities allows russia to compensate for a deficient conventional capability compared to nato (pfier, 2015). other authors have also highlighted russia’s conventional weaknesses but have pointed to china, rather than nato, as russia’s new competitor (podvig, 2015). this investment in military technology should be viewed not as a buildup of a new nuclear threat to the united states, but rather as a supplement to a declining nuclear force. the fall of the soviet union and the ensuing financial disasters led to drastic cuts in russia’s previously high military expenditures. these conventional weaknesses were in many ways countered by an expanded role for nuclear weapons in russia’s defense. in 2000, the new russian military doctrine reemphasized nuclear weapons and attempted to lower the nuclear threshold in a conventional conflict. this has been seen as a means of ensuring national security while reducing the amount spent on conventional armed forces (podvig, 2015). this policy was amended in 2010 to specify that nuclear weapons would only be used in a conventional conflict if there was an existential threat to the state (podvig, 2015). by this time, the russian economy had improved, allowing it to make greater investments in conventional weaponry. these policies indicate little change from traditional ideas of deterrence, and certainly no reason for alarm. existing arms control agreements are another assurance of the small likelihood of a great power nuclear conflict. russia still abides by the newstart treaty, which limits its number of deployed warheads. these limits mean that the development of new icbms or other nuclearcapable technology will be met with the decommissioning of older delivery vehicles (pfier, 2015). before current modernization programs, russia had significantly lower numbers of icbms, nuclear capable bombers, and nuclear submarines than the soviet union did in 1990 (lieber and press, 2006). many of these old delivery vehicles are near, or past the end of, their intended service lifetime (pfier, 2015); plagued by persistent maintenance and readiness problems, they have, in the past, cast doubt upon the very existence of a russian deterrent force (lieber and press, 2006). from this perspective, the russian force modernization can be thought of as ensuring the country’s second-strike capability, rather than a new aggressive stance. despite the residual presence of a cold war mentality among both americans and russians, as long as both sides adhere to the arms reduction treaties, there is little reason for the alarmist stance that many news outlets have taken on this issue (see einhorn et al, 2015 for an example of such an article in the new york times). while russia does have a nuclear arsenal capable of immense destruction, the likelihood of a great power nuclear conflict is incredibly low. policy makers in countries all over the world find it difficult to even consider using a nuclear weapon (cimbala, 1998, p. 22). more importantly, force parity is not required for deterrence, which means that it is not necessary for the united states to modernize and expand its nuclear program as russia does. increasingly, analysts and top policy makers have begun to question the need for a large nuclear deterrent force (cimbala, 1998). as soon as the ussr developed nuclear weapons in 1949, the united states believed it had little advantage, despite possessing a substantially larger nuclear arsenal (cimbala, 1998, p. 29). maintaining nuclear superiority did not lead to better diplomacy or coercion for the united states during the early stages of the cold war (pelopidas, 2015). especially in light of other threats to the united states, the perception that force parity is necessary for security has serious opportunity costs. the threat of nuclear terrorism in 2009, president obama gave a historic speech in prague about the prospects for a world free of nuclear weapons. he declared that, with the fall of the soviet union, the greatest threat to the united states had changed from that of a bipolar nuclear conflict to that of nuclear terrorism. the 2010 nuclear posture review echoed him, stating, “today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism” (nuclear posture review report, p. iv). in the words of president obama, after the cold war “the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up” (white house, 2009). in response to this threat, the early days of the obama administration included a reevaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security of the united states. president obama stated in prague that the united states, “will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same,” (white house, 2009). the 2010 nuclear posture review put combatting nuclear terrorism as the first among its priorities, followed by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in us national security strategy (nuclear posture review report). although deterrence is mentioned as a priority, it is in the context of reassuring regional allies, and not in terms of mutually assured destruction. this threat, which resonated strongly in the united states after the terror attacks of 9/11, is fundamentally different than the threat posed by the potential for a great power conflict. deterrence and an increase in the number and capabilities of nuclear weapons can, according to some, help reduce the risk of a great power nuclear conflict. however, even the most ardent proponents of the nuclear peace theory do not believe that an increase in the united states’ nuclear arsenal will serve to dissuade a nuclear attack from a terrorist group. as graham allison states in his seminal book on nuclear terrorism, al-qaeda has “no return address”, which means that there is no way to ensure retribution, or implement the logic of deterrence (allison, 2004 p. 2). an increase in the size of nuclear arsenals actually increases the chance that terrorists will be able to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon. therefore, traditional deterrence can increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. the solution to one perceived threat (great power conflict) only exacerbates the risk of the other (nuclear terrorism). responses and us weapons modernization faced with this paradox, the united states’ recent nuclear modernization can be qualitatively examined to determine how it affects these two perceived threats. the obama administration’s policy, despite its verbal commitments to countering nuclear terrorism, has maintained a position of traditional deterrence against russia. the us nuclear modernization program is estimated to cost approximately $348 billion between fy 2015 and fy 2024, according to the congressional budget office. however, independent estimates calculate the cost to be as high as $1 trillion (reif, 2015). these investments are primarily in delivery systems and warheads, which do little to decrease the likelihood of a great power nuclear conflict, and less to combat nuclear terrorism. the modernization program includes redesigning the minuteman iii missile, rebuilding the ohio class nuclear submarine, and developing a new class of nuclear bombers and cruise missiles (reif, 2015). this program is primarily a like-for-like replacement, which surprised many onlookers, given the obama administration’s previous statements on nuclear disarmament. the arms control association’s analysis states that a credible deterrent force could be maintained by reducing the us arsenal to one third of newstart levels (reif, 2015). the development of the new bomber forces in particular has raised questions about the us’ willingness to disarm. the bomber wing of the nuclear triad was the weakest before the most recent military modernization plan was announced, but significant investment will be made under the current plan to increase these capabilities. the plan replaces the air force’s fleet of old b-52 bombers with a new fleet of dual-capable bombers (costing over approximately $41 billion in research and development, and an additional $500 million per unit), and the development of a new nuclear tipped cruise missile (another $25 billion) (reif, 2015). previously, analysts had assumed that the bomber force was a prime candidate for force reductions. not only were the bombers old and limited in number, they have limited military usefulness when facing adequate air defenses (johnson et al, 2009). while the development of a new bomber force may have some tactical applications, it represents an enormous expenditure, without adding any specific capabilities to the us nuclear forces. the modernization plan includes only $8 billion dollars for “force improvement” in personnel and logistics, an area of the us nuclear forces that has been consistently weak (reif, 2015). for years, scott sagan and others have raised questions about the efficacy of the command and control structures and personnel of the nuclear arsenal (cohen and sagan, 1993; schlosser, 2013). schlosser’s recent book on this topic highlights the underappreciated danger inherent in maintaining a sizeable nuclear arsenal by examining a number of nuclear accidents and near-catastrophes in the last 50 years (schlosser, 2013). for instance, on multiple occasions, personnel working with nuclear weapons have been caught abusing illegal drugs (“finger on the trigger”, 2015) or cheating on proficiency tests (cooper, 2014). the appropriations for the nuclear modernization plan include very little funding or emphasis on solving these problems, instead favoring an emphasis on traditional deterrence policies. perhaps the most glaring omission of the nuclear modernization program is the lack of funding and programs focused on reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. while nuclear terrorism was highlighted in the 2010 quadrennial defense review as a key step to ensuring us nuclear security, it has not received funding or support on the same magnitude as deterrence. congress has passed several bills that include mandatory funding and the reporting of progress in nuclear forensic capabilities including the nuclear forensic and attribution act (“text of the nuclear forensic and attribution act”, 2010). despite a high level of interest in this field, the current nuclear modernization program continues outdated notions of deterrence and great-power nuclear relations, without more deeply analyzing the usefulness of deterrence in our current situation. creating a new deterrent through nuclear attribution if the united states expands its definition of a deterrent force to include countering nuclear terrorism, it will allow its nuclear modernization program to more fully match the stated priorities of the administration. early scholarship in this field discarded the idea of deterring nuclear terrorism. as terrorist groups often have no clear location or leadership structure, it becomes difficult to punish or deter them effectively (allison, 2004). terrorist groups that have little concern for the lives of their membership will not be easily dissuaded by threats of violence (talmadge, 2007). however, it is possible to use the logic of deterrence to prevent terrorists acquiring the material required to construct a nuclear weapon. it is widely accepted that a terrorist organization cannot produce its own nuclear explosive material (nem). a uranium bomb relies on a complicated, expensive, and highly visible enrichment procedure that is believed to only be achievable by states. the plutonium used in nuclear weapons is extracted from low burn-up nuclear reactor fuel and is also commonly considered to be secure from non-state actors (talmadge, 2007). therefore, the nuclear material necessary to create a bomb must at one point have been created by a state and either given freely, bought, or stolen by a terrorist organization (allison, 2004). deterrence, therefore, can be applied to states capable of creating nuclear material to persuade them that it is in their interest to not allow terrorists to acquire nuclear material, either on purpose or by accident. nuclear attribution, a subset of nuclear forensics that allows recovered nuclear material to be traced back to its source, is the key to a modernized idea of deterrence. it works by comparing the isotopic characteristics of the nuclear material to pinpoint a source location (kristo and turney, 2012). these analytic tools fall into one of three main categoriesbulk analysis tools, which analyze the overall isotopic composition of the sample; imaging tools, which provide detailed images of the material to confirm homogeneity; and microanalysis tools, which classify the constituents of the sample (international atomic energy agency, 2006, p. 25-26). for example, by using scanning electron microscopes, it is possible to determine the dimensions of a sample’s source, in order to determine whether or not there is more material on the nuclear black market (kristo and turney, 2012). the data that scientists gain from this analysis can then be compared to data on locations, processes associated with the formation of nuclear material, and other seizures of illicitly trafficked material in order to attribute the nuclear material to a geographic location. one of the main challenges that nuclear attribution faces today is a lack of information on various locations around the globe. many scientists have advocated for the establishment of an international library where information on nuclear materials from around the world could be kept for comparison (kristo and turney, 2012; decker, 2011; international atomic energy agency, 2006). such an institution would increase both accuracy and impartiality of results by allowing scientists to collaborate on attribution of nuclear-explosive material. the iaea established the illicit trafficking database (itdb) in 1995, which reports incidents of nuclear material trafficking (international atomic energy agency, 2006). if the powers of this body were to be expanded to include sharing of data on the isotopic characteristics of various nuclear processing locations around the globe, it would be easier to attribute nuclear materials to their sources, and develop an effective deterrent. once nuclear material is attributed to a source, the united states can determine where non-state actors obtained nuclear material, and hold those states responsible. the iaea gives states the responsibility for combating illegal trafficking of nuclear material (international atomic energy agency, 2006). if states were to face fiscal or military consequences for nuclear material taken from their territory by non-state actors, they would have increased incentive to secure loose nuclear material (kristo and turney, 2012). former us national security advisor stephen hadley has previously stated that the united states “will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts” (van de velde, 2009, p. 691). however, there has been little follow through on this statement. nuclear forensics can create a new kind of deterrence where states are held accountable for their nuclear material, and security can be achieved with a minimal arsenal. looking forward: policy priorities although the highest levels of the obama administration and congress hold nuclear forensics forth as a policy priority, it is viewed as in addition to, rather than a vital part of, deterrence. by expanding the definition of deterrence beyond cold war notions of force parity, the united states can ensure that its investments in its nuclear forces and infrastructure reflect the most relevant of current threats. the perceived necessity of a likefor-like deterrent is a direct product of an outdated concept of deterrence that fails to address what the administration itself defines as the greatest risk to us national security. spending up to a trillion dollars to modernize the nuclear triad will not address the threat of nuclear terrorism. it is uncertain it will even be effective in increasing the us deterrent, which has already almost removed the chances of a great power nuclear conflict. policy makers and authors are unsure about the effects of a powerful nuclear arsenal. some, like winston churchill, have referred to nuclear weapons as the “means of preserving peace” 1 (booth and baylis, 1989, p. 239), while others including former secretary of defense robert mcnamara have famously stated that “nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever” (mcnamara, 1983 p. 79). the latter group of scholars contend that “nuclear weapons neither crucially define a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it” (mueller, 1988 p. 55). therefore, the undeniable influence of nuclear weapons in security planning and strategy, they would argue, is misplaced (wilson, 2008; booth and baylis, 1983; pelopidas, 2015) 2 . due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, force imbalances become almost meaningless because even an inferior nuclear arsenal can act as a deterrent. while this is still under debate, with new quantitative studies highlighting both stability and instability in the international system connected to nuclear weapons (rauchhaus 2015), it is not clear that a modernized nuclear triad is necessary or desirable to increase us national security 3 . a critical examination of obama administration’s fy2017 budget request shows a fundamental disconnect between the threats which face the us (as stated by the administration itself and 1 this is known as the “nuclear peace hypothesis”. for more read waltz 1981 and 1990 2 these scholars argue that the “long peace” after wwii was neither particularly long nor particularly peaceful. it is impossible to prove that without nuclear weapons a war would have broken out (ie proving the counterfactual). this period without a great power conflict can be linked instead to increasing economic connectedness or a period of war weariness (wilson, 2008) 3 examples of times when deterrence failed to reduce conflict include israel and the six day war (cohen, 1988) and border wars between russia and china and china and india (pelopidas, 2015) outside sources) and its spending priorities. despite a prominent emphasis on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism during its first term in office, the obama administration has failed to critically evaluate the role of the nuclear triad in coming decades. the move to a like-for-like replacement of all triad capabilities comes at the expense of real improvements in nuclear forensics capabilities, which have the potential to become a new form of deterrent relevant to the post-cold war world. references 2010 quadrennial defense review (rep.). 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(2008). the myth of nuclear deterrence. the nonproliferation review, 15(3), 421439. retrieved march 22, 2016. program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 54 atomic dragon: chinese nuclear weapon development and the risk of nuclear war gabriel wacks university of illinois abstract as china’s economy, military, and regional power continue to grow, so do tensions between it and the united states. long characterized as peaceful, china’s ascension to a world power has been accompanied by a marked increase in sophistication of its nuclear arsenal and strategy. china is currently developing stronger nuclear deterrents, and there have been calls from the chinese military to shift its nuclear policy from a more passive strategy to a higher level of alertness, worrying us military planners. this research will delve into the background of china’s nuclear program, details of china’s current nuclear development, and the risk to global security that these developments present. about the author gabriel wacks is a junior at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. he is studying east asian languages and cultures with a concentration in chinese. during the summer, he worked as a researcher for arms control, domestic, and international security studying chinese nuclear weapon development. introduction ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 55 with the end of the cold war in 1991, the threat of nuclear war seemed to disappear. nuclear stockpiles stagnated and began to shrink, and trade expanded between former adversaries, particularly between the united states and china. although the world is not free of nuclear weapons and the same nuclear doctrines that dominated the post wwii-era (such as mutually-assured destruction) are still in effect, nuclear apocalypse no longer appears to be on the forefront of international diplomacy. as a quasi-capitalist country, china appears more preoccupied with managing its economy than with spreading its political ideology. despite their poor relations, russia and the united states rarely discuss nuclear weapons outside of low-level arms reduction treaty talks. however, there are undercurrents of a resurgence in nuclear tensions, particularly in east asia: a slow nuclear arms race between china and the united states now appears to be intensifying. not only do tensions remain high between the two countries, but territorial disputes and historical grievances between china and several us allies also still remain unresolved. one major source of tension is that china’s nuclear arsenal is both smaller and less technologically advanced than that of the united states. an american first-strike could potentially destroy china’s small nuclear stockpile, putting china at risk for a nuclear attack on its military or population centers. recent technological and policy developments have become a significant concern for the chinese military. us military advancements and foreign policy decisions have led to a chinese backlash, leading in part to an increasing rate of expansion in both the size and sophistication of china’s nuclear arsenal. this paper will explore the military capabilities and organization of china’s nuclear program as well as the technical and policy changes that this program is now undergoing. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 56 background on chinese nuclear weapons china completed its first successful nuclear test in 1964 (nuclear threat initiative, 2015). this was the culmination of 9 years of nuclear research, hampered by the withdrawal of soviet technical assistance due to the sino-soviet split. since its inception, the chinese nuclear program had different goals and technical specifications than the us or soviet programs. the primary focus, rather than offensive capabilities, was largely defensive in nature. very shortly after china became a nuclear weapons state, it declared a no-first-use (nfu) policy, a policy that it has since maintained (office of the secretary of defense 2016, p. 58). the nfu policy is a guarantee by china not to use nuclear weapons against other countries unless china is targeted by nuclear weapons first. china has additionally pledged not to launch strategic nuclear first-strikes against its enemies even during times of war, in contrast soviet and american policies. the rationale for china’s nfu policy stems back to mao zedong’s thoughts on nuclear weapons. mao believed that nuclear weapons were mere “paper tigers,” weapons that appeared powerful but were not decisive in terms of international conflict and diplomacy. mao wished for china to acquire nuclear weapons as a security precaution against american (and later soviet) nuclear threats. china faced potential one-sided nuclear war during the korean war and the taiwan straits crisis; by developing nuclear weapons, china sought to dissuade the united states from launching a nuclear attack on china. this framed china’s nuclear program and its future developments: the chinese nuclear program focused primarily on deterrence, and continues to do so (china daily, 2015). although china’s nuclear arsenal remained much smaller than the massive soviet or american arsenals, china’s possession of nuclear weapons effectively ended the us experts’ ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 57 discussion of a nuclear attack on china. this arsenal did not need to be large, as its mere existence was enough to prevent a nuclear strike for fear of large-scale nuclear war. from there, china sought to increase the survivability of its arsenal in the event of a nuclear first-strike. china began developing (or copying from soviet strategy) various methods to ensure that a nuclear first-strike could not destroy its nuclear arsenal, which would leave it essentially defenseless against follow-up strikes, such as mobile nuclear missiles and later nuclear submarines. recently, china’s level of nuclear organization has increased both technologically and structurally. communication systems used by the people’s liberation army (pla) have improved in recent years, ensuring that they can remain functional in the event of a nuclear strike (federation of american scientists, 2000a). control of china’s nuclear weapons has recently been given to the people’s liberation army rocket force, the successor to the second artillery division (ministry of national defense of the people’s republic of china, 2015). this branch of the military will have the same level of authority as the pla (people’s liberation army, which is composed primarily of ground units), pla navy (plan), and the pla air force (plaaf). nuclear weapons still play only a small role in chinese strategic planning, but are nonetheless increasingly autonomous from other branches of the military. while china’s fledgling nuclear submarine fleet did not appear to be under the control of the second artillery division, which was part of the pla, they have now been given over to the rocket force. this indicates a consolidation of nuclear power under a single military branch, possibly due to the increased sophistication of china’s expanding nuclear triad. the rocket force will control both landand sea-based missiles, as well as nuclear-capable bombers ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 58 (kelsey, 2016). this consolidation reflects the increased sophistication of china’s nuclear strategy and organization. even so, china’s offensive nuclear measures remain generations behind the united states. china only developed and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), capable of striking the entire united states in 1981, when the dongfeng-5 (df-5) icbm reached initial operational capability (federation of american scientists, 2000b). china’s air and sea capabilities remain very vulnerable to conventional attack by the us military. nevertheless, china has developed an impressive arsenal of nuclear missiles and delivery systems capable of striking potential enemies as well as nuclear strategies intended to keep its arsenal safe and ready for launch. chinese nuclear and military capabilities china does not publish records of its nuclear stockpile or most of its military capabilities, making it difficult to obtain concrete numbers; as a result, these estimates are somewhat speculative in nature. nevertheless, satellite footage and public releases by the chinese government provide rough information on china’s military developments. by observing china’s non-commercial nuclear reactors and estimating the size of its total load of fissionable material (nuclear material that can be made into nuclear weapons), the size of china’s nuclear arsenal can be calculated (international panel on fissile materials, 2016). it is believed that china has around 260 nuclear weapons and a variety of delivery systems (kristensen and norris, 2015). these nuclear weapons are on a low-alert setting, often with the warhead and the missile stored separately (u.s.-china economic and security review commission, 2015, p. 20). most of china’s nuclear weapons are land-based, though china has been deploying submarine-launched ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 59 ballistic missiles (slbms) and the submarines necessary to deliver them. these delivery systems (while inferior to us systems) are capable of targeting any location in the united states with nuclear weapons and of resisting us first strikes. china’s nuclear arsenal is intended to deter a us first-strike that could destroy china’s retaliatory capabilities. most of china’s nuclear missiles are silo-launched, meaning that they are launched from land-based locations throughout china. china is believed to have between 75-100 icbms in total, all of them from the dongfeng missile series (literally “east wind”, to be referred to as df) (office of the secretary of defense, 2016, p. 25). while china may have as many as 12 or 13 varieties of land-based rockets, only the df-5 and the df-31a have the capacity to strike the united states (nuclear threat initiative, 2015). the df-5 was first tested in 1971 and fully deployed 10 years later (federation of american scientists, 2000b). it comes in two varieties: the df-5a, which has a single warhead, and the df-5b, which carries multiple, independentlytargetable re-entry vehicles (mirvs). the df-5b is suspected to able to carry up to three warheads on a single missile, and therefore its destructive capability is vastly greater than the df-5a. there are believed to be only 10 of each types of df-5 missile, which have an estimated range of 12,000-15,000 km. both are liquid-fuel rockets, meaning that the warheads are kept separate from the missiles. the fuel, which is corrosive to the missile itself, is stored separately on-site (goldstein and erickson, 2005, p. 15). as such, it could take several hours after approval has been granted to launch one of these missiles, making them vulnerable to a us first-strike. however, some of china’s nuclear missiles are mobile, meaning that they are mounted on trucks or other such vehicles equipped with mobile launching stations. the df-31a is china’s primary mobile nuclear missile, and there are an estimated 25 such missiles that are operational (federation of american scientists, ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 60 1999a). the df-31a has an estimated range of 10,000-14,000 km. china could have many of these nuclear weapons in motion on its vast highway system, from downtown shanghai to the empty deserts of xinjiang province. these vehicles are most likely located on the roads in the rural countryside, ensuring that these mobile nuclear weapons would almost certainly remain intact even if china were targeted by a nuclear strike. critically, these rockets are some of the few in the chinese arsenal that are solid-fuel rockets, meaning that the missile and warhead are stored together. if authorized, a df-31a missile could be launched in a very short period of time, possibly minutes after launch approval was granted. china is also in the process of developing icbms with longer ranges and improved accuracy. the df-41 icbm, which could have a range greater than that of the df-5, is nearing completion and has been tested as a rail-mobile missile (missile threat, 2014). this would allow for china’s developed railroad system to be weaponized, housing icbms capable of targeting anywhere location in the united states while remaining untraceable due to the vast amount of trains on the rails at any given time. although this project appears to be in the final stages of development, it will probably not replace the chinese mobile arsenal for at least another few years. however, even in its current state, chinese land-based icbms are essentially impossible to destroy in a first-strike, given the sheer size of china. this guarantees that a land-based deterrent will remain intact, even after an enemy first-strike. china also possesses the capacity to deliver a nuclear strike using its air force assets. the plaaf maintains some 120 h-6 bombers, which are essentially the chinese version of the russian tupolev tu-16 (airforceworld.com). china is currently in the process of deploying the h-6k, which is specifically designed to be a long-range strategic bomber platform. the h-6k has the capability to carry up to six (or possibly seven, as sources conflict) cruise missiles that ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 61 could be fitted with nuclear warheads (military-today.com). it has a combat radius of 3,500 km, and its cruise missiles have an additional range of around 2,000 km, meaning that from mainland china it could strike targets as far as alaska. while a bomber-based nuclear strike does not figure prominently in chinese nuclear plans, china, like the united states, retains the capability to do so. chinese nuclear submarine development despite its strong land-based deterrent and growing air-based nuclear capabilities, fears of a successful us first-strike have led to chinese development of sea-based nuclear delivery systems. china has been developing nuclear submarines with the capacity to launch submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (slbms) capable of striking the united states. the jl-2 slbm has an estimated range of 7,400-8,000 km and is currently being readied for deployment (federation of american scientists, 1999b). the estimated number of jl-2 missiles varies widely from 48-96 missiles in total (kristensen, 2015). china’s jin-class submarine, which will form the base of the chinese nuclear submarine fleet, has recently been completed. the advantages of a nuclear submarine fleet are critical in regards to nuclear deterrence. while the jl-2 missile can only reach the west coast and alaska from chinese territory or coastal waters, a chinese nuclear submarine could target any part of the continental united states from hawaii (o’rourke, 2016 p. 18). nuclear submarines are very difficult to find and destroy, making it likely that china will be guaranteed a nuclear deterrence even in the event of a successful us nuclear first-strike. the united states is developing anti-submarine strategies, such as new submarine detection capabilities and strategic chokepoints to stop chinese submarines in the western pacific. in the event of a military confrontation with china, the united ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 62 states, the philippines, japan, and taiwan could collectively mount an anti-submarine war in the yellow sea, the ryukyu islands, and the south china sea, concentrating their efforts around key locations and thereby preventing chinese nuclear submarines from reaching the high seas. however, china is currently preparing to send out a nuclear “deterrence patrol,” which would begin long-range voyages throughout the pacific (baker, 2015). these submarines will be difficult to track and harder to destroy. if deployed first during peacetime, they would already be past the pacific defensive lines in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. a single submarine could carry as many as 12 jl-2 slbms, ensuring that even one submarine could lay waste to a dozen american cities in the event of nuclear war (o’rourke, 2016, p. 18). this submarine fleet would function as a serious deterrent to a nuclear first-strike against china. the jin-class nuclear submarines, however, are known to be very noisy and are generally outclassed by opposing us submarines, making them vulnerable to a sea-based first-strike. (u.s.-china economic and security review commission, 2015, p. 347). furthermore, the united states has been creating several anti-submarine systems. one of these is the sea hunter, an autonomous navy drone designed to track and follow enemy submarines, is intended to ensure that targets cannot avoid detection in the event of war (pellerin, 2016). future us technological developments could potentially counter the relatively outdated chinese sea-based deterrent before it is even deployed. nevertheless, the development of a functional sea-based deterrent marks a major step towards china finally developing a nuclear triad and makes it even harder to neutralize china’s nuclear arsenal with a first-strike. chinese military concerns ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 63 china’s security concerns continue to grow as the united states expands its military capabilities. china follows a no-first-use nuclear policy since 1964, in spite of a changing political and military landscape (china daily, 2015). because china’s nuclear arsenal is very small in comparison to the us arsenal (which contains over 7,000 nuclear weapons), the threat of a nuclear first-strike is still considered to be significant (arms control association, 2014). the sheer number of us nuclear weapons has led planners to fear that a nuclear first strike could destroy some or all of the chinese arsenal before it could be deployed against the united states. the united states has a wide variety of advanced delivery systems, early warning systems, and nuclear defense systems. a us strike can be launched from land-based nuclear silos, submarines, or by nuclear bombers while china is still struggling to develop any form of secure submarine deterrent. many chinese military scholars believe that china is at risk of a united states nuclear first-strike, a fear that could potentially lead to a major expansion of the chinese nuclear arsenal as well as a potential shift away from china’s low-alert status of nuclear weaponry (kulacki, 2016, p. 5) the current us nuclear mentality is deeply worrying to china; in the view of chinese experts, the us refusal to recognize its vulnerability to chinese nuclear weapons is an indication that it seeks to develop the means to neutralize the chinese nuclear program (kulacki, 2016, p. 1). the united states has spent billions of dollars attempting to develop an anti-ballistic missile (abm) system; while this has largely been ineffective, american willingness to develop these abm systems worries chinese planners. the united states has been attempting to construct nuclear defense systems, such as the aegis and thaad anti-ballistic missile system, which could theoretically intercept chinese ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 64 nuclear weapons en-route to the united states. although it would not necessarily be directed at china, plans to deploy a thaad system in south korea to defend against north korean nuclear weapons has elicited protests from the chinese government. the chinese government claims that such a system could be used against china’s nuclear arsenal and is thus an attack on china’s security and retaliatory capabilities (missile threat, 2015). effective missile defenses on the korean peninsula could weaken china’s offensive nuclear capabilities in northeast asia (despite thaad’s limited range and effectiveness), and many chinese military experts are worried by this prospect (the interpreter, 2016). this has contributed to rising tensions between the united states and china. another potentially destabilizing factor is the development of a “prompt global strike” system, which could potentially allow the united states to destroy any target inside china with non-nuclear missiles within hours (woolf, 2014 p. 2). these missiles could target nuclear storage sites, missile silos, and military targets from us territory without the use of nuclear weapons. just as with the anti-ballistic missile systems, pla military experts have expressed concern over this neutralization strategy. a conventional first-strike by the united states could cripple china’s nuclear deterrent, leaving china unable to retaliate beyond conventional means. due to the development of defensive strategies and alternative offensive measures by the united states, china has focused on the development of rail-launched nuclear missiles, as explained previously, and has been developing its submarine fleet. however, there are many in the people’s liberation army who do not believe that these measures are sufficient, and there have been calls by pla military experts to shift china’s nuclear weapons onto a higher-alert status (kulacki, 2016, p. 1) ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 65 chinese policy changes and nuclear false alarms of the estimated 45 land-based nuclear weapons that can reach the united states, the majority are believed to be mobile solid-fuel rockets which can be launched fairly quickly. unlike us missiles however, china’s missiles are on a low-alert status. this means that it could take several hours to authorize a nuclear launch, even if the nuclear missiles are attached to solid-fuel rockets. as such, a first-strike by the united states could lead to the destruction of china’s nuclear arsenal before it has a chance to launch a nuclear retaliation, a scenario that has not been lost on chinese military experts. in 2013, the chinese academy of military sciences published the science of military strategy (sms), a comprehensive overview of chinese military strategy and nuclear weapons policy (kulacki, 2016, p. 4). this book, intended for chinese readers, explains (among many other topics) china’s concerns with us policy and potential countermeasures. strategists in the pla call for shifting china’s nuclear weapons to hair-trigger alert, allowing them to be launched “on warning,” or after a missile launch has been detected, but before it reaches its target. the work references the ongoing development of an early-warning system to detect enemy nuclear missile launches, though it does not go into specifics. this lack of specificity is worrying because of a key risk in the field of global nuclear proliferation: nuclear false alarms. there have been several false alarms in which early-warning systems detected nonexistent nuclear missile launches, nearly resulting in nuclear war. the union of concerned scientists has compiled several memorable and terrifying incidents: in 1980, a malfunctioning computer chip led to the detection of a soviet nuclear missile launch, leading to the mobilization of the us nuclear bomber fleet (union of concerned scientists, 2016, p. 8). this could have ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 66 resulted in the deployment of nuclear bombers over soviet territory, triggering a conventional or nuclear war. in 1983, sunlight reflecting off of clouds led a soviet satellite to erroneously detect the launch of five nuclear missiles from the united states (union of concerned scientists, 2016, p. 7). this came at a period of high tensions between the two countries. despite the alert, the soviet officer in command of the early-warning system suspected that this was an error and did not report the launch. however, had he done so, the soviet union would have launched a nuclear strike against the united states. in 1995, a norwegian rocket designed to study arctic aurora was detected by the russian early warning system as a potential slbm launch and was interpreted to be an attempt to damage russian radar systems with a nuclear electro-magnetic pulse (union of concerned scientists, 2016, p. 8). while norway had informed russia of this rocket launch, the information had not reached the relevant authorities, nearly leading to russia launching nuclear weapons at the united states. these are only a few of the accidental near-launches, all of which are a result of the hair-trigger status of nuclear weapons. the chinese early-warning system is most likely in its infancy; should it detect an erroneous nuclear launch, china’s launch-on-warning policy could potentially lead to actual nuclear war. one potential consequence of relying on early-warning systems for a launch-on-warning policy is that a first-strike by conventional missiles could also trigger an accidental launch. as the united states expands its prompt global strike system, conventional missiles heading towards chinese nuclear sites could be mistaken for nuclear weapons, even if launched at a depressed angle (unlike an icbm, which launches at a much higher angle, though the previously mentioned norwegian rocket also travelled at a depressed angle and was still believed to be a ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 67 nuclear weapon) (woolf, 2016, p. 34). should chinese commanders mistake these missiles for a nuclear first strike, a conventional, non-nuclear war could escalate into nuclear conflict. there have also been concerns, raised primarily by american military experts, that china may abandon its nfu policy. china’s nuclear submarine developments have concerned many us analysts that china may change its nuclear doctrine or that it may not to keep its pledges to limit nuclear weapons to retaliatory purposes. with a submarine deterrent, china could discontinue the policy because it is no longer necessary to keep china safe from a preemptive nuclear strike (woolgar-james, 2015). however, china’s 2015 military defense paper and the sms both reference the nfu policy as the cornerstone of chinese nuclear policy and show no indication of changing it. the sms describes nuclear weapons as playing a relatively minor role in chinese military strategy, even following a nuclear attack on china. china’s nuclear retaliation plans do not involve striking us military centers, but rather population centers. (kulacki, 2015). the main reason behind this is that experts believe that china’s nuclear program is too small to successfully cripple the us military and thus is primarily a deterrence program. a successful chinese nuclear retaliation would cause tens of millions of civilian casualties, ensuring that the cost of nuclear war with china would be too heavy for any nation to pay. a chinese strike on an enemy’s military capabilities may not be successful and could leave china without an adequate nuclear deterrent. there is no conceivable reason to alter the nfu policy as china does not appear to be upgrading its nuclear weapons for battlefield use. even though a shift of china’s nuclear weapons to a high-alert status is being considered, chinese military experts do not appear to be abandoning the nfu policy. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 68 conclusion understanding chinese nuclear development is critical in understanding china-us relations as well as the future of bilateral nuclear arms control. china’s nuclear program and its ongoing changes reflect the pressures that china faces from its rivals abroad. while china’s arsenal may be smaller and less advanced than the american arsenal, it is slowly approaching military parity. shifting chinese nuclear weapons to a high alert status, would make the world significantly less secure from the threat of nuclear war. it is vital to understand china’s nuclear policy along with the trajectory of its current development in order to understand the risks facing global stability and security. perhaps with this understanding, us policies could be modified or abandoned in order to ensure that another cold war and nuclear arms race does not materialize. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 69 references airforceworld.com, h6 bomber – chinese plaaf, http://www.airforceworld.com/pla/english/b-6-h-6-bomber-china.htmloutline: arms control association, (2014, june 23), nuclear weapons: who has what at a glance”. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearweaponswhohaswhat baker, benjamin david, (2015, december 19) china deploys first nuclear deterrence patrol, the diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-deploys-first-nuclear-deterrencepatrol/ china daily, (2015, may 26), china’s military strategy. http://m.chinadaily.com.cn/en/201505/26/content_20820628.htm davenport, kelsey, china elevates nuclear rocket force, arms control association, march 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016_03/news/china-elevates-nuclearrocket-force federation of american scientists, (1999a, october 5), china: df-31. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/icbm/df-31.htm federation of american scientists, (1999b, september 3), jl-2 (css-nx-4). http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/slbm/jl-2.htm federation of american scientists, (2000a, june 23), china: command and control. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/c3i/ ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 70 federation of american scientists, (2000b, july 28), china: df-5. http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/icbm/df-5.htm goldstein, lyle j, editor, (2005), erickson, andrew s. china’s nuclear force modernization, naval war college. https://www.usnwc.edu/publications/naval-war-college-press/newport-papers/documents/22-pdf.aspx international panel on fissile materials, (2016, january 15), countries: china. http://fissilematerials.org/countries/china.html the interpreter, lowy institute for international policy, (2016, july 12), what thaad deployment in south korea means for china. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/12/what-thaad-deployment-in-southkorea-means-for-china.aspx kristensen, hans m. (2015, april 23), is china planning to build more missile submarines?, federation of american scientists. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/04/china-subs/ kristensen, hans m, norris, robert s, (2015), chinese nuclear forces, bulletin of the atomic scientists. http://thebulletin.org/2015/july/chinese-nuclear-forces-20158459 kulacki, gregory. (2015, march), the chinese military updates china’s nuclear strategy”, union of concerned scientists. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/chinese-nuclear-strategy-fullreport.pdf kulacki, gregory. (2016, january) china’s military calls for putting its nuclear forces on alert”, union of concerned scientists. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 71 http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/china-hair-trigger-fullreport.pdf military-today.com, h-6k, http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/h6k.htm ministry of national defense of the people’s republic of china, (2015, january 1), china establishes rocket force and strategic support force. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/armedforces/second.htm missile threat, a project of the george c. marshall and claremont institutes, (2014, february 12), df-41 (css-x-10)”. http://missilethreat.com/missiles/df-41-css-x-10/ missile threat, a project of the george c. marshall and claremont institutes, (2015, april 23), chinese military expert warns of thaad risks to regional security”. http://missilethreat.com/chinese-military-expert-warns-of-thaad-risks-to-regionalsecurity/ nuclear threat initiative, (2015), china. http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/ office of the secretary of defense, (2016), annual report to congress: military and security developments involving the people’s republic of china 2016. http://www.defense.gov/portals/1/documents/pubs/2016%20china%20military%20pow er%20report.pdf o’rourke, ronald, (2016, june 17), china naval modernization: implications for u.s. navy capabilities—background and issues for congress, congressional research service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rl33153.pdf ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 72 pellerin, cheryl, (2016, april 8), work: robot warship demonstrates advances in autonomy, human-machine collaboration”, u.s. department of defense. http://www.defense.gov/news-article-view/article/716156/work-robot-warshipdemonstrates-advances-in-autonomy-human-machine-collaboration union of concerned scientists, (2016, january), reducing the risk of nuclear war. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/reducing-risk-nuclear-warfull-report.pdf u.s.-china economic and security review commission, (2015, november), annual report to congress, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20annual%20report %20to%20congress.pdf woolf, amy f, (2016, february 24), conventional prompt global strike and long-range ballistic missiles: background and issues, congressional research service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/r41464.pdf woolgar-james, richard, (2015, november 19), china’s nuclear submarines: the end of ‘no first use?’ bulletin of the atomic scientist. http://thebulletin.org/chinas-nuclearsubmarines-end-no-first-use8900 about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the university of illinois library with the support of the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief chase bloch senior editors john hall gabriel wacks editors paisley meyer elaine sine madeleine hubbard buyandelger tsetsengarid nakita pradhan ahmed al-zubaidi corbin kakac alex pietrzyk directors of external relations jason williams web developer chris szul program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 32 drones: a projection of force abroad james holevas university of illinois abstract after the events that took place on september 11th, 2001, the united states military drastically increased their use of unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs). this type of projection of force abroad has not come without scrutiny. both the legality and effectiveness of use have come under question. this study sets out to understand whether the use of drones by the united states is an effective way to fight terrorism abroad. in order to measure success, the study looks at the legality of strikes with regards to how the united states frames their use of drones. the study also looks at the foreign policy goals of the united states usage of drones, specifically through the lenses of liberal-interventionism, in order to determine whether the usage of drones is effective in combating terrorism abroad. the study will focus on drone usage against al qaeda and the taliban, primarily in the countries of pakistan, afghanistan, and yemen. subsequently, the united states drone usage is a useful instrument because of the way it eliminates key targets and facilities of us enemies abroad. about the author james holevas is a senior in the department of political science honors program. he is also minoring in sociology. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 33 introduction between 2009 and 2013, the united states drone program under the obama administration eliminated over 3,000 al qaeda fighters and other members of terrorist organizations (bynam, 2013). although the use of drones in military actions has utilized since world war ii, states have opted to use unmanned aircraft because of substantial technological developments (gusterson, 2016). since the invasion of iraq and afghanistan following september 11, 2001, the united states has turned to the use of uavs to promote their interests abroad. the ability to project force around the world without physical human presence has become one of the us’ preferred tactic in fighting terrorism. this essay will analyze the question of whether drone usage is a successful tool in fighting terrorism in the middle east, by measuring the legality of strikes, the overall strategy and goal of these strikes, and finally by analyzing the actions through the foreign policy goals of the united states. this essay finds that the united states drone usage is a useful instrument because of the way it eliminates key targets of terrorist abroad and disrupts terrorist organizations in the middle east. background foremost, it is necessary to look at the context of events in the international world in order to understand the increase of drone usage by the united states. after the events of 9/11, the united states government declared the goal of fighting terrorism abroad a priority. the terrorists identified in the attacks on the us were said to be members of a group known as al qaeda. this terrorist group and its subgroups would become the primary target of us military action overseas. this group is primarily settled in the countries of pakistan and afghanistan (johnston ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 34 & sarbahi, 2015). a particular area of importance in this study is the federally administered tribal areas, which is largely a rural area where many offshoots of al qaeda are reported to be (johnston & sarbahi, 2015). the federally administered tribal areas (fata) are mountainous, poorly mapped, and not readily accessible to ground troops. to effectively exert force in this region, the us turned to the use of drones. to understand if the use of force was effective in the fight against terrorism, it is important to classify militants and combatants accordingly. defining terms and legality in order to understand whether the use of drones has been a beneficial tool in fighting terrorism, it is important to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants in conflict. for drone strikes to fit in the legality of war, they must be administered during the presence of an armed conflict (vogel, 2013). post 9/11 the united states and the us media posed the conflict against al qaeda as a “war on terror” in general. this description guided audiences and the public to see this conflict as an ambiguous fight against all terrorists abroad (vogel, 2013). by 2009, the administration would abandon the phrase “war on terror” instead changing the conflict to a “war with al qaeda and its associated forces,” (united states department of justice, 2009). this change of description would also include members of the taliban, who were thought to be harboring al qaeda members and would later be targets of drone strikes (vogel, 2013). as stated by vogel, this war against al qaeda and its associates has been “declared” numerous times by united states government through defense spending bills and presidential speeches. the war was first formally declared in 2001 by the passing of the authorization for the use of military force against terrorists (vogel, 2013). with the united states clearly stating they are in an armed conflict with a particular enemy, although it is considered a non-state actor, it opens the ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 35 door to the potential use of drones in this conflict. without the justification of being in an armed conflict, the united states would not be able to legally justify their usage (vogel, 2013). with that in mind, during these armed conflicts, there are often unforeseen casualties. these casualties are categorized into two main groups: combatants and noncombatants. under international human rights law, during a conflict there are certain privileges given to “lawful combatants”, this distinction is given to participants in the conflict who belong to the state that is fighting. for example, during the first world war, lawful combatants would be soldiers on either side of the fight. in regards to the us’ conflict with al qaeda, the us government did not categorize enemy fighters to be “lawful” but instead as “unlawful combatants,” which do not receive the same privileges as the latter (vogel, 2013). according to r.j. vogel, this classification was used by the us government because of the “irregular force” al qaeda had become. this “irregular force” is described to be committed by a non-state transnational organization whose “members’ actions do not allow for protections entailed to lawful combatants.” this distinction would be used by the united states in order to frame the legality of their drone strikes against “al qaeda and its associated forces.” (vogel, 2013). this proposed war would account for a substantial amount of casualties, and the us needs to ensure their use of force against non-state actors like al qaeda is legally justified. continuing, the united states would state that its declaration of the authorization for the use of military force against terrorists overrides provision set out in article 51 of the united nations charter that limits the use of force against non-state actors. the us suggests it holds jurisdiction to defend itself in three situations (1) after armed events, (2) where pre-emptive defense in necessary to address a “continuing threat,” (3) and in times where a threat is present ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 36 (nasser, 2015). with the combination of clearly defining the enemy and rights of those in the combat, the united states sets up a legal framework that could be argued to be within the bounds of international law. however, nasser points out that many of the justifications used by the united states to legitimatize their use of drones are rooted in ambiguities and the complexity of overlapping international laws (nasser, 2015). this legal justification is critical to understand if drone strikes have been a useful tool in the fight against terrorism. in order to stay within the boundaries of war, the us government needed to frame where the battle or conflict was taking place. as stated above, the majority of the empirical data comes from the federally administered tribal areas region, but the us was able to frame a much larger geographical area of conflict. since al qaeda is connected across many different countries, the us declared its fight on al qaeda and terrorism as a whole to have no geographical boundaries. this can be seen from the drone strikes in countries like yemen and iraq (byman, 2013). the us has tried to broaden its scope of force abroad by broadly defining both combatants and the area of conflict; this ensures that the us government stays within the bounds of a legal war. legality of use is one way that suggests the use of drones is beneficial. although, there is legality in targeting al qaeda, the civilian casualties because of drone usage is a fundamental criticism of the use. data collected by long war journal from 2006 to 2016, showed that drone strikes in pakistan accounted for an estimated 158 civilian deaths. in comparison, during that same period, the ratio of confirmed deaths of “al qaeda and associates” to civilian deaths was 17:1 (roggio, 2016). in the conflict with al qaeda, the united states is never legally justified in any of its killings of civilians. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 37 drone strike targeting the effectiveness of drone strikes in the middle east is critical in the understanding of the us’ goals. the us government turned to drone usage because of the difficulty of directly eliminating terrorist cells in the difficult terrain of the middle east. since al qaeda and its members know the region, they can stay hidden and concealed from most detection. by using drone surveillance, the government can locate specific groups and targets. target killings were sanctioned by the us in the years following 9/11. the first reported target killing occurred on november 2, 2002, when a head leader of al qaeda was eliminated during a strike in yemen (cheema & chaudhry, 2015). this would be the start to many future drone strikes, which would eliminate terrorist targets abroad without putting soldiers in harm’s way. the us government has continued to use targeted strikes to remove senior officials similar to those in yemen. drone strikes are also targeted on at strongholds and potential training grounds of terrorist groups. the government’s use of drones has disrupted the training of al qaeda members by discouraging them to gather in large groups or out in the open (bynam, 2013). the fear of a drone strike has made members go so far as to not use electronic communication systems (byman, 2013). even without the physical use of the drones, the us can exert military presence and power in a region far from us territory. with the both ability to eliminate key al qaeda members and disrupt the everyday workings of the organization shows the usefulness of the us drone strikes in the fight against terrorism in the middle east and south asia. in contrast, the obama administration has changed from targeting al qaeda members to most recently using “signature attacks” on the taliban. these “signature attacks” are when us drones target suspected groups of taliban ground soldiers. reports show over 40% of drone strikes during the obama administration have been aimed at the taliban (bergen & rothenberg, ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 38 2015). this shift in targets demonstrates the versatility of the us use of drones to target many facets of terrorism in the middle east. in looking at the data behind drone strikes, its usage in fighting terrorism in the middle east can be seen as beneficial. success by the numbers data acquired throughout the 2000s shows an increase of drone usage over time from the bush to the obama administration. according to data collected in april of 2011, there have been 233 drone strikes, resulting in that caused roughly 1,400 to 2,000 casualties. the study showed that 95% of those victims were military combatants (bergen & tiedemann, 2011). low rates of civilian deaths have been attributed to the increase in both cooperation between foreign governments and technology. drone strike data shows that the us is effectively using drones to take out specific targets and is doing so accurately. bergen and tiedemann also state that since 2011, drone strikes have taken out 33 “insurgent leaders”. research done by the long war journal estimated that from 2004 to 2016 over 50 either taliban or al qaeda leaders were killed by drone strikes (roggio, 2016). with that in mind, there is also data to show that drone strikes have killed a considerable amount of civilians. according to the bureau of investigative journalism, there have been 204 children killed by drone strikes (pugliese, 226). with a ratio of around seventeen confirmed militant kills to every one civilian, the argument of proportionality of use comes into the discussion. scholars, such as tony nasser would argue that there are international laws that prohibit the murder of civilians no matter the type of armed conflict or actors involved. although a counter-argument for the use of drones is that many would suggest these civilian fatalities would come whether the use of force was drones or alternative methods of combat. according to the bureau of ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 39 investigative journalism, the civilian death rate in yemen was three times higher when using non-drone military force such as “ground troops or non-drone missile strikes” compared to drone strikes during a fixed period of time (saletan, 2016). ultimately, the majority of measures taken from the data on drone strikes in the middle east, suggest that drone strikes are useful in the fight against terrorism. a tool to achieve us foreign policy goals with that in mind, the use of drone strikes is a tool used to promote the foreign policy goals of the united states. for the last two decades, the united states has promoted foreign policy goals that align with liberal interventionist ideology (parmar, 2009). this political theory favors the role of interventionism in humanitarian conflicts as well the promotion of democracy through interventions abroad. inderjeet parmar describes the recent interventions in iraq and the middle east to be focused on military action to promote democracies. parmar, suggest the us intervention in the middle is based on protecting the domestic security of the united states (2009). the protection of us security is clearly seen by the us use of drones in its fight against terrorism. the united states is able to continually promote its democratic interest abroad through its use of drone strikes. in addition drone usage continues to promote the recent foreign policy shift of neo-conservatism, which highlights the necessity for the united states to use its power to enhance the global stage (parmar, 2009). in order to affect the international arena, the us has turned to fighting terrorism in the middle east. the us government is achieving this foreign policy goal through the effective use of drone strikes in the middle east. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 40 both the bush and obama administrations have seen it as prudent to continue to combat terrorist groups abroad through the use of drone strikes. the use of drones gives the us continuous projection of force against threats to their national interest. the us drone usage allows the government to continuously promote its national interest in the middle east. the promotion of us foreign policy goals through the use of drones can be seen through the recent example of the us conflict with islamic state. islamic state conflict in the case of the us intervention against the islamic state in the middle east, the united states aimed their attacks in order to “eliminate the threat the posed to the international community” (department of defense, 2015). as of december 3, 2015, the department of defense reported 14 strikes carried out by unmanned vehicles against the islamic state and its resources in syria. many of these strikes were targeted at islamic state buildings and oil well heads ("strikes hit isil in syria, iraq"). these strategic attacks are one primary goal of the us in their fight against terrorism. as stated above, the elimination of crucial resources and targets disrupts the organization of terrorist groups. these strikes are also an example of how the us intervenes in conflicts around the world without the risk of endangering us military. this recent example highlights the us ideology of defending its interest abroad. conclusion ultimately, drone usage has been shown to be a useful tool in the fight against terrorism in the middle east. since the us government is engaged in armed conflict with terrorist groups, they have legal grounds in using this type of force. this projection of force eliminates key targets and leaders of different terrorist groups in the middle east. with the absence of ground troops, ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 41 the united states is still able to intervene in conflicts abroad without the risk of us military casualties. in looking at drone strike data, the us drone usage has been a useful tool in accurately eliminating targets without substantial civilian deaths. the united states has continued to increase its use of drone strikes from the bush to obama administration and could be argued to be their preferred tool in fighting terrorism in the middle east. currently, the united states has been able to dismiss international concerns of its drone use by the way it has shaped the legality of their strikes. policymakers must continue to accurately define combatants and externalities of the war to justify the use of drones. the united states has recently followed a doctrine focused on liberal interventionism in order to promote domestic security, and the use of drones has been shown to be one of the best tools for doing so, especially in its fight against terrorism in the middle east. ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 42 references bergen, p., & tiedemann, k.. (2011). washington's phantom war: the effects of the u.s. drone program in pakistan. foreign affairs, 90(4), 12–18. retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/stable/23039602 bergen, peter l., and daniel rothenberg. drone wars: transforming conflict, law, and policy. new york: cambridge up, 2015. print. byman, d. (2013). why drones work: the case for washington's weapon of choice. foreign affairs, 92(4), 32-43. retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1411622851?accountid=14553 cheema,p.i. and chaudhry, m. i. "license to kill on the legality of targeted killings in pakistan by drones." journal of political studies (2015). academic onefile. web. 2 dec. 2015. "coalition strikes target isil terrorists in syria, iraq from a combined joint task force operation inherent resolve news release."http://www.defense.gov/news-articleview/article/632483/coalition-strikes-target-isil-terrorists-in-syria-iraq. n.p., 3 dec. 2015. web. gusterson, hugh, remote control warfare, the mit press, dec 4, 2016 inderjeet, parmar. "foreign policy fusion: liberal interventionists, conservative nationalists and neoconservatives — the new alliance dominating the us foreign policy ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 43 establishment." international politics 46.2/3 (2009): 177-209. america: history & life. web. 6 dec. 2016. johnston, p., & sarbahi, a. (2015, april 21). the impact of u.s. drone strikes on terrorism in pakistan. retrieved october 01, 2016, from http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf nasser, tony. "modern war crimes by the united states: do drone strikes violate international law? questioning the legality of u.s. drone strikes and analyzing the united states' response to international reproach based on the realism theory of international relations." southern california interdisciplinary law journal 24.1 (2014): 289-327. academic search complete. web. 6 dec. 2016. pugliese, j.. (2015). drones. in m. b. salter (ed.), making things international 1: circuits and motion (pp. 222–240). university of minnesota press. retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/stable/10.5749/j.ctt14jxw02.20 roggio, bill. "pakistan strikes | fdd's long war journal." fdd's long war journal. n.p., n.d. web. 06 nov. 2016. saletan, william. "civilian deaths would be much higher without drones." slate magazine. n.p., 2015. web. 06 oct. 2016. u.s. department of defense "airstrikes hit isil in syria, iraq.". n.p., n.d. web. 04 dec. 2015. united states department of justice (2009) respondents’ memorandum regarding the government’s detention authority relative to detainees held at guantanamo bay, in re ijois fall 2016, volume ii program in arms control & domestic and international security 44 guantanamo bay detainee litigation, no. 08-442, 3 (washington, d.c.: march 13, 2009). vogel, r. j. (2013). droning on: controversy surrounding drone warfare is not really about drones. the brown journal of world affairs, 19(2), 112-122. retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1649691585?accountid=14553 ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 picking up the pieces: populism and the european union sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk university of illinois urbana-champaign abstract in recent years, populist parties have gained popularity and electoral significance throughout the european union (eu). however, a string of defeats in important elections has caused many politicians and commentators to declare that the populist threat is over. the first section of this paper challenges this claim, arguing that populist parties have succeeded in shaking the hegemony of mainstream political parties. while the greater question of populism’s place in europe has yet to be answered, we can expect major changes to occur in the european union over the coming years. part two of this paper will examine major policy directions that the european union is expected to take following europe’s populist wave. the main areas of focus of this section are a review of brexit negotiations, illiberal democracies in eastern europe, development of the common foreign and security policy and progress in supranational institution activity. picking up the pieces: populism and the european union sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk 2 part i: populist parties in the eu (sonam kotadia) introduction in the past few decades, populist parties1 across the eu have pushed themselves to the forefront of the political scene, not only on the national level but also on the european one. the influence of these parties is unmistakable, as evidenced perhaps most dramatically in june 2016, when the referendum in favor of brexit, that is, the exit of the united kingdom from the eu, passed by a slim margin. this victory, however, is slowly beginning to appear to be the pinnacle of success for the populists; indeed, populist parties suffered serious blows in a series of important elections in austria, the netherlands, and france following the brexit vote. these decisive defeats have led some commentators to declare that the tide of populism has been curbed (norris, 2017). the first section of the paper argues otherwise. although populist parties are losing support, their impact on the political environment in their respective countries have long-term implications. what is populism? the most commonly cited definition of populism in recent literature was presented by cas mudde in 2004. he defines it as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (mudde, 2004, p. 543). although this definition has been contested, it establishes a fundamental characteristic of populism: the focus on the “people.” populists juxtapose the “forgotten,” innocent common people and the self-serving, dishonest elites, who are typically defined as the mainstream political parties and the eu. these parties characterize themselves as the sole true representatives of the people (müller, 2015, p. 81). this demonization of the elite fosters a strong anti-establishment attitude. in general, populists openly criticize the political establishment, claiming that it has lost touch with whom it is meant to serve: the common people (immerzeel et al., 2016, p. 824). they sometimes go as far as to question the integrity of existing political structures, institutions, and even democratic procedures (müller, 2015, p. 86). jan-werner müller (2015) suggests an interesting revision to the anti-elitism of rightwing populist parties, arguing that they are not only anti-elitist but also necessarily anti-pluralist. by this, he means that this movement relies on separating a heterogeneous, inherently hypothetical group that exists outside any political institution – the people – and portraying them as homogenous and political. they then claim that this group is the only legitimate one, and that they are its only legitimate representatives: “the logic of populism is not ‘we are the 99 per cent’, it is: ‘we are the 100 per cent’” (p. 85). by doing this, populists move politics into the moral dimension: any opposition is seen as a sign of immorality, and any unfavorable result as a sign of immorality and corruption. 1 since the majority of prominent populist parties in the eu – with the notable exceptions of syriza in greece and podemos in spain – are on the right of the political spectrum, i will focus on right-wing populism. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 nationalism is another important defining characteristic of modern populism. the rhetoric of the vast majority of populist parties, especially those on the right, is highly exclusionary, lauding those of ‘pure’ ancestry and demonizing minorities. although nationalism suggests that ethnic minorities are the only groups targeted, this is far from true: religion, sexual orientation, language, immigration history, and gender are also common points of contention (müller, 2016, p. 84). right-wing populists often argue that members of the proper nation should receive preferential treatment, for example in access to welfare and other government-provided services (halikiopoulou and vlandas, 2015, pp. 281-282). this exclusionary sentiment lends itself to a strong anti-immigration stance. there is a general consensus among scholars and commentators that immigration is the most important issue area for right-wing populist parties (immerzeel et al., 2014, p. 824; halikiopoulou and vlandas, 2015, pp. 281-282). right-wing populists tend to call for more restrictive immigration policies and quotas as well as stricter requirements for integration programs and harsher punishments for noncompliance. the recent so-called “refugee crisis” has added a new dimension to this position. right-wing populist parties have become the primary voice against taking in refugees and refugee quotas (mudde, 2016, p. 25). in summary, modern populists on both sides of the political spectrum seek to divide their public into two groups: the common people and the corrupt elite. they aim to establish themselves as the only representatives of the former and thereby the only real opposition to the latter. characteristics that typify right-wing populist parties include anti-establishment, antipluralist, nationalist, and anti-immigrant attitudes. is the populist threat over? the decisive defeats delivered in the aforementioned elections in austria, the netherlands, and france suggest that the momentum gained through the brexit referendum and even the us presidential elections is waning. although it is very possible that this trend will persist in the eu, populist parties should by no means be considered inefficacious actors. the fact that these parties were viable and notable contesters in these prominent elections indicates that populists have succeeded in changing the political discourse. this has had a profound impact on the structure of the political environment at the very least on the national level. the austrian election exemplifies this. since austria became an independent state in 1955, it has been governed by one of the mainstream centrist parties, if not by a coalition between them. although other smaller parties have joined coalitions in the past, one of the mainstream parties has always been present. this pattern also extends to the presidency, which is a more ceremonial post – until the 2016 presidential election. neither of the mainstream parties made the final round; instead, the final two candidates came from the austrian freedom party, a right-wing populist party, and the green party, a left-leaning, liberal party. this historic development indicates that the long-standing stability of the austrian political environment has ended (müller, 2016). picking up the pieces: populism and the european union sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk 4 the french election reflects a similar trend. though the mainstream center-right and center-left parties in france have not enjoyed the same consistent success as their austrian counterparts, there has been relatively steady support for traditional gaullist parties. gaullism stems from the principles espoused by general charles de gaulle, the first president of the french fifth republic. he advocated for a strong, non-partisan presidency that above all sought to maintain political stability. the 2017 presidential election may symbolize the death of the gaullists. the final two candidates were true political outsiders: marine le pen of the front national, a right-wing populist party, and emmanuel macron of en marche!, a new, independent party on the center-left. although both of these candidates favorably compared themselves to de gaulle towards the end of their campaigns, neither of their platforms are truly gaullist. macron’s victory arguably represents a new era of french politics (mcauley, 2017) as the austrian and french examples illustrate, populism is far from dead. their electoral losses do not diminish their long-term impact: they have posed arguably the most serious challenge to the hegemony of the mainstream parties in the post-war era (norris, 2017). whether or not they remain the primary opponents to these traditional centrist parties, they have effectively shaken the political establishment. if mainstream parties wish to remain contenders, they must reorganize themselves. part ii: looking forward (justin tomczyk) while eurosceptics failed to achieve major gains in recent elections, the existential question posed to the european union by the populist-right has left many in brussels shaken. the lesson learned over the past year is that the existence of the european union and continued european cooperation is not to be taken for granted but rather defended and preserved through a conscious effort by policymakers and national leaders alike. the consolidation of power by parties like pis and fidesz have shown that illiberal democracies have firmly embedded themselves in the east, a reminder that authoritarian rule has not entirely left europe. now, the question for the european union is what sort of direction the union will take to ensure a stable and secure future for europe after the political turbulence of 2016 and 2017. brexit and the european union after the leave campaign’s narrow victory, many predicted that brexit would be the first domino in a continent-wide eu secession wave. political tension brought by austerity and the financial crisis, persistent youth unemployment, and the sudden shock of the syrian refugee crisis seem to prime the continent for a true “nationalist spring”. unfortunately for the united kingdom, the failure of fn and vpp to achieve electoral success has left theresa may’s government alone in leaving the european union. brexit provides the european union with two major political opportunities. the first is that the ongoing brexit negotiations will allow brussels to demonstrate just how much economic and political weight are behind the union. while many organizers of the leave campaign consider the european union to be more dependent on the united kingdom than vice-versa ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 (bbc, jan 2016), the united kingdom is finding itself losing much of its negotiating momentum. post-brexit economic predictions show that the u.k. will struggle to operate without proper access to the european union’s single market. this is due to the eu accounting for almost half of british foreign trade (dhingra, 2016). more and more financial offices are considering relocating from london to mainland cities like frankfurt (bbc, june 2016). the united kingdom’s labor market finds itself either forced to concede residency rights for eu nationals or search for almost 3 million extra workers (house of commons library, 2017), as a “hard brexit” from the eu will remove residency and labor rights for eu nationals in the united kingdom. initial plans to sign trade agreements with countries like india and the united states have met limited success, as the united kingdom remains represented by the european union’s single representative in the world trade organization (due to its participation in the eu single market) (united kingdom parliament, 2016). as of now, it seems that brussels has the higher ground. much of the economic damage brought upon by brexit has been mitigated as the eurozone continues to grow (eurostat 2017). political maneuvering by northern ireland and scotland in regarding independence form the uk and readmission into the eu to retain close economic and political ties to europe (riaghaltas na h-alba, 2016) have given the european union considerable leverage towards a “soft brexit”. furthermore, the exit of the united kingdom from the eu would mean the removal of one of the union’s notoriously obstructionist members. hypothetical projects like the european union defense force and a unified coast guard/navy have been heavily opposed by the united kingdom who considered participation in these projects to be a violation of sovereignty (rand 2017). eastern europe and illiberal democracies in dealing with euroscepticism in eastern europe, we will likely see the end of “two speed europe”. the idea of two speed europe is that the disparity between eastern and western levels of eu integration is permissible, because it is assumed that eastern eu members would continue their integration process until full harmonization with western europe. unfortunately, a combination of political disagreement and economic slowdown has led to a slow-down of eu integration. an example of this integration stagnation is that while all eu members are expected to adopt the euro, certain members in the east have shelved this process indefinitely while retaining full eu membership. unfortunately, the rise of illiberal democracies like orban’s hungary and pis-ruled poland have shown us that any degree of separation between the east and west will provide space for the far right to maneuver and grow. the result of two speed europe is something similar to brexit, as the united kingdom’s many opt-outs of integration criteria during its accession negotiations played a part in its “distance” from mainland europe. realistically, it can be expected that a post-populist eu will take a stronger stance on illiberal democracies like poland and hungary. macron has already voiced his desire to sanction these states if needed (ouest-france 2017), as the idea that an eu member may receive as many benefits as possible picking up the pieces: populism and the european union sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk 6 while contributing only what is convenient goes against the idea of eu solidarity. there is also serious consideration towards enacting article 7 of the european union and suspending hungary’s voting rights (european parliament, may 2017), as viktor orban’s government has continuously obstructed actions related to refugee redistribution. the goal of this process is to remove the idea of “cherry picking” eu obligations while accepting all eu benefits, reaffirming that solidarity is key to the european union’s function and will lead to continued prosperity for all members. while these policy positions will require a larger reconsideration of how the eu operates (enforcement mechanisms, the boundaries of collective action and state sovereignty, etc) the goal is that there will no longer be such a thing as a strictly “southern european issue” nor an “eastern european problem”. common foreign policy the european union finds itself walking a thin line regarding foreign policy. russia and turkey have slipped back into an authoritarian status as democratic norms have largely receded from the political sphere. the united states has found itself grappling with a presidency that is unconventional and unpredictable, shattering decades of implicit trust between both sides of the atlantic. the ongoing crisis of climate change and impending resource shortages have left the european union as one of the few actors capable of pursuing proactive policies to protect the environment. given the erosion in the eu’s relationships with its traditional partners, the european union has no choice but to act as a more assertive and proactive force. this will be carried out by two major entities: the european council/council of ministers and the high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy. the european council is a body composed of all 27 heads of eu states. the goal of this group is to find broad agreements on policy and steer the general direction of the eu. the council of ministers is a collection of ministry heads from all eu members, convened to discuss a policy area (i.e, all 27 eu ministers of defense or ministers of economics). the most basic level of a common foreign policy is independently converging all 27 national foreign policies onto one broader policy agreement. an example of this would be all eu members agreeing to adhere by the paris agreement and prioritize research into renewables and green energy (european council, 2016). this requires flexibility, as some eu members have national interests that cannot be ignored, but is one of the more feasible ways for a common foreign policy to occur. the second entity critical to the eu’s foreign policy is the high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy a position currently held by frederica mogherini. while the council will form the base of the eu-wide foreign policy, the high representative will act as the eu’s unified voice on more contentious issues. the high representative’s main goal will be communicating what strict foreign policy positions the entirety of the european union will take. for instance, while some members of the eu want to remove sanctions on the russian federation or continue trading with moscow, the european union will never recognize the legitimacy of the russian invasion of crimea (european external ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 action service, 2015). this position is best left to dealing with questions regarding rule of law and direct confrontation from third parties. proactive supranational policies finally, there is the greater question of what sort of supranational actions will be required to keep the european union intact. because the eu is built on the idea of shared sovereignty and the delegation of power, there is an immense amount of trust and institutional confidence that is required for its proper function. the failure of the european union to properly address a crisis will lead to stop-gap policies by national governments and erode trust towards the union’s function. much like plumbing, the european union is unnoticed when functional and unignorable when dysfunctional. we can expect a greater pivot in the eu away from reactive crisis management and more towards proactive decision-making. we’ve already seen the european commission take a more assertive stance towards tax-havens and technology firms hoping to bend eu regulations on data security and personal information. at the same time, the european parliament has reoriented itself towards a confrontational stance with the united states after washington’s failure to extend the eu-us visa-free tourist policy to countries like bulgaria and poland (european parliament, march 2017). these are all positions and policies enacted by the eu’s supranational structures like the european commission and european parliament – institutions that exist above the level of national governments. the end goal of this repositioning is for the european union to succeed on a global scale as a whole in areas where national governments may have struggled. conclusion european parliament president martin scuhlz once said, “what we all do in brussels can only become a success if everybody takes proper ownership. stop pretending that all success is national and all failure european". while the european union has exited the recent wave of populism mostly intact and generally optimistic, the project’s long-term success and existence is dependent on its member-states to secure. more importantly, the problems facing the european union should be considered another opportunity for transnational cooperation and success rather than a cause for chaos and disorder. through a combination of deliberate internal action and proactive foreign policy, the european union may overcome the current wave of western populism and continue its progress towards an ever-closer union. picking up the pieces: populism and the european union sonam kotadia and justin tomczyk 8 references bbc (2016, january 26). eu needs us more than we need it, says vote leave. bbc (2016, june 26). hsbc 'to move jobs to paris if uk leaves single market' dhingra (2016) “the consequences of brexit for uk trade and living standards”. the london school of economics. european parliament. (2017, march 2). parliament asks eu commission to press for full us-eu visa reciprocity. european parliament (2017, may 17) fundamental rights in hungary: meps call for triggering article 7. european council (2016) climate change: council adopts decision for eu ratification of paris agreement [press release]. european external action service (2015) declaration by the high representative federica mogherini on behalf of the eu on crimea [press release]. eurostat (2017) “flash estimate for the fourth quarter of 2016” halikiopoulou, d., & vlandas, t. (2015). the rise of the far right in debtor and creditor european countries: the case of european parliament elections. the political quarterly, 86(2), 279–288. house of commons library (2017) “migration statistics”. immerzeel, t., lubbers, m., & coffé, h. (2016). competing with the radical right: distances between the european radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues. party politics, 22(6), 823–834. mcauley, j. (2017, april 22). charles de gaulle would roll over in his grave over what has become of french politics. washington post. mudde, c. (2004). the populist zeitgeist. government and opposition, 39(4), 542–563. mudde, c. (2016, january). europe’s populist surge: a long time in the making. foreign affairs, 95(6), 25–30. müller, j.-w. (2015). parsing populism: who is and who is not a populist these days? juncture, 22(2), 80–89. müller, j.-w. (2016, july 25). austria: the lesson of the far right. the new york review of books. norris, p. (2017, may 17). so is the wave of populist nationalism finished? hardly. washington post. ouest-france (2017). emmanuel macron demande des sanctions contre la pologne. rand corporation (2017) “a snapshot of international perspectives on the implications of the uk’s decision to leave the eu”. riaghaltas na h-alba / the scottish government (2016) “scotland’s place in europe”. united kingdom parliament (2016) “chapter 6: trade under wto rules”. compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain 1 compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the preparatory commission for the comprehensive test ban treaty organization (ctbto) was established to stop the use of nuclear testing as outlined in the comprehensive test ban treaty (ctbt). at present, the ctbt has 166 state signatories, however, without the addition of the eight annex ii states (states that must ratify the ctbt for it to enter into force: united states of america (usa), china, india, pakistan, israel, democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk), iran, and egypt), the ctbt cannot be fulfilled. the ctbto is a liberal institution amid a realist-dominated world and without a proper understanding of the dynamics of this relationship, the ctbt will fail to be a successful and monumental document for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. the goal of the ctbto is to end the 20+ year delay the ctbt has seen since its original adoption in 1996. special attention ought to be placed on compliance with international treaties and why these consequences are not realistic. this paper looks at the existence of liberal institutionalism in a realist world. liberal institutions succeed when clearly defined verification is instituted. additionally, there is an exploration of the relationship between liberal institutions and realist states. the liberal institutional perspective is that international institutions are created out of the self-interest of states (stein, 1999). the realist perspective in this paper will be offensive realism. proponents of offensive realism believe that states act to gain as much power as they can in order to maintain security (mearsheimer, 2013). ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 introduction governments must recognize the mutual benefits that exist from non-proliferation. in august of 1942, the manhattan project was established in the united states, which would produce the world’s first nuclear weapons, that were dropped on hiroshima and nagasaki in august 1945. in august of 1949, the soviet union tested its first nuclear weapon, giving both cold war powers nuclear weapons (ican, 2017). in october of 1952, the united kingdom tested a nuclear weapon, becoming the third nuclear-armed state. in 1960, france joined the nuclear powers with china following four years later in 1964. by july 1968, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt) opened for signatures. under articles i and ii of the npt, the nuclear-armed states agree not to aid non-nuclear-armed states in the development of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states agree not to establish nuclear weapons programs (the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 2012). however, in may of 1974, as a nonsignatory to the npt, india conducted its first nuclear test. twelve years later in september of 1986, it was discovered that israel had a nuclear weapons program as well, although israel has not confirmed the existence of its program. by july 1996, the debate on the use of nuclear weapons was brought to the international court of justice, later that year on september 24, the ctbt opened for signatures (ican, 2017). on november 19, 1996, twenty-five days after the ctbt opened for signatures, the ctbto was adopted (ctbto preparatory commission, 2011) to make preparations for the entry into force of the ctbt and ensure once in force the ctbt would be operational. almost 21 years later in 2017, the ctbt has still not been employed ("status of signature and ratification"). while the organization has seen an increase in state signatories, the failure of certain annex ii states, all of which are required by law to legitimize the ctbt, to sign and/or ratify the treaty has prevented the ctbt from entering into force. despite this, the ctbto is still serving its purpose, albeit not its full purpose, which can only be achieved through complete ratification. literature review daniel verdier, a political science professor at the ohio state university, wrote an article titled “multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the nuclear proliferation regime” that delves into the struggles of compliance on the international stage. verdier outlines the importance of having clear methods to gain the compliance of realist states for a liberal institution. he accomplishes this through his analysis of the different mechanisms – multilateral, bilateral, or exclusion – used for the adherence of states to the npt. multilateral methods include creating treaties between multiple states. bilateral methods include creating additional treaties between two specific states in addition to the main treaty. exclusion methods include avoiding the acquisition of a state’s signature because it would be detrimental to the organization. the concepts outlined in verdier’s article on the npt can be transferred to the ctbt because verdier’s concepts have the potential for freeing the ctbt of the twenty one-year roadblock it has been facing. by understanding the different mechanisms at play and the correlation that compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain 3 exists between what governments see as beneficial and their ability to effectively comply with a liberal institution, the ctbto can become one step closer to becoming effective. additionally, many scholars have provided insight into international theories. the application of different theories can bring about different results for the same research, but here the application of john mearsheimer’s offensive realist theory will be applied. the definition of offensive realism in mearsheimer’s article “structural realism” and robert jervis’s article “realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate” is used. according to robert jervis: “…offensive realists think that the conflict we observe in international politics represents real incompatibility between desired states of the world,” (50). proponents of offensive realism believe that states act to gain as much power as they can in order to maintain security (mearsheimer, 2013). the definition of neoliberal institutionalism being used in this paper stems from the work of arthur a. stein in the oxford handbook on international relations. in describing the benefits of liberalism in international politics, stein states, “the heart of neoliberal institutionalism is a view of international institutions as the self-interested creations of states,” (208). stein’s definition is cited as an attempt to create a balance between liberal institutionalism and realist states. a neoliberal institution in a realist world the ctbto is based on the neoliberal institutionalist theory that a state’s best interest is to disarm (verdier, 2008). however, the organization faces opposition from realists, who correlate weapon acquisition with power. governments that associate nuclear weapons acquisition with power follow realist policies. this can be seen in all the annex ii states that have yet to ratify the ctbt. all these states either have nuclear weapons programs or have previously had them. the role of the ctbto is to persuade states to recognize the gains they would receive from ratifying the treaty and putting into effect the ctbt. entry into force is accomplished by changing what governments see as beneficial. how these gains and losses can be presented to state actors is outlined by verdier, where he presents the npt as both a bilateral and a multilateral treaty. verdier shows how changing a state’s perspective is complex. whether states negotiate bilateral attachments to a treaty is dependent upon whether the benefits of having a state be a signatory to the treaty outweigh the costs. some states have resisted signing and/or ratifying the ctbt since the treaty opened for signatures. it may be in the best interest of the ctbto to consider ways to persuade these holdout states with the attachment of bilateral treaties. devising ways to obtain ratifications may help further the process of placing the ctbt into law. a method used by the ctbto to attain ratification could be the addition of bilateral treaties to the ctbt. bilateral treaties could be attached to the ctbt for those states who have not signed. the ctbt could benefit from bilateral treaties between india and pakistan as well as israel and iran. these states have a deep distrust in one another, and the addition of bilateral treaties between these states may persuade them to sign the ctbt. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 annex ii signatories needed nuclear weapons states usa usa china china india india pakistan pakistan israel israel dprk dprk iran russia egypt uk (“status of signature and ratification”) france table 1. compares states with nuclear weapons to those needing to sign the ctbt (nuclear weapons, 2017). additionally, the annex ii states that have failed to sign the ctbt are mainly those currently possessing nuclear capabilities with the exception of iran and egypt (see table 1). this again aligns with an offensive realist perspective where an emphasis is placed on a state’s power (mearsheimer, 2013). it is the realist perspective of annex ii states that is preventing the ctbt from reaching universal implementation. a realist perspective shows challenges to the ctbto while a neoliberal institutionalist perspective shows how the organization operates. the ctbto focuses on the reduction of uncertainty in a world with nuclear weapons and solving collective-action problems. by creating a forum in which governments discuss disarmament, the ctbto is striving to create more certainty. without nuclear weapons testing present or allowed, the organization will effectively put an end to the symbolic power that comes with it. likewise, the ctbto is attempting to solve a collective-action problem by being an organization in which state parties agree to the benefits that will arise in a nuclear-test-free world. even a small nuclear explosion impacts a wide range of people through wind currents, which carry radioactive particles throughout the entire world. this results in detrimental health effects among those who live in the fallout zone, the area where high levels of radiation from a nuclear explosion reach. this can be seen from the victims of hiroshima and nagasaki. the enforced ctbt, which would rely heavily on scientific data through international monitoring systems (ims), makes it more difficult for countries to test nuclear weapons undetected. there are four types of ims systems the ctbto is in the process of implementing: radionuclide stations, hydroacoustic stations, infrasound stations, and seismic stations. radionuclide stations detect radioactive particles in the air. the composition of the air samples taken by these stations help determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred (“radionuclide monitoring”, 2010). in addition, hydroacoustic stations check for underwater nuclear explosions. hydroacoustic technology is “used to measure water pressure changes caused by sound waves,” (“hydroacoustic monitoring”, 2010). furthermore, infrasound stations watch for atmospheric compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain 5 nuclear explosions by analyzing low-frequency acoustic waves. the use of these stations help the ctbto locate where the explosion occurred (“infrasound monitoring”, 2010). rounding out the detection apparatus, seismic stations check for underground nuclear explosions using a seismometer. through analysis of the data received via the seismometer, it can be determined whether the activity was caused by a naturally-occurring event or man-made activity, such as a mine explosion (“seismic monitoring”, 2010). realism and neoliberal institutionalism both exist within the ctbto as it attempts to try to gain ratification of the ctbt. the ctbto exists within the realm of neoliberal institutionalism; however, in trying to gain full ratification of the treaty, the organization must work to change the perspective of states. the ctbto needs to convince governments that the ctbt, once in effect, would be of great benefit. finding the balance between realism and neoliberal institutionalism is what will best aid the ctbto in moving forward to gain complete ratification. findings in an interview with jenny nielsen, an affiliated researcher at the ctbto, she was asked questions concerning specific governments’ evasion of ratification, reasons for evasion, and paths taken to curb state resistance to signing. studying the current conduct of the organization helps determine what needs to be done to ensure that the ctbt is effective. in addition to the interview, relevant statistical data provided a broader image as to what is occurring within the organization. information regarding the completion of the ims and the number/location of ims stations were received. all of this data was found in the ctbt and was provided by the ctbto preparatory commission. the verification of the ctbt first presents itself under article iv verification (ctbto preparatory commission, 2011). this section of the treaty extensively details topics such as the establishment of the ims, funding verification, and on-site inspection procedures with the cooperation of states. in addition to verification listed within the treaty text, the ctbt provides “protocol to the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty” (ctbto preparatory commission, 2011), which outlines protocol that is to be followed in the establishment and conduct of the ims (ctbto preparatory commission, 2011). according to the may 10th talk held by the vienna centre for disarmament and nonproliferation on the entry into force of the ctbt, 90% of all ims stations have been established. there are several states, including iran, that have yet to establish ims stations. the states that have established ims but have not signed the ctbt include: usa, israel, egypt, pakistan, and china. the potential power of the ctbt and its verification regime is illustrated by the fact that countries that have not fully agreed to the terms of the ctbt often build ims stations, as outlined within the treaty. however, full verification, which includes on-site inspections cannot be implemented without the entry into force of the ctbt (vcdnp, 2017). the primary focus of the interview with nielsen was on verification. nielsen described the ctbto as heavily reliant on technologies such as seismological, hydroacoustic, infrasound, ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 and radionuclide stations (ctbto preparatory commission, 2011). nielsen further claimed that the ctbto advertises itself as a technical organization and not a political one, because the technology is non-discriminatory. the ctbto is a transparent organization through the use of its verification (nielsen, 2017). the international data centre is constantly receiving input from the ims, and when information is detected by the system, all raw data is sent out to the respective state governments (nielsen, 2017). through having a verification system which employs highly technical methods, it is nearly impossible to circumvent the rules outlined within the ctbt. since the initial opening for ratification for the ctbt, the dprk has been the only country to conduct nuclear tests. according to nielsen, every test that the dprk conducted since the establishment of the ims has been detected via various ims stations in the vicinity of the dprk. this data has been used to determine the exact time and location of the tests and the magnitude of nuclear weapons tested by the dprk (nielsen, 2017). this shows that the verification regime established by the ctbt has the ability to effectively monitor state compliance. what was not found among the research conducted was specific consequences that would occur for failure to comply with the treaty. nielsen believed that there was “a strong international norm” against nuclear weapons use that would dissuade any state from conducting tests and if a state did, the consequence would be strong international backlash. additionally, nielsen stated that like any other treaty, if a state was not complying with the ctbt, the united nations security council could take measures to ensure compliance; this would most likely take the form of sanctions. while these both outline theoretical consequences for lack of compliance, a lack of specificity is cause for concern. without any consequences specifically outlined, a state will be less likely to comply if it will not be reprimanded for its actions. the existence of strong international standards against a given action with potential backlash by international community for breaking that norm does not count as a consequence. the existence of a clearly outlined verification regime within the ctbt text supports the hypothesis that liberal institutions succeed when clearly defined verification is instituted. since the ctbt opened for ratification in 1996, the only state to have conducted nuclear tests is the dprk, which many scholars and policy makers consider an outlier. this hypothesis is only partially confirmed because the ctbt has yet to be implemented. therefore, this hypothesis could be adjusted to state that neoliberal institutions succeed when clearly defined verification is instituted and when there is a strong international norms aligning with the organization’s mission. compliance and consequences through analysis of the work presented, it is apparent that there is a tension between the coexistence of realist actors and neoliberal institutions. many non-proliferation treaties fail because they lack a solid enforcing body. for a treaty to become an effective force on the international stage, state governments need to voluntarily give up some of their power. if a state compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain 7 government does not see this as being in their best interest, there is little that can be done to force them to reconsider. overall, strategies should exist to ensure the compliance of a treaty for it to be effective. there are several methods by which this could be accomplished, such as specifically explaining how states are expected to comply and what specific measures can be taken to ensure state compliance ("status of signature and ratification," 2010). verdier further emphasizes the importance of compliance. compliance may be gained through the addition of bilateral treaties to a multilateral treaty. by adding bilateral treaties between enduring rivalries, these states would be more likely to comply after reaching a mutual agreement and thus build a new level of confidence between them. bilateral treaties could be beneficial between india and pakistan as well as between israel and iran. another issue preventing the creation of an effective balance between neoliberal institutionalism and realist states is the ability to layout and enforce consequences for not complying. the lack of consequences leads states to question the legitimacy of the organization or treaty to which they are a member. this ultimately creates an imbalance between neoliberal institutions and realist states, which is seen through yet another nuclear missile launch by the dprk on september 3, 2017 (lee, 2017). this goes against an international court of justice advisory opinion from july 8, 1996, which stated the “threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law,” (koplow 174, 2014). the inability for treaties to have consequences makes international treaties only effective when states willingly comply. because consequences cannot be realistically tied to international treaties, once the ctbt is in force, it is at risk of failing. the only way for the ctbto to prevent the failure of this treaty is to continue ensuring states that it is in their best interest to comply with the principles outlined in the ctbt. this compliance can be achieved by showing states that the ims has the ability to accurately detect any nuclear activity. by recognizing the inability to circumvent the ims, states should voluntarily comply to the ctbt. voluntary compliance is the only mechanism that can prevent the failure of the ctbt and voluntary compliance is not guaranteed. conclusion the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states can be successful if there are clear standards to adhere to. vague language and the inability to follow through on enforcement will lead to the collapse of neoliberal institutions. by focusing on and minimizing ways to circumvent compliance, a neoliberal institution can increase its chances of remaining an effective and relevant tool on the international stage. this will prevent the institution from become useless and unimportant. the ctbt is a unique document that has taken over 21 years to enter into force. the work that went into the ctbt should not be wasted and time should be spent ensuring that the document will be effective once it becomes official and binding. there needs to be a focus on any existing loopholes and the ability to ensure that no test can go undetected via ims. by understanding the details of how states will comply and how states are to implement what is ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 outlined by the ctbt, then the ctbto will be well on its way to creating a nuclear test-free world. the ctbt has the possibility to become the treaty that effectively reduces and eliminates the testing of nuclear weapons through the successful implementation of all ims world-wide and on-site inspections. however, steps must be taken to ensure that it will be a success. the ctbto should focus on ways it can effectively and realistically see the coexistence of their liberal institution with realist states. this can be done by finding ways to have the remaining ims stations built and have the remaining annex ii states sign and ratify the ctbt, so on-site inspections can begin. this can be most effectively achieved by adding bilateral treaties to the ctbt between enduring rivals. compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world caitlin j. mclain 9 references ctbto. “hydroacoustic monitoring.” hydroacoustic monitoring: ctbto preparatory commission. ctbto, 2010. web. 7 dec. 2017. ctbto. “infrasound monitoring.” infrasound monitoring: ctbto preparatory commission. ctbto, 2010. web. 7 dec. 2017. ctbto. “radionuclide monitoring.” radionuclide monitoring: ctbto preparatory commission. ctbto, 2010. web. 7 dec. 2017. ctbto. “seismic monitoring.” seismic monitoring: ctbto preparatory commission. ctbto, 2010. web. 7 dec. 2017. ctbto. "status of signature and ratification." status of signature and ratification: ctbto preparatory commission. ctbto, 2010. web. 3 mar. 2017. ctbto preparatory commission. comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (ctbt). vienna: preparatory commission for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty organization, 2011. print. ican. "nuclear weapons timeline." ican. international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, 2017. web. 12 apr. 2017. jervis, robert. “realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate.” international security 24.1 (1999): 42-63. president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology. 1999. web. 29 mar. 2017. koplow, david a. "a nuclear kellogg-briand pact: proposing a treaty for the renunciation of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy." syracuse j. int'l l. & com. 42 (2014): 123-91. georgetown university law center. georgetown university, 2014. web. 14 mar. 2017. lee, michelle ye hee. “north korea’s latest nuclear test was so powerful it reshaped the mountain above it.” the washington post, wp company, 14 sept. 2017. web. 18 nov. 2017. mearsheimer, john j. “structural realism,” in tim dunne, milja kurkl, and steven smith, eds., international relations theories: discipline and diversity, 3rd edition (oxford: oxford university press, 2013), pp. 77-93. web. 9 may 2017. nielsen, jenny. “ctbto innerworkings.” personal interview. 19 may 2017. stein, arthur a. “neoliberal institutionalism.” the oxford handbook on international relations, oxford university press, 2008, pp. 201-221. vcdnp. “achieving the entry into force of the ctbt.” achieving the entry into force of the ctbt. permanent mission of japan, vienna. 10 may 2017. lecture. verdier, daniel. "multilateralism, bilateralism, and exclusion in the nuclear proliferation regime." international organization 62 (2008): 439-76. department of political science. ohio state university, 2017. web. 28 feb. 2017. contents the ethics of cyber warfare .......................................................................................................... 5 opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto ...................................... 21 failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states ................................................................ 33 planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states ..................................................................... 41 the global crisis in syria............................................................................................................. 59 compliance and consequence: the coexistence of neoliberal institutionalism and realist states in a nuclear world ........................................................................................................................ 67 re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing ............................................................................ 77 program in arms control & domestic and international security iii about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the university of illinois library with the support of the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and is comprised of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief chris szul elaine sine editors gwyneth dixon alexander pietrzyk jakob domagala jason williams zach cleary mark toledano dylan hyams buyka tsets about the illini journal of international security ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 start i: a retrospective stuart polen university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract for decades, the united states (u.s.) and union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) were competing to be the dominant global military power. however, after a series of crises, both states realized that if the status quo was maintained, it could mean the destruction of their states and the rest of the world. thus, the u.s. and ussr agreed to limit their production of nuclear weapons. eventually, the states decided that arms reduction would be the future and the resulting agreement would change the international power structure. the negotiations lasted for nine years, including a hiatus, and also led to another iteration of the treaty before the agreement was ratified. this study analyzes various aspects of the strategic arms reduction treaty (start) negotiations, including the different stakeholders, their goals and tactics, alternatives, and the other factors that led to the final agreement. this study also analyzes the long-term effects of the treaty, its success, and who came out on top from start. start i a retrospective stuart polen 2 introduction during most of the cold war, the u.s. and ussr engaged in a series of arms races to gain influence and hard power globally. tensions from the arms races culminated with the cuban missile crisis. afterwards, the states began the strategic arms limitation talks (salt). these talks began so the states could reach an agreement on limiting the deployment of various nuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (slbms), and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (mirvs) (u.s. department of state). although successful, later iterations of salt were not as effective and the states eventually regressed to the status quo. this did not change until 1982, when ronald reagan suggested a reduction in arms instead of solely limitation (reagan 1982). the strategic arms reduction treaty was proposed to be a comprehensive and binding plan for both states, and it set out to reduce the arsenals of both powers (reagan 1982). although past frameworks were insufficient, the states had a mutual understanding that the status quo was unacceptable. start has improved since its 1992 ratification and it is still used as a framework for arms reduction today. actors actor a-the united states due to the length of start talks, the negotiating team of the u.s. spanned across two presidents: ronald reagan and george h.w. bush. during the reagan administration, the idea for start was first proposed during president reagan’s address at eureka college (reagan 1982). the agreement was coupled with a plan to modernize the united states’ arsenal by reducing strategic arms. as of 1982, the u.s. found itself on the wrong side of the balance of strategic power. the u.s. wanted to remedy the situation by reducing strategic weapon stores (the white house 1985). strategic arms reduction was only one facet of reagan’s foreign policy because he also wanted to improve america's standing abroad, especially in latin american states (rosenfeld 1986). in 1989, george h. w. bush became president and continued the talks with the ussr. during his time as a negotiator, bush worked to build confidence with summits and the u.s. verification and stability initiative, which gave both parties experience in verifying and monitoring their arsenals (federation of american scientists). much of bush’s work on start i was based in finalizing the agreement, and he eventually signed the treaty in 1991 (federation of american scientists). throughout the negotiations, both administrations remained relatively cohesive within their negotiating teams. actor b-the union of soviet socialist republics (ussr) throughout the ussr’s involvement in the start i talks, the ussr, due to its authoritarian regime, followed a monolithic model and each negotiating team was relatively cohesive. that being said, over the course of the start negotiations, the ussr had a high turnover on heads of state. one of the leaders during the negotiations was mikhail gorbachev who worked with both u.s. presidents on start (federation of american scientists). of the ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 soviet premiers, gorbachev was seen as the most cooperative during talks (nye 1989). gorbachev oversaw most the agreements on icbm ceilings and other concrete limits, which were a point of contention throughout the negotiations (bennett 1997). however, after the signing of the treaty, the ussr went through a major change. the dissolution of the soviet union gave birth to four nuclear post-soviet states: the russian federation, kazakhstan, belarus, and ukraine. this became a problem for the ratification process because the agreement was set up to be bilateral (federation of american scientists). to remedy the situation, the lisbon protocol was created so all of the post-soviet states could sign on and begin the drawdown. of all of the actors, the ussr was the most dynamic because of the series of leadership and regime changes. actor c-the united states congress the u.s. congress was responsible for the ratification of the start agreement. during negotiations, congress ensured that the agreement would include concrete reductions in the quantity of icbms and other strategic arms to appeal to the electorate (nye 1989). it is also noteworthy that, much like the presidency, congress experienced a change in leadership. congressional leadership changed between the two major parties multiple times throughout the negotiation and ratification phases of start i (u.s. senate). conditions at the onset of negotiations the negotiations and final product from start talks signaled a shift in soviet-american relations and the negotiation paradigm that surrounded the arms control debate. at the time that ronald reagan proposed start in 1982, he asserted that there was “malaise and resentment [of the west]” within the ussr and that was due to failed agreements and talks in the past (reagan 1982). before start was proposed, ripeness was the dominant paradigm due to the nature of the arms race that the united states and ussr were in. this is because arms races are very similar to the game of chicken (starkey 2010). throughout the 1960s and up until 1982, agreements such as the resolution during the cuban missile crisis and the salt agreements came about because the status quo became absolutely unacceptable for both parties. in fact, the salt agreements proved to be ineffective because of the rationality of the united states and ussr. salt ii was especially ineffective because of its “high ceilings and serious inequalities” (the white house 1982). thus, it was not adopted and both parties reverted to the status quo. however, reagan expressed his commitment to making a concrete agreement and building a more “constructive” relationship with the ussr (reagan 1982). in his speech at eureka college, reagan marked the transition from relying on ripeness to focusing on readiness. this transition from solely resolving the mutually hurting stalemate to focusing on an agreement that is mutually beneficial as well as long-term was a priority in reagan’s initial start proposal. nevertheless, start i marked the transition from just focusing on benefits and costs via ripeness to cooperation via readiness. start i a retrospective stuart polen 4 role of public opinion during the first couple years of the reagan administration, public opinion was lulled into accepting the status quo, as the administration’s official policy on arms control was that it was more of a problem than a solution (nye 1989). however, this lull was short-lived, and reagan eventually proposed start to appeal to the american public. thus, throughout the drafting process for start, the public placed a high value on arms control. during the pre-gorbachev era, arms control was a top priority for the american public because the ussr had a strategic advantage on many fronts (nye 1989). this pressure compelled the reagan administration to maintain momentum during start talks, especially when the ussr abandoned talks in 1983. in order to get the ussr back to the negotiating table, reagan signed the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty. this agreement removed the missiles from western europe (federation of american scientists). while the commitment to arms control was mostly consistent with the views/priorities of the american public, there were two challenges that public opinion posed. first and foremost, the united states had to properly communicate progress to the public. this led the united states to focus on communicating reductions of arms in terms of quantity as opposed to other proposed criteria. when it comes to arms control, the public places a high value on numbers because they are the easiest to understand as opposed to criteria such as missile range (nye 1989). a reduction in the number of arms would translate to a safer world in the eyes of the average citizen, which was important since nuclear winter theory permeated the arms control dialogue (robock 1989). the second challenge came about when gorbachev ascended to power. unlike his predecessors, gorbachev was more committed to arms control and the public had more confidence in him (nye 1989). this reduced the need for frequent public reassurance of progress and inadvertently led to slightly less pressure being put on the united states and ussr. however, these challenges did not impede negotiations and momentum was maintained. issues at stake the negotiations surrounding start illustrated a very important issue for both the united states and ussr: the global balance of power was changing. as start negotiations progressed, analysts found that the diffusion of power became more and more apparent. according to joseph nye, this was due to a reduction of hard power on both sides throughout the talks, which resulted in more states becoming more politically active (nye 1989). this gave way to the phenomenon of polycentrism, which is a global power structure in which the united states and ussr are still hard power centers, but other states can establish themselves as political centers (starkey 2005). as start became more of a reality, this power shift became more apparent. thus, it would be beneficial for both actors to ensure that their exchange in hard power translated into a comparable gain in soft power. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 structure of negotiations summary of structure (bilateral, public/private, high politics) the structure of talks has a great effect on how negotiations are carried out. factors such as the number of actors, whether or not the talks are public, and whether or not the actors perceive the issue as high-politics or low-politics can affect the proposal process. typically, high-politics issues are typically addressed by the highest level of government. on the other hand, low-politics issues are much less urgent and can be addressed by more junior government members (starkey 2005). by virtue of its subject matter, the start i talks were bilateral in nature and were tended to by the highest government officials. arms control was certainly considered a highpolitics issue by both actors, especially because nuclear arms were involved. while arms reduction was a highly salient issue for the u.s., it was not as serious for the ussr because the ussr had a strategic advantage over the united states in strategic arms, especially in terms of throw weight (the white house 1982). finally, many of the talks and summits between the u.s. and ussr were known to the public. minimal back-channeling occurred during negotiations and external observers were aware of the agenda and progress made (bennett 1997). opportunities and problems of the structure the bilateral structure of the negotiations gave the actors a less complex forum in comparison to negotiations with three or more actors (starkey 2010). therefore, one can infer that the interests and intentions were much easier to communicate between the u.s. and ussr. one could assert that the public nature of the talks also fostered the development of track ii diplomacy, which typically leads to a more impartial analysis of alternatives (starkey 2010). that being said, the secondary actors can lead to problems in team cohesion. while the negotiating teams could be cohesive at the highest level, they will also need to appeal to their domestic governments and allies, and those interests could cause internal conflicts. such was the case when nato deployed pershing ii missiles in europe and angered the ussr to the point of walking away from negotiations in the process (the white house 1985). influences: the two-level game and track ii during the start talks, both the two-level game and track ii diplomacy came heavily into play. in the case of the united states, all treaties must be ratified by both chambers of congress. without ratification by congress, any agreement made would only be an executive agreement, and one can infer that an executive agreement would not be viable for lasting arms control. in order to make an agreement that could be ratified by congress, the agreement had to appeal to the american electorate as well. this is due to the fact that each congressman wanted to retain his office (morrow 1991). in order to make the agreement appeal to the u.s. electorate, the proposal must include provisions that the public could easily translate into progress (nye 1989). for example, the public is more likely to understand a reduction in the number of icbms, but perhaps not other limitation metrics, such as throw weight or the number of delivery start i a retrospective stuart polen 6 vehicles. this compelled the united states team to focus on arms reduction by quantity of the drawdown. moreover, congress could influence start by setting the defense budget. congress had been known for making adjustments in the defense budget in order to bring the ussr to the table and show good faith, especially during the negotiations of salt i and salt ii (morrow 1991). thus, congress had a significant role to play during the start talks. in the case of the ussr, the two-level game did not come into play until the ussr’s dissolution. when the ussr dissolved, the duma was established, and they were given the power to ratify treaties much like the united states congress. one can infer that there was some concern that the newly-formed russian federation might not ratify start in its final form in 1991, but it was passed with ease (federation of american scientists). while the duma did not play a major role in the end of the negotiations, it is something that cannot be ignored. finally, due to the publicity surrounding the start negotiations, track ii diplomacy came into play during the final stages of negotiations. during negotiations, many drawdown strategies and criterion for the drawdowns were proposed, and many academics commissioned research to assess the viability of the different proposals. when talks began in 1982, the arms control association commissioned research on many of the different initial proposals (krepon 1983). this report focused on reductions based on the salt ii framework, flat reductions, percentage cuts coupled with an arms freeze, reductions in operational forces (launchers and reentry vehicles), and reductions based on throw weight (krepon 1983). the conclusion from this research is that many of the proposals at the time were not viable due to the extreme inequality between the arsenals of the united states and ussr. however, progress in track ii diplomacy mirrors the progress of talks between the actors, and in 1989, a new evaluation was conducted on the revised drawdown models. the analyses were conducted in conjunction with various analysis organizations within the u.s. department of defense and focused on various drawdown models involving warheads and delivery vehicles. unlike the research from 1989, these analyses also explored the drawdowns from the perspective of the ussr more extensively. in fact, this analysis served as a framework for the final start agreement and led to the united states’ suggestion to follow a 2-2-2-1 drawdown limit (owens et. al. 1995). as the negotiations progressed, these track ii actors had considerable influence on helping both parties find the most viable solutions. additional framing concerns start was initially proposed because the united states experienced a major change in policy between jimmy carter and ronald reagan. the united states was struggling against the ussr in their constant contest for global influence as demonstrated by the soviet occupation of afghanistan. reagan wanted to regain the strategic advantage the u.s. had over the ussr, so he coupled his proposal for start with a modernized defense system and the establishment of the reagan doctrine. between the ussr’s advantage in icbm capabilities and its increased global involvement in areas like afghanistan, reagan’s chief policy goal was to level the playing field again. this resulted in an ambitious foreign policy that supported pro-capitalist in states such as ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 nicaragua as well as leading the movement in arms reduction (rosenfeld 1986). start was ultimately one component of an entire mission to restore u.s. supremacy over the ussr and the negotiations were complemented by missions abroad. negotiation proceedings during negotiations, it is important for each actor to not only know their goals but also their limits. throughout the proceedings, the actors have to guess the goals and limits of the other parties in order to come to an agreement. in diplomacy, this is characterized by green lines and red lines. an actor’s green line is defined as the main goal of the negotiations and represents the ideal outcome. in contrast, a red line is the very least an actor can accept from the negotiations. the concept of red lines and green lines is important to diplomacy because agreements come about due to an overlap between each actor’s red lines and green lines. this is known as the zone of agreement, or the set of agreements that are acceptable by both actors (starkey 2010). it is important for an agreement to come from the zone of agreement or else the actors are forced to accept the next best alternative. this is known as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or batna. batna for the actors in order to understand the batnas for the united states and ussr, one must remember the nature of the diplomatic game the actors have been playing throughout the cold war. as mentioned earlier, the status quo for the arms debate was an arms race. when analyzed in the realm of game theory, the arms race is like the game of chicken (starkey 2005). according to game theory, rational actors will continue the proliferation of arms until a breaking point without negotiation. as a result, if negotiations bear no fruit, then the game of chicken will resume. because of game theory, the batna for the united states and ussr is the status quo, which made drafting a reliable agreement that much more important. united states-green lines and red lines the united states’ main goal with start was to enhance deterrence and increase stability of its nuclear arsenal. the chief green line of the u.s. was a “significant” reduction in icbms and other ballistic missiles, which the u.s. deemed to be the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. this was the most important green line for the u.s. since the ussr had a marked advantage in ballistic missile technology, plus soviet missiles had better throw weights (the white house 1982). this green line also required an emphasis on the number of icbms, as the public would respond more favorably to a reduction in the quantity of arms as opposed to simply a reduction in throw weight (nye 1989). concerning icbms, other requirements in the green line included a ban on the testing, development, deployment of rapid reload capability for fixed missile launchers, and a limit on the number of stored icbms (the white house 1982). in terms of the red lines for the united states, the focus was on maintaining a comparable icbm arsenal to that of the ussr and maintaining a general framework for strategic arms start i a retrospective stuart polen 8 reduction (the white house 1982, the white house 1983). first, the requirement of maintaining a sufficient icbm arsenal served as a red line because, when coupled with the other arms reductions, the u.s. believed that maintaining some capacity in icbms was a “prerequisite” for its security (the white house 1982). the united states’ other red lines were outlined in the basic elements paper, which was the broad framework used for its goals. due to its broad nature and the fact that it served as the minimum for an agreement, the united states did not authorize the dissemination of the paper until at least the third phase of talks. this was to prevent the ussr from undermining the efforts of the u.s. by branding the goals as too broad, which could compromise the goal of establishing concrete limits on arms (the white house 1983). ussr-green lines and red lines for the ussr, start was quite problematic for its strategic advantage. as mentioned above, the ussr had superior icbm capabilities compared to the united states (the white house 1982). thus, the green line for the ussr was to reduce the inevitable losses of arms as much as possible. in order to do this, the ussr’s green line would involve arms limitations based on throw weight as opposed to a ceiling on the aggregate missile launchers and bombers. the ussr’s green line can be shown through a revised version of salt ii, as many of the provisions were more favorable to the ussr arsenal (bennett 1997). this is because the proposed reductions by the u.s. would lead to the ussr having to dismantle ninety percent of its icbms in contrast to the fifty percent reduction on the end of the united states (bennett 1997). through a reduction in throw weight, the ussr would be able to hold more of its icbms, which constitute a great deal of its leverage over the united states. the ussr’s red line is unique in that it does not necessarily directly involve arms reduction at all. rather, the ussr’s red line was that the united states cannot deploy new missiles in europe (bennett 1997). this red line was violated by nato when it deployed pershing ii missiles and cruise missiles in europe (the white house 1985). this led to the ussr leaving the negotiating table for some time until the inf treaty was enacted (federation of american scientists). tactics used in diplomacy, each negotiation tactic can be grouped into either competitive or cooperative negotiation tactics. in terms of competitive tactics, the strategies are rooted in the notion that the particular negotiations occurring are a zero-sum gain. one of these strategies is positional bargaining, which is used when an actor proposes one position and refuses to move from it. another is coercive diplomacy, which involves one actor compelling another to meet a specific demand with either the use of or the threat of force. coercive diplomacy is closely related to the negotiating tactics of intimidation or chicken, which can both involve a certain degree of force. in contrast, collaborative diplomacy occurs when both actors find common interests and frame the negotiations in such a way so that problem solving is the main focus ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 9 (starkey 2010). one collaborative method of negotiation is interest-based bargaining, which is a tactic that involves the actor learning about the other’s needs and trying to find common ground. this tactic is closely related to both the listening strategy and confidence building. another good collaborative tactic is cutting the cost of compliance, which builds confidence for the other party by reducing the risk of carrying out a given agreement (starkey 2010). actors can also focus on solving their problem by emphasizing a common vision, which can be useful for starting negotiations or building momentum. because of the united states’ poor experience with salt ii, the u.s. wanted to ensure that a concrete agreement on arms reduction that the ussr would not defect from was made. to achieve this end, the united states focused on communicating its intentions clearly and focusing on collaborative negotiation tactics. first, the united states focused on communicating the difference between slow-flying “clearly second-strike systems” and more destabilizing weapons such as icbms (the white house 1982). this tactic has some aspects of sequencing, because the proposed figures for reducing strategic arms on both sides were contentious for both the united states and ussr. by differentiating these two types of weapons, this could have made the ussr more amenable to reducing its arsenal. the united states also took advantage of track ii diplomacy by having the department of defense commission analyses on the drawdown possibilities for each state’s arsenal (owens et. al. 1995). by not solely relying on the united states’ negotiating team, the u.s was using confidence-building measures and cutting the cost of compliance to further garner support from the ussr for their proposal. by analyzing the different drawdown methods and intermediate limits, the u.s. could find a drawdown that would give the ussr more flexibility, which would reduce the ussr’s risk and prevent defection (owens et. al. 1995). however, not every tactic the u.s. used was collaborative. the united states was aware that, in order for congressmen to get reelected, the agreement had to have some concrete reductions in the number of arms to appeal to the electorate (morrow 1991). thus, the united states was able to get these reductions by making the ussr aware of its limited authority due to the two-level game. the united states also strategically lied by omission to protect its interests. this was mainly done during the early rounds of negotiations by withholding the basic elements paper until at least the third round of negotiations. this was due to the fear that the ussr would undermine the united states’ efforts by saying that the proposal suggested by the u.s. was too broad (the white house 1983). to review, the united states put an emphasis on collaborative tactics to build the ussr’s confidence but was also able to leverage its limited authority when needed. while the united states focused on collaborative tactics, the ussr put an emphasis on competitive tactics in order to prevent excessive losses from arms reduction. a great deal of the ussr’s tactics can be derived from positional bargaining and taking advantage of deadlines. for example, the ussr would use positional bargaining and misinformation by portraying their positions as final, which pressured the u.s. to make concessions. in this same strain, the ussr would demand concessions from the u.s. close to the end of their summits, which is known as start i a retrospective stuart polen 10 the “eleventh hour squeeze” (bennett 1997). the ussr would also try to portray limited authority by stating that soviet generals were not on board with the proposals made by the united states (bennett 1997). however, the ussr also took advantage of external events to guilt the united states into concessions by intimidation. this was illustrated by the ussr walking away from negotiations after nato’s deployment of pershing ii missiles in europe (the white house 1985). the ussr did not return to negotiations until the conflict was resolved in the form of the inf treaty, which mixed both intimidation and linkage (u.s. department of state 2001). due to the risks of losing major leverage over the u.s., the ussr had to focus on competitive tactics to ensure that the losses from arms reduction were minimal. successful tactics as mentioned previously, a very large part of the united states’ proposals was the fact that reductions had to be focused on reductions in the quantity of arms so the electorate would approve of the treaty (nye 1989). the united states was successful in achieving this end through keeping the two-level nature of talks in the foreground via limited authority. another successful tactic the u.s. used was simply taking initiative. based on my research, it seems that the u.s. was the first to make proposals throughout the talks (federation of american scientists). this seems to have paid off in more soft power in the long term, which is further explained in the section titled the winners. in terms of the ussr’s successful strategies, the state was the most successful in using linkage to their advantage. the ussr saw an opportunity with the nato missiles in europe to hold the start agreement hostage unless concessions were made, and it paid off by solving the issue of missile deployment in europe for the soviets (the white house 1985, u.s. department of state). effects of time, location, and venue during the start negotiations, both parties tried to set up venues and times that were impartial to either side. many different rounds of talks occurred in geneva, which is typically used for impartiality. geneva was used as a meeting place throughout the start talks, and it was used for each side to present their draft agreements as well. the united states and the ussr also alternated hosting negotiating teams, as a few summits were held in moscow and washington d.c. between 1989 and 1991 (federation of american scientists). moreover, timing was manipulated by the ussr to pressure the united states and nato to reduce their aggression. at one point, nato deployed pershing ii missiles in europe to increase security, and this led to the ussr suspending talks. at the time, it seemed that violence would break out again between the united states and the ussr. however, instead of increasing pressure on the ussr, the action drove the ussr from the negotiating table and on the diplomatic offensive (the white house 1985). fearing the loss of momentum, the united states worked with the ussr to create the inf treaty, which brought the ussr back to the ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 11 negotiating table (federation of american scientists). in conclusion, the timing and venues were controlled to try and maintain neutrality so the start talks would not fall apart. analysis of outcome the winners when it comes to diplomacy and negotiations, the victors can be declared in many ways and, ultimately, winning depends on scale of reward and time. one way to judge an actor’s success immediately after a negotiation is through game theory. according to game theory, the winner of the game is the actor who comes out with the biggest gain in utility, as shown in the prisoner’s dilemma and chicken models (starkey 2010). in both models, the winner is determined by which actor can maximize their utility. that being said, this analysis can only judge a winner in the short term. since diplomacy rarely happens in isolation and parties will often have to work with each other again, winners could be determined by who establishes the most goodwill to ensure that future iterations occurred (olekalns & smith 2007). in a similar strain, a winner can be determined by what kind of power benefits are gained from the agreement. more specifically, the prospect of soft power is a fair indicator of which actors are winners for an agreement. many states use soft power as a metric of success because leading by example leads to more influence in both future iterations of negotiations with a given actor as well as the international community as a whole (nye 1989). as mentioned previously, start was an unprecedented agreement because it was the first of its kind to focus on arms reduction as opposed to simply limitation. therefore, there were many benefits that were experienced by both the united states and ussr. start was an agreement that showed the commitment of both the u.s. and the ussr to addressing the issue of global arms proliferation. thus, both states gained the favor of the international community to some degree because of the mutual nature. however, while both actors gained some favor from the international community, the united states would ultimately come out on top from start. this is because the short-term benefits that the ussr gained from start did not translate into substantial influence benefits in the future. before one can understand why the u.s. was the ultimate winner from the start agreement, one must understand the short-term victory that the ussr won from start. in the final version of start, the model used for drawdown limits was agreed to be a schedule with equal ceilings at the end of the third, fifth, and seventh years after the treaty’s ratification. the ceilings in the final version were based off the ussr’s straight-line drawdown as opposed to the one that the united states proposed. as a result, the ussr had more flexibility during the drawdown, especially in regard to multiple warhead ballistic missiles (owens et. al. 1995). because of the nature of this drawdown limit, the ussr was able to hang onto some warheads longer than the u.s. and thus maintain some hard power advantage during disarmament. thus, in the short term, the ussr won through a more favorable deal. unfortunately for the ussr, the victory from the drawdown limits was short-lived and the u.s. came out on top. this is because the united states was able to gain more soft power start i a retrospective stuart polen 12 from start while being able to maintain other sources of hard power. first, while start reduced the amount of nuclear warheads and other missiles, the agreement did not address conventional weapons. this would prove to be important because after the dissolution of the soviet union, the united states stood uncontested as the global “military hegemon” (starkey 2010). this power structure, which began after the dissolution, is called unipolarity because the u.s. military stands uncontested as a military power (starkey 2010). due to the dissolution, the russian federation’s hard power capacity is a shadow of what it once was. moreover, the u.s. has been able to gain more soft power from start than the russian federation has. this is shown through the agreements that came about thanks to start, which include start ii, start iii, and new start. regardless of whether or not any of the future agreements were ratified, one could assert that the united states gained influence because the u.s. was regarded as the initiator for all of these agreements. moreover, due to the united states’ leadership on agreements such as start, one can assert that the u.s. had a smoother transition into a more soft power-dominated world. this is best shown by how the russian federation handles international crises. for example, in 2014, russia annexed crimea under the guise of protecting ethnic russians in the region (englund 2014). this scenario demonstrates russia’s desire to dominate with hard power, and it shows that the state has not adjusted well to using soft power. this is not to say that the united states is a model for soft power necessarily because they are also known for exerting their hard power in scenarios, such as the war in iraq. however, it could be argued that the united states is more accustomed to using collective action in other facets of diplomacy. all in all, the united states gained much more than what was shown on paper, and thus the ussr got the short end of the stick in the long-term. critical errors by parties concerning the united states, the most critical error the state made was not being mindful of other sensitive security issues during the negotiations. as mentioned above, nato deployed pershing ii missiles in europe during negotiations, which angered the ussr into putting the talks on hold (the white house 1985). the united states should have been more aware of nato’s deployments because by antagonizing the ussr, they almost put start in jeopardy. start could have met the same fate at salt ii due to this misstep. had nato not deployed the missiles, the united states might have been able to prevent the need to make concessions and come out with a stronger agreement in the end. however, the negotiations resumed after a brief hiatus. the ussr also made the critical mistake of not thinking about the long-term implications of its actions. during arms control negotiations, the ussr was known to not take initiative. the ussr would make minimal counter-offers in response to the proposals that the u.s. made and simply react to the u.s. instead (bennett 1997). this strategy was used to wear down the u.s. and goad them into making unilateral concessions. while this was effective during the negotiations, the lack of initiative led to the ussr not realizing the full benefits of soft power after ratification. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 13 major accomplishments when start i was first proposed by ronald reagan, it was a dramatic turn from the previous policy of solely arms limitation (reagan 1982). in many ways, start i was a groundbreaking treaty not only because it was the first of its kind, but also because of the foundation it established for long-term arms reduction. for example, the start talks also resulted in the inf treaty, which was the first treaty that banned an entire class of weapons (u.s. department of state 2001). not only did the inf treaty ban intermediate-range ballistic missiles (irbms), but it also defined what an irbm and what a ground-launched missile cruiser (glcm) were (u.s. department of state). this closed a semantic loophole which both parties would use and, in turn, made past arms agreements fail (bennett 1997). moreover, start i showed the genuine commitment of both the u.s. and the ussr to arms reduction. this commitment was shown during the dissolution of the ussr. in spite of the dissolution, the russian federation, kazakhstan, belarus, and ukraine all signed on to start i via the lisbon protocol to reaffirm their commitment to the treaty (federation of american scientists). between being the first treaty of its kind and the foundation for global arms reduction, start i was a major diplomatic feat. effect on reputation for better or for worse, reputation has a strong effect on how negotiations are carried out. when it comes to reputation, actors can either use a distributive or integrative approach in their negotiations. in distributive negotiations, there is less chance for joint success than in integrative negotiations (tinsley et. al. 2002). as a result, actors with reputations of valuing distributive negotiations are less likely to be trusted making it harder for that negotiator to get a future agreement. moreover, there are many tempting opportunities to deceive the second party during negotiations. according to olekalns and smith, deception becomes more likely if goals in a dyad are not aligned. however, if there are common goals or multiple iterations of the same game, then deception decreases (olekalns & smith 2007). therefore, in order for arms control agreements to succeed, the parties involved must be regarded as reputable and not deceive each other. despite the shortcomings involved in salt and the early start talks, the united states and ussr were both able to finalize a treaty which was projected to reduce strategic weapons by 35%. start also held the actors accountable for complying with the terms of the agreement (nuclear threat initiative). start was one of the first arms control agreements that successfully curbed proliferation, and, as a result, the reputation of both the united states and ussr benefited considerably. the agreement proved that there was a concrete shift in sovietamerican relations and that more cooperation could be expected in the future. but one of the most important aspects of start i’s reputation building power is that the agreement was upheld after the dissolution of the soviet union. shortly after the united states senate ratified the treaty, the ussr broke up and four strategic weapon-holding states were formed: the russian federation, ukraine, kazakhstan, and belarus. to accommodate the change, the lisbon protocol start i a retrospective stuart polen 14 was added so these states could become parties to the treaty, and it was signed and ratified by all parties (federation of american scientists). a testament to the success of start i is the fact that four states established trustworthy reputations in the realm of arms control as a result of the treaty. in short, all parties involved improved their reputation as fair and responsible negotiators. likelihood of recurrence due to its success, start i paved the way for three updated iterations of the agreement: start ii, start iii, and new start. although start i would be in effect until 2009, the united states and the russian federation wanted to continue momentum and did so with varying degrees of success. even while start i was being finalized in 1990, start ii talks overlapped its predecessor. start ii would eventually be ratified in 1996 by the u.s. and in 2000 by the russian duma (federation of american scientists). after start ii talks concluded, start iii talks began. however, start iii was made obsolete by the strategic offensive reductions treaty (sort) in 2002, which set a cap on deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 (arms control association 2003). the most recent iteration of the start treaties is new start, which went into effect in 2011. new start streamlined the previous verification procedures to remove redundancies. moreover, it did not impose limits on weapons testing of current u.s. missile programs (u.s. department of state). thus, the spirit of start has remained strong for over 20 years, and it has taught the united states and ussr the power of trust. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 15 references arms control association. (2003). the start iii framework at a glance. bennett, p. r. (1997). russian negotiating strategy: analytic case studies from salt and start. commack, ny: nova science. berridge, g. r. (2002). diplomacy: theory and practice. new york: palgrave. englund, w. (2014). kremlin says crimea now officially part of russia after treaty signing, putin speech. washington post. federation of american scientists. strategic arms reduction treaty (start i). retrieved from federation of american scientists. strategic arms reduction treaty (start ii). krepon, m. (1983). assessing strategic arms reduction proposals. world politics, 35(2). morrow, j. d. (1991). electoral and congressional incentives and arms control. journal of conflict resolution, 35(2). nye, j. (1989). arms control after the cold war. foreign affairs. olekalns, m., & smith, p. l. (2007). loose with the truth: predicting deception in negotiation. journal of business ethics 76(2). owens, d. w., parnell, g. s., & bivins, r. l. 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(2003). ripeness. beyond intractability. boulder, co. sp20 final edition ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the university of illinois library with the support of the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and consists of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor in chief jakob domagala editors alexander pietrzyk buyandelger tsetsengarid dylan hyams mark toledo ryan vetticad web developer richard mcclure program in arms control & domestic and international security ii letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the third issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our fifth issue of the journal, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. in “the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories,” kathleen richardson explores how the people’s republic of china’s recent policies have negatively affected their grand strategy in east asia. traveling west, we focus in on the middle east with “a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan” and “a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it.” in “a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan,” siddharth singh chaudhari gives insight into why pakistan supports the afghan taliban and the implications for the united states and afghan governments. in zachary cleary’s “a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it,” he explores the how the islamic state transitioned to iraq after the destruction of their caliphate and the what this means for the iraqi government. moving northeast, we look into how the annexation of crimea and russian aggression along ukraine’s eastern boarder goes against the 1994 budapest memorandum and explore the view that ukraine is in a better position than that if they had not agreed to the memorandum in “empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later” from paisley ann meyer. zooming out to see a more global perspective, madison johnston reviews the evolution of intelligence gathering methods between the 1800’s to the cold war era and what this means for concerns and arguments of these methods in “the paradigm shifts in intelligence: from 1800 to present.” these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! christopher szul letter from the editor re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing zachary cleary 1 re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing zachary cleary university of illinois urbana-champaign introduction the purposeful killing of select individuals is a cornerstone of modern counter-terror and insurgency doctrine. the cia’s drone fleet strikes targets across the globe, while israeli strikes on hamas leadership have become so routine as to be compared to “mowing the grass” (inbar & shamir, 2014). despite the ubiquity of targeted killing, the academic community is divided as to its effectiveness. this article seeks to demonstrate that, as the literature on targeted killing has matured and become more rigorous, the consensus has shifted from seeing targeted killings as an ineffective or counterproductive measure to viewing them as an effective tool. after reviewing the early arguments against targeted killing, this article assesses these claims in light of more recent research. it explores why and how targeted killings aid security forces and concludes with four policy lessons. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 this paper uses the term “targeted killing” to refer to intentional strikes on high-value militants, generally leaders. the more limited term “decapitation strike” refers only to attacks on the most senior leader of an organization. the term “militant” is preferred to describe targets, as the groups this paper deals with blur the lines between insurgents and terrorists. this paper is restricted to concerns about the effectiveness of targeted killing as a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy. it does not discuss the legality or morality of targeted killing. rigorous study of targeted killing is a recent phenomenon. although targeted killing is a practice from time immemorial, systematic large-scale programs directed against militant groups are a product of the 21st century. the modern israeli program, one of the earliest, began in 2000 as a product of the second intifada (david, 2003, p. 1). the first american drone strike outside of a military operation was in 2002 (sifton, 2012). early academic works on targeted killing pushed back against their already extensive use. stephanie carvin (2012) noted, “[i]t is not difficult to discern that the overwhelming number of empirical studies do not support the idea that targeted killings are an effective counterterrorism tactic” (p. 542). in this early phase, three arguments against targeted killing developed. the first and simplest was that it was generally ineffective. the second was that it was specifically ineffective against certain groups. the third was that targetted strikes create a backlash that outweighs any benefits. the first and most fundamental criticism of targeted killing is that it simply does not produce positive outcomes. one study on the protracted israeli program found that targeted killings neither significantly increase nor decrease the level of violence (hafez & hatfield, 2006, pp. 377-378). another work on the same program goes further and argues that strikes increase the expected rate of suicide bombings (kaplan, mintz & mishal, 2005, pp. 232-233). jenna jordan (2009) found that groups that suffer leadership decapitation are 20 percent less likely than those who are not struck to be completely inactive in the two years following the strike (p. 746). thus, jordan concluded that targeting leadership is a counterproductive policy. the second, more nuanced, argument concedes that targeted killing may be effective against some organizations. however, it contends that other militant organizations are resistant or even immune to the damage targeted killing inflicts due to their age, size, or ideology. older organizations have had time to establish procedures, a bureaucracy, and a pool of veteran replacements, making the role of any one leader less vital. jordan (2009) found that increased organization age reduces the likelihood of complete collapse after the death of a leader (p. 741). likewise, larger groups are generally more dispersed and complicated; therefore, they may be more resilient when a single leader is killed. jordan (2009) found that decapitation slightly increased the rate of collapse for groups up to 500 members (p. 747). however, for larger groups, leadership decapitation does not increase, but instead reduces the rate of collapse by up to 46 percent. thus, jordan concludes that against any substantive foe, decapitation is counterproductive. lastly, some argue that certain ideologies confer increased organizational resilience to decapitation as followers are bound together by a common cause greater than any one leader. exactly which causes have this impact is debated. jordan (2009) argues that religious re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing zachary cleary 3 groups and separatist are particularly resilient to decapitation-induced collapse (p. 748). jeremy weinstein (2006) instead argue that the mass appeal of communist insurgencies makes them uniquely capable of absorbing the shock of decapitation (pp. 20-31). the third criticism, the backlash argument, holds that the net impact of strikes is negative due to increased recruitment, retaliatory violence, and weakened norms that protect leaders. adherents of this position argue that the outrage and collateral damage generated by strikes produce more recruits and support for militant groups (david, 2003, pp. 8-9). for instance, they hold that while israeli strikes kill individuals, the recruits generated more than compensate for the few militants killed (kaplan et al., 2005, pp. 232-233). additionally, militant groups might retaliate by increasing violent activity to demonstrate strength, show defiance, and avenge the fallen (byman, 2006, pp. 99-100). in her work, carson (2017) finds that al-qaeda responds to the killing of a leader with an increase in violence (p. 213). mannes (2008) proposes that religious groups are likely to increase violence in response to the death of a leader, but his findings are inconclusive (p. 43). steven david (2003) attempts to link four specific israeli strikes to major episodes of palestinian violence (p. 9). carvin (2012) proposes that targeted killing weakens norms against killing political leaders and thus invites retaliatory assassination attempts on public leaders (pp. 536-537). this early consensus that targeted killing is at best useless, and possibly counterproductive, has been challenged by more recent research informed by better data, more realistic measures, and increasingly sophisticated analysis. given the vanguard nature of their work, early authors had limited data (carvin, 2012, p. 546). thus, early efforts were often case studies or comparisons, which, due to their small scale, produce conclusions that cannot be generalized (carvin, 2012, p. 547-548). carvin (2012) acknowledges jordan as a pioneer in 2009 for her large dataset of 298 strikes, but she also argues that jordan “seems to be missing the forest for the trees” because jordan focused purely on individual strikes and not on campaigns (p. 546). early works frequently fixated only on whether leadership removal led directly to the collapse of the targeted group. it is this logic that leads jordan (2009) to conclude that targeted killing is a failed strategy, since it does not guarantee the disintegration of the target group within two years (pp. 753-754). thus, jordan is criticized for using unrealistically high coding standards of success (johnston, 2012, p. 49; price, 2012, p. 13). a more nuanced analysis indicates that decapitation strikes are correlated with increased organizational mortality rates (price, 2012, p. 43). furthermore, there is evidence that successful high-level decapitation strikes increase the probability of government victory that year by 32 percent (johnston, 2012, p. 63). targeted killings may not guarantee victory, but they appear to increase its likelihood. it may be true that some groups are more resilient than others to the effects of targeted killings; however, the exact characteristics that correlate with militant group durability are contested. the one point of consensus is that groups that depend heavily on a single highly charismatic leader and their cult of personality are especially vulnerable. the collapse of the shining path in peru after its leader manuel guzman was captured is a classic example (cronin, 2009, pp. 18-19). it is logical that groups that are heavily invested or centered around the leader ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 suffer more when the leader is killed, but that is where agreement ends. early assertions that age, size, or type of group are correlated with resilience to targeted killing have been qualified or contradicted by further research. for instance, johnston (2012) shows that even groups over ten years old suffer and are more likely to be defeated after a leader is killed (p. 74). jordan’s conclusion that sufficiently large groups benefit from decapitation strikes is directly contradicted by price’s (2012) latter finding that larger organizations do not fare better than smaller groups after a leader is killed (pp. 38-39). the backlash argument remains mostly theoretical with little empirical evidence of a consistent trend of increased militant recruitment or material support after a leader is killed. while targeted killing is often unpopular in the target area, it does not appear that such sentiments translate to increased militant membership or mobilization (johnston & sarbahi, 2016, pp. 211-212). if there was a backlash effect, it should be particularly visible after a failed strike. in such a scenario, the negative impacts of a strike, such as civilian casualties, would occur and there would be no actual damage to the militant organization. yet, research shows no significant increase in conflict intensity or the number of attacks after failed attempts to kill leaders (johnston, 2012, p. 68). nor has carson’s (2017) argument that militant groups will retaliate and increase violence in response to strikes been substantiated (hafez & hatfield, 2006, p. 378). instead, carson has been criticized for overstating the implications of statistically weak results gleaned from only ten data points (forst, 2017, p. 222). as forst (2017) rightly notes, “failure to find is not at all the same as a finding of failure.” (p. 222). instead, as will be discussed below, the balance of evidence suggests that strikes reduce militant violence. later research has generally contradicted earlier efforts and indicates that targeted killing is, in fact, effective. thus, the logical next question is, “why?” the simplest reason is that targeted killing programs degrade militant leadership. militant groups have limited recruitment pools and few skilled leaders. eventually, a sustained program will eliminate the most competent leaders the militant group has. when leaders are replaced by less talented replacements, the group suffers (johnston, 2012, p. 52). for an illustrative example, when abu musab al-zarqawi of al-qaeda in iraq (aqi) was killed, his replacement, abu ayyub al-masri, was a far less effective leader and his tenure marked a low point for al-qaeda in iraq. more generally, targeted killing programs often seek to neutralize other militant specialists beyond just leaders. militant groups have limited numbers of skilled members such as bombmakers and forgers (byman, 2006, p. 103). eliminating these individuals degrades the entire organization’s capabilities. specialists must be trained, they cannot be replaced by generic recruits (byman, 2006, pp. 103104). even if a militant group has an extensive supply of talented replacements, it will still suffer. each dead leader means a loss of experience and the connections that they have developed. targeted killings inhibit centralized control and can lead to groups splintering. only the most organized militant organizations have formal succession protocols in place. the covert and dispersed nature of militant organizations, combined with their heavy emphasis on personal networks, make establishing such protocols difficult (price, 2012, p. 18). militant groups are not re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing zachary cleary 5 like corporations and governments with clear and overt structures. therefore, power transfers and successions are often fraught for militant organizations. leadership turnover increases the likelihood of the group collapsing and killing leaders has a particularly pronounced impact (price, 2012, pp. 41-42). when decapitation does cause splintering, the smaller, more diffuse, fragments lack the capability to launch large attacks or sustained campaigns. while splintering a group may eliminate the possibility of a single decisive victory, such victories are rare when dealing with militant groups. instead of gambling on decisive victory, it is more practical to fracture large militant groups and then attempting to defeat the fragments in detail. beyond the damage dealt to the organization, targeted killings suppress and disrupt militant violence. regardless of other benefits, this aspect alone makes targeted killings a valuable tool for combatting militants. the unexpected death of a valued leader disrupts the regular function of the target organization and interferes with its operational capacity. in his analysis of 118 decapitation attempts, johnston (2012) finds that killing a leader results in decreases of both the number and total lethality of attacks (p. 65). supporting this conclusion, a more specific study on drone strikes in pakistan found an approximate 25 percent decrease in militant lethality in the week following a strike (johnston & sarbahi, 2016, p. 212). perhaps early theories were correct in arguing that targeted strikes induce the desire for violent retaliation, but they failed to appreciate the difficulties of realizing such intentions. these findings indicate that targeted killings not only inhibit militants’ ability to carry out attacks (lower volume of attacks) but leaves them unable to compensate by increasing the quality of attacks that are conducted (lower total lethality of attacks). research on palestinian reactions to israeli strikes indicates that, after a strike, the number of intended attacks is not decreased, but fewer are successfully carried to completion (jaeger & paserman, 2009, p. 340). to the extent this finding can be generalized to other conflicts, it suggests that the lack of backlash is due to reduced militant capability, not diminished will. however, it is essential to emphasize the temporary nature of this disruption effect. eventually, the militant group replaces the slain leader and returns to normal operation. the reduction in number and lethality of attacks is not permanent (johnston & sarbahi, 2016, pp. 215-216). this general pattern of temporarily reduced violence holds in the case of the israeli program (jaeger & paserman, 2009, p. 332). organizations can, in time, recover from individual blows. thus, constant pressure via sustained targeted killing campaign is essential. one product of decentralized militant command is an increase in the proportion of indiscriminate attacks against civilians instead of targeted attacks on government or military targets. at first, this seems undesirable. one of the primary responsibilities of counterterror forces is the protection of civilians. however, there is a strong body of literature showing that indiscriminate violence targeting civilians backfires against militants and ultimately diminishes their prospects of victory (abrahms & potter, 2015, pp. 314-315). senior militant leaders are aware of this trend and do their best to control such excesses (abrahms & mierau, 2017, p. 832). senior leaders attempting to enforce restraint can be found across groups, from al-zawahiri scolding zarqawi for reveling in his prominence as “sheikh of the slaughterers” to pkk leader ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 murat karayilin directing his forces not to target civilians (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 312). however, there is a principal-agent problem as there is a disconnect between militant leadership and the members who actually conduct attacks. lower-level militants lack the perspective of senior leaders, may not have the capacity to easily strike military targets, and even have other incentives to target civilians (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 316). militant groups with a weaker, less centralized leadership are less able to restrain their foot soldiers and are 15 percent more likely to target civilians (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 324). targeted killings reduce leadership control and increase self-defeating indiscriminate attacks. successful strikes increase the proportion of violence against civilians by seven percent and the act of attempting a strike alone increases the probability by 6.5 percent (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 328). this indicates that the presence of an active targeted killing campaign forces leaders to take security measures that inhibit their ability to control their organization. it is important to note that this pressure only increases the likelihood of attacks against civilians; it does not reduce attacks on military targets (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 329). security measures may leave the leader less able to restrain their forces, but still capable of directing attacks on military targets. however, successful strikes both increase the chance of attacks against civilians and decrease that of attacking military targets (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 329). this suggests that killing a militant group’s leader degrades the group’s striking capability, so they are forced to settle for less difficult targets. notably, there is brief delay before the reduction in attacks against military targets as plans in place before the attack are carried out (abrahms & potter, 2015, p. 330). the disruption to the militant group’s operations becomes fully apparent once new directions or planning is required. further studies have confirmed that militant groups engage in more indiscriminate attacks against civilians in the two weeks after a leader is killed (abrahms & mierau, 2017, p. 837). there is evidence that the increase is also not permanent and attacks on civilians return to normal levels eventually (abrahms & mierau, 2017, p. 845). as new leaders reassert control, discipline is once again imposed on the lower ranks. this ability to recoup from any individual strike further emphasizes the importance of a sustained targeted killing campaign instead of occasional strikes. while the consensus on the efficacy of targeted killing has shifted, it is premature to declare the issue concluded. there is still much left unsettled and underspecified, and thus, this article echoes those cited in its call for further research. the direct causal links between strikes, loss of militant leadership, and increased proportion of attacks on civilian targets must be better established. how long the impact of a strike lingers remains unclear. there is no research on whether the effects of successive strikes are cumulative or independent. nonetheless, while more research is needed, we can draw four valuable policy lessons from what has been done. first, targeted killing is probably not counterproductive. second, there is utility in killing targets other than the primary leader. the death of mid-level leadership and specialists also disrupts militant operations. third, sporadic strikes are insufficient since some of the most important impacts are temporary. thus, a constant campaign is desirable. fourth, states that engage in targeted killing should be aware of the increased likelihood of civilian deaths and be prepared for them. re-evaluating the efficacy of targeted killing zachary cleary 7 there is truth in the maxim that you cannot kill your way to victory in counterinsurgency. however, neither can there be a successful counterinsurgency operation without violence. targeted killings are a further extension of that theme. a targeted killing campaign degrades militant leadership, inhibits coordination, induces self-defeating acts, and suppresses violence. the value of a sustained targeted killing campaign is the space that it creates for nation-building and the difficult tasks that do defeat militant groups. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 references abrahms, m., & mierau, j. (2017). leadership matters: the effects of targeted killings on militant group tactics. terrorism and political violence, 29(5), 830-851. doi:10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671 abrahms, m., & potter, p.b.k. (2015). explaining terrorism: leadership deficits and militant group tactics. international organization, 69(2), 311-342. doi:10.1017/s0020818314000411 carson, j. (2017). assessing the effectiveness of high-profile targeted killings in the “war on terror”: a quasi-experiment. criminology and public policy, 16(1), 191-220. doi:10.1111/17459133.12274 carvin, s. (2012). the trouble with targeted killing. security studies, 21(3), 529-555. doi:10.1080/09636412.2012.706513 cronin, a. k. (2009). how terrorism ends: understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. princeton university press. david, s. r. (2003). fatal choices: israel's policy of targeted killing. review of international affairs, 2(3), 138-158. forst, b. (2017). targeted killings: how should we assess them? criminology and public policy, 16(1), 221-224. doi:10.1111/1745-9133.12282 hafez, m. m., & hatfield, j. m. (2006). do targeted assassinations work? a multivariate analysis of israel's controversial tactic during al-aqsa uprising. studies in conflict & terrorism, 29(4), 359382. inbar, e., & shamir, e. (2014). mowing the grass in gaza. the jerusalem post. retrieved from: http://www.jpost.com/opinion/columnists/mowing-the-grass-in-gaza-368516 jaeger, d. a., & paserman, m. d. (2009). the shape of things to come? on the dynamics of suicide attacks and targeted killings. quarterly journal of political science, 4(4), 315-342. johnston, p. b. (2012). does decapitation work? assessing the effectiveness of leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns. international security, (4), 47. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00076 johnston, p. b., & sarbahi, a. k. (2016). the impact of us drone strikes on terrorism in pakistan. international studies quarterly, 60(2), 203-219. jordan, j. (2009). when heads roll: assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. security studies, 18(4), 719-755. doi:10.1080/09636410903369068 kaplan, e. h., mintz, a., mishal, s., & samban, c. (2005). what happened to suicide bombings in israel? insights from a terror stock model. studies in conflict & terrorism, 28(3), 225-235. mannes, a. (2008). testing the snake head strategy: does killing or capturing its leaders reduce a terrorist group’s activity? the journal of international policy solutions, 9, 40-49. price, b. c. (2012). targeting top terrorists: how leadership decapitation contributes to counterterrorism. international security, (4), 9. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00075 sifton, j. (2012). a brief history of drones. the nation. retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/brief-history-drones/ weinstein, jeremy m. (2007) inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence cambridge; cambridge university press, http://www.jpost.com/opinion/columnists/mowing-the-grass-in-gaza-368516 what do they see? a look at the appeal of is to young muslim women raised in the united kingdom rebecca davis university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract this scholarly research investigates the recent recruitment of young british muslim women by the islamic state (is) in an effort to determine the appeal of said group upon this demographic. noting that such recruitment falls under the foreign fighter complex, which is usually male oriented, this research seeks to understand why is is able to extend its appeal to young women. in so doing, many of the preexisting theories for extremism are examined and found to be irrelevant to this particular demographic. thus, i am arguing that it is not poverty, lack of education, or other economic determinant as is commonly believed to be the roots of radicalization/extremism but rather a search for a personal identity these women feel is lacking, growing up as muslims in an immigrant context in a non-muslim country. about the author rebecca davis is a senior, graduating with a dual degree in global studies and spanish and a certificate in global security. throughout her work in global studies, she has focused on understanding the nature of and root issues behind terrorist behavior and especially the motivations for the foreign fighter complex. she will be continuing this research at the school for international service at american university in washington, d.c. in the fall of 2016. introduction in february of 2015, newspaper headlines covered the story of three young british muslim women who had gone missing while on holiday and were suspected to be en route to syria. these girls were amira abase and shamima begum, both fifteen, and their classmate, kadiza sultana, sixteen. the three girls were outstanding pupils at london’s bethnal green academy in tower hamlets, a rapidly growing community with a heavy concentration of immigrants. family members described the girls, detailing their favorite tv shows and hobbies and speaking of their high academic achievements. while not the first of such recruits, the trio quickly became the face of the new recruitment efforts by is. since their arrival in syria, at least two of them have been married to is fighters (dodd and khomami, 2015). amira is the most vocal of the trio, using social media to post updates glorifying life under is and trying to recruit more girls like herself. since the departure of these girls, experts have tried to understand their radicalization process, examining the possible explanations of radicalization by a relative, the school, or an outside contact. according to the principal of the school, it was impossible that the girls were radicalized there, stating that access to social media is blocked on school property (“syria girls: trio 'not radicalised' at bethnal green academy.”, 2015). however, concern has been voiced over some of the school staff and their ideological affiliations, noting that some have been involved with radical organizations within the uk and abroad. there are also reports that shamima contacted a well-known woman from is who had also left the uk for syria about a year and a half prior (“syria girls: trio 'not radicalised' at bethnal green academy.”, 2015). this was shortly before the trio left the country, and suggests that a peer network may have been influential in their radicalization. in addition, another friend and classmate from bethnal green had also left for syria just a few months before. given the example above, this research seeks to answer the why question by examining three related areas. first, pre-existing radicalization theories are evaluated to decide if they accurately account for the involvement of female foreign fighters. second, possible motivations are investigated for why these young women are leaving their homes in the united kingdom to join a movement in syria, even though many have no prior connections to the country. third, the appeal of is and their ideologies on this demographic is examined. literature review before delving into an overview of the theories, a clarification of terminology is requisite. fundamentalist islam will be defined as the “the belief or advocating of a conservative adherence to literal or traditional interpretations of the qu'ran and the sunnah” (collins dictionary, 2015). this may lead to extremism-adoption of a position that lies on the fringes of the ideological spectrum. extremism may or may not lead to extremist acts of terrorism. terrorism, as referred to in this research, will utilize the definition provided by the united states department of state, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (krueger & maleckova, 2003, 120). the term, noncombatants, refers to not only civilians but also “military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.” (legislative requirements and key terms, 2005, 9). when combined with an islamic religious perspective, this is the definition of salafi-jihadism . this is a fundamentalist approach to practicing islam with an aspect of violence, advocating for the overthrow of all governments that are not adhering to the teachings of the prophet and sharia law (stern and berger, 2015, xii-xiii). it is important to note that abiding by an extremist ideology is not necessarily correlated with committing acts of terrorism. one merely becomes more vulnerable to committing such acts in an effort to bring about the desired changes. a new dimension to this extremist problem is the foreign fighter complex, a phenomenon that has existed for centuries, though mostly focused on male participation. even though foreign fighters are often associated with jihadists such as the mujahideen, they are not strictly an islamic phenomenon, as demonstrated by malet (2010). in his research, malet (2010) cites several examples of american heroes who would also be considered foreign fighters, people such as davy crockett who left the united states to fight in the mexican territory of texas (malet, 2010, 99). adding complexity to this issue is the emerging recruitment of female foreign fighters by is from the muslim immigrant community in the uk it is a unique and concerning phenomenon, one that cannot be explained by conventional theories on extremist recruitment. existing theories on extremist recruitment in counter-extremism studies, there are four theories that attempt, with varying levels of success, to offer explanations for why individuals adopt extremism and go on to commit terrorist acts, namely poverty, illiteracy, cultural alienation, and transnational ideology. the first two are the most prevalent in official foreign counter-extremism programs; the latter two are newer theories which are more applicable to this case study. poverty as a push factor the first of these theories is predominant in counterterrorism. it sees extremist movements as arising from the impoverished masses. as j. brian atwood states, there is a “strong correlation between the absence of material well-being and the prospects for violence” (atwood, 2003, 160). quoting research done by the world bank, he goes on to say that the material divide in a country can lead not only to political instability within a nation state, but can also create animosity between developed and developing countries (atwood, 2003, 160). however, terrorism as a direct result of poverty is more difficult to substantiate than merely the existence of a higher probability of incidence of violence in poverty conditions. regardless, it is known that terrorist organizations frequently recruit their manpower from this demographic (atwood, 2003, 161), using economic benefits as leverage. thus, instead of viewing socioeconomic inequality and lack of access to resources as the causes of terrorist activity, they should be viewed as two of several factors that can increase a population’s vulnerability to their appeals. as stated by asef bayat, “the poor cannot afford to be ideological” and “to be ideological requires certain capacities (time, risk-taking, money) that the disenfranchised often lack” (bayat, 2013, 201). lack of education as a push factor the second theory for extremism holds that a lack of education can make a population vulnerable to its appeals. this common view is held by many, including those in government. colin powell once stated that “that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives.” (berrebi, 2007, 3). john o. mcginnis writes that “ignorance and poverty are the greatest friends of the terrorist, because the ignorant and impoverished are easy prey for the conspiracy theories and millennial religious visions that are staple of the islamic fanatics.” (mcginnis, 2003). however, one of the main drawbacks for this theory is that statistics do not support it. multiple studies have shown that terrorists tend to be educated. for instance, in research conducted by hassan among palestinian suicide bombers, all were educated and none were impoverished (hassan, 2001). other studies surveyed terrorists from a variety of national backgrounds, including several european countries and turkey, and found that they all shared a tendency to possess high levels of formal education (krueger and maleckova, 2003, 141). other researchers see terrorism as a mode of political participation, albeit a violent one. political participation, they argue, is a common trait among educated individuals and terrorism is simply another expression of it (krueger and maleckova, 2003, 142). cultural alienation of immigrant while the previous theories attempt to explain the radicalization and involvement in foreign fighting, they fail to explain why many extremists are neither poor nor illiterate. furthermore, they do not explain why a poor, uneducated individual with no prior ties to a country, its struggle or its dominant ideology will join an extremist movement. this policy response vacuum can be filled by a relatively underutilized theory of foreign fighter recruitment that focuses on the cultural alienation of the immigrant. once an individual adopts an extremist viewpoint, they may become radicalized enough to seek deeper involvement which may involve foreign fighting. however, malet (2010) argues that in order to be a foreign fighter, one must be recruited from outside of the country in which the conflict is taking place. thus, there has to be an underlying motivation to join which takes the form of a shared transnational identity, linking the foreigner with the fighters in the conflict. motivations to join can be encouraged through a shared religious affiliation (malet, 2010, 99100) of the country in conflict and the foreign recruit. thus, while radicalization may not directly cause an individual to leave their home to join in a conflict, foreign fighter recruitment could also attract people who have held those beliefs for a long time. diaspora communities are particularly vulnerable to this, due to their shared ethnic, ideological, and religious ties that transcend the physical borders of the state. transnational religious ideology the final reason is the presence of a transnational religious ideology. this is perhaps the most applicable theory to this case study. adherence to a transnational religious ideology can provide a personal identity that individuals may feel that they are otherwise lacking, especially in an immigrant community. taking part in a shared religious faith can provide this identity and help them to define themselves in a country where they may feel othered by the citizens of both the sending and receiving countries. this hypothesis derived from records of interviews with former radical muslims from the uk and research done in a fundamentalist islamic group, hizb ut-tahrir (hut), which has a strong presence in the uk. malet (2010) also hints at it in his research, quoting former jihadists who describe the appeal of fundamentalist islam in their lives. one of these men states that they were ‘‘men who had no home. men reviled in the west because they were not white and christian, and reviled at home because they no longer dressed and spoke like muslims.” (malet, 2010, 109). in the context of recruitment, he also says that “transnational ideological affiliation was a highly salient identity because immigration and modernization had destroyed other communal ties and produced isolated, embattled individuals” (malet, 2010, 109). alienation, which can make them vulnerable to the appeal of radical ideology (richardson, 2006, 69), can play a key role in these diaspora communities. these are just a sampling of the theories for why some people become radicalized or assume a position of extremism. there is also significant variation in the process of choosing to become a foreign fighter; they can pursue different paths but they all have a common thread. each path involves radicalization at some point. the first two theories say that radicalization stems from a social or educational disadvantage. the third theory posits that foreign fighter involvement comes from an appeal to a shared transnational identity. this could be religious (radicalized or not), ethnic, or otherwise. however, none of these theories fully applies to the case study at hand. thus, the fourth option is the most applicable here. while it is true that none are mutually distinctive, i argue that it is more of a matter of reordering the pieces. whereas the first two theories posit that it is poverty and ignorance that can contribute to someone turning to extremism, i contend that it is a search for personal meaning and identity. this identity can then become a transnational one, which can lead to foreign fighter recruitment as described by malet. i posit that this is what is taking place in the case of the young female british recruits to is. the role of religion and alienation in the extremist appeal religion, and in this case, islam, can provide a unifying force for extremist groups. as richardson states, “it provides a unifying, all-encompassing philosophy or belief system that legitimizes and elevates their actions.” (richardson, 2006, 63). religious extremist groups have the tendency to be more violent as well, as they can claim divine permission for their behavior(richardson, 2006, 61). changing the existing government from secularism to one of islamic principles is usually among the goals of islamic fundamentalists. to this end, they prey upon the alienation of muslims by promising a better future once the new government is achieved (richardson, 2006, 67). thus, while islam is not culpable for causing terrorism, it can be the vehicle for creating transnational ties that can motivate a person to leave their home and take sides in a foreign conflict (richardson, 2006, 68). this alienation can also lead to a cultural reactionary push back. experiencing rejection from the receiving nation’s culture can lead a population to be vulnerable to the appeal of ultraorthodox teachings and can result in a complete rejection of the host country’s culture. instead of gradually assimilating into the receiving culture, they instead create a parallel culture, based upon either their heritage or the perceptions of that heritage. this is seen occurring in muslim migrant communities within the uk. one example is tower hamlets, the hometown of the bethnal green trio. termed “jihadi cool” by the popular media, it is a complete rejection of everything western and is the latest cultural youth trend. the more devout one appears, the more ‘in’ they are. ironically, though, some of the strongest proponents of this “rejection of all things deemed western” utilize the latest fashionable social media platforms to target their audience (mccaul, 2014). they also are co-opting other facets of pop culture to spread their message, posting jihadi rap videos to youtube and distributing t-shirts with slogans glorifying jihad (chumley, 2014). thus, it is clear that at least part of the allure of “jihadi cool” is a form of cultural self-redefinition that occurs in other cultures as well. however, in this situation and with a militant form of islam, the result is more threatening than in other cases. data and methods to examine whether the aforementioned religious appeal and cultural alienation theories apply to female foreign recruits, i collected and analyzed data on young british muslim women who have left or been detained in attempting to leave the uk to join is. whereas it is much more common to see men joining foreign military movements, the participation of women as foreign fighters has had little historical precedent. the uk has been selected for this study as it has experienced an alarming and significant number of such cases. this research consists of a media review, examining the issue of this recent recruitment trend. the data is collected from newspaper editorials published in news sources including the bbc, the washington times, the atlantic, the new york times, and the guardian. these sources span the ideological spectrum, offering differing perspectives on the same topic or case and avoiding the distortion of political viewpoints in reporting. some of these online newspaper articles included embedded video footage and commentary on the women, which proved helpful as well. through the use of such sources, i sought to construct an idea of each young woman’s life, economic status, ethnic background, and path to radicalism. i also incorporate published interviews with the remaining family members of these girls. in collecting and examining these resources, i analyzed them for any common themes that could give clues to their paths to adopting extremist views and acting upon them. these themes include criteria such as age at time of departure, ethnic background, and degree of observed religiosity. these were noted for each of the subjects and were of particular importance as they provided the necessary evidence to counter the radicalization theories discussed previously. commonalities within the data were noted and efforts made to draw accurate conclusions. i also attempted to determine any common individuals, institutions or alternate sources that these women have taken to reach the point of radicalization. for example, through using available sources, i sought to determine methods of radicalization/recruitment and whether there was a common peer network or a radicalized family member involved. the results of this media review were then compared and contrasted to the arguments in the literature review. these results gave insight to an under-examined element of the foreign fighter phenomenon the engagement and experiences of women. this was in order to determine whether the prominent theories in the field of anti-terrorism research were applicable here. preliminary argument/hypothesis i am arguing that the preexisting theories on radicalization and adopting extremist ideology are not applicable to the case of the young british muslim women that have responded to the appeal of is. examination of the data corroborate this idea. popular ideas offered for adopting extremist views include poverty and a lack of education, among other things. this has not been the case for these women. at least several of them have been young women with exceedingly bright futures ahead of them; young women who were attaining high academic achievements and had promising opportunities for advancement. these findings are substantiated by research done by other terrorism experts such as hassan (cited above) and horgan (2014) who found that those who adopt extremist views often have at least completed high school education (horgan, 2014, 67). however, it is true that these findings can vary geographically. my argument in the current case is that the young women are turning to the form of islam that is espoused and glorified by is in an effort to create an identity that they feel they are lacking, growing up in an immigrant context. i posit that this type of faith is leaving them vulnerable to the appeal of is and is what differentiates them from the thousands of other lawabiding, peaceful muslims residing in the uk. it is not an issue of islam itself, but rather how it is practiced that can become dangerous. i further contend that the appeal of is to these women comes from the current societal culture in which these women are growing up. it is a culture that rejects everything associated with western ideology and sees pure islam as “cool”. this leaves them especially vulnerable to the ideological appeals of an organization that is calling for the reestablishment of a pure islamic caliphate. presentation and analysis of data in the process of the collection of the data for this research, it has been interesting to note both the existence and lack of certain trends. by this, i mean the commonalities that group them together as a subject group and the differences that at the same time cause them to retain their humanness and uniqueness. while many of them share an immigrant background, there are a few, such as sally jones, who would be termed ethnically british and are not acting from an immigrant context. thus, it is clear from the beginning that the appeal of is is not limited to those who have grown up as first or second generation british. there are also various nationalities represented among the data, as subjects come from sudan, somalia, bangladesh, pakistan, and ethiopia. economic background economic deprivation does not seem to be a push factor for radicalization or departure to syria. instead, the opposite seems to be true. as in the case of aqsa mahmood, a high profile recruiter from glasgow, her family was described as “comfortably middle class” (randall, 2014). financially prosperous, her family lives in a reputable neighborhood in an expensive house and sent aqsa to a prestigious private girls’ school for a number of years (dettmer, 2014). another girl, lena mamoun abdelgadir, also came from a well-to-do family. similar to aqsa, lena’s family also sent her to an expensive girls’ school for years until she graduated and entered medical school (farmer, 2015). lena has since accompanied a group of eight other medical students and graduates from a medical school in sudan on a trip to syria. their motivations are unclear. while it could be entirely humanitarian in nature, it is known that some of those in the group had at least been exposed to radical teaching while at the medical school (bennhold, 2015). degree of religiosity of the nineteen women and girls on whom data was gathered for this study, most were muslim by familial background. of the group, there were two who are known to be recent converts to islam. these women are sally jones and kadijah dare. the first woman, sally jones, is an outlier in many ways to the rest of the women who have left britain to join is. in her midforties and ethnically british, jones is neither young nor was she raised with an immigrant muslim background. for a number of years in the 1990s, this single mother of two played guitar in a female rock band, flaunting miniskirts and blond hair. this is a significant departure from the black burqa and gloves that she now wears in her twitter photos. her neighbors described her behavior as erratic, recalling her male friends and the bizarre things that she did, including the instances in which she believed she was a witch. then she met online and fell in love with junaid hussain, the young computer hacker from britain who was charged with murdering james foley (greenwood, 2014). hussain, who was young enough to be jones’ son, had left the uk to fight for is. jones followed some time later in 2013 (whitehead, 2015). they were married after her arrival and lived together until a drone strike specifically targeted her husband in august, 2015. she has been very active on is social media, frequently tweeting messages about the glories of her husband’s martyrdom and her desire to behead christians with a “dull knife” (whitehead, 2015). currently, there are fears that she may be preparing to become a female suicide bomber for is, given a recent threat that she made in her twitter feed (newman, 2015). kadijah dare, the other convert to islam, is not as extreme as jones. the daughter of christians, she had migrated from nigeria to the uk as a child. she was a devout christian until her college years, when she began attending a mosque and converted (styles, 2015). in 2012, she left for syria, taking her young son with her. shortly after arriving, she married a swedish is fighter known as abu bakr, who has since been killed (piggott, 2016). mi6, the british intelligence agency, views her as one of the biggest threats emerging from is, on account of her popularity and hostility in her social media posts (“white british girl who's now a 'celebrity jihadi'”, 2014). for instance, after the beheading of james foley, she famously tweeted requests for another foreign journalist for her to behead, desiring to become the first woman in is to execute a “uk or us terrorist” (halliday, 2014). aside from these two cases of converts, the remainder of the women investigated for this study are muslim by background. however, their levels of religiosity varied. in the case of shamima begum, for instance, she is reported to not even have known how to pray (ferguson, 2015). others did not even wear a hijab, the muslim head scarf, until shortly before leaving the uk. this was true in the instance of sharmeena begum, the first girl from the bethnal green academy to leave for is-controlled territory (sinmaz and reid, 2015). ethnic background the nineteen subjects for this study were found to be from six different countries. three of the women’s ethnic background could not be determined due to lack of information. however, the remainder came from pakistan, bangladesh, sudan, ethiopia, somalia, the united kingdom, and nigeria, with the majority being somali. all had spent at least part of their lives in the uk and had existing ties to the country at the time of their departure to syria. ethnicity is crucial to note as it cannot be argued that they have national ties to the country since none of the young girls and women were originally from syria. indeed, none of them even came from the middle-eastern countries surrounding syria. neither do they have any direct ethnic stake in the establishment of is. nevertheless, they are all immigrants in a foreign society and occupy a position that is relatively vulnerable to exploitation by the same societal structures that is is ideologically opposing. this shared link then explains the solidarity with a conflict that is not their own. occupational background at the time of each individual’s departure, the majority of the females were enrolled in school and performing well academically. some forty percent were schoolgirls, with another twenty percent attending a university or medical school. this statistic is reflective of their age (discussed below). a brief look at their occupations further strengthens the argument that these women were educated and relatively well-off. their motivations to join is cannot be adequately explained by either lack of education or the inability to enjoy a certain lifestyle or provide for basic needs. it follows, therefore, that there must be some non-economic factors providing the impetus for their decision to join. age of female recruits at the time of departure, the majority of the females in the subject group were found to be between the ages of fifteen and twenty. a total of eleven of the subjects, over half of the group, were under the age of 25. this is an important fact to note as this age is often associated with a great deal of searching for a personal identity. while it is normal for young people to go through a period of self-searching and redefinition, it is not normal for them to become involved in dangerous extremist activities as sponsored by is. in the case of these young women and girls, they desire to fit in with the culture but the culture does not completely accept them. thus, they create their own culture in a reactionary move against the mainstream culture. while not a new phenomenon, what is different in their case is that they are forming their counter-cultural identity in a militantly conservative form of islam and in a radically militant movement associated with it. recruitment network many of the women and young girls who left for syria were friends of one another and did not travel alone. as in the example of the bethnal green schoolgirls, the three left together, sometime after their fourth friend had also left. this friend, in turn, is suspected to have been groomed for recruitment by aqsa mahmood (randall, 2014). now, of the bethnal green trio, amira abase has been trying to recruit girls through her social media. this is an example of a peer recruitment network. often times, sisters would become radicalized and leave together. this was the case for the dawood sisters-sugra, zohra, and khadijah. all three left the uk in may, 2015, with their nine children under the pretext of traveling to saudi arabia for religious purposes. they disappeared on the return trip and have since been reported being smuggled into syria. it is also alleged that a brother had already left and was fighting in syria. this is another example of how the recruitment network operates (“bradford dawood family 'split to cross syria border'.”, 2015) and is similar to the case of the twins, salma and zarah halane. originally from somalia, these sixteen-year-old girls were high achieving students until they ran away from home in june of 2014, in route to syria (glendinning, 2014). here, there could be two causes for their radicalization. like the dawoods, it is alleged that the twins’ older brother had already joined is (wagner, 2014) and there are rumors that aqsa mahmood could have been involved too (randall, 2014). conclusions this research has focused on the recruitment by is of young british muslim females growing up in an immigrant context. it looks at several of the explanations and theories of foreign fighter involvement including becoming radicalized and committing extremist acts. specifically, it evaluates the theories that material deprivation and poverty and a lack of education cause an individual to adopt extremism. these theories have been proven to be inapplicable here, as the majority of the subjects were highly educated and did not appear to be suffering from the effects of poverty. thus, alternative theories were offered to explain their motives for joining is. drawing upon research done on the foreign fighter complex, it suggests that the motivating reasons stem not from a lack of material resources or attainment of education, but rather a transnational identity based in some shared identityreligious, ethnic, or ideological. i argue further that these women are grasping this opportunity to develop their sense of identity by participating in an international group. by so doing, they are taking this shared identity, religious in this case, and by participating in it, creating their own personal identities. thus, adherence to, and participation in, some style of an orthodox form of islam constitutes the basis of their personal identity and provides them with the impetus for joining a foreign conflict. the data gathered for this research seems to corroborate this. most of the subjects were young at the time of departure, an age at which it is common to question and to struggle to define one’s personal identity. they also were mostly of immigrant backgrounds, either being firstgeneration britons or moving there during their childhood. sixty percent were pursuing some type of educational degree, most with excellent school track records. with the exception of sally jones, none appear to have been on economically difficult times. these two findings rule out the relevance of the first two theories for explaining the causes of extremism. therefore, i argue that it is instead a search for a personal identity that is propelling these girls and young women to join is. growing up in an immigrant context, they identify fully with neither their country of origin nor the country in which they grew up. hence, they turn to other alternatives to find their identity, in this case an ultra-orthodox form of islam. this imperils them to the appeals of radical extremist groups such as is. references (1 sept. 2014). “white british girl who's now a 'celebrity jihadi': mother-of-two a 'top priority' for mi6 and she calls on muslims to join the terror group.” daily mail. (2015). fundamentalist islam. in collins dictionary online. retrieved from http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/islamic-fundamentalism. (23 february 2015). “syria girls: trio 'not radicalised' at bethnal green academy.” bbc news. (19 june 2015). “bradford dawood family 'split to cross syria border'.” bbc news. atwood, j.b. (2003). the link between poverty and violent conflict. new england journal of public policy, 19(1), 159-165. bayat, a. (2013). life as politics: how ordinary people change the middle east. stanford, ca: stanford university press. bennhold, k. (a) (22 march 2015). “medical students from britain are sought in syria”. the new york times. berrebi, c. (a) (2003). “evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among palestinians.” princeton university industrial relations section working paper no. 477.  (2007). evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among palestinians. peace economics, peace science, & public policy, 13(1), 1-36. burgoon, b. (2006) on welfare and terror: social welfare policies and political-economic roots of terrorism. journal of conflict resolution. 50 (2) 176-203 chumley, c. (27 june 2014). “terrorists go ‘jihad cool’, use rap to entice young americans.” washington times. dettmer, j. (3 sept. 2014). “the bride of isis revealed.” the daily beast. dodd, v. & khomami, n. (3 july 2015). “two bethnal green schoolgirls 'now married to isis men' in syria.” the guardian. farmer, b. (23 march 2015 ). “former private school girl among ‘brainwashed medical students volunteering for isil’.” the telegraph. ferguson, b. (3 august 2015). “left in the dark: the story behind the families of three girls groomed by the islamic state.” vice news. glendinning, a. (9 july 2014). “twin girls who ran away to syria were star pupils with 28 gcses between them.” manchester evening news. greenwood, c. (31 august 2014). “revealed: benefits mother-of-two from kent once in all girl rock band who is now jihadi in syria and wants to 'behead christians with a blunt knife'.” daily mail. halliday, j. (22 aug. 2014). “london mosque distances itself from 'female jihadi' who http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/islamic-fundamentalism worshipped there.” the guardian. hassan, n. (2001). an arsenal of believers. new yorker, 77(36), 36. horgan, j. (2014). the psychology of terrorism. new york, ny: rutledge. krueger, a. b., & maleckova, j. (2003). education, poverty and terrorism: is there a causal connection? journal of economic perspectives, 17(4), 119-144. malet, d. (2010). why foreign fighters? historical perspectives and solutions. orbis. 97-114. mccaul, m. (2014, sept. 11). “islamic state is recruiting america's 'jihadi cool' crowd: the threat from terrorists holding u.s. passports is rising, and the administration is still playing catch-up.” the wall street journal. mcginnis, j. (2003). “expanding trade: a powerful weapon against terrorism.” retrieved from https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/expanding-trade-a-powerful-weapon-againstterrorism. newman, r. (30 nov. 2015). “isis mother sally jones threatens to blow herself up after husband is killed in drone strike.” the independent. piggott, m. (4 january 2016). “isis video: london cab driver says boy in daesh video is grandson 'i can't disown'.” international business times. randall, c. (2014, sept. 23). “from coldplay to jihad, the scottish girl who joined isil.” the national. richardson, l. (2006). what terrorists want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat. new york, ny: random house. sinmaz, e. & reid, s. (13 march 2015). “she loved rihanna, clothes and make-up.then fell under the spell of islamists: meet the first british schoolgirl who fled to join isis.” daily mail. state department (2005). chapter 1. “legislative requirements and key terms.” accessed from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf stern, j. & berger, j.m. (2015). isis: the state of terror. new york, ny: harpercollins styles, r. (8 april 2015). “the devil took her away': heartbroken mother of british jihadi bride khadijah dare uses first ever tv interview to beg her daughter to come home.” daily mail. wagner, m. (9 july 2014). “‘very religious 16-year-old twins who fled from uk to syria were stellar students, ‘nice girls’: report.” new york daily news. whitehead, t. (15 sep 2015). “widow of british jihadist, 'proud' he was killed by us.” the telegraph. about:blank about:blank http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf sp20 final edition ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 contents cultural insensitivities and aggravating factors in iraq and afghanistan………………………7 isis: the evolution of a terrorist state……………………………………………………….…15 analyzing the economic influences on the evolution of the russian military since 1991…………………………………………………………………………………………..… 28 the nuclear weapons program of the united states and its strategic value in the twenty-first century…………………………………………………………………………………...……...37 the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 1 the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem university of chicago introduction as modern society advances technologically, information networks have become vulnerable to wrongdoing by malicious states and non-state actors. with recent strikes affecting critical infrastructures around the globe, the threats associated with cyber attacks no longer seem like science fiction. while the world has not yet faced catastrophic cyber assaults, our dependency on information networks exposes us to potentially devastating attacks. these technologies present attractive targets for cyber attackers aiming to undermine national interests or even to threaten state sovereignty. the international community is at a critical juncture: we now have the opportunity to determine what is morally permissible with regard to cyber warfare before we are ever faced with a worst-case scenario. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 this essay draws upon just war theory to examine the military responses that are morally permissible in the face of a cyber attack. indeed, certain cyber attacks originating from a state’s government can be considered acts of war when analogous to conventional attacks either in means or in effect. these cases may justify a self-defensive response from victim states. cyber responses are preferable to conventional responses in these cases, depending on the victim’s technological capabilities. however, the realities of cyber engagement have particular qualities, which, in contrast to other forms of conflict, render these more straightforward ethical norms less applicable. firstly, the most dangerous cyber attacks are not physically immediate in the way of traditional weapons. thus, ethical norms based primarily on the permissibility or impermissibility of physical violence are less straightforwardly applicable to cyber attacks without considering the grave, physically harmful potential of targeting immaterial code. secondly, and more importantly, cyber attacks are often difficult to credibly attribute. the epistemological problem associated with an unattributed cyber attack leaves its victim at a seeming impasse: if the state cannot credibly identify its aggressor, how can it justify a counter-strike? this paper takes a different, less traditional approach toward the difficulty of attribution, as well as toward the justified responses to identified non-state actors. i argue that according to the present legal and military norms, the epistemological bar for justified military retaliation is set at a level that may be appropriate for conventional attacks, but inappropriately high for cyber attacks. while very precise attribution to the source computer(s) may not be possible in many cases, the state from which the attack originated can more readily be identified. i contend that if a cyber attack can be reliably traced to the territory of a particular state, this state should be held at least partially responsible for the attack. calling for the establishment and enforcement of codified norms of domestic and international cyber criminality, i argue that if a state becomes a frequent launchpad for cyber attacks, does not reasonably cooperate with victims to identify perpetrators, and fails to enforce criminal laws prosecuting such attacks, the state may ultimately be liable for these attacks. if diplomatic means prove ineffective, victim states would be justified in a reprisal. this punitive form of retaliation would only be permissible in a narrow range of cases and should only be limited to temporarily disabling the launchpad state’s cyber testing capabilities. are cyber attacks acts of war? if cyber attacks can be categorized as acts of war, then a conventional attack may be a justifiable response. certainly, the idea of using physical force against attacks on computer systems may seem counterintuitive. however, i argue that these intuitions stem from the fact that many cyber attacks thus far have not exhibited the physical characteristics of conventional attacks, making straightforward classifications a challenge. however, the term “cyber attack” denotes a vast array of potential operations, many of which may be analogous to recognized acts of war. the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 3 according to international legal norms, the first use of force is prohibited. this is apparent in article 2.4 of the united nations charter, which prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the united nations.” the term “aggression” denotes the first use of force, which would justify a victim state’s self-defensive war. the term is defined in resolution 3314 of the united nations general assembly: “aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state.” according to this document, aggression includes, but is not limited to (see article 4): invasions, bombardments, blockades, and armed attacks by one state against another (see article 3). while purposefully non-exhaustive, the language of the document conveys the notion that war is physical, transgressing real boundaries and causing tangible effects. these two documents were drafted in the mid-20th century, so it is unsurprising that they qualify military coercion in a manner consistent with contemporary warfare: by its instruments of “arms” and “force” (schmitt, 2010, p. 154). by contrast, the physical coerciveness of a cyber attack stems from its consequences, not from its instruments. at the same time, resolution 3314 does not exhaustively define “armed attack,” leaving an interpretive space where cyber attacks could fit. for instance, considering computers and digital code as weapons leads to a broad definition of aggressive cyber attacks. on the other hand, when assuming a more strict interpretation of “force,” then the documents do not prohibit non-physical economic or political coercion (tallinn manual, p. 46)— consequences of many of the cyber attacks we have witnessed to date. ultimately, aggression broadly includes threats to and breaches of the peace (un general assembly resolution 3314, preamble), and the explicit purpose of the united nations is to “maintain peace and security” (charter of the united nations, article 1.1). thus, it is reasonable to believe that at least some physically coercive cyber attacks could map onto its definition of aggression, even by a relatively conservative interpretation. however, without an established convention for classifying cyber attacks as a form of aggression, philosophers as well as military ethicists have proposed three main standards for analyzing whether a cyber attack can be classified as an act of war. the first is a “means-based” metric. this standard classifies a cyber attack as an act of war if the attack produces the same type of physically-immediate destruction that an existing conventional weapon can, thus mirroring existing military means. the second standard is “target-based.” by this metric, a cyber attack constitutes an act of war if it damages national critical infrastructure. the final standard is “effects-based,” which classifies a cyber attack as aggression if it produces a physically violent or overall destructive consequence to its victim. therefore, the type of harm itself may not be completely analogous to that created by conventional weapons. this metric regards injurious effects as those that either create physical harm (like the means-based metric) or engender unacceptable physical or digital interferences to critical infrastructure (like the target-based metric). as with the target-based metric, what exactly constitutes “unacceptable interferences” is ambiguous and open to interpretation. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 note that the last two metrics could, by certain interpretations, consider some harm that is not physically threatening (such as interfering with financial services) to be aggression. however, just because a type of cyber attack is considered aggression does not give a state a carte blanche to start a war. indeed, a war started in response to such an attack would not meet the jus ad bellum proportionality requirement (i.e. the threshold at which the harm done to a victim justifies war as a proportional response), since the potential loss of life and damage to property would be unacceptable to defend one’s state against an economic downturn. the necessity requirement (i.e. the state’s need to resolve a conflict through war) may not be met either. indeed, a war would not be an effective or immediate way to reverse an economic downturn, and would be much more likely to exacerbate it. regardless of which of these metrics is adopted, the crucial point is that scholars and international policymakers (most notably nato and the us department of defense) do recognize that cyber attacks can and should be considered as acts of war. by extension, the use of force in self-defense may be a permissible response by victims. what is a just response to a cyber attack? a just response to a cyber attack will vary based upon the type of attack, as well as the entity that perpetrated it. the conduct with regard to a state or a non-state actor will entail different procedures. attacks may be attributed to states or non-state actors, or they may go unattributed. cases attributed to states are the most straightforward. most actions that constitute aggression would justifiably prompt a victim state to undertake a war of self-defense, provided that the jus ad bellum standards of proportionality and necessity are met. responses against state-committed cyber attacks that do not constitute aggression may include “naming and shaming” or economic sanctions. cyber “aggression” attributed to a non-state actor cannot be considered an act of war because, according to international law, only states can declare war upon each other. therefore, attacks of this character should be considered cyber criminality, and would require international cooperation between the victim and the “launchpad” state to pursue the attacker. certainly, if an attack cannot be attributed at all, the victim state cannot react. however, as i will argue later in this essay, non-attributed attacks that can be reliably traced to a particular territory may justify certain types of force in response. in what immediately follows, i will discuss permissible conduct with regard to attributed attacks. for the sake of argument, i will define aggression using the “effects-based” metric because it has been adopted publicly by the us and nato, and consequently has real-world policy relevance. however, i acknowledge that if this metric of aggression is interchanged with any of the other standards, the permissible conduct in each case may change as well. illustration 1: state-attributed cyber attack with a violent effect in this case, state x has launched a cyber attack on state y, targeting an automated weapon on a base in the territory of state y, causing it to activate and fire at a false target within the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 5 the territory. on the surface, this case appears analogous to a uav being flown over the border of state y, or artillery shell being fired over the border into the territory of state y (strawser, 2010, p. 354). however, a key difference is that no enemy person nor weapon violated the territorial integrity of state x. indeed, the hijacked weaponry itself originates in the attacked state—it originates in state y rather than in state x—even though the computer initiating the attack may be in a remote location. this nuance, while noteworthy from a tactical standpoint, does not create confusion when it comes to the internationally conventional “aggression.” consider the un general assembly’s definition of aggression. it states that aggression entails the “use of armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial integrity” (un general assembly resolution 3314). specifically, we are told that “bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state or the use of any weapons by a state against the territory of another state” qualifies as aggression (un general assembly resolution 3314, article 3b). paying close attention to the article’s language, we note that the locus of the attack’s origin is not specified. therefore, there is no categorical difference if the attack is initiated in state y or elsewhere; rather, the effect of that attack must be within the territory of state y. furthermore, the article uses broad language when referring to weapon types: it takes any weapon into account. thus, the definition of aggression does not preclude a cyber attack, since in this case, it activated a conventional weapon, and a computer has been mobilized to a violent end. now that state x’s attack qualifies as aggression, let us assess how state y may proceed. according to the un’s definition, “a war of aggression is a crime against international peace. aggression gives rise to international responsibility” (un general assembly resolution 3314, article 5.2). taken together with the charter of the united nations, and assuming that a peaceable resolution cannot be forged, then it would be legally justified for state y to respond to state x’s attack through military means, since state x has begun an illegal war against state y, and y has the right to defend itself against this attack. indeed, the document specifies that “nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the united nations” (the charter of the united nations, “chapter vii: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” article 51). in short, a military response may legally be launched against a cyber attack with a violent effect. illustration 2: state-attributed cyber attack with a plausible hostile threat in this case, imagine that state x has launched a cyber attack on state y, targeting state y’s government servers. the attack causes a shutdown of the system of military control and command of state y, temporarily interfering with military communication. since we are classifying aggression with an “effects-based” metric, it is evident that this attack constitutes aggression: an attack of this magnitude on a security system would constitute a serious attack on a state’s critical infrastructure, thereby justifying a self-defensive response. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 some observers may object to the idea that a conventional attack would be justified to this form of aggression. however, i reject this position. unlike case 1, this cyber attack produces no immediate physical harm. we may consider this attack a cyber form of the military tactic of interdiction. in conventional circumstances, interdiction is defined as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or to achieve enemy objectives” (scott, 2016, p. vii). applying this definition to the present case, state x executes cyber interdiction on state y. notably, the phrasing of the above definition does not pertain only to a first use of force. indeed, it may imply that the state upon which the interdiction was carried out was already in a state of war or had prior hostile intent. therefore, to avoid the causality dilemma of attributing state x’s behavior to preemption, i assume for the sake of argument that state y gave state x no reason to believe that it was planning an imminent attack, nor threatening violence. it is plausible for the government of state y to believe that state x has hostile, even bellicose, intent. according to the un definition, “threats” on peace may be considered aggression. one such threat detailed in the document is a blockade of ports or coasts (un general assembly resolution 3314, article 3c). a blockade is similar in character to a cyber interdiction insofar as it does not have an immediate violent effect, but disrupts a state’s capabilities. in fact, blockades are often categorized as interdiction (scott, 2016). the categorical similarity between cyber interdiction and blockades may be enough to argue that state x’s act is aggression, and allowing state y to legally proceed as in case 1. once again, a military response may be permissible against a cyber attack. however, some may argue that cyber interdiction is not analogous to a blockade because of the very evident imminence that a conventional blockade implies. without this direct link to the un charter, the question still stands: would it be plausible for state y to believe that state x poses a hostile threat? to answer, i will invoke walzer’s logic of preemption. walzer uses the purposefully vague term “sufficient threat” as the defining trigger of preemption (walzer, 1977, p. 81). while walzer does not give a comprehensive list of the types of attacks that would constitute sufficient threats, he does offer a set of reasoning allowing us to judge different situations. on his rule, “states may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence. under such circumstances it can firmly be said that they have been forced to fight and that they are the victims of aggression” (walzer, 1977, p.84). a response to a sufficient threat would be considered an act of self-defense. the disabling of military control and communication would seem to pose a sufficient threat in walzer’s sense. this is because state y could logically assume that state x’s intention was to inhibit their ability to effectively mobilize against an unknown threat. based upon y’s prior knowledge and relationship with x, this situation may breed a high level of fear in y, leading them to anticipate any number of frightening scenarios. in this case, if y has reason to believe, based upon contextually relevant factors, that x has dangerous hostile intent, then x poses a sufficient threat. thus, a preemptive strike is permissible (that is, if state y is able to the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 7 mobilize some sort of counter-strike, despite the attack). since this attack is defined as selfdefense against unjust aggression, then a military response is justified, by the logic of selfdefense employed in case 1. what aim would a preemptive strike serve against x when the exact threat it poses is unknown? a physical or cyber attack targeting x’s military-related critical infrastructure or x’s command and control could undermine x’s conventional and/or cyber capabilities. this strike could exacerbate escalations if mishandled. therefore, it should only be undertaken if it is reasonable to believe that the attack could succeed. if successful, the strike may allow y to take control of escalations, and thwart x’s unknown, future attack. illustration 3: state-attributed cyber attack without violent effect or hostile threat in this case, imagine that state x has launched a cyber attack on state y, targeting voting machines and altering election results. for the sake of argument, assume that neither the elected candidate nor opposing candidates planned to start a war, or commit atrocities such as genocide or enslavement. considering the act in isolation, there is not enough information to determine state x’s motivations in tampering with the results. since no candidate claimed hostile intentions, we cannot say that state x was trying to thwart an election result that threatened one or multiple nations. nor can we say state x wanted to ensure that a potentially violent candidate came to power. it is undeniable, however, that state x violates state y’s right to selfdetermination by tampering with the election results. a violation of self-determination alone may be a dubious reason to go to war. moreover, the language of “effects-based” aggression is no longer applicable here, for there is no physical harm to persons or property or critical infrastructure. while it is surely morally objectionable to interfere with a voting system, the system does not qualify as critical infrastructure. even if voting systems qualified, an attack in response to election tampering would not meet the necessity or proportionality criteria. for, y could simply annul the results of the election without engaging militarily with x. the potential loss of life or property damage resulting from a strike against x cannot be justified. therefore, a military retaliation, whether conventional or cyber, would not be permissible. a better course of action would be for state y to reclaim the self-determination it temporarily lost through a revote (preferably in a manner that is not susceptible to cyber interference). state y may also be justified in employing a nonmilitary type of punishment against x, such as economic sanctions. illustration 4: attacks attributed to a non-state actor the nascent international precedent with respect to cyber criminality, as evidenced in the most relevant international treaty, the budapest convention on cyber crime, is that states should be expected to cooperate with each other in the maintenance of global cyber security (council of europe, “convention on cyber crime,” 2001). international justice of this sort requires an obligation of states to pursue non-state actors who commit cyber attacks from the state’s territory. (graham, 2017) beyond this, “it confirms the duty of states to prevent their territories from being used by non-state actors to conduct these attacks against other states” (graham, 2017, ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 p. 94). such obligations would include fortifying their cyber defenses, criminalizing cyber attacks within their own domestic law, finding and monitoring belligerent hacking groups before attacks occur, cooperating with the victim state to locate perpetrators, or even extraditing a cyber criminal to the relevant victim state. these obligations are reasonable, because they help to maintain an ordered cyber terrain and ultimately minimize the use of physical force. on my view, the reasonable level of cooperation should be determined on a case-by-case basis, since states may have different levels of wealth and technological capabilities, which may be due to structural factors beyond their control. it may be that weak states are willing to cooperate. they genuinely may place a strong effort into their cooperation, but still lack sufficient capabilities to prevent attacks or pursue assailants. it would be unfair to punish such states for negligence, especially if they are willing to have the victim state aid them in pursuit of assailant. in the same vein, i contend that states willing to cooperate, but unable to uphold these obligations due to lack of resources or technological capability, should be given aid to fortify their cyber systems against attack or increase monitoring capabilities. this way, upholding the terms of the obligations will not be based primarily on wealth and technological advancements. the overall effect of such aid will be increased global cyber security. however, if a state is unwilling to perform these obligations, victim states may reasonably believe that the attack was state-sponsored or endorsed. moreover, it is possible that the state knew about a threat posed by a non-state actor, but did not act within its capabilities to thwart the threat, making the state culpably negligent. in these cases, victims may then be justified in imposing some sort of punishment or sanction against the state. depending on the lethality of the attack or frequency with which attacks originate from that state, victims may be justified in holding this safe-haven state responsible for the acts committed by non-state actors. the permissible resources in this case mirrors that of non-attributed attacks: a one-time reprisal with the intention of punishing that state. i will argue for this type of response in detail later in the essay. self-defense: conventional responses or cyber responses? when it is appropriate to respond to cyber aggression, a state may employ a cyber or conventional form of retaliation. in this section, i assess these two means for their relevant moral differences. bare in mind that any morally justified response, whether cyber or conventional, would be subject to the constraints of proportionality and necessity. cyber attacks have the potential to minimize harm in several ways. firstly, engaging in a cyber response minimizes risk to a state’s soldiers because they do not have to physically be present in hostile territory, where they may become subject to enemy attack or capture. secondly, cyber attacks have the potential to precisely target a specific area of code within a certain system without causing unnecessary damage to persons or property. therefore, in theory, cyber attacks could effectively disrupt enemy systems while eliminating collateral damage. conversely, even precise conventional means, such as uav strikes, create excess collateral damage. in a similar vein, the degree of engagement can be controlled more easily with a cyber the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 9 attack than with a conventional attack. for instance, the visceral shock and immediacy of bombing a military base may engender a more rapid and more violent escalation than temporarily shutting down military communication lines. finally, many cyber attacks are meant to be temporary (due to a time-sensitive code), or can be reversed with repairs or patches. on the other hand, the effects of most conventional attacks cannot be reversed. and while buildings can be rebuilt and populations can regrow, the actual damage caused by conventional attacks is permanent. despite the fact that a cyber attack may be enacted by anyone, a highly complex cyber attack takes an advanced level of technological sophistication to perform. at the same time, for an attack to be successful, it will often involve both cyber and conventional forms of reconnaissance and espionage (wheeler and larsen, 2003). due to these factors, the entities that can successfully carry out a highly sophisticated attack may be limited to wealthy governments with strong technological and intelligence capabilities. therefore, if we determine that only cyber retaliation is permissible against cyber attacks, we may inadvertently create an asymmetrical moral environment. strong governments could enact cyber attacks against weaker governments without fear that they will succumb to a symmetrical response. therefore, i suggest that cyber attacks should be preferred to conventional attacks because they can minimize the harm associated with retaliatory attacks. indeed, if a cyber attack could be effective enough to achieve a certain outcome, the necessity requirement may bar a state from utilizing a conventional attack in its stead. however, it may be permissible to enact a conventional attack in response if the victim state does not have the technological capabilities to respond with a reasonably effective cyber attack. the problem of attribution some cyber attacks are claimed by their perpetrators at the outset, and other unclaimed attacks can be attributed by their victims, although the attribution may not be immediate. however, given the relatively low threshold for being able to commit a cyber attack, and the ease with which an attack’s origins can be purposefully obscured, attribution becomes difficult. while some argue that the problem of attribution is not unique to cyber attacks (cook, 2010), cyber attacks are particularly susceptible to attribution problems in a way that conventional attacks are not. while internet protocol (ip) addresses can be traced—i.e. the specific code assigned to each device on a network—doing so does not always provide credible leads. for example, an ip address can easily be faked using proxy servers. certain attacks use malware to infect “civilian” computers, turning them into robots to enact remote commands. thus, tracing an attack to its computer of origin does not provide information about the computer that triggered the attack. one attack of this category, the denial of service attack, triggers multiple, even thousands, of computers in diverse locations to launch attacks simultaneously, making pinpointing the originating computer even more difficult. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 10 notably, in countries, such as north korea, where the computer systems are centralized or heavily regulated, then it is reasonable to assume that a cyber attack was launched by, or directly commissioned by, the government (cook, 2010). on the other hand, an ip traced to a state with a prominent group of non-state actors could serve as a smokescreen for governmentlaunched attacks (cook, 2010). in recent years, cyber security experts have developed more sophisticated methods to get closer to attributing attacks, such as linguistic analysis (boebert, 2011), tracing the pattern of the malware infection (sklerov, 2009), or analyzing the attack’s targets and its level of sophistication. while these methods are often inconclusive, they may be helpful in allowing us to pursue the most just response to a non-attributed attack. this is why certain experts consider attribution as a sliding scale of confidence, rather than pursuing a standard of 100% certainty (jones, 2017; wheeler and larsen, 2003). at the present moment, completely and decisively resolving an attribution problem requires dispensing time and money in conventional forms of investigation or espionage (dipert, 2010). but we can imagine situations where a state faced with violence must react quickly to a cyber attack, even with the epistemological barrier imposed by the problem of attribution. can a state respond to an unattributed attack? the attribution problem complicates cases 1 and 2 for two reasons. firstly, aggression is defined in just war doctrine as a crime of states upon states (un general assembly resolution 3314). both justifications above hinged upon the concept of self-defense against aggression. these justifications do not apply in the case of a non-state actor. therefore, it would be insufficient to argue just war theory’s doctrine of self-defense to aggression alone to justify an attack against a non-attributed strike. secondly, if a state is to launch a counter-attack against a non-attributed cyber attack targeting the territory where it originated, it has to accept the possibility that in some scenarios, it may be attacking a non-liable community. in other words, if a non-state actor is the true perpetrator, then the attacking state breaks the other’s peace, effectively committing aggression. yet, determining that the victim state cannot act against a violent attack or a hostile threat, from a consequentialist stance, may unintentionally generate a precarious precedent for coercive engagement. for if a state has no recourse in the face of the problem of attribution, it leaves itself open to many future attacks. the only time that it can counter is against assailants who are too careless or too ill equipped to cover their tracks (eberle, 2013). thus, we could inadvertently create a precedent where states and non-state actors alike would be motivated to develop systems that disguise their identities, knowing that the epistemological doubt they have created will leave their victims with limited permissible recourse. and the better malicious entities become at hiding their identities, the more dangerous and lethal operations they could commit without fear of detection or retaliation. against this backdrop, i reason that a victim state may be justified in holding a launchpad state responsible for an attack that is emitted from its territory. the purpose for this is threefold. the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 11 first, states will have less motivation to perpetrate acts themselves, since they cannot hide behind the smokescreen of non-attribution. second, states will have incentive to control these entities by monitoring and policing within their borders if they know that they may be attacked for the actions of non-state actors. additionally, they will become less inclined to harbor or fund these groups. finally, this principle encourages states to become increasingly concerned for the maintenance of not only their own national cyber security, but also global cyber security: a posture that is appropriate to the fact cyber systems are at their very essence a mark of globalization. therefore, from a consequentialist standpoint, holding states liable for attacks emanating from their territories would theoretically serve as an incentive against becoming a launchpad or safe-haven state, and at the same time, serving as a disincentive to becoming a cyber attacker, and promoting an overall safer cyber terrain. if states are held responsible for the attacks, are they liable to violent retaliation? as discussed earlier in this essay, states have a duty to prevent cyber attacks from emanating from their territory, either committed by the state itself or by a non-state actor. a cyber attack traced to the state’s territory indicates a failure in one of those two duties. the ex post facto investigation should determine if the state could have been reasonably expected to prevent such an attack from occurring. if the state could have prevented the attack, it becomes liable for the harm caused by that attack. again, this is because, from a consequentialist perspective, punishing a state for failing in this duty would incentivize them to prevent cyber attacks. to assess a launchpad state’s liability for an attack, victims must look to the launchpad’s domestic policy toward cyber attacks (graham, 2017). the victim state should consider the launchpad state’s criminal law, its cyber security fortifications and monitoring platforms, its record of cooperation with victim states in the past, and its record of arrest and prosecution of known cyber criminals (graham, 2017). strict criminal laws and rigorous law enforcement would be deterrents for cyber attacks (sklerov, 2009). a lack of criminal laws or law enforcement may indicate a state’s passivity and indifference toward preventing cyber attacks. the international community should give due vigilance to the potential of ill-intentioned states scapegoating innocent individuals in order to give the false impression that they comply with the law enforcement requirement. these factors, taken together, will help the victim to determine whether an attack could have been prevented from occurring. the level of reasonable cooperation expected from each state would differ based on its resources and technological capabilities. this should be taken into account so as not to create a precedent that would unfairly punish well-intentioned states lacking in adequate resources due to structural factors beyond their control. if an attack originates from such a state, it may be morally responsible, although not liable to punishment. one may question why states should be held liable for attacks that they potentially did not commit. the debate about holding states responsible for the actions of non-state actors is not a new one. indeed, it is often debated with regard to states in which terrorists hide. some critics argue that holding a state responsible for the actions of non-state actors unjustly shifts the blame to an innocent state. critics argue that the victim states are actually initiating hostilities by ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 12 unjustly invading an innocent state, thereby transgressing its sovereignty and territorial integrity. to this objection, i respond that states that allow attacks to launch from their territories are acting as a safe-haven for terrorists, thereby acting immorally. by failing to stem attacks, they increase the potential of harm to innocent people. moreover, if a state cannot effectively police its borders, it demonstrates that it is not entirely sovereign. retaliatory violence against such states would be punitive in character—punishing the launchpad states for not upholding their sovereign duty. therefore, these states would be liable to a reprisal, as it is a punitive use of violence. reprisals the doctrine of reprisals is a military convention that, with some key modifications, would allow victims to hold launchpad states responsible for any cyber attacks originating in its territory. by definition, a reprisal is “a limited and deliberate violation of international law to punish another sovereign state that has already broken [these laws]” (partsch, 2000, p. 380-383). the doctrine of reprisals came under harsh scrutiny after wwii, and justifiably so, because it entails the purposeful targeting innocent individuals. until this point, the doctrine of reprisals’ rather straightforward, “eye for an eye” mentality was thought to intuitively appeal to fairness (christopher, 2004). reprisals are considered to be punitive for two reasons. first, reprisals are used to punish the state for an unjust attack that it has committed. more importantly, reprisals are used to punish a state for failing in its sovereign duty to prevent its territory from becoming a safe-haven for belligerent non-state actors. this punishment is intended to be a one-time action to reestablish an already broken peace (christopher, 2004; walzer, 1977). thus, a reprisal is meant to prevent an escalation to war, rather than initiate a new one. the reprisal is committed against the state for not being able to uphold, or refusing to uphold, this sovereign obligations of policing within its territory. these attacks are coercive ones, used to incite the state to autonomously police its territory (walzer, 1977). reprisals are illegal under international law for two main reasons. firstly, reprisals, being forms of punishment, constitute a form of retributive justice executed directly by states rather than by an international tribunal, etc. secondly, reprisals generally involve the massacre of civilians or prisoners of war, both of which are illegal and immoral. however, with a key modification, i argue that a reprisal may be a morally justified response to a cyber attack in certain cases. a state’s reprisal can be morally justified if it minimizes, and preferably eliminates, harm to morally innocent people. walzer assumes this line of reasoning, stating that reprisals should target property. reprisers should make certain that any bystanders leave the scene well in advance of the attack. walzer justifies this stipulation by noting that attacks on property challenge state sovereignty, without committing an “affront to humanity” by harming individuals who have not forfeited their right to life in any way (p. 219). thus, even if individuals were killed in the initial attack, doing so in the reprisal would constitute murder (p. 217). the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 13 in the case of cyber warfare, if we are committed to the notion that reprisers must avoid all harm to civilians, then reprisals symmetrical to the original attack would be unjust in many cases. certainly, targeting the critical infrastructure of a state would generally be impermissible because it creates the massive potential for civilian harm. for instance, a reprisal against a cyber attack of a hospital’s power cannot target another hospital because it would place civilians in unnecessary harm. likewise, launching an artillery missile at civilians in order to reprise a similar attack would also be unjust. thus, it becomes clear that to remain morally justified, the reprisal to a cyber attack should be chosen very carefully. however, the reprisal could target property, such as less consequential types of computer systems. alternatively, the victim could disable the cyber attack testing capabilities of the other state. the property destroyed in the reprisal should be proportionate to what was destroyed by the initial cyber attack (walzer, 1977). it is reasonable to assume that, as long as the harm is proportionate, the reprisal may be cyber or conventional. at the same time, there are important factors to consider when deciding between a cyber attack or a conventional attack, as explained in a prior section. we can transpose the same reasoning to reprisals: a cyber reprisal should be preferred to a conventional reprisal unless the victim state lacks effective cyber capabilities. thresholds to justify reprisals it would be unjustified to undertake the use of force without attempting diplomatic means in advance. commensurate to this idea would be the installation of a threshold by which to determine if states uphold their duties to prevent cyber attacks that originate from within their territories. i propose two such thresholds: one regarding the number of attacks originating from the state and the other regarding the degree of severity of these attacks. the first threshold, the number of unattributed attacks that originate from a certain state, should be adopted because it demonstrates how rigorously a state upholds its duty to prevent itself from becoming a safe-haven for cyber attackers, or from being a repeat cyber attacker itself. if several attacks originate from the same territory, this could point to a few explanations, none of which are positive for the state in question. the first is that the state is unable to police within its own borders, indicating that it is not completely sovereign over its territory. the second is that the state is unwilling to install the necessary measures to prevent non-state actors from committing cyber attacks, meaning that it is harboring these attackers. finally, it could mean that the state’s government is committing the attacks itself, but has advanced enough capabilities to hide its identity, a prospect that is both dangerous and disingenuous. as stated earlier, well-intentioned, cooperative states that are weak for economic or structural reasons beyond their control would not be liable to attack. they may accept aid to fortify their cyber defenses or increase law enforcement capabilities. the actual threshold should be determined by the international community. when the threshold is reached, a victim may be justified in the use of force against the other state. the second threshold, the severity of the attack, is an important one because it emphasizes the proportionality justification. an attack may not be severe enough to justify the ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 14 use of force against it. furthermore, if an attack is extremely severe or threatens the critical infrastructure in a tremendous way, then a victim state may be justified in retaliating as a direct response to this single attack, but only after allowing the originator state a certain amount of time to attempt to rectify the situation, search for the assailant, etc. however, it is true that some very extreme attacks, for example, false activation of a nuclear weapon, require a far more urgent response than others. it is reasonable to assume that attacks taking a more extreme nature would be far more likely to mirror the bellicose motivations and advanced capabilities of a government than a non-state actor. the idea of being able to punish a state for a single unattributed attack is rather tenuous, and lends itself very easily to abuse. i stipulate that doing so should remain illegal, so as not to create a dangerous, easily-abusable norms, although in extreme cases such conduct may be morally justified in retaliating after a single attack. conclusion the international community is at a crucial moment: we now have the opportunity to determine what is morally permissible with regard to cyber warfare before we are ever faced with a worst-case scenario. arguably, this is the best moment to decide the moral principles, which will govern our future conduct by influencing policy determinations. in this essay, i have explored the just responses to a cyber attack arriving at one self-defensive account and one punitive account. attributed attacks constitute a first use of force, and justify self-defensive responses by victims. i first assessed just responses to attributed attacks. these self-defensive responses varied based upon the attack’s character, as well as the assailant. i then posited that cyber responses were preferable to conventional responses in these cases, depending on the victim’s capabilities. finally, i tackled addressed. the problem of attribution requires a very different category of response, however. victim states may sometimes hold launchpad states responsible for unattributed attacks originating in their territory. when states were liable to attack, then the punitive measure of reprisal was a justified response. notably, i draw upon and adapt a traditional norm to address a very contemporary problem in this growing field of coercive engagement. the ethics of cyber warfare lina dayem 15 references boebert, w. earl. 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"techniques for cyber attack attribution." defense technical information center (2003): united states department of defense. web. program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 49 empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later paisley ann meyer university of illinois urbana champaign abstract the annexation of crimea and continued russian aggression into ukraine’s eastern border directly defied the 1994 budapest memorandum. under this agreement, ukraine was given sovereignty and territorial assurances, and in return, it gave back its nuclear arsenal to russia. this paper explores why this decision was made and explains how this action benefited ukraine. it explores ukrainian relations with russia and western democracies in the early 1990s, and it shows how ukraine was economically dependent on the continued support of these states. the purpose of this paper is to counter the argument some ukrainian politicians and numerous journalists began making following crimea’s annexation, stating that ukraine would have been better off relying on nuclear deterrence than international agreements. empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later paisley ann meyer 50 in 1991, ukraine became independent from russia and inherited thousands of nuclear warheads. in 1994, ukraine signed the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty (npt) as a non-nuclear state, and by 1996, it had returned the last of those warheads to russia, upholding its commitments to the npt (nuclear weapons timeline, 2017). the state with the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons at the time had been convinced to completely disarm in just five years. ukraine giving up strategically advantageous technology like nuclear weapons suggests that, in some circumstances, the benefits of becoming a non-nuclear state must outweigh the security benefits of keeping its stockpile. in this paper, i explore why ukraine decided to become a nuclear-free state and how these “benefits” now relate to ukraine’s territorial integrity. because russian actions have violated the 1994 budapest memorandum, many ukrainians now believe the decision to disarm ultimately proved counterproductive to maintaining ukrainian security; however, the belief that nuclear deterrence instead of disarmament would have protected the state from military incursion is misguided and flawed. a brief historical overview of early nuclear treaties relating to ukraine ukrainian relations with russia have been complicated since ukraine declared its independence. when the soviet union collapsed, 15% of its nuclear arsenal was in the hands of the newly-formed ukrainian state, enabling it to become a nuclear power if ukraine created new launch codes. despite arguments that the weapons were necessary to protect ukrainian sovereignty, the government was persuaded to return them to russia (umland, 2016). ironically, ukraine continued to find itself subjected to russia’s dominating presence. russia’s belief that they are responsible for protecting russian speakers outside their border conflicts with ukraine’s assertions that as a sovereign state it alone holds a responsibility for people within its borders. these conflicting policies meant the budapest memorandum was ultimately too little support for this ideological issue (turbokav, 2001). relations between russia and ukraine had to be clarified by extending some of the former treaties between the ussr and the us to cover issues that involved former bloc states. the budapest memorandum came from negotiations with ukraine for the lisbon protocol to the strategic arms reduction treaty (start) in 1992. start was an arms reduction treaty originally signed in 1991 by the united states and the soviet union (ussr). after the ussr collapsed, an addition to this treaty (the lisbon protocol) was needed to extend this treaty to the new states of belarus, kazakhstan and ukraine. the lisbon protocol called for them to give up the nuclear weapons in their possession “in the shortest possible time and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end” (protocol to the treaty, 1992). these nuclear weapons were to be returned to russia, the successor state of the ussr. by signing the lisbon protocol, these states were also agreeing to become non-nuclear states under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt). however, ukraine hesitated to ratify the treaty without reassurances that it would maintain its national sovereignty. according to turbokav (2001), senior fellow and expert on russia, ukraine, and european relations at uppsala universität in sweden, the concept of independence was almost brand new to ukrainians when the soviet union fell, but the issue of sovereignty quickly became the focal point. the 1994 budapest memorandum was created to address these concerns and provided ukraine with the assurance it needed to sign onto the lisbon protocol. the memorandum gave ukraine guarantees from the united states, the united kingdom, and russia that they would uphold the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 51 ukraine, only using weapons against the state in matters of self-defense. with these promises, ukraine followed through with becoming a denuclearized state and signed as a non-nuclear weapons state to the npt (memorandum on security assurances, 1994). adding ukraine as a party to the npt was a victory for diplomacy and international cooperation. created in 1968 and extended indefinitely in 1995, the npt separates the world into nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapons states, making the development and procurement of nuclear weapons outside of the us, the uk, france, china, and russia illegal under international law (treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1968). despite the illegality, several states have refused to sign the treaty and developed their nuclear weapons programs. given the fact that some states have openly defied international law to obtain the perceived security benefits of nuclear deterrence, ukraine’s willingness to disarm despite tensions with its nuclear neighbor, russia, was no small diplomatic victory. the original premise of the npt was to stop both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, ending the development of new nuclear weapons programs and limiting the growth of existing stockpiles. the nuclear weapon counts from 1968 to the present day give credibility that the treaty has reduced the global nuclear threat. in 1968, there were just over 39,000 nuclear weapons in the world between six states. as of 2010, this number was estimated to be around 18,000 across eight states. since the signing of the treaty, nuclear weapon counts have been halved, but the total number of nuclear weapons in 1968 was far from the peak. weapons counts peaked at 70,000 in 1986, but by the time ukraine became independent from russia, the total number of nuclear weapons was starting to finally see significant declines (between 1991-1994 total counts dropped from 55,000 to 41,000). the cold war had ended, and the nuclear era seemed to be ending (norris & kristensen, 2010). security strategies: nuclear deterrence or nuclear free applying game theory to nuclear disarmament as the stag hunt model (see jervis 1978 for full explanation of the model) demonstrates, the preferred course of action for belarus, kazakhstan, and ukraine was for them to cooperate and to sign on to the npt, rather than independently developing their own nuclear programs. when the soviet union collapsed, the last thing the world wanted was for these states to keep their nuclear stockpiles. nuclear weapons and disarmament are a classic example of a security dilemma and a breakdown of the stag hunt concept. in an ideal world, all states would sign the npt and work towards being nuclear weapons free. a nuclear-free world (the stag) would provide all states with the benefit of not needing to expand their nuclear stockpiles in competition with other states. however, diversion (the rabbits) from this objective by some states leads to nuclear arms races (the us and ussr during the cold war). those who chose to cooperate and work towards a nuclear-free world are left with the commitment to never develop an entire class of weapons (jervis, 1978). partial cooperation is not enough for the stag hunt to succeed, and if deviations from the npt’s original objective of reducing nuclear stockpiles persists, non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states will continue to operate under the threat of nuclear war. empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later paisley ann meyer 52 ukrainian economy and european dependence at the time of its independence, ukraine was one of the poorest soviet bloc countries, with a gdp per capita of $1307 and a shrinking economy according to sutela (2012), a senior associate for the carnegie endowment for international peace. until 1996, the country was facing negative growth rates of around ten to twenty-two percent, causing hyperinflation and halving the total gdp by 1994. it was not until 2001 that ukraine’s economy began to show improvement. this growth could be attributed to rising global metal prices, a major export for ukraine, and continued cheap oil prices from russia (sutela, 2012). unlike some former soviet bloc countries, ukraine did not cut ties with russia, and ukraine’s debt grew tremendously as it continued to rely on russian gas and oil. this dependency was used by russia as political leverage against the state. needing to separate itself, ukraine began “walking the line” between western democracies and russia, creating relations with both camps was viewed politically in ukraine’s national interests (turbokav, 2001). ukraine’s dependence on russian exports and its desire to integrate with western european countries—noting that that european union was created in 1993—meant that the inherited nuclear arsenal could not be kept if interstate relations were to be created. the more realistic reality is that if ukraine had chosen to keep its nuclear weapons, it would have likely faced economic sanctioning from rather than expanded trade with, the west. if it had refused to give the nuclear weapons back to russia, it likely would have faced serious economic sanctions, facing consequences like those faced by india, pakistan, the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk), the republic of korea (rok), and others. in the case of the rok, economic sanctioning was successful in stopping further nuclear weapons developments. for india and pakistan, sanctions were lifted respectively for the following ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 53 reasons: becoming a major economic power and aiding in the fight against terrorist organizations. the dprk has been operating under extremely harsh sanctions as it continues to develop its nuclear program, a choice that has led to a crippled economy that relies heavily on domestic production (ichimasa, 2017). the notable exception to this pattern was that israel obtained nuclear weapons in 1967, making it the sixth nuclear power and the first to not be recognized by the npt. however, it did not face economic retaliation. this can most aptly attribute to two things: the npt was still being acceded by many countries in this year, and israel pledge to the us not to use the weapons as a diplomatic tool. with the acceptance of the us and their very early development, economic retaliation from major world powers never occurred, though many middle eastern countries today use israel’s nuclear arsenal as reasoning for their own economic restrictions on israel and her citizens (johnson, 2010). by the 1990s, the npt had been in place for decades, and no major power at the time was willing to turn a blind eye to ukraine’s keeping a third of the former soviet nuclear arsenal. the pressure from the international community to sign the npt and return those weapons would have been too strong. as seen in the analysis of its economic health in the early nineties, ukraine was not in a position of power economically. had economic sanctions been applied to ukraine, the state likely would have fallen to the same pressures the rok did in the 1970s. ukraine did not have any political or economic leverage that would encourage sanctions to be lifted. it also was also too economically dependent on russia for energy; cutting off economic ties with russia would mean cutting off 90% of its oil and gas usage (sutela, 2012). for a state that was aspiring to one day become further integrated with the west and seeking an end to the hyperinflation and economic declines of the early 90s, maintaining the nuclear arsenal would have been a politically and economically suicidal move. effectiveness of deterrence ukrainian disarmament is an instance used to illustrate that international cooperation towards nuclear disarmament is possible, but deterrence rather than disarmament continues to be the strategy held by nuclear weapons states. some would argue that the practice of nuclear deterrence has saved the world from wwiii, but meyer and sauer (2018) counter that this is not provable and can be more justifiably attributed to global economic interdependence and the memory of the horrors brought on by wwi and wwii. in 2014, some ukrainian politicians began to call into question ukraine’s decision to disarm. these politicians and numerous new sources questioned the empty promises in the budapest memorandum rather than utilizing the fear of nuclear retaliation to deter future russian incursion. one politician and his supporters believe that had ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, russia would have never been able to take crimea or promote rebels in the donbas region (zurcher, 2014). what is largely ignored in this argument is that deterrence does not guarantee the protection and stability it implies, and to some it appears to promote destabilizing and suicidal philosophies like mutually assured destruction (mad), which could harm the conflicting states in conflict and the rest of the world (zurcher, 2014). an escalation of nuclear-level tensions can result in the destruction of the world, and deterrence only works for so long. when deterrence between states fail, it will be the people who suffer the most. to further discredit the idea that maintaining a nuclear arsenal would have guaranteed ukrainian security, meyer and sauer’s (2018) point to conflicts like the yom kippur war, the gulf war, and pakistan’s kargil incursion as instances when having nuclear weapons technology empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later paisley ann meyer 54 did not automatically protect states from conflict. in each of these instances, states involved had nuclear weapons, but deterrence did not protect them from conventional warfare. this calls into question whether deterrence is an entirely effective means of protecting a country. one area where nuclear deterrence has shown little benefit is in the digital realm, with russia being an international threat regarding information warfare. research conducted by the center for research analyses explained that ukraine represents one of the first major areas where russia used strategic cyber and information warfare to undermine state’s authority and communications abilities within both the political and military sphere. beginning with smaller cyber-attacks through phishing, distributed denial of service (ddos), or malware, russia was able to disrupt ukrainian telecommunication, and the state’s critical infrastructure has been further undermined by cyber-attacks to the power grids (connell and vogler, 2017). these attacks have allowed for russia to create confusion and disorder within ukraine without the use of conventional military operations. these kinds of attacks also make it difficult for deterrence to effectively protect ukraine if it had maintained the nuclear weapons arsenal. even major nuclear weapons states recognized by the npt, like the united states, have been subject to information warfare tactics. the controversy over the extent russia’s disinformation campaign aided us president donald trump in winning the 2016 election is still a major point of concern. having used ukraine as a testing ground, russia has been able to utilize its experiences to target major, more powerful international players like the us (polyakova and boyer, 2018). if these methods of disruption were able to potentially undermine a nuclear power like the us, then deterrence plays little to no role in protecting a state in the cyber sphere. with cyber and information warfare being the primary aspects of russia’s strategy in creating divisions in ukraine, a nuclear arsenal would not have been an effective safeguard. ukraine’s decision with 20+ years of hindsight the illusion that the budapest memorandum would protect ukraine broke in twenty years. russia showed it had no intention of respecting any of those promises as it annexed crimea in 2014. by breaking this treaty and taking aggressive actions that directly violate the memorandum, russia has hurt the likelihood of diplomatic nuclear disarmament being used successfully in the future. non-nuclear states are not, however, ready to back down. the world is moving away from an era of accepting nuclear weapons as a form of security for a few states. ukraine would not have been more secure if it kept its nuclear weapons, but looking at past treaties and the timing, one can understand that disarming was the more attractive option. as a new state, ukraine needed international support to combat russian influence, and the npt is an attractive treaty in theory. however, russian actions against ukraine will continue to destroy the complacency states’ have historically held towards the status quo on nuclear weapons, and this event will be used by other states to call into question why they should not only start a nuclear weapons program, but to ignore diplomatic solutions that may result in empty promises. the crucial take away from the violations to the budapest memorandum should not be that states would be better off with nuclear weapons to deter aggression, but that states should be held accountable when in violation of international agreements. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 55 references connell, m., & vogler, s. 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https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/underachiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991-pub-47451 https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text http://content.ebscohost.com/contentserver.asp?t=p&p=an&k=6875067&s=r&d=asn&ebscocontent=dgjymnle80seprq4wtvholcmr1ceqk9ss6m4slgwxwxs&contentcustomer=dgjympgut1c3rlznuepfgeyx44dt6fia http://content.ebscohost.com/contentserver.asp?t=p&p=an&k=6875067&s=r&d=asn&ebscocontent=dgjymnle80seprq4wtvholcmr1ceqk9ss6m4slgwxwxs&contentcustomer=dgjympgut1c3rlznuepfgeyx44dt6fia http://content.ebscohost.com/contentserver.asp?t=p&p=an&k=6875067&s=r&d=asn&ebscocontent=dgjymnle80seprq4wtvholcmr1ceqk9ss6m4slgwxwxs&contentcustomer=dgjympgut1c3rlznuepfgeyx44dt6fia https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-26676051 empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later letter from the editor (sp20) letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the sixth issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our sixth issue of the journal, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. in “cultural insensitivities and aggravating factors in iraq and afghanistan” dylan hyams explores how a lack of cultural training has damaged american relations with local communities in iraq and afghanistan. christopher mitchell explores the changing nature of the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis) from its beginnings to 2019 in his paper “isis: the evolution of a terrorist state”. shifting focus, in “analyzing the economic influences on the evolution of the russian military since 1991” author philip j. klafta discusses the development of the russian military as well as the economic and political factors that influenced these changes. finally, vincent prayugo covers the efficacy of america’s nuclear stockpile in the modern era in his paper “the nuclear weapons program of the united states and its strategic value in the twenty-first century”. these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! jakob domagala editor-in-chief the global crisis in syria dylan h. hyams 1 the global crisis in syria dylan h. hyams university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract throughout this paper, i will explore the ongoing crisis in syria, most commonly known as the syrian civil car, and look at the key aspects as well as the global issues that it has presented to the international community. first, i will be giving an overview of the conflict in syria and a detailed history of the destabilization of the region. next, i will be using a concept that is used in the textbook “world politics” by friedan, lakes, and schultz (fls), where i will be addressing the actors, their interactions, preferences and choices, and the institutions governing their decisions. after that, i will be addressing the human rights violations of the assad regime, its allies, and the opposition forces in respect to the universal declaration of human rights (udhr). after human rights, i will be addressing a conflict resolution strategy that i believe is the most effective on the global scale in reference to middle eastern conflicts. this paper’s main objective is to explain the complexity of the syrian civil war and how it has become one of the greatest and most challenging conflicts of our generation. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 the global crisis in syria the civil war in syria is a complex, multifaceted conflict with over 470,000 deaths, 5 million refugees, and 6.3 million people displaced from their homes (human rights watch, 2016) which involves many actors each with varying choices and preferences. as the conflict continues, many international institutions such as the united nations (un) have been facilitating international talks among the international community; however, due to the differing agendas of the actors, little to no progress has been made in the united nations security council (unsc). over the course of this paper, the atrocities exhibited in the conflict will be examined and will provide the details that make it necessary for international collaboration to end the conflict once and for all. actors and interests primary pro-assad forces syrian arab republic: on july 17, 2000, after the death of his father, hafez al-assad, bashar al-assad assumed the position of the president of syria under the ba’ath party, which rules under an authoritarian regime (central intelligence agency, 2017). upon taking power, bashar al-assad and his regime worked towards ridding the former government of corruption. after the expulsion of many government officials; authors rather, ali, and abbas explain, “bribery and preferential treatment at higher echelons of the government” (2015) lead to the protests of the arab spring in syria in 2011 and to the current state of affairs revolving around assad’s regime. iran: for many years, iran has been supplying the assad regime with weapons and funds and has been working with syria to keep its economy afloat in the midst of a conflict (horowitz, 2014). iran has also been increasing its support for the assad regime by supplying ground and air components to help keep assad in power for as long as possible (fulton, holliday & wyer, 2013). since the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa), the international community has decreased sanctions on iran, which has given iran greater economic leverage than it previously held. russia: russia, the largest and most powerful ally to the assad regime, has been providing assad with a “diplomatic shield” in the un (laub, 2017). in addition to carrying out airstrikes in support of ground operations, the russian military has been providing weapons and training to syrian government forces. according to the bbc, russia’s involvement in backing the assad regime lies in its desire to keep a power presence in the middle east, to protect its port in syria that connects it to the mediterranean, and to give it a stage to demonstrate its power in the war on terrorism (doucet, 2016). the global crisis in syria dylan h. hyams 3 primary opposition forces the free syrian army (fsa): in march of 2017, the assad regime opened fire on peaceful protesters, firing the first shots of the syrian civil war. as a result of this, the free syrian army took up arms against the assad regime (laub, 2017). the fsa consists of former syrian military personnel (who joined the fsa after the war broke out), civilians, and a mix of extremist groups looking to overthrow assad. the kurdish people’s protection units (ypg): with the unrest in syria, the kurdish governing party in syria was presented with an opportunity to further their goal of reclaiming land from the islamist rebels in the region of rojava. as of 2017, the ypg is being armed and trained by the united states, who believes that the ypg is the most capable group in the region to combat the islamic state (is) (laub, 2017). turkey: turkey was one of the main opponents to assad during the 2011 uprising due to assad’s violent reaction to protests (zalewski & spencer, 2011). turkey began training syrian defectors in order to create the fsa to combat the assad regime and ultimately overthrow the syrian government. turkey’s main interests are the defeat of the is and a syrian regime change (dombey, 2014). united states: in 2011, after the assad regime fired on civilians during a peaceful protest, the obama administration condemned the attack and called for bashar al-assad to resign (myre, 2017). as the violence turned to a civil war, the united states, at first, was hesitant to join the conflict because of former president obama’s plan to reduce its presence in the middle east. however, after the emergence of the is in the region, former president obama ordered the bombing missions against the extremist organization in syria while negotiating peace with assad (laub, 2017). after donald trump was elected president, assad used chemical weapons against unarmed civilians. this sparked the first direct strike on assad forces by the united states on april 6, 2017. currently, the united states has been pushing for support in the unsc to condemn syria for their chemical attacks; however, most of their attempts have been blocked by russia (mckirdy, 2017). outside combatant group ad-dawlah al-islāmiyah (is): established in 1999 under the name jama'at al-tawhid wal-jihad, the is is a breakoff group of al-qaeda, with greater and more extremist ideals compared to the al-qaeda terrorist group. in syria and iraq, is’ main goal is to establish a caliphate, or state, where it can impose sharia law. the is is in conflict with all groups mentioned above and with many smaller groups such as tahrir al-sham and ahrar al-sham. in 2016, is began to lose territory in syria and iraq through precision strikes, cooperation, and overwhelming force. the is has been suffering greatly and has lost an abundance of its claimed territories (laub, 2017). ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 international institutions united nations: the un has played an important role during the conflict in syria. within the united nations security council (unsc), there are five permanent members: china, france, russia, the united kingdom, and the united states. each permanent member has the ability to veto any resolution instantaneously without debate. during the syrian civil war, russia has frequently vetoed resolutions regarding the syria conflict. this can be attributed to the russian policy, with its main goal being to block american efforts in shaping middle eastern politics (yan, 2013). issues of human rights in syria since the syrian civil war began in 2011, human rights have been a major focal point for advocacy groups and the united nations human rights council (unhrc), where abuses have been brought to light against both the pro-assad forces as well as the opposition forces. the abuses range from torture and inhumane treatment to the killing of civilians with small arms and weapons of mass destruction (wmds); most notably sarin gas used by the assad regime in correlation with russia. the issues of human rights abuses deal directly with the universal declaration of human rights (udhr), on all sides of the war. according to the human rights watch (hrw), a non-governmental organization (ngo) that specializes in observing human rights abuses in war zones around the world, the assad regime has broken seven articles written in the udhr. human rights abuses – pro-assad forces article 3. in article 3 of the udhr, it is stated that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (2017). as reported by the hrw, the assad regime has been indiscriminately targeting and killings civilians. prior to the outbreak of the syrian civil war, civilians gathered in damascus to peacefully demand governmental reforms. in response, the syrian army opened fire on the peaceful protesters, killing and injuring several people. the regime has continuously violated article 3, however due to the lack of support from russia and china in the unsc, the killings of innocent civilians cannot be formally acted upon. articles 5/6/7. since march of 2011, hrw reports that around 12,679 people have died while in custody of the syrian government (2017). these deaths are thought to have been caused by inhumane punishments such as, torture, starvation, and disease due to a lack of medical care (goldman, 2017). the prevention of medical treatment and inhumane killings directly violates article 5 that states that, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (2017). the detained civilians are unable to speak to family members or lawyers and are being denied the right to be recognized as a person before the law, as stated in article 6 and 7 of the udhr, which declares that “everyone has the right to recognition as a person before the law” and that “all are equal before the law” (2017). the pro-government forces have also been engaged in the unlawful, secret abductions of advocates for rights such as free speech and democracy; two ideas that are currently under attack the global crisis in syria dylan h. hyams 5 from the syrian government. according to the washington post, around 58,000 civilians have disappeared and are reportedly being held in government run facilities without due process (naylor, 2015). there are few accounts of what occurs within these “detention centers” due to the low survival rate of those detained. article 20. article 20 states that everyone has to right to assembly, which includes peaceful protests or demonstrations. in 2011, the syrian army fired into a crowd of peaceful protesters, killing around 44 people (shadid, 2011). this action taken by government forces stripped its civilians of peaceful assembly, and then triggered a civil war. article 25. since the start of the civil war, assad has ordered the military to target hospitals and schools, preventing medical assistance to patients in targeted hospitals (hrw, 2017). these violations eliminate the rights of medical treatment as set forth in article 25 of the udhr (2017). human rights abuses – opposition forces over the many years of the civil war, human rights abuses have increased exponentially; especially among the is, the fsa, and the turkish military. articles 3/18. the is has crossed the syrian border and conquered land for its selfproclaimed caliphate. through its conquest, the is has forced civilians to conform to their interpretation of sharia law and killed those who did not (amnesty intl., 2016). the is has abused articles 3 and 18 of the udhr that state that “[e]veryone has the right to life” and that “[e]veryone has the right to religion” (2017). article 5/9. as said in the previous section, article 5 and 9 have to do with the fair treatment of detainees. according to the hrw, some opposition groups have kidnapped and tortured civilians and government workers for ransom (2017). according to an activist known as mazen, this torture sometimes leads to the death of the captive (hrw, 2017). another human rights abuse under article 5 that is present in syria is the execution of civilians via inhuman ways. for example, in a video obtained from liveleak, turkish soldiers were seen throwing women off cliffs and shooting them as they landed (turkish army committing war crimes, 2016). governance and conflict resolution in syria first, the areas in which governance and conflict resolution has failed will be examined with the example of the conflict in iraq. the conflict in iraq was a failure on the part of the usled coalition because of the lack of preparation for the occupation and transition period. the conflict in iraq functions as a case study for the major flaws of an invasion and provides insight into what can be changed to increase the chance of military success. the iraq war, also known as the second gulf war, began in 2003 when allied forces of a us-led coalition invaded, defeated, and overthrew the iraqi government. the us-led coalition decided to invade after receiving information that iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (wmds) and that the country’s leader, saddam hussein, was committing crimes against ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 humanity (iraq war, 2017). with the downfall of saddam hussein, insurgent groups began to form due to lack of governance. this sparked the post-invasion phase of the iraq war in 2007 which revealed unseen, extensive troubles. groups such as al-qaeda and the is severely impacted the iraqi economic buildup and iraq’s ability to create a stable post-saddam state (world bank, 2017). although the saddam regime was overthrown by allied forces, this intervention largely failed due to increased instability of the state, as well as the region as a whole. the first plan of action that the international community should take is to approve of a unified post-war strategy regarding the assad regime. any strategy must be approved by all five permanent members of the unsc to ensure its efficacy. international cooperation can lead to global support and greater stability. in her chapter on global conflict, shirley fedorak suggests, “military intervention is necessary to ensure peace and stability;” however, she also suggests, “military intervention can lead to the further destabilization of an already unstable political situation” (2014). this idea from fedorak suggests a costly scenario in a unsc strategy for syria, and is open to many different conflict resolution strategies. an intervention in syria could lead to another occupation and insurgency like that of iraq. only when the international community addresses the conflict in its entirety and discusses the post-war situation can it negotiate a resolution with tools such as sanctions, military action, regime change, or united nations peacekeeping missions. conclusion the syrian civil war has dragged on for years with no definitive conclusion as of 2018. with the assad regime and its allies being backed by russia and a multitude of rebel groups being supported by various other foreign states and terrorist organizations, the war may last for an extensive period of time, given the abilities of each of the actors to finance the war. the horrendous acts of human rights violations must be addressed by the international community without bias. in order to resolve the conflict in syria, there needs to be months of collaboration and planning that is not currently present in the international community. the global crisis in syria dylan h. hyams 7 references amnesty international. (2016, july 5). retrieved december 06, 2017, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/syria-abductions-torture-and-summarykillings-at-the-hands-of-armed-groups/ benner, t., brockmeier, s., burai, e., murthy, c., daase, c., mohan, m., . . . haibin, z. (2015, april 07). effective and responsible protection from atrocity crimes: toward global action. retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.gppi.net/publications/peacesecurity/article/effective-and-responsible-protection-from-atrocity-crimes-toward-globalaction/ central intelligence agency. (2014). the world factbook. retrieved january 15, 2015 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html(publicly accessible database) dombey, d. (2014, june 27). turkey ready to accept kurdish state in historic shift. retrieved december 15, 2017, from https://www.ft.com/content/65ae9ac2-fe00-11e3-bd0e00144feab7de doucet, l. (2016, november 16). why is russia engaged in aleppo? retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37995780 fedorak, s. (2014). global issues: a cross-cultural perspective. toronto: university of toronto press. fulton, w., holliday, j., & wyer, s. (n.d.). iranian strategy in syria. retrieved december 15, 2017, from http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria goldman, russell. “assad’s history of chemical attacks, and other atrocities.” the new york times, the new york times, 5 apr. 2017. horowitz, r. (2014, april 09). why is iran shipping arm to hamas and hezbollah? retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/why-is-iran-shippingarm-to-hamas-and-hezbollah human rights watch. (2016). regions. human rights watch. retrieved january 13, 2016 from http://www.hrw.org/regions (public database) iraq war. (2016, july 20). retrieved december 06, 2017, from https://www.britannica.com/event/iraq-war laub, z. (2017, april 28). who's who in syria's civil war. retrieved december 06, 2017, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war mckirdy, e. (2017, april 13). 8 times russia blocked a un resolution on syria. retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-unsc-syriaresolutions/index.html mitchell, m., & louvel, n. (directors). (n.d.). the uncondemned [video file]. retrieved december 06, 2017, from (n.d.). retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.theuncondemned.com/ myre, g. (2017, april 08). what is the u.s. goal in syria? retrieved december 06, 2017, from about:blank http://www.gppi.net/publications/peace-security/article/effective-and-responsible-protection-from-atrocity-crimes-toward-global-action/ http://www.gppi.net/publications/peace-security/article/effective-and-responsible-protection-from-atrocity-crimes-toward-global-action/ http://www.gppi.net/publications/peace-security/article/effective-and-responsible-protection-from-atrocity-crimes-toward-global-action/ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html about:blank about:blank http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37995780 about:blank http://www.hrw.org/regions about:blank ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/08/523016523/what-is-the-u-s-goal-insyria naylor, h. (2015, november 05). syrian government accused of profiting from abductions, detentions. retrieved december 06, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-syrian-government-profits-from-massabductions-detentions/2015/11/05/b28ff495-04e4-4877-b331b02fefa7fa01_story.html?utm_term=.5a707c0ab585 shadid, a. (2011, september 16). protesters killed in syria. retrieved december 15, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/world/middleeast/at-least-six-protesters-killed-insyria.html turkish army committing war crimes [video file]. (2016). turkey: liveleak. retrieved december 06, 2017, from https://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f14_1477761241. yan, h. (2013, august 29). why russia, iran and china are standing by syria. retrieved january 11, 2018, from http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russiasupporters/index.html zalewski, p., & spencer, r. (2011, june 10). turkey condemns violence as assad's helicopters open fire. retrieved december 06, 2017, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8569383/turkeycondemns-violence-as-assads-helicopters-open-fire.html about:blank https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-syrian-government-profits-from-mass-abductions-detentions/2015/11/05/b28ff495-04e4-4877-b331-b02fefa7fa01_story.html?utm_term=.5a707c0ab585 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-syrian-government-profits-from-mass-abductions-detentions/2015/11/05/b28ff495-04e4-4877-b331-b02fefa7fa01_story.html?utm_term=.5a707c0ab585 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/amnesty-syrian-government-profits-from-mass-abductions-detentions/2015/11/05/b28ff495-04e4-4877-b331-b02fefa7fa01_story.html?utm_term=.5a707c0ab585 about:blank about:blank https://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f14_1477761241 about:blank about:blank http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8569383/turkey-condemns-violence-as-assads-helicopters-open-fire.html http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8569383/turkey-condemns-violence-as-assads-helicopters-open-fire.html hyams (1) cultural insensitivities and aggravating factors in iraq and afghanistan dylan hyams university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract when examining terrorism, you can find many reasons as to why people may resort to such violence; whether they be for financial purposes, religious incentives, revenge, or for the thrill of violence. however, in western literature one aspect infrequently written about is how cultural insensitivities and other aggravating factors, presented in this paper, contribute to grievances that help solve the collective action problem posed by many organizations. throughout my paper i introduce flaws in the handling of cultural practices in the wars in afghanistan and iraq, how they have plausible correlation with increased recruitment by extremist organizations, and what the department of defense is doing to the promote the elimination of these factors. this paper explores instances of cultural mishandlings and abuse at the arms of united states service members; including abu ghraib, u.s. drone strikes, and ground force activities. using empirical data on the amount of terrorist attacks occurring in iraq and afghanistan and the dates of significant military incidents, i try to narrow the gap between grievances and the use of political violence by terrorist organizations. later, i introduce programs created by the department of defense to increase cultural awareness and boundaries of the regions that troops will be deployed to. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security throughout the two wars in iraq and afghanistan, the united states has been fighting asymmetric battles against the taliban, islamic state, and al-qaeda. as of 2018, these conflicts have taken the lives of over 475,000 individuals and have turned parts of the middle east and western asia into war zones, displacing tens-of-thousands of people (brown, 2018). although these conflicts themselves are important, the united states has neglected to significantly train and equip its troops with the necessary cultural training in understanding the various sects and ethnicities within the middle east, causing greater grievances among the local populations relating to an increase in violence and anti-american rhetoric. this situation allows for non-state actors to gain an upper hand and continue to wage their jihad against western influence in the region, giving them a greater ability to use the local populations to their benefit. after the attacks on september 11, 2001, the united states began its invasion of afghanistan, nicknamed operation enduring freedom (oef), with the hopes of ousting the taliban from power for harboring al-qaeda terrorists, and to remove their influence from the country. in addition to the war in afghanistan, the united states invaded iraq in 2003, nicknamed operation iraqi freedom, with over 100,000 troops, officially starting the iraq war (“u.s.”, 2003). the goal of operation iraqi freedom was to topple the saddam regime and establish a new government. this goal, however, did not foresee the tribal struggle for power after the saddam regime was toppled, and further drove the country into a cultural sandpit. in both wars, the united states has been reducing its troop presence as the conflicts have been ongoing for almost two decades with moderate success. this paper will be greatly influenced by the grievance theory, which will help explain the rise of terrorist activity proceeding important events related to the united states and its coalition within iraq and afghanistan. according to the grievance theory of terrorism, actors turn to violence due to an event in their life that triggered an emotional response such as sadness, anger, or distress. in their paper, “the rationality of radical islam,” kaltenthaler and wiktorowicz suggest that grievance theory helps rationalize the actions taken by individuals within a terrorist organization and is an offset of systematic inequality and alienation (2016, p. 297). in order to further support grievance theory explanation and its tie to this paper, different cases backed by statistical data will be presented and elaborated on in order to prove that cultural insensitivity has had a negative impact on local populations and shows correlation with an increase in terrorist activity. when approaching the middle eastern cultures, you cannot use a westernized viewpoint; which characterized the united states’ actions early on in the two conflicts and is still going on in some instances today (lazarus, 2018). the disparity between these two groups of peoples creates more animosity towards the americans and an increasingly negative image of the military (gharib, 2009, p. 16). gharib further elaborates that american service members' lack of cultural preparedness prior to deployment to an arab region caused “severe mishandling of various incidents” and further demonstrates the crucial need for a stronger sense of cross-cultural [training] for all levels of the military” (2009, p. 16). the cultural insensitivity contributed by the west is not the only act that has caused grievances among the arab population. throughout the conflict in afghanistan and iraq, american service members have been involved in incidents, controversies, and human rights violations which have greatly contributed to the increase of violence from terrorist organizations. within the cultural framework of the arab community and their interactions with the united states military, there have been many instances in which its forces have unintentionally insulted and humiliated the citizens by disrespecting their cultural norms. when american forces ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security first entered iraq, they did so with kuwaiti translators. this was viewed by many iraqi’s as insulting due to the country’s history with kuwait in the 1990s (“caat”, 2004). additionally, us hired translators were often plagued by cultural biases that ran in the opposite direction of military objectives and critically harmed the relationship between the local tribes and us forces. through this early display of insensitivity by american forces and lack of adequate translators, iraqi tribal leaders had a negative view of the western forces occupying their country. as outlined is the united states army’s chapter on civil military operations and cultural issues in iraq, they list a few scenarios that have contributed to the increase of anger and distrust with us forces. the first is the detainment of family members of anti-coalition members. the united states response to this was that they hoped the individual whose family was being detained would turn themselves in, however what actually happened was greater distrust among the iraqi population. in addition to the detainment of family members, american forces would also detain the “women and children [of the family] without due process [which] contribute[d] to a lasting negative image” (“caat”, 2004). in the arab household, women and children are seen as a symbol of the man’s honor, and taking their family away is seen as dishonoring the man. in another instance where the family was targeted, mohamed ghani gives a personal narrative “of a man he knew whose wife had been searched by american soldiers” (gharib, 2009, p. 23). gharib adds that the act shamed the woman’s husband and destroyed his honor (2009, p. 23). the issue portrayed in this scenario was that male soldiers would often search the females, as female soldiers were often not in the field. in the arab culture, touching another man’s wife is a sign of disrespect and is highly looked down upon, and in some instances sparks long lasting feuds between families. some can argue the americans were doing their job and ensuring their safety, however their insensitivity to the arab culture cost more than it benefited them by contributing to the local population’s rage. in addition to the above scenarios which question cultural fluidity between the arab people and the west, mosques were often used as staging areas for militant operations and frequently raided by american soldiers on patrol (“caat”, 2004). in the islamic religion, individuals must take their shoes off prior to entering the mosque and leave any weapons outside, as not doing so is considered disrespectful and insulting. this was not followed by the us army who would enter with their boots on and weapons up (“caat”, 2004). this sign of cultural ignorance created greater anger among the arab population due the disrespect and dishonor the american soldiers had brought upon the muslim peoples. further contributing to the rise of grievances among the populations of iraq and afghanistan during the wars are additional aggravating factors that created a breeding ground for ideas and helped spread the jihadist ideology to a greater populous. included in these factors are certain acts perpetrated by the us military or a member within its ranks, and consist of unlawful engagements against civilians, prisoner abuse and torture, and collateral damage as a result of targeted strikes on suspected terrorist forces. there is also a positive correlation between an increase of terror attacks and the acts mentioned above, however, no causation could be appropriately concluded from the data. coming into the public eye in 2004 were the atrocities that took place among american service members towards prisoners at the abu ghraib prison in iraq. within the compound, arab prisoners were stripped of their clothes, hooded and “piled on top of each other in a pyramid shape” (nasr, 2009). the males were additionally forced to touch their genitals on camera, beaten, and dragged around on leashes by female soldiers (nasr, 2009). in addition to the events at abu ghraib, human rights watch reports similar treatment of prisoners have reportedly taken ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security place in detention centers in afghanistan at bagram air field, kandahar, jalalabad, and asadabad (sifton, 2004). this event significantly harmed relations and public support for the united states in the middle east, and further attributed to the anger of the local populations. in the islamic culture, nasr writes, “the human body is a taboo, a sacred temple that should be covered and respected… exposing the naked body is a sin” (2009). at abu ghraib, the soldiers lack of cultural conscientiousness and religious tolerance gave terrorist organizations like al-qaeda and the taliban greater leverage over the united states with respect to its recruitment campaign. the public outrage at these crimes was significant and spread across the arab world like a wildfire. when the first images of the abuses leaked out of the prison in 2004, data gathered in iraq on terrorist attacks significantly increased during the period of 2003 through 2004, from 102 to 323 (ritchie et al., 2013). additionally, when the second set of images emerged in 2006, attacks rose from 617 to 838 in iraq alone (ritchie et al., 2013). although correlation does not necessarily mean causation in this case, there was a dramatic jump in the numbers compared to other years observed. furthermore, in 2008, a united states airstrike targeted a wedding procession in haska meyna, iraq. after three bombs were dropped, 47 individuals were killed, including 39 women and children (shah, 2008). according to the deputy chairman of the senate in iraq, burhanullah shinwari, “[t]hey were all civilians, with no links to al-qaeda or the taliban” (shah, 2008). the indiscriminate targeting of us strikes on the local iraqi people has caused additional grievances among the population and is also seen as correlation with an increase in violence among terror groups. following the trend in data, there is a small increase in terror attacks in iraq from the years 2007 to 2008, with a continued increase through 2009; from 1,047 to 1,106 to 1,137 (ritchie et al., 2013). the increase shown in those two data points shows a unique correlation between the incident and the increase, however causation cannot be appropriately inferred due to lack of evidence much like the earlier scenario of american soldiers entering a mosque with boots and weapons, the defamation of a religious event in the islamic culture is also a sign of cultural insensitivity within the iraq war. throughout iraq and afghanistan, religion has played an important role in creating distrust between the americans and local populations. for example, in rwaida gharib’s thesis, he describes an unnecessary violence that often took place, writing, “a white flag, which in western definitions is a means of surrender, led many marines to assume a black flag was the opposite of surrender. as a result, many shiites, who traditionally fly black flags at home as a religious symbol” were often labelled as an enemy and shot at (gharib, 2009, p. 22). this use of unnecessary force gave greater leverage to terrorist organizations in their recruitment by characterizing the american’s as enemies who came to occupy their land and tame their people. the united states coalition has been working on ways of addressing the difference of culture issue presented in the cases earlier in this paper and has implemented new ways to train and equip allied forces to limit the number of incidents. beginning in early 2005, the department of defense initiated a new language training program giving more individuals within the armed forces the skills necessary to “comprehend, read and converse in more world languages” in the hope that the cultural aptitude of the troops would grow (gharib, 2009, p. 31-32). in 2005, the marine corps adopted and has grown a new cultural training plan for the middle east, focusing on “islam, history, the arab culture, cross cultural communication and tactical application” (gharib, 2009, p. 31-37). additionally, prior to deployments, ground forces are able to receive hands-on training in a ‘arab culture simulator’ taking place in a mock-up village with actors ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security pretending to be civilians (gharib, 2009, p. 37-38). this allows pre-deployment forces to practice different situations they may come across in the field and be evaluated by instructors on their performance and effectiveness in decision making along cultural lines. following the start and implementation of the new language and culture program in the department of defense (dod), the united states has yet to witness another incident as damaging as abu ghraib, though over the course of the past 15 years, smaller incidents have occurred between american coalition troops and the iraqi and afghan populations. however, one can argue that with the rise of the taliban after 2005 and its reemergence during negotiations in 2019, growth of al-qaeda, and the emergence of the islamic state in 2014, it appears the cultural programs initiated by the dod have not been successful in their mission to eliminate cultural grievances, as there has been a surge of individuals joining these terrorist organizations in an effort to drive out western influence within the region. these programs have provided greater situational awareness among coalition troops and have implanted individuals with added knowledge of culture and language into frontline units, in an attempt to decrease the likelihood of cultural incidents to take place in the future. throughout this paper, the impact of cultural differences and insensitivities was discussed and was supplemented by data showing a plausible correlation, but not causation. cultural differences and insensitivities discussed include lack of knowledge with islamic practices, cultural taboos associated with the arab culture, negligent use of translators, and abuses by american soldiers on iraqi and afghani prisoners. these differences and insensitivities caused grievances to build and “exacerbate[d] tensions and ha[d] negative consequences” with the local populations (greene et al., 2011, p. 959). the cases listed in this paper are catalysts for the grievance theory of terrorism, and when looking at yearly statistics of terrorist attacks, there is a significant increase in terrorist attacks around the timeframe of those cases. when looking at the larger picture, these cases could have directly contributed to the failure of the us counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions in iraq and afghanistan through increased resistance to allied forces in the region. as a result, the implementation of a cultural program by the dod is expected to help reduce incidents revolving around culture and language by providing training to individuals and units who are forward deployed in areas where large amounts of interaction are expected. this expectation, however, has not been successful on the large scale. according to gharib, “[t]he evidence in the current training demonstrates that not only are the present systems of training inadequate, but also that the post-op briefing for cultural and language use simply does not exist” (2009, p. 44). studies suggest that in iraq, peace-keeping missions have led to an increase in conflict due to coalition forces not being taught “the intricacies of the various cultures and behaviors of” the local population (gharib, 2009, p. 69). in response, the united states and its coalition partners must revisit their cultural training programs and target specific communities that military units will be deployed to, instead of giving 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(2011, january 11). the impact of culture clash on deployed troops. retrieved from https://www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/publications/assetfiles/other/greene2010-cultureclash.pdf lazarus, neil. “the situation in the middle east.” counterterrorism and conflict management. counterterrorism and conflict management, 11 june 2018, tel aviv, israel. nasr, o. (2009, may 21). abu ghraib photos provoked shock, then anger, for arabs. retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2009/world/meast/05/21/iraq.abu.ghraib.impact/index.html ritchie, h., hasell, j., appel, c., & roser, m. (2013, july 28). terrorism. retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security shah, a. (2008, july 11). 47 afghan civilians killed by u.s. bombs, group says . retrieved from http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/world/iraq/20080711-0458 afghanistan.html u.s. has 100,000 troops in kuwait. 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(2016). the rationality of radical islam. political science quarterly, 131(2), 421–448. doi: 10.1002/polq.12480 philip klafta paper (3) analyzing the economic influences on the evolution of the russian military since 1991 philip j. klafta university of illinois-urbana champaign abstract in this paper, i will discuss the development of the russian military from its weakened state of the early 1990’s to its current role as an international actor in the middle east, specifically syria, and will examine the economic conditions, policies, and developments that have influenced its growth and evolution. i will begin by discussing how the political and economic conditions of the early 1990’s contributed to a weak and unorganized military in immediate post-soviet russia and will continue to talk about how specific policies and world oil prices contributed to an economic revival. i will conclude by examining how the russian military industrial complex has influenced its current involvement in syria and will argue that there is a strong and clear correlation between the economic success in russia and its military strength. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security the 1990’s: weak and incapable beginning in 1991 with the collapse of the soviet union and throughout the rest of the 1990’s, russia maintained a weak and largely incapable military that resulted from a deficient inheritance from the ussr, economic catastrophe, and lack of political support for reform. first, the military forces that russia received from the former soviet union were fractured and outdated. the former soviet union strategically placed its most updated and best equipped units and bases on the southern and western borders. however, with the break-up of the ussr, these bases, equipment, and sometimes even soldiers became aligned with their newly independent national governments (odom, 1998). further, after losing a valuable portion of their armed forces to the surrounding states, russia was still averse to revamp their military due to borris yelstin’s fear of a political overthrow. as a result, he purposefully fragmented the russian army in an effort to weaken the possibility of a threat to his administration and further reinforced specific aspects of the armed forces that he found particularly dedicated to his cause (renz, 2018). second, there was a lack of political incentive to revamp the military. this is because the government believed that the existing army was capable of dealing with the small ethnic conflicts it was currently engaged in and that there was no significant threat from the west due to the resolution of the cold war (renz, 2018). further, the government believed that russia’s sheer size and nuclear stockpile would be enough to deter an invasion by any other country. the combination of these two factors contributed to a sense of contentment with their existing forces and provided the government little to no reason to update the military. lastly, the poor economic status of the country throughout the 1990’s left the administration incapable of any type of military reform because it was focused entirely on attempting to prevent the nation’s economy from collapsing. from 1991-1998, russian real gdp decreased by nearly 30%, $150 billion worth of assets left the country, and foreign direct investments decreased dramatically (cooper, 2009). while some scholars argue that this economic catastrophe was the product of political change and the adjustment to a capitalist style market, the world bank claims that the economic success of a country in transition is largely dependent on the policies enacted by the government and economic stability is very possible post transition (bar et al., 1996). thus, with the government focusing on trying to save the economy, there was no room left for military reform. the 2000’s: economic revival russia’s economic revival of the early 2000’s can largely be credited to putin’s economic policy changes and russia’s reintegration into the world trading market. this economic reform allowed the military to make its necessary developments in 2008. first, in 1998, after years of failed economic reform, russia was forced to devalue its currency, the rubble, and default on its debts. the same year, according to the levada center, the government received its lowest score in the last twenty years where 82% of russians believed that russia was headed down the wrong track and could be headed towards a “dead end”. while this is something that russia undoubtedly wanted to avoid, the devaluation of the rubble forced russia to focus on the domestic production of many goods. this led to an increase in exports relative to imports and helped balance out the trade deficit. further, in 1999 consumer prices increased at a quarter of the rate than the year before, and for the first time, a sign of economic optimism emerged (chiodo & owyang, 2002). ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security second, a series of economic policies put in place by president putin increased tax revenue, created a more business friendly economy, and created a reserve that was used to finance the countries deficits. when putin took over as acting president in 2000, the largest and most daunting task he faced was trying to rebuild the russian economy. one of the steps he took was consolidating the taxing system. before putin, many local and state taxes overlapped and were trying to generate revenue from the same sources. this caused many russians to avoid paying taxes and risk getting caught or underreporting economic activity and not pay the full amount they should have (cooper, 2009). businesses also faced similarly conflicting regulations and inspections which decreased profitability and incentives to new business development. according to cooper, putin responded to this by eliminating the majority of these laws in an effort to create a more business friendly economy (2009). regarding important economic policy changes, in 2004 the russian government created a reserve system that saved revenue from oil sales every time the price per barrel reached over $20 usd. this policy was put in place to have a cushion in case the price ever dipped below $20/barrel. however, in 2008 the fund had over $225b which the government used to pay off its budget deficits and international debt. this created financial freedom the country hadn’t seen in decades and was crucial for upcoming military reform. finally, and perhaps most significantly, was the increase in the international price of oil and natural resources. russia is one of the largest exporters of oil and natural gas in the world and the health and stability of their economy is often reflected in the changing world price of oil. cooper found that by 2007, oil, natural gas, and coal made up 65% of the country’s exports. further, the high cost of oil, in addition to the taxes russia placed on its sale, contributed greatly to russia’s ability to have a fiscal surplus equivalent to 4.6% of gdp. more so, russia’s exports increased 525% from 1999 to 2008 and imports increased 640% over the same time frame and this drastic growth gave russia a trade surplus that was roughly equal to $180b usd (2009). the economic revival that russia underwent during the first decade of the twenty-first century laid the groundwork that allowed for military reform in 2008 and played a significant role in the development of russia as an international player. georgian war: the effects as stated earlier, the program reform that was announced in 2008 would not have been possible without the economic revival of the 2000s. in 2008, russia engaged in a conflict with georgia that lasted only five days and resulted in a quick victory. however, despite the brief and successful conflict, this war highlighted the need for military reform and sparked armed forces policy change from the russian government. as a result, the war with georgia in 2008 led to personnel, structural, and technological changes within the russian armed forces. first, the war in 2008 highlighted the army’s cumbersomeness and led to reforms that increased efficiency and professionalism of all its soldiers. in attempts to increase the efficiency, the army decreased the number of officers and soldiers it retained and attempted to restructure its army toward a permanent readiness status (lavrov, 2018). further, lavrov found that “russia aimed to abandon a soviet-style army with a large number of understaffed “skeleton” military units for a smaller but more mobile army which theoretically remains at a high level of permanent readiness” (2018 ,p. 2). the “skeleton system” lavrov mentions was a strategy that russia embraced where units placed in strategic areas only consisted of officers but was ready to be filled by conscripts or reserves. this method proved inefficient and expensive and was one of the top priorities of the 2008 reform. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security second, the georgian war highlighted the need for updated technology and modernization of equipment. the reform of the late 2000’s consequently and successfully modernized the vehicles, tactics and weaponry in almost every branch of the armed forces. most notably, the russian air force received the largest share of the funding and received 500 new combat aircraft and 500 new helicopters (lavrov, 2018). further, the navy, which was already large in size, was able to develop new, non-nuclear missiles and long-range weapons. finally, the army created a program to create a more functional uav drone, or unmanned aerial vehicle, but when this program ultimately proved to be unsuccessful they began purchasing drones from foreign governments. however, the success of this modernization has to be taken with a grain of salt. according to renz, “in absolute terms, russian military hardware today is incomparably more modern and technologically advanced than it was during the 1990s and 2000s. in relative terms however, the russian armed forces are still a long way off achieving parity with the technologically advanced militaries in the west and the united states in particular.” (p.79) this is largely because when the air force and army received “new” vehicles, they were updated versions of older models and not the development of new technologies. nonetheless, the russian armed forces became more efficient, better equipped, and more prepared for a role as an international actor. military industrial complex the russian defense industry has become vital to the russian economy because of the jobs it provides and the contributions it makes to national exports through arms sales. the military industrial complex, or mic, is the mutually beneficial relationship between the defense sector and the country’s military, with a focus on the economic benefit a country can receive from the production of military goods. the defense sector in russia since the late 2000’s has become more and more integrated into the success of the economy and much like the size of the army in the early 1990’s, has become too large. the russian mic currently employs around 2 million people (around 1.4% of the population) and accounts for 25% of mechanical engineering production. regarding the final product, 33% of the goods produced are used domestically, 45% are used militarily, and the remaining 22% are sold internationally (balashov & martianova, 2016). as a result, the employment that the mic provides and the goods that it produces, promotes consumption and stimulates short term economic growth. further, compared to the rest of the world, according to the stockholm international peace research institute, russia ranks second in global arms sales by revenue at $6.4b which accounted for 21% of total global arms sales in 2016 and since 2008, they have sold weapons or military goods to seventy-three different countries. balashov and martianova (2016) argue that the military industrial complex, in russia specifically, becomes problematic to economic success because the russian government has allocated funds to many different firms who are assigned to similar contracts. this leads to unnecessary costs and high levels of inefficiency. further, much of the money spent on the production of weapons for exports is spent on updating soviet era technologies instead of developing new technological advancements which only spurs short term economic growth and hinders long term growth due to the lack of investments. similar to the military reform of 2008, the defense industry in russia needs to undergo reform to consolidate and become more efficient. finally, the mic is problematic because a country's economic stability can become ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security fundamentally based around the need to finance conflict, which becomes apparent when analyzing the russia-syria relationship. russian economic interests in syria after the 2008 revival of the russian economy and modernization of their armed forces russia was again able to reenter the middle east as a global actor after decades of sitting on the sidelines. by undoubtedly saving bashar al-assad’s regime from overthrow, russia was able to secure its role in the middle east as a major player both financially and politically. while there are many contributing factors to russia’s decision to intervene in the syrian civil war, including geopolitics and an attempt to capitalize on the united states’ declining interest in the middle east, russia had a vested economic interest in both syria and the rest of the region. first, russia’s intervention in the syrian civil war was an attempt to protect a political and financial asset in syria. the soviet union has been selling syria weapons since the 1970’s but since 2000, there has been a significant increase in russian military sales to syria. from 2000-2010, russia has sold a cumulative $1.5 billion worth of weapons, tanks, aircrafts, naval vehicles, and ammunition to syria which at the time made up for 10% of russia’s total arms sales (gaplin, 2012). as a result, the syrian government would have been a costly importer to lose if the united states-backed rebel groups were successful in toppling the assad regime. however, more than protecting an arms importer, russia was able to secure a role as a major actor in the middle east again. dating as far back as the russo-turkish wars, but especially since the end of wwii, the middle east has been a major part of soviet foreign policy and as a result, russia's lack of engagement in the region after the collapse of the ussr marked a break in involvement that the region hadn’t seen in decades. in 2015 when us interest in the region was waning, russia stepped into syria, changed the tide of the civil war, and subsequently embedded itself financially and politically in the region. according to reumer (2019) of the carnegie endowment, through the victory in syria, russia was able to prove to other middle eastern countries (and the west) that they were a valuable ally in an unstable region. in this new political landscape, russia was able to calm years of disagreements with saudi arabia and turkey. in the case of saudi arabia, the two were able to conceive a mutually beneficial relationship in which both countries coordinated their oil policies. this was both a major financial and political success for russia because it created an ally with the second largest oil producer and also because it allowed for an opportunity to increase its representation in an increasingly middle east without the us. additionally, now as one of the most secure economies in the region, russia has been able to financially expand themselves through increases in arms trades and investments into gas and oil with the surrounding countries. according to the sipri, russia has increased its arms exports into the middle east by 19% since 2009-2013 including a 750% increase to iraq and 150% to egypt. conclusion since its formation at the beginning of the 1990’s there has been a clear correlation between the strength of the russian economy and its global military presence. starting with the collapse of the soviet union both the russian military and economy were shells of its soviet counterpart during the height of the cold war. however, under putin’s administration a dramatic shift in the economic strength combined with an updated and revamped military set the stage perfectly for russia to regain its status as a major global power in the middle east. russia’s ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security vested interest and economic dependence on the global oil market and defense sector production clearly lends itself to the involvement in military operations. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security references balashov, aleksei i., and yana v. martianova. “reindustrialization of the russian economy and the development of the military-industrial complex.” problems of economic transition, vol. 58, no. 11/12, nov. 2016, pp. 988–1004. ebscohost, doi:10.1080/10611991.2016.1316094 barr, nicholas; claessens, stijn; gelb, alan harold; gray, cheryl williamson; harrold, peter c.; le gall, francoise m.; nellis, john r.; wang, zhen kun; zachau, ulrich. 1996. world development report 1996 : from plan to market (). world development report. washington, dc : world bank group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/917191468155732199/world-development report-1996-from-plan-to-market chiodo, abbigail j., and owyang, micheal t. “a case study of a currency crisis: the russian default of 1998.” st. louis fed, 2002. https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/02/11/chiodoowyang.pdf cooper, william h. russia’s economic performance and policies and their implications for the united states. congressional research service, 2009, fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rl34512.pdf. galpin, richard. “russian arms shipments bolster syria's embattled assad.” bbc, 30 jan. 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16797818. “importer/exporter tables.” sipri, 11 mar. 2019,armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php. “indicators.” levadacenter, 2019, www.levada.ru/en/ratings/. lavrov, anton. “russian military reforms from georgia to syria” center for strategic and international studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security public/publication/181106_russiasyria_web_v2.pdf?sm_hvtq0qs4_ttu9rsts_sdjj cb.ipg odom, william e. (1998). the collapse of the soviet military. yale university press. isbn 0 300-07469-7. renz, bettina. russia's military revival, polity press, 2018, pp. 50–83. rodgers, james. “russia and syria: policies, problems, perspectives.” forbes, 11 jan. 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/jamesrodgerseurope/2019/01/11/russia-and-syria-prospects-and prizes/#11cfdc9a6852. rumer, eugene. “russia in the middle east: jack of all trades, master of none.” carnegie endowment for international peace, 2019, carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233. “the russian military-industrial complex by the numbers.” the globalist, 25 may 2018, www.theglobalist.com/russia-united-states-military-arms-sales/. trenin, dmitri. “why russia supports assad.” new york times, 9 feb. 2012. program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 65 human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko university of illinois urbana champaign abstract human trafficking is an issue in almost every country across the world and yet it is often overlooked by those in the national security field. funds from human trafficking are directly used to fund illicit activities like terrorism or organized crime syndicates while trafficking threatens human security by stealing the rights of individuals to their freedom. furthermore, in the age of social media, the threat of human trafficking has spread online to vulnerable groups who normally would never have been exposed to this danger. sadly, rather than tackle the threat head on, media companies have avoided taking precautions against human trafficking and opted to take no responsibility for the crimes committed on their sites. this, in combination with the overlooking of human trafficking as an issue of national security by those in power, has led to a network of over 25 million people being trafficked each year. in order to stop the cycle of trafficking, social media companies, government officials, and the general public must work together to raise awareness of the issues and to help rescue people from trafficking networks. human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 66 human trafficking is modern day slavery that has evolved at alarming rate in the age of technology. globally, it is one of the largest organized crime operations that generates billions of dollars in revenue through the exploitation of others. the backgrounds of those who are trafficked and the fields to which they are forced into are varied, making it difficult for the international community to combat. in recent years, the rise of social media has generated new ways for traffickers to find and communicate with potential victims. therefore, by understanding the issue of human trafficking and the role social media has played within it, policy makers can create new legislation and prioritize trafficking as a national security issue. traditional scholars of national security have failed to adequately address human trafficking as a major security issue. according to the department of homeland security, “human trafficking involves the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain some type of labor or commercial sex act.” when states ignore human trafficking as a national security issue in favor of other threats, they are overlooking a vital matter of human security. according to roza pati at the university of miami, human security is, “people-centered and emphasizes the idea of shielding people from pervasive threats while empowering them to develop resilience to adversity” (pati, 2014). essentially, these are the issues that individuals are more likely to see as threats to their own security. they include: protection from hunger, crime, unemployment, disease, environmental hazards, and civil and political unrest. what the government and groups who study national security see as important to security, such as nuclear weapons or terrorism, are important, but are not something that people are likely to encounter in their daily lives. in most countries terrorism accounts for less than 0.01% of deaths and the last nuclear bomb ever dropped in combat was in 1945 (ritchie, hasell, appel, & roser, 2013). overall, the likelihood of becoming victim to or interacting with someone being trafficked is much higher, yet these other threats are discussed more often by the news media and scholars. therefore, human trafficking should be considered a major threat to national security because it is a more prevalent threat to human security and rights. there are many different types of trafficking to which a diverse range of people can become victims to. according to estimates, nearly 25 million people globally are under some form of trafficking. victims of human trafficking spend an average of 20 months in forced labor with nearly 74% of victims working outside of their home country (humanrightsfirst.org, 2017). in total, trafficking is an estimated $150 billion-dollar global business that encompasses about 25 different ways people can be trafficked (humanrightsfirst.org, 2017). these include being trafficked into hospitality, construction, prostitution, food service, domestic work, manufacturing, or working in bars and strip clubs. overall, these types of human trafficking can be broken up into two major sects which are labor trafficking and sex trafficking. according to the united states’ trafficking victims protection act of 2000 human labor trafficking is, “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery” (human trafficking laws and regulations, 2017). the department of state estimates that over four million people annually are trafficked https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#share-of-deaths-from-terrorism-by-country ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 67 for labor in the united states into industries like agriculture, carnival work, commercial cleaning services, construction, factory work and more. the most common way for people to be recruited into labor trafficking is by in-person recruitment (anthony, 2018). however, in recent years, some traffickers have moved to gaining new victims by posting brazen photos or videos showing large amounts of cash or falsified adverts for jobs on social media. once a vulnerable person looking for a job is located, a trafficker will usually offer this person work in a different state or country where they will be dependent on their trafficker for support. these victims are oftentimes forced to work for little or no money with no way of escaping their situation (anthony, 2018). the department of health and human services (dhhs) reports that children are also major targets for the labor trafficking industry. a common way for this to happen is for teenagers to be recruited for street peddling. most minors being trafficked have never worked before, so it is common for them to not understand the illegality of their “jobs.” minors are often tricked into working long hours, receiving little pay, and having no access to basic provisions while they are forced to work alone in unsafe locations. if they do not sell what they were supposed to, their traffickers will often abandon them in these dangerous situations. according to the dhhs, “many parents are also unaware of these dangers and believe they are allowing their children to work for respected and legitimate companies” (clawson, dutch, solomon, & grace, 2017). the other major type of human trafficking is sex trafficking, which is the most profitable form of trafficking. sex trafficking is defined by us law as, “when a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion.” an estimate 4.8 million people are victims of sex trafficking, making up only 19% of the total amount of people trafficked, yet it accounts for 66% of the global profits (humanrightsfirst.org, 2017). on average, a woman forced into the sex trade will make their trafficker about $100,000 a year, which is six times more than the average labor trafficking victim (humanrightsfirst.org, 2017). additionally, information from equality now, a nongovernmental organization that works to help advance the rights of women, says that nearly 96% of sex trafficking victims are women. sex trafficking is typically the most difficult for people to escape from because victims are usually extremely vulnerable and have a hard time getting support. the dhhs attempted to find the commonalties among those who become sex trafficked and found that many of them came from disadvantaged communities where there were few economic opportunities (clawson, dutch, solomon, & grace, 2017). a very common scenario for sex trafficking is that the victims are promised economic incentives that usually involve moving, sometimes internationally, to more developed areas or nations like the united states. once they arrive, their traffickers work to keep them in the business by destroying their legal paperwork, threatening their families or keeping them bound by debt while isolating them from their past lives. in addition, many people being trafficked in the sex industry are minors. with nearly one in six minors being trafficking under the age of twelve (bouché, 2018). these individuals usually come from broken homes where other family members were sexually abusive, addicted to drugs, or separated due to loss of a parent in death, divorce, or abandonment (clawson, dutch, human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 68 solomon, & grace, 2017). another risk factor for minors becoming trafficked is if they are runaways. minors who run away from their families, treatment centers, or foster homes are at a higher risk of being taken in by traffickers. finally, people who are exploited in the sex trade are more likely to be people of color, especially those living below the poverty line (lehman, 2017). for these reasons, it is important for policy makers to prioritize informing these high-risk groups about the dangers of human trafficking. people are much more likely to fall victim to a threat they do not see coming, so it is imperative that these groups are informed of the danger. spreading awareness can be done through presentations in schools for young students as well as though media campaigns. in 2019, the department of homeland security added the blue campaign to its website, which has aimed to promote national awareness for human trafficking by working with law enforcement, the private sector and ngos to teach people how to identify victims (blue campaign, 2019). the blue campaign, which started in 2010, has pushed for greater awareness and is working to help victims. in recent years, the rise of social media has given traffickers new platforms such as facebook, snapchat, instagram and twitter to find and stalk potential victims. according to the polaris study on how social media has affected human trafficking, “trafficking by an individual– generally a pimp or an intimate partner– often begins with the trafficker and potential victim building a relationship through social media” (anthony, 2018). the trafficker is likely to start small by liking a person’s photos and commenting on their posts. as time goes on, they will progress to direct messaging their victims and eventually into what they call boyfriending. in this phase, the trafficker will attempt to flatter their potential victim by faking a romantic attraction or offering them jobs in a field like modeling. finally, they will offer to meet each other and that is when the person will often be taken and forced into labor or sex trafficking (anthony, 2018). this new way to find victims is making trafficking even more dangerous for human security. people who would never have encountered traffickers in their daily lives are unknowingly opening themselves up to becoming victims, which is especially worrisome when thought about in the context of minors. lauren hersh, an expert in sex trafficking, talked about the prevalence of targeting minors when trafficking via social media. “in pretty much every situation of trafficking i’ve seen unfold there’s some element of social media, whether it’s someone being recruited or advertised” (lehman, 2017). she explains that young girls are more susceptible to trafficking because they are emotionally immature and are looking for someone to understand them. they are also more likely to allow people they do not know to follow them on social media because they want the validation and attention from a large following. oftentimes, they will share online what is making them upset and traffickers will reach out to them to make an emotional connection that can lead to manipulation and eventually trafficking. notably, some social media sites have features that include gps (snapchat) or location sharing (facebook & instagram) that are supposed to be used to tell friends where they are (anthony, 2018). however, if a child is followed by a trafficker then that predator can use this information to find and kidnap them. despite a popular belief that victims of trafficking are cut off from the internet and the ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 69 outside world, more than three quarters of survivors in polaris’s survey of victims of human trafficking stated they used internet platforms during their exploitation (anthony, 2018). platforms such as snapchat or wickr (a site that allows user to send encrypted text, audio, video or photo messages) can be used by victims because of their features that allow for messages to disappear. this can help those who are kept in captivity reach out to their families and try to escape, but traffickers are more likely to not allow their victims to use apps with disappearing message features. nonetheless, in most modern cases of human trafficking, victims are still allowed to use their social media accounts. the trafficker may want it to look as though the victim is happy and safe despite their situation and will therefore let them continue to post and message their family and friends. in the case of minors being trafficked, the amount of internet use is even larger. according to thorn, a non-profit organization that works to protect children from sexual exploitation, 74% of victims we allowed to have personal phones. of those with phones, 75% had access to the internet during the time they were trafficked and 90% with access to the internet used social media (bouché, 2018). the study found that most calls and messages to family and friends were highly monitored, but many victims had less restricted access to social media. the reason behind this more open access was because victims were often forced to use websites and apps to help sell themselves. 75% of participants in the study said they were advertised online and 52% of them wrote their ads themselves. these ads included a variety of keywords provided by their traffickers to signal that they were underage (bouché, 2018). a very common site used to post these ads was called backpage. backpage was a classified advertising website that had become the largest marketplace for buying and selling sex. in april of 2018, backpage was seized by the fbi and essentially shutdown (jarrett, 2018). despite a progressive step forward, many of the sellers moved from backpage onto different platforms like craigslist or facebook. the study connected by thorn also looked at which apps were being most commonly used by trafficked minors and found that 51% had a facebook account and 23% had an instagram (bouché, 2018). since these social media outlets are the top two most commonly used by victims, they could work with initiatives like the blue campaign to include features that would allow victims to signal to national hotlines that they need help. this kind of feature could pop up as an advertisement or be located on a facebook page does not immediately signal to the trafficker that it is a hotline in order to protect the victim. from there, they could be directed to the department of homeland security website or a non-profit anti-trafficking organization. even though technology and social media are making it easier for people to be trafficked, they can also be used to pinpoint traffickers and identify potential victims. the most innovative example of this is the development of photodna by microsoft. this technology, “attempts to identify victims by scanning photos uploaded to the platform and to match them against a set of known child sex abuse images from illicit child pornography websites…” (anthony, 2018). thus, if victims can be identified, then the police can use the profiles on the websites that uploaded the material to track down the victims and help them escape. a recent example of human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 70 modern technology being used to locate a victim was in new york city. a trafficking victim was photographed on top of 100-dollar bills and using image enhancement, the police were able to read the serial numbers on the money. investigators were able to track where this money was used and arrest a man who had been trafficking minors for over 10 years (sex trafficking moves…, 2016). using technology to locate human traffickers is an important way to address this security issue, but social media outlets can be doing more than what they currently are. these platforms have the capability to build algorithms that could flag adults who are following and communicating with minors or help produce content that is intended to teach minors about the dangers of trafficking or how to spot someone who may be a trafficker online. legally, media companies have no direct responsibility for the content that is produced on their platforms. according to polaris, “section 230 of the communications decency act protected… all web companies from liability for anything on their sites that is created by others” (anthony, 2018). this bill eventually went under some revision with the implementation of the stop enabling sex traffickers act and changed the ruling to say that companies can be sued civilly and prosecuted at the state level if they knowingly facilitate sex trafficking. the loophole here is that if sites choose not to actively prevent trafficking then they can reasonably say that they did not know what was happening. moreover, victims of trafficking are unlikely to have much money, so their chances of winning a civil lawsuit against a large media corporation are quite small. although it is difficult to say what the government should do in response to this, the public should encourage social networking companies to be more accountable for the material and activities on their site regarding sex trafficking. importantly, social media sites are not the only ones responsible for combatting human trafficking. globally, policy towards human trafficking is very diverse and ranges in its effectiveness across various countries and cultures. each nation has different types of trafficking that are more prevalent and different laws for how to combat it. in the united states, the first federal law against human trafficking, the trafficking victims protection act (tvpa) was passed in 2000. the law, which has provisions for reauthorization and new amendments nearly every four years, works to prevent labor and sex trafficking while punishing offenders. additions to the law in recent years have included a provision for the department of labor to release a list of products produced by forced and child labor, measures to add liability to government contractors using trafficked labor, and stricter punishments for those traveling for sex tourism (jesionka, 2013). other countries have also taken a more active approaches to the threat of trafficking by passing more progressive legislation. in sweden, denmark, france, iceland, and ireland it is illegal to buy sex but not to sell it. sweden, which was the first nation to adopt these laws, found sex trafficking decreased because, according to equality now, “criminalization of women and girls in the sex trade leaves them more vulnerable, while the possession of a criminal record can make it even harder to exit the trade” (the equality approach…, 2018). sweden saw a nearly 50% decrease in men looking to purchase sex once these laws were enacted. because of this, sweden has become an undesirable place for sex traffickers to work and the instances of sex ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 71 trafficking have decreased significantly (the equality approach…, 2018). however, these countries are in the minority, and human trafficking is still neglected as a national security issue in most places. in the most recent global reports, only 9,071 cases of human trafficking were tried and convicted in 2016, with the vast majority being in southeast and central asia (humanrightsfirst.org, 2017). relative to the amount of trafficking victims each year, nearly 25 million, these numbers demonstrate a clear failure on the part of the international community to address human trafficking as a priority. still, many scholars are skeptical about labeling a human security threat as a national security problem. national security is a difficult concept to define and is what constitutes a part of security is largely determined by the government in power. in general, national security encompasses defense of citizens, economy, and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. in terms of defense of citizens, human trafficking is a clear violation of the human rights. yet, the problem extends even further into the economic and institutional security. according to roza pati, “human trafficking is now a business of choice for well-organized and versatile crime syndicates” (pati, 2014). due to increased border security and tougher immigration laws, operations looking to smuggle people and drugs had to become more effective and organized. many of these criminal organizations have learned how to evade international law enforcement, judicial systems and tax systems, in order to launder money and people. these large-scale crime operations use this knowledge to procure victims for labor or sex trafficking and use the money to fund more illicit activity. similarly, studies have shown that the profits made from human trafficking are also used to fund terrorism. the salafi network (global salafi jihad) uses money from human trafficking as well as the notorious narcoterrorism group mara salvatrucha (ms-13) (pati, 2014). according to studies done in the united states, nearly 46% of respondents said they were worried about becoming a victim of terrorism and 10-20% were very worried about it (ritchie, hasell, appel, & roser, 2013). with a citizenry that is this concerned about terrorism, the government must work to prevent human trafficking which helps to fund it. if governments are unable to stop major crime networks working within their own boarders, then they are not adequately protecting their citizens. therefore, because human trafficking is so intertwined with organized crime it threatens economies and institutions, and because it is a violation of human rights, it should be considered a major national security concern. in general, there are three main paths that can be taken to stop trafficking by policymakers. the first is to decriminalize prostitution so more women can leave trafficking without being punished. many trafficking victims are currently unwilling to cooperate out of fear of law enforcement and deportation, which makes identification and rehabilitation efforts difficult (schoeberl & nivens, 2018). this also leads to a gap in knowledge for scholars who have a hard time finding victims to study because of the fear of prosecution. as a result, few large-scale human trafficking prevalence studies have been able to be conducted, so the problem may be way worse than predicted. like in sweden, making punishments harsher for people looking to buy sex will raise the stakes for the purchaser, which can help decrease the market https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/citizenship https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/economy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/government human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 72 within that country. the second path is to make social media sites more accountable and work closer with anti-trafficking initiatives. requiring media companies to monitor adults who follow kids or who pretend to be children while implementing ways for victims to reach out through social media will help prevent human trafficking online. finally, the third path is to increase awareness by having trafficking issues be taught in schools, especially low performing ones where kids are more likely to be victims. educating people on the dangers of trafficking through initiatives like the blue campaign, will help minors understand the dangers and avoid becoming victims. overall, technology is a huge part of how human traffickers find their victims and customers in the 21st century. as a new generation of minors grow up in the age of social media it is important that policy makers and the general public push to educate young people on the dangers of trafficking. with that being said, there is not one simple answer to how human trafficking can be stopped and no matter what laws are passed individuals need to educate themselves of the warning signs of trafficking. people can work to help prevent trafficking by being informed about the types of trafficking and knowing the warning signs, while national governments can work harder to make trafficking more difficult and less appealing within their borders. if policy makers choose to make human trafficking a priority to national security, they will be able to better protect their citizens from the threat of modern-day slavery. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 73 references anthony, b. (2018, november 2). human trafficking and social media. retrieved from https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking-and-social-media. bouché, v. (2018, january). survivor insights: sex trafficking & the role of tech. retrieved from https://www.thorn.org/survivor-insights/. blue campaign. (2019, june 25). retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign. clawson, h., dutch, n., solomon, a., & grace, l. (2017, february 21). human trafficking into and within the united states: a review of the literature. retrieved from https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/human-trafficking-and-within-united-states-review-literature human trafficking by the numbers. (2017, january 7). retrieved from https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers human trafficking laws & regulations. (2017, april 19) department of homeland security. retrieved from www.dhs.gov/human-trafficking-laws-regulations. jarrett, l. (2018, april 7). justice department seizes backpage.com. retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/politics/backpage-doj-seizure/index.html. jesionka, natalie. (2013, february 1). what's being done to stop human trafficking? retrieved from www.themuse.com/advice/whats-being-done-to-stop-human-trafficking. lehman, sarah. (2017, april 19). human trafficking in the age of social media. retrieved from www.machronicle.com/human-trafficking-in-the-age-of-social-media/. pati, r. (2014, february 1). human trafficking: an issue of human and national security. university of miami national security & armed conflict law review, 4. retrieved from https://repository.law.miami.edu/umnsac/vol4/iss2/5/ ritchie, h., hasell, j., appel, c., & roser, m. (2013, july 28). terrorism. retrieved november 2019, from https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#media-coverage-of-terrorism. schoeberl, r., & nivens, b. (2018, july 25). human trafficking – a national security issue. retrieved from https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/human-trafficking-anational-security-issue/. sex trafficking moves to social media to find victims and perpetrators, connecticut authorities say. (2016, june 19) new haven register. retrieved from www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/sex-trafficking-moves-to-social-media-to-find11330629.php. the equality approach to addressing sex trafficking. (2018) equality now. retrieved from www.equalitynow.org/factsheets. https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking-and-social-media https://www.thorn.org/survivor-insights/ https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/human-trafficking-and-within-united-states-review-literature https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers http://www.dhs.gov/human-trafficking-laws-regulations https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/politics/backpage-doj-seizure/index.html http://www.themuse.com/advice/whats-being-done-to-stop-human-trafficking http://www.machronicle.com/human-trafficking-in-the-age-of-social-media/ https://repository.law.miami.edu/umnsac/vol4/iss2/5/ https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#media-coverage-of-terrorism https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/human-trafficking-a-national-security-issue/ https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/human-trafficking-a-national-security-issue/ http://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/sex-trafficking-moves-to-social-media-to-find-11330629.php http://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/sex-trafficking-moves-to-social-media-to-find-11330629.php http://www.equalitynow.org/factsheets human trafficking as a national security issue ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the sixth issue of illini journal of international security (ijois)! ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. we publish exceptional papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our seventh issue of the journal, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. the first paper that is presented in this edition of the journal is one by emma hamel, titled “the nuclear awakening of china, which explores the expanding nuclear arsenal of china and explores the background of chinese nuclear ambitions. the second paper is by keunhee kim, titled “at what cost? examining the efficacy of military intervention,” and explores the role of the united nations and united states in intervention in conflicts around the globe. the third paper is by jake sepich, titled “in support of an independent kurdistan,” and looks at the historical background of national sovereignty and goes on with the present example of kurdistan and its struggle for independence. the final paper presented is by ryan vetticad, titled “the justification of international military intervention in response to human rights abuses,” which looks at the pros and cons to military intervention in response to human rights abuses and argues in favor of intervention. these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading! dylan h. hyams editor-in-chief opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 1 opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk university of illinois at urbana-champaign introduction following the collapse of the soviet union and turbulence of the 1990s, the russian federation has reemerged as a regional power in the greater eurasian region. through its participation in the shanghai cooperation organization and the creation of the eurasian economic union, moscow has emulated the west’s usage of treaty organizations and regional bodies as a means of powerprojection. among the many regional bodies encompassing the former soviet union, few are as relevant to russian defense policy and eurasian security as the csto (collective security treaty organization). like the warsaw pact before it, the csto functions as the security pillar of moscow’s political reconstruction of greater eurasia. this paper will analyze the general function of the csto, compare the equipment and doctrine used by nato and the csto, and contrast the csto’s rapid reaction force (crrf) to nato’s response force (nrf), the spearhead. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security the structure of the csto the csto is currently composed of six member states (armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, and the russian federation) and two observers (afghanistan and serbia). the organization was formed in 1992 and, similar to the commonwealth of independent states (cis), is composed entirely of former soviet republics. georgia, azerbaijan, and uzbekistan have all formally left the alliance while turkmenistan has completely abstained from membership. although ukraine never pursued membership in the csto, russia did maintain a naval facility at sevastopol prior to the annexation of crimea. all six members of the alliance compose the cis joint air defense system—a separate regional network of radar systems, antiair installations, and airports designed to secure airspace throughout the former soviet union. beyond its absolute advantage in population, geographic size, and military might, russia effectively maintains veto power over the establishment of new military bases in other csto members by third parties (sodiqov, 2012). member obligations within the csto one of the easiest ways to understand the function of the csto is to compare it to its western counterpart, nato. when analyzing the founding treaties of the csto and nato, there is a visible disparity in what sort of actions each alliance expects of their members. nato places a large emphasis on obligatory action and unquestionable commitment towards the defense of the alliance. in comparison, the csto stresses the voluntary nature of collective defense and the supremacy of national sovereignty over collective action. an effective way to understand this divide is to compare key articles within the founding charters of both alliances. article 5 (nato) the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in europe or north america shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by article 51 of the charter of the united nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the north atlantic area. any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the security council. such measures shall be terminated when the security council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (nato, 1949) nato’s article 5 clearly states how members of the alliance must respond to an attack against one member, the legal action considered invoked (in this case, article 51 of the united nations charter), and the actions that may be taken to secure peace,“...including the use of armed force.” this article even includes reference to the security council and what actions would result opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 3 in the resolution of article 5,“...such measures shall be terminated when the security council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” compared to nato’s founding treaty, the csto lists significantly fewer obligations of its members in regards to collective defense and crisis response. this is most evident in articles three and five of the document, the closest thing to an “action clause” in the treaty: article 3: the goals of the organization shall be strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states, in achievement of which the member states prefer political means. article 5: the organization shall operate on the basis of strict respect of independence, voluntariness of participation, equal rights and duties of the member states, non-interference into the affairs falling within the national jurisdiction of the member states. (csto, 1992) article 3 of the csto treaty states the alliance’s preference towards political resolution, while article 5 reinforces the strictly voluntary nature of the alliance and the relationship between its members. compared to the details listed in nato’s article 5, the csto leaves the conditions required for collective action and the means of conflict resolution open to interpretation. even the warsaw pact, the soviet-led predecessor to the csto, expected a higher degree of action in response to a security threat: article 4: in the event of armed attack in europe on one or more of the parties to the treaty by any state or group of states, each of the parties to the treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with article 51 of the charter of the united nations organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other parties to the treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. the parties to the treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security. measures taken on the basis of this article shall be reported to the security council in conformity with the provisions of the charter of the united nations organization. these measures shall be discontinued immediately the security council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security (warsaw pact, 1955). ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security the inclusion of the phrase “...either individually or in agreement with other parties to the treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force,” implies a significantly larger degree of member autonomy in the warsaw pact compared to the csto. the csto’s hesitancy to include stronger terminology may be a reflection of the warsaw pact’s history, as the only joint action taken by the organization was the 1968 invasion of czechoslovakia, another member of the alliance (global security, 2011). the disparity between nato and csto member expectations may be an indication of the greater difference in defense doctrine and what “collective action” would be taken by either treaty organization. a comparison of equipment and projection capabilities infantry and armor: the standard infantry weapon among csto members is the ak-74, a rifle developed in the early 1970s which saw heavy usage throughout the eastern bloc and elsewhere in the world as a major export armament. infantry are typically supported by bmp-2 infantry fighting vehicles and btr-80 armored personnel carriers, two vehicles whose designs date back to the mid 1980s. the t-72 tank remains the cornerstone of the csto’s armored formations and has seen prolonged service life due to a wide variety of retrofits and updates. recently, the russian federation unveiled the t-14 armata, a next-generation main battle tank designed as part of a wider modernization effort in the russian military. while members of the csto are allowed to purchase weapons from the russian federation at the same price as the russian military (weitz, 2014), the militaries of the csto remain dependent on soviet-era weaponry. nato utilizes a heterogeneous collection of weapons and military hardware. it is not uncommon for nato members to employ a combination of domestically produced arms and equipment imported from other members of the alliance. this diverse mix of weaponry is bound together by decades of standardization practices designed to ensure cross-compatibility. for example, france, the united kingdom, and the united states use different assault rifles in their respective militaries, but through nato standardization, each rifle fires the same caliber round and utilizes the same type of magazine (arvidsson, 2008). a lesser degree of standardification is seen among former warsaw pact members in nato. while countries like poland and bulgaria still depend on soviet-designed weaponry, a variety of modernization programs has ensured a degree of cross-compatibility with nato-standard hardware (stratfor, 2012). the continued usage of soviet weaponry and universal dependence on russian arms imports within the csto has effectively created a monoculture of military equipment. this provides the csto a slight advantage, as members of the alliance may enjoy near-perfect hardware compatibility between one another. this greatly reduces the logistical burden of field operations, as csto members would not be concerned with compatibility between competing standards of military equipment. opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 5 naval capabilities the russian navy represents the csto’s main means of naval projection. the russian navy maintains a presence in the baltic sea, black sea, pacific ocean, and the arctic ocean. russia’s naval capabilities in the far north are greatly enhanced by the usage of nuclear powered icebreakers—craft capable of exerting more force than their diesel-powered counterparts and breaking through thicker ice (zerkalov, 2016). the russian navy also contains the aircraft cruiser admiral kuznetsov. the admiral kuznetsov’s designation as an “aircraft cruiser” is a reflection of its heavy armament and formal classification as a “heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruiser” by the russian navy (“тяжелый авианесущий крейсер” тавкр). the admiral kuznetsov’s multirole capability comes at the cost of a reduced aircraft capacity compared to other aircraft carriers. in 2016 the admiral kuznetsov was deployed in the mediterranean sea as part of a naval operation in support of the syrian government (ria novosti, 2016). kazakhstan currently maintains a 14-vessel patrol fleet in the caspian sea. while this fleet is mostly preoccupied with enforcing kazakhstan’s claims to the caspian sea, the fleet’s isolation from international waters has greatly diminished its strategic utility. the russian and kazakh navies are dwarfed by the combined naval forces of nato. the united states possesses 11 aircraft carriers, with six currently deployed. when combined with the three fixed-wing aircraft carriers utilized by other nato members (the charles de gaulle, cavour, and newly commissioned queen elizabeth), the number of aircraft carriers operated by nato forces grows to nine. this number does not include amphibious assault ships, helicopter carriers, and other ships capable of launching vertical take-off and landing (vtol) aircraft. there is also a visible difference in the amount of aircraft, crew, and other auxiliary forces fielded by both navies. the russian navy is staffed by 148,000 personnel and is supported by 359 aircraft (defense intelligence agency, 2017). in comparison, the us navy alone is crewed by 322,421 personnel (not including reserves) and maintains a complement of at least 3,700 aircraft (u.s. navy, 2017). aircraft and air defense compared to the extensive network of air bases and aircraft carriers spanning from the pacific coast of canada and the united states to eastern europe, the air forces of the csto are limited to operations within the former soviet union. while the russian air force has demonstrated a continued presence in strategic theaters like the baltic sea and scandinavia, other members of the csto struggle to match russia’s aerial projection capabilities. the air forces of smaller csto members such as tajikistan typically operate a limited fleet of aging sovietdesigned craft or, in armenia’s case, function primarily as support infrastructure for russian air divisions stationed in their territory (mkrtchyan, 2016). the disparity of aerial capabilities within the csto, combined with the size of the alliance’s airspace (an area covering roughly 13 percent of the earth’s landmass), has lead to a greater emphasis on air-defense in place of aerial superiority. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security the s-300 and s-400 surface-to-air missile systems arguably provides the largest strategic utility among members of the alliance. the s-300 was developed in 1975 and served as the primary means of sophisticated air-defense for the eastern bloc as a whole. depending on the particular variant and method of launch, the s-300 missile is capable of intercepting targets within a range of 40-250 kilometers (aerospace daily, 2015). while primarily attached to infantry regiments or deployed in fixed positions, the s-300 has been adapted for compatibility with certain naval craft (the most notable being the admiral kuznetsov). armenia, belarus, kazakhstan, and the russian all utilize the s-300. the s-400 was developed in the early 1990s and represents a modernized version of the s-300 system. unlike its predecessor, the s-400 is capable of intercepting cruise missiles and other forms of ballistic artillery (gady, 2017). certain configurations of the s-400 may reach a range of roughly 400 km (dr. kopp, 2014). it is likely that the development of such capabilities was influenced by nato’s proposed “missile shield” over eastern europe. the deployment of s-300 and s-400 anti-air systems throughout the csto would be an effective counterweight against nato’s aerial superiority and would force an opponent to engage the alliance through ground-based conventional methods. the collective rapid reaction force the csto’s collective rapid reaction force (crrf) is a multinational military brigade created in 2009, designed to provide an immediate response to a threat against a csto member. the two largest contributors to the crrf are the russian federation and kazakhstan—both of which contribute paratrooper units in the crrf (denisenko, 2009). belarus, kyrgyzstan, armenia, and tajikistan have also contributed their own infantry elements to the formation. while no longer a member of the csto, uzbekistan pledged to commit resources to csto missions and the crrf on an “ad-hoc basis” during tashkent’s second membership period (tolipov, 2013). as stated by the alliance’s leadership, the primary targets of the crrf are non-state actors such as terror cells or trafficking networks (csto, 1991). given the focus on these two groups, it is likely that the crrf’s theaters of operation would be central asia and the caucuses. both regions face their own challenges related to terrorism while central asia’s notoriously porous borders have made the region a gateway for narcotics and weapons trafficking into the former soviet union. although not officially a crrf mission, military exercises between russia and other members of the csto (e.g. zapad 2017) offer a hint of the organization’s capabilities in interstate conflict. following russian military doctrine after the annexation of crimea, zapad (2017) placed heavy emphasis on the usage of “hybrid war” elements and focused on mobility and asymmetric elements of conflict rather than rehabilitating older unwieldy soviet strategies (schmitt, 2017). there are many scenarios that would lead to an external deployment of the csto rapid reaction force. one possible situation would be deployment to a frozen conflict zone such as south ossetia, abkhazia, nagorno-karabakh or the luhansk people’s republic/donetsk opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 7 people’s republic as part of a peacekeeping operation. none of these territories are recognized as independent states by the international community. however, these frozen conflict zones receive extensive material, political, and military support from members of the csto. an example of this relationship would be russia’s engagement with south ossetia and abkhazia. moscow remains one of the largest advocates for the international recognition of abkhazian and south ossetian independence from georgia. beyond political support, moscow maintains a military presence in both territories and has ensures varying degrees of economic integration between both territories and the russian federation (gerrits, 2016). it is possible that the crrf may be mobilized and deployed to one of these frozen conflict territories in response to a geopolitical crisis, particularly if escalation of the crisis would pose a direct threat to a member of the csto. it is likely that this sort of action would emulate russia’s role in the 2008 russogeorgian war, for russia’s actions were largely focused on supporting already existing south ossetian and abkhazian militias in opposition to the georgian military (nichol, 2009). another hypothetical scenario that would lead to the external deployment of the crrf would be the establishment of a peacekeeping mission to syria as part of a larger regional stabilization effort. while rumors of impending csto deployment to syria were quickly dispelled by the governments of kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan (kucera, 2017), operations conducted by russia (such as the de-mining of palmyra and deployment of the admiral kuznetsov in the mediterranean sea in support of the assad regime) provide an insight into what sort of action would be taken by the csto in relation to the syrian civil war. the csto rapid reaction force and nato’s spearhead the nato response force (nrf) is a multipurpose military formation created in 2002. the purpose of the nrf is to provide an immediate response to any crisis facing the alliance, including non-military threats such as natural disasters or political instability. nrf deployments include disaster-relief following hurricane katrina and security operations during the athens olympic games and 2004 afghan presidential elections (european parliament, 2014). in 2014, nato members approved the creation of the very high readiness joint task force (vjtf), often referred to as the “spearhead force.” while the spearhead force shares a similar multipurpose role as the nrf, the vjtf features a greater amount of troops designated for rapidresponse actions and a larger emphasis on combat operations. the spearhead force is primarily designed for crisis management and rapid response and may also act as a vanguard for a larger nato-led intervention mission. the spearhead force is composed of 5,000 troops and is designed for deployment within “three to five days” of a crisis (nato, 2015). this spearhead force is supported by nato’s standing naval maritime groups and may be accompanied by other aerial and naval assets. the formation almost exclusively uses temporary deployment in place of permanent stationing and is primarily focused on the eastern members of the alliance such as poland, romania, and the baltic states. the creation of the spearhead force was partially in response to political developments in eastern europe in early 2014, as russia’s ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security intervention in crimea and eastern ukraine following euromaidan has lead to a renewed interest among nato members in addressing the challenges posed by state-actors. although the collective rapid reaction and spearhead forces share a similar emphasis on rapid response and crisis management, there are many elements that separate both formations. nato’s spearhead is focused on a system of continuous rotating deployment, while the rapid reaction force is based on static deployment to fixed military installations throughout the csto. while the spearhead utilizes elements of naval support to enhance mobility and projection capabilities, the rapid reaction force is heavily dependent on airborne infantry and paratrooper elements due to the land-locked nature of much of the csto. there is also a disparity between the size and structure of both forces. compared to the spreadhead force’s function as a small, highly mobile contingent, the csto’s designation of multiple brigades and divisions as part of the collective rapid reaction force seems to imply a greater emphasis on macroscopic regional security rather than precision crisis response. this may be a result of the csto’s significantly larger geographic area. just as the collective rapid reaction and spearhead forces differ in their geographic deployment, the crrf is composed of a static group of designated divisions while the spearhead is composed of a rotating brigades that have been designated to the mission. although the collective rapid reaction force has never been formally deployed, a component of the crrf participated in the annexation of crimea and subsequent war in eastern ukraine. the 31st guards air assault brigade, one of the two russian units designated as part of the collective rapid reaction force in 2009 was dispatched to the crimean peninsula without insignia as part of the irregular forces often referred to as “little green men” (sutyagin, 2015). following the occupation of crimea, the 31st guards air assault brigade participated in the battle of ilovaisk, a major engagement between russian-backed separatists and the ukrainian military in august 2014. the involvement of a major ccrf component in the annexation and subsequent invasion of another state contrasts sharply with the spearhead’s emphasis on ally assistance and crisis response. considering the importance of the 31st guards air assault brigade to the functionality of the crrf, it is entirely possible that the collective rapid reaction force may be used to subdue a csto member that strays from moscow’s influence. conclusion similar to many of the russia’s geopolitical projects, it is possible that the csto’s utility is not derived from the alliance’s ability to provide security assurances to its members, but rather the greater political implications that come with csto membership. after the expansion of nato and the european union, the russian federation has found its influence gradually receding in the former soviet union. the csto presents the russian federation an opportunity to translate its soft power and influence into a new political demarcation of the former soviet union. yet the loss of three csto members over the past 25 years hints at an even larger geopolitical crisis—the russian federation has found itself increasingly at odds with traditional opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 9 allies like ukraine and georgia while losing relevance to parts of central asia. the continued usage of strong-arm tactics and military intervention in response to unfavorable political developments has lead to the erosion of russian political capital and influence in the former soviet union. failure to present the tangible strategic benefits of alignment with moscow and the csto will guarantee the further loss of allies in the region and increased isolation for russia. yet despite russia’s challenging geopolitical situation, the creation of the collective rapid reaction force by the csto represents one of the more concrete security initiatives taken by the alliance. although the crrf struggles to match the mobility and projection capabilities of nato’s spearhead, the force is clearly capable of ensuring an effective response to a wide variety of geopolitical challenges whether it is a crisis in the caucasus and central asia or the sudden thawing of a frozen conflict. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security references aerospace daily (2015) “s-300 surface-to-air missile system”. retrieved from: http://aviationweek.com/sitefiles/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2015/07/asd_08_06_2015_dossier.pdf arvidsson, per (2008) “nato infantry weapons standardization”. retrieved from: https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2008/intl/arvidsson.pdf csto (1991) “basic facts”. retrieved from: http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm csto (1992) “treaty on collective security”. retrieved from: http://www.odkb.gov.ru/b/azbengl.htm defense intelligence agency (2017) “russia military power”. retrieved from: https://info.publicintelligence.net/dia-russiamilitarypower2017.pdf denisenko, viktor (2009) “moscow block”. retrieved from: http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=3297 dr. kopp, carlo (2014) “almaz-antey 40r6 / s-400 triumf self propelled air defence system / sa-21”. retrieved from: http://www.ausairpower.net/apa-s-400-triumf.html european parliament (2014) “nato response force”. retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914nato responseforcecomplete_/sede240914natoresponseforcecomplete_en.pdf gady, franz (2017) “india, russia to ‘soon’ set delivery date for s-400 missile air defense systems”. retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/india-russia-to-soon-setdelivery-date-for-s-400-missile-air-defense-systems/ gerrits, andre (2016) “russian patronage over abkhazia and south ossetia: implications for conflict resolution”. retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21599165.2016.1166104 global security (2011) “soviet invasion of czechoslovakia”. retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/czechoslovakia2.htm kucera, joshua (2017) “kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan, under right conditions, open to deployment to syria”. retrieved from: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84106 mkrtchyan, hasmik (2016) “armenia ratifies agreement on joint air-defense system with russia”. retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-russiadefence/armenia-ratifies-agreement-on-joint-air-defense-system-with-russiaiduskcn0zg2as nato (1949) “the north atlantic treaty”. retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm nato (2015) “nato's new spearhead force gears up”. retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_118642.htm nichol, jim (2009) russia-georgia conflict in august 2008: context and implications for u.s. interests. retrieved from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/rl34618.pdf ria novosti (2016) “aerial division of the northern fleet leaves for mediterranean sea”. retrieved from: https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161015/1479305461.html http://aviationweek.com/site-files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2015/07/asd_08_06_2015_dossier.pdf http://aviationweek.com/site-files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2015/07/asd_08_06_2015_dossier.pdf http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm http://www.odkb.gov.ru/b/azbengl.htm http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=3297 http://www.ausairpower.net/apa-s-400-triumf.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914natoresponseforcecomplete_/sede240914natoresponseforcecomplete_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914natoresponseforcecomplete_/sede240914natoresponseforcecomplete_en.pdf https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/india-russia-to-soon-set-delivery-date-for-s-400https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/india-russia-to-soon-set-delivery-date-for-s-400http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84106 https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_118642.htm https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161015/1479305461.html opfor, blufor: a comparative analysis of nato and the csto justin tomczyk 11 schmitt, eric (2017) “vast exercise demonstrated russia’s growing military prowess”. retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/zapad-russia-military-exercise.html sodiqov, alexander (2012) “csto agreement on foreign bases frustrates tajikistan’s ambitions”. retrieved from: https://jamestown.org/program/csto-agreement-on-foreignbases-frustrates-tajikistans-ambitions/ stratfor (2012) “the transformation of the polish armed forces: nato and military modernization” retrieved from: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/transformationpolish-armed-forces-nato-and-military-modernization sutyagin, igor (2015) “russian forces in ukraine”. retrieved from: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf tolipov, farkhod (2013) “uzbekistan without the csto”. retrieved from: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12652-uzbekistanwithout-the-csto.html united states navy (2017), “navy data”. retrieved from: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146 warsaw pact (1955) “treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the people's republic of albania, the people's republic of bulgaria, the hungarian people's republic, the german democratic republic, the polish people's republic, the rumanian people's republic, the union of soviet socialist republics and the czechoslovak republic”. retrieved from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp weitz, richard (2014) “csto and sco”. retrieved from: https://www.research collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/86797/1/eth-8857-01.pdf zerkalov, georgy (2016) “the nuclear powered icebreakers”. retrieved from: http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph241/zerkalov2/ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/us/politics/zapad-russia-military-exercise.html https://jamestown.org/program/csto-agreement-on-foreign-bases-frustrates-tajikistans-ambitions/ https://jamestown.org/program/csto-agreement-on-foreign-bases-frustrates-tajikistans-ambitions/ https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12652-uzbekistan-without-the-csto.html https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12652-uzbekistan-without-the-csto.html https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12652-uzbekistan-without-the-csto.html https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/86797/1/eth-8857-01.pdf ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security contents notes section public right of access to america’s war on terror by joseph lehman……………………….09 a response to patrick pexton’s what about israel's nuclear weapons by ayah jaber..............15 the ratification question: why the united states should ratify the convention of the rights for persons with disabilities by anthony valiaveedu..…………...…….…..……19 the political psychology of regime change in iran by ryan vetticad.…………………...…...26 article section on private military companies and hybrid warfare by norman de castro...............................35 divide and conquer: separatism in transcaucasia and russian intervention by james monroe………………………………………...…………………………..………….43 the race for artificial intelligence by anthony valiaveedu and peter f. rybinski………...….52 analysis of the effects of large-scale disasters on the behavior of non-state violent actors in countries already under duress by dylan hyams………………………………..…67 5 failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states zishen ye 1 failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states zishen ye university of illinois at urbana-champaign introduction almost three decades after an arms embargo was placed on china by the european union (eu) and the united states (us), the arms trade between china and some member states of the eu has been thriving for two decades. the intention of this arms embargo is for the us and eu to work together to prohibit china from acquiring advanced weaponry. however, with arms exports peaking at over 400 million euros from the eu to china in 2003,1 some european nations’ blatant violation of the arms embargo against china is a textbook example of the failure of international cooperation. this paper will examine the reason behind this inefficient, if not a failed, cooperation between the european union and the united states in the arms embargo against china. it will also illustrate the actions and interests of both actors. 1 hancock, tom. “european companies are supplying china with billions in weapons and military technology.” business insider, business insider, 30 apr. 2014. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 this paper argues that the failure of cooperation was caused by the outweighing of gains over the cost of defection from the european side. moreover, the diversion of interests between the members of the eu and the us in trading with china exacerbated such decision calculi. more specifically, major arms exporters within the eu regard economic interests as a priority while trading with china, while the us considers security interests as a priority. hence, such diversion incentivized the lack of enforcement mechanism and vague wording of terms of the embargo from the european side. as a result, china is able to acquire hundreds of millions of euros worth of advanced weaponry from members of the eu every year. background the arms embargo was placed against china in 1989, as a direct response to the chinese communist regime’s violent suppression of protesters at the tiananmen square on june 4th, 1989. on june 26th, 1989, the council of ministers of the eu declared an embargo on trade in arms with china.2 on june 29th, 1989, us president george h.w. bush used his executive powers to impose a ban on arms shipment to china.3 these official statements made by the most powerful and influential democratic entities in the world were a clear and strong condemnation of china’s human rights abuses, and served as a declaration of solidarity with freedom, democracy, and protection of human rights. lead by these entities, other democratic countries, such as japan, also cooperated to impose an arms embargo on china, and states pretended to work together in halting china’s military modernization and human rights abuses. subsequently, all military cooperation, defense-related talks, trades, and conventions between china and advanced democracies had been suspended, jeopardizing millions of dollars of ongoing arms contract for china’s trading partners in the west.4 prior to the arms embargo, the us and eu members had been trading, and mostly exporting, weapons to china since their diplomatic ties were established in the 1970s. the defense firms of these states signed lucrative deals with china, and the west was also pleased to embrace a pawn in east asia to hold off the soviet union. therefore, the gains made both in economic and security interests led to an annual increase in the volume of arms trade.5 several years after the implementation of the arms embargo, chinese warships armed with french helicopters and german diesel engines began patrolling the chinese coast. warplanes equipped with british radars and engines and french missiles were deployed by the chinese air force. arms exports from european states to china soared with general trade after 2 council of the european union. “council of ministers declaration on china sipri.” stockholm international peace research institute, 26 june 1989. 3 glass, andrew, et al. “house sanctions post-tiananmen china, june 29, 1989.” politico, 28 june 2011. 4 hufbauer, gary clyde., et al. economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy. institute for international economics, 1990. 5 gill, bates, and kim taeho. chinas arms acquisitions from abroad: a quest for superb and secret weapons. oxford university press, 1995. failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states zishen ye 3 the year 2000.6 such blatant violations of the arms embargo by major european powers left the united states as one of the very few actors abiding by the arms embargo, despite the declaration on arms embargo is valid until the present day. gains, costs, defection, and division of interest decision calculus of the eu and us after china fully implemented its economic reforms and opened up its markets to international companies in 1992, foreign firms rushed into this authoritarian nation to take advantage of its cheap labor and unprecedented market potential.7 since then, the european union has placed economic interests as a priority while trading with china, including the trades in weaponry. although the united states has placed a high degree of importance on economic interests when dealing with china, it also emphasizes security interests in the region. the division of interest between the eu and the us led to the eu defection from the arms embargo against china. exacerbated by the division of interests, some members of the eu could enjoy very high gains over costs from selling weaponry to china. on the contrary, selling arms to china has higher security costs than economic benefit for the us. to understand this calculation, it is also helpful to consider the relationship between china, the us and some european member states as multiple two-level games, as discussions of costs and gains continue. the european union’s interest the states in the european union have very limited, if not nonexistent, security interests in east asia. arming china could result in more economic gains than costs, and is unlikely to interfere with the eu’s limited security interests in east asia. thus, defecting from the arms embargo is unlikely to incur any meaningful costs, but gains. regarding the two-level game between members of the eu and the united states, the cost for defection during this cooperation is inexistent. although these two entities decided to implement an arms embargo and created an image of cooperation, there has never been any legally binding policy to enforce the cooperation on this issue.8 in fact, the steepest cost that european states have bore includes an attempted persuasion, a vocal condemnation, and a threat to cut off defense cooperation from president bush, which was never realized.9 according to stein’s article, “coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world,” it is fair to say 6 hancock, tom. “european companies are supplying china with billions in weapons and military technology.” 7 foreign languages press. “deng xiaopings south china tour (jan. 1992) china.org.cn.” china.org.cn, 19 apr. 2011. 8 ning, qin. “the failure of lifting the eu arms embargo against china: the analysis among interests, values and symbolism.” university of twente, universiteit twente &westfälischewilhelms-universität münster, 8 sept. 2009. 9 pemberton, miriam, and rachel stohl. “wrangling over arms sales to china | ips.” institute for policy studies, 21 nov. 2006. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 that the eu decided to defect constantly without losing anything. this is due to the lack of any meaningful enforcement and punishment mechanism.10 the states of france, the uk, and germany are ranked as top exporters of weaponry to china.11 given the fact that prominent european defense firms like the bae systems, mbda, thales, and other firms employ around 500,000 people and indirectly generate 1.2 million jobs in europe. politicians and policymakers in europe have to recognize their economic potential and political concerns.12 building onto putnam’s argument on the national and international level negotiations, the domestic benefit for politicians and states will be primarily satisfied with loose enforcement of the arms embargo, which is also a favorable move for the defense firms.13 this is consistent with defense firms’ spending on lobbying in many states in the eu.14 for the states in europe, a robust military-industrial complex directly translate to more economic growth and employment opportunities. this would benefit politicians by creating a higher chance of getting reelected. yet, these arms sellers and politicians do not bear much of the cost for allowing defection in the arms embargo against china to take place. these domestic factors directly result in the vague wording and lack of enforcement mechanism of the arms embargo, which enabled the failure of cooperation. with the common foreign and security policy that oversees the arms embargo, nations are free to determine their own interpretations on lethal weapons, and they also get to decide what is considered military use, civilian use, or dual-use technology.15 previous policies have demonstrated that china acquired most of its western weaponry under the guise of dual-use or civilian use technology. in addition, trading weapons from third-party actors such as pakistan and hong kong is also a loophole that china and europe have used.16 on the international level, a two-level game is also being played between china and members of the eu. the arms embargo is a significant obstacle that china and european nations have to face. however, for european states, selling weapons to china opens up many opportunities for cooperation, as other subsequent business deals can generate greater benefits than arms sales alone. the most blatant violation of the arms embargo is the collaboration on the satellite-navigation network, which has vast military potential. in 2003, china pledged to contribute two-hundred million euros to the european galileo satellite program, which is jointly 10 stein, arthur a. “coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world.” international organization, vol. 36, no. 02, 1982, pp. 299–324. 11 hancock, tom. “european companies are supplying china with billions in weapons and military technology.” business insider. 12 european commission. “defence industries.” european commission 13 putnam, robert d. “diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” international organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427–460. 14 rufanges, jordi calvo. “the arms industry lobby in europe.” american behavioral scientist, vol. 60, no. 3, 28 oct. 2015, pp. 305–320. 15 shambaugh, david. “don’t lift the arms embargo on china.” brookings, brookings, 23 feb. 2005, 16 “the eu arms embargo on china: a swedish perspective.” foi swedish defense research agency, jan. 2010. failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states zishen ye 5 developed by most of the prominent defense firms and the european space agency.17 in fact, the relationship between china and the eu has never been better due to this high level of cooperation.18 for many european nations, it is evident that the sales of advanced weaponry have gone beyond arms themselves.19 considering that china is now the second largest trading partner for the eu,20 allowing weaponry to flow into china in exchange for a tighter bond and business deals in other fields are rational and beneficial. consequently, several official discussions regarding the lift of the arms embargo have been held in the european union between 2000 and 2005.21 this sends a clear signal of the desire to defect from the arms embargo and of the gains that come from working with china in a larger scale, including arms trade. this stance remains unchanged. in 2015, the european commissioner for external relations and european neighborhood policy, benita ferrero-waldner, commented on china and the arms embargo: "this strategic partnership is so important, but it is being conducted on the basis of an outdated agreement that is simply no longer up to the job.”22 this official remark sums up europe’s take on the diversion of interests and the possibilities of exporting arms to china. the united states’ interest after the arms embargo was placed, the united states implemented it strictly, since its security interests outweigh the economic gains of selling arms. as a key player in the international arena, the us has treated china as a threat to taiwan, its regional ally that china perceives as a renegade province. as a result, the taiwan relations act explicitly stated that “any effort to determine the future of taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the western pacific area and of grave concern to the united states.”23 china has always sought reunification with its “renegade province,” and the expansion in military power is a direct and useful way to demonstrate its resolve and capability. for the us, a regional ally falling into the hands of a regional competitor would frighten other strategic partners in the region. a rising china can be seen as a great challenge to existing trade ties and foreign ties between american allies, and a 17 lague, david. “special report-in satellite tech race, china hitched a ride from europe.” reuters, thomson reuters, 22 dec. 2013. 18 ibid 19 casarini, nicola. “the international politics of the chinese arms embargo issue.” the international spectator, vol. 42, no. 3, 13 sept. 2007, pp. 371–389., doi:10.1080/03932720701567588. 20 european commission. “top trading partners 2016.” european commission, 2017. 21 “the eu arms embargo on china: a swedish perspective.” foi swedish defense research agency, jan. 2010. 22 from a meeting between the european commissioner for external relations and european neighbourhood policy and the chinese foreign minister. 23 united states, congress, cong., house foreign affairs. “taiwan relations act: conference report to accompany h.r. 2479.” taiwan relations act: conference report to accompany h.r. 2479, us govt. print. off., 1979. 96th congress. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 threat to several military bases in the east asia. therefore, allowing china to gain a comparative military advantage over taiwan and other regional allies is not acceptable for the us. in the past, the us has always deterred china’s effort to gain a competitive edge in the region, and it has never ceased to signal to china its resolve and capability. in 1996, us president bill clinton ordered the biggest show of force since the vietnam war by sending aircraft carriers over the taiwan strait during the third taiwan strait crisis, which served as a signal to the world about how much the us cares about its security interests and presence in the region. in 1995, the us traded over $55 billion of goods with china amid the crisis, and that number has been growing at 10% annually.24 on the other side, the fact that the us is willing to risk its multi-billion-dollar investment and trade for taiwan is the strongest evidence that security interests trump economic interests. furthermore, according to lipson’s article, the two-level game between the us and china is essentially a prisoner’s dilemma in the security arena with many drawbacks. given the secrecy of security and military institutions, the us is likely to have a hard time observing and measuring china’s war readiness and intentions of using arms against taiwan. as lipson puts it, the goal of cooperation in security institution is to maximize the difference of gains. in this context, the us would also want to maximize such difference between china and its renegade province, since the us is also selling weapons to taiwan. for the us, not protecting taiwan from china could result in devastating tangible and intangible losses, and such a cost is simply too high to accept. thus, abiding by the arms embargo is a great way to maximize security interest at a small economic cost. conclusion as illustrated, the diversion of interests and the lack of an enforcement mechanism enabled the failure of cooperation between the eu and the us on implementing the arms embargo against china. in the late 2010s, the economic gains of violating the arms embargo still incentivizes some eu member states to sell weapon to china, but china has a shrinking demand for foreign weaponry due to its increasingly modernized and self-reliant military.25 for the us, although this arms embargo is not being discussed often, it is evident that it did achieve the goal of halting china’s military modernization, protecting taiwan, and satisfying other security interests in east asia. 24 us census bureau. “trade in goods with china.” us census, 2017. 25 wezeman, siemon t. “china, russia and the shifting landscape of arms sales.” sipri, 5 july 2017. failure of cooperation in arms embargo against china: diversion of interest and decision calculus of the european union and the united states zishen ye 7 references brookes, peter. “the lifting of the eu arms embargo on china: an american perspective.” the heritage foundation, 2 mar. 2005, www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-lifting-theeu-arms-embargo-china-american-perspective. casarini, nicola. “the international politics of the chinese arms embargo issue.” the international spectator, vol. 42, no. 3, 13 sept. 2007, pp. 371–389., doi:10.1080/03932720701567588. council of the european union. “council of ministers declaration on china sipri.” stockholm international peace research institute, 26 june 1989, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/council-statement.pdf. european commission. “defence industries.” european commission, ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence_en. european commission. “top trading partners 2016.” european commission, 2017, trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf. foreign languages press. “deng xiaopings south china tour (jan. 1992) china.org.cn.” china.org.cn, 19 apr. 2011, www.china.org.cn/china/cpc_90_anniversary/201104/19/content_22392494.htm. gill, bates, and kim taeho. chinas arms acquisitions from abroad: a quest for superb and secret weapons. oxford university press, 1995, www.sipri.org/publications/1995/chinas-arms-acquisitions-abroad-quest-superb-andsecret-weapons. glass, andrew, et al. “house sanctions post-tiananmen china, june 29, 1989.” politico, 28 june 2011, www.politico.com/story/2011/06/house-sanctions-post-tiananmen-chinajune-29-1989-057928. hancock, tom. “european companies are supplying china with billions in weapons and military technology.” business insider, business insider, 30 apr. 2014, www.businessinsider.com/european-companies-are-supplying-china-with-billions-inweapons-and-military-technology-2014-4. hufbauer, gary clyde., et al. economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy. institute for international economics, 1990. lague, david. “special report-in satellite tech race, china hitched a ride from europe.” reuters, thomson reuters, 22 dec. 2013, www.reuters.com/article/breakoutbeidou/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-china-hitched-a-ride-from-europeidusl4n0jj0j320131222. lippman, thomas w. “bush makes clinton's china policy an issue.” washington post , 20 aug. 1999, www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/chiwan082099.htm. lipson, charles. “international cooperation in economic and security affairs.” world politics, vol. 37, no. 01, oct. 1984, pp. 1–23., doi:10.2307/2010304. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 mizokami, kyle, et al. “5 american super weapons stolen by china.” the national interest, the center for the national interest, 1 apr. 2017, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/5american-super-weapons-stolen-by-china-19975. ning, qin. “the failure of lifting the eu arms embargo against china: the analysis among interests, values and symbolism.” university of twente, universiteit twente &amp;westfälischewilhelms-universität münster, 8 sept. 2009, essay.utwente.nl/60352/1/ma_thesis_q_ning.pdf. pemberton, miriam, and rachel stohl. “wrangling over arms sales to china | ips.” institute for policy studies, 21 nov. 2006, www.ips-dc.org/wrangling_over_arms_sales_to_china/. putnam, robert d. “diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” international organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427–460., doi:10.1163/24681733_shafr_sim290030047. risen, james. “us warns china on taiwan, sends warships to area.” los angeles times, 11 mar. 1996, articles.latimes.com/1996-03-11/news/mn-45722_1_taiwan-strait. rufanges, jordi calvo. “the arms industry lobby in europe.” american behavioral scientist, vol. 60, no. 3, 28 oct. 2015, pp. 305–320., doi:10.1177/0002764215613406. shambaugh, david. “don’t lift the arms embargo on china.” brookings, brookings, 23 feb. 2005, www.brookings.edu/opinions/dont-lift-the-arms-embargo-on-china/. stein, arthur a. “coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world.” international organization, vol. 36, no. 02, 1982, pp. 299–324., doi:10.1017/s0020818300018968. united states, congress, cong., house foreign affairs. “taiwan relations act: conference report to accompany h.r. 2479.” taiwan relations act: conference report to accompany h.r. 2479, us govt. print. off., 1979. 96th congress. “the eu arms embargo on china: a swedish perspective.” foi swedish defense research agency, jan. 2010, www.academia.edu/5475879/the_eu_arms_embargo_on_china_a_swedish_perspecti ve_2010_. us census bureau. “trade in goods with china.” us census, 2017, www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html#1996. wezeman, siemon t. “china, russia and the shifting landscape of arms sales.” sipri, 5 july 2017, www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shiftinglandscape-arms-sales. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 the nuclear awakening of china emma hamel university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the people’s republic of china, one of the biggest military presences in the world, has been rapidly expanding its once modest nuclear arsenal. this article will explore these developments and attempt to explain why china may be expanding its arsenal by looking at motivations arising from international conflicts. the article discusses the history of china’s nuclear weapons program, the current efforts to modernize its warheads, and the possible factors that may have spurred this development. the findings in this article showcase how chinese territorial disputes with its neighboring countries, as well as possible nuclear tensions with the united states, are likely motivating china to improve its nuclear weapons program. additionally, there is evidence that they are broadening their nuclear capabilities to become a leading nuclear power like the united states and russia. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 although widely seen as an international military superpower, the people’s republic of china kept a notoriously small nuclear arsenal throughout most of its history. in recent decades, however, the country has been developing its land, air, and sea-based nuclear armaments. china is expanding its nuclear arsenal in response to recent advancements in american military technology and a need to project power around its neighboring countries. history of china’s nuclear arms program since its conception in 1949, the people’s republic of china has kept a limited nuclear arsenal. to date, the country only possesses 290 nuclear bombs and no tactical weapons, making it one of the smallest nuclear arsenals of the major world powers (davenport & reif, 2019). china also keeps a relatively small collection of ram-type launchers for land-based missiles and bombers for air-based missiles. moreover, unlike the united states and russia, china does not keep nuclear warheads on nuclear launchers during peacetime and has a no first use policy, which dictates that china will only use a nuclear bomb in response to a nuclear strike. these factors suggest that china created a nuclear weapons program merely to display the country’s military prowess and diplomatic credibility, as well as deter nuclear harassment from other countries. the size of china’s nuclear capabilities may also be attributed to its unending amount of manpower. chairman mao zedong was confident that the size of his country could adequately defend from any possible nuclear attack, famously stating, “i’m not afraid of nuclear war. … china has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left” (“china's nuclear”, 2019). in an interview with an american journalist, he further expounds upon this idea, saying “the atom bomb is a paper tiger which the u.s. reactionaries use to scare people. it looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon..” (“talk with american”, 1946). since then, nearly every chairman of the people’s republic has kept a small nuclear force until chairman jinping. under jinping’s administration, the chinese nuclear triad made significant growth in the past two decades.the following sections will detail china’s current plans to update its nuclear weapons and attempt to explain why china is developing its nuclear arsenal. current efforts to modernize china is making strides in its ‘nuclear triad’ by diversifying its nuclear capabilities across land, sea, and air. since the early 2000’s, china has been developing new land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles such as dong feng (df) class missiles are the newest and most impressive addition to china’s land-based arsenal. the latest version of these silo-based missiles, the df-41, has a range of 15,000 km, can hold up to eight warheads, and has survivability thanks to its mobility (“how”, 2019). the df-41 could potentially release the equivalent of 1 megaton of tnt (“dong feng-41 (dong feng-41 / css-5)”, 2019). china has roughly between 60-200 df-21 missiles (“dong feng-21 (dong feng-21 / css-5)”, 2019) and 25 df-31 missiles deployed (“dong feng-41 (dong feng-41 / css-5)”, 2019). the nation’s ballistic missile-equipped submarines (similar to american ssbns) and attack submarines are also being modernized. the xia, a jin-class submarine, is the only operational chinese ssbn currently in use and are considered to be technologically primitive, as they are relatively noisy and therefore can be located easily (farnsworth & tamerlani & taylor & timothy, 2013). the chinese submarines currently deployed are equipped with jl-2 missiles, ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 9 at-sea ballistic missiles (slbm) that have a range of 8,000-9,000 km and are generally seen as less capable than american and russian slbms, which have a greater range (goldstein & erickson, 2019). however, china is building five new jin-class ballistic missile submarines that can hold 24 julang-3 (jl-3) missiles, which is comparable to american and russian slbms (china makes, 2018). furthermore, china plans to bolster its once low-priority air-based delivery systems. the chinese air force is currently developing a new bomber plane, the h-6k. the h-6k bomber is able to carry up to ten cruise missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers, and deliver the payload to a total range of 5000 kilometers. additionally, beijing may be seeking to develop a stealth bomber called the h-20 (mizokami, 2020). this bomber is similar in design to the american b-2 bomber, and may be ready to deploy as early as 2025. possible factors for expansion the chinese government officially states that its efforts to increase its nuclear arsenal are to strengthen its security (“china's military”, 2015). however, many other factors may have influenced the sudden expansion. in recent decades, china has found itself in various international disputes. tensions between the united states and china may have incentivised the nation to match the nuclear prowess of america. additionally, china is also attempting to expand its borders, which has resulted in a number of territorial conflicts with other countries, such as the south china sea dispute with the philippines. the nation may be building its nuclear arsenal to defend or dissuade an attack from one of its competitors. american defense behavior has clearly impacted china’s military desires. chinese government officials were alarmed when president george w. bush pulled out of the 30-yearold anti-ballistic missile treaty in 2002. once the united states withdrew from the agreement, the country could develop missiles that could overpower china’s nuclear arsenal. their suspicions were correct; the bush administration and the following presidential administrations continued to heavily invest in missile defense systems. recently, chinese experts have taken particular interest in new american long-range missiles that can hit any target across the globe within an hour (china's nuclear, 2019). with such a weapon, american forces could easily decimate china’s collection of nuclear warheads and launchers. it is clear that china is aware of the nuclear climate and understands that the united states is fully capable of destroying its nuclear arsenals. thus, american nuclear efforts may have motivated china to develop new long-range missiles so the nation can counter such an attack. the newest line of the df missile, the df-41, is capable of hitting american soil from china within an hour (china's nuclear, 2019). china is also preparing for a possibility of a american-chinese nuclear conflict in it’s own backyard: the south china sea. territorial disputes in the south china sea have incentivized china to expand its naval nuclear capabilities. three countries currently claim large sections of the south china sea: the philippines, vietnam, and china. in july of 2016, the permanent court of arbitration at the hague ruled that china was operating illegally in philippine territory in the south china sea. in the court’s holding, they state that china has historically not had an exclusive claim to the region and that the country is actively “interfering with philippine fishing and petroleum exploration” (“the south china sea”, 2016, p.2). china has ignored the court’s ruling and continues to operate in the region. (territorial, n.d.). this comes as no surprise, as absolute control of the south china sea would come with a multitude of benefits. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 10 the south china sea is a resource-rich area and is estimated to hold around 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of untapped oil, worth around $6 trillion (territorial, n.d.). the islands located in the sea also contain fishing areas and other natural resources estimated at around. with the south china sea, china can amass around $5 trillion from trade and control one third of the world’s cargo that passes through the south china sea. with this trade advantage, china may also be able to restrict trade to countries. additionally, control of the south china sea holds a significant military advantage. satellite imagery shows that china is creating and increasing the size of islands in the sea, as well as constructing ports, airstrips, and other military facilities on them (territorial, n.d.). all of these factors suggest that the south china sea is of great economic and strategic value to china. china is clearly ready to defend its claim in the south china sea as the nation recently conducted naval exercises in the area in april of 2018. the united states also has a significant military presence in the south china seas to protect its security, political, and economic interests (territorial, n.d.). china clearly views american influence in the region as its biggest threat. thus, the country has been developing the jl-3 missile, which supposedly rivals the capabilities of missiles carried by american submarines and surface ships deployed in the south china sea (chan & huang, 2019). with these weapons, china will be ready to retaliate against or discourage an attack from america and the other nations who disagree with china’s illegal claims. the development of these weapons indicates a possible arms-race between china and the united states, and that china aims to achieve a strong nuclear triad in its effort to become a major nuclear power. america is not the only nuclear threat concerning china. china has played an active role in the india-pakistan nuclear conflict. china sees india as a concern, as the two nations have a territorial dispute at the indo-sino border. this has led china to supply aid to pakistan, india’s largest nuclear rival. china provided funding and weapon designs to pakistan until the mid1990’s (burr, 2004). today, they still sell nuclear delivery vessels, such as submarines, to pakistan (hundley, 2018). this alliance may also suggest that china would send military support to pakistan if the nation were to go to war with india. china’s support of pakistan’s nuclear ambitions may be attributed to the territorial conflicts between china and india. specifically, both countries claim a large land mass in eastern kashmir called aksai chin. despite being uninhabitable, aksai chin is strategically important to the chinese occupation of tibet. in the region, the chinese have built a highway to transport troops from xinjiang to tibet (basrur, 2019). the construction of this highway sparked a violent conflict between india and china in 1962 and since then, china has completed the highway with little interference. tibet is a crucial component of chinese imperialism. like the south china sea, china wants tibet for its strategic geographical location. with tibet under chinese control, china can reach the rest of eurasia more readily, especially india. tibet also has a lucrative mining industry and plentiful water sources which may be of interest to china (why, 2008). the emphasis on chinese control of tibet may be the reason they have been increasing their military presence in the region and growing their collection of land-based nuclear weapons. as china’s influence in aksai chin and tibet grows, the more likely china will protect its claim on the territory. there is a possibility of nuclear conflict over the region as violent attacks between the two countries have plagued the region for decades. the most recent attack in 2019 was a bombing conducted by islamic militants that sparked both sides to conduct a number of air strikes in pakistan and indian-controlled kashmir (yusuf, 2019). both pakistan and india ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 11 have been refining their nuclear weapons should the conflict in kashmir become worse. china may be inclined to produce land-based missiles to defend its claim on aksai chin. as previously discussed, china is developing a number of powerful short-ranged land missiles, some of which were deployed in china’s western provinces as recently as 2010 (kristensen, 2010). this may signify that china is anticipating the risk of going to nuclear war with india, or is planning to use nuclear weapons as a means of deterring india from attacking. conclusion china’s territorial expansion and tense relationship with the united states and its neighboring countries have made the possibility of nuclear war a very real threat. in response to these perceived international threats, china has been substantially expanding its nuclear capabilities. although this may seem like a reasonable response to the current international climate, china should be cautious of how other countries perceive their efforts to bolster its nuclear weapons program. china’s competitors, such as the united states and russia, could interpret this development as a threat and act accordingly by developing weapons to counter the new chinese nuclear weapons. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 12 references basrur, rajesh (2019) india and china: a managed nuclear rivalry?, the washington quarterly, 42:3, 151-170, doi: 10.1080/0163660x.2019.1666354 burr, william (2009, march 4). “china, pakistan, and the bomb: the declassified file on u.s. policy, 1977-1997.” retrieved from nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsaebb/nsaebb114/index.htm. chan, m., & huang, k. (2019, february 7). is china about to drop its 'no first use' nuclear weapons policy? retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2184577/could-china-abandon-its-no first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy china makes 'big progress' with new submarine-launched ballistic missile. (2018, december 20). retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2178983/china makes-big-progress-nuclear-strike-range-new-submarine china’s military strategy (full text). (2015, may 27). retrieved from http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.h tml china's nuclear arsenal was strikingly modest, but that is changing. (2019, november 21). retrieved from https://www.economist.com/china/2019/11/21/chinas-nuclear-arsenal was-strikingly-modest-but-that-is-changing davenport, k. & reif, k. (2019, july). fact sheets & briefs. retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearweaponswhohaswhat ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 13 df-21 (dong feng-21 / css-5) (2020, january 2). retrieved from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/. df-31 (dong feng-31 / css-10) (2019, october 8). retrieved from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-31/. df-41 (dong feng-41 / css-x-20) (2019, october 8). retrieved from https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/. goldstein, lyle j. & erickson, andrew s. & naval war college (u.s.) center for naval warfare studies. (2005). china's nuclear force modernization. newport, r.i : naval war college, http://www.usnwc.edu/publications/naval-war-college-press/newport papers.aspx hundley, tom (2018) india and pakistan are quietly making war more likely. vox how is china modernizing its nuclear forces? (2019, december). retrieved from https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/ kristensen, h. m. (2010, september 28). df-21c missile deploys to central china. retrieved from https://fas.org/blogs/security/2010/09/df21c/ mizokami, k. (2020, january 22). explained: everything you want to know about china's nuclear weapons. retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/explained everything-you-want-know-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons-83376 permanent court of arbitration. (2016, july 12). retrieved from https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/ph-cn-20160712-press-release-no-11-english.pdf rajagopalan, rajeswari pillai. “why china's growing military might in tibet should worry india.” the diplomat, the diplomat, 3 mar. 2020, thediplomat.com/2020/03/why chinas-growing-military-might-in-tibet-should-worry-india/. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 14 territorial disputes in the south china sea (n.d). retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south china-sea taylor, tamerlani & farnsworth, timothy (2013). pentagon sees china progressing on slbm. arms control today. arms control association. tse-tung, m., & strong, l. (2004). talk with the american correspondence anna louise strong. retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume 4/mswv4_13.htm why is remote tibet of strategic significance? (2008, march 25). retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tibet-strategic/factbox-why-is-remote-tibet-of strategic-significance-idussp2305020080325 yusuf, m. w. (2019, may). arms control today. retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/pulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear environment ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 15 planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 1 planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli university of chicago introduction instances of global conflict have increased dramatically over the last decade.1 as climate change, population increase, and globalization continue to proliferate over the next century, it will be crucial for stakeholders at every level to reevaluate the best ways to address issues pertaining to global conflict, violence, and state stability. despite many multilateral and nonprofit opportunities for intervention, states will most likely be tasked with mitigating the worst effects of these issues. one way that countries such as the united states (us) can begin to combat global conflict and state fragility is by reevaluating existing development strategies, policies, and budgets. even a cursory glance at the us foreign development budget illustrates the low priority of current development policies. in fact, despite widespread misinformation among the american public, us expenditures for all international development line items constitute less than 1% of the total annual us budget.2 agricultural development policy in particular is an underutilized method of preventing conflict, increasing state stability, and advancing us national security interests in the process. existing literature has highlighted the links between food insecurity and instability, which means that agricultural development may have the ability to simultaneously improve the lives of millions of civilians across the globe and help the us advance and protect its strategic national security interests, including the global war on terror. 1 uppsala conflict data program 2 center for global development ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 the us has many of these vested global interests, but existing foreign and national security policy relies heavily on american military presence to engage these interests and actors, acting as enforcing agents for us policy and projects throughout the world. this is a costly model; not only is it one of the largest (and continually growing) line items in the us federal budget — falling behind only healthcare and social security — but it can also result in immense human cost in the form of american casualties.3 agricultural development may offer an efficient alternative to continuous increases in military spending. if used effectively, it can provide dynamic new opportunities for the us government to continue advancing its strategic national security interests, while simultaneously decreasing state fragility and saving human lives in the process. by reframing agricultural development policy in this context and providing empirical evidence to support this assertion, it may be possible to make investment in international agricultural development more politically appealing. the world of foreign aid and assistance is a complex one. for clarity, itis important to parse out the differences within this field, highlighting the aspects of foreign aid addressed in this study. the state department identifies foreign assistance as “the voluntary transfer of resources from the government of one country to the government, or people, of another.”4 within foreign assistance, the state department recognizes three subcategories of aid including security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and development assistance – the last of these three is the focus of this study. development assistance is unique because it supports sustainable increases in living standards and reduction in poverty through economic and social advancement, whereas humanitarian assistance focuses on providing direct assistance to those in crisis. i aim to illustrate the importance of continued and increased levels of us spending on agricultural development policy as both a humanitarian imperative leading to increased levels of stability and a means of increasing us national security in the process. through analysis of current us agricultural development expenditures and levels of state fragility provided by the fund for peace, i highlight an observable relationship between drastic increases in us agricultural development spending and consistent decreases in state fragility. to make sense of that relationship, however, it is critical to gain a contextual understanding of the existing literature on food insecurity and conflict. first, i synthesize existing spheres of thought on the impacts of food insecurity on what i identify as state fragility. by synthesizing existing literature on the topic, with a special emphasis on work completed by cullen hendrix, i provide a theoretical framework through which this real-world data can be analyzed. i then employ themes illustrated by existing scholars in both a quantitative and qualitative context, using ethiopia, a state considered fragile by the fund for peace’s fragile states index (fsi), as the primary case study. by analyzing the annual fluctuations in stability as evaluated by the fund for peace’s fsi through the lens of us agricultural development spending, i illustrate that us foreign assistance specifically in the form of agricultural development spending can increase food security, resulting in decreased levels of state fragility, subsequently impacting us national 3 “the budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027,” congressional budget office 4 smith, f bureau briefing packet planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 3 security. in order to eventually bring the focus to us strategic interests and national security, i highlight the links between state stability and strategic us interests, like global terrorism. ultimately, i conclude with a set of policy recommendations that would serve the national security interests of the united states by increasing the stability of states critical to us national security priorities by combating food insecurity through agricultural development policy. the first step, identifying existing theoretical frameworks for the relationships between food insecurity and everything from poverty to violent conflict, helps to lay the groundwork for the high level correlations identify between state fragility and us agricultural development spending. there are some important considerations to bear in mind when following this logical pathway, however. first, it is virtually impossible to prove causation between development policies and outcomes, particularly when the state is the unit of analysis. although the sheer number of variables and factors that contribute to state success or failure make causation unachievable, illustrating the correlation between us dollars spent on agricultural development in country and state stability, contextualized by the existing literature on food insecurity and political instability, will be useful in highlighting agricultural development policies’ role in stabilizing fragile states and mitigating the negative repercussions of instability. i am confident that this strong correlation paired with the existing literature on the subject will lead to a compelling argument in favor of us agricultural development spending and policies. the existing literature authors such as todd smith, cullen hendrix, and henk-jan brinkman have made inimitable contributions to the existing body of literature on food insecurity, state fragility, and agricultural development policy. by synthesizing their work to create a foundation for my own data analysis, i can utilize the existing logics articulated by these authors to strengthen my claim that us agricultural development policy has a direct impact on the stability of states in subsaharan africa, which can also be interpreted to mean that increased spending on agricultural development on behalf of the united states should remain a goal of any comprehensive development or national security strategy. the mechanisms articulated by these authors, especially the ways in which food insecurity results in a variety of destabilizing events, provide the contextual framework necessary for understanding the relationship between us agricultural development spending and decreases in state fragility score in the case of ethiopia. henk-jan brinkman and cullen hendrix authored one of the most seminal works in the nascent field of food insecurity in 2010, which was eventually published as a background paper in the 2011 world development report. in it, hendrix and brinkman provide evidence for the link between food insecurity and different types of conflicts: civil war, interstate war, regime stability, violent rioting, and communal conflict. in one of the most compelling points in the paper, the authors study the occurrence of violent rioting in 48 different countries, graphing the relationship between these riots and price spikes in agricultural commodities. they find that the occurrence of riots reached its peak during the years with the highest agricultural commodity ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 prices of staple goods such as wheat, maize, and rice according to the fao.5 another critical takeaway from this working paper is that these riots are most likely to occur in countries without the capacity or infrastructure to foster strong government services — what they identify as low government effectiveness.6 this concept, that governments must possess the capability to respond to agriculture-related issues, is crucial in the analysis of both ethiopia and anywhere where capacity and resilience building are the main development or aid objectives. without the infrastructure to combat political instability as a result of agricultural issues, countries may see an exacerbation of other issues, including violence and poverty. the conclusions found in the work by brinkman and hendrix are important because of the problems they identify. while they are not the only academics to highlight the links between food insecurity and all manner of violent events, they do coherently articulate a critical point for my analysis: food insecurity has the potential to cause violence. for the purposes of this paper, it also makes it possible to question whether or not there are policies and programs that could be implemented to disrupt this causal chain. ultimately, brinkman and hendrix conclude that in order to break the link between food insecurity and conflict, nation-states, multilateral institutions, and ngos should focus on implementing mechanisms that shield food consumers and producers from short-term price instability.7 here, these authors analyze the cyclical nature of food security and conflict in the sahel, which encompasses a large swath of northern and sub-saharan africa, including the northern portions of senegal, burkina faso, nigeria, ethiopia, cameroon, the central african republic, and eritrea, among others. they posit two important claims: first, they illustrate that violent conflict is actually a driver of food insecurity,8 highlighting the hugely undiscussed reality that the relationship between acute food insecurity and violent conflict is a circular, self-perpetuating one. secondly, they provide evidence that shows how food insecurity can result in popular mobilization and be a risk multiplier for conflict. hendrix and brinkman, explicitly and intentionally, dismiss attempted monocausal explanations for violent conflict, instead choosing to argue that food insecurity is a risk multiplier rather than a monocausal explanation for conflict. by adapting their logic here, it is possible to make strong corollary claims for the impact of food insecurity and subsequently the implementation of agricultural development policy, while still recognizing the limitations of causal explanations for violent conflict more generally. the concept of risk multipliers is of particular importance when viewed through the perspective of us policy making. policy makers and elected representatives constrained by the political realities of a democratic system — especially the continuous election cycles of the american democratic system — have a difficult time endorsing policy decisions that lack short-term gratification or success guarantees. instead of making false claims about direct causation, 5 “food insecurity and conflict,” hendrix and brinkman, pg. 5 6 ibid.,pg. 6 7 “food and insecurity and conflict,” hendrix and brinkman, pg. 6 8 ibid.,pg. 1 planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 5 academics and policy professionals should embrace this concept of risk multiplication in an attempt to preemptively combat the disastrous effects of under-funded agricultural development policy. in addition to these main points, they provide evidence to suggest that participating in food security interventions or development can help decrease possibilities of conflict, contributing to more stable environments. hendrix and brinkman’s rejection of monocausal explanations of conflict (an important deviation in conflict literature in the policy space) and claims regarding the benefits of outside intervention provide crucial contextual evidence for claims about the effects of state stability that i make through analysis of the fund for peace’s fsi.9 “when hunger strikes” is a more recent piece by cullen hendrix, taking the form of a report commissioned by the chicago council on global affairs through their global food and agriculture program. hendrix provides evidence that suggests political instability is a direct cause of food insecurity. in this study, hendrix analyzes the relationship between food-price shocks in the global south and the occurrence of non-violent and armed conflict.10 using the food-price related government overthrows in madagascar, haiti, and the arab spring as starting points, he finds that food-related protests and riots were directly correlated with price spikes occurring to the fao food price index. with the support of these case studies and data from multilateral institutions like the world bank and the united nations, hendrix engages in a variety of policy recommendations for donors of international development and food security aid, including: the elimination of export bans, further research on the relationship between food insecurity and political instability, advocacy for the use of regional food balance sheets, the creation of new programs to assist governments in the transition from food subsidies to more sustainable types of aid, and direct us development involvement in the most food insecure regions of the planet —namely sub-saharan africa. rabah arezki and markus bruckner look at the effects of food prices on democracy and intra-state conflict in over 120 countries from 1970 – 2007. to do so, they: “... conduct country-specific food price index that is driven by the variation in the international food prices for a panel of over 120 countries during the 1970-2207. [they] use rigorous panel data techniques that account for both unobservable cross-country heterogeneity and common year shocks, and we identify the effects that international food price variations have on political and social stability from the within-country variation of the data.”11 using this methodology, arezki and bruckner analyze polity scores and food price indexes according to the fao and ultimately conclude that increases in food prices in low income countries (lics), dramatically deteriorate the standing of democratic institutions, while 9 “food and security and conflict,” hendrix and brinkman, pg. 6 10 ibid 11“food prices and political instability,” rabah arezki and markus bruckner, pg. 6 ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 simultaneously increasing the occurrence of anti-government demonstrations and other forms of civil conflict. in short, they find that food prices impact social and political stability. again, we see existing authors completing important and compelling work that highlights the observable relationship between food insecurity and volatile and political stability and civil conflict. with the exception of cullen hendrix’s “when hunger strikes,” however, none of these authors provide potential policy applications or study the impact that existing agricultural development policies have had on preventing the types of conflict observed in this study and so many others. the existing literature – summary these studies and pieces of literature are instrumental in creating the foundation for my analysis as they provide causal mechanisms and explanations for the relationships that i highlight between us agricultural development expenditures and state fragility levels in sub-saharan africa. despite the great work that has already been completed by these authors, agricultural development and its impact on conflict, violence, and state stability is still an extremely nascent field. by building on the existing literature and engaging with these topics on an analytical level, i hope to fill the important gaps in the literature. in summary, there is little work that has been done on how existing agricultural development policies have already helped contribute to state stability, and there is a dearth of research on how agricultural development spending actually works to mitigate the well-documented negative effects of acute food insecurity highlighted by authors like hendrix and henk-jan brinkman. by using the existing literature as a foundation and starting point for my analysis of us spending on agricultural development, i hope to engage the literature in a new way, discussing not how food insecurity causes conflict but how the conflict caused by food insecurity discussed in the aforementioned papers is addressed by us agricultural development policy. with this, i articulate an explicitly policy-driven final argument: not only does the data show that these types of policies can work, but they already are, which means that us agricultural development policy in particular should be continued and expanded. it stands to reason that if food insecurity is causally linked to outbreaks of violent conflicts, implementing policy that decreases food insecurity and its effects (like food price spikes) can decrease the likelihood of these events. more generally, however, i link the existing strands of thought on this issue. by combining the aforementioned impacts of food insecurity on a variety of different factors and indicators, i paint a more comprehensive picture of its effect on state stability, emphasizing the importance of using agricultural development policy as a diplomatic strategy and foreign policy tool over the next century. quantitative analysis – ethiopia with this literature in mind, it is possible to analyze a real world example, which highlights the positive impact of us agricultural development expenditures. to engage in a comprehensive analysis of this impact, a variety of different data sets are necessary to analyze the impact of us spending on agricultural development projects. the first data-set utilized is the planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 7 fund for peace’s fragile states index (fsi), which uses a variety of different indicators to measure the fragility of more than 170 states relative to one another, including the primary case study in this paper: ethiopia. the indicators used by fsi fall into four categories: cohesion (security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance), economic (economic decline, uneven economic development, human flight and brain drain), political (state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law), and social (demographic pressures, refugees and idps, external intervention). for consistency, i use the aggregate rating of these 12 indicators to highlight the relationship between state stability and us agricultural development expenditures. further research could analyze other indicators such as state legitimacy, levels of political opposition such as riots and uprisings, the occurrence of political violence in the forms of armed insurgents, terrorism, and political assassinations, or overall confidence in the government. for the purpose of illustrating a high-level relationship between us agricultural development spending and state stability, however, the aggregate rating proves most useful because of its generalizability.12 by looking at this yearly analysis of individual countries, it is possible to see how state fragility has fluctuated over time, which enables the identification of correlations between decreases in state fragility (practically known as increases in state stability), and american spending on agricultural development projects. the fund for peace data is not without criticism, however, and it is important to address some of the most compelling critiques of this database before engaging in a quantitative analysis of the relationship between this data and us agricultural development expenditures. one of the main critiques of this data is articulated well by bridget coggins, an associate professor of political science at the university of california, santa barbara. coggins argues that many concepts in the ranking remained undefined – from the sources of data for the 12 indicators of fragility itself – making an in-depth analysis of its contents difficult, if not impossible.13 additionally, the relationships between the indicators are not defined or explored, and are weighted equally. this makes it difficult to identify differences between types of governance relative to one another. while these criticisms are well-founded, the macro-scale lessons from the index still stand: generally speaking, states at the bottom of the list (determined to have lower levels of state fragility) are typically safer and better governed than those at the top. therefore, witnessing a state’s descent down the list of fragile states is still important to recognize and understand, regardless of the values, scoring, or mechanisms that allowed it to decline in score more generally. in addition to utilizing fund for peace’s fsi, data sets provided by the office of us foreign assistance resources (f bureau) at the us department of state are used to investigate the relationship between us government spending and state fragility. their influence comes from their aggregate nature; they include all us government spending on foreign development, including data on spending on behalf of all agencies. to illustrate the high-level relationship 12 fund for peace, fragile states index 13 “fragile is the new failure,” bridget coggins ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 8 between agricultural development implementation on behalf of the united states and state fragility, i utilize the total annual “spent” funds on u.s. foreign assistance, economic development, agriculture.14 other authors, particularly cullen hendrix and henk-jan brinkman, have offered important insight into the types of agricultural development policies that might be most effective. this is an important question to explore, especially when creating potential agricultural development policies. for the purposes of this paper, however, i am more concerned with highlighting the general trends related to us agricultural development overall, making this aggregate number the most representative indicator. the office of us foreign assistance resources identifies agriculture as: “the science and practice of food, feed, and fiber production (including forestry, wildlife, fisheries, aquaculture and floriculture) and its relationships to natural resources, processing, marketing, distribution, utilization (including nutrition), and trade.”15 functionally, this broad definition means that this indicator capture any us funds allocated towards to the production and management of natural resources (oil, diamonds, etc.), agricultural commodities (wheat, corn, maize, etc.), and livestock (fish, cattle, pigs, goats, etc.). with this information in mind, here is the quantitative data analysis of us agricultural development spending in ethiopia. in 2006, the first year that the fund for peace began compiling its fsi, ethiopia had a raw fsi score of 91.9, which steadily increased every year until 2010, when it stayed relatively even at 98.8, at the time making ethiopia the 17th most fragile state in the world.16 in 2013, however, things began to change, with three subsequent years of decline in ethiopia’s fragility score (also known as an increase in state stability) after nearly a decade of steady increases in state fragility, due in no small part to the fractured elites and lack of state capacity mentioned earlier. figure 1 illustrates this relationship, demonstrating the relationship between total us expenditures and state fragility score on the usaid indicator “us foreign assistance: economic development: agriculture: spent.” the united states spent almost nothing on agricultural development projects and assistance in ethiopia prior to 2013. this changed when the obama administration increased agricultural development spending in-country from merely $48,324 to $31,000,000. the results of this upsurge in spending, which would have begun to take effect after the end of fy 2013 in october of that calendar year, occurred in tandem with ethiopia’s first extended decrease in state fragility score since the beginning of the fund for peace’s record of state fragility. as state fragility in ethiopia continued to decrease in 2014 and 2015, us investment in agricultural development and assistance in the region grew to new heights, reaching 69.155 million in 2014 and 67.198 million in 2015. ethiopia’s fsi score matched this through an inverse relationship, declining through 2016. assistance in the region 14 foreign assistance tracker 15 ibid. 16 the fund for peace, fragile states index planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 9 grew to unprecedented levels, reaching 69.155 million in 2014 and 67.198 million in 2015. ethiopia’s fsi score matched this through an inverse relationship, declining through 2016. figure 1 u.s. department of state, foreign assistance fund for peace, fragile states index ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 10 what was responsible for this decline, and what explains the 2017 increase in state fragility? one answer may lie in the amount of us foreign assistance spending that was occurring at the same time as these fluctuations. the united states has complex spending patterns and projects, but there was almost no spending on agricultural development projects or assistance in ethiopia on behalf of us government agencies including the state department, the department of defense, usaid, and the united states department of agriculture. us policy in the region changed in 2013, when the obama administration increased agricultural development spending in-country from nearly zero to 31.47 million.17 this increase in spending occurred in tandem with ethiopia’s first decrease in state fragility score since the beginning of the fund for peace’s record of state fragility. as state fragility in ethiopia continued to decrease in 2014 and 2015, us investment in agricultural development and assistance in the region peaked reaching 69.155 million in 2014 and 67.198 million in 2015. ethiopia’s fsi score matched this through an inverse relationship, declining at faster rate in 2014 and 2015. while it is impossible to prove direct causation — and if cullen and hendrix’s well-reasoned argument against mono-causal explanations are to be accepted, there never can and never will be just one cause — it is clear that there is a direct correlation between the amount of significant agricultural development spending in the region and decreased levels of state fragility. academics and policy makers should both be asking the same question: is the decrease in fragility score observed after the increase in american aid a statistically significant one? in order to explore the statistical significance of these shifts in fragility score, i used a one-sample t-test to determine whether or not the final fragility score, 97.2 was a statistically significant distance from the average fragility score over a given period of years. in the event that the final recorded fragility score was a statistically significant distance from the mean, it would indicate that the impact of us agricultural development spending was a statistically significant one. first, i ran a one-sample t-test of the fragility score after recorded us agricultural development aid had been implemented in large numbers (97.2) against the average fragility score over the 11 years that the fund for peace has been recording this information (97.14). the resulting p-value from that test .93, which means that the final fragility score is not a statistically significant distance from the average fragility score over the entire 11 years. this is likely because of the outlier fragility score in 2006, when the fund for peace scored ethiopia at 91.9. i have included a visual representation of the one-sample t-test, which can be seen in figure 2. 17 foreign assistance tracker planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 11 figure 2, statacorp u.s. department of state, foreign assistance fund for peace, fragile states index the purpose of this study, however, is to identify the impact of increased levels of american food aid on state stability rather than analyzing levels of state stability independent of other factors. to reflect this , i ran the final state fragility score of 97.2 against the mean of ethiopia’s fragility scores from 2011-2016, or the only years for which data on u.s. food aid to the country exists. this test resulted in a mean of 98.8 and a p-value of .0196 — well within the range required to indicate that the decrease in state stability found in the years following substantial increases in american agricultural aid to ethiopia was a statistically significant distance away from the mean over this same period of time. this test indicates that the observed shift over this period of time had a significant impact. ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 12 figure 3, statacorp u.s. department of state, foreign assistance fund for peace, fragile states index when taken together, the combination of the easily observable relationship between us agricultural development expenditures and the statistical significance of the decrease in fragility score offers important insight into the effectiveness of us agricultural development policy as a whole. qualitative analysis -ethiopia in order to fully understand the impact of us agricultural investment in ethiopia, it is helpful to gain some insight into the country’s economic, political, social, and historical contexts. ethiopia has a total gdp of $47.5 billion with an average per capita income of $505. ethiopia’s population hit a staggering 94,100,756 in 2013 with an annual population growth rate of 2.55%.18 its urban population in the same year rested at 18.59%, which means that large swaths of the country still remain classified as rural land. a majority of these rural areas are farming communities. these numbers have likely increased since the world bank’s analysis in 2013.19 between 1998 and 2001, ethiopia experienced over 80,000 deaths as a result of state based violence during the eritrean–ethiopian war.20 as a result of this tumultuous start to the 21st century, ethiopia’s standing in the international community as seen through the perspective of state fragility was bleak, and the country was plagued by continued violence, fractured elites, and 18 world bank group 19 ibid. 20 uppsala conflict data program planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 13 a lack of state capacity even after the cessation of hostilities in 2000. although fund for peace did not officially begin tracking and ranking fragile states until 2006, it is easy to identify a clear pattern from that point onward, allowing for educated hypotheses about what the start of the new millennium would have had in store for ethiopia if the fund for peace had been tracking fsi data at the time. fractured elites, limited state capacity, and vast human rights abuses as a result of the end of the eritrean-ethiopian war resulting in ethiopia climbing to the top of the fragile states list. in 2006, ethiopia found itself fairly high on the list as the 26th most fragile state in the world. pre-eritrean-ethiopian war, however, it is likely that ethiopia would have found itself even further from the list of the world’s most fragile states. as the first decade of the 21st century marched onward, ethiopia saw steep increases in its total fragility index score. ethiopia is a particularly helpful example for another reason as well: its location in the horn of africa means that it is experiencing the same weather conditions currently faced by somalia, yemen, south sudan, and northeastern nigeria.21 as of october 2017, a total of 20 million people in all of these countries were on the brink of famine (with the exception of somalia, which has already declared a famine), making it the largest humanitarian crisis in terms of the number of people involved since world war ii.22 not only has the drought put these countries on the brink of famine, but terrorist organizations like al-qaeda have been able to take advantage of the opportunity, gaining ground against weakened state governments. this is a particularly important factor when evaluating the usefulness of agricultural development spending through the perspective of increasing us national security. if agricultural development spending is found to increase resilience to droughts and prevent governments from weakening further and potentially giving ground to armed insurgents, it could be used as an effective strategy to limit the reach or terrorist organizations, particularly in the global south. in addition, more than 5.3 million children are undernourished, with 1.4 million of them at risk of death from severe malnutrition and more than 600,000 of them are at imminent risk of death from starvation.23 ethiopia, due in no small part to immense agricultural development investment over the last decade, has been able to maintain its food security and keep famine at bay, while somalia has already officially declared a famine. because of continued investment in the region on behalf of the united states and other actors, ethiopia has been able to continue building its resilience – in and of itself an important aspect of global agricultural development policy. one of usaid’s core principles is mitigating violence and conflict, and it achieves this predominately through agricultural development policies that aim to increase resiliency. resiliency is defined as, “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.”24 this is an important concept to consider when 21 the chicago council on global affairs 22 ibid. 23 the chicago council on global affairs 24 resilience in the face of drought in ethiopia: new evidence ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 14 evaluating ethiopia’s ability to respond to the drought as a result of us agricultural development policy. to evaluate ethiopia’s resiliency as a result of usaid’s programs, it collected data from the same households, all of which were reached by usaid’s pastoralist area resilience improvement through market expansion (prime) project, repeatedly during the drought. by controlling for factors like household size, food assistance, education, assets, and the gender of the head of household, usaid was able to identify that households directly benefited from prime: they only saw a 4% decrease in food security as opposed to the 30% decrease observed in households that were not reached by prime.25 this is important for two reasons: first it illustrates that there are ways to isolate the impact of us agricultural development policies and spending. secondly, building resilience through agricultural development is crucial in keeping state fragility low. first, the level of state fragility found throughout the region makes it possible to illustrate the potential and demonstrate the impact of us spending on agricultural development policy. secondly, similarities in climate, gdp, population, and religions make it possible to control for some variables, strengthening the validity of the argument as a whole. while these countries are still incredibly diverse, with huge variations in ethnic makeup, gdp, and internal domestic and political factors, any small steps that help control for the massive number of potential confounding variables contribute to the accuracy of the analysis. policy applications and implications agricultural development is an effective way of increasing state stability. not only does it decrease levels of poverty, conflict, gender inequality, thereby increasing the stability of states, but it can also play a direct role in improving america’s national security. the links between radicalism, violent extremism, terrorism, and food insecurity are stark. ertharin cousin, previously an executive director of the world food programme, excellently articulated the reality that when young men are jobless and hungry, they turn to radical groups capable of providing those services in exchange for their support.26 the united states is still engaged in the global war on terror, with many trials and tribulations to come.. in order to effectively end this global counterinsurgency and combat expansive terrorist networks made more powerful by the global interconnectedness of our world, national security policy must look beyond traditional military strength and formulate dynamic new policies capable of striking one of the core causes of terrorism. agricultural development can play a strategic role in us counterterror policy, making its investment even more important, as if it were not important enough already. if the united states is serious about finishing the global war on terror, engaging in agricultural development policy and other development diplomacy strategies will be integral to success. in 2013, a kaiser foundation poll found that, on average, americans believe that the federal government spends 28% of the total budget on foreign aid. in reality, the u.s. government spends less than 1% of the budget on foreign aid. meanwhile, defense spending 25 ibid. 26 “food aid cuts ‘making refugees targets for isis recruitment’”, kareem shaheen. planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 15 accounts for more than 16% of the federal budget, totaling $646 million. by investing in agricultural development policy, not only could the united states decreased levels of state fragility, but it could also directly combat is recruitment and islamic extremism, which has been linked to food insecurity.27 the argument for agricultural development can be sold to lawmakers and the public the same way that seemingly uncontroversial increases in military spending are sold: it is an investment in us national security. in addition to increasing our national security, agricultural development policy also contributes the vital tenets of humanitarian aid that runs central to us engagement with the world – saving millions of lives in the process and making the entire international community safer. the us also stands to gain vital new partners and allies, resulting in economic and diplomatic boons that no amount of military intervention can achieve. finally the salience of food security issues to countries where the us has vested strategic interests. the following is a direct statement from the office of the director of national intelligence from a 2016 report on global food security: “we judge that the overall risk of food insecurity in many countries of strategic importance to the united states will increase during the next 10 years because of production, transport, and market disruptions to local food availability, declining purchasing power, and counterproductive government policies. demographic shifts and constraints on key inputs will compound this risk. in some countries, declining food security will almost certainly contribute to social disruptions or large-scale political instability or conflict, amplifying global concerns about the availability of food.’28 if agricultural development is not effective, it is still vital to us national security interests to begin addressing these issues, particularly as climate change and population increase continues to dramatically alter the political situations in the middle east, southeast asia, and sub-saharan africa. agricultural development efforts have a unique ability to advance strategic us interests.compounded by its effects on stabilizing food insecure regions and increasing state stability, agricultural development is a powerful, and drastically underutilized, weapon in the foreign policy and national security arsenals of the united states. conclusion there is much progress to be made in the fight against global conflict, poverty, and instability. there is ample literature to support the claim that strong links exist between food insecurity and increased levels of conflict and state fragility. if that theoretical framework holds, it stands to reason that investing in effective agricultural development policies would result in decreased levels of conflict and state fragility. this logical reasoning is already at play in subsaharan africa, where us agricultural development policy has played an important role in 27 kareem shaheen, the guardian 28 intelligence community assessment (pg. 1) ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 16 stabilizing countries. by comparing annual us agricultural spending and annual fragility score from the fund for peace’s (fsi), the correlation between us agricultural development policy and decreased levels of state fragility becomes clear. through statistical analysis, i have also demonstrated that the decreases in state fragility seen in ethiopia as a result of agricultural development spending are not insignificant, making the potential investment in these types of agricultural development policies even more worthwhile. ethiopia is just one example of the beneficial impacts that robust agricultural development policy can have. not only did it play a role in increasing state stability, it also helped advance strategic us national security interest in the region. through continued funding of international development programs and initiatives, the us is poised to make the world a safer, more stable place, while simultaneously advancing its national security. because of the strong links between violent extremism and food insecurity, the prevalence on food insecurity in countries vital to us interests, and the assured exacerbation of these issues over the next century as a result of climate change and population increase, the us would be wise to engage in agricultural development efforts at a greater scale. successful, long-term national security strategy should take all of this into account when evaluating its priorities in the global south, particularly when it comes to the horn of africa and the arabian peninsula. if the us, other countries, multilateral institutions, nonprofits, and ngos do not begin investing in capacity and resilience building now, especially in the vulnerable and volatile agricultural sector, the likelihood that stability will decrease in large swaths of the global south is virtually assured. my findings suggest that american disengagement from the international community is dangerous . if the us does not take advantage of its position as a global leader in international development and agricultural technology, the result will be a world with greater political instability.29 by taking advantage of this opportunity and leveraging the immense power of foreign investment and agricultural development in particular, the united states can save money and lives, both at home and abroad. 29 reforming and reorganizing u.s. foreign assistance, conor savoy and erol yayboke planting the seeds for stability: the power of development diplomacy and the impact of u.s. agricultural development policy on fragile states zach wehrli 17 references arezki, rabah, and markus bruckner. "food prices and political instability." imf working papers 11, no. 62 (2011): 1. doi:10.5089/9781455221066.001. brinkman, henk-jan, and cullen s. hendrix. "food insecurity and conflict." world development report, 2010. doi:10.1596/27510. "the budget and economic outlook: 2017 to 2027." congressional budget office. march 13, 2018. accessed april 19, 2018. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370. coggins, bridget. "fragile is the new failure." political violence at a glance. june 27, 2014. accessed march 11, 2018. http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/06/27/fragile-is-thenew-failure/. foreignassistance.gov. accessed march 11, 2018. https://foreignassistance.gov/analyze/wizard. 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"the fund for peace." fragile states index. accessed october 14, 2017. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 https://foreignassistance.gov/analyze/wizard http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/resilience%20at%20usaid%20-%20infographic.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/resilience%20at%20usaid%20-%20infographic.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/usaid-fact-sheet-resilience-evidence-april-2017.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/usaid-fact-sheet-resilience-evidence-april-2017.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/13/food-aid-cuts-making-refugees-targets-for-isis-recruitment https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/13/food-aid-cuts-making-refugees-targets-for-isis-recruitment http://fundforpeace.org/fsi ijois spring 2018 volume iv program in arms control & domestic and international security 18 "the world's largest humanitarian crisis since wwii." chicago council on global affairs. accessed march 11, 2018. https://digital.thechicagocouncil.org/worlds-largesthumanitariancrisis?utm_source=fb&utm_campaign=ysk18&utm_medium=social&utm_t erm=famine&utm_content=ion#home. "ucdp uppsala conflict data program." ucdp uppsala conflict data program. accessed october 12, 2017. http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory. united states. national intelligence council. office of the director of national intelligence, intelligence community assessment: global food security. september, 2015. http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 about the illini journal of international security the illini journal of international security (ijois) is a peer-reviewed undergraduate academic journal that was founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. ijois is published biannually through the university of illinois library with the support of the program of arms control & domestic and international security (acdis) and consists of exceptional undergraduate and graduate papers on topics related to international security or foreign affairs. ijois utilizes a crossdisciplinary approach and accepts papers from students studying the social sciences, stem fields, business and the humanities that analyze international security issues from innovative perspectives. while ijois is run by students at uiuc, the journal accepts submissions from students at all university of illinois campuses (urbana-champaign, chicago, and springfield). ijois staff editor-in-chief dylan hyams senior editors mark toledano editors ryan vetticad joe lehman web developer richard mcclure ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security a response to patrick pexton what about israel’s nuclear weapons? ayah jaber university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract while israel has never come forward to confirm that their nuclear weapons exist, it has become a general understanding among states that they exist. the state has not signed the non-proliferation treaty (npt) and made it clear in the late 1960s that they would not be the first state in the middle east to “introduce” nuclear weapons. however the ambiguity of their use of the word has led many to believe that it refers to openly testing and confirming their possession. even though the basic perception supports the existence of israel’s nuclear weapons, the united states has notably not pushed for them to be officially confirmed. this puts the average american worker in a compromising position, leaving them unable to either acknowledge these weapons of mass destruction nor criticize them without risking a halt in their professional progression. although pexton condemns the systems which have created this position, specifically denouncing the media’s lack of comprehensive analysis and coverage of israel’s nuclear weapons, his piece is deficient in giving the reader a thorough detailing of israel's relationship with nuclear weapons. continuing the confidentiality israel displays on the issue along with the laissez faire attitude adopted by the united states cannot allow for nuclear balance to ever be truly achieved or sustained. 15 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security quite often, israel is viewed as a delicate subject in the american political field. our questionable ties to the state results in each individual and system holding their opinions on the matter quite strongly. while there are passionate, opposing beliefs, the discourse concerning the state of israel and our connection to it is not often discussed in the manner it should be. especially not on platforms that hold much weight. this bleeds over into the way workers in america discuss the issue. the passive nature of many american professionals regarding israel is dangerous in regards to maintaining nuclear balance. they seemingly try to take the pressure off of themselves and place it onto other professionals however still attempting to seem engaged. pexton, although criticizing this very occurrence, demonstrates it perfectly in his piece.26 while, understandably, a dangerously passive nature of communicating a certain topic can not be overwhelmingly positive, there are some positive outcomes. pexton discusses one benefit of the united states not pressuring israel to be open about possessing nuclear weapons -that there is no added pressure for other arab states to have their own nuclear weapons. for many, keeping the number of states with access to nuclear weapons as low as possible is a main concern. so, the united states’ underwhelming reaction to israel’s nuclear weapons helps achieve that goal. however, there is another benefit that pexton does not address. without other arab states having control over nuclear weapons, there is less reason for the united states, and other nations, to call war onto those states under false pretenses. however, that is where the benefits end. pexton goes on to mention the fear of criticizing israel among american professionals as he says that it is almost an immediate way to stop the progression of one's career. this idea is supported by the mere existence of the israel anti-boycott bill. introduced27 in 2017, this bill would have criminalized individuals with involvement in foreign commerce supporting boycotts of israel proposed by international government organizations. yet, this bill did not pass. pexton goes on to give credence to the notion that because of israel’s origins, it is not at “fault” for having control of nuclear weapons. however, the beginnings of israel are irrelevant28 to the matter at hand. the state of israel continuously preaches peace among arab nations and has attacked these states under the guise of bringing peace to the middle east. yet through these attacks, israel itself fails to commit to a peaceful middle east. israel has long utilized the begin doctrine, the term widely used to describe its government’s attacks on any enemy state’s production of weapons of mass destruction. most notably this has applied to the production of nuclear weapons. the israeli government has come forth to declare that it stands for its citizens and that it will not allow anything that could overwhelmingly harm them to be manufactured.29 however, many have wondered if the israeli government is simply trying to disguise its attempts to ensure no other state in the region obtains nuclear weapons. if one were to do so, 29 “fact sheet: israel's nuclear arsenal.” center for arms control and non-proliferation, june 23, 2020. https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-israels-nuclear-arsenal/. 28 see footnote 1. 27 israel anti-boycott act. bill (2017). 26 pexton, patrick b. “patrick pexton: what about israel's nuclear weapons?” the washington post. wp company, august 31, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/patrick-pexton-what-about-israels-nuclear-weapons/2012/08/31/390e486 a-f389-11e1-a612-3cfc842a6d89_story.html. 16 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security israel would be under more pressure to be open about their possession of nuclear weapons. it is no surprise that there is pressure among american professionals to not critique israel as the state’s actions clearly mirror similar calls for peace made by the united states that are often a mask to give reason for attacking another nation. the main point pexton attempts to bring home is the manner in which the media is at fault for not giving the reality of israel and its nuclear weapons more in depth coverage. i concur with this notion. ultimately, any nation having control of nuclear weapons has the ability to affect anyone. it is therefore the job of the media to inform its viewers. unfortunately, it is difficult to appreciate pexton’s calls when he displays the same actions that he criticizes. without giving possible solutions to the fears that bar american professionals from criticizing israel, it is futile that the author argues that we need more publications to discuss the presence of these weapons. discussing israel’s nuclear weapons in more depth and with more analysis than the author does here would be contradictory to what he says is crucial information to understanding the general american position. while pexton himself is the media, the most he does is state that israel has nuclear weapons but gives no clear critique on the hypocrisy of this and, instead, spends most of his piece critiquing the media for not having proper coverage on the issue while he himself is engaging in that very type of lackluster coverage. all in all, pexton is the perfect example of the very thing he is criticizing. solely mentioning the existence of the nuclear weapons that israel possesses but not giving any concrete analysis is the type of coverage that pexton began his piece critiquing. yet overall, his thesis is correct. the only chance of keeping nation states holding states accountable is through national pressure. but national pressure can not occur without the average citizen being aware of the facts. while there are benefits to israel not being upfront about their possession of nuclear weapons, including the lowered pressure on neighboring states to obtain their own nuclear weapons, they do not outway the negative social and physical repercussions. on the international field, neither achieving nor sustaining nuclear balance is possible if the attitude displayed by both israel and the united states continues and becomes standard practice. 17 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security 18 ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 contents the nuclear awakening of china………………………………………………………………..8 at what cost? examining the efficacy of military intervention……………………………….17 in support of an independent kurdistan………………………………………………………...28 the justification of international military intervention in response to human rights abuses….......................................................................................................................................43 ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 program in arms control & domestic and international security a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 38 a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary university of illinois at urbana champaign abstract in response to the inevitable destruction of its territorial caliphate, the islamic state (is) has transitioned to an insurgency in iraq. this insurgency is active and increasingly well entrenched. the iraqi government has made a series of problematic decisions which have enabled is and bolstered its narrative. however, if the iraqi government were to rectify these mistakes it has an opportunity to significantly decrease support for the islamic state. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 39 introduction claims of the islamic state’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. while is’s territorial caliphate has been dismantled, it survives in its affiliate network and as an insurgency. in iraq is has successfully transitioned back to an insurgency. it is conducting attacks on a regular basis in several providences. the iraqi insurgency is well established, and the islamic state is prepared for a long war of attrition. the iraqi government has enabled the islamic state’s survival and recovery through four problematic decisions. the iraqi government has pursued a policy of retributive justice and security forces have engaged in unpunished extrajudicial violence. the iraqi government has created large internally displaced persons (idp) camps and detention camps that are prime is recruiting grounds. the iraqi government has failed to provide adequate infrastructure and services to citizens. finally, the iraqi government has not invested in local security forces. if the iraqi government continues these behaviors it is unlikely that it will be able to successfully destroy or contain is. return to insurgency the islamic state’s conventional defeats have substantially weakened it. the organization has lost leaders, resources, fighters, and prestige. waging open warfare exposed is to the superior conventional forces of its foes. the loss of territory has reduced is’s revenue streams and its ability to present itself as a state. at its peak is commanded approximately 45,000 fighters in iraq and syria (mitchell, 2018). a report from the summer of 2018 stated that the us department of defense estimated that is had 15,000-17,100 fighters in iraq (lead inspector general). is’s fighting force may have atrophied further but what remains still represents a significant threat due to is’s decision to revert to insurgency. insurgent warfare is an inherently asymmetric strategy and does not require is to achieve military preponderance. it is important to remember that is’s predecessor organization the islamic state of iraq (isi) was once reduced to less than 700 fighters (callimachi, 2019). failure to capitalize on this weakness allowed isi to regroup and lead directly to the rise of the islamic state. the same mistake must not be repeated; is cannot be allowed to recuperate and re-entrench itself. in 2017 the prime minister of iraq proclaimed victory over the islamic state (coker & hassan). although his statement was inaccurate, he was correct in asserting that is’s ability to hold territory conventionally was at an end. however, is had already begun to transition back to an insurgency. islamic state leadership had long prepared for the inevitable destruction of its physical caliphate. hassan (2018) argues that the group was discussing a desert-based insurgency as early as summer 2016. evidence for this can be found in how is moved to adjust its propaganda and prepare followers for the transition to insurgency. in a may 2016 address, the spokesman at the time abu muhammad al-adnani publicly announced the organization’s expectation that it would lose all cities and its plan to return to insurgency (hassan, 2018). this adjustment can also be seen in military behavior. after the fall of mosul, the organization became significantly less willing to fight conventionally and repeatedly ceded territory. as is demonstrated at baghouz it still could mount significant defensive efforts when it chose to. a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 40 instead, the leadership prioritized conserving men and material for insurgent operations (hassan, 2018). the islamic state has also been preparing financially for insurgency. it smuggled up $400 million out of iraq and has transitioned to revenue streams which do not require territorial control such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and extortion (clarke, 2018). extortion is a particularly important source of revenue for is as it also serves to assert a level of control over the local population. these extensive preparations indicate that the transition to insurgency was part of a planned decision and not purely due to degraded capability. today the islamic state today has fully transitioned back to insurgency. by the end of october 2018 is had launched at least 1,270 attacks (knights, 2018). the organization has established itself in the rural areas of iraq and the ungoverned zones near the syrian border (hassan, 2018). is generally avoids hardened targets such as police stations instead choosing to strike unguarded targets (knights, 2018). even if is cannot conventionally contest security forces it still exerts a significant degree of control over the regions it operates in. night time checkpoints are common as well as targeted assassinations of problematic local leaders (hassan, 2018). killing prominent opposition leaders is an essential element in is’s attempt to reestablish itself as an insurgency. by doing so is seeks to intimidate rural communities into compliance and deter cooperation with security forces. is focuses such operations in the areas it seeks to establish strongholds in. according to knight (2018) “in southern nineveh, rural kirkuk, and northern diyala, there were 103 targeted assassinations in the first 10 months of 2018 (75% of all islamic state assassinations during that period).” furthermore, as an insurgency is reach is greater than as a conventional force (hassan, 2018). is never conquered the diyala governorate but it is now one of the centers of the new insurgency (knights, 2018). the islamic state no longer seeks decisive confrontations but an extended war of attrition. the iraqi government and its security forces must adapt to this new phase of the conflict. counterproductive iraqi decisions the iraqi government has made several decisions which have aided the islamic state. if these policies remain unchanged, they will significantly hinder anti-is efforts. the islamic state presents itself as the sole champion of the iraqi sunni population in a hostile world. according to this narrative, the central iraqi government is a sectarian shia intuition which conspires with dark foreign forces to keep the sunni populace oppressed and powerless. cooperation with the iraqi government is impossible as it is fundamentally hostile to sunnis and thus violent resistance is the only option. the problems described below each benefit is in their own unique way, but the common link is that they strengthen is’s narrative. the iraqi government must not allow is to brand it as a hostile out-group actor for that is the path to mass radicalization (mccauley & moskalenko, 2008). according to munqith al-dagher, one of iraq’s premier pollsters, dissatisfaction and distrust of the central government have always been the islamic state’s greatest sources of support in iraq, not religious fervor (2015). this is fortunate as it means that it is within the iraqi government’s ability to reduce is’s domestic appeal. if is’s support was truly religious in nature ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 41 the problem would be significantly more difficult to resolve. instead, the iraqi government has the ability and responsibility to restrict is’s support base by resolving locals’ grievances. by addressing the problematic behaviors described below the iraqi government can make significant progress in its struggle against is. cycle of revenge iraqi military and paramilitary forces have engaged in widespread extrajudicial violence. systematic executions of suspected is members were especially common during the fall of mosul. human rights watch’s june 4, 2017 article reporting that the bodies of 26 blindfolded and handcuffed men had been found and that security forces had been implicated was typical for the period. according to a 2018 report from the un special rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions many of these extrajudicial executions were conducted by popular mobilization forces (pmf). the popular mobilization forces are a paramilitary organization aligned with the iraqi government comprised of numerous militias. many of the pmf militias explicitly identify as shia. thus, their excesses are particularly inflammatory and likely to inflame sectarian tensions. security forces have also “disappeared” large numbers of people (ohchr, 2017). some are released, often alleging abuses during their detentions, but many remain missing. iraq currently has the largest number of missing persons in the world due largely to forced disappearances (human rights council, 2018). extrajudicial violence creates a backlash effect that strengthens the islamic state. there is a significant and expanding literature that supports the backlash thesis which holds that overly harsh counterterrorism policies can strengthen terrorist groups (faria & arce, 2012). extrajudicial violence is extreme enough to provoke this effect as well as trigger more conventional routes of radicalization. prior work has identified personal victimhood and political grievance as causes for individual radicalization in addition to mass radicalization due to conflict with an outgroup (mccauley & moskalenko, 2008). extrajudicial violence by state forces facilitates all these paths to radicalization. when the relatives of those slain seek vengeance it is the islamic state that they will turn to. furthermore, every death widens the perceived gap between the local population and the central government. how can people trust the government that stood by as their relatives were killed by its security forces? ultimately, in an insurgency the objective is the support of the local population. abuses by the security forces alienate the contested population decreasing intelligence flow and increasing insurgent support. the massacres during and after the fall of mosul are particularly problematic as research indicates that mass killings are strongly associated with increased terrorist violence (avdan & uzonyi, 2017). these events polarize society and become a rallying cry for anti-government forces. the iraqi judicial system has also been the scene of significant abuses. the iraqi government’s determination to hold members of is accountable is laudable but its current course of action is not. trials are perfunctory, evidence is optional and death by hanging common (human rights watch, 2017a). the scale of the problem is daunting. from february to late august of 2017 the nineveh counterterrorism court alone initiated the trials of 5,500 isis a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 42 suspects (human rights watch, 2017a). the individuals brought to trial are frequently arrested in dragnet operations or due to unsubstantiated accusations. for instance, pmf forces separated out approximately 1,300 men and boys from a refugee caravan fleeing falluja in june 2016 (human rights council, 2018). of that number approximately half were later found to have been transferred to government custody and the other half remain missing (human rights council, 2018). the accused rarely have proper legal counsel, in part because the iraqi government has harassed defense lawyers and threatened to charge them as terrorists (human rights watch, 2018). treatment of detainees is also problematic. due to the policy of mass internment the iraqi judicial and detainment systems are overloaded. even those found innocent frequently spend months in overcrowded prisons (human rights watch, 2017a). there is evidence of widespread torture of detainees (human rights watch, 2017a). there is also the potential prison radicalization issue. it is true that the prison radicalization threat is often overstated (jones, 2014). however, the way iraq is managing prisoners seems designed to facilitate prison radicalization. large numbers of low threat detainees (those arrested in mass operations and those arrested for nonviolent crimes) are being held alongside hardened jihadis (human rights watch, 2017a). the terrorist population is not so diluted as to be ineffective. the trauma of prison is amplified by the poor treatment of prisoners encouraging group bonding amongst prisoners as a support and coping mechanism. this increased cohesion due to isolation and external threats facilitates radicalization (mccauley & moskalenko, 2008). the torture of prisoners is liable to accelerate this process as it creates clear group grievances against the state and its security forces that is adherents can exploit. the wanton abuse of the iraqi judicial system is perhaps even more dangerous than extrajudicial violence. it clearly establishes the central government as an enemy of the sunni population. there is no deniability or separation as with the instances of extrajudicial violence. the formal institutions of the central government are clearly unfairly executing sunnis. furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the judicial process clearly signals that innocence is no protection. this disincentives loyalty to the central government as it is not rewarded and reduces the perceived price of supporting is. the sunni population was already primed to be distrustful of the iraqi government before the latest excesses (al-dagher, 2015). a populace that distrusts the judicial system is unlikely to cooperate with security services. which means that counterinsurgency operations will lack crucial intelligence. in response, the iraqi security forces may choose to utilize less discriminant methods which will only advance the cycle of distrust. the iraqi government must restore faith in the legitimacy of its judicial institutions. trials of suspected is members should continue but with proper rule of law and standards of evidence. moreover, the iraqi government should prosecute those responsible for some of the most extreme extrajudicial violence. doing so may be costly politically but it demonstrates that the government is not a purely sectarian actor and is truly committed to achieving justice. if handled properly trials of is members could be a potent weapon against the organization. the government should take the opportunity to publicize is’s abuses of the community it claims to protect and drive a ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 43 wedge between the two. additionally, credible trials present the iraqi government to brand is as criminals instead of martyrs. displaced and detained populations the devastation of the campaign against is left many internally displaced. the internally displaced sunni population could be fertile is recruiting ground. during the battle of mosul is was already recruiting from displaced civilian populations (hassan, 2018). displaced persons camps are particularly attractive to is recruiters as they provide a concentrated audience with few ties. furthermore, conditions in the camps are often poor which leads to dissatisfaction with the central government. more problematic still are allegations that security forces are abusing the civilian populace in idp camps (mosul eye, 2017). such behavior guarantees that the populace sees security forces as enemies and jailors instead of liberators and protectors. the central government must prioritize getting displaced citizens back to their homes. if they fail to do so they present is with concentrations of increasingly dissatisfied potential recruits with few ties that would prevent them from joining. the iraqi government has also established large-scale internment for supposedly islamic state affiliated families. although not officially imprisoned the families are forcibly relocated into idp camps which security forces prevent them from leaving (wille, 2018). doing so creates a permanent support base for is by inhibiting individuals’ ability to rejoin iraqi society. many of those detained in these camps are guilty only by association or of being in the wrong place at the wrong time (wille, 2018). furthermore, it is likely that these camps are vectors for large-scale radicalization. just as camp bucca served to radicalize much of is’s current leadership the new detention camps may create the next generation of insurgent leadership. this is especially likely as the iraqi government has chosen to detain children in these camps (wille, 2018). the decision to hold these families in idp camps facilitates the radicalization of actually displaced individuals in addition to the families being detained. the iraqi government has created a dilemma for itself. it must either indefinitely keep a large population detained on little evidence or it must release a population that it has alienated and radicalized. the only way to minimize the damage is to selectively release as many detainees as possible and leave only those whom the government is certain are clear danger. in particular, the children must be brought out of the camps before is gains a new generation of aggrieved supporters. failure to provide services the islamic state and its predecessor organizations have long exploited the central government’s failure to provide reliable infrastructure and civil services. prior research indicates that low state capacity and weak civil institutions correlate with increased terrorist activity (hendrix & young, 2014). iraqi infrastructure has historically been poor as sanctions, economic mismanagement and wars have left lasting damage. in the 1980s iraq was one of the most developed middle east countries in terms of infrastructure and social services (beeher, 2006). however, by 2006 the once proud nation was in disrepair. that year a us report found that only a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 44 a quarter of the iraqi population had access to potable water (beeher, 2006). failure to provide reliable infrastructure and services reduces local faith in government, making is a more attractive alternative. the islamic state spent a significant amount of effort and money providing services to areas under their control. is organized a dmv, ran a garbage collection system, and provided utilities (callimachi, 2018). this behavior is not unique to the islamic state criminal and insurgent organizations often fill the void when states fail to provide services. doing so signals that the group is more capable than the government and allows it to co-opt locals. since the iraqi government has historically underperformed it is easier for is to surpass it. is often intentionally worsens problems seeking to further discredit the government. supply of electricity provides an illustrative example. iraq regularly experiences protests, of an often-violent nature, when insufficient electrical infrastructure leaves many without any cooling during iraq’s brutally hot summer (barnard 2015; mohammed, 2018). the islamic state has repeatedly attacked power plants and parts of the power distribution system (al jazeera, 2017; ali, 2018). the is attacks are focused on sections of the electricity infrastructure that supply sunni communities. although shia communities also see similar issues and protests, is has not sought to systematically attack their power infrastructure. this indicates that the attacks on the power infrastructure are not intended as a means of punishing the local population, but to further exploit an existing local grievance with the government. after these attacks is can point the lack of power as proof of the government’s inability to provide basic services. more importantly, such attacks increase general discontent with the central government. it is this general feeling that the central government does not care for the local population that is exploits. of the problems listed this is the hardest to resolve. the iraqi government claims that reconstruction will cost $88 billion, an already significant figure (chmaytelli & hagagy, 2018). however, others assert that actual cost is more likely around $198 billion (gunter, 2018). furthermore, the iraqi government relies heavily on oil revenue to finance the rebuilding and oil prices are low (gunter, 2018). thus, a slow and difficult rebuilding process is inevitable. however, the iraqi government can make positive changes. firstly, it must increase infrastructure security in areas of is activity. this signals commitment to the local populace and will reduce the islamic states ability to worsen the situation. for is the key is not that the infrastructure situation is poor but that the populace blames the government for the situation and believes is can do better. thus, the government should seek to invert is’s narrative and position itself as the defender of infrastructure. secondly, the iraqi government must quickly make tangible improvements to citizens lives in contested areas. the liberation of is held territory is an opportunity for the iraqi government to reinvent itself as a positive force. since this opportunity is fleeting speed is more important than scale. finally, the iraqi government should not let the rebuilding crisis go to waste. rebuilding will require a great deal of unskilled labor. the iraqi government would be wise to use this opportunity to employ idle youth who might otherwise be recruited by is. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 45 failure to rebuild local security institutions the iraqi government has not significantly invested in rebuilding local security forces. instead, it has preferred to use pmf paramilitaries as a holding force (knights, 2016). this is a two-fold mistake. first, as previously mentioned is greatest fear is local sunnis joining the security forces. security forces have been most successful when they have cooperated with and integrated the local sunni population. islamic state leadership largely attributes the defeat of its predecessor organization isi in 2008-2009 to the sahwat (hassan, 2018). the sahwat were sunni tribal paramilitary forces that assisted in the struggle against the islamic state of iraq. in many ways the story of sahwat is prophetic. incredibly successful against isi forces they were ultimately disbanded by the maliki government which refused to integrate them into the national security forces. this inevitably led to the security vacuum which is exploited in its rise to power. secondly relying upon non-local security forces creates a clear division between the populace and the security forces. instead of the situation being the central government and locals fighting together against is it becomes the central government sending its forces to police the locals. in this second narrative, it is easy for is to insert itself as the representative of the local population and the vehicle of liberation. using pmf fighters to provide security in contested territory is particularly problematic due to their tainted reputation. the central government does not have enough security resources to fully control the rural areas which is now bases itself. there are large ungoverned zones in iraq that provide the islamic state with a secure area to rest, train and store equipment (hassan, 2018). areas such as the diyala delta are characterized by rough terrain, rural nature and potentially supportive sunni populations (knights, 2016). by refusing to build up local security forces the central iraqi government only worsens its manpower deficiency. building local security forces engages locals in the security process and enhances their ability to defend themselves. is’s insurgency is primarily rural in nature which means that targets are geographically dispersed. equally dispersed local security forces are necessary to provide comprehensive security and compliment the more concentrated central government forces. is has made targeting village leaders who do not support the group a priority (knights, 2018). so far is has been successful in this campaign of terror. local security units would degrade is’s ability to conduct such attacks and thus their ability to exert control over rural communities. conclusion the islamic state has been injured but not destroyed. in iraq it has successfully transitioned to insurgency and is rapidly re-establishing itself. the iraqi government has enabled this by feeding the is narrative that the central government is intrinsically hostile to the sunni population and only is can protect and care for them. domestic iraqi support for is generally stems from the populace’s disappointment in and distrust of the central government and its security forces. therefore, if the iraqi government were to address the populace’s grievances it could significantly degrade is support base. it is essential that foreign partners understand that the struggle against is has not ended and provide the iraqi government with the support it a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 46 requires. further research on how is’s international affiliates interact with the iraqi insurgency could help guide further suggestions. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 47 references al-dagher, m. (2015, march 14). how iraqi sunnis really feel about the islamic state. washington post. retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com al jazeera. (2017, september 2). isil suicide attack on iraq power plant kills seven: one attacker wearing army uniform and armed with grenades detonates himself while police shoot down two others. al jazeera. retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com ali, s. (2018, may 25). iraqi cities face complete power outage after is targets towers in kirkuk. kurdistan 24. retrieved from www.kurdistan24. avdan, n., & uzonyi, g. (2017). v for vendetta: government mass killing and domestic terrorism. studies in conflict & terrorism, 40(11), 934-965. barnard, a. (2015, august 1). 120 degrees and no relief? isis takes back seat for iraqis. new york times. retrieved from www.nytimes.com beeher, l. (2006, june 22). iraq’s faltering infrastructure. council on foreign relations. retrieved from https://www.cfr.org callimachi, r. (2018, april 4). described as defeated islamic state punches back with guerilla tactics. new york times. retrieved from www.nytimes.com callimachi, r. (2019, january 21). the isis files. new york times. retrieved from www.nytimes.com chmaytelli, m., & hagagy, a. (2018, february 12). iraq says reconstruction after war on islamic state to cost $88 billion. reuters. retrieved from https://www.reuters.com clarke, c.p. (2018, october 10). isis’s new plans to get rick and wreak havoc. rand. retrieved from https://www.rand.org/blog coker, m. & hassan, f. (2017, december 9). iraqi prime minister declares victory over isis. new york times. retrieved from www.nytimes.com faria, j. r., & arce, d. (2012). counterterrorism and its impact on terror support and recruitment: accounting for backlash. defence and peace economics, 23(5), 431-445. gunter, f. r. (2018, november 21). rebuilding iraq’s public works infrastructure following the defeat of isis. foreign policy research institute: program on the middle east. retrieved from https://www.fpri.org hassan, h. (2018, september). out of the desert: isis’s strategy for a long war. middle east institute. retrieved from https://www.mei.edu/publications hendrix, c. s., & young, j. k. (2014). state capacity and terrorism: a two-dimensional approach. security studies, 23(2), 329-363. human rights council. (2018, june 20). report of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to iraq (a/hrc/38/44/add.1). retrieved from http://ap.ohchr.org human rights watch. (2017a, december 5). flawed justice: accountability for isis crimes in iraq. human rights watch. retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report human rights watch. (2017b, june 4). iraq: dozens found handcuffed, executed in, around mosul: evidence points to killings by government forces. retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/ https://www.aljazeera.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/ https://www.cfr.org/ http://www.nytimes.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/ https://www.reuters.com/ http://www.nytimes.com/ https://www.mei.edu/publications http://ap.ohchr.org/ a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it zachary cleary 48 https://www.hrw.org/news human rights watch. (2018, september 12). iraq: officials threatening, arresting lawyers: blocks services for isis suspects and their families. retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news jones, c. r. (2014). are prisons really schools for terrorism? challenging the rhetoric on prison radicalization. punishment & society, 16(1), 74-103. knights, m. (2018, december). the islamic state inside iraq: losing power or preserving strength? ctc sentinel, 11(11). retrieved from https://ctc.usma.edu knights, m. (2016, august 25). contesting facts on the ground in iraq. war on the rocks. retrieved from https://warontherocks.com lead inspector general for operation freedom’s sentinel. (2018, august 20). operation inherent resolve report/operation pacific eagle-philippines, report to the united states congress, april 1, 2018-june 30, 2018. retrieved from https://media.defense.gov mccauley, c., & moskalenko, s. (2008). mechanisms of political radicalization: pathways toward terrorism. terrorism and political violence, 20(3), 415-433. mitchell, e. (2018, january 22). experts warn isis still has up to 10,000 loyalists in syria, iraq: report. the hill. retrieved from https://thehill.com mohammed, a. (2018, july 15). two protesters killed in clashes with iraqi police as unrest spreads in south. reuters. retrieved from https://www.reuters.com mosul eye. (2017, april 10). a message to human rights watch. retrieved from https://mosuleye.org office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights [ohcrh]. (2017, november 24). end of visit statement of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her visit to iraq. retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org wille, b. (2018, november 14). iraq’s so-called “isis families”: rounded up, vilified, forgotten. human rights watch. retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news https://www.hrw.org/news https://www.hrw.org/news https://ctc.usma.edu/ https://media.defense.gov/ https://thehill.com/ https://www.reuters.com/ https://www.ohchr.org/ a return to insurgency in iraq: the islamic state’s transition to insurgency and the iraqi mistakes that have aided it program in arms control & domestic and international security empty promises: the denuclearization of ukraine and its effects twenty years later paisley ann meyer 56 the paradigm shifts in intelligence: from 1800 to present madison k. johnston university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract this article reviews the evolution of intelligence gathering methods from the late 1800’s to the cold war. while the changes in these methods can be directly connected to the development of improved technology and changing ideology, the concerns and arguments around these methods have remained the same. the progress of time blurred the lines between foreign and domestic actions. at the same time, perceived threats to nations moved from external to internal as information and communicating became easier to access. through the years, the field of intelligence has gotten more complex as ideology, institutions, and technology have become increasingly interconnected and diverse. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 57 introduction while the methods of gathering information used for intelligence purposes have changed drastically over the past few centuries, some of the concerns and arguments surrounding these methods remain the same. the changes that have occurred are directly related to the evolution and development in technology and ideology. what remains the same is directly related to the relationship between a populace and its government. as the world becomes more and more interconnected, the lines between foreign and domestic are becoming blurrier. from eras of western imperialism and autocracy to decolonization and democratization, intelligence has remained a constant effort in order for governments maintaining control domestically as well as understanding how allies and foes are operating abroad. mark lowenthal describes intelligence as a process, a product, and an organization (2017). this definition of intelligence still rings true today and has been true throughout all of history as governments have put institutions in place which gather information of value either diplomatically or during a period of war. carl von clausewitz of the 19th century said, “war… is merely the continuation of diplomacy by other means (clausewitz, 1962).” in sun tzu’s the art of war, he argues that knowledge is power on the battlefield and in order to defeat your enemy, deception is necessary (tzu, 2006). these ideas of war and diplomacy are considered to be timeless by some and outdated by others. one thing has not changed: gathering information about other actors whether in war time or time of negotiation are crucial for advancing a nation’s interests. throughout the 1800’s, perceived threats to sovereign states began to shift from external to internal as a result of increased access to information and communication during the industrial revolution. not only were nations worried about their enemies abroad, but they were also worried about potential threats on their own soil. a similarity can be found in the wake of the rise of the internet and how domestic surveillance has increased dramatically. today information and intelligence are shared between nations through organizations such as the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) and the five eyes (fvey). the organizations which have gathered and analyzed information have evolved from the cryptographers and code breakers in the “black cabinets” of 18th century europe, to the secret agents operating in britain’s colonies post world war ii, to the creation of multi-national intelligence organizations and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (j-isr) efforts in nato and the european union (eu) (gottemoeller, 2018). these overarching themes of technological development, ideology, and structural organization have remained consistent over the past two centuries, but some of the overarching questions of intelligence ethics remain. how vital is the truth to good intelligence? what is considered ethical and not ethical in intelligence operations? where is the line drawn for surveillance? how can a government ensure privacy and security for their citizens while monitoring for internal threats? what are the relationships between the intelligence community and policy makers? how has cybersecurity introduced a new threat to intelligence? these uncompromising questions have not disappeared, nor will they disappear for some time. looking back into the history of intelligence, we can understand how these questions formed and changed over time. we will find that they have grown more complex as technology, ideology, and institutions have evolved to be more interconnected and diverse than ever before. industrial revolution the first half of the 19th century held many changes in technology, ideology, and the human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 58 organization of governments and therefore intelligence services. the industrial revolution was in full swing and that meant advancements in communication, transportation, information, manufacturing, health, and war. notable inventions include the telegraph in the 1830s, the telephone in the 1870s, an undersea cable between europe and north america by 1866, and the radio in 1895. along with these new methods of communication came new methods of documenting information and record keeping. the typewriter allowed for information to be copied quickly onto index cards and then organized into steel filing cabinets (warner, 2014). but for the autocratic rulers in europe in the early 1800’s, these advancements resulted in the questioning of their powers and citizens called for a greater representation in their governments. the revolutions across europe in 1848 were a direct response to the oppression populations had lived under for so long at the hand of monarchies that ideas of liberalism quickly spread with the help of new technologies. this marked the end of the medieval era “black cabinets” that had existed in europe previously. these intelligence offices relied upon intercepted information of other powers and then had professional code breakers and deciphering specialists who worked for the european monarchs (tulard, 1991). but these technological advances of the industrial revolution did not come without consequences for the average person and low-wage worker. the rise in manufacturing lowered the number of jobs and devalued the skills of the common urban worker. many skilled laborers saw their trades overrun by machines and new inventions which created a sense of loss in society. economically, these advancements isolated money to the high echelons of society resulting in monopolies and oligarchies that abused working class citizens and did not adequately provide for them (warner, 2014). the fight for liberal ideals continued throughout the century on both the domestic and foreign fronts. advancements in technology also includes advancements in design of weapons. warner writes, “if liberal ideals of property rights, trade, and the rule of law had gained wide influence in the west, the prosperity they helped to create ensured that the introduction to such ideas in the rest of the world was often announced by cannon fire” (warner, 2014). in the 1860’s, the united states was ravaged by civil war. union soldiers employed the use of heavier than air balloons to scout out where confederate forces were hiding. warner gives the example of union allegiant captain custer who would send his reconnaissance balloon into the air before sunrise in order to scout confederate campfires locations (warner, 2014). these balloons seemed like a crucial and competitive technology at the time, but overtime the heavier than air reconnaissance vessels were seen as slow and vulnerable. meanwhile in europe, leaders were more concerned with putting the industrialization of war to good use by quelling uprisings and revolutionaries on their mainland and abroad. the british empire was full force in asserting their power and influence over central and southern asia in india, persia, and afghanistan. however, the russian empire was also expanding their affairs into the region. the feud between the two empires became known as the “great game” and british foreign dignitaries gathered intelligence on russia’s dealings with tribal leaders in afghanistan. this was an old pastime of british spies in their colonies. late 1800’s by 1873, the topographical and statistics department of the war office had been renamed to the intelligence branch (later the intelligence department) and worked to gather useful intelligence on foreign militaries, maps, and developments in their colonies around the world. in india, british intelligence efforts were much more intrusive to the native populations than in afghanistan. india had a history of established communications and government as seen ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 59 in the mughal and hindu systems and were very well organized. when the british east india trading company arrived and set out to exploit the land and people, they did so ineffectively with little ability to understand the indigenous systems even though they attempted to manipulate these systems. the british strategy of gathering intelligence about the native population was to implement their own postal service and replace the one that had previously existed. the service that was already in place used the working of well educated harkaras or ‘do-alls’ that worked as runners to spread information and acted as the ‘human intelligence’ informants of the time. indian leaders did not want to allow the british to use their postal runners because they feared what the british might do with the intelligence they gathered, but the british would recruit them for their service. these leaders were not keen on sharing their power with the british (bayly, 1996). other ways the british would attempt to gather information was in the indian courts and the persian newsletter. the courts were filled with people who were reporting information back to their allies or were sharing information for a bit of money. the newsletter was unfiltered information about different ruling families in court or important merchants and gave the british very useful intelligence about the native population. bayly refers to it as a “tolerated espionage system” (1996). however, the british lacked the perspective of their indigenous counterparts and were unable to infiltrate and destroy the patrimonial indian society. the intelligence failures as a result came to fruition in the rebellion of 1857. the british were too concerned with the statistics and economics of the native populace and knew nothing of their “sentiments, politics, or beliefs” (bayly, 1996). the british empire knew very little of the people and land they had colonized, and this put them at a huge disadvantage. in europe, police forces grew and special branches were created to deal with and spy on violent extremists within their own borders. these branches spied on the populace because new ideologies were running rampant through societies came as a violent reaction to liberal ideals and “came in many stripes: traditionalist, religious, socialist, anarchist, nationalist, ethnic, and racial” (warner, 2014). in ireland, the fenians were becoming increasingly more violent in their nationalist sentiments in the 1880s, so the london police force created its special irish branch in 1883. by 1888, the office had been renamed to the special branch and dealt with several other domestic unrests through surveillance and intelligence gathering. similar police reforms took place in europe around the same time period with the sûreté nationale in france and the department for protecting the public security and order or okhrana in russia. the okhrana eventually began operations abroad in paris in 1883 and shared information with french authorities while keeping tabs on their own expatriates. the okhrana were even known to deploy agents provocateurs who would stir unrest amongst french revolutionaries (warner, 2014). while the different interpretations of intelligence in society, government, economics, and foreign affairs remained at the forefront of political discussions, critics of the ethics of intelligence did not remain silent. in 1895, british general george furse publishes information in war and voices his opinion of the ethics of intelligence processes: “the very term spy conveys to our mind something dishonourable and disloyal. a spy, in the general acception of the term, is a low sneak who, from unworthy motives, dodges the actions of his fellow beings, to turn the knowledge he acquires to his personal account” (warner, 2014). by 1900, american usage of the telegraph and telegram in the civil war had resulted in privacy human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 60 concerns surrounding the new technology. the sparring soldiers would intercept the other’s messages so enciphering was a way to maintain the secrecy of their movements. some of the questions asked throughout history are still being asked today with the introduction of new technologies. “who owned the information transmitted along a wire strung by someone else? who had a right to hear it or view it? for the purpose of law enforcement, was it public speech, or private” (warner, 2014)? the turn of the century brought about a new outlook on intelligence in western europe along with a surge in spy-fiction literature. the industry of war had brought about a new appreciation for what spies do for their nations, and how effectively they do it. many of the stories written foreshadowed the war to come, but nothing would compare to the great war. spy mania had the effect of facilitating the acceptance of spying as a part of war and it widely became recognized as a profession. in 1910, mi5 was created in britain as the formal domestic intelligence service and the secret intelligence service for foreign intelligence. both replaced the short-lived secret service bureau that set the precedent of design for british intelligence services. the world was set for global war and “the needs of governments and militaries to gather and concentrate information by all available means were beginning to transform spycraft into intelligence” (warner, 2014). world war i the great war polarized to the triple entente (russia, france, and britain) and the triple alliance (included italy who later joined the triple entente) or central powers (germany, austria-hungary, bulgaria, and the ottoman empire). sabotage agents were used early on in the war, particularly by germans in america. because the us was relatively neutral at the outset of the war, american banks were loaning huge sums of money to the europeans in conflict. german sabotage agents set fire to a facility full of arms in new york harbor that were meant to aid the triple entente. germany’s secret agents were less effective on the tactical level in britain because mi5 was very effective at arresting suspected spies (warner, 2014). the most effective methods of intelligence proved to be by monitoring and intercepting enemy signals like radio transmissions. while human saboteurs were effective on the tactical level, radio intercepts aided in understanding the tactical and strategic operations of your enemy. this often took decoding and deciphering your enemy’s messages. in 1917, the zimmerman telegram was intercepted by british “room 40” a code breaking task force that focused on diplomatic correspondence across the atlantic (warner, 2014). it was the german foreign minister george zimmerman who was making an offer to the mexican president at the time to wage war on the united states together. it ultimately brought the us into the war which quickly exposed how american intelligence efforts had a lot of catching up to do. the military intelligence division (mid) was created quickly in 1917 as a matter of necessity and warner argues is an example of changes in the organization and intelligence doctrine for all powers during the war, just on a much shorter timeline than their european counterparts (warner, 2014). also in 1917, the us passed the espionage act that empowered the federal bureau of investigations (fbi), created in 1908, to serve as a federal counterintelligence agency. the technological advancements were amazing in the four years of war and one key weapon that changed warfare forever was the airplane. it not only operated as a weapon, but also for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. but it was ultimately signals intelligence (sigint) that helped the triple entente win the war in 1918 with radio triangulation and transmission interception to know where german u-boats’ locations (warner, 2014). ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 61 restructuring in the interwar era the interwar period saw a regime change in russia during the bolshevik revolution which maintained power with the help of their intelligence service known as the “all-russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution, profiteering and corruption,” otherwise called cheka. the cheka organization in russia was a brutal force that hunted down and killed anyone who seemed like a potential threat to their revolution. it was described as a “loose organization and no standards but revolutionary fervor made them drunk with power and desperate to save the revolution-and themselves” (warner, 2014). like in germany and italy, the economic downturn following wwi led to party extremism, totalitarianism, fascism, and communism. these ideologies were not isolated to these countries. britain too was seeing a rise in communist and socialist sentiment on their mainland. british intelligence services were keeping tabs on the communist party of great britain (cpgb) in order to contain their operations. the creation of the signals intelligence service (sis) in 1929 was the beginning of several organization reforms. mi5 was renamed the security service (domestic) and the secret intelligence service was confined to foreign operations (warner, 2014). the us on the other hand was undergoing a very harsh isolationist policy after wwi. many american leaders were not keen on the idea of spying and espionage during peacetime and had ethical issues with the idea. the head of mid said in 1920, “secret service methods carried on by military agencies cannot be justified in time of peace.” although it is not confirmed, herbert hoover’s secretary of state, henry stimson, is believed to have said, “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” (warner, 2014). the american reforms of the time reigned in the power of investigators and attempted to keep the fbi out of the politics of washington. the fbi was going to train their agents in “scientific standards of evidence gathering and professional ethics” (warner, 2014). however, some officials warned of the abilities that the government had developed during the war. supreme court justice louis brandeis said of the government's relationship with technology, “the progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping” (warner, 2014). in the build up to world war ii while american and britain’s intelligence agencies were weakening, intelligence institutions of germany and russia grew stronger. as a result of emergences of ideologies, power vacuums, and economic crises in both countries after wwi, intelligence efforts were intertwined in the political scene as the bolshevik communist party took hold in russia and the nazi party in germany. the german abwehr maintains it status of military intelligence and operates mainly as the foreign intelligence service while the nazi schutzstaffel (ss) gains power domestically, especially from its intelligence branch, the sicherheitsdienst (sd) (warner, 2014). the russian institutional reforms included the nkvd (people’s commissariat for internal affairs) and gru (soviet military intelligence). all of these organizations shared a counterintelligence policy which was formed from their ideological beliefs. the german ideology of racial purity ended up being a huge limitation for them throughout the duration of the war. world war ii germans tried to infiltrate british government by dropping spies into the british countryside via airplane, but almost all were caught and turned into double agents. this became known as the double cross system. this counterintelligence move was a great victory of human human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 62 intelligence (humint) for the british during the war. after the war however, the soviet espionage efforts proved much more effective than that of the germans. the “magnificent five” or “cambridge five” were soviet informants who had reached the higher ranks within the british intelligence services including the foreign office, sis, and mi5. the british government code & cypher school (gc&cs) at bletchley park was created as an gigantic deciphering task force that used ground breaking technology at the time, the first computer known as colossus. the technology was used to break german enigma code in a top secret operation called ultra which was kept very quiet (warner, 2014). however, the success of the soviet infiltration through the cambridge five is seen in their intelligence regarding the secretive ultra operation at bletchley park. this gave the soviets a full view of british code breaking abilities. the gc&cs was later renamed the government communication headquarters (gchq) in 1945 (walton, 2013). after the war, intelligence did not stagnate as it did after wwi. it does quite the opposite. as the soviet union is enhancing their espionage capabilities and stealing secrets of american nuclear weapons development, the us begins to reform their own institutions. the office of strategic studies (oss) disbanded in 1945 and made way for the national security act of 1947 which created the central intelligence agency (cia). the us army security agency (asa) becomes armed forces security agency (afsa) in 1949, which eventually becomes the national security agency (nsa) in 1952. in russia, the kgb appeared in 1954 (warner, 2014). cold war the cold war brought about a new era of intelligence institutions and ideologies through huge technological advancements. the worlds’ superpowers were the main intelligence powers because they were the only nations who had the money to put into the development of intelligence services and agents. however, colonies around the world were rebelling against their various imperial powers and the british and french empires were granting certain areas the right to self-governance. this left open a power vacuum in these countries which were then vulnerable to fall into the soviet sphere of influence. as seen in india after independence, v.n. krishna menon served as the high commissioner of india in london and as an outspoken left-wing politician. it was obvious to britain’s mi5 (technically domestic service, except for former regions of the commonwealth) and india’s director of intelligence bureau (dib) that menon could have been receptive to the communist cause. the kgb was very active in india in the 1950’s which was strategic on the soviet’s part in an effort to turn former colonies against their imperial powers. many methods of thought in communist circles saw imperialism as the evil product of capitalism. walton writes that “britain and its western allies failed to prevent india from gravitating towards the soviet union in the cold war” (walton, 2013). since the cold war, the us has seen its greatest reform in intelligence organizations in the post september 11 era. in 2004, the office of the director of national intelligence (odni) was created in an effort to have all sixteen american intelligence agencies underneath one bureaucratic figure. the cia saw major growth after the attack, the defense intelligence agency (dia) grows along with the rest of the military intelligence services, and the department of homeland security (dhs) was created. nowadays, technology has evolved exponentially with drone surveillance, robotic process automation (rpa) unmanned aircraft, worldwide gps, and the democratization of the internet have completely revolutionized the industry of war, and therefore intelligence, yet again. for intelligence and technology are intrinsically connected. ideologies have sparked another war on the concepts of religion, imperialism, and liberal ideals. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 63 privacy is a question now more than ever with the increased sharing of information online, mostly willingly, on social media. this has led to a heightened surveillance of all-american citizens. no matter the era, the balance between freedom and privacy remains an issue. now it is even more complex a question with more methods of communication than ever before. although the fact still remains according to furse: “necessity knows no laws, and means which we would disdain to use in ordinary life must be employed in the field, simply because we have no other that we can turn to profitable account. information has sought through spies in all wars, and we can plead in our favor that the enemy will not scruple to employ them in his behalf.” human trafficking as a national security issue chloe tymoszenko 64 references bayly, c.a. empire and information: intelligence gathering and social communication in india, 1780-1870. new york: cambridge university press, 1996. clausewitz, k. v. (1962). war, politics and power. place of publication not identified: regnery. gottemoeller, r. (2018). speech presented at kyiv security forum, kyiv, ukraine. lowenthal, m. m. (2017). intelligence: from secrets to policy. thousand oaks, ca, ca: cq press, an imprint of sage, publications. tulard, j. (1991). les francais sous surveillance : le "cabinet noir" de napoleon. l'histoire, 32, 81-83. tzu, sun. (2006). the art of war. place of publication not identified: filiquarian pub. walton, calder. empire of secrets: british intelligence, the cold war, and the twilight of empire. london: harperpress, 2013. warner, michael. the rise and fall of intelligence: an international security history. washington d.c: georgetown university press, 2014. the paradigm shifts in intelligence: from 1800 to present ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 16 at what cost? examining the efficacy of military intervention keunhee kim university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract according to the united nations, human rights are the rights to which all people are equally and fairly entitled. among these are: to be free from slavery and torture, to express themselves, to work and be educated, and to life itself (declaration of human rights, 1948). globalization has been a powerful means to deal with crucial issues integral to the sanctity of human life by bringing international attention and support from around the world to violations of human rights. the military efforts of nato and the un forces are ready examples of the global initiative against human rights violations; however, they are not without their cost. this is evidenced by the general ineffectiveness of military interventions, seen in conflicts such as the iraq war which led to the formation of the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis) (1999-present) (lopez, 2020), the somali civil war (1989/1991-present), the kosovo war (1998-1999), and the bosnian war (1992-1995). in order to provide an in-depth analysis, this paper limits its purview to the kosovo war and the bosnian war. the high casualty rates, impact of refugees, and destabilization to international societies during the kosovo war, and then again three years later in the bosnian war, show how difficult military intervention is for protecting human rights. instead, the international society should explore non-violent alternatives—economic sanctions and cyberattacks—and work together to combat human rights violations. the importance of global collaboration in non-violent intervention can be used, for example, to cease north korea’s mass human rights abuses under the current dictatorship. while the u.s. government’s sanctions are not the most effective, and focus more on nuclear rather than human rights issues, scholars have speculated that sanctions from stronger trading partners will have a real impact on the situation; thus, non-violent approaches call for international collaboration. this paper examines the scholarship on armed interventions and argues that military interventions even for humanitarian purposes are not justifiable for two reasons: the negative global impact of war and the inability of ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 17 military solutions to solve the repeated tensions that lead to their respective wars. additionally, this paper examines the potential effectiveness and risk-mitigation of non-violent alternatives and urges international alliances for higher capability in mitigating the issue of human rights violations. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 18 introduction globalization has been a powerful means to deal with crucial issues integral to the sanctity of human life by bringing international attention and support from around the world to violations of human rights. after world war ii, the united nations formulated an inclusive “international human rights law” to combat existent and potential violations of human rights, such as genocide (cnn wire, 2020, p. 1). countries have adopted the united nations’ principles and therefore bear the responsibility to ensure that individual citizens retain their fundamental human rights. no matter what, human rights should be valued above national interests as means to a successful cosmopolitan society. a growing number of people are examining egregious human rights abuses and ethnic persecutions (coady, 2002, p.1). for example, north korean defectors reported torture and other atrocities committed by the north korean regime to the un human rights council (unhrc) in 2013 (keesing’s record of world events, 2013, p.2). north korean defectors and south korean governmental members have advocated for an international action on north korea. however, over the past decades, the politics and ethics of military intervention in response to humanitarian issues has been controversial. americans debated whether armed intervention in vietnam was morally justified, having demonstrations against the brutal violence of the war effort. this paper examines the scholarship on armed interventions and argues that military interventions even for humanitarian purposes are not justifiable for two reasons: the negative global impact of war and the inability of military solutions to solve the repeated tensions that lead to their respective wars. additionally, this paper examines the potential risk-mitigation of non-violent alternatives and urges international alliances to take on the obligation in remedying the issue of human rights violations. background in international human rights scholarship every person is equally entitled to their human rights regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, age, religion, language, or any other status. the united nations (un) defines this principle in article 2 of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) (the united nations, 1948). the canadian philosopher kimberley brownlee points out that a violation of human rights is a matter of cardinal importance; with globalization, international organizations and governmental actors increasingly address and attempt to prevent human rights violations as a priority matter (2013). for example, the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) and the human rights council (ohchr, 2020) established the international human rights treaties. the ohchr issues publications to raise awareness of human rights violations in the world. despite international efforts, human rights abuses still occur in countries around the world. human rights watch reports that female genital mutilation has been globally practiced on more than 140 million females, mostly on young girls under 15 years-old, for non-medical reasons, but for cultural or religious reasons such as the coming-of-age ceremony (2010). scholars disagree about whether human rights abuses justify international armed intervention. while some scholars maintain that international armed forces should intervene in cases of human rights abuses, they often argue that war should be the last resort (de waal & omaar, 1994, p. 6). alex de waal and rakiya omaar illustrate that if military forces are needed to intervene, they should maintain a neutral position (p. 8). however, people should think about whether military intervention is an ethically justifiable method; preceding military intervention, de waal and omaar claim that relief and diplomatic efforts should be prioritized (p. 7). ironically, military intervention can result in more human rights abuses in the end, leading to higher casualties and refugees. beyond thinking about the rationale for military interventions, ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 19 they also call for accurate and independent evaluations of the scale and nature of humanitarian needs (p. 7). additionally, they point out that military intervention may not necessarily address the strategic context of a disaster (p. 8). finally, they state that intervening forces should strive for neutrality and be accountable (p. 8). in summary, de waal and omaar assert that international military intervention for human rights abuses can work, but it should be the last resort. many scholars think that even though the aim of military intervention is to stop human rights abuses, armed intervention cannot be justified. for example, political science scholar dursun peksen argues that regardless of the intentions of the intervening force, foreign armed intervention of any kind does not help human rights abuses (2012). indeed, supportive, neutral, or hostile interventions all promote domestic instability across the nation. interventions in general only increase the occurrences of human rights abuses via “more violence, humanitarian disasters, and other instabilities given the inherent link between the respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace and security” (peksen, p. 568). military interventions—regardless of their intention or strategic approach and despite their humanitarian goals—lead to violence, instability, and further human rights violations. generally, armed conflict has damage global societies in numerous ways. political scientist arben qirezi shows serbians used “self-determination strategies” against albanian populations, which called for the genocide of the kosovo war (2016). three years after the bosnian war, the serbians repeated this genocide against a different target, albanians. qirezi delicately described the aftermath of the war and international military intervention against serbians’ human rights abuses. for example, qirezi highlights that during the kosovo war, there were a lot of civilian deaths and a mass exodus to neighboring countries due to the effect the war had on the population (2016, pp. 39-22). political science professor richard regan provides specific numbers of refugees from the aftermath of the bosnian war (2013). in both cases, the sudden and heavy influx of refugees into countries that were unprepared, stressed, and taxed of their resources, made kosovo, bosnia, and other neighboring countries unstable. while military intervention may seem to be an immediately effective option, haggard and noland argue that the international community should work together towards a non-violent interventionist approach to resolve the underlying issues of conflicts and put pressure on a country that repeatedly violates human rights; one example being north korea (2011). they also show possible effective non-violent strategies in terms of international financial and diplomatic isolation through sanctions to compel the target to listen to the international community (2011). scholarly positions for intervention scholars point out violations of human rights that have been committed around the world. north korea has rampantly infringed for some time on personal rights such as forced labor, murder, torture, rape, forced abortion, religious and racial persecution, and deliberate starvation (human rights watch, 2014, p. 360). therefore, the unhrc established a committee in 2013 to carry out formal inquiries to examine the human rights situation in north korea (human rights watch, 2014, p. 360). international communities have been appealing for help to stop and to prevent systemic human rights abuses under the totalitarian regime. given these ongoing human rights abuses and countries’ involvement, such research is significant in making non-violent interventions more palatable. nevertheless, there is some disagreement in scholarship on international armed intervention for humanitarian purposes. some scholars have the point of view that armed ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 20 intervention can work to discourage human rights abuses, but they believe that armed conflict should be the last resort. alex de waal and rakiya omaar are of this opinion and believe that when armed forces intervene, they should maintain a neutral position focusing on verifying facts without bias (1994, p. 8). in contrast, dursun peksen refutes waal and omaar’s idea pointing out that supportive or even neutral interventions cannot solve human rights abuses (2012). military interventions, which take a supportive or neutral stance towards the government of a country, make extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture more likely to occur (peksen, 2012, p. 558). notably, dursun peksen’s stance is an argument against taking a neutral position when it comes to international military intervention for humanitarian purposes. to illustrate this point, richard regan notes that the neutral intervention does not work because, in the bosnian war, even though the security council created six “safe areas” for people in bosnia, these were attacked by serbians who continued to violate human rights of bosniaks (2013, p. 207). the un attempted to maintain neutral positions. yet, this did not have a desired result as the serbians did not acknowledge the neutrality of the un. military intervention is not without its fault. de waal and omaar highlight that war leads to other mass human rights abuses by creating high rates of casualties, orphans, and refugees (1994). the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (ohchr) and the unhcr provide specific numerical information to support this. the ohchr examines the number of unlawful killings to civilians due to armed conflicts between both parties (2015). during the sri lankan civil war, the government estimated the number of people who were affected by the conflict to be only 100,000, but later acknowledged an estimated 300,000 people were affected (p. 51). the unhcr points out that post world war ii, wars and conflicts have caused around 51.2 million people to seek refuge in neighboring countries (2014, p. 5). altogether, the consequences of armed intervention are further abuses to human rights, which counters the aim of the international military intervention to reduce human rights abuses. even de waal and omaar are aware of the seriousness of this aspect, and they think that the most important part in terms of international military intervention, is whether or not the military force can do the job (1994, p. 7). they maintain that even if military intervention takes place for human rights abuses, armed intervention cannot be the preferred strategy (p. 7). in other words, since most modern armed forces utilize highly developed weapons and technologies to win a war in a short period of time, they predict that there would be more or worse violations of human rights during or after the war (p. 7). de waal and omaar describe armed intervention for humanitarian purposes in somalia in 1992 and show the drawbacks of international military intervention to solve human rights violations (1994, p. 7). this is why they believe that international military intervention for humanitarian purposes should be the last step to resolve violations of human rights. on the whole, military intervention for humanitarian purposes is still a controversial issue. on one hand, scholars such as dursun peksen acknowledge the benefits of armed intervention. other scholars such as arben qirezi, regan, haggard, and nolan also provide realistic reasons why armed intervention is not justifiable even though it is to protect human rights. in contrast, de waal and omaar provide reasons why international military intervention cannot be justified for humanitarian purposes. the cost of violent intervention taking all the scholarly positions into consideration, international military intervention cannot be justified, even if it has humanitarian purposes, due to its usual severe negative global ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 21 impact. first of all, richard regan (2013) and arben qirezi (2016) elucidate the aftermath of war, making examples of the bosnian war and the kosovo war; wars which only settled after international military forces intervened. the bosnian war occurred from april 6th in 1992 to december 14th, 1995. in 1992, the society was composed of bosnian muslims (bosniaks), bosnian-serbians, and some other ethnicities (regan, 2013, p.199). the incident began with the declaration of independence of bosniaks. with the spread of nationalism, serbians, who did not support and even resisted the independence of the bosniaks, fanned the flames of their desire to create a great serbia. serbians started the ethnic cleansing of bosniaks in order to force them to flee. regan pointed out that the serbians committed vile atrocities on bosniaks, especially in the bosnian capital, sarajevo, where serbians massacred the civilians with artillery (regan, 2013, p.199). despite several attempts by the un, serbia's violation of human rights continued. to remedy the human rights abuses, nato externally intervened by employing air strikes against the serbians, after which the serbians backed down (regan, 2013, p. 210). ostensibly, the military intervention ended the bosnian war, but the cost of the armed intervention must be taken into consideration. throughout the violence, bosnia lost many lives, and even after the war, bosnians suffered. richard regan described that during the war, 2,000,000 bosnians became refugees and fled to neighboring countries (regan, 2013, pp. 203204). the ohchr defines a refugee as, one who is forcefully displaced “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and stipulates how all different kinds of human rights should be protected (ohchr, 2020). regan also points out that most residential areas and cities were destroyed, and people suffered from shortage of indispensable resources (regan, 2013, pp. 203-204). these repercussions are consistent with brownlee’s description of human rights violations (2013). secondly, international armed involvement cannot be justified by human rights violations, since the military force cannot resolve the tension underneath the war or prevent repetition of conflict. the critical loophole of military intervention is that it can only be a temporary solution for humanitarian purposes as examined in the bosnian and kosovo wars. less than three years after the bosnian war ended, serbians again violated human rights against albanian populations in kosovo. the kosovo war is considered to be another instance ethnic cleansing and occurred between may 5th, 1998 and june 11th, 1999. serbia had an unfulfilled desire for the great serbia, so it wanted an annexation; however, albanians fought for their independence. when a serbian police officer who went out for patrol was killed by an albanian, serbian aggressors used his death as an excuse to massacre albanians (qirezi, 2016). serbia sent troops to kill albanian civilians. in june of 1998, the united states of america and the european union demanded the withdrawal of the serbian military and the termination of the massacre of albanian civilians. however, serbians ignored the ultimatum and occupied an albanian military base. the bloodshed dragged on for a year until nato intervened yet again to stop the escalation of the conflict. the military intervention of nato did not solve the core issue underlying the war, even if it was for a humanitarian cause. serbians infringed upon human rights with the same reasons and with the same strategies in the kosovo war as they did in the bosnian war. even though nato stopped serbians’ human rights abuses temporarily with its military attacks, serbia repeated the violations later against another target. therefore, the kosovo war had most of the severe negative impacts not only domestically but also internationally. arben qirezi and regan ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 22 show that military intervention has critical limitations to prevent further conflicts and human rights abuses by giving numerical information and specific events. for instance, arben qirezi highlights that during the kosovo war, 13,321 of civilians died or went missing and about 164,000 people left kosovo due to the aftermath of the war (arben qirezi, 2016, p.5). another inability of international military intervention that can be shown from both the bosnian and kosovo war is that if external powers is what it took to force an end of tensions, then the major fault that led to a war would have remained, so that continuous conflict would last for a long time. for instance, arben qirezi focuses on the discord between serbians and albanians after the formal peace agreement at the end of the war with an example of an outbreak of ethnic riots by albanians against serbians in 2004 (2016, p.57). qirezi stresses the point that since the delicate relationship between the two groups was determined by external intervention, “this unresolved dispute continues to foster both group insecurity and regional instability” (2016, p.37). this demonstrates that external military intervention by force cannot solve main conflicts that initiated a feud between both parties. while the military intervention may work on the surface issue, it does not present as a sustainable and long-term strategy. lastly, due to the negative consequences of armed conflicts, as shown above, international society should seek for sustainable, non-violent alternative strategies of intervention and cooperation for humanitarian purposes. for example, by collectively putting pressure on a target country and by isolating it from the global society—financially and diplomatically—in order to weaken the target regime and protect its citizens’ human rights. what could be a good alternative or remedy for the international community in regard to the severe drawbacks of military intervention? haggard and nolan point out “the difficulty the united states had in mobilizing pressure on north korea” (haggard & nolan, 2011, p.14). as the united states has a much weaker trade relationship with north korea than china and south korea, non-violent interventions like sanctions have little effect and are not very persuasive (p.14). however, if stronger trade partners like china and south korea, who account for “55 percent to 80 percent of north korea’s trade,” were to sanction north korea, their efforts would be much more effective in pressuring the regime (haggard & nolan, 2011, p.16). haggard and nolan also argue that the international community should team up against the target country financially and diplomatically with an example of north korea (2011, p.14). they highlight that china’s commerce made about 2.7 billion dollars of trade with north korean commerce in 2007 (haggard & nolan, 2011, figure 4). this enormous foreign capital enables north korea to maintain their communist regime, which leads to systemic human rights violations. as north koreans are educated to worship the kim dynasty, anyone who defies kim’s regime will be tortured or even killed (larsen, 2020; edwards, 2015). the unique structure of the dictatorship of north korea, which concentrates power in the hands of a single dynasty, enables systemic human rights abuses such as torture, murder, rape, and arbitrary detention (choe, 2020). therefore, it is important to financially and diplomatically isolate north korea from the international community in order to protect human rights. haggard and nolan insist that the whole international society should cooperate to strategically isolate north korea, forcing them to back down (2011, p.14). for example, the scholars highlight the decrease in trading between japan/south korea and north korea as well as the increase in trading between china and north korea. the author stresses the point that “despite the high partner concentration of north korea’s trade, its vulnerability to sanctions has not necessarily increased. those countries more inclined to sanction north korea—the united states and japan—have negligible economic exchange with the country” (haggard and nolan, ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 23 2011, p.16). that is to say, even though nations concerned about human rights violations are enacting diplomatic/financial non-violent interventions, such as sanctions, those nations, like the united states, do not significantly affect north korea’s earnings from foreign capital. countries that are weak trading partners with the offending nation will have little pressure on the offending nation and thus have a small effect in their intervention. the active commercial trade between north korea and china is a large enabler of north korea and its operations. if china and other significant trade partners of north korea were to get on board with the rest of the world and sanction north korea, this collaboration could become a method of putting pressure on a country for certain demands. the international community should be in alliance with each other by signing treaties which might allow them to backfill their economic losses that are derived from the economic sanctions against the target country to stop its human rights abuses. this means that if the global society does not work together and only thinks about their own interests, the financial/diplomatic isolation would not be as effective in getting any country to listen to the international community. the coalition should prioritize human rights over instant gratification, like economical gains, for the benefit of global prosperity. the international community should ensure to propagate the idea of human rights so that all of mankind can fully understand that they deserve to have human rights and human rights abuses should not be tolerated. conclusion: violent intervention is never justifiable infringement upon individual human rights should be combated with more effective and non-violent joint efforts of the international community. there are some disagreements amongst scholars whether armed intervention can be justified or not. international military intervention has been shown to have a negative global impact and to be ineffective at solving the tensions underlying the wars and situations in which human rights violations occur. additionally, the global society should strive to improve non-violent alternative intervention strategies such as financial and diplomatic sanctions and cooperatively implement them for humanitarian purposes. the international community should fight against injustice in its society and regrasp the ideal of inborn human rights, but this can only be done if it is pursued non-violently and in one accord. should the international community choose to commit to joint, non-violent intervention for the sake of human rights, military intervention and all its downsides may never again be necessary. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 24 references brownlee, k. (2013). a human right against social deprivation. the philosophical quarterly, 63(251), 199-222. retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/24672421 c. a. j. coady, u.s. institute of peace. (2002). the ethics of armed humanitarian intervention. policy papers. retrieved from https://advance-lexiscom.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentite m:4789-38h0-0108-p042-00000-00&context=1516831 de waal, a., & omaar, r. (1994). can military intervention be "humanitarian"? middle east report. 2-8. retrieved from doi:10.2307/3012587 genocide fast facts. (2020). cnn wire. retrieved from https://advance-lexiscom.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentite m:5yjg-sjh1-dy7v-g04m-00000-00&context=1516831 haggard, s., & noland, m. (2011). engaging north korea: the role of economic statecraft. east-west center. retrieved from 14-30 doi:10.2307/resrep21457.7 human rights watch. (2014). north korea. in world report 2014: events of 2013. bristol university press. 360-364. retrieved from doi:10.2307/j.ctt17mvk6w.52 peksen, d. (2012). does foreign military intervention help human rights? political research quarterly, 65(3), 558-571. retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/41635255 qirezi, a. (2016). settling the self-determination dispute in kosovo. in mehmeti l. & radeljić b. (eds.), kosovo and serbia: contested options and shared consequences. pittsburgh, pa.: university of pittsburgh press. 37-62. retrieved from doi:10.2307/j.ctt1qv5n21.9 ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 25 regan, r. (2013). the bosnian war (1992–95). in just war, second edition. washington, d.c.: catholic university of america press. 198-218. retrieved from doi:10.2307/j.ctt5vj8j2.18 revision of founding principles of ruling party. (2013, august). 59.(8), 52787-88. retrieved from http://www.keesings.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/index_new.php?page=a rticle&article=52835n01prk&search=%22revision%20of%20founding%20princi ples%20of%20ruling%20party%22 the international human right treaties, and human rights council. (2020). convention relating to the status of refugees. retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/wopiframe.aspx?sourcedoc=/documents/prof essionalinterest/refugees.pdf&action=default&defaultitemopen=1 the international human right treaties, and human rights council. (2015). last phase and aftermath of the armed conflict. retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/wopiframe.aspx?sourcedoc=/documents/hr bodies/hrcouncil/oisl/lastphase.doc&action=default&defaultitemopen=1 ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 26 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the political psychology of regime change in iran ryan vetticad university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract in the study of the 20th century's most infamous case of regime change, the 1953 iranian coup d’etat, the role of political psychology played an increasingly vital role in how these revolutions panned out. in these instances, the u.s. central intelligence agency (cia) had analyzed specific individuals, respectively being iran’s mohammed mossadegh, that were not adhering to policies in conjunction with american interests. as a result, the cia led an immense role in the orchestration of the revolution and handpicked iran’s successor, reza shah pahlavi. this essay works to perform a nuanced psychological analysis of these two individuals discussing the contested nature of why the cia did not cooperate with mossadegh, and why they picked pahlavi to fill his place. furthermore, it makes the invariable argument that while the u.s. central intelligence agency is not a terrorist organization as a whole, it’s involvement in the revolution does constitute as a specific act of terrorism. 26 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the topic of regime change is one of the more riveting subjects in the study of politics and international relations, especially when that change in government resulted from the interference of an outside or foreign agency. but a more latent aspect to note in the discussion of regime change is how specific individuals contribute to the development of the rise and fall of these governments, which requires the nuance of political psychology a complex academic discipline, falling both under the branches of social psychology and political science. the interdisciplinary nature of the field is dedicated to understanding politics, politicians, and overall political behavior from a psychological perspective, and an important aspect of this process is the acquisition and study of distinct psychological profiles. in the study of the 20th century's most infamous case of regime change, the 1953 iranian coup d’etat, the role of political psychology played an increasingly vital role in how these revolutions panned out. in these instances, the u.s. central intelligence agency (cia) had analyzed specific individuals, respectively being iran’s mohammed mossadegh, that were not adhering to policies in conjunction with american interests. as a result, the cia led an immense role in the orchestration of the revolution and handpicked iran’s successor, reza shah pahlavi. this essay works to perform a nuanced psychological analysis of these two individuals discussing the contested nature of why the cia did not cooperate with mossadegh, and why they picked pahlavi to fill his place. furthermore, it makes the invariable argument that while the u.s. central intelligence agency is not a terrorist organization as a whole, it’s involvement in the revolution does constitute as a specific act of terrorism. before delving into these pyschological profiles, however, this essay requires a definition of terrorism. in the scope of political science and international relations the word terrorism, is one of the (if not the) most loosely defined terms of the discipline. there are various ways and avenues that one can take in defining the theory, but there exist three that are most relevant in this discussion of political psychology and regime change. the first being professor bruce hoffman’s definition, tenured professor of international relations at the edmund a. walsh school of foreign service at georgetown university. in his book “inside terrorism” he defines the concept as “the deliberate creation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change” (hoffman,1998). essentially meaning that it is artificial violence created for the purpose of political altercation. the second definition is one that exists from standard international relations theory in which it’s defined as politically motivated attacks against non-combatants by an individual or group. the key difference from hoffman’s definition being the inclusion of non-combatants in the scope of its meaning. the last definition is how professor nicholas grossman, assistant professor of political science at the university of illinois urbana-champaign defines it being “targeted, violent disruption of normalcy by a relatively weak actor for political purposes” (grossman, 2020). the important aspect being that the action is committed by a relatively weak actor. all three of these definitions provide an overly similar view of the concept but differ in the addition of one key attribute, i.e. fear, non-combatants, and relative power. nonetheless, each provides a clear course in which one could attribute the cia’s actions in both iran and guatemala to fitting at least one, if not all, of these forms of terrorism. now with the understanding of the contested nature that exists in the definition of terrorism one can move on to the psychological profiles of these leaders. in the case of iran, mohammad mossadegh, born june 16, 1882 and raised in a prominent persian family in the capital of tehran. in 1909, mossadegh traveled to paris where he studied law at the institut d’etudes politiques de paris, or more commonly known as sciences po, one of the finest 27 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security universities of political science and law in all of europe. after completing his studies in france, mossadegh then traveled to switzerland to study a doctorate en droit (doctorate of laws) at the university of neuchâtel, where after completing his studies in the june of 1913 became the first iranian in history to receive a phd in law from a european university. following his studies he returned to iran where he began a long and arduous career in iranian politics. in reference to his specific leadership style and overall psychological profile, mossadegh can be described as an overall fighter of iranian interests, holding the nation close at heart and known to sacrifice his livelihood and wellbeing in its defense “if i sit silently, i have sinned” (mossadegh, 1950). a journal article from the university of chicago press entitled “...the case of mohammed mossadegh'' works to further support and expand on moassadegh’s role as a prominent leader of the iranian state. the article describes how there were two main hazards during mossadegh’s time as prime minister, the first being the lack of clear definitions of political power between himself and the shah, i.e. whether or not the shah acted as a national symbol separate from politics or that he wielded actual power. and the second being the lack of a strong national party movement, with various factions, interest groups, and shifting personas that dominated the parliamentary atmosphere creating an overall sense of great internal instability. nonetheless, the study reaches the conclusion that despite these pitfalls “that he was able to survive [in this political climate] is a tribute to his political safacity and organizing ability. indeed his rule was something of a tour de force in iranian politics.” (efimenco, 1955). in contrast reza shah pahlavi, could be seen in an almost completely different light. pahlavi, born october 26, 1919 was raised in royalty, being the son of reza khan, the first shah in the pahlavi dynasty. khan was a dominating figure who showed little compassion for pahlavi, and raised him in an demanding and austere environment. in abbas milani’s (director of irananian studies at stanford university) novel the shah, he describes it as “growing up under his shadow, mohammad reza was a deeply scarred and insecure boy who lacked self-confidence” (milani, 2011). the only real form of compassion and love that the prince grew up with came in the form of his mother and sisters, and even then that was only for the first 6 years of his life before his father took him away to be given a more masculine education. noted political psychologist, marvin zonis, at the university of chicago booth school of business, stated in his psychobiography majestic failure: the fall of the shah, that the overall result of his upbringing between a loving and compassionate mother, and an overbearing martinet father created “a young man of low self-esteem who masked his lack of self-confidence, his indecisiveness, his passivity, his dependency and his shyness with masculine bravado, impulsiveness, and arrogance” (zonis, 1991). this further led to an internal struggle of great contradictions within the crown prince as he would later be described as “both gentle and cruel, withdrawn and active, dependent and assertive, weak and powerful” (zonis, 1991). the transition of power that then occurred between these two individuals, came in the context of operation ajax. mohammed mossadegh was a member of the national front party which favored more socialist policies, the greatest of which was the plan to nationalize iran’s oil industry. at the time british and american oil companies held an increasingly large share of the iranian oil market, anglo-persian oil being one of the largest whose shares were more than 50% owned by britain, and mossadegh wanted to take back control of these resources. this fell far from conjunction with american and british interests and in turn, ajax was soon executed in the august of 1953, essentially the cia organized mass street riots and protests along with political subterfuge that forced mossadegh from power. the result being the disposition of 28 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security mossadegh and his government, and the strengthening and continued establishment of shah pahlavi's rule. mossadegh possessed specific characteristics, tenacity, nationalism, political and intellectual efficacy, that made the cia know that he would never be one to align with american interests. so instead of seeking to reason with mossadegh they sought to simply overthrow him with an individual with characteristics that aligned with american goals and one they could easily control, pahlevi being the obvious choice. pahlevi had grown up in a complicated household, and lacked any real sense of compassion and sympathy that led him to being easily persuaded to join the american cause. keeping these psych traits in mind, one has to look at what had actually occurred during the cia’s involvement in the revolution. essentially what operation ajax had done was create an overwhelming sense of fear and hysteria, with the immense threat of actual violence in order to mediate a shift of political power, which constitutes as a near perfect example of professor hoffman’s definition of terrorism. the first half of his definition “the deliberate creation or exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence”, coincides with how the cia organized mass protests that forced mossadegh’s resignation. ervand abrahamian a leading scholar and historian of modern day iran explains in his book titled the coup: 1953, the cia, and the roots of modern u.s. iranian relations, how the cia hired two of the largest and most feared gang leaders of the south tehran ghetto, “icy ramadan” and shaban jafari (also known as “brainless shaban”) to mobilize mass protests against mossadegh. and the second half of his definition “in the pursuit of political change”, furthermore can only work to be attributed how these protests were vital in securing reza shah pahlavi's path to the throne. overall, it becomes increasingly clear that from hoffman’s definition of terrorism that the cia’s involvement in the iranian coup simply consitute’s as an act of terrorism. however, when analyzing standard international relations theory and its definition of terrorism, the arguement can be made that the cia orchestration of the coup d’etat is far from an instance of terrorism. the rationale being that standard ir theory defines the term as a politically motivated attack against non-combatants. mossadegh and his supporters were inevitably always involved in this process, so it could be argued that perhaps they were always combatants. the fault in this logic however, is that combatants are defined as military personnel who hold the capability to defend themselves and non-combatants referring to civilians who do not possess that ability. over the course of the 5 day coup, a primary source new york times article from 1953 documents how more than 300 civilians were killed over the course of the fighting (new york times, 1953). these were royalists who had supported reza shah pahlavi and took to the streets and killed supporters of mossadegh but also civilians they encountered as well. although it technically was not the cia who had committed these murders, they had provided immense support to the people who had. for does there exist a prominent difference between the man who provides the gun and tells them who to kill, and the person who actually pulls the trigger? it cannot be left to a technicality for the cia to retain political autonomy for these actions, and the truth of the matter is that even in the scope of standard international relations theory that the cia’s involvement in 1953 iran does consititute as terrorism. the last definition to explore is professor nicholas grossman’s, in that terrorism is the targeted and violent disruption of normalcy by a relatively weak actor. even with the added nuance of the emphasis falling on the word relative, it is clear that cia’s involvement in iran can be attributed to terrorism. by no means was the cia stronger than mossadegh’s rule in iran. one has to understand that the agency was not sending military troops to subjugate mossadegh’s rule 29 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security but rather crafting an air of political hysteria and fear, and this agency was working against the entirety of the iranian government. in the scope of the word relative it’s obvious that the cia was relatively weak when compared to the government of iran. it can be likened to comparing apples to oranges, it is one agency of a government versus a government in its entirety, inevitably it would be considered as the weaker actor. in light of this revelation, it can then be easily seen how grossman’s definition too fits with this situation, and the fact remains that cia involvement in the 1953 coup d’etat constitutes as an act of terrorism. this is not an argument that the central intelligence agency as a whole can be designated as a terrorist organization, but rather in the scope of the definitions that this course provides that its involvement in the iranian revolution can be called as an instance of terrorism. when analyzing the complexity of the psychological profiles of both mohammed mossedgh and reza shah pahlavi, along with the dynamic interplay they share with the three most prominent definitions of terrorism. it is clear that the central intelligence agencies role in the iranian revolution of 1953, can be attributed and defined as an act of terrorism. 30 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security references the new york times, the new york times, archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/082053iran-army.html. “1. defining terrorism.” inside terrorism, 2017, pp. 1–44., doi:10.7312/hoff17476-003. abrahamian, ervand. the coup: 1953, the cia, and the roots of modern u.s.-iranian relations. the new press, 2015. efimenco, n. marbury. “an experiment with civilian dictatorship in iran; the case of mohammed mossadegh.” the journal of politics, vol. 17, no. 3, 1955, pp. 390–406., doi:10.1017/s0022381600091076. hoffman, bruce. “inside terrorism.” 2017, doi:10.7312/hoff17476. john, peter st, and bruce hoffman. “inside terrorism.” international journal, vol. 55, no. 1, 1999, p. 159., doi:10.2307/40203468. milani, abbas. the shah. st. martin's press, 2012. zonis, marvin. majestic failure: the fall of the shah. university of chicago press, 1991. 31 vincent prayugo paper (4) the nuclear weapons program of the united states and its strategic value in the twenty-first century vincent prayugo university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the united states’ nuclear stockpile has been a contentious issue with regards to its size and active deployment since the end of the cold war. however, nuclear deterrence is still necessary and a crucial factor in safeguarding the security of the united states from foreign threats and preventing nuclear proliferation in other states. the extension of the united states’ nuclear umbrella to its allies also strengthens their allegiance and discourages rivals from committing acts of aggression. aside from nuclear weapons deployment, the united states should modernize its nuclear stockpile and upgrade its delivery systems and retrofit them with new advanced technology – improving reliability and accuracy. these measures should be taken to fulfil national security priorities of the united states and its allies in the twenty-first century. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 since the end of the cold war, there have been increasing calls to denuclearize the united states by anti-nuclear groups, such as physicians for social responsibility and greenpeace. proponents of denuclearization suggest nuclear weapons increase the risk of international conflict, claiming the size of the united states’ nuclear arsenal hinders nonproliferation efforts in foreign countries. however, recent nuclear tests in north korea and the existence of unstable regimes, such as iran and pakistan, can undermine international peace and threaten regional or global nuclear war if they have access to nuclear weapons. these realities preserve the relevance of maintaining a nuclear arsenal for the united states to contain the threat of nuclear proliferation and the outbreak of international conflicts across the globe. during the cold war, the presence of a large nuclear arsenal between the united states and the soviet union along with the extension of the united states’ nuclear umbrella successfully prevented world war iii. while the presence of nuclear weapons created extreme tension between the two superpowers, the fear of a global nuclear war pressured both sides to solve their differences through diplomacy. thus, nuclear weapons are vital in protecting national security interests of the united states and maintaining global peace through nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation due to their strategic capabilities and the absence of alternatives. current us nuclear stockpile and modernization efforts currently, the united states still maintains one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world with a total of 6,185 warheads, 1,750 of which are deployed and 2,050 warheads in storage as of 2019 (kristensen & norris, 2019). the united states also operates 400 minuteman iii inter-continental ballistic missiles (icbm), trident ii submarine-launched ballistic missiles (slbm), 44 operational b-52h stratofortress, and 16 b-2a spirit bombers to deliver nuclear warheads in the case of war (kristensen & norris, 2019). under the new start (new strategic arms reduction treaty), which began in 2011, the united states and russia are obligated to report their nuclear launchers inventory every six months with the end goal of reducing both parties’ nuclear missile launchers by half in 2021, translating to 700 launchers for both parties. the treaty also requires participants to limit deployed warheads to a maximum of 1,550. with these reductions, the department of defense (dod) plans to close down 104 empty icbm silos, mostly in montana and wyoming (kristensen & norris, 2015). aside from reducing the current stockpile to adhere to new start, the united states is planning to spend a trillion dollars over thirty years to maintain and modernize its nuclear arsenal and launchers to increase combat readiness and strategic capabilities (doyle, 2016). this plan includes designing a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic submarine (ssbn), the columbia-class, a nuclear-capable long-range bomber, the b-21 raider, and air launched cruise missile (alcm), which is currently designated as long-range stand-off weapon (lrso). an lrso is designed to be a cruise missile capable of being armed with the w88 nuclear warhead. the proposed design for the columbia-class submarine will contain sixteen launch tubes, instead of the current twenty-four in ohio-class submarines. this is done as part of a cost-saving effort and compliance with new start. as a stop-gap measure, the b-21 raider will be equipped with the current b61-12 guided nuclear bomb before the new lrso missile begins production (doyle, 2016). ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 2 the dod is also upgrading all of the fuses for submarine launched w76-1/mk4a warheads with a “super-fuse”, increasing its accuracy and lethality by roughly a factor of three. the main advantage provided by the new fuse allows the warheads to detonate on a flexible height above its target, instead of a fixed height on the older fuse, within the lethal volume of the target (kristensen et all., 2017). with better accuracy, the us could reduce the number of warheads required to destroy a single target, improving overall offensive capabilities while adhering to the new start treaty. another aspect of the modernization program is extending the service life for the current minuteman iii nuclear icbm and designing a new icbm. under the dod ground-based strategic deterrent program (gbsd), the united states allocated 62.3 billion dollars over a thirty-year period to replace the aging components of current minuteman iii icbms while also designing a new icbm which uses the current infrastructure of minuteman iii but improves its design to enable it for both fixed-silo and mobile-missile launcher deployment. while the design improvement increases the cost of the program, the pentagon believes it will save money in the long-term due to the adaptability of the new launchers and by avoiding expensive life-extension programs (lep) on its current nuclear launchers and warheads (doyle, 2016). nuclear weapons’ strategic value on global politics and non-proliferation one of the main points for maintaining a sizable nuclear arsenal is the strategic value it provides the united states to preserve its status as a superpower and maintain global peace. the united states’ extension of its nuclear umbrella to its allies has successfully deterred potential adversaries without needing to deploy a significant number of conventional weapons and troops on foreign soil to safeguard its allies, as demonstrated during the cold war (fruhling & o’neal, 2017). security guarantees by the united states to taiwan, japan, and south korea also successfully limited the scope of recent chinese assertiveness in the south china sea (fruhling and o’neal, 2017). this scenario shows an effective application of security guarantees backed by the threat of nuclear force, allowing the united states to deter foreign aggression without needing to place large numbers of its troops on foreign soil, thus respecting foreign countries’ sovereignty and avoiding political repercussions. the relative peace in the cold war compared to previous centuries is an evidence that international crises and wars were minimized due to the large presence of nuclear arsenal between two global superpowers since the end of world war ii (jervis, 1988). in “the political effects of nuclear weapons: a comment” (1988), jervis argues that highprofile incidents, such as the cuban missile crisis, are evidence of compromise between superpowers due to mutually assured destruction (mad) doctrine instead of resorting to war to achieve their goals, as witnessed in world war i and world war ii. this phenomenon is most evident in the cold war, where both the united states and the soviet union were deterred from absorbing one another’s sphere of influence due to the risk of an all-out nuclear war if one side attacked the other (jervis, 1988). the cuban missile crisis is an example where nuclear weapons act as an equalizer between two opposing states, persuading the united states and the soviet union to address their security concerns through diplomacy. the resultant talks concluded with the united states and the soviet union removing short-range missiles from turkey and cuba respectively, addressing security concerns between the two countries. without nuclear weapons, the two superpowers may not have had enough bargaining power to pressure ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 each other to peace talks, since both countries would be relatively immune to one another’s offensive capabilities. aside from the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, their use would trigger costly political repercussions for both parties of a conflict, making diplomacy more attractive. for example, in world war ii, many european countries decided fighting nazi germany was a better option than outright surrender since the cost of the war was considered acceptable and a chance to preserve their independence. however, in a hypothetical nuclear war, jervis (1988) argues both parties will suffer “unacceptable casualties and destruction” and cause the extermination of human civilization. hence, the presence of nuclear weapons increases the cost of war to unacceptable levels for nucleararmed countries and their respective allies. alternatively, in cases where leaders are willing to risk war at all cost to achieve their goals, such as adolf hitler, nuclear weapons might not be enough to act as a deterrent. however, the possibility of such a scenario occurring is small in the era of nuclear weapons due to domestic pressure and the lingering possibility of nuclear annihilation for the aggressor itself (mueller, 1988). in the modern era, kim jong un’s nuclear ambitions have been repeatedly challenged by the united states’ nuclear arsenal, restraining even one of the most brazen leaders in the twenty-first century. the extension of the united states’ nuclear umbrella to its allies, namely nato countries, prevented nuclear proliferation for both allied countries and adversaries. allied countries are not incentivized to manufacture their own nuclear weapons due to the security assurance guaranteed by the united states, thus minimizing nuclear proliferation and possibilities of nuclear theft in these countries. similarly, nonnuclear armed adversaries of the united states are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons due to their unwillingness to risk a nuclear war or conflict with the united states. one of the most noticeable cases is iran’s nuclear weapons program, where iran agreed to temporarily suspend its program in 2003 in response to international pressure and fear of a united states invasion (kroenig, 2016). nuclear weapons advantages compared to its alternatives critics of nuclear weapons point out improvements in accuracy and reliability of conventional weapons are sufficient in neutralizing targets threatening the united states. in lieber & press (2013), the authors argue that a large conventional explosive – or example, the gbu-57, have a destructive power of approximately 3-5 tons of tnt, while the least explosive nuclear weapons in the united states’ inventory have an explosive power of 300 tons of tnt. also, conventional weapons must score a direct hit or land “close enough” to destroy its targets while nuclear weapons provide a higher margin of error to successfully destroy their targets due to their higher destructive capability. the accuracy of conventional weapons can also be undermined by many factors, such as bad weather or the presence of jammers that erode the accuracy of guidance systems, resulting in a lower chance of direct hit. despite this problem affecting both weapon systems, nuclear weapons’ larger yield allows for greater margin of error, negating the chance of missing a target due to inaccuracies produced by faulty guidance systems. while conventional weapons are always an integral component of united states’ national defense, their limitations necessitate the deployment of nuclear weapons. anti-nuclear critics claim us stockpiles of nuclear weapons undermine arms control objectives, risking international wars. however, this critique is flawed since wars ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 4 that happened in the cold war until the present are mostly police actions aimed against unstable regional aggressors and civil wars, which are not between two states (lieber & press, 2013). nuclear armed countries such as north korea, pakistan, and israel check their larger adversaries’ perceived aggression, such as the united states, india, and iran respectively. if the united states abandons its nuclear arsenal and relies on conventional weapons and diplomacy while the opposing party has nuclear weapons, the balance of power would be disrupted, resulting in a national security dilemma for the united states and its allies in their responses to acts of aggression (lieber & press, 2013). nuclear weapons can also be used as an offensive weapon aimed at deterring a superior enemy from engaging in warfare or aggression for a relatively low cost. according to the congressional budget office (cbo, 2019a), the cost of maintaining and upgrading current nuclear weapons amounts to 50 billion dollars per year from 20192028, including procurement of submarines, aircrafts, and missile defense. in contrast, the total cost of defense in fiscal year 2020 is 700 billion dollars and projected to increase by one percent every year till 2034 (cbo, 2019b). nuclear-armed small countries have also demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons. for example, the threat of israel’s “samson option”, a last resort massive retaliation aimed to destroy countries participating in aggression against israel, deterred neighboring adversaries, such as iran, from annihilating it. at the beginning of the 1973 yom kippur war, hersh (1991) claimed israeli prime minister, golda meir, ordered eight nuclear armed f-4 jet fighters on 24-hour alert as a precaution if israeli defenses collapsed. the news signaled by soviet intelligence led to warnings to syria and egypt to limit the scope of their offensives. in israel’s case, due to its hostile neighbors, nuclear weapons have become a necessary deterrent to preserve its existence as a sovereign nation. in another case, north korea’s nuclear weapons deterred south korea and the united states from deposing the ruling elite by promising nuclear retaliation on both should they attack. during the cold war, the promise of all out nuclear war between nato and the warsaw pact nullified the latter’s larger conventional military personnel and hardware in eastern europe, successfully deterring war in europe (lieber & press, 2013). conclusion despite the fall of the soviet union, nuclear weapons are still relevant in the twenty-first century to protect the united states from nuclear threat and maintain global peace. the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons has prevented large-scale wars between conflicting states and limited the scope of conflicts that do emerge. because of this, the united states should adapt its strategy in tackling foreign threats using nuclear weapons to reduce the threat of foreign aggression through a bellicose stance on a second strike. with nuclear weapons being the primary tool to ensure national security, the united states should maintain its nuclear arsenal and improve its quality to maintain global peace, ensure national security, and halt nuclear proliferation across the globe. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 references congressional budget office. (2019a). projected cost of u.s. nuclear forces, 2019 to 2028. retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-01/54914nuclearforces.pdf congressional budget office (2019b). long-term implications of the 2020 future years defense program. retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-08/55500-cbo2020 fydp_0.pdf doyle, j.e. (2016). the plan for a trillion-dollar triad. adelphi series, 56 (462), 21-30. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2016.1375308 fruhling, s & o’neal, a. (2016). nuclear weapons, the united states and alliances in europe and asia: toward an institutional perspective. contemporary security policy, 38 (1), 4 25. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1257214 hersh, s. (1991). nuclear blackmail. the samson option: israel's nuclear arsenal and american foreign policy (pp. 225). random house. retrieved from https://archive.org/details/sampson_option/page/n235/mode/2up jervis, k. (1988). the political effects of nuclear weapons: a comment. international security, 13(2), 80. 90. retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446776/pdf kristensen, h.m. & korda, m. (2019). us nuclear forces. bulletin of the atomic scientists, 75(3), 122-134. retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needacc ess=true ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security 6 kristensen, h.m., mckinzie, m., postol, t.a. (2017). how us nuclear forces modernization is undermining strategic stability: the burst-height compensating super-fuze. bulletin of the atomic scientists, 1. retrieved from http://www.acamedia.info/politics/escalation/references/kristensen_us_first_strike _capab lity_march_2017.pdf kristensen, h.m. & norris, r.s. (2015). us nuclear forces. bulletin of the atomic scientists, 71(2), 107-119. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340215571913 kroenig, m. (2016). us nuclear weapons and non-proliferation: is there a link?. journal of peace research, 53 (2), 166-179. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315626770 lieber, k.a. & press, d.g. (2013). the new era of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and conflict. strategic studies quarterly, 7(1), 3-14. retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26270573.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3abbaaaa78ff 0f7faf 8ede1385d559207 mueller, j. (1988). the essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons. international security, 13(2), 55-79. retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538971?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 40 the justification of international military intervention in response to human rights abuses ryan vetticad university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract interstate conflict, in layman's terms war, is by nature a highly complex and debated issue. from absolute or total war, to multi, dyadic, or systemic level conflicts, to simply a war fought for personal or state glory, the nature of war and military intervention is no doubt a complicated and intricate issue. when the nuance of human rights is added to the picture, the entire concept as a whole becomes increasingly difficult to delve into. but the fact remains that even in the fog of war the question of whether or not international military intervention is justified by human rights abuses, is of the utmost importance. this paper will analyze the salience of this question, and the fact remains that no matter the circumstance there are bound to be human rights violations where there is military intervention and that action is justified. specifically the paper will discuss three underlying themes behind this rationale 1. due to the inescapable nature of war, 2. numerous case studies such as the rwandan or armenian genocide, and 3. most government's responsibility to protect commitment. overall the paper will come to the conclusion that international military intervention is undoubtedly justified by human rights abuses. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 41 ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 42 introduction: interstate conflict, in layman's terms war, is by nature a highly complex and debated issue. from absolute or total war, to multi, dyadic, or systemic level conflicts, to simply a war fought for personal or state glory, the nature of war and military intervention is no doubt a complicated and intricate issue. furthermore, adding the nuance of human rights to the picture, the entire concept as a whole becomes increasingly difficult to delve into. but the fact remains that, even in the fog of war, the question of whether or not international military intervention is justified by human rights abuses, is of the utmost importance. the rationale behind this idea is seen throughout history and even in the present day. a newsletter from the africa news in regards to the former president of nigeria goodluck jonathan illustrates this exact point. in the letter, jonathan stated in regards to the nigerian army combating terrorism in the region, “[w]e are sticking to international best practices in prosecuting the war against terrorism and doing our best to ensure that we don’t have cases of human rights abuses in the north-east” (vanguard (lagos), 2015). even when it comes to dealing with atrocious terrorist groups such as boko haram, the importance of the issue still comes to light and showcases the importance of the question when it comes to discussing international military intervention in regards to human rights. additionally, one can look towards the issue at hand that is currently occurring in myanmar (former burma). an article from the islamabad policy research institute spoke to the sentiment that western governments have towards the situation in myanmar stating, “[t]he non-democratic governments and the human rights violations in myanmar have been opposed by the west. this is reflected in the international support [they have received] over the year” (dr. imran syed, 2019). western democracies have opposed human rights violations, and as a result have supported this approach through any means necessary, including military intervention. furthermore, it is not only real world examples that showcase this question's significance, but also the input of learned political scholars as well. a news article from ken booth, a prominent political scientist of international relations at the aberystwyth university, spoke on how the relationship between military conflict and human rights is an unclear but salient issue. in the abstract of his article he stated “[h]uman rights have been in the practice of international relations… since the discipline became institutionalized in 1919” (booth, 2019). booth brings light to the fact that human rights are an extremely important facet of the international system, and the question of whether or not governments should intervene on behalf of human rights is far-reaching and consequential across all nations. in light of these revelations, the fact remains that where there is military intervention it is bound to include some form of human rights violations, and due to the nuances of the problem those actions are justified. due to the inescapable nature of war, numerous case studies such as the rwandan or armenian genocide, and most government’s responsibility to protect commitment, international military intervention is undoubtedly justified by human rights abuses. literature review: there are various scholarly publications that support this viewpoint and one of the most prominent is hans speier’s journal on the social types of war. speier was a german-american sociologist who worked with the government of the united states both during and following world war 1. his journal article distinguishes the difference between the various forms of war and how they interact with each other and society as a whole. the main thesis that he forms early ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 43 on in his article is what exactly these forms are and what differentiates them from one another. he states “the three pure types of war may be called absolute war, instrumental war, and agnostic fighting. absolute war is unrestricted and unregulated war, agnostic fighting is regulated according to norms, and instrumental war may or may not be restricted, according to considerations of expediency.” (speier, 1941). he goes on to elaborate on these three overarching types of war and what exactly they each constitute in their respective right. absolute war is characterized by the absence of any restrictions or regulations that are more common to the concept of traditional warfare, and includes more instances of treachery, human rights violations, and violence. also referred to as “total war”, this form of war is further based on the fact in which an entire nation is taking part in the fight against another and the only way to victory is, as speier puts it, “absolute war is waged in order to annihilate him.” (speier, 1941). on the other hand, instrumental war is waged in order to gain control or access to resources and/or values that the opposing party controls. these values can be considered as political (such as strategic sites, or alliances), economic (industry, or access to markets), or religious (cultural sites). the last form of warfare that speier speaks of is agnostic fighting. this form of warfare is much more complex and difficult to grasp. as speier puts it, agnostic fighting is observed “under the strict observance of rules” (speier, 1941). meaning that both parties are seemingly equal, and the purpose of the fight is nothing more than personal or state glory. overall speier’s argument boils down to the idea that there are only these three pure types of war, and they are “oriented, respectively, toward (1) annihilation, (2) advantage (especially enrichment), and (3) glory and justice.” (speier, 1941). but more so that no actual war coincides with any specific one of these three pure types of war, and that making the distinction between what constitutes as a morally “good” or “bad” war is highly up to speculation and debate. in addition to speier’s journal on the various forms of war, it is imperative to identify specific case studies of actual examples of prominent human rights violations. one in particular was that of the rwandan genocide that occurred without (and some argue because) there was little to no use of military intervention. david scheffer, the former u.s. ambassador at-large to the u.n.’s war crimes issues, and current northwestern law professor, wrote a journal article in the georgetown university journal of international affairs titled, “lessons from the rwandan genocide”. for those who are unfamiliar with the genocide, over the course of 100 days, more than 800 thousand men, women, and children (mostly of tutsi decent) were killed by the hutu majority. over the course of his article, scheffer makes the claim that both the united states and the international community failed to respond to the atrocity, and that the main lesson to be learned from this event is that policymakers have to be able to handle multiple crises simultaneously especially due to the fact that so many lives were at stake. early on in his article scheffer asserts the notion that there were various reasons that the u.s. and international community reacted to the situation poorly, including the disbelief of information, a ‘politically correct’ early response, and an incohesive u.s. peacekeeping policy. overall, scheffer brings light to the fact that the main idea that can be learned from this event is that policymakers have to juggle multiple tasks in order to fulfill their civic duty, “we learned that policymakers cannot permit other priorities and breaking events to distract them from responding swiftly to atrocities” (scheffer, 2004). in addition the armenian genocide is another prominent case study that further explores the effects of non-military intervention in regards to human rights violations. richard g. hovannisian, an armenian american professor emeritus at the university of california los angeles, wrote a chapter in the book “embracing the other: philosophical, psychological, and ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 44 historical perspectives on altruism” entitled the question of altrusim during the armenian genocide of 1915. hovannisian makes the claim that those who intervened and carried out good deeds during the genocide garnered little public attention, but still made an immense difference. over the course of his chapter, hovannisian explains that it was very difficult to recap the events of the genocide due to a multitude of factors, including the limited amount of data on the subject, that the turkish government denies the fact that a genocide ever occurred, and that the event was overshadowed by an overarching world war. hovannisian goes on to detail how he carried out a study and investigation of 183 individual survivors of the genocide and how they recount an overarching account of instances of altruism over the course of the genocide. he went on to elaborate how there are various facets to his study including, sexual exploitation, the economics of the situation, religious motivations, humanitarian motivations, and prior acquaintances. overall, hovannisian makes multiple conclusions, the most important of which “there were numerous individuals, families, and even entire villages that were moved to intervene” (hovannisian, 1992). furthermore, perhaps the most important concept to discuss is the concept and idea of responsibility to protect, that exists within the international system. expanding upon the idea that within these case studies, even when there are multiple forms of warfare occurring, most nation-states maintain that they carry the responsibility to intervene during such occurrences. dwight raymond, a former colonel in the u.s. army and current member of the u.s. army peacekeeping and stability operations institute, constructed a research report within the igarape institutes report implementing the responsibility to protect: new directions for international peace and security? titled “responsibility to protect and the military”. raymond’s overall claim is that the overall concept of responsibility to protect (r2p) is vital but does include various caveats, and that while instituting r2p, policy-makers and the military have to additionally include the new concept of responsibility while protecting (rwp). early on in his report, raymond claims that the military carries a prominent role in the prevention of various atrocities and human rights violations, being done in various stages including preventing, reacting, and rebuilding. there are, however, various risks while undergoing the process of instituting r2p which include unintended escalation, collateral damage, anti-intervention sentiment, quagmire, and politicization. raymond makes the point that adopting the new measure of responsibility while protecting (rwp), which include facets as planning for contingencies, efficient reporting, and the quick termination and withdrawal of forces, will mitigate these risks and create an overall more efficient and effective program in stopping global atrocities. raymond states “rwp can be a helpful concept to shape r2p efforts effectively (including military measures) and mitigate the risks of action and inaction.” (raymond, 2013). overall, he makes the claim that rwp is a helpful and important tool in order to effectively implement r2p policies and prevent future human rights violations. while building upon these concepts of r2p and rwp, it is important to note that there is some controversy that exists within these ideas, and a few questions that require a deeper investigation in order to fully explore the exact nature of these concepts. questions such as whether or not people believe if intervention reduces human rights abuses or makes them worse; the fact if scholars and leaders think these ideas are even effective; and what constitutes if intervention is good or when it is bad? in answering these questions, we need look no further than the third chapter in a book published by the brookings institute, written by gareth evans titled “the scope and limits of the responsibility of the responsibility to protect”. evans makes the argument that there are five quintessential problems, or what he refers to as ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 45 ‘misunderstandings’, that exist within this protocol known as r2p. the first being that “r2p is just another name for humanitarian intervention” the second, “in extreme cases r2p means the use of coercive military force” third, “r2p applies only to weak and friendless countries, never the strong” fourth, “r2p covers all human protection issues” and fifth, “iraq 2003 was an example of the application of the r2p norm and a forstate of things to come” (evans, 2008). these five ‘misunderstandings’ as evans characterizes are more or less simple to understand. but their true importance lies in trying to understand and answer these core questions when it comes to analyzing r2p. not all scholars agree that r2p will reduce the amount of human rights abuses and furthermore that there is a lot of skepticism if the policy is effective at all. overall evans’ core analysis is that r2p is not all that it appears to be and that there are some fundamental flaws that lie within it. along with navigating these questions regarding the flaws in r2p, it is imperative to explore exactly what constitutes implementing the policy. afterall is it not easier to engage in discussion over a concept, than it is to actually implement it? that is the very discourse that julia rabar at the australian strategic policy institute seeks to answer. in march of 2011, she published a policy report titled “uncharted terrain: libya and the responsibility to protect”. in her report she delved into how the concept of r2p, simply put, is much easier said than done. she cited the intervention in libya as her prime example, expanding on the fact that the situation in the nation became increasingly complex as the relationship between president muammar qaddafi’s government and the rebels continued to escalate. that intervention itself means so much more than simply protecting the populace in this conflict, but forces countries to legitimize and pick a side. in rabar’s words “... it enables the rebels and implicitly legitimises[sic] their agenda. the intervention chooses a side.” (rabar, 2011). the whole idea of military intervention for the basis of human rights revolves around this idea of r2p, and libya in itself is an important case study in how the concept of r2p is flawed while at the same time highly important in the battle to protect those who need it. overall, rabar’s core argument aligns with most academic scholars, that although r2p is somewhat flawed it is the best tool we have in order to correct the abuses of human rights. discussion: the question of whether or not military intervention is justified in response to human rights abuses is by no means a straightforward discussion. it is without a doubt, however, that due to the nature of war, numerous case studies, and the international community’s commitment to the concept of responsibility to protect, that military intervention is undoubtedly justified by human rights abuses. the literature review encompassed six salient pieces of information, all of which include multiple sources of evidence and explanation that supports the notion that the answer to this question is clearly ‘yes’. but it is important to realize that it is possible to go about this discussion in two distinct themes or ways. the first of which is characterizing this argument from the facts of the nature of war, which correlate to the case studies of rwanda and armenia. the second theme revolves around the whole concept and idea of responsibility to protect how it functions, what it constitutes, and what flaws that it also has. by going about this discussion in the means of these two individual themes, the purpose is to craft and expand on the nuanced and complex relationship that exists between them in order to fully support the assertion that international military intervention is justified by human rights abuses. speier’s article on the social types of war first, provides the framework on which to explain the inherent nature of war and conflict in general. simply put, war is an extremely ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 46 intricate and dynamic issue, but can be categorized to fall within one of these three forms that speier insinuates absolute, instrumental, and agnostic. but furthermore is the fact that there is the possibility for these three forms of war to intersect and overlap in various ways. an instrumental war, for instance, can be waged in a manner that is consistent with absolute warfare, and thus it would be unfeasible to distinguish the two from one another. this is the first generalization that is important to make, that simply due to the nature of war and conflict, that while there are various forms of war in theory it is near impossible to distinguish them in reality. moreover, the second generalization that is vital to muse over is that speier’s first form of warfare, absolute war, is by definition consistent with every human rights violation imaginable. the purpose of absolute war is not merely to win strategically but to “annihilate” the enemy, as the theory suggests that there can be no peace until the opponent is wiped out. with these two generalizations, it is safe to say that it is simply in the nature of war for violations of human rights to occur. since the three forms of warfare are dynamic and overlapping, and due to the fact that absolute war consists of human rights violations, conflict in general will inevitably lead to human rights violations. and such, it is because of this fact that military intervention is always justified by the human rights violations simply because there is no escape from the fact that human rights violations will never cease to exist in the scope of war. this further leads to the two case studies of the rwandan and armenian genocides. and specifically these were not merely factual accounts of both events but rather more nuanced approaches to both affairs. in the case of rwanda, through the perspective of the west and international community, and the lessons that can be learned from the incident. in the case of armenia, with the overtone of the theme of altruism and how that motif fits into the overall picture. both scheffer and hovannisian assert the position that there are numerous undertones that go along with both of these events. in the case of rwanda, the international community made multiple mistakes and as a result, one of the greatest atrocities of the 21st century occurred. in the case of armenia, although the international community did not necessarily have the ability to intervene due to the circumstances of the situation (the first world war), there were still individuals and communities that took the responsibility to intervene even while the events of the genocide unfolded. what both of these sources work to provide is that it is both the responsibility of the international community and system to intervene when human rights violations like this occur, and in addition, it is in our human nature to help those who need it even in the most dire of circumstances. as a result it is more than justifiable to engage in military intervention, as it is both our civic duty as well as in our human nature. in addition to these two case studies, it is vital to incorporate the topic of how these human rights abuses and international conflicts have affected people in the scope of their actual livelihood. the main avenue to explore that dynamic is in reference to the refugee crisis that currently exists in many wartorn countries that both have and have not experienced international military intervention. the table above comes directly from the unhcr (united nations high commissioner for refugees) and showcases the amount of refugees that various regions of the world currently have. however, going a step further, the table below showcases that pertaining data and explores exactly which countries have the highest number of refugees. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 47 unhcr 2018 unhcr 2018 at closer inspection and comparison between these two tables, one can easily see that syria (6.7 million), afghanistan (2.7 million), south sudan (2.3 million), myanmar (1.1 million), and somalia (0.9 million), just five countries house more than two-thirds or 67% of all refugees worldwide. the reason why this information is vital, especially when analyzing which specific countries have the most refugees, is because when one compares that data to the international ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 48 military intervention that particular nation has seen it showcases how conflict has impacted the lives of that nation's people in regards to their human rights. when you look at nations such as myanmar (which was discussed earlier) and south sudan, it becomes known that there is not an immense degree of international military intervention if any at all. in turn that reflects the immense amount of refugees from those states. yet, if there was international military intervention perhaps those numbers would be smaller and fewer people would have been displaced. this only works to prove the fact that if there were international military intervention, then the amount of refugees from these countries could be lower and this only works to justify the fact that international military intervention is not only vital in stopping human rights abuses but is justified by them. building off of this point, the last theme to discuss is the concept of r2p as a whole. colonel raymond’s report on the concepts of both the responsibility to protect as well as the responsibility while protecting, works to encapsulate this entire argument. one can already see that it is both an aspect of civic duty as well as in our human nature to intervene when there are violations of human rights, and this whole concept of r2p is that very idea codified. evans showcased the dynamic that exists on the other side of the aisle, bringing to light some of the fundamental flaws that exist within the r2p protocol. yet even with these flaws, one can see that r2p is generally a successful and prominent approach when it comes to military intervention in the international system, and rabar’s report works to bring the whole argument together. that even though r2p is nowhere near perfect, it is by far the best approach the international system possesses, and fully works to the benefit of both the country receiving as well as the country giving help. this only works to support the notion that international military intervention is fully justified when it comes to human rights abuses. the r2p concept as a whole is an ‘imperfect’ approach towards working and solving the issues of international conflict, specifically in regards to human rights. conclusion: overall, it is clear to note that the importance of this question is easily distinguished. the entire concept of human rights is of the utmost salience and affects each and every one of us. that is why it is crucial to intervene when there are gross violations of human rights. speier’s three social types of war, theorize that war and conflict inevitably leads to violations of human rights. the case studies of rwanda and armenia goes to show that it is both our civic duty as well as in our human nature to step in when there are injustices occurring, and the data from the unhcr only works to display what happens when states do not take action. the entire theory and practice of responsibility to protect works to encapsulate all of it; from a state’s duty to intervene to an individual's desire to serve. as a result it can be clearly identified that due the inescapable nature of war, various case studies, and the concept of r2p that international military intervention is without a doubt justified by human rights violations. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 49 references (march 4, 2015 wednesday). human rights; war against terror military'll avoid human rights abuses in its operations -jonathan. africa news. retrieved from https://advance-lexis com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentitem:5ff 9-k4b1-dyr8-34dc-00000-00&context=1516831. dr. imran syed. (june 30, 2019 sunday). to intervene or not to intervene: ethics of humanitarian intervention in myanmar. ipri journal. retrieved from https://advance lexis com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentitem:5w n6-fp61-jch9-g3c9-00000-00&context=1516831. ken booth. (january 2019). great illusions or great transformations? human rights and international relations a hundred years on. international relations. retrieved from https://advance-lexis com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentitem:5yj f-kg91-jbmy-h1d1-00000-00&context=1516831. speier, h. (1941). the social types of war. american journal of sociology, 46(4), 445-454. retrieved april 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/2769917 scheffer, d. (2004). lessons from the rwandan genocide. georgetown journal of international affairs, 5(2), 125-132. retrieved april 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/43134297 hovannisian, r. (1992). the question of altruism during the armenian genocide of 1915. in oliner p., oliner s., baron l., blum l., krebs d., & smolenska m. (eds.), embracing the other: philosophical, psychological, and ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 50 historical perspectives on altruism (pp. 282-305). new york; london: nyu press. retrieved april 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg24m.21 raymond, d., hamann, e., & muggah, r. (2013). implementing the responsibility to protect: new directions for international peace and security?(pp. 24-31, rep.). igarape institute. retrieved april 20, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19168.6 evans, g. (2008). the scope and limits of the responsibility to protect. in the responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all (pp. 55-76). brookings institution press. retrieved may 6, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg7fp.7 rabar, j. (2011). (rep.). australian strategic policy institute. retrieved may 7, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03980 angelica, eulirio, warao, delta amacuro, & warao. (n.d.). global trends forced displacement in 2018 unhcr. retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 17 a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari university of michigan abstract this article explains why pakistan supports the afghan taliban. it contends that pakistan has extensive systematic incentives to do so. furthermore, internal pakistani dynamics enable and encourage support for the taliban. the article considers the implications for the united states and the afghan government. this work extends the existing literature and presents novel arguments. a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 18 introduction “give your enemy a thousand chances to become your friend, but do not give your friend a single chance to become your enemy.” – imam ali on the 30th of november 2016, roughly three weeks after his scarcely believable triumph in the united states’ presidential election, president-elect donald j. trump spoke with the then prime minister of pakistan, nawaz sharif, over the phone. as various news organizations have since reported, the conversation between the two leaders did not go according to plan. having elected to eschew the state department’s guidance altogether, the president-elect instead chose to compliment the pakistani prime minister’s terrific character and remarkable performance and praise pakistan’s exceptional people and boundless opportunities. while the president’s ringing endorsement of pakistan and its leader may be described as exaggerated, his statements are somewhat in keeping with the united states’ foreign policy towards the south asian giant. the u.s. government, after all, intended to contribute over $742 million in foreign assistance to pakistan over the course of 2017 (foreign assistance – pakistan). that figure is, by no means, an anomaly. former president obama acknowledged the complicated nature of his country’s relationship with pakistan and even refused to visit the latter during his time in office. the u.s. government, however, granted more than $2.6 billion in foreign assistance to pakistan between 2011-2016 (foreign assistance – pakistan). in recent years, the nature of the relationship between the two countries has come under intense strain. mounting evidence of systematic collaboration between elements of the pakistani government and security establishment on the one hand and members of the afghan taliban on the other has repeatedly undermined the united states’ counterterrorism strategy in afghanistan. but as pakistan remains hostile to the united states vis-a-vis the afghan war, the u.s. government continues to acknowledge the nation as a major non-nato ally (mnna), placing it in an elite group alongside other stalwart supporters like australia, japan, and south korea. as i hope to illustrate over the course of this essay, this constitutes a major strategic error on the part of the united states. this essay analyzes the pakistani government’s position pertaining to the united states’ efforts to defeat the afghan taliban. highlighting territorial sovereignty and financial considerations, i argue that pakistan is likely to continue to support the afghan taliban covertly, as an ongoing rivalry with india, an unresolved border dispute with afghanistan, and an avaricious security establishment leave an unstable afghanistan in the nation’s strategic interest. my overarching aim, then, is to offer a response to the following question: ➢ why is pakistan undermining the united states’ anti-taliban strategy in afghanistan? key contentions this essay has been divided into seven sections. i begin with an overview of the scholarly literature on the role played by pakistan in the war in afghanistan. i, then, provide a brief history of the afghan war. the third section dwells on the rationale behind the pakistani government’s actions in afghanistan from a realist perspective. the subsequent section contains ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 19 a discussion on pakistan’s centrality within and contributions (both positive and negative) to the war in afghanistan. the fifth section highlights pakistan’s territorial sovereignty considerations. here, i argue that pakistan’s constant fear of a growing indian influence within the afghan government and the re-litigation of the durand line dispute by that government compels it to lend its support to the afghan taliban. finally, i emphasize the role that greed has played in the pakistani security establishment’s decision to enforce its government’s policy of siding with the afghan taliban. i conclude with a brief discussion of the policy implications of my arguments. literature review the scholarly community’s views on pakistan’s involvement in the war in afghanistan have evolved considerably since the u.s.-led invasion in 2001. early assessments were cautiously optimistic. akhtar, for instance, argued that while pakistan’s attitude towards afghanistan had been wolfish in the past, the events of 9/11 changed the nation’s calculus significantly (2008, 50). electing to partner with the united states, pakistan seemingly consigned age-old rivalries to the dustbin of history and invested itself in the quest for a stable afghanistan, free from the shackles of taliban rule (akhtar 2008, 61-62). others also emphasized this post-9/11 shift in pakistan’s foreign policy behaviour and expressed renewed hope for cooperation with the united states (kux 2001; khan 2007; khattak et al 2014). recent contributions, however, have been far more critical. several scholars have pointed out pakistan’s involvement in a dangerous game in afghanistan. a common criticism pertains to the incongruous nature of pakistan’s strategy in the war-torn nation. scholars observe that while the pakistani government continues to identify itself as an ally of the united states in the fight against the afghan taliban, the country provides a safe haven for some of the terrorist group’s most influential leaders and military commanders within its own territory (kruys 2009; rashid 2012; mcgovern 2013; nadiri 2014). others have drawn attention to the material and logistical support – recruits, military training, funding, and weaponry – that pakistan’s security forces have contributed towards the afghan taliban’s cause in the past decade (constable 2007; jones 2007; mitton 2007). however, while pakistan’s underhanded actions in afghanistan have been criticized repeatedly in the scholarly literature, few scholars have studied the afghan conflict from pakistan’s perspective and reflected on the country’s motivations. the handful of accounts that do exist tend to over-emphasize pakistan’s enmity with india while ignoring other important factors (akbarzadeh 2003; khan 2010; mezard 2010). this essay, then, assesses the u.s.-led war against the afghan taliban from a pakistani standpoint and attempts to build a holistic picture by highlighting the role an ongoing border dispute and avaricious security apparatus play in determining the south asian nation’s strategy in afghanistan. a brief history of the war in afghanistan while the current afghan war began in 2001 with the invasion of afghanistan by a coalition of forty nations led by the united states, the country has suffered from political turmoil and conflict for decades. as rubin and armstrong point out, “for much of the modern era, a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 20 afghanistan might credibly be defined as a large body of rocky land surrounded by neighbors who export their own conflicts onto its territory” (2003, 31). trouble began in september 1979, when disagreements and internal rivalries between the leaders of the communist people’s democratic party of afghanistan (pdpa) led to the ouster of president nur muhammad taraki, one of the founding members of the party and a soviet union loyalist, by hafizullah amin. educated in the united states and eager to strengthen his country’s relationship with pakistan (a member of the western alliance at the time), amin was immediately identified as a threat by the soviet union. wary of its loosening grip over the pdpa and the increasing influence of the mujahideen (and, by extension, of the pakistanis and americans that financed and trained them) in various parts of the country, the ussr found itself under considerable pressure. unwilling to surrender an important ally and neighboring country to pakistani and american control, the ussr intervened militarily in december 1979, capturing and assassinating amin within a matter of days. this, in turn, triggered a nearly ten-year long war that led to the loss of somewhere between 500,000 to 2 million civilian lives and destroyed each and every pillar of the afghan state (khan 2012, 212-213). in the aftermath of the soviet withdrawal from afghanistan in 1989, factional infighting between the mujahideen (who had only recently united to thwart the soviets) became the norm. a political vacuum emerged that permitted opportunistic states like pakistan to construct their spheres of influence in the country (rubin and armstrong 2003, 31). by extending its support to the burgeoning taliban movement, pakistan invested its efforts in attempting to install a friendly authority in its neighboring country. the taliban movement comprised of a loosely affiliated group of afghan teachers and students from conservative religious academies (madrasas) in afghanistan and pakistan that intended to restore order in the country through the enforcement of sharia law and tribal traditions (rubin and armstrong 2003, 31). pakistan had been “intimately associated” with the group since its establishment in the early 1990s (riedel 2013). indeed, the inter-services intelligence (isi) had trained mullah omar, the eventual supreme commander of the afghan taliban, at one of its training camps in the 1980s to fight against the soviet union (riedel 2013). when the time came, then, the pakistanis turned to their old ally and helped omar establish the taliban as a powerful organization in kandahar. with considerable pakistani support to rely on, omar and the taliban captured the afghan capital of kabul in 1996 and cemented their rule in the country, establishing the so-called islamic emirate of afghanistan. as the taliban graduated from insurgency to governance and secured their monopoly over the use of force, pakistan became one of only three countries (the others being the kingdom of saudi arabia and the united arab emirates) to recognize the terrorist outfit as the rightful and legitimate government of the nation (riedel 2013). by 2001, the pakistani government had made itself indispensable to the afghan taliban. pakistan supplied the taliban regime with “hundreds of advisers and experts to run its tanks, aircraft and artillery, thousands of pakistani pashtuns to man its infantry and small units of its special services group commandos to help in combat” with rival authorities (riedel 2013). simply put, “pakistan provided the oil needed to run the taliban’s war machine” (riedel 2013). ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 21 a landmark event in the united states, however, altered this arrangement considerably. while the western world was still reeling from the events of september 11, 2001, the federal bureau of investigation (fbi) quickly identified each of the nineteen hijackers responsible for the horrific attacks. for his part, osama bin laden, the founder of al-qaeda, vehemently denied that his organization had recruited, trained, and financed the terrorists. having returned to afghanistan a few years earlier to avoid arrest, bin laden had established a strong relationship with mullah omar and leveraged his connections with the afghan taliban to expand al-qaeda’s operations across the world (anderson 2015). as it became clear to the rest of the world that al-qaeda had been using afghanistan as its head office, bin laden continued to plot, secure in the knowledge that he would never be extradited to the united states by the taliban government. within days of the september 11 attacks, the united states government demanded that the taliban surrender bin laden over to them and dismantle the al-qaeda training camps that had sprung up across their territory. the afghan taliban refused to accept these demands and taunted the u.s., compelling the latter to initiate operation enduring freedom in october 2001. the united states led operation dismantled the taliban government in less than a week. by december 2001, large parts of the afghan territory were under american control. facing complete annihilation, the defeated taliban fighters were ordered by omar to retreat and flee from armed confrontation with their far superior enemy (reidel 2013). while several militants returned home, others fled to pakistan and found shelter in the city of quetta, where omar himself settled (reidel 2013). after a few years of hiding and ignominy, omar identified an opportune moment. as the u.s. became embroiled in the war in iraq, omar gathered his recovering troops and launched the now infamous taliban insurgency. by 2004, afghanistan had once again become a theatre of war. a north atlantic treaty organization (nato) report containing data procured from 27,000 interrogations with over 4,000 taliban and al-qaeda militants was leaked in 2012. the report claimed that the pakistani security establishment had proved crucial to the survival and resurgence of the afghan taliban in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 invasion. the pakistani intelligence agency, the isi, offered shelter, training, tactical know-how, and funding to the organization while keeping information pertaining to the location of the group’s leaders hidden (maqbool 2012). the pakistani government and security establishment have repeatedly cast aspersions about the findings of this report. however, the fact that the taliban re-emerged to snatch back what they regard as their territory cannot be disputed. indeed, the taliban also released a report entitled, “percent of country under the control of the mujahideen,” in march 2017. the report assesses the ongoing power-struggle between the taliban, local warlords, and the u.s. backed afghan government of president ashraf ghani in 349 of the 400 known districts in afghanistan. according to the report, the afghan taliban “fully controls 34 districts, including the district centers, and contests another 167 districts (these are districts where the taliban claims it controls between 40 to 99 percent of the territory)” (roggio 2017). furthermore, the terrorist outfit claims that it maintains a considerable presence (10 to 39 a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 22 percent) in another 52 districts and a minor presence in six districts (1 to 9 percent) (roggio 2017). these numbers have been largely verified by several news organizations and do not differ significantly from those provided by the special inspector general for afghanistan reconstruction (sigar) in a recent report. there are many reasons that account for the afghan taliban’s dramatic return to power in several regions of the war-torn nation. numerous mistakes by u.s. authorities, including a considerable reduction in the number of american troops left behind in afghanistan since 2014 and a shift towards addressing the threat posed by the islamic state have no doubt contributed to the taliban’s recent string of successes. as i argue in subsequent sections, however, the united states government’s over-reliance on the pakistanis lays at the core of the afghanistan imbroglio. a realist perspective on the rationale behind the pakistani position in order to appreciate the pakistani position vis-à-vis the afghan taliban, it is important to understand the countries’ relationship with the afghan government (the terrorist group’s greatest enemy). here, i turn to the principles of realism. the realist doctrine is built on the assumption that the international arena is characterized by the lack of an established authority figure or anarchy. in the absence of an established authority figure to monitor, outline objectives for, and resolve conflicts between states, individual states’ foreign policies are governed by a combination of internal and external factors. the size, location, capacity, and historical trajectory of a state, along with its system of governance and leadership, play a significant role in determining each state’s foreign policy behaviour in the international arena. but while states receive different scores on the aforementioned parameters, realists argue that all states pursue a common objective: survival. in an anarchic international system, “the survival of the state can never be guaranteed, because the threat or use of force culminating in war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft and foreign policy behaviour” (ahmed 2010, 314). as a result, a state must do whatever it may take to ensure its survival. survival is an abstract concept. from the pakistani government’s perspective, survival (in the context of the war in afghanistan) involves preserving its territorial sovereignty in the face of existential threats from india and afghanistan. territorial sovereignty refers to the pakistani government’s right and power to preside over its territorial affairs without the threat of foreign interference or intervention. as i go onto discuss in a forthcoming section, the pakistani government remains of the view that its right and power to conduct the country’s business is constantly compromised by its indian and afghan counterparts. this, in turn, prompts the government to attempt to weaken its adversaries by extending support to the afghan taliban and embroiling the indian and afghan governments in a frustrating and endless conflict. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 23 territorial sovereignty pakistani government pakistani security establishment foreign assistance while the pakistani government remains convinced that its right to rule is constantly jeopardized by its neighbors, it cannot maintain its sovereignty on its own. to secure this objective, the civilian government has had no choice but to engage in a symbiotic relationship with the pakistani security establishment, comprised primarily of the pakistani armed forces and the isi. members of the security establishment, however, have an agenda of their own that is independent of their interest in protecting the government’s territorial sovereignty. as i go onto argue in a subsequent section, pakistan’s security apparatus has benefited tremendously from the united states’ foreign assistance to pakistan and retained a financial incentive to keep the threat of a resurgent afghan taliban alive. it has secured this generous flow of capital by taking advantage of the civilian government’s credibility in the eyes of the american authorities. the pakistani government and its quasi-independent security establishment, then, have both used the threat of a strong afghan taliban for their own ends. pakistan’s contributions to the afghan war before delving into the reasons behind pakistan’s decision to continue to support the afghan taliban, it is worth reflecting on some of the contributions the country has made to the u.s-led war in afghanistan. the events of september 11 left the pakistani government in a quandary. their previous support for the afghan taliban had been well documented. indeed, pakistan was the last nation to rescind the diplomatic recognition it granted to the islamic emirate of afghanistan. the 9/11 attacks gave the united states the moral high ground and widespread sympathy across the world. the united nations security council’s decision to unanimously adopt resolution 1368 granted an additional veneer of legality to the united states’ counterterrorism agenda in afghanistan. cognizant of the significant outcry that would result from them dragging their feet on what many at the time viewed as a black-and-white issue, the pakistani government attempted to thread the proverbial needle. with contradictory interests at stake, pakistan chose to “cooperate where its national security interests converged with those of the usa and avoid where they diverged” (khattak et al 2014, 86). as the former foreign minister of pakistan, abdul sattar once explained, his country’s policy vis-à-vis the war in afghanistan now involved a “[y]es-but approach,” wherein the pakistani government would unequivocally accept each of the united states’ demands in public, before expressing its reservations and disagreeing with key details in private (nadiri 2014, 140). a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 24 disagreements aside, pakistan has aided the united states’ counterterrorism agenda in several ways since the launch of operation enduring freedom in 2001. the country has granted members of the coalition access to its military bases for reconnaissance and rescue operations, provided logistical support, and contributed intelligence resources and airspace for targeted strikes against taliban and al-qaeda operatives (akhtar 2008, 62). the pakistanis also helped the u.s. establish a joint patrol along the afghan-pakistan border and deployed soldiers in certain areas of the tribal belt near the contested border for the first time in their history (akhtar 2008, 62). these efforts have directly contributed to the capture of dozens of al-qaeda militants. additionally, the pakistani security establishment has also assisted in the search for and apprehension of a limited number of terrorists hiding within its own borders. a majority of these, however, have been low-level, rank-and-file targets, and few have served as members of the afghan taliban. pakistan’s attempts to aid the united states in its anti-taliban efforts have been undermined by an unwillingness to quash the afghan taliban within its own territory. the terrorist group remains highly active in pakistan’s more accessible urban and peri-urban areas, generating funds and attracting recruits in some of the country’s major cities (nadiri 2014, 142). senior taliban officials have repeatedly claimed in interrogations that they travel freely between the federally administered tribal areas (fata), quetta, and haripur, under the guaranteed protection of the pakistani government and security establishment (nadiri 2014, 142). indeed, several of these officials continue to maintain stable residences in these regions and lead comfortable lives, in full view of the pakistani authorities. it is a poorly kept secret that the pakistani government and security establishment are “thoroughly aware of taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior taliban personnel” (riedel 2013). the authorities in question, however, have done little with this information and largely turned a blind eye to the terrorist group’s operations both within and across the border. the ongoing indo-pak rivalry the pakistani government’s ongoing rivalry with its indian counterpart lies at the forefront of its decision to support the afghan taliban. a rivalry is loosely defined as a competitive relationship between two (or more) actors striving to achieve a common goal or preponderance over the other. the relationship between the pakistani and indian governments, however, is more than merely competitive. the arrangement between the south asian giants “is included on virtually every comprehensive list of international rivalries. it is, in other words, an exemplary (and therefore troubling) case” (mitton 2014, 361). the countries have engaged in four wars (in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999) since the partition of india took place in 1947. frequent outbursts of violence have ensured that relations between the two nations remains defined by a lack of trust. key figures on both sides of the unending conflict are convinced that the opponent will seize any opportunity to destroy them. most recently, widespread outrage and protests in indian-administered kashmir in the aftermath of the killing of a prominent mujahideen leader by indian soldiers on july 8, 2016, have rekindled tensions between the ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 25 eternally distrustful neighbors. while the decades-old dispute over the future of indian-administered kashmir has often dominated the headlines, pakistan and india have also found themselves on opposing sides in afghanistan. wedged in between afghanistan in the west and india in the east, pakistan is a narrow country that has long been wary of india’s relationship with its conflict-ridden neighbor. from the pakistani government’s viewpoint, india has aligned itself with the u.s.-backed afghan government, a spiritual successor to the northern alliance that fought the pakistanbacked afghan taliban in the 1990s (mitton 2014, 362). after years of hostile relations with a taliban regime partial to pakistan, then, the indian government has made friends of its own in afghanistan. the indians have gone to great lengths to consolidate these gains, offering foreign aid and investments as incentives. the indian government has spent over $1 billion in development funds to “provide an array of benefits including health, education, energy, communication, and general infrastructure support” for their afghan counterparts, with the promise of even more aid in the future (mitton 2014, 362-363). india also contributed to the construction of the country’s new parliament building, incurring a cost of around $25 million and “linking the site of afghanistan’s nascent democracy to india and the indian people” (mitton 2014, 363). even more worryingly, the indian map exhibiting pakistan’s position between afghanistan and india government has gradually ramped up its military involvement in afghanistan. india has been providing comprehensive training services to afghan military personnel and supplying defensive military equipment, including armored checkpoints and watchtowers to the growing afghan national security forces (ansf) (mitton 2014, 363). the indian government has also set up four new consulates in afghanistan to complement the work already being done by its embassy in kabul (khan 2010, 179). the pakistani security establishment has repeatedly claimed that a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 26 these consulates “are, at best, intelligence gathering sites and more likely bases for carrying out operations inside pakistan” (khan 2010, 179). the pakistani government has also formally accused the indian intelligence services of relying on these locations to recruit afghans to carry out terrorist operations in pakistan (khan 2010, 179). the pakistani government is fully aware of the benefits india is hoping to accrue from ingratiating itself with the afghan government. a closer relationship between the two nations, for instance, will grant its biggest rival consistent “access to energy-rich central asia, with afghanistan serving as a conduit and corridor” (mitton 2014, 364). india is also likely to leverage any relationship with the afghans to strengthen its security apparatus in their country and reduce its vulnerability to attacks from terrorist organizations operating out of afghanistan. most importantly, however, india may eventually see afghanistan as a springboard to ratchet up the pressure on pakistan’s western border. this, in turn, would leave the latter exposed to attacks from the east and the west and cement india’s hegemony in the indian subcontinent. throughout the course of its existence, pakistan has been involved in a relentless race to achieve military deterrence with respect to its significantly larger neighbor to the east. the country currently maintains one of the world’s largest active militaries and boasts a defense budget that amounted to approximately 3.4% of the country’s gross domestic product (gdp) in 2016 (gady 2017). that budget was increased by roughly 7% for 2017-2018 fiscal year (gady 2017). in addition, pakistan has maintained a fully-functioning nuclear arsenal, with most experts in agreement that the country is in possession of somewhere between 100-130 nuclear warheads. from the government’s point of view, however, the country’s military might will offer scarce comfort if india continues to make significant gains in its relationship with the afghan government. pakistan’s distrust for india has captured its government’s psyche for decades. the pakistanis are convinced that “india’s intentions are to squeeze pakistan by giving it two hostile borders” (khan 2010, 181). india’s provision of aid and investment to afghanistan belie its strategic interest in weakening pakistan’s security on the western front and constitute a “direct affront to pakistan’s sense of propriety in a country it has historically treated… as a client state” (chaudhari 2011, 85). given its simply extraordinary defensive commitments and frail economy, “pakistan cannot afford the military establishment it has, much less a far larger one to prepare for a possible ‘second front’ against afghanistan” (khan 2010, 181). a growing indian presence in afghanistan, then, represents an existential threat in pakistan’s backyard. it leaves the pakistani government with the unenviable task of having to protect its territorial sovereignty from attacks hailing from the west and the east in the event of an indian invasion. consequently, the pakistani government is likely to continue to offer support to the afghan taliban in the foreseeable future. the terrorist organization also views india as an enemy, given the latter’s support for the erstwhile northern alliance and current partnership with president ashraf ghani’s “illegitimate” government in kabul. short of invading afghanistan and systematically dismantling its enemy’s infrastructure in the country, the pakistani government’s only option is to continue to cooperate with the afghan taliban, an organization that is unlikely to turn against its old patron and provides a resilient barrier against indian expansionism in the region. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 27 the durand line dispute pakistan shares an approximately 2400-kilometer-long border with afghanistan referred to as the durand line. established via an agreement between imperial britain and the erstwhile emirate of afghanistan in 1893, the border is the subject of a long-standing dispute between pakistan and afghanistan. the nineteenth century witnessed the british and russian empires, two of the world’s most powerful actors at the time, engage in what historians have since referred to as “the great game.” as russia methodically conquered its neighbors and expanded its influence in central and southern asia, britain was alerted. worried that the russians would eventually set their sights on the wealthy colony of india, the british elected to invade afghanistan with the hopes of using the emirate as a barrier. each of the britain’s attempts to forcefully bring afghanistan into its sphere of influence, however, failed miserably. with time running out, the british turned to sir mortimer durand, the foreign secretary to india. an accomplished diplomat, sir durand reached an agreement with the emir on november 12, 1893. the final, one-page long treaty, “resulted in a frontier that ran from the karakoram range in the northeast running south through the spin ghar mountains… before turning west along the chagai hills to the border with iran” (micallef 2017). the agreement was plagued by controversies from the outset. the new border established by the treaty divided the pashtun tribal lands, a region colloquially referred to as pashtunistan in two, with half of the area now part of british india (modern-day pakistan) and the balance remaining a part of afghanistan (micallef 2017). the division also led to the loss of the province of baluchistan to british india (modern-day pakistan), stripping the emirate of its historic access to the arabian sea (micallef 2017). furthermore, while the original agreement was drafted in english, dari, and pashto, sir durand insisted that the english version must be treated as “the definitive copy” (micallef 2017). this left the emir at a disadvantage, given that he neither read nor understood the english language. the demarcation surveys that began in 1894, then, may have commenced without the informed consent of afghanistan’s leader. the division was, nonetheless, completed by may of 1896. the legitimacy of the durand line has been questioned by the afghans ever since. successive generations of afghan governments, for instance, have claimed that the a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 28 map exhibiting the durand line terms laid out in the dari and pashto versions of the november 1893 agreement state, “the legality of the afghan-pakistan border should have lapsed in 1993, 100 years after the signing of the agreement” (qassem 2007, 66). no documents, however, have ever been unearthed to justify these claims. previous afghan governments have also claimed that the british confiscated the original copies of the dari and pashto versions. these allegations have been strongly and repeatedly refuted by the british government. as things stand, then, there “is absolutely nothing in the durand line agreement or in subsequent documents between the british and afghan boundary commissions which completed border demarcations until 1896, to indicate that the border was determined only for 100 years” (qassem 2007, 66). indeed, the original agreement has been ratified both formally and informally on numerous occasions, including in 1922 and 1930. questions regarding the legitimacy of their claims have not prevented afghan governments from reviving the durand line debate from time-to-time. in the 1940s, for instance, as pakistan became an independent nation, “the afghan rulers refused to recognize the treaty and played the nationalist card of ‘greater pashtunistan’, laying claim to dir, swat, chitral and amb, baluchistan and the princely states of kalat, kharan, makran, and las bela” (wagner and khan 2013, 73). in the 1960s, governments in kabul continued to observe a pashtunistan day and even brought the durand line issue to the attention of the international islamic economic conference and the united nations (wagner and khan 2013, 75). more recently, former president hamid karzai stated unequivocally that pakistan has “no legal authority to dictate terms on the durand line,” and that the afghan government and people would never acknowledge the legitimacy of the arbitrary afghan-pakistan border (siddiqui 2017). from the pakistani government’s perspective, the durand line debate represents a zeroijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 29 sum situation. any meaningful attempts by the afghan government to relitigate the issue pose an existential threat to the pakistani government’s territorial sovereignty. the humiliation of 1971, when east pakistan (modern-day people’s republic of bangladesh) declared its independence and separated from the homeland with the assistance of the indian government and armed forces, still looms large in the memories of pakistan’s elites. the areas that the afghan government seeks to repatriate amount to approximately two-thirds of pakistan’s territory as a nation (micallef 2017). the loss of these areas, then, would lead the total collapse of the pakistani state and cannot be tolerated by the government under any circumstances. in this instance, however, the pakistani government’s reliance on the afghan taliban for support is complicated by the fact that the latter has also refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the afghan-pakistan border. while he depended on pakistani assistance throughout his time as the supreme commander of the afghan taliban, mullah omar refused to recognize the durand line and argued that muslims ought not to be divided by worldly barriers. the pakistani government, then, has had to weigh its options carefully in recent years. trapped between the proverbial rock (an afghan government that is forever unwilling to recognize the durand line) and a hard place (an afghan taliban that shares the government’s disregard), the pakistani government has had to bank on a cynical balancing game. aware of the fact that president ghani’s elected government has the recognition and support of the united states and the international community, pakistan has hedged its bets and continued to provide aid to the afghan taliban. the pakistani government’s calculus here is simple: a perpetual stalemate is preferable to a decisive outcome. if the afghan taliban is provided with sufficient resources to persist as a constant thorn in the side of the afghan government, but not enough to overthrow the government altogether, the two parties will remain locked in an endless stalemate. this, in turn, will prevent both sides from finding the time and energy to revisit the durand line debate in any meaningful way. while such a strategy has risks associated with it, it has served the pakistani government well so far. unable to dismiss the other from the playing field, neither the afghan taliban nor president ghani’s government have found themselves able to challenge the afghanpakistan border concertedly. consequently, it is unlikely that the pakistani government will abandon its support for the afghan taliban while the durand line debate remains unresolved. a stable afghanistan, as things stand, runs contrary to the pakistani government’s interest in preserving its territorial sovereignty. the greed of the pakistani security establishment while the pakistani government’s aim to preserve its territorial sovereignty offers a concrete purpose for the country’s security establishment to pursue, greed has also played an important role in its decision-making. to explain the effect of avarice on the pakistani security establishment’s decision to implement its government’s policy and cooperate with the afghan taliban, i begin by analyzing the country’s military expenditure. pakistan’s military expenditure, i.e. the total amount that the pakistani government spends on maintaining the country’s security establishment (which is made up of the country’s a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 30 armed forces and intelligence agencies), has been consistently high in recent decades. the nation spent roughly 6.8% of its gdp on military expenses in 1988 (sipri 2016). while this figure had been halved by 2016, the economy had grown considerably (sipri 2016). as a result, the military’s budget doubled from roughly $4.5 billion in 1988 to over $9 billion in 2016. the security establishment’s demand for resources, however, has also increased. consequently, in recent years, it has received a generous amount of foreign assistance from the united states in return for its cooperation in the war on terror. in 2013, for instance, the u.s planned to provide $348 million in foreign aid to the pakistani security establishment (foreign assistance pakistan). that figure equates to roughly 4% of pakistan’s military budget for the same year. similarly, the u.s. planned to contribute $328 million in aid in 2016, which amounts to approximately 3.6% of the pakistani military budget for that year (foreign assistance – pakistan). the united states’ generous financial aid, then, has added to the pakistani security establishment’s already lavish budget. indeed, it has helped senior officials of the pakistani armed forces to engage in widespread corruption in recent years. senior officers have invested heavily in dozens of highly profitable local businesses, ranging from marriage halls and dairy farms to factories, banks, and insurance firms (shams 2016). as siddiqa observes, “today the pakistani military’s internal economy is extensive, and has turned the armed forces into one of the [country’s] dominant economic players” (2007, 18). ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 31 to secure this steady supply of foreign aid from the united states (and other countries), the pakistani security establishment has had to focus on two interrelated objectives. first, as i stated earlier, the armed forces and isi have extended their consistent support to the afghan taliban, thereby ensuring that the terrorist group remains an ever-present threat to the afghan government and the u.s. remains fully-committed to an expensive and long-term counterterrorism strategy in the region. indeed, the pakistani armed forces have had a long history of supporting religious extremists in afghanistan for their own ends (siddiqa 2007, 86). secondly, the pakistani armed forces have had to retain the faith of the united states and convince the latter that they can be relied upon in the fight against the afghan taliban. to achieve this aim, the armed forces have taken advantage of their considerable influence in the pakistani government. the pakistani armed forces occupy a unique and prestigious position at the heart of the country’s security establishment. the constitution of pakistan grants the country’s armed forces the ability to “subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so” (pakistani.org). in practice, this has allowed the army to reserve “the right to abandon its declared political aloofness and intervene in governmental affairs whenever the high command determines that the civilian government is not acting properly, and that its actions or performance are undermining political stability, military institutional autonomy, and national security” (shah 2014, 221). as a result, the army has used its constitutional leverage to overturn elected governments and implement martial law on several occasions and even stage coups to establish its own rule at other times. in times of civilian rule, the pakistani armed forces’ influence in government has ensured that the country’s ministry of defense remains organized in a manner that allows serving and retired military officials to “occupy central positions in the ministry… [thereby making] it possible for them to control and monitor the work according to the desires of the military establishment” (anwar and rafique 2012, 381). the armed forces’ pervasive presence in the halls of pakistan’s government, then, has allowed its members to take advantage of any credibility that the civilian government has accrued with the united states and use it to guarantee a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 32 a steady stream of foreign aid. indeed, the army has routinely tightened the screws on government officials, pressuring them to reassure the u.s. government of its “commitment” to implementing the latter’s counterterrorism agenda in afghanistan. the pakistani security apparatus, then, has established and maintained a symbiotic relationship with the country’s government. in exchange for preserving the government’s territorial sovereignty (which is also in the security establishment’s best interests), the armed forces have utilized the civilian government’s connections and credibility to placate the americans and guarantee a regular flow of foreign aid for their various initiatives and personal enrichment. while the lion’s share of the security establishment’s funding stems directly from the pakistani government, the united states’ generous foreign assistance continues to offer an additional incentive for the pakistani security establishment to support its government’s decision to keep the afghan taliban afloat. policy implications for the u.s. and directions for future research as i have outlined in previous sections, the pakistani government’s (and security establishment’s) interests in afghanistan are fundamentally contrary to those of the united states at this moment in time. here, i discuss the policy implications for the u.s government. • pakistan’s rivalry with india began shortly after the creation of the two nations in 1947. the relationship between the two countries has had its ebbs and flows ever since. mutual suspicion and fear, however, prevent any major rapprochement from taking place between the two countries in the foreseeable future. consequently, the pakistanis will continue to support the afghan taliban, given that the terror outfit offers a resilient barrier against its enemy’s growing influence in afghanistan. the u.s. government, then, ought to consider forging a stronger alliance with india instead. the two countries share a common interest in overcoming the afghan taliban. moreover, india’s increasing investments in and trade with afghanistan are likely to strengthen the hold of the latter’s u.s.-backed government and bring prosperity to the war-torn nation. this, in turn, will reduce support for the taliban among everyday afghans. • the durand line debate represents an existential threat to the pakistani state. the u.s. must acknowledge this fact and realize that until the dispute is resolved conclusively, the pakistanis will support the afghan taliban and foment instability in afghanistan. supporting the pakistani or afghan position will only serve to alienate the scorned party and create further problems in the conflict-ridden region. consequently, the united states government should remain neutral on the subject and allow the governments in question (as well as tribal leaders) to arrive at an agreement at their own pace and on their own volition. • the u.s. government’s foreign aid to the pakistani security establishment continues to stoke the fires of greed. the former ought to consider either reducing the amount of aid its provides to the latter significantly or attaching stricter conditions to its contributions. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 33 this may prompt the pakistani armed forces to make at least a nominal effort to curb the afghan taliban, if only to regain the americans’ trust and continue to fill their coffers. a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 34 references ahmad, shayeq qassem. 2007. 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"pakistan, afghanistan, and the taliban." international journal on world peace 25 (4): 49-73. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://searchproquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59847917?accountid=14771. anderson, jon lee. "the ballad of mullah omar." the new yorker. june 19, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-ballad-of-mullah-omar. anwar, muhammad azfar and zain rafique. 2012. "defense spending and national security of pakistan: a policy perspective." democracy and security8 (4): 374-399. doi:http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1080/17419166.2012.739551. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1559004154?accountid=14771. barzegar, kayhan. 2014. "iran's foreign policy in post-taliban afghanistan." the washington quarterly 37 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2014.926213. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/0163660 x/v37i0002/119_ifpipa. barzin, s. 1998. iran's afghan worries. middle east international(582) (09): 7, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60881909?accountid=14771 (accessed september 15, 2017). bayat, a. 1998. will iran spark an afghan war? world press review 45, (12) (12): 8-9, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/61284900?accountid=14771 (accessed september 15, 2017). chaudhuri, rudra. 2011. "balancing us interests in india and pakistan." the international spectator 46 (2): 75-89. doi:10.1080/03932729.2011.576172. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/03932729 /v46i0002/75_buiiiap. constable, pamela. 2007. "a wake-up call in afghanistan." journal of democracy 18 (2): 84http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/204225657?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/204225657?accountid=14771. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/09715231/v17i0002/313_matfpop http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/09715231/v17i0002/313_matfpop http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/207591054?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/207591054?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59847917?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59847917?accountid=14771. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-ballad-of-mullah-omar http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1080/17419166.2012.739551.%20http:/myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1559004154?accountid=14771. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1080/17419166.2012.739551.%20http:/myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1559004154?accountid=14771. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1080/17419166.2012.739551.%20http:/myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1559004154?accountid=14771. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/0163660x/v37i0002/119_ifpipa http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/0163660x/v37i0002/119_ifpipa http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60881909?accountid=14771%20 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60881909?accountid=14771%20 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/61284900?accountid=14771%20 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/61284900?accountid=14771%20 http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/03932729/v46i0002/75_buiiiap http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/03932729/v46i0002/75_buiiiap ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 35 98. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60322951?accountid=14771. gady, franz-stefan. "pakistan raises defense spending." the diplomat. june 05, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/pakistan-raises-defense-spending/. gall, carlotta. "in afghanistan, u.s. exits, and iran comes in." the new york times. august 05, 2017. accessed september 15, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html. george kruys, brig gen. 2009. "insurgency and counter-insurgency in afghanistan and the role of pakistan." strategic review for southern africa 31 (2): 97-124. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/743016223?accountid=14771. "iran and afghanistan." institute for the study of war. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.understandingwar.org/iran-and-afghanistan. "iran." oec iran (irn) exports, imports, and trade partners. accessed september 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/#trade_balance. khan, feisal. 2010. "why borrow trouble for yourself and lend it to neighbors? understanding the historical roots of pakistan's afghan policy." asian affairs, an american review 37 (4): 171-189. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/851268643?accountid=14771. khan, ijaz. 2007. "pakistan's post september 11 2001 afghan policy shift." journal of asian and african studies 42 (5): 461-475. doi:http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1177/0021909607081127. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59794177?accountid=14771. khan, ijaz, shahid ali khattak, and minhas majeed marwat. 2014. "pak us relations: allies under compulsion?" journal of political studies 21 (2): 81. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1761665873?accountid=14771. khan, imtiyaz gul. "afghanistan: human cost of armed conflict since the soviet invasion." perceptions17, no. 4 (december 2012): 209-24. http://sam.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/9-imtiyaz_gul_khan.pdf. kux, dennis. 2001. "the pakistani pivot." national interest (65): 49-59. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60138512?accountid=14771. maqbool, aleem. "pakistan helping afghan taliban nato." bbc news. february 01, 2012. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16821218. mcgovern, kira mae. "al-qaeda in pakistan: how this safe haven and relationship impacts insurgency and war in afghanistan." order no. aai1530287, . http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquesthttp://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60322951?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60322951?accountid=14771. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/pakistan-raises-defense-spending/ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/743016223?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/743016223?accountid=14771. http://www.understandingwar.org/iran-and-afghanistan. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/%23trade_balance. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/851268643?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/851268643?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59794177?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/59794177?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1761665873?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1761665873?accountid=14771. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/9-imtiyaz_gul_khan.pdf http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/9-imtiyaz_gul_khan.pdf http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60138512?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60138512?accountid=14771. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16821218. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1520338135?accountid=14771. a case of mistaken identities: the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan siddharth singh chaudhari 36 com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1520338135?accountid=14771. mezard, isabelle saint. 2010. "rivalry between india and pakistan in post-2001 afghanistan." politique etrangere (4): 871-884. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/875716428?accountid=14771. micallef, joseph v. "why pakistan supports the taliban." military.com. april 25, 2017. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/25/whypakistan-supports-taliban.html. milani, mohsen m. 2006. "iran's policy towards afghanistan." the middle east journal60 (2): 235-256. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/218575050?accountid=14771. "military expenditure by country as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2002." sipri military expenditure database. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/milex-share-ofgdp.pdf. mitton, john. 2014. "the india-pakistan rivalry and failure in afghanistan." international journal 69 (3): 353-376. doi:http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1177/0020702014540281. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1692525499?accountid=14771. nader, alireza, ali g. scotten, ahmed idrees ramani, robert stewart, and leila mahnad. "iran's influence in afghanistan." rand national security research division. 2014. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/rr600/rr616/rand_r r616.pdf. nadiri, khalid homayun. 2014. "old habits, new consequences: pakistan's posture toward afghanistan since 2001." international security 39 (2): 132. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1638897932?accountid=14771 "pakistan foreign assistance." foreignassistance.gov. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/pakistan. "products that iran exports to afghanistan (2002-2015)." the observatory of economic complexity. accessed september 15, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/line/hs92/export/irn/afg/show/2002.2015/. rashid, a. 1998. islamic face-off. far eastern economic review 161, (38) (09): 18-20, http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60900228?accountid=14771 (accessed september 15, 2017). rashid, ahmed. 2012. "pakistan, afghanistan and the us." orient deutsche zeitschrift fur politik und wirtschaft des orients 53 (2): 7-9. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1037874790?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1520338135?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/875716428?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/875716428?accountid=14771. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/25/why-pakistan-supports-taliban.html. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/04/25/why-pakistan-supports-taliban.html. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/218575050?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/218575050?accountid=14771. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/milex-share-of-gdp.pdf. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/milex-share-of-gdp.pdf. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1692525499?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1692525499?accountid=14771. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/rr600/rr616/rand_rr616.pdf. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/rr600/rr616/rand_rr616.pdf. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1638897932?accountid=14771. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1638897932?accountid=14771. http://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/pakistan. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/line/hs92/export/irn/afg/show/2002.2015/ http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60900228?accountid=14771%20 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/60900228?accountid=14771%20 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1037874790?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1037874790?accountid=14771 ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 37 riedel, bruce. "pakistan, taliban and the afghan quagmire." brookings. july 28, 2016. accessed september 15, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pakistan-taliban-andthe-afghan-quagmire/. roggio, bill. "afghan taliban lists 'percent of country under the control of mujahideen'." fdd's long war journal. march 28, 2017. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/afghan-taliban-lists-percent-of-countryunder-the-control-of-mujahideen.php. rubin, barnett r. and andrea armstrong. 2003. "regional issues in the reconstruction of afghanistan." world policy journal 20 (1): 31. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/232588661?accountid=14771. shah, aqil. 2014. the army and democracy : military politics in pakistan. cambridge: harvard university press. accessed september 14, 2017. proquest ebook central. shams, shamil. "a spotlight on the pakistani military's corruption | asia | dw | 22.04.2016." dw.com. april 22, 2016. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/aspotlight-on-the-pakistani-militarys-corruption/a-19207488. siddiqa, ayesha. military inc. ann arbor, mi: oxford university press, 2007. http://www.saifullahkhalid.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/military1incbyayeshasiddiqa_3.pdf. siddiqui, naveed. "afghanistan will never recognise the durand line: hamid karzai." dawn.com. june 21, 2017. accessed september 15, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1318594. tarock, adam. 1999. "the politics of the pipeline: the iran and afghanistan conflict." third world quarterly 20 (4): 801-819. doi:http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1080/01436599913569. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1779888068?accountid=14771. "the constitution of pakistan: chapter 2." pakistani.org. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part12.ch2.html. toscano, roberto. "iran's role in afghanistan." january 2012. accessed september 15, 2017. "u.s. foreign assistance." foreignassistance.gov. accessed september 15, 2017. http://www.foreignassistance.gov/. wagner, christian and amina khan. 2013. "the changing character of the durand line." internationales asien forum.international quarterly for asian studies 44 (1): 7184,213,215. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1468418263?accountid=14771. yusuf, moeed. 2017. "a marriage estranged: the strategic disconnect between pakistan and the united states." asia policy (24): 46-52. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1927767895?accountid=14771. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pakistan-taliban-and-the-afghan-quagmire/ https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pakistan-taliban-and-the-afghan-quagmire/ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/afghan-taliban-lists-percent-of-country-under-the-control-of-mujahideen.php. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/afghan-taliban-lists-percent-of-country-under-the-control-of-mujahideen.php. http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/232588661?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/232588661?accountid=14771 http://www.dw.com/en/a-spotlight-on-the-pakistani-militarys-corruption/a-19207488 http://www.dw.com/en/a-spotlight-on-the-pakistani-militarys-corruption/a-19207488 http://www.saifullahkhalid.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/military1incbyayeshasiddiqa_3.pdf http://www.saifullahkhalid.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/military1incbyayeshasiddiqa_3.pdf https://www.dawn.com/news/1318594 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1779888068?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1779888068?accountid=14771 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part12.ch2.html http://www.foreignassistance.gov/ http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1468418263?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1468418263?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1927767895?accountid=14771 http://myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docview/1927767895?accountid=14771 a case of mistaken identities:the real friends and foes in the war in afghanistan ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security letter from the editor dear reader, on behalf of the ijois editorial board, the program in arms control & domestic and international security, the university library, and the supportive academic community of the university of illinois at urbana-champaign, we would like to thank you for reading the eighth issue of the illini journal of international security (ijois). ijois is a peer-reviewed academic journal founded in september 2015 by undergraduate students at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign in an effort to publish exceptional undergraduate papers on topics within international security or foreign affairs. for our eighth issue of the journal, we are excited to publish outstanding undergraduate papers that explore some of the most pressing issues within international security and foreign affairs, covering a wide range of topic areas and geographical regions. furthermore, ijois is excited to announce the commencement of a brand-new notes section. these notes are comprised of shorter papers that discuss the themes of the journal but in a more concise and argumentative manner. the editorial board created this section in an effort to align further with other professional academic journals and law reviews. in our notes section, the first paper presented in this edition, “public right of access to america’s war on terror” written by joseph lehman delves into pressing issues regarding the growing debate between privacy and security. the second paper, “a response to patrick pexton’s what about israel's nuclear weapons” by ayah jaber is an argumentative response to pexton’s article. the third paper, “the ratification question: why the united states should ratify the convention of the rights for persons with disabilities” by anthony valiaveedu concerns the crpd and its impact on international security. the fourth paper, “the political psychology of regime change in iran” written by ryan vetticad explores the psychological factors that have impacted regime change in the middle-eastern nation. in our articles section, the first paper “on private military companies and hybrid warfare” written by norman de castro a master’s candidate at sciences po paris, concerns the impact that pmc’s hold on terrorism and gurilla warfare. the second paper, “divide and conquer: separatism in transcaucasia and russian intervention” by james monroe is a regional paper discussing the motives russia held in its intervention in transcaucasia. the third paper, “the race for artificial intelligence” coauthored by anthony valiaveedu and peter f. rybinski explores the impact the intersection between technology and ai holds on international security. the fourth and final paper, “analysis of the effects of large-scale disasters on the behavior of non-state violent actors in countries already under duress” written by dylan hyams is a thorough analysis of the effect that disasters hold on nsva’s. these exceptional undergraduate papers present novel arguments on a wide array of issues within international security and foreign affairs. we hope that these papers will challenge and inform our readers, spark discussion, and encourage undergraduate students to explore these pressing issues or pursue international studies further. we hope you enjoy reading. ryan vetticad editor-in-chief 3 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the ratification question: why the united states should ratify the convention of the rights for persons with disabilities anthony valiaveedu university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the convention of the rights for persons with disabilities was one of the earliest products of multilateralism within the united nations in the twenty-first century, led by the united states. however, since its creation in 2006, the united states has avoided ratifying the convention. under the obama administration, steps were taken to push for ratification by becoming a signatory to the treaty and a u.s. senate foreign relations committee recommending ratification. this paper will argue for the ratification of the convention of the rights for persons with disabilities. by ratifying the convention, the united states can garner further legitimacy within international law and multilateral institutions. furthermore, the signal of ratification can help regain the united states leadership in human rights initiatives. in addition, ratification can help curb structural violence within the united states. aside from providing assistance for people with disabilities, the convention’s other statues can curb corporal punishment within schools. 19 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security what would i do if i could feel? what would i do if i could reach inside of me and to know how it feels to say i like what i see? then i'd be more than glad to share all that i have inside of here. and the songs my heart might bring you'd be more than glad to sing. and if tears should fall from my eyes just think of all the wounds they could mend. the tin man from “the wiz” (“what would i do if i could feel?”) the tin man represents himself as a metaphor towards those who are deemed disabled because of their difference within society. he offers an interesting point of view of his inability to be similar to others due to his lack of a brain. the song he sings offers a deeper understanding for those who are unable to understand others because of his insability to comprehend. it further demonstrates the underlying depression caused by a lack of being similar to others. the violence disproportionally targeted towards disabled bodies can be witnessed by corporal punishment discipline policy. these inadequate policies caused the united states to be out of line within international standards and further destroy the united states’ credibility within international law formation. these inadequate policies, internationally and domestically, can be remedied by full ratification of the convention on the rights of people with disabilities. the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (c.r.p.d.) is a key convention that the united states helped create within the united nations but failed to ratify. much of the convention was modeled after the domestic laws in the united states. specifically, much of its statutes was modeled after the american disabilities act which was adopted in 1990 by the united states congress. however, certain issues arose regarding the c.r.p.d. and national sovereignty. article 24 of the c.r.p.d. outlines statutes regarding educational initiatives towards disabled students and highlights the immorality of corporal punishment within schools (suarez). in a more liberal reading, it provides a right to education. this became a key point of contention, since certain nations felt that such legal agreement would infringe upon the authority of the nation. in 2012, the united states senate attempted to ratify the convention, but it sparked backlash by congress over the question of legal sovereignty and therefore failed. other nations that have ratified the convention currently include the people’s republic of china, the russian federation, and the islamic republic of iran (u.n.). this goes to show that other, more authoritarian, countries currently respect the c.r.p.d. and that ratification by the united states is not unreasonable. ratification would promote the credibility of the united states in international law. the united states has been and still is seen as a beacon for many nations in turmoil, and its position signifies great importance for the treaty overall. during early formation of the convention, many nations looked towards the united states for guidance and creation of the convention. the absence of ratification by the united states is the key determiner for the future of the convention. many foreign policy analysts point out that “the determination not to sign and ratify 20 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the convention raises important questions of whether other nations will choose to sign and ratify the treaty” (melish 41). the absence of a forward leadership presence forces other nations to adopt a “wait-and-see” approach that is net-worse because it prevents immediate compliance measures for disability rights. the non-compliance approach of the status-quo towards the convention created gaps within american treaty legitimacy. this created the perception of american exceptionalism in the international order. ratification can provide an effect method to close those gaps and reverse exceptionalist perceptions by signifying full legal compliance in the multilateral order. a full ratification by the senate would indicate that “the united states would confirm its commitment to international norms” and thereby close current treaty gaps (farmer and stinson, 1036). included within this, compliance measures would promote the united states stance globally. the participation of the convention has a massive symbolic value to united states human rights promotion. ratification would signal participation that would “[enable] the united states to take part in a global conversation on important issues” (lord, 41). the implications of this are significant . first, american leadership in forming norms in international law is critical to solving and mitigating threats in areas that require legal norm development. american leadership in “the international system provides unique specialized and technical expertise” due to its military and technological primacy and its overall legitimacy (crocker). by promoting a strong presence and expertise in the system, the united states can promote a strong international stance to solve existential threats through effective multilateral forums with american leadership. furthermore, the symbolism of ratification would be a massive promotion of human rights by the united states. human rights are in of itself good, but promotion globally can provide hope to millions. an absence of a strong united states approach to human rights would be a “tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world” (piccone). with human rights declining in the status-quo from deteriorating governments and the covid pandemic, now is a critical time to promote international rights (repucci and slipowitz). a strong united states approach to ratification can promote its legitimacy in multilateral forums and human rights promotion. ratification can also produce a massive domestic effect by conforming in international law. ratification would ensure that the provisions of the c.r.p.d. would be implemented as law of the land due to article vi of the constitution. one of the most immediate benefits is preventing corporal punishment against disabled students. the c.r.p.d. combats disproportional corporal punishment among disabled students by preventing the use of seclusions and restraints. though, disabled students are themselves harmed disproportionally by corporal punishments within schools, the racial and gender differences within the disabled population is further disproportionate (suarez, 875). though being “17.1% of the nationwide student population” african americans have a paddling rate of 35.6% (farmer and stinson, 1039). this also disproportionately affects females. recent research shows that “there is a strong gender dimension to the stigma and discrimination that children with disabilities experience” (lord, 15). only a clear and fully supported ratification can prevent localities from circumventing key human rights such as this. the convention of the rights of persons with disabilities contains effective language and legal defense to promote effective solutions to this problem. many have noted that the convention’s progressive nature has been effective to combat domestic problems. the framework offered specifically to “amplify human rights violations that are particular to children with disabilities” (lord 11). this is done with effective multilateral initiatives through 21 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the convention itself like international oversight. by ratifying, the united states can effectively bring its domestic policies in line to prevent further disproportionate harm. the united states should ratify the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. ratification would promote the united states’ legal standing in international law. that can allow effective international forums to combat existential threats. furthermore, ratification would be a massive symbol and critical push of united states human rights promotion. independently from the international benefits, the domestic benefits are worthwhile as well. ratification can combat corporal punishment upon disabled students and potentially begin to end it. the rise of disability activism can provide further leverage and support for ratification. this is explicitly evident during the rise of disability activism during the attempt of repealing the affordable care act (abrams). reform and activism is a process and it will take time, energy and effort. though ratification is a long and difficult process, the potential good it can do should encourage its ratification. 22 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security works cited abrams, abigail. “how donald trump sparked a new disability rights movement.” time, time, 26 feb. 2018, time.com/5168472/disability-activism-trump/. crocker, bathsheba. “assessing the united nations at 70.” u.s. department of state, 12 mar. 2015, 2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/rm/238852. farmer, alice, and stinson, kate. "failing the grade: how the use of corporal punishment in us public schools demonstrates the need for us ratification of the children's rights convention and the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities." nyl sch. l. rev. vol. 54, 2009, pp. 1035-1069. the wiz. directed by sidney lumet, performances by diana ross, michael jackson, nipsey russell, ted ross, mabel king, theresa merritt, thelma carpenter, lena horne, and richard pryor, universal pictures, 1978. lord, janet e. "child rights trending: accommodating children with disabilities in the global human rights framework and us foreign policy." whittier j. child & family advocacy, vol. 16, 2017. melish, tara j. “the un disability convention: historic process, strong prospects, and why the u.s. should ratify.” human rights brief, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, www.researchgate.net/profile/tara_melish2/publication/228185116_the_un_disability _convention_historic_process_strong_prospects_and_why_the_us_should_ratify/link s/5501c04d0cf2d60c0e605f06.pdf. piccone, ted. “tillerson says goodbye to human rights diplomacy.” brookings.edu, brookings, 5 may 2017, 23 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/05/tillerson-says-goodbye-to-human -rights-diplomacy/. repucci, sarah, and amy slipowitz. “democracy under siege.” freedom house, freedom house, 2021, freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege. suarez, lanette. restraints, seclusion, and the disabled student: the blurred lines between safety and physical punishment. university of miami law review, 24 apr. 2017, repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4508&context=umlr. united nations, “15.convention on the rights of persons with disabilities.” united nations treaty collection status of treaties, chapter 5, 15, n.d. treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20i/chapter%20iv/iv-15.en.pdf. accessed 19 april 2021. 24 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security 25 program in arms control & domestic and international security ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract this paper explores how the people’s republic of china’s (prc) recent domestic and foreign policies have weakened the prc’s national security and undermined their grand strategy in the east asian region. the presented analysis does so by dissecting the prc’s interference in hong kong’s election law since 1997 and the effect this interference has on independence movements in hong kong, taiwan, tibet, and xinjiang. likewise, it scrutinizes the shift in diplomatic communiqué since the 2012 elections and how this shift has escalated tensions both domestically and regionally. finally, the presented analysis addresses potential physical security issues for the prc in the south china sea if the quasi-state of taiwan were to declare formal independence and align itself with other east asian actors. by the end of this paper, it should be clear how it is imperative for the prc to shift their grand strategy from a hard power approach to a soft power approach in order to secure their influence in east asia. if the prc cannot counterbalance the need for state security with the need for human security, then their growing hegemony in the east asian region may be significantly diminished in the years to come. the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 2 historical overview of chinese territories following the exploitation associated with the “century of humiliation” and the trauma of the chinese civil war, the unification of the chinese state became a matter of national pride and honor for the people’s republic of china (prc). however, the prc’s claim to sovereignty in several territories has been heavily debated since the prc’s founding in 1949. all throughout the republic there are regions that have a fractured loyalty to the prc due to their political and cultural heritage. this fractured loyalty has caused sustained hostility within the chinese state as the prc continues to consolidate their power within these regions—often at the expense of the people. in macau and hong kong, the development of their governance systems under foreign rule is the main cause of tension with the prc. until the late 1990s macau and hong kong remained under the colonial rule of portugal and the united kingdom, respectively. although democratization was slow to materialize under both colonial governments, progress was made through proposals such as the green paper: a pattern of district administration in hong kong. through the green paper and other similar documents, the citizens of macau and hong kong were able to achieve constitutional reform to promote local representation in the government. by the time macau and hong kong were returned to the prc, many democratic values had already flourished in the collective consciousness of citizens as non-negotiable rights—such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and universal suffrage. this was taken in consideration as negotiations in 1980s between the colonial governments and the prc commenced. these negotiations over the transfer of power led to the development of the “one china, two systems” philosophy and when negotiations were completed both macau and hong kong were transformed into chinese special administrative regions. this special administrative status was a compromise between the colonial governments and the prc that granted the prc sovereignty over both territories as part of a unified china (one china) while guaranteeing the right for hong kong and macau to maintain certain administrative, economic, and democratic rights that are not found in other parts of the prc (two systems). since then both territories have sought to bolster their autonomy under the prc’s watchful eye—though macau often seeks much less autonomy than hong kong (why macau is less demanding of democracy than hong kong, 2017; yick, 2014). the precarious equilibrium of “one china, two systems” has led to the rise of pro-independence movements in both regions as critics claim that the prc has progressively interfered with the democratic processes guaranteed under basic law (hong kong profile, 2018; yick, 2014). similarly, in taiwan the precedent of a separate government as the republic of china (roc) has led to disaccord with the prc. this conflict can be traced back to the end of the chinese civil war in 1949 when the kuomintang (kmt) fled to the island of taiwan and established the roc as the official government of china. while taiwan originally developed as a province under the autocratic rule of chiang kai-shek, after his death in the 1970s taiwan began to transition into a self-governing democracy. however, while democratization was taking place, taiwan’s sovereignty began to falter as the prc gained international influence. during ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 this time foreign states began to recognize the prc as the official government of china in the place of the roc, reducing taiwan's international status (timeline: taiwan's road to democracy, 2011). since then the prc has sought to further constrain taiwan’s diplomatic relations with foreign states and international organizations in order to inhibit taiwan’s capability to establish formal independence and declare itself a fully sovereign state (kuo, 2018). currently taiwan functions as a quasi-state that is neither entirely separate from china nor completely unified with china (romberg, 2016; everington, 2019). even though taiwan still has its own government as the roc and regularly attempts to re-legitimize its sovereignty as a state, taiwan faces constant pressure from the prc to unify with mainland china. as a result, tensions between the governments of the prc and the roc have continued to escalate the provinces of tibet and xinjiang are also in conflict with the prc. however, their clashes with the prc stem from religious and cultural repression. in tibet the fall of the qing dynasty in 1913 led the buddhist tibetan government to act as its own de facto independent state for several decades (bajora, 2008). thus, when the prc invaded in 1950 to reclaim the region, it was met with a strong resistance by the people of tibet. while a year later the tibetan government signed an agreement to grant sovereignty of the region to the prc, the subsequent banishment of the dalai lama in 1959 and the repression of the tibetan people has led to a proindependence movement that still thrives in the present (tibet profile, 2017; bajora, 2008). likewise, the attempts by the prc to subjugate the uighurs—a muslim ethnic group composed of around 12 million people—has led to extremist groups and pro-independence movements to develop in the prc’s xinjiang province (fish, 2014; buckley, 2018). after a series of violent anti-government attacks took place in china between 2013 to 2014, president xi jinping ordered xinjiang authorities to “strike hard” and “strike first” in a campaign to survey and detain uighurs for suspected extremist activity (shih, 2017; buckley, 2018). since the start of this campaign the united nations estimates that up to a million uighurs have been sent to “education centers” by xinjiang police (leigh, 2019). at these centers it is reported that uighurs are forced into indoctrination programs that can last up to two years. in these programs, the detainees are forced to renounce their religion and praise the communist party of china (ccp) (leigh, 2019; shih, 2017; buckley, 2018). meanwhile the prc claims that these centers merely offer job training and that no one is forced to stay within these centers (buckley, 2018). many beijing officials view the suppression of independence movements in their territories as a necessary step to ensure the prc’s national security. however, as this paper will show, the tactics used by the prc only serve to estrange citizens and decrease the faith in the “one country, two systems” philosophy. this in turn fuels rather than inhibits independence movements. consequently, the prc’s national security is currently threatened more from consolidation efforts than it would be if the prc truly offered these regions the autonomy to selfgovern. the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 4 the disillusionment of chinese citizens when the sino-british joint declaration was signed in 1984 by margaret thatcher and deng xiaoping, a document entitled basic law of the hong kong special administrative region of the people's republic of china was also created to outline the governance of hong kong after the transfer of power. this document served three important objectives for the negotiators: (1) to embody the “one country, two systems” concept conceived by deng xiaoping during negotiations, (2) to ease the mind of investors who were anxious about the stability and future of hong kong under communist rule, and (3) to serve as a constitution to hong kong until least 2047 (yahuda, 1993). however, basic law is far from perfect. per chinese law, “basic statutes” –-which the basic law falls under—come second to the chinese constitution in legal matters (palumbo, 1990). this means that the prc can use the chinese constitution to undermine or circumvent basic law without breaking the sino-british joint declaration or violating international treaty law. when the prc denied hong kong the right to sit at the table in the sino-british joint declaration negotiation in the 1980s, it set a clear precedent about the way the prc would view power relations going forward with all their contentious territories: desire for autonomy would be secondary to the prc’s demand for consolidation. since hong kong’s return to the prc’s governance canopy in 1997, sino-hong kong relations have been embroiled in controversy. beijing appointed tung chee-hwa to be executive chief to hong kong, but this appointment was met with disapproval as tung cheehwa was “a shanghai-born former shipping tycoon with no political experience” (hong kong profile, 2018, para. 20). however—from beijing’s perspective—what tung lacked in political savvy, he made up in loyalty to the mainland (siu-kai & hsin-chi, 2002). tung would prove this loyalty in 2002, when his administration introduced an attempt to legislate article 23 of the basic law. article 23 states that “hong kong should enact laws on its own that prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and linkage with foreign political organizations” (ngok, 2017, p. 20). this effort to create legislation on article 23 was met with intense criticism from the hong kong public and political elite because of the potential for article 23 to reduce the individual rights of citizens—such as the right to peaceful protest and freedom of speech (kellogg, 2003). by 2003, when the new article 23 legislation was close to being passed, “an estimated 500,000 people marched through the streets of hong kong in order to voice their disapproval” (kellogg, 2003, p. 310). the outcry of the public led tung to withdraw the proposed amendments only a few months later (kellogg, 2003). since 2004 no renewed attempts to pass legislation based around article 23 was pursued. however, during this time the issue of universal suffrage (the right of hong kong citizens to elect leaders through general elections without interference from the beijing) would become the new point of contention. in 2005, donald tsang—a civil servant elected to chief executive after tung was forced to resign among controversy—attempted to bridge the gap between hong kong’s democratic needs and beijing’s desire for consolidation by pursuing amendments to articles 7 and article 3 of basic law via the 5th report (chen, 2005). the goal of the 5th report ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 was to pave the way for universal suffrage within hong kong, but due to pressure from beijing, the 5th report lacked a clear timeline of when the reforms for universal suffrage be initiated (chen, 2005). it wasn’t until 2007, after years of protest and pressure from hong kong, that beijing finally relented and announced plans to allow for universal suffrage by 2020 (hong kong profile, 2018). from 2007 to 2014 universal suffrage continued to be a contentious issue between hong kong and beijing, but universal suffrage didn’t gain a large international public forum again until 2014, when several protests, referred to as the umbrella movement, took place throughout hong kong (kaiman, 2014; hong kong profile, 2018). this movement was an act of civil disobedience against beijing inspired “after china announced that beijing would vet candidates to run in the 2017 elections, thus regulating the race to be hong kong chief executive” (hong kong profile, 2018; mccarthy, 2014, para. 3). the protests lasted 79 days and involved around 100,000 protesters total (wong, 2016). despite the mostly peaceful nature of these protests, beijing censored the news coverage of the protests in mainland china and publicly condemned the demonstrators (wong, 2016). since the transfer of power in 1997, the prc has used the basic law loophole to implement officious tactics to sway hong kong election law in favor of politicians with probeijing stances (siu-kai & hsin-chi, 2002). however, these tactics have done little to increase the control the prc has over the governance of hong kong. instead, it has mostly caused harm to consolidation efforts by causing disillusionment among the youth of hong kong to the “one country, two systems” ideal as well as pro-independence groups in taiwan, tibet, and xinjiang who watch the tension in hong kong with wary apprehension. this disillusionment can be best understood through the gradual change in identification from the national title of ‘chinese’ to the regional title of ‘hongkonger’ or ‘taiwanese.’ the university of hong kong’s public opinion programme found that “between 2008 and 2016, those who see themselves as hongkonger or a hongkonger in china rose from 47.4 percent to 63.7 percent while those who identified as chinese fell from 47 percent to 33.9 percent” (zhang, yau & tsui, 2017, para. 5). comparable statistics can be found in taiwan that state “in 1992, when democracy just began in taiwan, only 20 percent of the respondents to an annual poll held by taiwan’s national chengchi university called themselves “taiwanese only.” in 2018, more than 50 percent did so. and those identified solely as chinese dropped from a quarter of those asked in 1992 to less than 3 percent” (pomfret, 2019, para. 7). as the youth of china began to identify more with their region than they do with the prc, it will be more difficult for the prc to push the idea of a unified china under the strict leadership of beijing, especially if the promise of “one china, two systems” continues to fail in the eyes of those that are supposed to trust in it. the growing connection between territories since the 2014 protests within the china may also prove to be a hurdle for the prc’s consolidation efforts. in the news analysis under the shadow of china by samson yuen, yuen points to the increase in partnership between hong kong and taiwanese activists in 2013: “the organizers of hong kong’s budding pro-democracy campaign, occupy central, travelled to taiwan to give public talks about the election reform the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 6 movement in the hope of borrowing insights from taiwan’s social movements” (2014, p. 75). as part of the insight offered by taiwanese activists, hong kong organizers learned invaluable skills such as how to coordinate supplies and quickly spread information on the internet (sui, 2014). this cooperation eventually led to further collaboration between hong kong activists and taiwanese activists a year later during several different protests in both regions. this includes the taiwanese sunflower student movement, which was a “protest against the attempt by the kuomintang (kmt) to pass a service trade pact with china” (yuen, 2014, p. 69). though the prc has since attempted to blacklist known activists to prevent travel between the two regions, taiwanese activists stated that they will continue to offer assistance to hong kong activists as “supporting each other will help both sides" (sui, 2014, para. 25). even within mainland china, support for the protests during 2014 could be found on the social media platforms wechat and weibo—though chinese citizens condemning the protesters were also easily found on these platforms (werime, 2014). despite lacking the same amount of freedom of expression within tibet and xinjiang, independence leaders from these regions also emphasized how important the connections were between hong kong, tibet, xinjiang, and taiwan activists towards struggle for more autonomy from the prc. uighur leader rebiya kadeer expressed that the protests had taken place in other territories—particularly in hong kong—were an inspiration to the international uighur independence movement, which at the time was concerned about the discrimination towards the practice of fasting in the month of ramadan in the xinjiang province (fish, 2014; why is there tension between china and the uighurs, 2014). similarly, tibetan activist tenzin jigdal stated that “what we have in common with the people in hong kong is that we are all fighting for freedom and justice against an authoritarian regime that has broken its promises again and again” (jacobs, 2014, para. 17). activists like jigdal hoped that the international attention brought to the prc’s handling of hong kong and taiwanese protesters would also help bring attention to the less press-friendly regions of tibet and xinjiang (jacobs, 2014, para. 3). if the prc cannot find a way to temper their consolidation policy within these regions, the materialization of one of the prc’s largest fears may arise—the mismanagement of one territory and its subsequent secession leading to support for secession throughout other chinese territories. unlike citizens in taiwan where there is a very clear lack of enthusiasm for unification with the prc (below 3.0% in 2012), many citizens in hong kong don’t seek complete independence from the prc (magcamit, 2014). rather, they simply desire the unfettered autonomy that was promised to them in spirit of the basic law such as the freedom of press or the freedom to protest. in the same way, various activists in the tibetan independence movement have supported the “middle-way approach” rather than complete independence as way appease both sides of the conflict. this includes endorsement of the plan from the dalai lama (bajoria, 2008). therefore, if the leadership in beijing would step away from the hard power approach it has traditionally used in these territories, it might find more success. however, since 2012 evidence has grown that the prc is headed in the opposite direction. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 2012 elections: a watershed moment to prc grand strategy and rhetoric when deng xiaoping took over as the head of the chinese communist party (ccp) in 1978, he changed the trajectory of the prc from an ideological maoist state to “socialism with chinese characteristics” driven market-economy (guo, 2009). not only would this change lead to the liberalization of chinese markets, it would also eventually form the prc’s economic integration strategy in domestic and foreign policy (mcguire, 2017). as the chinese economy has grown since the 1980s, so has the international trade relations between the prc and other countries (guo, 2009). in 2014 the prc replaced the united states as the world’s top trading partner; 43 countries reported china as their top export partner compared to the 31 countries that reported the united states as their top export partner (holodny, 2015). throughout east asia the prc has sought to use this top export partner status to their advantage. by enacting economic sanctions and other methods of coercion, the prc has hoped to discourage east asian states from straying away from chinese grand strategy—such as the prc’s attempt to reduce u.s. influence in east asia (mcguire, 2017). however, the prc has had limited success with economic integration strategy as a deterrent because no east asian state desires full dependency on the prc. south korea proved this when it agreed to the install the u.s. terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) missile defense system on the korean peninsula. this is despite repeated threats from the prc that is would impose sanctions on south korea if south korea agreed to host the missile system (mcguire, 2017). correspondingly, the prc’s lack of success in using economic integration strategy as tool of coercion can also be observed via bilateral relations between the prc and the association of southeast asian nations’ (asean). for nine years the prc has been the largest trading partner of asean. by 2009 the prc accounted for “11.6% of asean’s total trade of $1.54 trillion” (raine, 2011, p. 82). despite this economic dependence, most of the disputes between asean and the prc in the south china sea remain unresolved. to further delegitimize the chinese economic integration strategy, there is an argument put forth by avila & goldman that the prc’s aggressive maneuvers against other east asian states is likely what has led to more interregional cooperation outside of the chinese scope (2015). the inability to limit the countervailing domestic and international interests to chinese grand strategy has led the central government in beijing to increase the use of militaristic approaches in east asian relations. according to several analysts, this militarized policy serves several purposes for the central government. the first is that it channels the rising nationalism among the country’s fenqing (‘angry young men’) into a more manageable space by directing it towards non-domestic issues, such as the disputes in the south china sea (raine, 2011, p. 81). along the same vein, the militarized rhetoric shifts the public spotlight away from widespread national issues such as faltering gdp to more on regionally-focused issues—like the unification of taiwan to mainland china (haass, 2019). in 2012 internal speeches surfaced from the newly elected president xi to senior military personal that declared “the central military commission’s ‘first requirement’… was to forge a military that could ‘fight and win’ a modern war” (lewis & litai, 2016, p. 216). while this the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 8 announcement by itself isn’t far from past beijing rhetoric, this hardened approach signaled the central government’s attitude towards language in diplomatic communiqué moving forward both domestically and internationally. for example, in the release of the 2018 eu policy paper, the prc set clear redlines by shifting the use of language from a suggestive lexicon to an absolutist lexicon regarding how the eu should address chinese governance issues in taiwan, hong kong, and tibet (chan, 2019). the language that president xi has used in public speeches has also taken a more militarized or aggressive approach. in 2017 xi delivered a pointed speech at the end of his 3-day visit to hong kong on the 20th anniversary of the handover. in it he said: “…making everything political or deliberately creating differences (will) severely hinder hong kong’s economic and social development… any attempt to endanger china’s sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government… (or) use hong kong to carry out infiltration and sabotage against the mainland is an act that crosses the red line and is absolutely impermissible” (ramzy, 2017, para. 5-6). this universal declaration of redlines is disconcerting, as pointed out by political analyst willy lam, because “this is the first time xi jinping or anyone in the leadership has mentioned a ‘red line.’ it’s a warning to the pro-independence or other so-called anti-china elements to not challenge the authority of the central government” (ramzy, 2017, para. 8). the tough rhetoric from president xi would reach crescendo in january 2019 when xi delivered a controversial speech aimed directly at taiwanese leadership (van der wees, 2019). in his speech president xi “warned that the taiwan ‘problem’ could not be put off for another generation” (pomfret, 2019, para. 8). as pointed out by van de wees, “while he (xi) did call for peaceful unification, in the next breath xi warned that china reserved the option of using force if taiwan didn’t go along” (2019, para. 3). this firm stance on the use of force if taiwan doesn’t consent to unification quickly set off alarm bells in the international community. xi’s speech shifted the dialogue away from the globally-supported maintenance of the status quo in the crossstrait conflict to instead a call for action from the taiwanese leadership to choose between unification or war. since the 2016 elections in the taiwan that resulted in the majority win for the democratic progressive party (dpp) candidate tsai ing-wen and her party, the tension in the sino-taiwanese conflict has persistently escalated. for example, immediately after the election the prc broadened economic sanctions as on the quasi-state in retaliation to the proindependence party’s win (stewart, 2019). before president xi’s speech to taiwan, president tsai attempted to maintain a moderate approach in cross-strait relations through the promotion of both peaceful diplomatic resolutions and the democratic rights of the taiwanese people (romberg, 2016). however, president tsai’s rhetoric changed drastically after president xi’s speech to taiwan. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 9 in response to president xi’s speech, president tsai ing-wen stepped away from her moderate platform to firmly reject president xi’s position. tsai stated that the taiwanese government “would not accept a ‘one country, two systems’ political arrangement with the china” (lee, 2019, para. 1). furthermore, president tsai has gone on to say that “it is impossible for me or, in my view, any responsible politician in taiwan to accept president xi jinping’s recent remarks without betraying the trust and the will of the people of taiwan” (horton, 2019, para. 2). by clearly opposing president xi, it has been theorized that president tsai hoped to garner more steadfast support from international allies (horton, 2019). however, thus far most actors such as the u.s., the eu, or japan have only continued to reiterate the importance of peaceful cross-strait negotiations while covertly supporting taiwan through other means. if tensions continue to rise in the cross-strait conflict, many international actors will be forced step away from the status-quo and officially declare a side. the prc’s national security dilemma in the south china sea maintenance of the prc’s presence in the south china sea is vital to the national security of china for two major reasons: physical security and economic security. the issue of physical security is predominantly due to the proximity of the numerous island states within the south china sea in relation to the southern coast of the prc—including taiwan and hong kong. however, these physical security problems can also be tied to the economic security of the prc. for example, as the chinese economy grows more dependent on imported oil to fuel energy demands, the prc has been forced to rely on ships that carry petroleum from the middle east to pass through the spratly islands quickly and uncontested (lewis & litai, 2016). this dependency has led the prc to use hard power tactics such as land reclamation and military aggression to strengthen their presence in the territory (przystup & saunders, 2017). though these tactics help promote the might of the prc, they have also often served to exacerbate hostilities within the region. due to the prc’s reliance on trade and limited success with coercion, the prc has also attempted to use soft power in south china sea relations. the prc has accomplished this through the promotion of maritime cooperation with asean on issues related to security, environment, and public health (rain, 2011; yee, 2017). in 2002 the prc also used soft power to advance the non-binding declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea. the goal this agreement signed with asean was to “work towards adopting a legally binding code of conduct whilst exercising ‘self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes’” (raine, 2011, p. 70). though southeast asia has been responsive to this soft power approach conducted by the prc, the overall success of diplomacy in the south china sea has been hampered by the hard power the prc still applies to the region. even china’s foreign ministry has expressed frustration at what it has called the “counterproductive effect” from the central leadership’s “more assertive statements of chinese rights in the south china sea” (rain, 2011, p. 82). amid these bellicose relations between the prc and other asian states, taiwan has taken the the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 10 opportunity to advocate its soft power and influence within east and southeast asia. as a result, there are several states that look more favorably on taiwan than they do the prc. taiwanese and east asian alliances since the demotion of taiwan into a quasi-state status in the 1970s, the island has attempted to recreate global diplomatic ties through security alliances and trade agreements. as of 2014 taiwan has formed free trade agreements (ftas) with japan, south korea, new zealand, and singapore (magcamit & tan, 2014). overall, the prc has supported these ftas taiwan has developed with other east asian states, but the prc has adamantly objected to the command taiwan has used a quasi-state to forge security alliances throughout east asia. in the eyes of the beijing leadership, taiwanese security alliances not only delay the unification of their “defiant province” with mainland china, but these alliances also decrease the capacity for the people’s liberation army’s to use military force against taiwan. for instance, if japan or the u.s. were to provide a theater missile defense system to taiwan through current security alliances, the prc will lose the ability to credibly threaten the use of ballistic missile attacks (christensen, 1999). the prc is aware that any diplomatic or security alliances could weaken the prc’s ability to politically coerce taiwan into accepting unification. as a result, the prc has sought to limit the ability of taiwan to form diplomatic or security ties. despite this taiwan and other east asian states have continued to build up their bilateral relations—albeit through subtle means. japan is an excellent example of this. over the last several decades bilateral relations between japan and taiwan have continued to improve through various initiatives such as the taiwan-japan fisheries agreement in 2013 (chen, 2017; thim & matsuko, 2014; leng & chang liao, 2016, p. 370). as a result of these trust-building measures between japan and taiwan, the positive views between the two nations’ citizens have continued to solidify. in 2008, 60 percent of taiwanese people were found to have friendly views regarding japan while “the proportion of japanese who felt ‘close’ to taiwan rose from 56.1% in 2009 to 66.9% in 2011” (leng & chang liao, 2016 p. 370). this means that while japan may not yet publicly acknowledge the diplomatic ties it has with taiwan, the support from the japanese public is strong. japanese politicians have taken this public support into consideration when dealing with taiwan. in 2013 japan released white papers that “included a prc attack on taiwan as one of the scenarios that could prompt a japanese conflict with china” (thim & matsuoka, 2014, para. 2). these white papers confirmed the prc’s fear that even unofficial diplomatic relations could boost taiwan’s claim to independence. however, japan is far from the only state with alliances to taiwan. the u.s.’s relationship with taiwan also poses a risk to the prc’s claim over the quasi-state. since the end of wwii, the united states has maintained a strong security presence in east asia. through security alliances created via bilateral treaties—such as the mutual defense treaty signed with the philippines in 1951, the mutual security agreement signed with south korea in 1954, the treaty of mutual cooperation signed with japan in 1960, or the taiwan relations act signed in 1979—the u.s. has create a strong interconnected network within east ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 11 asia that has often overcome regional conflict to cooperate with their ally. for example, japan and south korea put aside the historical tension stemming from wwii to join the u.s. in their first trilateral ballistic missile tracking drill in 2016 (mcguire, 2017). the u.s. also has sought to strengthen ties within southeast asia and one of the strongest security alliances the u.s. has within the region is with the philippines. currently the prc and the philippines have a contentious relationship due to their dispute over the spratly islands in the south china sea. if the philippines were to join a u.s.-backed security alliance against the prc, it would be a hard blow the presence of the prc’s freedom to navigate within the south china sea. this is because as of 2016 the philippines has eight outposts in the spratly island region. therefore, if the philippines was incentivized by a security alliance, it could make passage through the region difficult for china and threaten their physical and economic security (lewis & litai, 2016). before the trump administration, the u.s.’s previous approach to cross-strait relations had been to promote the status quo. however, ever since president trump’s phone call to president tsai in 2016, there has arguably been a shift in strategy from the u.s. government. since then there has been a visible uptick in u.s. military operations in the taiwan strait. this uptick has raised concerns in the prc and hope in taiwan that the u.s. has changed its official stance towards the “one china” policy in cross-strait relations (stewart, 2019). while there is no guarantee that east asian states or the united states would choose to support taiwan if it declared formal independence, many of these actors have economic, diplomatic, and security interests that support the concept of a completely sovereign taiwan. japan’s unofficial diplomatic ties with taiwan and the philippines’ security interest in securing the spratly islands are examples of this. furthermore, if the u.s. does choose to side with taiwan, it is likely that other east asian states with u.s. security alliances will follow suit as they have in other u.s.-led east asian initiatives. therefore, it is in the prc’s national security interest to placate tensions with taiwan rather to continue with its hard power approach that has been escalating cross-strait relations since 2012. conclusion it is difficult to decipher whether xi jinping or other beijing officials recognize the risks associated with their insistence on a unified china regardless of the cost. however, what is clear is that the harder the prc pushes their territories or the quasi-state of taiwan to fall in the line, the harder these territories push back. the growing disillusionment of the youth in china has created a generation that identifies more with their territory, religion, or ethnic group than they do as citizens of china. the more this disillusionment grows, the more difficult it will be for the prc to push for a unified china without consideration of the democratic rights of those that it governs. while the toughening of rhetoric since 2012 has solidified beijing’s power domestically among nationalists and other mainlanders, internationally this rhetoric has left bilateral and multilateral relationships frayed. correspondingly, the push from beijing to consolidate their the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories kathleen richardson 12 power in the territories of hong kong, taiwan, tibet, and xinjiang has fueled pro-independence movements throughout these regions. if any of these movements were to officially declare independence from the prc and gain steady internal and external support, the unity that has grown between these regions could be a catalyst for the other regions to follow suit with their own declarations of independence. for taiwan and hong kong in particular, the prc faces unique physical security threats because of the location of these two territories in the south china sea. furthermore, the hard power coercion tactics that the prc uses through military strength, aggressive rhetoric, or economic sanctions has proven to have limited the overall success in the promotion of chinese dominance within east asia. instead, where chinese hegemonic strength has gained momentum is through soft power diplomatic avenues like the treaties and agreements negotiated with asean in the south china sea. yet diplomatic treaties or agreements themselves are not enough. it has also proven critical for the prc to follow the spirit of the agreements and participate in trust-building measures with their allies lest tensions continue to escalate—like they have in hong kong over the prc’s exploitation of basic law. going forward, the beijing leadership faces a difficult decision on how to approach domestic and international relations. if the prc wishes to once again see a unified china that acts as a global leader then it must recognize the growing importance of soft power. once the prc is able to do this, their hegemonic power in east asia will only continue to grow. ijois spring 2019, volume v program in arms control & domestic and international security 13 references avila, a. p. c., & goldman, j. 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'i am a hongkonger': how china loses the hearts of the city's young generation | hong kong free press hkfp. retrieved from https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/03/25/i-hongkonger-china-loses-hearts-citys-younggeneration/ https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-30/first-hong-kong-now-macau-chinas-former-westernhttps://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-30/first-hong-kong-now-macau-chinas-former-westernhttps://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/03/25/i-hongkonger-china-loses-hearts-citys-young-generation/ https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/03/25/i-hongkonger-china-loses-hearts-citys-young-generation/ https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/03/25/i-hongkonger-china-loses-hearts-citys-young-generation/ the people’s republic of china’s security dependence on semi-autonomous territories ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security divide and conquer: separatism in transcaucasia and russian intervention james monroe university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” this quote from the famous ancient historian thucydides may come off as rather harsh, but it describes well the attitude that many historical great powers have had towards weaker states. in the modern day, one can find a similar (albeit more nuanced) attitude with the russian federation’s own affairs with its neighbors. none of these neighbors can hold a candle to the geopolitical might that russia is able to project, including those based in the south caucasus. the south caucasus (transcaucasia) was part of the russian empire since the early 19th century. control continued with the establishment of the soviet union, but ended with its collapse in 1991. in the wake of russia’s retreat from the region came the birth of three new transcaucasian republics: georgia, armenia, and azerbaijan. however, independence was never straightforward for these new countries and political instability has remained in them ever since. independence was never straightforward for these countries, and political instability has haunted them ever since instability which russia has noticed. this paper discusses and analyzes russian intervention in the south caucasus. while russian policy towards each transcaucasian country differs somewhat, russia commonly exploits the separatist movements and violence in these states namely those of south ossetia and abkhazia in georgia, and nagorno-karabakh in azerbaijan within the hope of leveraging influence. 43 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security introduction “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” this quote from the famous ancient historian thucydides may come off as rather harsh, but it describes well the attitude that many historical great powers have had towards weaker states. in the modern day, one can find a similar (albeit more nuanced) attitude with the russian federation’s own affairs with its neighbors. none of these neighbors can hold a candle to the geopolitical might that russia is able to project, including those based in the south caucasus. the south caucasus (transcaucasia) was part of the russian empire since the early 19th century. control continued with the establishment of the soviet union, but ended with its collapse in 1991. in the wake of russia’s retreat from the region came the birth of three new transcaucasian republics: georgia, armenia, and azerbaijan. however, independence was never straightforward for these new countries and political instability has remained in them ever since. independence was never straightforward for these countries, and political instability has haunted them ever since instability which russia has noticed. this paper discusses and analyzes russian intervention in the south caucasus. while russian policy towards each transcaucasian country differs somewhat, russia commonly exploits the separatist movements and violence in these states namely those of south ossetia and abkhazia in georgia, and nagorno-karabakh in azerbaijan within the hope of leveraging influence. the bully next door before an analysis can be given of the conflicts in the south caucasian countries and russia’s desire to take advantage of them, it must be asked first: why is russia so interested in a domineering foreign policy in that region, and how do they stand to benefit from doing so? russia undoubtedly wants to be a great power, as stated by influential russian leaders themselves: the head of the russian council on foreign and defence policy, sergey karaganov, once said that “we want the status of being a great power… we want to be the heart of greater eurasia, a region of peace and cooperation.” this necessitates russia acting like a hegemon in its own neighborhood, the south caucasus included (jonavičius et al., 2019, p. 8). desire to recreate imperial prestige from the times of the tsars and the bolsheviks is not the only driving force behind russian imperialism in transcaucasia. russia is also concerned with nato presence in the south caucasus. the putin administration accuses nato of “destabilizing the caucasus region with joint exercises in georgia” (nasriov et al., 2017, p. 51). through leverage over the south caucasian republics, russia can “deny nato’s involvement as an emerging stakeholder through new membership roadmaps and enhanced cooperation opportunities” in the region (kasapoglu, 2017, p. 3). this policy doubles as check-mating rival turkey as well, since it is also a member of nato. finally, there is the issue of energy. there is plenty of oil and natural gas to be found both within the caucasus and in the pipelines extending from the caspian sea: azerbaijan possesses “7 billion barrels of oil (bbl) and 35 trillion cubic feet (cf) of gas,” while georgia’s reserves lie at “40 billion bbl and 300,000 million cf” (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 3). moreover, there are four pipelines (three oil, one gas) extending from the caspian sea and over the caucasus. however, with the exception of the baku-novorossiysk oil pipeline, the pipelines are “owned and operated by western companies and do not cross russian territory” 44 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security (peña-ramos, 2017, pp. 3-4). this reality is detrimental to russian geopolitical interests, for local russian dominance on energy exports is being challenged. therefore, it is great power mentality, security concerns, and energy interests that motivate russia to take an interventionist stance in the violence of the south caucasus. by controlling and manipulating the instability of the region through a peculiar mix of provocation and mediation, russia can effectively keep it divided and so project both military and economic power abroad. how russia exactly goes about this from one transcausian country to the next will be detailed and analyzed below. david vs. goliath: russia, georgia, and secessionist south ossetia and abkhazia one russian strategy of keeping the south caucasus divided is to support the secessionist movements in south ossetia and abkhazia, thereby weakening georgia. this was exemplified by the 2008 russo-georgian war and its aftermath. abkhazia and south ossetia enjoyed a degree of autonomy during soviet times. south ossetians could lay claim to autonomy as early as shortly “before the “sovietization of georgia in 1921” (saparov, 2014, p. 75). the political and military institutions established by south ossetian partisans hostile to georgian rule enabled them to “exercise some political influence and… a certain degree in minor decision-making” (saparov, 2014, p. 75). their pains would be rewarded by the victorious invading russian bolsheviks with the establishment of the south ossetian autonomous oblast in 1922 (saparov, 2014, p. 82). similar efforts asserted by abkahzians at the same time, meanwhile, would net them even greater autonomy. sometime after the bolshevik invasion of georgia, stalin heaped upon the abkahzians the abkhaz autonomous soviet socialist republic (saparov, 2014, p. 49). therefore, a history of autonomy, combined with linguistic differences (ossetians and abkhazians each speak a language different to georgian), would help to release long pent-up tensions between the three groups when the ussr collapsed. it also did not help that south ossetians in particular have closer affinity with russia than with georgia: their northern brethren reside in russia, and as many as “nearly 90 percent” of south ossetians possessed russian citizenship in 1992, the year both russia and georgia signed the dagomys agreements following the first outburst of violence between south ossetians and georgians (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 6). sporadic fighting between georgians and secessionist elements haunted the 1990s and beyond. the last time georgia made a serious effort at ending the autonomy of its breakaway provinces was in 2008, when georgian troops invaded and bombed south ossetia and abkhazia through operation clear field and operation rock, respectively (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 6). these campaigns turned out to be a serious blunder for georgia, as russia immediately intervened on behalf of the secessionists. with little nato support and a miniscule military, the brief clash with russia went as well for georgia as anyone could reasonably expect. the end of the 2008 war witnessed russian troops stationed in south ossetia and abkhazia, an occupation that lasts to this day. so has russia taken advantage of georgian weakness? for one, russia obviously has now greater freedom in militarily inserting itself in georgia. the now-permanent stationing of russian troops in both south ossetia and abkhazia means that military facilities can be constructed in these regions. perhaps the best example of this is the abkhazian port of 45 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security ochamchire, which has enabled russia to “strengthen the already massive presence of its naval fleet in the black sea” (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 7). furthermore, naval basing in abkhazia as well as crimea situates russia well against turkey, bolstering the former’s position in the “race in naval modernization going on between the two nations” (kasapoglu, 2017, p. 4). but what perhaps benefited russia even more out of its support of south ossetia and abkhazia is its now-greater leverage over the energy flowing through georgia. georgia and other south caucasian states have tried to lessen their dependence on russian energy through positioning themselves as energy transit states (i.e. energy flowing from the caspian sea would go through these countries and not russia). needless to say, this trend would go against russian interests, but russian victory in the 2008 war may have reversed it. with a diminished georgian army and russian forces now within striking distance of tbilisi from abkhazia and south ossetia, russia has helped in discouraging the “creation of new pipelines through the south caucasus and georgia avoiding russian territory,” such as the now-stillborne nabucco project (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 7). russia itself, meanwhile, became a more attractive alternative corridor for the transit of energy: thanks to russian presence in south ossetia, the dzuarikau-tskhinvali pipeline the “highest mountain pipeline in the world” was built in that breakaway region in 2009 (pototskaya, 2014, p. 303). in short, russia’s backing of georgian secessionists has kept georgia weak, increased russian military capacity in its sphere of influence, and shifted the balance of power in regards to energy transportation in moscow’s favor. we will see similar consequences with russia’s intervention in the nagorno-karabakh crisis. into the frying pan: russia’s intervention in the nagorno-karabakh crisis russian relations with azerbaijan and armenia are shaped by the conflict waged between the two over nagorno-karabakh. russian posturing in the crisis acting as both mediator and instigator enables it to spread its military and economic influence abroad not unlike what it accomplished with georgia. nominally part of azerbaijan, the existence of nagorno-karabakh is an oddity. whereas azerbaijan is “predominantly muslim and ethnically azeri,” as much as “75 percent of the population of nagorno-karabakh is christian and ethnically armenian” (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 6). this is because the soviet union, “in an effort to divide and rule the south caucasus,” intentionally placed the armenian-majority nagorno-karabakh district under the azerbaijani soviet republic in 1921 (di france, 2018). similar to south ossetians and abkhazians within georgia, armenians felt alienated inside a state whose majority ethnic group spoke a different language (and in this case, practiced a different religion). also similar to georgia, pent-up tension between azeris and armenians residing in azerbaijan would be released violently with the collapse of the ussr. nagorno-karabakh’s attempt to secede from azerbaijan and unite with armenia towards the end of the 1980s resulted in conflict between armenia and azerbaijan, ending with armenian occupation of “about 20% of azerbaijani territory namely nagorno-karabakh and seven surrounding azerbaijani districts” (di franco, 2018). although nagorno-karabakh now desires outright independence as the republic of artsakh, it continues to receive strong military support from armenia and so relations between armenia and azerbaijan remain tense (despite the recent ceasefire in 2020). as a matter of fact, the border between azerbaijan and armenia 46 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security is the “most militarized in the world” (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 8). so how has russia positioned itself in the conflict, so as to increase its leverage over the competing sides? to maximize its geopolitical weight over the south caucasus, russia wants armenia and azerbaijan to continue their hostile relationship. this necessitates firmly aligning with either country, and russia has chosen armenia. armenia is russia’s “only military and political ally in the region” through armenia’s continued membership in both the russian-dominated commonwealth of independent states (unlike georgia) and the collective security treaty organization (unlike georgia and azerbaijan) (pototskaya, 2014, p. 301). because of this, russia is able to maintain a military presence in armenia namely through its “bases in erebuni (mostly air elements) and gyumri” (kasapoglu, 2017, p. 6). it is this power projection, furthermore, that allows russia to better keep nato (i.e. turkey) in check and keep an eye on the nagorno-karabakh dispute. however, russia does not necessarily want to totally antagonize azerbaijan either, for it is the most strategically placed of the south caucasus republics when it comes to the transportation of energy in that region (azerbaijan borders the caspian sea, where it extracts natural gas) (pototskaya, 2014, p. 303). to maintain local geo-energy dominance, russia has a share of the gas azerbaijan exports. for this reason, russia provides some military aid to azerbaijan. for instance, it was reported by unofficial sources that in september 2010 there was a “significant delivery of russian weaponry to azerbaijan” (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 8). lastly, russia’s playing of both sides is evident in its handling of the nagorno-karabakh conflict. simply put, russia acts as both instigator and mediator in the dispute over nagorno-karabakh: it seeks to maintain the status quo. on the one hand, it is imperative for russia as advocated by major russian news outlets themselves such as the moscow times to “firmly hold back yerevan, baku, and the karabakh leadership from a new war” (trenin, 2018). after all, should azerbaijan commit to an all-out lengthy invasion, the energy flowing from its capital to russia’s novorossiysk would be hampered or cut out altogether. it is for this reason that russia helped to mediate a ceasefire between the two in 1994 and another in 2020, as well as maintain a presence of 2,000 russian peacekeepers in the region (di franco, 2018; bbc, 2020). on the other hand, russia wants to impede progress towards everlasting peace between armenia and azerbaijan by instigating violence (or at least mutual distrust) just enough that there will not be a unified south caucasian bloc that could possibly counter russian interests. it is also through intentionally keeping the conflict prolonged that russia manages to “sow doubt over the construction of the tap [trans adriatic pipeline] and other pipelines that cross the south caucasus or those being planned that intend to avoid russian territory” thereby maintaining russia’s regional monopoly on energy exports (peña-ramos, 2017, p. 10). hence, russia sells arms to both sides (in fact, azerbaijan receives “85% of its arm imports from russia”) (di franco, 2018). conclusion moscow’s policy towards the south caucasus differs from state to state there. however, the one commonality that can be identified in these interactions is russia taking advantage of secessionist movements in the region. this is done so as to keep the transcaucasian states disunited, bolster russia’s geo-energy interests, and project military 47 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security power abroad. a nato report perhaps best summarizes russia’s behavior in the south caucasus as “cooperation with armenia, confrontation with georgia, and confusion with azerbaijan” (kasapoglu, 2017, p. 3). russia is clearly not afraid to support abkahzian and south ossetian aspirations to the point of war with georgia, thereby diminishing georgia’s strategic position as a terminal energy transit state as well as georgia’s ability to defend itself militarily. the matter of nagorno-karabakh is more complex. russia is firm allies with armenia; while azerbaijan is not entirely pleased with russian military bases placed in its rival (as well as other mixed signals sent by russia), the government of baku can hardly complain about russian military aid through arms imports. russian support emboldens both countries enough to continue disputing over nagorno-karabakh but not to the point of a protracted war (the most recent clash between the two countries only lasted about a month before russia and other states mediated a ceasefire). this all plays to russia’s benefit as detailed earlier. time will tell whether russia’s divide-and-rule strategy in the south caucasus will either reap long-term benefits for moscow, or just ultimately end up getting it involved in a quagmire. even now, nato is not entirely dissuaded from seeking new partnerships in the region, while russia’s geo-energy monopoly is still not entirely assured as plans for new pipelines continue to be explored. it will especially be interesting to see whether putin’s future successor can play the game as well as putin himself does in keeping the south caucasus within russia’s orbit. 48 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security references di franco, e. (2018, august 13). only russia can solve the nagorno-karabakh conflict but does it really want to? my country? europe. https://mycountryeurope.com/international-relations/only-russia-can-solve-the-nagornok arabakh-conflict/ kasapoglu, c. (2017). russian forward military basing in armenia and moscow’s influence in the south caucasus. nato defense college, 1-16. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17619. jonavičius, l, delcour, l., dragneva, r., & wolczuk, k. (2019). russian interests, strategies, and instruments in the common neighbourhood. eu-strat working paper series 16, 1-43. 10.17169/refugium-1915 nagorno-karabakh: russia deploys peacekeeping troops to region. (2020, november 10). bbc. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54885906https://www.bbc.com/news/wor ld-europe-54885906 nasirov, e., iskandarov, k., & sadiyev, s. (2017). the south caucasus: a playground between nato and russia? connections: the quarterly journal 16, no. 3 (2017), 47-56. https://doi:10.2307/26867919. peña-ramos, j.a. (2017). the impact of russian intervention in post-soviet secessionist conflict in the south caucasus on russian geo-energy interests. international journal of conflict and violence 11, no. 3, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-3086 49 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security pototskaya, t.i. (2014). geopolitical interests of russia in post-soviet space: southern border. regional research of russia 4, no. 4, 301-308. https://doi.org/10.1134/s2079970514040170 saparov, a. (2014). from conflict to autonomy in the caucasus: the soviet union and the making of abkhazia, south ossetia and nagorno karabakh. routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315758992 trenin, d. (2018, april 11). why russia needs to update its south caucasus policy (op-ed). the moscow times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/04/11/why-russia-needs-to-update-its-policy-on the-south-caucasus-a61122 50 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security 51 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security on private military companies and hybrid warfare norman de castro sciences po paris abstract this paper analyses how the growing role of private military companies pmcs has flown largely under the radar of the international community, even as dangerous legal loopholes and ambiguities come to light. from a strategic point of view, pmcs in general offer both benefits and new forms of risk for individual actors and international organizations. this paper focuses on two main aspects related to private military companies: how they are the newest and most versatile tool in the “hybrid war” and shadow-war arsenal and how they are the byproduct of decades of misguided and ill-fated proxy warfare. we also discuss one of the most controversial pmcs: the wagner group, the technically inexistent but actually russian state-backed military organization. hybrid warfare, as employed in modern grand-strategy, is an ever-evolving concept with borders as shadowy and grey as the actors used to deploy this type of strategy.through the prism of the private military world, we will see how the new shape of our conflicts has solidified the waging of war as a business, a lesser-known but equally significant precedent. furthermore, as we see warfare taken out of the public spotlight and away from congressional oversight, the need for clear and strict legal frameworks to the world of warfare becomes even more apparent. 35 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security as the world evolves, so does the world of warfare. in the past century, the planet saw two world wars and a myriad of conflicts that fall under the umbrella of the “cold war”. one of the lasting legacies of this age of proxy warfare is what is called “hybrid warfare”. through hybrid warfare, countries seek to achieve strategic goals by employing military, economic, political, and informational assets, with more regard for their interest than regulations and laws governing war. in recent years, clear examples of hybrid warfare have come to light. while this concept applies to any nation, recent trends show russia employing a wide spectrum of hybrid techniques to achieve its strategic and economic goals. this has been particularly effective in areas with high levels of instability, allowing russia to employ less conventional practices with less fear of reprisals. throughout this paper, we will describe the uses of hybrid warfare and non-linear warfare. seeing as how recent russian and western academic definitions of hybrid warfare differ, we will base our work on the definitions employed by nato and put forward by frank g. hoffman, research fellow at the inss center for strategic research, who defines hybrid warfare as warfare incorporating “a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” throughout this paper, however, we will refer to russian30 definitions of hybrid warfare, as we believe these serve their tactical and political objectives best. one of the main tools in the hybrid warfare toolkit are private military companies (pmcs). these firms provide a wide array of security and security-related services, from logistics and transportation to intelligence gathering and special forces operations. there are different categories of companies involved in private defense and security. these include general service contractors that offer logistical assistance, private security companies that offer strategic, operational, and organizational support, and private military companies, that offer all of the former, with the added capability of engaging in direct combat, going as far as directing airstrikes and special forces operations. this last category, through its impact on the world of hybrid warfare, will. private military companies have made themselves the perfect cover for states to claim plausible deniability while engaging in questionable behavior. furthermore, the lack of accountability these firms display in the current international system makes it so that they can operate with a dangerous degree of autonomy. as we mentioned earlier in our paper, the cold war brought along with it an age of proxy and indirect warfare, the impact of which we’re still evaluating today. for years, countries with territorial ambitions employed proxy campaigns and information tactics to achieve strategic, and political goals. in more recent years, however, countries such as russia and iran have adopted the use of “non-linear warfare” as part of their overarching strategic objectives. in simpler terms, this means that they employ means outside the strict realm of the military to better 30f. hoffman, conflict in the 21st century: the rise of hybrid wars, potomac institute for policy studies, virginia, 2007, pp. 7-8. 36 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security achieve their geostrategic goals. these two regimes in particular, have evolved their toolkits to achieve their goals in a world where the international community is more wary and observant of nations with ambitious geopolitical strategies. these strategies then have needed to develop an added layer of legal protections, insulating official policymakers and military members from some of their operations, to at least maintain plausible deniability of the aspects of hybrid warfare that might fall in grey or illegal areas. the proxy conflict and political strategies laid out during the cold war, by both great powers and smaller, regional hegemons, helped establish the tactical groundwork for the hybrid war strategies we see today. on the other hand, the military upheaval brought on by the collapse of the soviet union, offered potential defense contractors the opportunity to begin employing former soldiers from a noticeably enlarged workforce, a development aided by the increased circulation of formerly used military equipment. finally, we can also conjencture how the political developments of the late 1980’s and 1990’s encouraged decision-makers to explore possible responses that would allow states to achieve military and strategic goals whilst reducing exposure and investment of their own armed forces, thus reinforcing the need for private military contractors to expand their offer of service to governments and defense ministries. there are three key aspects of the role that private military companies play in hybrid warfare: first exploring how pmcs are a way to wage war in the dark; afterward analyzing the consequences of the vietnam syndrome in the way that policymakers have adopted pmcs and finally focusing on the russian scenario. this last part is particularly pertinent as russia has been a major employer of pmcs in some of their recent battle scenarios, and their particular brand of shotgun diplomacy is still unique to them. private military companies, as corporations operating (in most cases) at the behest of state or defense ministries, offer a particular skill set with obvious drawbacks, but also clear benefits. these are particularly pertinent to policymakers and politicians. the more clear of these is of course the fact that private employees, formally contractors, can be deployed with far less caution than traditional soldiers, or even special forces operatives. politically speaking, deployments of armed forces members are always riskier than charging private soldiers. governments are not directly responsible for casualties regarding private contractors, and the public is less likely to be influenced by these: in most cases, “contractor” casualties attract less media and congressional oversight, particularly in areas where us military involvement is kept out of the public spotlight. this aspect is pertinent in countries where transparency between the armed forces and the political leadership is strictly enforced, such as the united states. the use of troops is strictly controlled by congress, who see themselves as the voice of the voting public. contractors, however, can be quickly and discreetly deployed at the behest of the defense or state departments, without fear of reprisals. flaws have arisen in this way of operating, however, when private operatives have superseded their authority or committed illegal acts while under contract for the us government. after the peak of us forces involved in the second iraq war , for example, the ratio of military personnel to contracted personnel was about 1:1.31 on one hand, this meant that far fewer us uniformed lives were being used and put at risk. on the other, this allowed the dod to have a fighting force less accountable to congress, yet more 31 jeremy scahill, « bush’s shadow army », the nation, 15 march 2007, 2 37 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security accountable or at least more subordinate to white house. but as the events of the 2004 fallujah ambush and the 2007 nissour square massacre so violently illustrated, an elevated presence of private military contractors entails a heightened risk for these companies and their personnel, as well as a dangerous lack of oversight from the dod that could lead to both human and political crises. as the future of hybrid warfare seems inextricably tied to a decrease in transparency32 33 for foreign operations, it becomes evident that the role of pmcs will have to be revisited and better regulated. hybrid warfare is also a resource for countries wishing to achieve geostrategic goals at a cost lower than traditional troop deployments. by hiring corporations whose main goals are to make a profit and cut costs, it becomes evident that pmcs offer the possibility to drastically reduce costs for the countries involved. this makes them particularly appealing to both authoritarian and democratic regimes. the former will probably attempt to maximize their return on investment, particularly if their aims are more long-term and aimed at destabilization, or if they are financially motivated. for the latter, this is a useful tool to decrease the likelihood of political interference, as accountability towards taxpayers comes into play. we must also consider the long-term impact of the “vietnam syndrome,” the notion that has34 permeated the foreign policy establishments of many countries that wars cannot be fought without clear objectives, overwhelming military force, and the support of the public and elected officials. while born in the us, this has influenced how other countries direct their military goals. as hybrid strategies can be deployed at both small and large-scales, solutions allowing for the use of force without calling for full-scale war become increasingly valuable. this is especially evident when we consider that the last time a major power declared war was in1945 when the us declared war on japan and germany. private military companies fit perfectly into this narrative. as policymakers and heads of state worry more about their image domestically and abroad, the use of pmcs and special forces operating clandestinely rises, as cost-cutting solutions to geostrategic objectives. this is the same logic that has led to a rise in the use of combat drones, allowing for cleaner warfare without putting the lives of members of the armed forces at risk. furthermore, the end of vietnam saw major powers move away from unilateralism and drifts toward more multilateral deployments. pmcs, by offering forces outside the military and at a lower cost, offer countries the possibility of building their own “coalition of the billing” whenever they see fit, without creating much publicity and most importantly, without having to validate their objectives and methods in front of the international community. thanks to this,35 countries with the power to hire pmcs no longer need to rely on their allies, as was once the norm in warfare. if we view this through a hybrid warfare perspective, pmcs offer a perfect gateway from which to deploy as many forces as needed without the need for congressional or allied oversight, and most importantly, in a variety of roles. pmcs such as the wagner group, which we will study more closely in the next section, offer their clients the capacity to handle 35 https://www.wired.com/2004/07/coalition-of-the-billing/ 34 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/22/its-called-the-vietnam-syndrome-and-its-back/ 33 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html 32 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3585765.stm 38 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security intelligence, disinformation, and broadcasting services, helping both lead combat and political operations. we cannot forgo the russian case, in this case, exemplified by the wagner group. this corporation, whose organizational structure and ties to the russian intelligence and defense forces are intentionally murky, identifies as a pmc, primarily serving the russian government and its allies. formally created in 2014, the wagner group presents itself as a traditional pmc, offering the usual benefits to governments and non-state actors interested in hiring them. upon closer analysis, however, experts have described the group as a mostly self-funded unofficial paramilitary arm of both the russian gru and of putin’s closest allies. the wagner group’s deployment in ukraine and syria, particularly, have illustrated how this pmc serves the kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy perfectly. through them, the russian government gains a layer of plausible deniability especially useful in politically risky scenarios, such as the annexation of crimea or the fight against syrian rebels. the relation between this organization and the kremlin is both close and foggy, however, granting russian authorities what many have called “implausible deniability,” implying that the use of the wagner group offers putin deniability so thin and difficult to believe that it almost defeats its purpose. formally, the wagner group is funded by its founder, evgeny prigozhin,36 and its operations, much like any formal, independent company. a closer look illustrates how the company has benefited from lucrative deals in exchange for their services, such as those they performed in syria, that saw them officially profiting from oil fields they liberated.37 as putin’s foreign objectives expanded in the past 5 years, so have deployments of the wagner group which has now been identified as having contracts in venezuela, car, libya, syria, madagascar, and sudan. under the assumption that the wagner group is simply a cover for38 russian foreign operations, we can understand how the benefits brought by their creation serve russian geostrategic goals in the fields of war, intelligence, political influencing and financial gains. this last point can also be explained by the tenuous nature of the group. its contracts and concessions in foreign countries also point to the organization serving the private goals of russian oligarchs and their corporate interests, further fusing the wagner group to putin’s personal objectives, many of which can be completed thanks to hybrid warfare strategies. from a legal standpoint, the wagner group serves to exemplify the risks the international community faces from the legal vacuum in which pmcs can operate today. although individual countries have enacted legislation applicable to or aimed towards regulating pmcs, the lack of enforceable international conventions regulating the use of such forces poses a series of legal and ethical dilemmas. the lack of universally accepted definition for what pmcs and39 privately-employed defense contractors are pose a significant challenge if legal or jurisdictional 39http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/microsoft%20word%20-%20pmsc%20article,%20us,%20kevin %20lanigan,%20final.pdf 38 https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/diplomacy-and-dividends-who-really-controls-the-wagner-group/ 37 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries syria.html 36https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/02/implausible-deniability-russia-s-private-military-companies-pub-81954 39 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security issues where to arise. this poses a threat to the legality of conflict today, as the use of non-regulated forces poses significant risks for all involved parties, as well as the legitimacy of existing statutes surrounding warfare. it would therefore be necessary to enact enforceable conventions, separate or annexed to existing laws surrounding war, in order to fully regulate and transparentize pmcs and their employers. this would also serve to both address humanitarian concerns involving the deployment of private forces and help enforce financial transparency vis-a-vis these firms. this latter suggestion goes beyond the tributary and would help enforce the formal chain of leadership and financing for firms operating in the sector. finally, enacting such regulations as conventions would give them the legal backing to be enforced by international organizations and tribunals, thus further protecting civilians and other combattants in theaters of operation involving pmcs. in conclusion, we can say that as the world moves toward embracing and adopting hybrid warfare, albeit to varying degrees, private military companies see themselves in a privileged position of being able to fulfill, or at least supplement, many foreign policy objectives of their employers. strengthening legal frameworks surrounding these firms would also facilitate their employment and use by states who might otherwise be discouraged by the lack of adequate legal standards and definitions regarding their use and deployment. hybrid warfare seeks to pursue objectives through a variety of means and on different fronts, and the versatility of private militaries is perfectly suited to this. 40 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security references mumford, andrew. “proxy warfare and the future of conflict.” the rusi journal, vol. 158, no. 2, taylor & francis group, apr. 2013, pp. 40–46, doi:10.1080/03071847.2013.787733. p w singer, ‘corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry and its ramifications for international security’, international security (vol. 26, no. 3, 2001–02), p. 193. marten, kimberly. “russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the wagner group.” post-soviet affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, informa uk limited, mar. 2019, pp. 181–204, doi:10.1080/1060586x.2019.1591142. reynolds, nathaniel. front matter. carnegie endowment for international peace, 2019, pp. [i]-[ii], putin’s not-so-secret mercenaries: patronage, geopolitics, and the wagner group, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20986.1. accessed 1 dec. 2020. gardner, hall. hybrid warfare: iranian and russian versions of “little green men” and contemporary conflict. nato defense college, 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10250. accessed 3 dec. 2020. kasapoglu, can. russia’s renewed military thinking: non-linear warfare and reflexive control. nato defense college, 2015, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10269. accessed 3 dec. 2020. johnston, karli. “private military contractors: lessons learned in iraq and increased accountability in afghanistan.” georgetown journal of international affairs, vol. 10, no. 2, 2009, pp. 93–99. jstor, www.jstor.org/stable/43133578. accessed 3 dec. 2020. 41 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security public right of access to america’s war on terror joseph lehman university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract the saga of guantanamo bay litigation continued into a new area of law earlier this year. in an opinion written by judge justin walker, the united states court of appeals for the dc circuit dismissed an attorney’s petition to observe a tribunal hearing of an islamic terrorist. while judge walker’s opinion ultimately dismissed the attorney’s petition, the opinion left open the possibility that american citizens could demand access to guantanamo hearings under the first amendment. lively debate exists over whether or not enemy combatants enjoy certain constitutional rights. but regardless of whether a terrorist has a sixth amendment right to a public trial, american citizens – under the original understanding of the first amendment – have a qualified constitutional right to observe the hearings of enemy combatants. 9 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security i. introduction the saga of guantanamo bay litigation continued into a new area of law earlier this year. instead of habeas corpus litigation on behalf of detainees, “a defense attorney… (with no client) petitioned a court (with no jurisdiction) to reverse a procedural ruling (excluding the public from a classified hearing) in an appeal filed by other attorneys who…have no client.” if that sounds1 convoluted, then as judge walker said in his opinion in this case: “welcome to guantanamo bay.” while judge walker’s opinion ultimately dismissed the attorney’s petition, he left open2 the possibility that american citizens could demand access to guantanamo hearings under the first amendment. rightly so. the original understanding of the first amendment surely guarantees a right to access hearings of guantanamo bay detainees. ii. background ibrahim al qosi is an islamic terrorist. ten years ago, he was arrested and charged with two counts of terror-related charges. during the criminal proceedings, attorneys from the military commissions defense organization represented al qosi. counsel for al qosi, either employed by the department of defense, or civilian defense counsel retained by the accused at his own expense , ultimately entered two pleas of guilty. in exchange for the pleas of guilty, the3 government released al qosi after a prison sentence of only two years. after being released to sudan, al qosi had no contact with his defense attorneys. once back in sudan, al qosi joined al qaeda, became a leader in the organization, and began encouraging terror attacks on the united states. mr. al qosi has yet to be eliminated, and is still at large. in spite of al qosi’s continued4 terrorist actions, and the fact that he has had no subsequent contact with his counsel, the dod attorneys who represented him “continue to challenge [al qosi’s] conviction.” this is where5 philip sundel comes into the picture. mr. sundel works as an attorney for the department of defense, but is not – and never was – counsel al qosi. nevertheless, mr. sundel wished to attend a closed-to-the-public classified hearing on the al qosi case. after asking both the military judge and then the court of military commission review for access to the hearing and both denied his petitions. mr. sundel appealed to the united states court of appeals for the d.c. circuit, asking for access to the hearing. iii. the court’s ruling the d.c. circuit, in a panel made up of judges henderson and walker, and senior circuit judge silberman, dismissed mr. sundel’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. the court found that it could “review a challenge only if it is, among other things, a final 5 id. 4 supra note 1 at 2. 3 office of military commissions, organization overview, department of defense (last accessed april 28, 2021). https://www.mc.mil/aboutus/organizationoverview.aspx 2 id. at 2. 1 philip sundel v. united states, no. 19-1234, 1 (d.c. cir. jan. 26, 2021). 10 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security judgement.” since mr. sundel was appealing the military judge’s decision to seal the hearing,6 the court found that mr. sundel’s appeal concerned a decision rather than a judgement. the7 court, however, carefully emphasized that “it is an open question whether the public has a first amendment right to attend hearings related to detainees at guantanamo bay.”8 iv. the first amendment versus national security military tribunals are a curious forum of adjudication in america. they have often appeared during times of conflict, and disappeared soon after. yet, one constant in these military tribunals is that government officials have sought to keep them confidential, often under auspices of national security. while the first amendment extends a right of access to article iii judicial proceedings, no court has considered whether or not that right applies to military tribunals. this9 permits courts to seal tribunals for national security purposes, and to erode “the primary purpose of the first amendment [which is that citizens] understand the issues which bear upon our common life.” with this vital civil liberty being balanced against the government’s interest in10 maintaining national security, the touchstone for determining how far the government may go is the original understanding of the first amendment. v. original understanding of the right to access at the time of the founding, the public considered freedom of the press (from which the right to access flows) to be of paramount importance. in his essay ``rights of man” thomas paine lamented that the english government had corrupted the press, “most english newspapers are directly in the pay of the government or, if indirectly connected with it, always under its orders.” paine further explains that this severe and dangerous restriction on press came as a11 result of the “miseries of war and the flood of evils it spreads over a country.” far from seeing12 war as justifying restrictions on the first amendment, paine argued that governments abused their powers in war time to curtail fundamental rights. this impression of the importance of public access continued through to the historic trials of thomas preston and william wemms in 1770. preston and wemms – two english soldiers – stood trial for the boston massacre. inflamed passions were the obvious result of the massacre, and the court delayed the trial to let passions cool, so as to not taint the proceedings with unfair prejudice. during the delay in the trial, both sides used the press to air their versions of events.13 once trial began, however, the press motioned to sell accounts of the massacre itself, but was14 14 hiller zobel, the boston massacre 206, 221 (1970). 13 indeed, the colonists deeply desired a fair trial for these soldiers because of the vindication that comes with a properly wrought guilty verdict. to this end, the defense was furnished with high-quality counsel including future president john adams. 12 id. 11 thomas paine, common sense, rights of man, and other essential writings of thomas paine, signet classics ed., 131 (2003). 10 alexander meiklejohn, free speech and its relation to self-government, 75 (1948). 9 richmond newspapers, inc. v. virginia, 448 u.s. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 8 supra note 1 at 4. 7 id. 6 supra note 1 at 5. 11 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security denied out of concern that such accounts could “unduly prejudice those whose lot it might be, to be jurors to try these causes.”15 in spite of these restrictions, the trial of preston and wemms remained open to the public, and the public attended regularly. eventually, preston and wemms were acquitted, and a jury found only two soldiers (in a different trial) guilty. the boston massacre trials evidence that, even in one of the most divisive times in american history, the public demanded access to the trial of foreigners who had murdered americans. the boston gazette lent even more support to this expectation of free access and freedom of the press when they lamented that british authorities had started suppressing speech about the quartering of british soldiers in american homes. the author argued that “since those journals have been discontinued, our troubles from that quarter have been growing upon us.”16 this expectation of openness continued after the founding. the sedition act trials further demonstrate that the freedom of speech and press extends to watching trials implicating national security. between 1798 and 1801, the united states prosecuted at least 26 individuals17 with “publishing false information, or speaking in public with the intent to undermine support for the federal government.” taking a step back, the federalist congress passed the sedition acts18 in response to international conflict with france and to target republican authors and speakers who criticized the adams administration. the government, in all of these cases, alleged that the defendants attempted to stir up sedition, and undermine the american government itself. in spite of this, none of these trials were sealed and the public could access them freely. so free was the press coverage and access to these cases that one defendant, matthew lyon, “wrote a widely publicized account of the trial…[and]…won reelection to the u.s. house of representatives.” the wide media coverage19 “reflected public interest in the sedition trials, many of which became public events that attracted large and often prominent audiences.” so intense was the debate over the sedition acts that it20 “prompted debates on the nature of constitutional government itself” including two state attempts to nullify the federal law on first amendment grounds. in 1800, a senator charles pinckney21 supported thomas jefferson’s candidacy for president by “arguing that sedition prosecutions were a threat to the public’s right to free discussion of public affairs.”22 fast forward to the american civil war. president abraham lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and had begun trying american civilians in military tribunals. in indiana, the government arrested one man, lambdin milligan, who challenged his detention (in part) on the 22 id. at 44. 21 id. at 43. 20 id. at 43. 19 id. at 4. 18 bruce a. ragsdale, the sedition act trials, 1 (2005). 17 the irony of using sedition act prosecutions as evidence of an american fidelity to free speech is apparent. but while the rights of the defendants may have been trampled, the fact that the public had to these trials demonstrates the importance of free access under the first amendment. 16 boston gazette (march 12, 1770). 15 article signed “vindex” (boston gazette, dec. 31, 1770), the writings of samuel adams 110 (1904-1908). 12 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security grounds that the government denied him his right to a “public trial before an impartial jury.” as23 it relates to the right of access, the supreme court ruled that, in order to abrogate american civil liberties “necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the court and deposes the civil administration.”24 vi. limits of the first amendment even accepting this long history as true, it may be argued, it is irrelevant to modern military tribunals because the defendants are enemy combatants, and that the defendants do not have any rights under the constitution. on this point there is much debate, but the resolution of such debate is not relevant to the point here. the question here is not whether enemy combatants have a sixth amendment right to a public trial, but whether american citizens have a first amendment right to access military tribunals. the government did restrict the press in the boston massacre case, and the milligan court recognized that civil liberties could be curtailed in situations of actual military necessity, but these restrictions were always narrowly tailored, and were the least restrictive means by which to achieve the government’s compelling interest in national security. for better or worse, the first amendment is not absolute, and there are cases where a judge could reasonably seal a military tribunal for actual military necessity. but the original understanding of the first amendment strongly supports a presumption that military tribunals be open to the public, just as other judicial proceedings are. vii. conclusion even in the times of deepest division in america, from the revolution, to suspicions of sedition, to a civil war, the american public enjoyed wide-open access to all manner of proceedings. limits were imposed, but the american people ratified the first amendment with the understanding that it prevents the government from restricting their right of access to hearings and tribunals. this brings us back to judge walker’s open question in 2021: is there a first amendment right of access to detainee hearings? the original understanding of the first amendment certainly suggests that, while there may be limits, the first amendment does protect that right. hopefully a court addresses this issue soon and closes the issue. the longer it remains unanswered, the easier it is to “slide from a case of genuine military necessity, where the power sought to be exercised is at least debatable, to one where the threat is not critical and the power either dubious or nonexistent.”25 the meaning of the first amendment has not changed since the states ratified in 1791. whether or not the guantanamo detainee has a right to a public trial, american citizens have a constitutionally protected right to keep a watchful eye on governmental prosecution. 25 william rehnquist, all the laws but one, vintage books, 224 (2000). 24 id. at 127. 23 ex parte milligan, 72 u.s. 2, 62 (1861). 13 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security 14 christopher mitchell paper (2) isis: the evolution of a terrorist state christopher mitchell university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract isis has proved to be a persistent threat in recent history by adapting to whatever political situation it finds itself in. while isis is often considered a modern terrorist group, its history stretches far back to the invasion of iraq and even arab-israeli tensions. isis took on new roles such as state building and law enforcement, but ultimately was unable to keep up militarily with its state adversaries. while the caliphate has been destroyed, isis will continue to pose a threat if their policy of evolution continues to succeed. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) was at one point the most dangerous terrorist organization operating in the middle east. isis evolved from a small band of radical jihadists detained in a jordanian prison to a terrorist state with territory stretching across several countries. under abu musab al-zarqawi, the is predecessor, al-qaeda in iraq (aqi) played a prominent role in the chaos of the us occupation by upending law and order and stoking sectarian conflict that continues to be a problem today. us forces and tribal groups partnered together in the anbar awakening to decimate aqi, but aqi took this opportunity to morph into the islamic state in iraq (isi). isi then evolved into a terrorist army as a result of civil unrest in syria and rebranded itself as isis and then simply is. the secret to is success has been blitzkrieg-like tactics, extreme brutality, and capitalizing on social and political cleavages to move between different levels of warfare. while these factors helped is rise, they also played an important role in the destruction of the islamic state’s caliphate. isis was born in a remote jordanian prison. known as al-jafr, this high-security prison was set up to contain some of jordan’s most dangerous criminals including abu musab alzarqawi and abu muhammed al-maqdisi, the original progenitors of what would become isis. zarqawi, born ahmad fadeel al-nazal al-khalayleh, of zarqa was not born a jihadist. his life of crime and subsequent adoption of radical islamism mirrors that of many future recruits that would come to join him and his terrorist descendants decades later. in his early years, zarqawi was little more than a petty criminal and street thug (warrick, 2016, p.49). he is reported to have used drugs and alcohol, and had tattoos, all things strictly prohibited by the muslim faith. his mother was devoutly religious and pushed him to attend religious classes at the hussayn ben ali mosque. after committing to a pious islamic life, zarqawi was taken by stories of islamic warriors around the world and left jordan to fight in afghanistan 1989 (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 16). while he did not participate in any fighting because the soviets pulled out soon after his arrival, he did gain practical experience and contacts. he was also rigorously indoctrinated in the ideology of jihad and salafism. after failing to adjust to normal jordanian life upon his return, zarqawi formed his first terrorist group known as bay’at al-imam with radical cleric abu muhammed al-maqdisi in 1994 (warrick, 2016, p.55). the group planned to attack an israeli border post in order to disrupt the israeli-jordanian peace process, but was never able to accomplish its mission. later that year, jordanian general intelligence directorate agents raided the group’s hideout and arrested both zarqawi and maqdisi. they were both incarcerated in aljafr, but would not remain there long. while in prison, zarqawi overtook maqdisi as leader of the group, pushing his brutal agenda to the forefront. when jordanian king abdullah ii succeeded his father, king hussein, he proclaimed a general amnesty and zarqawi was released from prison. zarqawi traveled to pakistan where he slipped across the border into afghanistan to meet with osama bin laden in 2000. while al-qaeda leadership found zarqawi to be gruff and atypical for an al-qaeda recruit, they gave him his own franchise in herat, western afghanistan. with money and a camp provided by al-qaeda, zarqawi quickly set up jama’at al-tawhid waljihad (jtj). the purpose of the jtj camp was to train foreign fighters who came from jordan, iraq, syria, turkey, and beyond. jtj used connections to the nearby iranian border to bring these recruits into afghanistan. zarqawi was not privy to bin laden’s plans for the september 11th attacks, and may have even been out of the country when they took place, but he was targeted by the united states and northern alliance forces during the invasion of afghanistan. zarqawi’s camp was destroyed in an airstrike while osama bin laden fled to the tora bora mountains (warrick, 2016, p.68). ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security after being injured in afghanistan, zarqawi fled with the remnants of jtj to iran, where he most likely received medical treatment before moving on to iraq. remote northern iraq gave zarqawi the perfect haven to rebuild his training camp and prepare to retaliate against the west. zarqawi’s presence in iraq became the focal point of colin powel’s 2003 address to the un security council in which he attempted to make the case that zarqawi was the link between 9/11 and saddam hussein (warrick, 2016, p.94). many of these assertions came from unreliable reports and misconstrued intelligence. the cia repeatedly asked for authority to strike his new training camp and destroy ansar al-islam, but was denied, and the bush administration opted to invade iraq entirely in 2003 (warrick, 2016, p.75). this strategy only bolstered radical terrorist groups and destabilized the region leading to what is now known as the islamic state. us forces quickly dispatched the iraqi army and soon thereafter captured saddam hussein. the united states then pushed sadaam’s baath party, a predominantly sunni organization, aside in a policy known as de-baathification. the us authorities also dissolved the iraqi army and other security forces. this left thousands of well-trained sunni security and political officials out of power in a majority shia country and set the stage for a brutal insurgency and an alliance between zarqawi and disenfranchised baathists. after the invasion, iraq was awash with weapons and people willing to use them for two main purposes. the first was to drive out american forces, a goal shared by both sunni and shia militants. the second was to engage in sectarian reprisals. zarqawi displayed an acute knowledge of iraq’s sectarian divides and how to use them to his advantage. he attacked several targets that contributed to triggering a sectarian civil war that the coalition provisional authority was ill equipped to control. zarqawi earned the nickname “the sheikh of slaughters.” zarqawi’s first attack in iraq was a truck bombing at the jordanian embassy in baghdad in 2003. the blast killed eleven people and shook the surrounding neighborhood. it also shook the confidence of iraqis by proving that the occupation and scant iraqi security forces were unable to protect them. zarqawi’s second target was the un headquarters in a baghdad hotel. a truck with former iraqi air force weapons inside drove straight into the hotel and detonated, killing the un chief of mission (warrick, 2016, pp.106-110). this attack crippled the un’s peacebuilding efforts in the area, forced ngos to evacuate, and further demonstrated the terrorists’ ability to strike anywhere they pleased. zarqawi’s brazenness would reach a new high in his third attack in 2003. on august 29th, 2003, ayatollah mohammed bakir al-hakim gave a rousing sermon at the imam ali mosque in najaf, his hometown. al-hakim was a member of the supreme council for islamic revolution in iraq (sicri), a prominent shiite opposition party who lived in exile in iran before the invasion. al-hakim called for unity in a divided iraq and for the withdrawal of american forces. al-hakim was killed in a truck bombing outside the mosque that closely resembled the one used to destroy the un hq. the assasination engendered a high degree of mistrust between shia and sunni sects, making reconciliation and cooperation nearly impossible (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 28). more importantly, it enraged sicri’s armed wing, the badr corps, an iran backed militia. the badr corps retaliated against both the sunni population and american forces with brutal efficiency. iraq’s shia population and its militias were baited into a horrible overreaction that started a sectarian civil war and created the right conditions for greater regional instability, terrorism, and sectarian warfare. in 2004, zarqawi formally pledged bayat, or allegiance, to osama bin laden, and jtj became al-qaeda in iraq (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 19). aqi’s ranks swelled with foreign fighters and former baathists looking for revenge. aqi only comprised 14% of fighters in iraq, ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security but was by far one of the most intense terrorist groups in iraq, carrying out over 42% of suicide bombings (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 28). in 2005, aqi massacred shias and americans, causing reprisals that ultimately kept sunnis from going to the polls, with as little as 1% voting in some provinces (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 42). this further isolated them from the government and made them more resentful. in 2006, aqi bombed the samarra mosque and kicked off a period of brutal shia reprisals led by the iraqi government and popular mobilization forces (warrick, 2016, p. 203). aqi forces soon took control of territory outside of ramadi and fallujah. aqi also co-opted state institutions like customs agencies to do its bidding, such as preventing supplies for the coalition from crossing in from jordan (warrick, 2016, p.208). while not on the same level as isis, this period was a bloody harbinger of what the next decade would bring. later in 2006, aqi began to wear out its welcome with the sunni tribes. long periods of bloodshed and suffocating aqi rule turned the tribes back towards the central government and us forces. tribal leaders grew tired of aqi’s imposition of strict islamic codes and their own loss of control. nighttime vigilantes began hunting aqi members, seeking revenge for their family members who had been raped or murdered (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 69). us forces seized the opportunity to build trust with the tribes who ultimately partnered with the government out of self-interest. tribal leaders formed emergency councils and hundreds of sunni tribesmen joined the iraqi police. this movement came to be known as the anbar awakening (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 220). alongside the awakening, the bush administration deployed 30,000 new troops to iraq who were tasked with hunting aqi, territorial control, and keeping shia and sunni forces apart long enough for political concessions to be made. us forces were also deployed into iraq’s troubled cities that had become havens for extremists. in baghdad, us forces erected large walls to keep different religious and political groups apart and minimize their chances of direct conflict. a major breakthrough happened in june 2006. us surveillance aircraft tracked zarqawi’s religious advisor to the town of hibhib where they spotted zarqawi. zarqawi’s hideout was struck by two bombs dropped from an f-16. us delta force troops arrived twenty minutes later to confirm that zarqawi had been killed (warrick, 2016, pp. 216-217). without him, aqi declined rapidly as us and iraqi forces retook control of the country with the help of local militias. al-qaeda in iraq underestimated the resolve and religious fervor of iraq’s sunni tribes. the tribe’s main gripe was political rather than religious. tribal leaders and former baathists accepted aqi as a means to restore their power rather than establish an islamic state. sunnis had the same enemy as aqi, naturally making them effective partners, but aqi failed to see the nuance of this newfound relationship. aqi’s extreme interpretation of islam and predatory nature eventually wore out its credibility so much that the tribes chose cooperation with the government and us over aqi. american forces recognized this and ensured that sunni tribes played a central role in defeating aqi and securing iraq. unfortunately, the shia dominated government continued to abuse the tribes after the anbar awakening, thus ensuring that when isis came to power the tribes would not partner with the iraqi government to fight them. new leaders, al-masri and abu omar al-bhagdadi renamed aqi as the islamic state in iraq and took the group underground. in 2010, a us raid killed them both (warrick, 2016, p.250). after their deaths, abu bakr al-baghdadi was proclaimed as the new emir of isi. baghdadi was nothing like his predecessor, zarqawi. baghdadi received both a masters and doctorate in islamic studies from the university of islamic science, in stark contrast to the high school dropout zarqawi (warrick, 2016, p.117). those who met baghdadi before he became ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security caliph have described him as shy and demure. after his university mentor returned from fighting in afghanistan, he became more radical and adopted salafism. after the us invasion, baghdadi formed an islamist organization, but was detained by us forces in camp bucca before he could do anything. camp bucca did far more to foster his jihadism than deter it. camp bucca and other detention centers were havens that allowed radical ideology to fester. thousands of iraqi men suspected of extremism were detained in camp bucca. at the height of camp bucca operations, there were 24,000 prisoners detained at once for a grand total of 100,000 total detainees in its lifetime (mccoy, 2014). people who were already violent extremists met others with their same violent depredations and forged new networks for when they were released. bomb makers, soldiers, and terrorist leaders were all detained within the same facility, and those not already indoctrinated were at the mercy of the zealots in the bed next door. camp bucca was such an effective tool for jihadists that they deliberately tried to be sent there (warrick, 2016, p. 82). former is leader abu bakr al-baghdadi was detained there for several years. he was reportedly viewed as a peacemaker and allowed to roam the prison nearly at will. this allowed him to forge new contacts in isi that would eventually propel him to the position of caliph (warrick, 2016, p. 258-259). camp bucca and other facilities like abu ghraib would not only radicalize the detainees but also muslim populations around the world. us military prisons engendered a greater sense of moral outrage for years to come. isis and its predecessors would make a point of attacking prisons, freeing detained comrades, and executing detained shias in the future. isi propaganda would continuously emphasize the prison experience with those being executed wearing similar orange jumpsuits to those worn in us military prisons. in 2004, an american named nick berg, wearing an orange jumpsuit, was brutally beheaded, likely by zarqawi himself, on camera (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 30). isis would repeat this ritual with similar jumpsuits and a black clad executioner with a british accent known as “jihadi john.” us prisons did far more to promote jihadism than stop it and proved to be a major propaganda victory for extremists. in may 2011, reform protests began in syria. at first, protests were largely peaceful, but president assad sought to discredit them. assad released a number of dangerous al-qaeda terrorists from jail to make it seem as though this was a terrorist uprising rather than a popular groundswell (warrick, 2016, p.243). in december of the same year, the last of us forces evacuated iraq. the instability of the greater middle east, syria, and the absence of us forces in iraq created the perfect opportunity for the severely weakened isi to return to power. bhagdadi dispatched a small detachment, as few as eight men, to make contact with other extremist forces in syria and gain new recruits (warrick, 2016, p. 251). the extremists released by assad became key new members of bhagdadi’s expeditionary force. by 2012, this group came to be known as jabhat al-nusra, an affiliate of al-qaeda (warrick, 2016, p. 267). al-nusra began by fighting the regime and taking control over areas where government forces fled (warrick, 2016, p. 275). alnusra was composed of experienced fighters and enjoyed both military success and support from anti-assad civilians. in april 2013, bhagdadi announced that isi would envelop al-nusra to form the islamic state of iraq and syria. this immediately provoked a negative reaction from ayman al-zawahiri, who rebuked baghdadi for announcing a merger without prior approval. several months later, after denying an order to submit to zawahiri, isis was officially kicked out of al-qaeda (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 196). thousands of fighters from al-nusra and other jihadist organizations streamed into isis ranks. rather than crippling or delegitimizing it, this strengthened it, representing a new generation of jihadism that was much more grotesque than its predecessors. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security one of isis’s first operations was to free prisoners from facilities across iraq, giving it a new force of experienced troops. isis quickly moved to fill the void left by syrian government troops and seized a number of cities in the short span of a few months. by the end of 2013, isis forces were taking control of ramadi, their former capital, and fallujah. isis also took control of the border highway in iraq that would allow them access to syria. in april of 2013, isis took control of raqqa, syria, where it would declare its capital (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 182). in june, isis forces converged on mosul with little more than light weapons and pickup trucks. within three days, isis took full control of the city after iraqi forces fled. the lack of discipline and widespread corruption in iraq’s military led to it buckling under the brutality of isis. for years, soldiers were simply bribing their commanders to allow them to go home where they still collected a wage (bbc, 2014). isis not only took control of iraq’s second largest city, it also took control of a massive arsenal. mosul was well stocked with heavy weapons ranging from t72 tanks to stinger anti-aircraft missiles and hj-8 anti-tank missiles (bender, 2014). in the span of just two years, isis evolved from a battered jihadist group to a full-fledged state with a military comparable to a small country. these military successes were key for acquiring new recruits, and by 2015 over 30,000 people from 85 countries were fighting for the caliphate (picker, 2016). this demonstrated a clear evolution from a covert jihadist organization to one capable of fighting on both conventional and guerrilla plains. while this allowed isis to graduate from a guerilla force it also made them a significantly larger target. after taking control of mosul, abu bakr al-baghdadi officially declared the creation of the caliphate that would now be known as the islamic state (is). like any state, is had a government, sources of income, public services, and security forces. initially, is governance was welcomed in some areas of syria where the fsa was viewed as corrupt and inept. isis settled disputes and ensured basic public services such as garbage collection continued in the absence of the syrian regime. is also provided for schools and the upkeep of public spaces. for some communities, is was their best option (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 164). satellite data shows that economic development took place under is rule with expanded markets and more street traffic in mosul (robinson et al., 2018). is was also able to control power and route it to important buildings like hospitals, but failed to provide effective electricity to most of its territory. this thin veneer of islamic virtue would only last so long. is soon implemented sharia law and a set of harsh hudud punishments. men were required to grow beards and women were forced to wear conservative outfits that covered them from head to toe. public beheadings and floggings were carried out in city centers across the caliphate (warrick, 2016, pp. 287-289). stadiums were transformed into prisons and torture facilities where crimes as small as theft or smoking were potentially punishable by amputation or death (malsin, 2017). homosexuality was punished by being thrown off of a roof. is also used other barbaric punishments such as crucifixion. these punishments terrified the west and kept is subjects in line. is created a variety of security forces and institutions to oversee the implementation of its version of sharia. is set up their own version of police that enforced religious laws and is control. is also created al-khansa brigades of female police, tasked with enforcing sharia law on women (kafanov, 2016). there was also an fbi-like force known as the amniyat that was responsible for counter espionage and intelligence gathering (weiss & hassan, 2015, p. 211). is also set up sharia courts to settle disputes and mete out punishments on its subjects. is then moved to settle scores in iraq. is assassins and suicide bombers killed several of the tribal leaders who participated in the anbar awakening. is recruited from the local tribes and then forced its new recruits to execute their resistant relatives (weiss & hassan, 2015, pp. 205-206). this meant that tribes ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security would be divided under is rule and unable to effectively fight back. through security forces and divide and rule tactics, is solidified its rule against any anbar awakening type of uprising. funding such a massive operation with thousands of foreign fighters and state functions took a large economic effort. is primarily funded itself in three ways: taxes and fines, oil, and the sale of seized goods and people. is controlled large oil fields in deir ezzor that it used to keep its military functioning. is also sold oil from these fields to foreign and black market buyers. between 2014 and 2015, is brought in over 450 million dollars in oil revenue that primarily benefited the organization’s top leadership (hoffman et al., 2016). despite having control over power production and oil fields, satellite data shows that over 60% of all buildings across all of is territory went without power (robinson et al., 2018). people living in is territory were also subject to hefty fines and taxation. every shop and salary under is jurisdiction could be taxed up to 50% in a taxation scheme known as zakat (robinson et al., 2018). in traditional islam, zakat is the act of giving alms that all muslims are required to do. by naming taxation after this pillar of islam, is aimed to grant greater religious legitimacy to its policy that resembled robbery more than charity. some government workers were still receiving their wages while under is occupation, forcing the iraqi government to cut them off (robinson et al., 2018). this kept is well supplied but also drove a wedge between is and local populations. finally, is trafficked both stolen goods and people, predominantly women. any valuables or non-muslim women that is came across were taken by the group and auctioned off in markets. is fighters were allowed to buy goods at reduced prices and sex slaves for less than $200 (arraf, 2019). is’s strict control over all economic activity in its territory allowed it to generate funding that allows it to continue its terror today. when is became hard pressed to maintain its forces, its economic control crushed local economies and made it hard to gain the population’s support. the employment of propaganda has been important for all terrorist organizations, especially is. since the times of aqi, propaganda has placed violence and other atrocities mixed with religious undertones at the forefront. many videos have prominently shown is fighters in combat in action movie like productions. others show joyous fighters waving flags or driving armored vehicles around in celebration. these videos are not only meant to showcase the glory of fighting for is but also the excitement of it, likening real war to that of call of duty and other video games with which many youths are familiar. is specifically tailored its propaganda to appeal to disenfranchised muslim youths in europe and america that are familiar with gang crime and inner city life (burke, 2017). is skillfully used numerous social media accounts on sites like twitter to publish propaganda, directly reach out to new recruits, and even solicit donations. while is operatives encouraged people to come to the caliphate, they also encouraged them to take action in their own home territory if they were unable to join them in syria and iraq. the vast majority of attacks in western europe and nearly all attacks in north america were inspired through is outreach in some manner (lister, 2018). is also made sure to include women and sex slavery in their propaganda. this also served to attract young recruits with the allure of sexual exploits that were not just allowed, but encouraged by is ideology (ali, 2020). is propaganda was key to attracting new recruits and allowing is to strike deep into western territory without having to use much of its own resources. is maintains that it has control over a range of provinces or “wilayat.” these provinces mostly came about as a result of other islamist groups pledging allegiance to baghdadi. is has provinces in afghanistan, the philippines, somalia, chechnya, nigeria, libya, and tunisia. these groups became emboldened by the military success of is, but all have so far failed to recreate it. boko haram in nigeria and the abu sayyaf in the philippines have come the closest ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security so far. boko haram has controlled small amounts of territory in nigeria, but was ultimately driven back into the forests by the nigeria military. the abu sayyaf captured the city of marawi in may of 2017 proclaiming it as part of the caliphate. after several hard months of fighting, the phillipine military pushed them out of the city at a great cost (scmp, 2018). while these provinces are not true extensions of is in iraq and syria, they still pose a threat as havens for islamist extremism. they also demonstrate the appeal of is’ success. extremist groups that have previously had trouble gaining notability or success grafted themselves on the is brand to raise their profile and embolden their followers. these groups may now provide safe harbor for dangerous is fighters fleeing syria and iraq, making these is suspects harder to capture. is caught the attention of the world when it took control of mosul, but when it began advancing towards the kurdish capital of erbil and baghdad the international community took action. the us formed a coalition of western and middle eastern nations to begin striking is targets and supporting local forces like the peshmerga and syrian democratic forces. in august of 2014, us navy fighter jets struck is artillery positions and convoys in iraq (roberts & ackerman, 2014). strikes continued to intensify, and by mid 2015, us forces claimed to have destroyed over 16,000 is targets (@cjtfoir, 2015). however, the us led coalition would not have been able to defeat is without the cooperation of local forces who fought on the ground. iraqi and peshmerga forces worked together to push is out of iraq. by december2015, iraqi forces reclaimed ramadi less than a year after it was lost. in june of 2016, fallujah was also liberated from is control. in october, syrian forces captured dabiq and struck a major blow to is ideology and propaganda. without dabiq, is could no longer claim to be bringing about the end times prophesied in the hadith. later, in october, iraqi forces began their push towards mosul, iraq’s second largest city. the battle for mosul took several months and countless lives. iraqi and kurdish forces began by liberating outlying minority villages, and then moved into the city, they were met by heavy resistance. building to building fighting lasted for months until is forces made their final stand in mosul’s old city and al-nuri mosque. in july of 2017, iraqi forces took full control of the city effectively ending the is caliphate in iraq (wilson center, 2019). the iraqi military benefitted from having support from several well organized fighting groups that included the kurdish peshmerga and iranian backed popular mobilization forces that helped to retake territory along with us air cover. in october 2017, sdf and us forces captured the deir ezzor oil fields and raqqa from is. fighting against is in raqqa was heavy and required the extensive use of air strikes and artillery, thus effectively leveling the city (malsin, 2017). raqqa was not retaken by government forces, but by syrian democratic forces, a coalition led by kurds but comprising many different militant groups. in the final days of the battle, local is fighters struck a deal with the sdf so that they and their families would be allowed safe passage out of the city. this deal specifically excluded foreign is fighters who were left in the city for american and sdf forces to eliminate (france24, 2017). by november, iraqi and syrian forces officially declared that they defeated is in their territories. in february 2019, sdf forces encircled the last remnants of the caliphate in baghouz and finally destroyed them (wilson center, 2019). in the dark of night on october 26th, 2019, an american assault force of delta force operators descended on a compound in northern syria. intelligence from baghdadi’s security advisor, including dna, was used to confirm his presence. one of baghdadi’s captured wives as well as kurdish and iraqi intelligence units made substantial contributions to the raid. upon entering the compound, they discovered abu bakr al-bhagdadi and pursued him into an underground tunnel where he detonated a suicide vest, killing him and two of his children (walcott, 2019). while his death and the destruction of the caliphate are major milestones, the ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security fight against is is far from finished. is has continued to conduct terrorist attacks from hiding places in the desert just as it did after the anbar awakening. the islamic state was clearly not the junior varsity team president obama joked about. it successfully cultivated a large group of fighters and evolved into a state-like organization. for a time, things were going well for is. as is evolved from a covert group to an overt one, the challenges it faced changed and multiplied. is may have had tanks and even some surface to air missiles which allowed them to effectively fight weakened syrian and iraqi armies, but is lacked the training and equipment to combat their more powerful patrons like the united states. us airstrikes were able to easily destroy the islamic state’s military forces. where the us deployed advanced fighter aircraft, is could only deploy store bought drones; there was simply no contest. terrorist groups can only evolve so much in the modern age in comparison to professional militaries. is may have been one of the world’s most powerful terrorist organizations, but when compared to professional state armies, it failed to measure up to its adversaries. just as it failed to measure up in military terms, it also failed to function like a proper government. in the beginning, is tried to effectively carry out state functions like running schools and public utilities, but this did not last long. is was responsible for millions of people, but as the war went on they provided less and less for them while taking more and more. is was unable to properly attend to the needs of a civilian population and fight a war at the same time. is oppressed its population in an effort to command compliance rather than win hearts and minds in the interest of popular legitimacy. after is took control of territory, it continued to function like a hostile occupation rather than a government acting in the interests of its people. is lacked the true support structure and legitimacy of a real state, undermining their ability to rally subjects to its aid at critical moments. is may have developed an army and administered territory, but it never truly became a state, much less a nation. is clearly failed to learn that winning hearts and minds are important to a war effort and state formation. it is important to understand how the islamic state adapts both its form and ideology to best suit its circumstances. when syria fell into chaos, is capitalized on the situation to capture territory and equipment. they then seized on cracks in iraq’s security structure to do the same there. when coalition forces beat is back, it did not implode, but moved to a lower and more covert form of warfare. this allows it to evade its adversaries, continue fighting, and regroup. is did this in the past after the anbar awakening and came back stronger than ever, a distinct possibility for the future. is also manipulates its religious ideology to reflect its material realities. is leaders now claim that the loss of the caliphate is not a result of their failings, but a test from allah. this allows it to retain its more religiously inclined followers and remain ideologically relevant. not everyone believes this, and a small portion of former is members believe the caliphate was destroyed after falling out of allah’s favor as a result of its extreme brutality (bunzel, 2019). while is might try, its perverse ideology only convinces a minority of muslims. is is battered, but it is not completely defeated, and as long as it can continue to evolve to effectively match its circumstances, it will continue to pose a threat to the world. ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security references ali, m. (2015). isis and propaganda: how isis exploits women. retrieved may 7, 2020, from https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/isis%2520and%2520prop aganda-%2520how%2520isis%2520exploits%2520women.pdf arraf, j. (2019, march 14). yazidis tell their stories about life under isis. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.npr.org/2019/03/14/703287508/yazidis-tell-their-stories-about-life-under-isis. bender, j. (2014, july 08). as isis routs the iraqi army, here's a look at what the jihadists have in their arsenal. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-militaryequipment-breakdown-2014-7 bunzel, c. (2019, march 11). divine test or divine punishment? explaining islamic state losses. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.jihadica.com/divine-test-or-divine-punishment/ burke, j. (2017, october 21). rise and fall of isis: its dream of a caliphate is over, so what now? retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphateislamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist 'final phase' of battle for raqa as is fighters leave. (2017, october 15). retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.france24.com/en/20171015-final-phase-battle-raqa-fighters-leave hoffmann, t., glasziou, p., & davidson, j. (2015, december 16). how isis runs its economy. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-isis-runs-itseconomy/ iraqi army 'had 50,000 ghost troops' on payroll. (2014, november 30). retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30269343 ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security kafanov, l. (2016, november 20). how all-female isis morality police 'khansaa brigade' terrorized mosul. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/howall-female-isis-morality-police-khansaa-brigade-terrorized-mosul-n685926 lister, t., sanchez, r., bixler, m., o'key, s., hogenmiller, m., & tawfeeq, m. (2018, february 12). isis: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html malsin, j. (2017, november 6). raqqa is in ruins, and isis in retreat time.com. retrieved may 7, 2020, from https://time.com/raqqa-ruins-isis-retreat/ mccoy, t. (2014, november 04). how the islamic state evolved in an american prison. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-anamerican-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/ philippines says marawi militants died in bloody last battle. (2018, july 20). retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2116564/battle-over-philippinesdeclares-end-marawi-siege-after picker, l. (2016). where are isis's foreign fighters coming from? retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.nber.org/digest/jun16/w22190.html roberts, d., & ackerman, s. (2014, august 08). us begins air strikes against isis targets in iraq, pentagon says. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/08/us-begins-air-strikes-iraq-isis robinson, e., culbertson, s., dobbins, j., bahney, b., & jones, s. (2018, january 09). what life under isis looked like from space. retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.rand.org/blog/randreview/2018/01/what-life-under-isis-looked-like-from-space.html ijois spring 2020, volume vi program in arms control & domestic and international security timeline: the rise, spread, and fall of the islamic state. (n.d.). retrieved may 07, 2020, from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state walcott, j. (2019, october 28). here's how u.s. forces finally found al-baghdadi | time. retrieved may 7, 2020, from https://time.com/5711905/al-baghdadi-capture-isis-intelligence/ warrick, j. (2016). black flags. london: transworld. weiss, m., & hassan, h. (2016). isis: inside the army of terror. new york: regan arts. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 1 transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss university of illinois urbana-champaign abstract using two case studies of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks, this paper explores how each transformed from local movements to transnational organizations. this qualitative paper, which ranges from the late 1980's to present day, has wider connotations, as it argues that personal connections forms through prior conflicts are instrumental in this transformation. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss glossary afpak -afghanistan-pakistan ak -ajnad kavkaz aq -al qaeda aqap -al qaeda in the arabian peninsula aqim -al qaeda in the islamic maghreb ce -caucasus emirate hts -hay’at tahrir al sham iib -islamic international brigade iju -islamic jihad union iks -imarat kavkaz v sham (caucasus emirate in syria) imu -islamic movement of uzbekistan is/isis -islamic state/islamic state of iraq and syria jas -junud al sham jma -jaysh al muhajireen wal ansar kbk -kabarda, balkaria, karachay kib -katibat imam al bukhari km -kata’ib muhajireen ktj -katibat al tawhid wal jihad lma -liwa al muhajireen wal ansar mak -maktab al khidamat scw -syrian civil war tip -turkistan islamic party ubl -usama bin laden ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 3 introduction on august 30, 2016, an explosive-laden mitsubishi delica van rammed into the gates of the chinese embassy in bishkek, kyrgyzstan, killing one security guard and injuring several others in the suicide attack. while no group has yet to claim the suicide bombing, kyrgyz intelligence has pinpointed those behind it. in a statement, kyrgyzstan’s state committee for national security (gknb) said that chinese uighur and uzbek militants connected to al qaeda plotted and coordinated the attack from syria. investigative reporting from kyrgyzstan has also identified the mastermind of the attack as an uzbek al qaeda commander who was born in kyrgyzstan and then traveled to syria to fight alongside the jihadist group. the bombing in kyrgyzstan is just one such instance that highlights the increasing danger of transnational jihadist networks, which use internationalized civil wars as a training hub and launching pad to export attacks around the world. this phenomenon is nothing new, as internal conflicts have often turned international, like the spanish civil war, the lebanese civil war, or perhaps more famously the civil wars in afghanistan (richardson 1976, midlarsky 2014). in all of these cases, the fighting began with local grievances before being internationalized and the focus transformed. what is newer is the rising number of cases of foreign fighter involvement in muslim causes. hegghammer (2010-11) surveys the period 1945 to 2009 and finds that eighteen of the seventy armed conflicts in the muslim world involved foreign fighters, but only two of those eighteen before 1980. the dangers posed by internationalized civil wars are fairly straightforward, in that foreign fighters gain knowledge, expertise, and connections and may end up exporting the violence to their home countries or elsewhere. in the case of afghanistan, a safe-haven for dangerous actors may prove catastrophic for countries thousands of miles away. al qaeda used its safe-havens in taliban-controlled afghanistan to plot the 9/11 attacks. it was also able to use this haven to funnel money, resources, and fighters to conflicts around the world. in the case of the chinese embassy bombing mentioned above, the kyrgyzstan bomber and several suspects identified as helping the bomber logistically, came from syria. syria, which is currently in its sixth year of civil war, has become the forefront for the global jihad. many different nationalities and ethnic groups have appeared on the battlefield with various different groups – including al qaeda and the islamic state. tens of thousands of foreign fighters have poured into syria’s borders to fight in the civil war on both sides of the conflict. it is worth looking into how and why these different groups wind up on the frontlines of syria’s battles. much work has already been done on european jihadists, arab foreign fighters and iranian-backed shia militias from iraq, lebanon, afghanistan and pakistan, but little has been done to look at chechen, north caucasian, or russian-speaking foreign fighters, or central asian militants in syria. recently, western analysts and researchers have been predominantly concerned with european, american, or arab foreign fighters recruited to fight in syria. but it is equally as important to look at other foreign fighters, who are just as dangerous. what put the chechen/north caucasian and central asian jihadists pipelines on the same par as arab jihadist networks is that the former have also been in place for decades. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss like the afghan arabs of the 1980’s, north caucasian and central asian militants have had longstanding networks. chechens have appeared in afghanistan, pakistan, syria, yemen, and possibly elsewhere. the same is true for central asians (especially so for afghanistan and pakistan). conversely, this is evident with arab foreign fighters fighting with chechen rebels and militants since the early 1990’s. but it is important to look at how these networks began, key players, and why these networks survive. these answers will help explain why we have seen these fighters pop up in various jihadist conflicts around the world: how transnational networks have emerged in the last generation, when they were rare beforehand (hegghammer, 2010). in this thesis, i will be looking at how jihadist networks transform local movements into transnational organizations, in a comparative case study of chechen/north caucasian and central asian fighters. literature review based on the available research, much work has been done to examine jihadist networks in general. for instance, in 2010 thomas hegghammer looked into why certain conflicts see an influx of foreign fighters. one hypothesis is that the local movements include some small degree of an islamist ideology which can link to jihadist interpretations. hegghammer finds that foreign jihadists (or groups), looking to fight in what they believe to be a global religious conflict in which all true muslims should be obligated to participate, flood the local movements with fighters (hegghammer, 2010). this is similar to what monica toft found in 2007, in that civil conflicts with even a limited or merely cultural islamic identity are more likely to escalate and transform into a fullscale religious civil war (toft, 2007, 2015). the potential for international outreach in islamic communities is particularly strong because islam allows for a global perception of a single community, or ummah, that is at risk. this perception is strongly held in jihadist circles, which helps explain why they tend to join an insurgency with even the most minimally observant islamic identity. toft also found that religious civil wars are often bloodier, longer in duration, and have been increasing in the percentage of overall civil wars around the world (2007, 98). in citing an empirical study in her own prior work, she writes, “a recent empirical survey of civil wars from 1940 to 2000 revealed two findings. first, the percentage of civil wars in which religion has become a central issue has increased over time. second, these civil wars are much more destructive than wars fought over other issues, they result in more casualties and more noncombatant deaths, and they last longer.” the transnational islamic identity helps us explain how global jihadist groups like al qaeda have exploited these conflicts to create transnational networks rooted in the infiltrated local movements and groups. the idea of a global ummah is exactly how and why al qaeda (hereafter referred to as aq) was founded in the first place. as bruce hoffman, an expert on aq, states, “al qaeda serves as the base or foundation from which worldwide islamic revolution can be waged.” (hoffman, 2007) in fact, looking at how aq is structured, one can get a decent idea ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 5 of how this actually works. thomas joscelyn, a senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracies, testified before congress in 2013 on this very subject. in this testimony, he looked at not only how aq is structured and its relationships with various affiliated groups around the world, but also how aq manifested (and continues to manifest) itself as a global jihadist network: “as part of this islamic army, osama bin laden ‘enlisted groups from saudi arabia, egypt, jordan, lebanon, iraq, oman, algeria, libya, tunisia, morocco, somalia, and eritrea.’ the burgeoning al qaeda network ‘also established cooperative but less formal relationships with other extremist groups from these same countries; from the african states of chad, mali, niger, nigeria, and uganda; and from the southeast asian states of burma, thailand, malaysia, and indonesia.’al qaeda also supported efforts in the balkans, central asia, chechnya, and the philippines. bin laden and al qaeda pursued a ‘pattern of expansion through building alliances’ and had laid the groundwork for a true global terrorist network.” joscelyn quoted findings from the 9/11 commission report, which contains a significant amount of information relevant to aq’s transnational networks. for instance, the report found that bin laden’s relationship with the taliban in afghanistan “provided al qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihadi groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes.” these other jihadi groups and leaders came from all over the world to coordinate and join forces with bin laden and aq. overall, the report estimated that anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 militants were trained in aq’s camps in afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. this is incredibly important in the formation of ties that will later become useful in the analysis of chechen/north caucasian and central asian networks in afghanistan post-2001 and in today’s syrian conflict, which will be discussed later. however, there are distinct limitations to the existing literature. in the context of aq, or the conflicts in which it is engaged, most research has been done on european networks (levitt, decottignies, rosland, 2016). additionally, there seems to be an oversaturation of research into arab networks, being that aq is dominated by arabs and has long operated in arab countries. in some respects, analysis of recruitment efforts for jihadist networks is also outdated due to new technologies like encrypted messaging applications. this is particularly true for a post-islamic state (is) world, which really revolutionized the use of social media for recruitment (farwell 2014). much work, like peter neumann’s book joining al qaeda: jihadist recruitment in europe, has been done on aq’s recruitment in the past, which was largely done in person (however, this is changing with advances in technology and in the face of competition with is.) in addition, thomas hegghammer recently wrote that “the study of foreign fighters has largely been confined to the subfield of terrorism studies.” (hegghammer 2010, 55.) for example, the global terrorism database only captures individual acts rather than broader conflicts, although perpetrators may well be foreign fighters. the interesting networks that magouirk, atran and sageman (2008) construct from this data to analysis of southeast asian terrorist incidents therefore do not speak to the impact on civil war. toft (2015, 222, 223) also argues that the literature has been too narrowly focused on suicide terrorism, and too broadly on transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss violence in general, and too little, in both theoretical and empirical terms, on the phenomenon of islamist engagement in conflict. she sees the need for considerably more empirical work on what distinguishes islamist claims and how the international context and organization matters. in this context, especially organizational ties to international networks, the absence of significant work on the chechen/north caucasian and central asian networks, are equally as important as the arab or european network categories. referring to the literature on suicide terrorism, a portion is dedicated to individual motivations for blowing themselves up, which at times can be useful. for instance, hoffman found in 2004 that these motivations can be explained, in part, by the jihadist ideology. aq, and similarly is, have longed preached about the importance of so-called “martyrdom operations.” in fact, michael horowitz (2015) found that “the existence of al qaeda as a critical node in a network of violent nonstate actors around the world also facilitated the rise of suicide bombings.” this is important because this ideology (rooted in salafi-jihadism, which will be discussed later) is not just contained in one geographical location, which is evident with the number of foreign suicide bombers in various jihadist conflicts in which aq or is play a major role. horowitz also finds that international networks play a large role in this later phenomenon. “at the international level, between groups rather than individuals, social networks similarly seem to help drive the spread of suicide bombing.” he later goes on to show “how the large number of connections that hezbollah [an iranian-backed shia terrorist organization primarily based in lebanon] and al qaeda, respectively, had to other groups helped spread the diffusion of suicide bombing.” it needs to be stated that unlike the notion of the ummah, the ideology surrounding these “martyrdom operations” is not something that ordinary muslims believe. groups like aq or is have religious officials which are great at twisting words from the qu’ran to fit their violent interpretation and to encourage this type of violence. global jihad it is also important to understand what the term “global jihad” means for this thesis. the origins of the idea of a global jihad can be traced back to sayyid qutb, an important islamic theorist in the egyptian muslim brotherhood in the early 1960’s. his book, milestones, detailed how the world is divided between a state of freedom, or islamic governance, and jahiliyyah (ignorance), or dictatorships or even democracies. according to qutb, the only way to remove jahiliyyah and institute this “freedom” was for a revolutionary vanguard to bring about this change through preaching and “physical power and jihad.” (qutb, 1964) this idea greatly influenced three important arab mujahideen in the soviet-afghan war of the 1980’s: usama bin laden (ubl), abdullah azzam, and abu musab al suri. during the war, the former two laid the foundations for al qaeda through their maktab al khidamat (mak). mak was the precursor to al qaeda, in which foreign fighters, especially from arab countries, were trained and funded. towards the end of the war, ubl and abdullah azzam, emboldened ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 7 by the withdrawal of soviet troops, began thinking about the future of the jihadist movement. the two postulated the idea of a “base” from which to train, fund, organize, and coordinate islamic insurgencies across the world. (bbc, 2014) with this, al qaeda (literally “the base” in arabic) and the foundations for the idea of a global jihad was born. in addition, abu musab al suri, a former member of the syrian muslim brotherhood, who joined up with ubl’s al qaeda in the early 1990’s, was instrumental in helping to shape the idea of the global jihad. (suri, 2004) in his book, the global islamic resistance call, suri wrote “because allah decreed to protect his religion and his book and keep [the] truth, [there is a] perpetual group within the islamic nation, fighting for the religion, un-harmed by those who let them down or by those [who] oppose them.” (joscelyn, 2015) this sentiment is heavily influenced by sayyid qutb’s idea of a global vanguard force, which al qaeda sees itself as. the end goal of this global vanguard force is the establishment of a global caliphate and the end of jahiliyyah. those groups and networks who abide by a global jihadist ideology therefore see themselves as at one with various jihadist conflicts around the world. as a result of this ideology, al qaeda has provided a “base” for dozens of jihadist groups from morocco, to the balkans, and to southeast asia. this means that those within this ideology are fighting for islamic governance within a specific region, but also fighting for global islamic governance due to interconnectivity and the idea that all jihadist conflicts are part of one larger conflict. this global vanguard force also preaches salafiyya, which refers to the “forefathers” of islam or the first muslims. salafists emerged as a modernist movement in the face of european encroachment in the middle east in the 1800’s. it attempts to return to the “golden age” of islam, in which the traditions and of the forefathers are returned to modern society. salafi-jihadists are attempting to establish islamic states based on a strict interpretation of islamic law based on the salafi doctrine. theory based on what has already been written about jihadist networks and how they operate, especially within the scope of al qaeda and the islamic state, i plan to expand on this by looking at how these constructs fit the cases of chechen/north caucasian and central asian militants. my analysis works from the following starting point : the political and religious landscapes in the north caucasus and in some areas of central asia were transformed by al qaeda, thereby facilitating the changes and requirements needed for a local movement to become a transnational organization. this is especially important for chechen/north caucasian and central asian militants as many groups in this region are transnational. in some cases, these groups are much larger than european networks and are more similar to arab networks in scale. this radical transformation of local movements allowed for networks to be established, which is why many north caucasians and central asians are seen in syria and still seen in afghanistan. before going further i need to provide definitions of key terms—of jihadism, foreign fighters, networks, and the components of a jihadist network. jihadism, or a jihadist group or movement, can be defined for the purposes of this research as a group or individual who ascribes transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss to the global jihad ideology. jihad, which is not an inherently violent term, means “struggle” in arabic and in the traditional islamic sense it means to struggle with both oneself to be a better muslim but also to protect muslims in the event of any existential threat (which is referred to as the lesser jihad in religious texts). in the basic sense of the word, a jihadist is someone who engages in this act. in the case of jihadist groups, these are groups who see themselves as having the religious duty and authority to wage war based on this idea. but groups and movements discussed in this paper ascribe to a global jihadist ideology, which means that they see the jihad as a global struggle. al qaeda and the islamic state, both major examples of global jihadists, want to see the establishment of a global caliphate. networks are understood in the organization literature as more flexible and more decentralized than the standard organizational structure. jihadist networks can be described as interconnected groups or individuals who share command structures, resources, or are in constant communication. additionally, financing, both state-sponsored or private, can also be conceptualized as being a necessary component of such a network. hegghammer defines a foreign fighter as an actor who has “(1) joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) is unpaid." (hegghammer, 57-58) there are some problems with this definition, however, as foreign fighters can certainly be paid. for instance, in lawrence wright’s book the looming tower, he discusses at length how osama bin laden had his foreign fighters in afghanistan on his personal bankroll. additionally, as seen in syria, foreign fighters can be affiliated to an official military organization. this is apparent with thousands of shia foreign fighters joining the fray on the side of the assad regime and being paid and supported by the iranian government. that said, the hegghammer definition gives us a good working definition for the confines of this paper. i have two hypotheses for how local groups or movements are transformed into transnational organizations. hypothesis 1 personal ties or connections to a leader or key individual in the already established jihadist network are instrumental in the transformation of local militants into components of a larger network . to use an example to illustrate how this works, one can look at a group called junud al makhdi, comprised of largely ethnic bashkirs and tatars, that operates in both afghanistan and syria. many members of this group, including its emir (leader), fought in the chechen wars alongside ibn khattab, al qaeda’s first official representative in the wars (paraszczuk, 2016). this connection to an al qaeda leader was instrumental in this local group moving fighters to afghanistan from chechnya, to assist al qaeda in fighting the us invasion in that country. in line with this trend, the group also sent fighters to assist al qaeda in syria. the ties established with al qaeda in the 1990’s is what caused this group to become a transnational organization. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 9 hypothesis 2 ideological affinity or overlap is more instrumental in this transformation than personal ties. to be precise, ideological affinity is present in any case; even personal ties or connections may not lead groups to become transnational or join a larger network without some ideological overlap. however, this hypothesis looks at whether this ideological affinity is more important. an example of this is the many foreign communist or left-wing brigades formed during the spanish civil war to help fight alongside the second spanish republic. this is evident with the communist brigades set up by the communist international (comintern) in which people would join from around the world due to an ideological overlap or affinity rather than any personal ties. (richardson, 1976) to be sure, it is quite possible that a combination of both ideological affinity and personal ties are at play in this phenomenon. data and methods in order to pursue a qualitative approach to this topic, i will be using the method of a structured focused comparison to look at my two cases. this method is defined as “’structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. the method is ‘focused’ in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.” (george & bennet, 2005) this will be a qualitative comparative case study, but limited elements of quantitative data will be utilized. this is the best method for pursuing this project, as systematic evidence is not available for a more quantitative approach. the number of overall jihadist groups, let alone the number of jihadist groups in the two main jihadist networks that will be discussed in this paper, is not suitable for a large n study. for context, however, i will be able to draw on david malet’s data base from the foreign fighters project (malet, 2007), in which he creates a typology of foreign fighters in civil conflicts using the correlates of war (cow) intrastate war and prio-cscw data on armed conflict data sets, 1815-2005. in addition, some normal modes of case selection, such as deviant or typical cases, are not appropriate nor is the use of random sampling, which is rarely appropriate in case study research (seabright and gerring 2008). a structured focused comparison of jihadist networks belonging to al qaeda and the islamic state is therefore the best method based on the impossibility of a largely quantitative paper. in addition, central focus is on examining these networks as they exist within the confines of the syrian civil war. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss case selection the al qaeda and islamic state jihadist networks will be the focus of this paper as the two are arguably the largest and most important networks in the jihadist world. almost every sunni jihadist group in the world has some tie to either of these networks. it should be noted that in some instances, ties to al qaeda are deliberately hidden or denied by some groups. this stands in stark contrast with the islamic state, which has been quick to announce ties or pledges of allegiance to it. this concept of how the different networks and affiliations work will be discussed later. the main focus of this paper will be on the chechen/north caucasian and central asian networks within these larger frameworks. i am choosing these subgroups because of the relative lack of attention compared to european or arab networks. the chechen/north caucasian and central asian role in islamic militancy from afghanistan to syria is an often overlooked and understudied element that is equally as important and dangerous as the others. moreover, it cannot be assumed ahead of time that the recruitment and affiliation of these groups is identical to the arab and western pipelines we already know more about. data will be gathered from news reporting, social media, other academic research, and propaganda released by the groups themselves. some of this data will be in english, but i will be utilizing my knowledge and understanding of arabic to use arabic-language resources; these are incorporated and cited in the text in accessible form in the online reports i authored for the foundation for defense of democracy’s long war journal. my employment at the long war journal and my internship at the foundation for defense of democracies has put me in a better position to accumulate relevant sources, such as jihadist websites or social media accounts, which i monitor on a daily basis. the data gathered takes the form of be statements, photos, or videos which indicate ties to important figures in a jihadist network, locations of fighting, or even biographical material. the latter resource is helpful in seeing how ties work, as often times groups will disclose this important information, for example, in the biographies of killed fighters or leaders. i have also interviewed experts and analysts in this topic for this thesis, some of whom use pseudonyms to protect their actual identity. it should be noted that any piece of literature that delves into exactly how jihadist networks operate can only be accurate relative to the amount of publicly known information. the nature of these organizations is clandestine and accurate information may be hard to come by unless one is an actual member of a jihadist organization or information is gained from current or former members of said organization. sometimes an organization will issue a brief overview of its history, which includes slivers of network ties vis a vis who its leader is, where he fought before, why the group is fighting in that certain location, etc. this information is usually limited, but valuable information can be gained from these types of publications which will be discussed later in this paper. one can make educated guesses based on available information and knowing how these networks operate, but we can only fully confirm what these groups are willing to openly share with the world. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 11 nomenclature in this paper, most names of groups and individuals will be transliterated based on their arabic or russian names. in other cases, the names will be translated for the reader’s understanding. for example, imarat kavkaz will be referred to as the caucasus emirate. in addition, some spellings of groups or individuals, like al qaeda, has been standardized throughout the text for uniformity. the arabic term “jamaat,” or group, will also be used throughout the text. the term is popular among north caucasian jihadists for naming specific groups within a larger entity. this practice has continued into syria, whereby small groups are often referred to by its leader (i.e tarkhan’s jamaat, where tarkhan is the leader.) many names used in this thesis are kunyas, which is based off of traditional arab naming systems in which the parents take the name of their first born child (i.e abu omar, or father of omar). this naming system is critical in jihadist networks as individuals seek to hide their true identity, akin to a war name. jihadist networks before getting into the actual case studies, it is important to define what a “jihadist network” is. at its core, a network can be defined as “a group or system of interconnected people or things.” on this basis, a jihadist network can be defined as interconnected groups, cells, or individuals within the same group structure. a jihadist network can be a small, interconnected cell or a large group with vast territorial areas of operations. to illustrate this, those individuals in the infamous hamburg cell, which would perpetrate the 9/11 attacks, were a network. at the same time, these individuals were connected to officials higher up in the al qaeda hierarchy, which would then expand the network. a variant of this is various groups who pledge allegiance to al qaeda in the islamic maghreb (aqim) in north africa and the sahel. groups in algeria, morocco, tunisia, libya, mali, burkina faso, and niger pledge allegiance to aqim’s senior leadership in algeria. these groups have smaller cells or groups which coordinate with other groups under aqim’s sphere. while each of these groups are separate entities, they all constitute aqim’s network. at the same time, they also constitute a component of al qaeda’s wider network. thomas joscelyn best defined the al qaeda network in a congressional testimony in 2013. joscelyn states that “the backbone of today’s al qaeda consists of its “general command” in afghanistan and pakistan (others refer to this as the “aq core”) and its formal affiliates.” (2013) these affiliates (or branches, as “affiliates” carries a connotation of a lesser degree of control and coordination) include the aforementioned aqim, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, al shabaab in somalia, hay’at tahrir al sham in syria, and al qaeda in the indian subcontinent. in addition to these groups, joscelyn states that allied or associated groups are also part of the network. “ in addition to the established affiliates, there are numerous associated jihadist organizations that the al qaeda network either influences or outright directs without officially recognizing the group as an affiliate,” he states. examples of this would include ansar al sharia in libya, ansar dine in mali, ansaru in nigeria, or fatah al islam in lebanon. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss marc sageman in his book understanding terror networks, he states that a network “can be viewed as a collection of nodes connected through links. some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. these more connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network.” (sageman, 2004) essentially, aqim would be a hub in the aforementioned example, and its affiliated groups would be nodes. these nodes would be connected to al qaeda’s general command hub via the connected hub of aqim. sageman also notes that these connected links and hubs can transcend geographical boundaries. the north caucasus case the phenomenon of local organizations being transformed into transnational entities can be exemplified in two case studies. the first is the case of north caucasian fighters, especially from the russian republics of chechnya and dagestan. during the two wars in chechnya, the local insurgents, who began as nationalists, were significantly transformed into transnational jihadists through contact with external networks. the second case is that of central asian islamist movements, many of which began as movements focused on local issues in their respective countries. however, after being forced to relocate to afghanistan in the 1990’s, they began a transformation into transnational entities, sending fighters elsewhere. to begin, i think it is important to start with the case of north caucasian fighters. it is first important to define “north caucasians.” there are more than four dozen ethnolinguistic groups in the caucasus mountain region of southern russia. in using the term north caucasian, i am referring to those fighters who are originally from the russian republics of chechnya, dagestan, ingushetia, north ossetia, kabardino-balkaria, karachay-cherkessia, and stavropol kray. fighters from other parts of the russian federation who merged into north caucasus groups are included, such as tatarstan and bashkortostan. in addition, i am also including fighters from the south caucasus (georgia, armenia, and azerbaijan) who aligned with north caucasus groups. at least one group profiled includes leadership from the crimean peninsula in ukraine, which is also added due to ethnic ties to the north caucasus. the north caucasus has had a long history of conflict, especially the chechen people, with the many incarnations of russian governance under tsarist and soviet rule as well as after russian independence. the historical conflict was largely nationalistic in nature, as the chechens have long wanted an independent home outside of russian control. however, starting in the first chechen war in the 1990’s, goals began to change. this appears to be largely due to the presence of al qaeda within the insurgency. as the global jihadist group began sending fighters to the region and having its members staffed in important positions in various local groups, the insurgency began shifting from nationalist to jihadist goals. (hughes, 2008) after the insurgency took on an explicit jihadist nature, the transformation of the local entity into a transnational one appears to be the result of shared ideology with a larger, already ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 13 established transnational entity, al qaeda. this can be seen in the case of the caucasus emirate. in addition, many different splinters have formed as a result of this transformation. background originating from the caucasian front (also known as the caucasus mujahideen), a collection of north caucasian and foreign fighters of the separatist chechen republic of ichkeria in the second chechen war starting in 1999, the caucasus emirate was formed in 2007. the power grab by dokka umarov, the fifth president of the unrecognized republic, officially abolished the chechen republic, and formed a jihadist entity, announcing an islamic emirate within the claimed borders of the republic. the move was condemned by various members of umarov’s own cabinet, but the now-emir (leader) of the caucasus emirate explained this move using the same rhetorical argument used by al qaeda for the creation of islamic states. in a speech shortly after the declaration of the emirate, umarov said “the caucasus is occupied by infidels and apostates and is dar al-harb, a land of war, and our immediate task is to turn it into dar as-salam [land of peace], to institute sharia on its territory and to drive out the infidels.” he goes on to say, “after driving out the infidels, we shall have to get back all of the historical territory of muslims, and that territory is [also] located beyond the borders of the caucasus.” (souleimanov, 2011) additionally, umarov explicitly linked the caucasus emirate to the global jihad led by al qaeda. “today our brothers are at war in afghanistan, iraq, somalia and palestine. anyone who attacks muslims, wherever they may be, is also our enemy,” he said. umarov added “our enemy is not only russia, but also america, england, israel and anyone who is waging war against islam and muslims.” compare this rhetoric with various al qaeda ideologues and officials who spout similar mantras. for example, in febuary 2016, ibrahim al qosi, a former guantanamo inmate and senior leader of al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap), discussed at length the necessity for muslims to protect other muslims, as well as combat those who “oppose the ummah.” (joscelyn, 2016) in a letter to abu musab al zarqawi, the leader of al qaeda in iraq, in 2006, then deputy emir of al qaeda, ayman al zawahiri also wrote about this subject. according to lawfare, zawahiri discussed that the enemies of islam “are both the external enemy—“idolatrous infidels”—and the enemies within islam. the latter, he says, are “traitorous apostates” who belong to “the community of renegade deviation” and embrace polytheism and secularist beliefs.” (bar, minzili, 2006) the latter is a reference to those majority muslim countries who cooperate with american and western governments against jihadist groups, like saudi arabia, and other muslim sects. the fact that dokka umarov would echo the same ideological arguments as al qaeda should not be surprising. during the first chechen war in the 1990’s, umarov fought under the ruthless chechen rebel commander ruslan gelayev. gelayev was an ally of and often fought alongside the arab commander ibn al khattab, al qaeda’s first representative in chechnya. however, the presence of al qaeda within the chechen insurgency significantly spread which helped in the radicalization and reforming of the insurgency into one with a distinctly jihadist face. indeed, in 1996 ayman zawahiri traveled to chechnya to inspect the insurgency, as well as transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss scope out a potential location for a base for his egyptian islamic jihad group. (orton, 2015) by the time of the second chechen war, the insurgents were predominantly split between nationalists and jihadists, with the latter proving to be the most formidable on the battlefield. this can be seen in various groups, all of which had al qaeda commanders staffed within their ranks. this includes the islamic international brigade (iib), first led by the aforementioned ibn khattab and chechen shamil basayev. this was the “official” al qaeda group in chechnya at the time, with most foreign fighters operating under this banner. however, al qaeda members were also found within the special purpose islamic regiment, led by gelayev. lastly, al qaeda helped form the riyad-us saliheen brigade of martyrs, a group commanded by basayev dedicated to suicide bombing, a tactic not indigenous within the chechen insurgency. (darling, 2004) basayev’s own al qaeda connections went back to the early 90’s when he traveled to afghanistan to train in their camps after fighting in nagorno-karabakh. (2004) the original transnationalization of the chechen networks, then, originated in the context of an internal war, as many chechen fighters were sent to afghanistan to train in al qaeda’s camps, subsequently to return to the frontlines in chechnya. according to counterterrorism analyst dan darling, “several hundred additional chechens were trained in afghanistan during the republic's period of de facto independence from russia.” he also states that “a number of elite chechen fighters were also made members of bin laden's personal guard.” an unspecified number of chechen militants fought alongside the taliban and al qaeda against the northern alliance in afghanistan. this relationship went both ways as bin laden reportedly sent “several hundred members of al qaeda's elite brigade 055” to chechnya. (2004) even after the september 11th attacks and the subsequent invasion of afghanistan, basayev and khattab sent fighters to afghanistan to assist in the fight against american troops. (2004) role of the caucasus mujahideen by the turn of the millennium, the networks of north caucasus fighters were clearly established. before the attacks of september 11, 2001, north caucasian fighters were found in afghanistan, bosnia, tajikistan and elsewhere. however, their presence and role expanded greatly after the terrorist attacks and subsequent us invasion of afghanistan. chechens, specifically, were touted as especially good fighters. us special forces members speaking to abc about their battles with chechens on the afghan battlefield said that they were “a different breed” and that they “stood out for their ferocity and refusal to surrender.” (meek, 2014) as the conflict expanded and militants moved in neighboring pakistan, so did north caucasian fighters. after the us-led invasion of iraq in 2003 and jihadist forces loyal to al qaeda began to fight against us troops, north caucasians were also spotted in combat there, although the identity of the official representative of the caucasus mujahideen in iraq was never known (if this position even existed). ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 15 elsewhere around the world, chechen fighters have been found on the battlefield with other al qaeda branches. for example, in 2014 a chechen fighter was killed in a large-scale yemeni military raid on militants in aqap. the fighter was identified as abu islam al shishani (the chechen) and as a commander for the al qaeda branch. (the national, 2014) according to yemeni and saudi intelligence officials, shishani was a veteran of the jihad in chechnya with the caucasus emirate. his high rank within aqap would also imply he had a similar role within the emirate, before migrating to yemen. his case also represents how close the caucasus emirate was to the al qaeda network, as he represents sharing of fighters and resources. in the world’s most dangerous place: inside the outlaw state of somalia by british journalist james fergusson, a chechen fighter was even found on the battlefield in mogadishu, somalia. fergusson writes, “the best al shabaab marksman was said to be a chechen, a veteran of the iraq war, who had shot so many people with his trademark dragunov rifle that the medics at the amisom [african union mission to somalia] field hospital had learned to recognize his handiwork.” (fergusson, 2013) it should be noted that with this case, it is not known if this sniper had any prior experience in the north caucasus. however, it is likely he did fight with al qaeda in iraq during his time there. since the time of ibn khattab and shamil basayev in the 1990s, sending fighters to afghanistan to assist ubl and al qaeda in the fight there, the transformation of the jihadist networks in the north caucasus, specifically in chechnya, appears to have been both a case of ideological and personal affinity. the local groups in the north caucasus most certainly transformed due to the ideology being espoused by al qaeda there, but at the time, personal connections with al qaeda leaders, such as zawahiri, khattab, and ubl, appear to have also played a role. even after the deaths of several of these leaders and commanders in both the global al qaeda hierarchy and in the local north caucasian groups, these personal connections have continued to be important to present day. i find that without the mixture of both ideological and personal affinities, this would likely not be the case. the relationship between al qaeda and the north caucasus, especially with the caucasus emirate and its predecessors, cannot be understated. gordon hahn, an esteemed scholar on this relationship, has noted that a declassified defense intelligence agency document shows “not just khattab’s deep involvement but also that of aq and osama bin laden personally with the ce’s predecessor organization...in the mid 1990’s.” (hahn, 2011). he continues by saying that “several times in 1997 in afghanistan bin laden met with representatives of chechen and dagestani wahhabites from gudermes, grozny, and karamakhi.” (2011) hahn also notes the fundraising activities of aq for north caucasian jihadists. for instance, saif al islam al masri, a top aq member in the 1990s, was based in chechnya and then later ingushetia and georgia. (2011) these ties certainly help explain the transformation of the local groups in the north caucasus into transnational organizations. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss north caucasians in syria the best and most detailed example of north caucasian fighters operating outside of the north caucasus is in the syrian civil war (scw). the scw has seen a significant migration of fighters from the caucasus since the war began in 2011. the exact numbers are unknown, but the numbers are estimated to be in the low thousands. russian security sources have speculated this number to be anywhere from 3,000 to 5,000 by the end of 2015 (war monitor, 2017). in many respects, north caucasian fighters, especially chechens, have played a significant role in the fighting in syria. numerous fighters within these groups has experience with the jihad in the north caucasus, however, only the leadership of these groups can be profiled. my research indicates that most north caucasian leaders in syria had prior experience alongside either the caucasus emirate or al qaeda-linked individuals in the caucasus. north caucasians, specifically chechens, first began appearing in syria in late 2011. however, in late to mid 2012, these individuals began playing a much larger role in the insurgency. the first major group to form was kata’ib muhajireen, or the muhajireen brigades (km) sometime in mid-2012. km was led by abu omar al shishani, an ethnic kist, a chechen subethnos that primarily live in the pankisi gorge in georgia. in october 2012, km participated in a battle in which it, alongside the al nusrah front (the name of al qaeda’s branch in syria at the time), captured a syrian air-defense base in aleppo province. (roggio, 2012) in december 2012, km and nusrah overran syria’s base 111 also in aleppo province (roggio, 2012). just two months later in february 2013, it helped overrun another military base in aleppo province, the 80th regiment base (roggio, 2013). a month later, km then merged with several local syrian groups to form jaysh al muhajireen wal ansar (army of the emigrants and helpers, jma). (roggio, 2013) omar shishani retained his leadership role, as did his deputy, sayfullah shishani. both men had prior military experience before joining the jihad in syria. however, the routes and reasons for both men were opposite of each other. omar shishani, whose real name was tarkhan batirashvili, was formerly a member of the georgian armed forces. batirashvili had participated in the 2008 russo-georgian war before being arrested in 2010 for smuggling weapons. (cullison, 2013) it is in prison where he became radicalized, after probably being exposed to jihadist inmates within the georgian prison system. being unable to travel to chechnya and reportedly having a brother already in syria, he traveled to the country in 2012 to join the jihad there. it is unclear if he joined up with his brother once in syria. as such, it appears ideological affinity had more of a role in his transformation than any personal connections. however, for sayfullah shishani, it is the opposite story. sayfullah, or ruslan machalikashvili, was an ethnic chechen who had taken part in the chechen wars alongside the jihadist insurgents. (paraszczuk, 2014) after that, he traveled to afghanistan where he fought alongside al qaeda and the taliban against the us-led forces there (2014). based on this information, it is likely that both ideological affinity, as well as personal ties established to al qaeda figures in chechnya and/or afghanistan, played a role in his decision to go to syria. in the ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 17 formation video for jma, a spokesman states that it numbered close to 1,000 fighters, which included an unspecified number from the caucasus emirate. (roggio, 2013) along with machalikashvili, these fighters were likely drawn to syria for the same two reasons. however, personal connections played an integral role within north caucasians in syria once infighting broke out between a pro-al qaeda faction led by sayfullah shishani and a pro-islamic state faction led by abu omar shishani. in spring 2013, omar shishani pledged allegiance to the islamic state (then known as the islamic state in iraq and syria, isis) on behalf of the entirety of jma. by may 2013, omar had been appointed by isis as its leader for northern syria, as well as the leader of its north caucasian fighters. (us state department, 2014) several hundred fighters under omar defected from al qaeda’s sphere in syria to isis; however, not all of them were content with this decision. sayfullah, who until this point was still omar’s deputy, rejected this pledge of allegiance and returned back to al qaeda’s fold with several hundred of his own fighters. those who decided to stay with either omar or sayfullah did so due to personal connections between the individuals. since then several north caucasian islamic state groups have formed around omar shishani. this includes the dagestani-uzbek sabri’s jamaat (youtube, 2014) which also existed prior to the feud, abu hanif’s jamaat, another dagestani group that existed prior to the feud. (paraszczuk, 2014) the latter was formerly had ties to al qaeda’s operations in syria, and abu hanif had presumably militant activities in russia before moving to syria. (paraszczuk, 2015) groups comprised of ethnic azeris also exist on both sides of the jihadist divide in syria. many azeris (also called azerbaijanis) were members of jma under omar shishani. as such, many left with him to join the islamic state. (north caucasus caucus, 2014) others stayed within al qaeda’s orbit in syria; however, it appears more azeri jihadists are with the islamic state inside syria. indeed, the islamic state has advertised its azeri fighters in the past. (youtube, 2014) while it is unclear just how many are fighting for either is or aq in syria, azerbaijani officials have said that at least 900 of its citizens are fighting in either iraq or syria. (apa, 2017) the feud between pro-al qaeda and pro-islamic state north caucasians continued and in some degree has continued to present day. this feud has oftentimes been bloody, as seen in the vicious rebel infighting in 2013-2014, but it has also manifested itself in ideological battles. proaq and pro-is north caucasians ultimately have the same ideology, as aq and is do not really differ in that respect, however, the disagreement, like the wider infighting between aq and is, boils down to different methodology. in al qaeda’s criticisms of the islamic state, a common trope is that the foundation of the caliphate is illegitimate because is did not achieve a consensus among the muslim community before declaring itself a caliphate. aq has also criticized is for its brutality. pro-aq chechen commanders, such as muslim shishani in syria, have echoed this sentiment. (paraszczuk, 2014) on the pro-is side, supporters say that aq is not tough enough against the “enemies of islam.” pro-is chechen fighters have also accused pro-aq chechen fighters of putting nationalism “over allah.” (paraszczuk, 2014) transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss sayfullah formed his own group with the fighters who left omar shishani with him and quickly pledged allegiance to the al nusrah front. he was eventually killed fighting for control of aleppo’s central prison in february 2014. additionally, jma continued to operate under a new leader, salahuddin shishani and his deputy, abdul karim al krymsky. salahuddin claimed to be the official representative of the caucasus emirate in syria, as such, this made jma the official branch of the caucasus emirate in syria and continued to be the largest north caucasian group in syria outside of the islamic state’s north caucasian contingent. salahuddin, like sayfullah shishani, also had experience in fighting in the north caucasus. according to from chechnya to syria, a website that tracks russian-speaking militants in syria, salahuddin fought under ruslan gelayev in abkhazia in the republic of georgia and in chechnya. (paraszczuk, 2015) salahuddin continued to be the leader of jma until june 2015 when he and krymsky were removed from their leadership positions within the group. jma replaced salahuddin with a tajik commander, reportedly a veteran of the afghanistan jihad, while salahuddin went on to form a new group with members of jma who left with him. jma has since joined al qaeda in syria, however, this will be discussed in greater detail later. this new group formed in july 2015 and aptly began calling itself the caucasus emirate in syria (iks for its chechen acronym). (roggio, 2015) salahuddin pledged allegiance to the then caucasus emirate leader, abu usman gimrinski. in subsequent videos and pictures released by the group, members can be seen wearing caucasus emirate tee shirts and sporting the logo elsewhere. while this practice of sporting caucasus emirate branded clothing or stickers was not exclusive to those north caucasians in iks --indeed almost every group that contained north caucasians had seen this phenomenon1 -those in iks seemed to have a made a point of it. this was likely due to the need to establish the connection between it and the mother branch in chechnya and dagestan, as it claimed to be the official branch in syria. salahuddin and his new deputy leader, khayrullah shishani, another chechen with assumed fighting experience in the north caucasus, would eventually be removed from this post, as well, and went on to form another outfit. however, this new group, jaysh usrah, while chechen-led, was thought to be small and its current status is unknown. iks is believed to still be active; however, after the fall of aleppo in december 2016, it has been relatively quiet on the social media front. but in february 2017, a branch of the parent caucasus emirate, vilayat kabarda, balkaria, and karachay (kbk), released a video from syria (weiss, 2017). the video featured a handful of fighters from vilayat kbk fighting in syria’s northwestern province of idlib. the flag of iks was flown, which is likely the group that these vilayat kbk members fight under inside syria. the video was produced by islamdin, which is a caucasus-based media outlet affiliated to vilayat kbk. this is significant as it shows that the caucasus emirate in the north caucasus is sending, and openly advertising, its members to partake in the jihad in syria. additionally, it definitively shows that iks is being treated as the 1 http://imgur.com/gallery/mi85a ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 19 official syrian branch of the caucasus emirate. it should be noted here that with russian counterterrorism operations in the north caucasus virtually leaving the caucasus emirate decimated in the region, migration to another theater would be a logical step for the group to take in order to maintain group survival. yet another group is ajnad kavkaz, or the soldiers of the caucasus (ak), which is led by abdul hakim shishani and his deputy hamza shishani. both of these individuals had long careers in the jihad in the north caucasus. abdul hakim fought under rustam basayev, a cousin of shamil basayev and close friend to dokka umarov. (paraszczuk, 2014) abdul hakim has also been linked to a close associate of ibn khattab (paraszczuk, 2015). at some point in his career, abdul hakim was promoted to the leader of the caucasus emirate’s central sector in chechnya. (paraszczuk, 2016) another cousin of shamil basayev, abu bakr basayev, who was a well known figure in jihadist circles, held the position prior to his death. (jawa report, 2007) as for hamza, he joined the jihad in dagestan in 2004, according to from chechnya to syria. he and his group eventually found their way to chechnya, where he took part in the fighting as part of the caucasus emirate’s eastern sector. (paraszczuk, 2016) ajnad kavkaz began as a group within the larger ansar sham rebel group based in syria’s latakia province. ansar sham, which has since joined al qaeda’s venture in syria (zelin, 2017), was predominantly syrian. however, its military leader and a small contingent were chechen. abu musa shishani, the military leader, is also assumed to have had fighting experience with the caucasus emirate before migrating to syria (paraszczuk, 2014). abdul hakim and hamza broke away from ansar sham in mid to late 2014 and formed the khalifat jamaat. (paraszczuk, 2014) in early to mid 2015, it began calling itself ajnad kavkaz. this is also after a small group comprised of ethnic circassians in syria pledged allegiance to abdul hakim. (tamimi, 2014) the jihadist group has since played an integral role in the fighting in idlib and latakia provinces. as other north caucasian groups have disbanded or merged into other groups, ak has became the largest independent north caucasian group in syria. as such, it releases propaganda in both russian and arabic. before this, however, one of the more influential chechen commanders in syria was muslim shishani. muslim, whose real name is murad margoshvili, is an ethnic kist from the pankisi gorge in georgia who led the group junud al sham (soldiers of the levant, jas). he was a member of the soviet military and was deployed to moldova until the collapse of the soviet union. afterwards, he joined the jihad in chechnya and fought alongside ibn khattab, according to a video biography released by his group. (roggio, 2014) from chechnya to syria also reports that muslim was involved in at least one terrorist attack in russia before his arrest in 2003. (paraszczuk, 2014) after his release from prison, he formed a new fighting unit, according to the video biography, and pledged allegiance to dokka umarov. he joined the jihad in syria in 2012, quickly forming a group and taking part in battles. in 2014, he was one of the main leaders in the al anfal offensive in northwestern syria. this offensive, which was largely led by al qaeda-linked forces, saw a large portion of northern latakia province overran by rebel forces. (wikipedia) prior to that, jas had taken part in several transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss other battles with al qaeda’s forces in syria. this led to the us state department designating muslim shishani a global terrorist in september 2014. (roggio, 2014) this did not stop muslim, however, has he continued to fight alongside al qaeda in syria. this includes the spring 2015 offensive in which aq-linked forces captured the entirety of idlib province. (weiss, 2015) muslim’s role within the al qaeda network has also been celebrated by other aq branches. in july 2015, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula released an arabic-language video dedicated to chechen fighters2. in this video, muslim shishani was clearly featured in several parts. it is unlikely that was a coincidence, as muslim’s popularity in syria had already peaked. in addition to muslim, his deputy, abu bakr shishani, also had a long history of fighting in the north caucasus. from chechnya to syria reports that abu bakr has been fighting since at least 1999, when he took part in the al qaeda-led invasion of dagestan. (paraszczuk, 2016) after that details are scarce, but it is reported that like muslim, abu bakr also fought under khattab. another deputy of muslim is abu turab al shishani. while it is assumed that abu turab also has fighting experience in the north caucasus, there is very little publicly available information to confirm this. (steinberg, 2016) like ajnad kavkaz, junud al sham also released propaganda in russian and arabic. it also released some propaganda in german, indicating recruitment of chechen diaspora in germany and austria3. several other smaller north caucasian and russian-speaking groups exist or have existed in syria. one group is the crimean jamaat, which included north caucasians, tatars from both crimea and tatarstan in russia, and tajiks. the group was led by an individual who went by the moniker ramadan, who was formerly a member of jma. the crimean jamaat pledged allegiance to al qaeda in syria in october 2015. (weiss, 2015) there is also tarkhan’s jamaat, a small chechen group that began in chechnya but migrated to syria. it is led by the eponymous tarkhan, but he is based in chechnya not syria. all of the fighters in the group are thought to have fought in the north caucasus before in syria. it has also released videos showing it fighting alongside other chechen groups and al qaeda’s forces in northwestern syria. a small group, ansar al sharia, is another chechen group which operates in latakia province. however, it has pledged allegiance to the islamic state as its leader, abu bara al shishani, was close to abu omar shishani. before this, abu bara led another chechen group, jamaat ahadun ahad. lastly, there is also the nogai jamaat. this group, which is likely only a few dozen ethnic nogais from dagestan, only began advertising itself in syria late last year. a nogai jamaat has also existed within the caucasus emirate in the north caucasus. the group fought with ibn khattab, al qaeda’s first official representative in the caucasus, and shamil basayev in the conflict in chechnya in the early 2000’s before merging with others to form the caucasus emirate, according to the jamestown foundation. (vatchagaev, 2007) the nogai jamaat was also linked by russian authorities to the 2011 suicide attack at the domodedovo airport in 2 from an aqap video released july 2015 saved to personal archive. has since been taken down from youtube 3 videos released in 2014 on youtube and saved to personal archive. videos since taken down. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 21 moscow. (b92, 2011) it is unclear if this is the same group, however, it remains a distinct possibility. (weiss, 2017) in addition to these “independent” groups (independent in the sense that they operate outside of the official al qaeda hierarchy in syria even though they are still connected to the network), there are various north caucasian subgroups within al qaeda’s official branch in syria. this includes sayfullah shishani’s jamaat, the group founded by and first led by sayfullah, jma, and the aforementioned crimean jamaat. after sayfullah shishani’s death, an ethnic uzbek, abu ubaydah al madani took over the helms. after jma, the crimean jamaat, and an uzbek group, katibat al tawhid wal jihad, pledged allegiance to the al nusrah front, the al qaeda branch merged the russian-speaking jihadists into one entity, liwa al muhajireen wal ansar (emigrants and helpers brigade, lma), with madani as its leader. madani now serves as a religious leader for lma and the larger al qaeda entity, now known as hay’at tahrir al sham (or the assembly for the liberation of syria, hts). north caucasians in afghanistan when the caucasus emirate was formed by dokka umarov, it had an official representative and branch in afghanistan. however, this was not made public until 2014 -after umarov’s death. in early 2014, a video entitled “mujahideen of the islamic emirate of the caucasus on the territory of khorasan [afghanistan],” was released on jihadist forums and social media. the video featured a figure identified as commander abdullah, who was described as the emirate’s representative and emir in the afghanistan-pakistan (afpak) region. (north caucasus caucus, 2014) the commander reportedly invoked the ideology of the global jihad for why the caucasus emirate has a branch inside afpak. while it is not known when those north caucasians actually entered afghanistan, the video confirmed what many analysts hypothesized: that the caucasus emirate did indeed have a branch inside afpak. it should be noted here that it is unknown if this branch is still in existence. in an interview with mr. orange, an independent analyst who has focused on north caucasian fighters, he said that it “would be interesting if it still belongs to ce [caucasus emirate], seeing that the group is mostly extinct with a small group in syria and a number of retirees and refugees keeping the idea alive online4.” even if this branch is now defunct, it definitely appears that both ideological affinities and personal ties played a role in the formation of this branch. it appears it was ideological in that it was established to assist in the global jihad; at the same time, without the personal connections with dokka umarov and former al qaeda leaders in afghanistan, it may not have been formed there. chechens have also been reported fighting alongside both the afghan and pakistani taliban in afghanistan and pakistan. (roggio, 2013) in addition to those two groups, chechens have also been found with the islamic movement of uzbekistan and its offshoot the islamic 4 interview, february 2017. mr. orange is a pseudonym to protect his identity. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss jihad union. (meek, 2014) while many have doubted the presence of chechen fighters on the afghan battlefield, jihadist propaganda has sometimes shed light on this. alongside the actual caucasus emirate videos, the afghan taliban released a video in 2010 in which chechens can possibly be spotted throughout the video (roggio, 2010). in a conversation with thomas gibbons-neff, a reporter for the washington post and combat veteran in afghanistan, he also spoke of he and his comrades encountering chechens on the battlefield. “when we went into marjah [a town in helmand province] s2 [military slang for intelligence officers] said that chechens were advising the tb [taliban] on aa [anti-air] equipment,” gibbons-neff said in a conversation on twitter5. ethnic bashkirs and tatars from russia have also been found on the battlefield in afghanistan. the main group is junud al makhdi, which also operates in syria. the group was formed between a merger between the bulgar jamaat, which long operated in afghanistan, and another group inside syria. many members of this group, including its emir (leader), fought in the chechen wars alongside ibn khattab. it has only released a few pieces of propaganda, including its foundation video which was in russian and bashkir and then subsequently translated into arabic. the arabic-language transcript of the video is what this information is partly based from. azeris, like in syria, have also been found in afghanistan. it some cases, it appears that azeris who had fought in chechnya in the 1990’s, moved to afghanistan after 2001. this is the case for ebu omer, one of the leaders of azeri fighters in the country. (north caucasus caucus, 2014) little information exists about azeri fighters in afghanistan, but in 2014 it was reported that at least 40 azerbaijani citizens from one village left to fight in syria and afghanistan. (eurasianet, 2014) in 2012, pakistani authorities said they killed an azeri al qaeda operative in the tribal regions of pakistan. (roggio, 2012) jihadist media in afghanistan has sporadically highlighted the presence of azeris as well. in 2011, the pakistani taliban said it executed a turkish member for killing dagestani and azeri members of their group. (roggio, 2011) the three were involved with a group called taifatul mansura (the victorious sect), a foreign subgroup of the predominantly uzbek islamic jihad union. taifatul mansura was established in 2009 to accommodate foreigners from europe, specifically german and turkish fighters according to the long war journal. (2011) many azeris are thought to be within this group. as this shows, it appears that personal ties surrounding leadership plays an important role in the transformation of these groups. in addition, groups seem to coalesce under the same ethnic or linguistic composition. this is because keeping the same ethnicities or linguistic speakers in the same fighting unit helps with overall cohesiveness and cuts down on any potential infighting resulting from ethnic or linguistic divides. personal ties seem to frame the composition of groups within these networks. this is especially true for central asian jihadists. 5 conversation via direct messaging on twitter, august 15, 2016 ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 23 central asians central asian jihadists have played an important role in both afghanistan and syria. from both theaters, these central asian jihadists have threatened the entirety of central asia. suicide bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and clashes have all occurred throughout central asia since the late 1990’s. these attacks can be traced to jihadists who met and organized themselves in taliban-held afghanistan. in discussing the role of central asian movements and networks, it is important to denote what the term “central asian” means in this context. in this study, i will be looking at groups and individuals from the central asian countries of kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, turkmenistan, tajikistan, and uzbekistan. in addition, i will also look at uighurs, a turkic ethnic group (as are the majority of nationalities in most of central asia) from china’s northwestern xinjiang province. fighters from each of these demographics have been found in jihadist groups in both afghanistan and syria. that said, only the major groups, and the leadership, will be profiled in the research. this is because the major central asian jihadist groups have formed around only a select few ethnic groups, namely uzbeks and uighurs. as such, groups and individuals from these two ethnicities will receive the most attention. central asians in afghanistan central asian jihadists began fighting in afghanistan following the soviet invasion of afghanistan. several groups have also been formed inside afghanistan since the taliban’s rule dedicated to spreading to global jihad across central asia. this includes the uzbek group islamic movement of uzbekistan (imu), its splinter groups, and the chinese uighur turkistan islamic party (tip). while kyrgyz, turkmen, and kazakh fighters have been seen with these groups, no major jihadist group has formed around these ethnic lines. the imu, its splinter group islamic jihad union (iju), and the tip represent the biggest jihadist threats to central asia. in addition, a tajik jihadist outfit, jamaat ansarullah, also exists. all four are or were within the al qaeda network. the imu was formed in 1998 by tahir yuldashev and juma namangani, two uzbeks. yuldashev was a radical preacher who had converted namangani, a former soviet paratrooper into radical islam. (rashid, 2002) during the tajik civil war from 1992-1997, namangani fought alongside the islamists and became a military leader. in the same period, yuldashev was traveling the middle east, establishing connections, before moving to peshawar, pakistan, where he established ties with osama bin laden. (2002) after the tajik civil war and with seed money from bin laden and islamist charities in pakistan, the imu was formed. according to journalist and central asian expert ahmed rashid, the imu in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s contained primarily uzbeks from uzbekistan, as well as tajiks, kyrgyz, uighurs, and kazakhs. (2002) the group quickly became a strong ally of al qaeda and the taliban in afghanistan, engaging in battles against the northern alliance alongside the two. in addition, it began spreading across central asia, with bases in border regions in tajikistan and kyrgyzstan. with transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss material and financial support from bin laden, the imu launched a series of assaults in kyrgyzstan and uzbekistan in early 2000. (2002) it also kidnapped four us citizens, which subsequently led to the united states declaring the imu as a foreign terrorist organization. (us state department, 2002) after the us invasion of afghanistan and the beginnings of counterterror operations in central asia, the imu was forced to retreat to the tribal regions of pakistan. there the imu became more ingrained with al qaeda and also recruited more local fighters. yuldashev was placed on al qaeda’s top governing council, a position he held until his death in in 2009 by a us drone strike. (roggio, 2009) yuldashev had also replaced namangani as the overall leader of the imu, as the latter was killed in battles with the afghan northern alliance. imu fighters participated in suicide attacks in both afghanistan and pakistan on behalf of al qaeda and affiliated organizations, while more experienced fighters became bodyguards for senior al qaeda leaders. (roggio, 2011) this relationship with al qaeda continued as the civil war in syria escalated. according to us intelligence officials contacted by the long war journal, imu began recruiting uzbeks to send to syria to fight alongside al qaeda’s forces there. (2014) it should be noted that the imu did switch allegiance to the islamic state in 2015. (joscelyn, roggio, 2015) a splinter faction has emerged re-pledging allegiance to the taliban and al qaeda. (roggio, weiss, 2016) much like what was found with the north caucasians, both ideological affinity and the forging of personal connections appears to have been the reason for imu’s creation and transformation into a transnational entity that extends across central and south asia. in 2002, a splinter faction of imu emerged in uzbekistan. this group, the islamic jihad union (iju), essentially became an ethnic uzbek brigade of al qaeda according to bill roggio, a senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracies6. the iju, much like its parent organization, also operates throughout central asia while now being based in the afghanistanpakistan region. in addition, it has also recruited from the western world, attracting many german and american converts. (roggio, weiss, 2015) in fact, so many germans (both ethnic germans and turkish muslims resident in germany) have joined the group that some analysts have referred to the iju as the “german taliban7.” this recruitment of germans has also resulted in several terrorist plots inside germany, including a major plot foiled in 2007. (dw, 2008) despite the inclusion of many western fighters, specifically within the aforementioned taifatul mansura subgroup of the iju, the group is still largely a central asian entity. in various propaganda videos released in 2016 and early 2017, the iju detailed its foreign fighters (weiss, 2017). this included many fighters from tajikistan and kyrgyzstan. while the iju has not publicly stated its role in syria, it has also sent fighters there much like the imu. it has, however, 6 phone call with bill roggio, march 30, 2017 7 phone call with bill roggio, march 30, 2017 ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 25 hinted at this in a video released earlier this year in which iju commanders addressed “the brothers in syria8.” unlike the imu, however, the iju has shared little information about its leaders. this makes it difficult to determine what factors played a role in the iju’s transformation. based on the little information we have on the iju’s founder and first leader, najmiddin jalolov, both ideology and personal ties appear to have been instrumental. that said, personal connections might have played a slightly larger role. what we do know of jalolov, who was an ethnic uzbek, is that he was close to osama bin laden. (falkenburg, 2013) we also know that jalolov was the mastermind of a failed 2007 bomb plot in germany, as well as the mastermind of simultaneous terrorist attacks on israeli and us targets in tashkent, uzbekistan in 2004. (glasser, 2004) it is entirely plausible, therefore, that jalolov’s personal relationship with bin laden, and therefore the iju’s role in the al qaeda network, played a key role in this. another uzbek group, katibat imam al bukhari (also known as the imam bukhari jamaat, kib) also exists. kib mainly operates in afghanistan’s north alongside the islamic jihad union, al qaeda, and the taliban. however, not much is known about the group’s activity or leadership in afghanistan. according to bill roggio, intelligence officials he has spoken to have referred to kib as yet another splinter of the imu9. however, kib plays a large role inside syria and this will be discussed more in depth later. in terms of tajik fighters, one ethnic tajik group in afghanistan is known to exist. this group, jamaat ansarullah, is thought to be relatively small. tajik authorities have placed its numbers around 100. (bahrom, 2016) it was formed around 2010 in afghanistan and participated in battles alongside the taliban and al qaeda. afghan intelligence officials also report that it receives training from al qaeda (2016). it has also conducted at least one suicide bombing in tajikistan, as well as an ambush on tajik troops near the afghanistan border (2016). tajik authorities, as well as western security analysts, believe that jamaat ansarullah is a tajiksplinter of the imu (interfax, 2014). however, it appears that has remained aligned with al qaeda. this could be due to personal connections made by its leadership, but not much is known about its leadership’s history. jamaat ansarullah has also attempted to send fighters to syria, as will be discussed later. the last major central asian group in afghanistan is the turkistan islamic party (tip), an ethnic uighur jihadist group from xinjiang, china. the tip was formed in 1997 in talibancontrolled afghanistan. it was formed by hasan mahsum as primarily a uighur separatist movement with the goals of creating an islamic state in xinjiang. (stratfor, 2008) however, its role in afghanistan, and the connections formed in the conflict, transformed the group into a global jihadist movement. in jihadist propaganda, photos have been shared of mahsum meeting with al qaeda leaders ayman al zawahiri and bin laden sometime before the september 11 attacks. (weiss, 2017) tip members took part in battles alongside al qaeda and the taliban 8 iju video released in jan 2017; video removed 9 phone call with bill roggio, march 30, 2017 transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss against the northern alliance both before and after the us invasion of afghanistan. after the invasion and the relocation to pakistan, the tip became even closer to al qaeda. it continues to fight alongside al qaeda’s forces in both afghanistan and pakistan and has even conducted suicide bombings on behalf of aq. according to the long war journal, at least two tip leaders have also been dual-hatted al qaeda leaders. the tip’s current leader, abdul haq al turkistani, has sat on al qaeda’s main governing council since 2005. (roggio, 2015) in addition, its former leader, abdul shakoor al turkistani, was also the overall leader of al qaeda in pakistan until his death in 2012. (roggio, 2012) since the relocation to pakistan, the tip has claimed several attacks in china. (martina, rajagopalan, 2014) some researchers have doubted if the tip actually exists in china and have stated that china has made up this threat to say it is fighting its own war on terror. (roberts, 2012) however, i disagree with this assessment. while china does exaggerate the capabilities of the tip in china, it appears that the group does indeed exist in the country based on its own propaganda. while the propaganda also expands the group’s capabilities, it does prove that they do indeed operate in xinjiang. in several videos released since 2015, clips of members ramming their vehicles into crowded places have been released in official media. in addition, in some videos for claims of attacks in china, it has shown the alleged bombs being manufactured in pakistan. while it could be possible that the bombs in the videos are not the same used in the actual attacks, in at least one instance the bomb matched the description of the bomb used in the attack. (martina, rajagopalan, 2014) regardless of if the tip actually does exist inside china, we do know that it does operate in central asia, especially among the uighur population in kyrgyzstan. (putz, 2016) this was, of course, the scene of the terrorist attack perpetrated by uzbeks and the tip mentioned in the beginning of this paper. while the tip has been active in afghanistan since its founding, it has since became a major player inside syria. much like the iju, i find that both ideology and personal connections play a role; however, it appears that personal connections forged between hasan mahsum and al qaeda in the early days of its history seem to have been the instrumental factor. central asians in syria like the north caucasians, central asians have played an integral part in the civil war in syria starting around 2012 and 2013. most central asians at these early stages joined exsiting groups, such as jma as these group were also russian speaking, allowing easier communication. however, these individuals eventually coalesced into ethnic brigades of either al qaeda or the islamic state. within the latter group, entire units based around one ethnic group have been advertised since late 2013. tajik, kazakh, kyrgyz, and uighur units have all been profiled in the past. in addition, the successor of abu omar al shishani as the leader of is’ military leader for northern syria is an ethnic tajik. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 27 gulmurod khalimov made headlines last year when he was reported to be the successor to shishani. this was in part due to khalimov’s former life as a police officer, with extensive us training, in his native tajikistan. (kramer, 2016) tajik fighters, likely under khalimov’s leadership, have become one of the top providers of suicide bombers for is. according to one study from december 2015 to november 2016, tajik fighters were involved in at least 27 suicide attacks. (pravda, 2017) this is quite a significant number as only 412 tajik nationals, many of them with is, were thought to be fighting in syria in 2015. (abdulloyeva, 2015) kyrgyz and uighur islamic state members are also present in the low hundreds. for kyrgyz, this number is around 600. (rfe/rl, 2016) however, it is not known how many of the 600 are with is or aq groups. kyrgyz officials have also stated that around 80 percent of kyrgyz nationals in syria are ethnic uzbeks, the main ethnic minority in kyrgyzstan. (paraszczuk, 2015) as for uighurs, chinese authorities have estimated around 100 to 200 are fighting for the islamic state. (allen-ebrahimian, 2016) is has attempted to make the uighurs appear to be a large ethnic group within its ranks; however, based on over two years of research and tracking i have done on uighurs in syria, the overwhelming majority are with the tip in syria. the numbers of kazakh fighters with the islamic state are unclear, but the jihadist group has profiled kazakhs, especially kazakh children, in several videos in the past. (standish, 2015) all of these groups have been found on the other side of the jihadist spectrum in syria. the aforementioned jma’s second overall leader was a tajik. other tajiks have been found in the crimean jamaat and lma. kyrgyz and kazakhs have also been eulogized and profiled by jma. uzbeks and uighurs appear to be present in much larger numbers in aq groups in syria. several units have formed around these two ethnic groups. this includes two groups that originated in afghanistan, katibat imam al bukhari and the turkistan islamic party. two other uzbek groups exist within al qaeda’s network in syria -both of which also have ties to afghanistan. katibat al tawhid wal jihad (ktj) is an ethnic uzbek brigade in hts. before this, it was a brigade within prior incarnations of al qaeda in syria and an independent unit. it is led by abu saloh, an ethnic uzbek kyrgyz citizen. it has fought with various al qaeda-linked jihadist groups in northwestern syria. (weiss, 2015) ktj is thought to be one of the units that the imu has recruited for in the past. its numbers are unknown, but it is almost exclusively an uzbek group based on my research. katibat imam al bukhari, while also operating in afghanistan, has a much larger presence on the battlefield in syria. kib in syria is led by a veteran of the jihad in afghanistan, one shaykh salahadin al uzbeki. salahadin, who has loyalty to the afghan taliban, has claimed in the past that members of the taliban, including sirajuddin haqqani, a dual-hatted taliban and al qaeda leader, sent him and his unit to syria. (paraszczuk, 2014) if true, this makes this transformation highly dependent on personal connections. based on my research into the group, it is also likely that many other members of the unit previously fought in afghanistan. like ktj, katibat imam al bukhari is also thought to have been a beneficiary of imu recruiting. the last uzbek group to be profiled is ansar jihad, a relatively new jihadist group in syria. transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss it is likely a subunit of al qaeda’s main branch in syria, but it is largely an uzbek group. it likely contains other central asian groups, but its propaganda is almost exclusively produced in the uzbek language (and also some turkish, indicating some turkish presence in the unit). its former military leader, abu omar al turkistani, however was an ethnic uighur. abu omar had formerly fought in afghanistan in 2001 with bin laden at tora bora before being captured in pakistan. (weiss, 2017) after he was released, he quickly rejoined with the iju in afghanistan. (2017) abu omar was killed in a us drone strike in northern syria in early 2017. he was killed alongside a senior al qaeda leader, indicating abu omar’s status in syria and within the network. (2017) while abu omar was a uighur within ansar jihad, by far most uighurs in syria fight alongside the turkistan islamic party. based on videos and interviews online of the group’s commanders, the tip claims to have been inside syria since 2012. if so, this would make them one of the earliest groups based in afghanistan to start sending fighters to syria, if not the first. since 2014, however, it has taken a much larger role in the insurgency. based on my tracking of the group for over two years, it has conducted at least 12 suicide bombings in support of al qaeda and other rebel groups. it has taken part in the capture of several strategic locations in the northwest and helped take over idlib province. (weiss, 2015) i have also documented over 125 killed fighters it has eulogized in its media. given its large area of operations in northwest syria and the number of killed fighters, its numbers are likely in the low thousands. local syrians living in jisr al shughur, idlib, believed to be the hub for the tip in syria, and israeli officials have confirmed this estimate. (ahlulbayt, 2017) based on its afghanistan-based parent branch, the ties formed in the 1990’s with al qaeda leaders is definitely a major reason why the tip plays such a large role inside syria today. prominent jihadist figures from central and asia and the north caucasus: summary statistics based on the research done for this thesis, i created a database biographical material on 47 major north caucasian and central asian leaders or prominent members of jihadist groups in syria and afghanistan. these leaders are prominent enough to allow for the compilation of biographical material. (note: due to the social media and media attention in and to syria, leaders and commanders in syria are perhaps overrepresented in the data). i have included kunyas, real names, country of origin, ethnicity, group affiliation, prior group affiliation, and current status. i have also denoted the personal relationships of these individuals to the best of my ability. some information could not be found; this too is denoted within the charts. in the charts below, i use this database to capture some of the characteristics of the identifiable leaders. ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 29 transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 31 this data reinforces some of the earlier findings. most importantly, almost 70% of these fighters have identifiable personal ties to key jihadist leaders. this adds weight to the hypothesis that personal ties are the most instrumental factor in the transformation of local groups into transnational entities. some leaders or figures have lost social media contact or have otherwise lessened their presence. the statuses of others were unable to be found. conclusion what i have found is that most north caucasian commanders in syria and afghanistan had prior experience in the north caucasus. the overwhelming majority were formerly affiliated with either the caucasus emirate or al qaeda-linked fighters in the north caucasus and fed into their networks. as for the few central asians profiled, they were mainly located in syria and most had prior experience with groups in afghanistan. this gives credence to my hypothesis that personal ties has a prominent role in the transformation of local movements into transnational organizations. however, i find that ideology must play a role in this or these individuals would not have joined these groups in the first place. in addition, groups would not have become transnational organizations without first believing in the ideology of global jihadism. conversely, personal ties may have precipitated the conversion to the islamicist cause. it is thus impossible to find out definitively if either plays a larger role than the other without actually talking to these individuals and groups. short of doing that, looking at the backgrounds and history that these groups have allowed the outside to see is still a good way of determining this information. while the ideology is important, it appears from this research that personal ties play a much more critical role. many of the commanders and fighters profiled, in fact around 28%, had fought with ibn khattab or dokka umarov in the past. from the time that transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss the syrian conflict started, for example, this was over a decade later. if personal ties to individuals within al qaeda were not important, they would not have continued to play an integral role that many years later. looking at the imu as an example, the ties that tohir yuldashev formed in the early 1990’s with bin laden continued to play a critical role in the organization way beyond yuldashev’s own death. as bill roggio explained to me, “the importance of shared personal ties cannot be underestimated10.” he elaborated that “the clandestine nature of these groups (for example, al qaeda and central asian or middle eastern groups) dictates that close relationships must be maintained to ensure both trust and a chain of command. senior leaders, commanders, and operatives have forged close ties on numerous jihadist battlefields over the past four decades (afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, syria, somalia, libya, mali, egypt, algeria, etc.). these relationships have allowed the groups to fight side-by-side over extended periods of time, and has elevated the local groups to global status.” personal ties also seem to make a difference in determining which side of the jihadist spectrum a group a group joins. for example, abu omar shishani had no prior relationship to an individual within the al qaeda network. on the flipside, sayfullah shishani did have extensive ties to individuals in the north caucasus affiliated with al qaeda. the former defected to the islamic state, while the latter stayed loyal to the aq network. more research needs to be done into all facets of this study, especially on the ideology side. this is a much more complicated task if based only on open-source information and would require direct communication with these individuals or groups. talking to terrorists, while sometimes beneficial, is not something i am keen on doing. that said, more information in this aspect would definitely help in understanding what definitively plays more of an instrumental role in the transformation of local jihadists movements into transnational organizations. 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kyle: “how russia manipulates islamic terrorism.” kyle orton. september 8, 2015 paraszczuk, joanna: “more detailed information and interview with newly-formed tatar group junud al makhdi whose amir trained in north caucasus with khattab.” from ijois spring 2017, volume iii program in arms control & domestic and international security 35 chechnya to syria. july 3, 2016 paraszczuk, joanna: “sayfullah shishani: ‘fought in chechnya, afghanistan.” from chechnya to syria. june 20, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “syria: notes on a dagestani-led group in islamic state of iraq.” ea worldview. february 25, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “daghestan resident suspected of fighting with is in syria.” radio free europe/radio liberty. february 10, 2015 paraszczuk, joanna: “muslim abu walid shishani on the fitna in syria.” from chechnya to syria. july 4, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “isis north caucasians: muslim shishani raises chechen flag above that of allah.” from chechnya to syria. july 11, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “salakhuddin shishani fought under gelayev & in abkhazia.” from chechnya to syria. may 27, 2015 paraszczuk, joanna: “a little more about abdul hakim shishani, emir of khalifat jamaat.” from chechnya to syria. november 23, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “abdul hakim shishani, emir of ajnad kavkaz, linked to khattab.” from chechnya to syria. april 4, 2015 paraszczuk, joanna: “ajnad al kavkaz amir abdul hakim shishani was amir of central sector in chechnya.” from chechnya to syria. january 4, 2016 paraszczuk, joanna: “a more detailed biography of khamza shishani of ajnad al kavkaz.” from chechnya to syria. january 7, 2016 paraszczuk, joanna: “syria: abu musa shishani, military leader of ansar a-sham.” from chechnya to syria. april 6, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “chechen faction khalifat jamaat splits from ansar a-sham in latakia.” from chechnya to syria. october 6, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “updated: muslim shishani accused of links to 2003 north ossetia terror attacks.” from chechnya to syria. august 3, 2014 paraszczuk, joanna: “abu bakr shishani now fighting alongside ajnad al kavkaz in latakia.” from chechnya to syria. february 9, 2016 paraszczuk, joanna: “kyrgyz official blames minority uzbeks for syria presence.” radio free europe/radio liberty. march 27, 2015 paraszczuk, joanna: “main uzbek militant faction in syria swears loyalty to taliban.” radio free europe/radio liberty. november 12, 2014 pravda: “tajikistan: source of suicide bombers for islamic state.” pravda. march 29, 2017 putz, catherine: “criminal gangs selling fake kyrgyz passports to china's uyghurs.” the diplomat, august 17, 2016 qutb, sayyid, milestones. 1964. pg 63-69 rashid, ahmed: “they’re only sleeping.”new yorker january 14, 2002 rfe/rl: “kyrgyz official: 600 nationals fighting in syria, iraq.” radio free europe/radio transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss liberty. august 3, 2016 richardson, r dan, “foreign fighters in spanish militias: the spanish civil war 1936-1939.” (military affairs, feb 1, 1976) roberts, sean: “imaginary terrorism? the global war on terror and the narrative of the uyghur terrorist threat.” george washington university. march 22, 2012 roggio, bill: “al nusrah front commanded free syrian army unit, ‘chechen emigrants,’ in assault on syrian air defense base.” the long war journal. october 19, 2012 roggio, bill: “al nusrah front, foreign jihadists seize key syrian base in aleppo.” the long war journal. december 10, 2012 roggio, bill: “al nusrah front, foreign jihadists overrun another syrian military base.” the long war journal. february 13, 2013 roggio, bill: “chechen commander forms ‘army of emigrants,’ integrates syrian groups.” the long war journal. march 28, 2013 roggio, bill: “chechen commander in syria pledges to islamic caucasus emirate.” the long war journal. july 10, 2015 roggio, bill: “state department adds chechen, moroccan-led jihadist groups to terrorist list.” the long war 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journal. february 8, 2017 weiss, caleb: “turkistan islamic party in syria fighting alongside junud al sham in idlib.” the long war journal. april 23, 2015 weiss, caleb: “crimean jamaat reportedly pledges allegiance to al nusrah front.” the long war journal. october 3, 2015 weiss, caleb: “north caucasian group highlights training in syria.” the long war journal. march 28, 2017 weiss, caleb: “an update on katibat al tawhid wal jihad.” the line of steel. july 2, 2015 weiss, caleb: “uighur jihadist fought in afghanistan, killed in syria.” the long war journal. february 14, 2017 weiss, caleb: “turkistan islamic party had significant role in recent idlib offensive.” the long war journal. april 30, 2015 weiss, caleb. twitter. 15 feb 2017 weiss, caleb. twitter. 12 jan 2017 transformative networks: the case of north caucasian and central asian jihadist networks caleb weiss wright, lawrence, the looming tower: al qaeda and the road to 9/11, random house 2006. united states government. national 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west. because of this, and features of their state such as promotion of democratic values, the united states should actively support an independent kurdistan from a minimum of the territory held in iraq to as large as the total territory which could have been gained under the referendum promised in the treaty of sevres. this paper examines first the historic background since 1921 which has led to how the situation currently stands. next, it examines the aspects of an independent kurdistan which would be beneficial to the united states and western society at large. these are shown through the political and economic work that has been undertaken in kurdish territory in northern iraq. finally, it is worth considering possible issues behind support of such a policy for the united states and thus the major issues are laid out for consideration. while no decision has been made, there is certainly room for movement, especially with the election of a new biden administration. when discussing improving relations with united states allies, it bears considering a shift in view of the middle east to bring the kurds into the fold of close u.s. allies. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 28 the area that would make up an independent state of kurdistan lays across four countries: turkey, iraq, iran, and syria. today, there are approximately 30 million kurds throughout the world (the kurdish project) with many of them living outside of this area. because of this, the kurds are one of the largest, stateless, ethnic groups in the world. the united states should support an independent kurdistan despite the opposition from other countries in the region due to the economic, security, and strategic benefits which could be gained subsequently. kurdistan’s benefit as an economic partner is primarily based in the energy sector with their large oil reserves. they are currently renovating their economy away from one that is oil-based to one that includes an emerging private sector and use of the vast quantities of arable land, which was overtaken by saddam hussein’s urbanization project. on the security front, the kurds have fought alongside the syrian democratic forces (sdf) and have been a vital ally in the defeat of the islamic state in iraq and the levant (isil) because of the territory they have held and the support they have provided. they were the first ethnic group to react and fight against isil and were a necessary partner. finally, the kurds can help the united states reach its strategic goals of promoting democratic goals and norms throughout the region both by example and as a close ally of israel. the kurds have also shown their ability to do this through a history of following democratic norms and promoting diversity within their own territory. history of kurdistan from the end of wwi present following world war i and the defeat of the ottoman empire, the treaty of sevres was negotiated to split up the middle east (sansal). in this treaty, the kurds were promised a referendum to determine whether or not to create an independent kurdistan under the british sphere of influence. however, three years later nationalists overthrew the sultan of turkey. the new turkish government did not recognize the treaty of sevres and renegotiated it to become the treaty of lausanne in 1923 which denied a kurdish homeland. despite the setback in efforts to create a kurdish state, resistance groups attempted to make progress. general mullah mustafa barzani led most of these revolutionary attempts until his death in 1979. his first attempt was in 1943 when he attempted to fight the iraqi government with a small force. after this failed, in 1945 he fled to the kurdish mahabad republic in iran. in large part due to support from the ussr, the kurds were able to successfully fight the iraqi government. in the end, support was receded from the kurds and the iranian government attacked barzani and his forces, ending this stage of resistance. barzani returned to iraq in 1958 when the free officers, an underground military organization, overthrew the monarchy and established a new government that recognized kurdish national rights. despite this, the kdp, or kurdistan democratic party, now led by barzani, staged a revolt against the new government in 1961 with the assistance of local tribal groups. the government eventually put down the revolt and dissolved the kdp, but offered an autonomy agreement in 1970. this agreement was not seen as providing enough authority to the kdp, and ultimately resulted in a final failed revolt by general barzani. in this revolt, the united states provided weapons to the kurds in hope that they would defeat iraq, but would not take an official stance (smith). in 1975, the us broke off all support for the kurdish rebels after the algiers agreement between iraq and iran because they did not view iraq to be as large of a threat. thus, the iraqi army pushed the kurds back and the united states allowed general barzani to live out his final days in the u.s. in the 1980’s, the kdp and another kurdish rebel groups, called the patriotic union of kurdistan (puk), came together with iran to fight against iraq and saddam hussein. as the war ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 29 with iran came to a conclusion, saddam sent his brother, along with the iraqi military, to put down any semblance of resistance. his brother, ali hassan al–majid, proceeded to use chemical weapons on both rebel targets and civilian towns. between chemical weapon attacks and other humanitarian atrocities, it was believed that up to 90% of all kurdish villages were destroyed (johns, 2006) in the anfal campaign, or anfal genocide. in 1990, president george hw bush called upon iraqis to help throw saddam out of power. after operation desert storm and with saddam still being in office, he began to take revenge on the kurds who had helped the united states. in response to the defeat of saddam hussein by the united states and allied forces, the kurds began an insurgency attempt in 1991. saddam hussein proceeded to use chemical weapons (air force historical support division, 2012) to suppress the insurgency. as a consequence of the burgeoning humanitarian crisis, the united states instituted a no-fly zone in northern iraq. this was led by the united states, united kingdom, and france to prevent another genocide like the one that occurred in anfal in 1988. this allowed the kurds to take over large swaths of territory, establish an autonomous region, form the kurdistan regional government (krg). the krg is a power sharing agreement between the puk and kdp, but the peace did not last long and a civil war erupted from 1994-1998. the u.s. invaded iraq five years after the conclusion of the civil war in 2003 and the kurds assisted in overthrowing saddam hussein. following the overthrow, the kurds continued to work towards achieving increased levels of independence. in 2009, the krg attempted to begin oil exports but were blocked from doing so by the iraqi government in baghdad. the pkk also continued to use coercive measures against other states, such as turkey and iran, in attempts to gain independent territory from these states. soon after these attempts by the pkk to gain territory, the region was shaken by the invasion of iraq by isil and the occupation of vast swaths of territory. while the kurds were the first ethnic group to join the fight against isil, and were invaluable in counterinsurgency measures, they did not stop fighting for their independence at the same time. in 2015 a suicide bomber killed 33 people (who are the kurds?, 2017) in a kurdish town near the border of isil territory. the pkk accused the turkish government of “complicity” with the bomber and attacked turkish soldiers and police. consequently, turkey launched a “synchronized war on terror” (who are the kurds?, 2017) against the pkk and isil. turkey has also begun to more widely oppose kurdish groups. turkey now claims that the people’s protection unit (ypg) and the democratic union party (pyd) share the pkk’s goal of secession through armed struggle. throughout the entirety of counterinsurgency efforts, kurds were fighting isil and taking back land in iraq for themselves, including the oil rich town of kirkuk. this land was called the “disputed territory” until 2017 at which point iraqi kurds, under the krg, held a secession referendum regarding both the agreed upon autonomous region and the disputed territory. baghdad declared the referendum illegal (iraq supreme court rules kurdish referendum unconstitutional) and moved in with its military to retake the disputed territories. the referendum could have succeeded despite a lack of support from baghdad except for a few key factors. there was, and is, no superpower who will be an advocate for kurdish independence. israel supports an independent kurdistan, but 90% of arabs surveyed in the 20172018 arab opinion index viewed israel as a threat to the security of the region. other powers will not support the kurds because of reasons such as their view of regional instability in the wake of the islamic state, and iran’s attempts to move in as a regional hegemon. after the decade of the 2010s which revolved around regional instability, it appears as if the middle east is finally returning to a state of calm. uprisings from the arab spring have finally ended, ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 30 including the winding down of the syrian civil war. isil has been defeated and territory is being returned to the states who previously had sovereignty. the united states appears poised to remove troops from the middle east. no major powers want to risk these factors being disrupted and causing a war over land disputes to give the kurds their own country. these states also remember the civil war of 1994, which occurred very shortly after global powers helped the kurds establish an autonomous region. they are hesitant in their support of a new or expanded state given how the independence process went the first time. arable land is still being recovered from explosives used in this conflict to expand the agricultural economy (ministry of planning, 2013). despite this conflict, there has been no kurd-on-kurd political violence since the civil war ended in 1998 and major progress has been shown when the kdp and puk combined to create the majority party in the most recent krg. both of these are signs that there would be a functional government which could work across party and long-standing familial lines. despite the crushing loss to the central government in iraq, a positive light shined out of syria for the kurds. president bashar al-assad had been vehemently opposed to the kurdish occupation of syrian land and claimed that he would take back all of syria. nonetheless, the syrian foreign ministry stated in september 2017 that they are open to negotiations with the kurds. additionally, in early 2019 the turkish government stated that they were willing to create a 20 mile “safe zone” for the kurds (syria war: turkey ready to create 'safe zone' for kurds erdogan, 2019). this opened the possibility of negotiations between the kurdish population in northeastern syria and the syrian government. despite hopes for improving relations, they quickly deteriorated during turkey’s operation peace spring during which time they invaded the kurdish populated northeastern area of syria. president erdogan claimed this operation was undertaken to “neutralize terror threats against turkey and lead to the establishment of a safe zone, facilitating the return of syrian refugees to their homes” (kirby).turkey undertook this invasion of kurdish-populated territory because they are afraid of the connection between the sdf and pkk and wished to establish a buffer by moving syrian refugees back into the territory previously held by the kurds. this was precipitated by the united states removing their troops from syria and iraq despite turkish threats of invasion. the operation did establish a safe zone, but it has not been as successful as was hoped. president trump has left the kurds without any support from the united states and it is unknown if this status will change anytime soon. reasons to support an independent kurdistan the primary reason to support the kurds is that they have a history of helping the united states promote their strategic goals in the middle east. in 1991, they assisted the united states by rising up against saddam hussein when they did not need to and they were punished for doing so. the u.s. did not provide any support during this time and did not work to prevent the anfal genocide from occurring. then, after having failed at gaining independence from iraq once already, it decided to help the united states again in 2003 when they invaded iraq. the kurds proceeded to assist in the fight against isil throughout the entirety of counterinsurgency efforts. kurdish forces were in fact the first to fight back, and held a 600-mile line for three years (boteach). the united states continued to arm and support the peshmerga, the military unit of the kurdish region, to fight with the syrian democratic forces during this period. this continued support bolstered the kurds ability to defeat both remaining isil cells, and other security forces. from the invasion by the united states until they began fighting isil in iraq and syria, kurdistan was the only sector of iraq where no terrorist attacks by isil occurred (frantzman). while no terror was undertaken by isil, the pkk, a group considered terrorists by turkey and ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 31 the united states, and ypg, often conflated with the pkk by turkey, continued to use coercive measures. another major goal for the united states is curbing iran’s influence in the region. while the kurds have allied with iran before, most of these alliances ended with iran backing out, such as when iran revoked their support for the kdp in the 1970’s as a result of the 1975 algiers accord. this was called the most cruel betrayal in kurdish history (taleblu and tahiroglu, 2017). iran has also historically persecuted the kurds and attacked groups such as the democratic party of iranian kurdistan, the party of free life of kurdistan, and the pkk. the leader of the kurdistan freedom party (pak) also recently claimed that iran is the kurds and democracy’s greatest enemy (aziz, 2019). despite this all, iran has been attempting to improve economic ties with the krg. improving the united states’ relationship with the kurds will help to prevent iran from spreading its influence further through the region. iran has the benefit of providing kurdistan with a land border that they could permanently move goods across. however, tensions over territory have risen in recent times. in september 2020, iran and turkey signed an agreement to coordinate efforts against “armed kurdish groups” (menmy, 2020) in both turkey and iran. iran has an incentive to work with the kurds, especially if other western powers are not. iran and the united states have had major issues over the past several years. in january 2020, the united states assassinated general soleimani and then in november 2020 israel assassinated mohsen fakhrizadeh, the head of iran’s nuclear program. this comes as the united states has withdrawn from the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) and is looking to rejoin the agreement early in 2021. despite this attempt to revitalize relations between the two states, the united states is still looking to prevent iran from becoming a regional hegemon. this is where the kurds would become extremely useful. they would be able to work with israel and other countries who have normalized relations with them in recent times to counter iranian aggression and provide pressure to rejoin the jcpoa. the kurds have also shown a willingness to support western values more than other states in the region. despite the fact that they are not an independent state, kurdistan has a wellfunctioning democratic system. the krg has had peaceful transfers of power since the end of the civil war between the kdp and puk in 1998. in the krg, there are requirements for female and minority representatives (jones). the government is also a champion of religious neutrality in schools (mansfield) despite the territory being 94% muslim. these freedoms are unseen in other states throughout the middle east, even in our strategic allies. the krg also supports a free press, which is a vital cornerstone of democracy that is oftentimes difficult to establish. the secession referendum, with results showing 93% of kurds who voted supported secession from iraq (mckernan, 2017), presented a devotion to democratic values as well. another reason for the united states to support kurdistan is that they are viewed favorably by the state of israel. in 2013, 96% of egyptians (beauchamp, 2014) who were polled viewed israel’s influence as mostly negative. this is not an uncommon view throughout the middle east. despite this, the kurds and israel have a good relationship. prime minister netanyahu has called for international support of their independence (sobelman). so far, israel is the only state to explicitly state their support for an independent kurdistan. kurdistan may also provide a continuance of normalizing relations with israel in the region. while president trump did succeed in having normalization agreements be agreed upon between israel and sudan, bahrain, and the united arab emirates, kurdistan would provide an effective state to continue these agreements in the beginning of a new biden administration. israel is the strongest supporter ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 32 of the united states in the middle east. this could allow the kurds to work bilaterally to improve relations between israel and other arab states. if successful, the united states would have two strong democratic allies in the region to work with while providing israel with increasing numbers of normalized relationships in the region. this would be critical to regional stability. an independent kurdistan would finally provide the us an economic foothold in the region through both investment in the kurdish government and the creation and improvement of a private sector in kurdistan. this has already begun with initiatives like the united states – kurdistan business council which “seeks to highlight the unique opportunities for companies to invest in the kurdistan region of iraq and to make it easier for companies to secure their investments and be successful” (united states-kurdistan business council.). as of 2018, more than 20% of all kurds ages 18-34 were unemployed (van wilgenburg, 2018). while this is not promising for an independent state, it provides ample opportunity for american business to come in and have workers readily available. as of 2013, 50% of kurdistan was 20 years old or younger, and it was projected that 1.1 million new jobs would need to be created by 2033 (ministry of planning, 2013). to do so, the private sector will have to step in to help provide between 43,000-54,000 jobs per year (ministry of planning, 2013). on top of this, kurds are looking for work in the private sector. while there is high unemployment, more than 17% of those who have a job are underemployed (ministry of planning, 2013). despite the high rate of youth unemployment, 93% of kurds 18-24 years old can read and write (benaim, 2018). the krg, led by masrour barzani, has spoken about its desire to professionalize the krg. these two factors are vital to the success of a strong, modern economy. advances in the private sector funded by the united states will also open up availability for domestic private business to thrive. the krg has also been making attempts to improve relations for foreign direct investment. this primarily has been undertaking major portions of the kurdish economy. it is also important to acknowledge the abundant agricultural sector which is available to kurdistan. vast quantities of arable land were harmed by saddam hussein’s chemical weapon attacks and explosives used in subsequent conflicts. this land has not been available to kurdish farmers since the attacks because of the expense in terms of both time and money to bring it back to functional levels. once the recovery process is complete, 28 percent of the land controlled by the krg will be arable (kerr, 2012). this vast quantity of arable land, combined with a focus on improved agricultural production by the kurdish government, will allow them to take advantage of this available resource. opposition to u.s. support for an independent kurdistan the primary reason to oppose supporting an independent kurdistan is the negative relationship the landlocked state would have with its neighbors. kurdistan imports an estimated 80-90% of all goods (dziadosz, 2017) from their neighbors and other states in the region. it would be devastating to the kurdish economy and its ability to move goods if any of those states decided to cut them off. the kurds export many of their goods for their gdp. luckily, oil can be moved by pipelines, but other sectors of the economy that they are trying to move into can not be moved so easily. agricultural goods require a land or sea access location to move their goods out of what would be an independent nation. all of their neighbors have, at some point, threatened economic sanctions or to close their borders on kurdistan if they attempt to become independent. be that as it may, given the current situation in syria, it is unlikely that they would be unable to move goods or services through their borders. additionally, territory in turkey that is largely ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 33 populated by ethnic kurds, as well as historically possessed by the kurds, has access to the mediterranean sea. these facts create doubt in the idea that their neighbors could block necessary goods from arriving, especially if kurdistan had western support. should the united states choose to support an independent kurdistan, it would also be choosing an expensive undertaking. the cost would not just be economic, but also require manpower and political capital. it would also be difficult to nation-build with the potentially violent opposition of the kurds’ neighbors. given the defeat of isil and winddown of the syrian civil war, stability has been becoming more of a reality in the region, and some leaders believe that efforts to create a kurdish state could upset chances at long lasting stability. however, there is rarely more political capital than at the beginning of a new administration. the political cost would not be so dire if they undertook a process of supporting this proposal early on in the administration. in terms of economic costs, while the covid-19 pandemic will decrease the quantity of funds available for any projects outside of rebuilding the country, support for the kurdish government could provide valuable economic stimulus. as previously mentioned, the developing kurdish private sector would provide ample opportunity for american investment. this investment would provide ample opportunity for revitalizing the economy in the wake of the pandemic. in terms of manpower, the united states would need to work multilaterally with other major powers to determine and utilize best practices for nation-building because of their history of failure in this regard. the united states would also have to find a way to handle the fears of turkey, an important ally to both the united states and the north atlantic treaty organization (nato). turkey, and its leader president recep tayyip erdogan, have previously vowed to crush kurdish rebels and groups they consider to be sympathetic to the kurds. a central reason for this is that the turkish government considers the peshmerga to be a terrorist organization. this continues to be the case, despite the peshmerga and pkk, or kurdistan workers’ party, fighting against isil. turkish kurds have attempted to secede in recent time, but turkey believes that if iraqi kurds succeed then it is only a matter of time before their kurdish minority attempts to secede as well. even if the kurds’ state did not involve turkey or turkish land, turkey has been clear that it will not support the state. president erdogan stated that if american troops leave, “we will curse them as traitors” (barkey, 2019). turkey has also cracked down on kurdish political leaders, even those without outspoken secessionist desires. an example of this was when the leader of the main kurdish political party in turkey was imprisoned. the united states would have to either convince erdogan and his government that there is not a threat of their kurdish minority seceding, or potentially lose a critical ally. turkey also has enormous control over kurdistan’s economic stability. they recently allowed kurdistan to build the kirkuk-ceyhan pipeline, a $1 billion oil pipeline (dziadosz, 2017) through their country which is critical to their economy. turkey also threatened to stop buying oil (dziadosz, 2017) from the kurds. iran has been more welcoming to the idea of an independent kurdistan, especially in regards to economic coordination with the krg. they do not want the kurds in their own country to have autonomy or to rise up against them, but do not oppose the krg. finally, despite the kurds overwhelming support of independence for their own state, the united states has a history of opposing secessionist movements. the kurdish representative in washington expected opposition because, in a situation that was believed to be similar to their own, they claimed that if the us policies of the 1990’s had its way then the “[baltic states and croatia] would still be part of the eastern bloc” (calamur, 2017). because of this, they believe that they had to move forward with the referendum in 2017 despite widespread opposition, ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 34 including harsh statements to not move forward with the vote from the united states. even more recently than with the baltic states, the united states did not support catalonia in its recent attempt to break away from the rest of spain. it would contradict the majority of post-revolution american history to support the kurds in their attempt to gain sovereignty. conclusions since the rise of isil in 2014, kurds have shown why they could be a valuable ally in the region if given proper support. their vast quantities of oil, as well as the infrastructure which is already in place, provides a stable economic base which many fledgling countries have not had. this would provide them time to reinvent their economy and make it more sustainable while supporting a currently almost nonexistent private sector. these changes would be mutually beneficial to the kurds and the united states. the kurds have also helped the united states promote their military goals since the mid-1970s. this would be critically important to have in an ally, especially with the defeat of isil approaching and the attempts by iran to become a regional hegemon. finally, the kurds can help be a city on the hill in a region where the united states and its allies are traditionally not viewed well. the kurds’ promotion of democratic norms is critical as a potential launching ground for spreading democracy throughout the middle east. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 35 references air force historical support division. (2012, september 18). 1991 operation provide comfort and northern watch. https://www.afhistory.af.mil/faqs/factsheets/article/458953/operation-provide-comfort-and-northern-watch/. akrami, sara. (2014, november 14). iran's state-sponsored oppression of kurdistan. huffpost canada. www.huffingtonpost.ca/sara-akrami/iran-kurdistan_b_5818438.html. al jazeera. (2017, october 1). who are the kurds?. al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/kurds-170516072934887.html. al-qatari, h., gambrell, j. (2018, december 1). iraq, saddam and the 1991 gulf war looms large over george h.w. bush's legacy. chicago tribune. www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-gulf-war-bush-legacy-20181201story.html. anderson, r. (1974, march 12). limited local autonomy granted to kurds in iraq. the new york times. www.nytimes.com/1974/03/12/archives/limited-local-autonomy-granted-tokurds-in-iraq.html. aziz, i. (2019, january 22). anti-iran kurdish official to asharq al-awsat: we want to establish independent state. asharq al-awsat. https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1556556/anti-iran-kurdish-official-asharq-alawsat-we-want-establish-independent-state. barkey, h. (2019, march/april). the kurdish awakening. foreign affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-02-12/kurdish-awakening. bbc news. (2017, november 20). iraq supreme court rules kurdish referendum unconstitutional. bbc news. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42053283. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 36 bbc news. (2019, january 13) syria conflict: pompeo 'optimistic' on deal to protect kurds. bbc news. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46853979. bbc news. (2019, january 15) syria war: turkey ready to create 'safe zone' for kurds erdogan. bbc news. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46877308. bbc news. (2017, october 31) who are the kurds?. bbc news. www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-29702440. beauchamp, z. (2014, july 29). how the world sees israel, in one chart. vox. https://www.vox.com/2014/7/29/5948255/israel-world-opinion. benaim, d. (2018, december 18). kurdistan’s new moment. center for american progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/12/18/464309/kurdistansnew-moment/. boteach, s. (2017, september 26). a democratic kurdistan will inspire liberty in the middle east. the hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/352558-a-democratic-kurdistanwill-inspire-liberty-in-the-middle-east. calamur, k. (2017, october 20). why doesn’t the u.s. support kurdish independence? the atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/us-kurdishindependence/543540/. dziadosz, a., (2017, september 26). the economic case against an independent kurdistan. the atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/kurdistanbarzani-iraq-turkey-blockade-oil/541149/. frantzman, s. (2017, august 1). kurdistan independence vote -hopes for stability & democracy run high. national review. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 37 https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/kurdistan-regional-government-independencevote-september-25-2017-iraq-iran-united-states/. johns, d. (2006, january 24). 1988 the anfal campaign. pbs. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html. jones, o. (n.d.) kurdish afrin is democratic and lgbt-friendly. turkey is crushing it with britain’s help. the guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/16/turkey-democracy-kurdishafrin-britain-syria-arming. kerr, s. (2012, november 26). kurdistan’s food security begins at home. financial times. https://www.ft.com/content/382419e2-3732-11e2-893a-00144feabdc0. kirby, j. (2019, october 9). turkey attacks northeastern syria, leaving kurds at risk. vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/9/20906239/turkey-invades-syria-trump-erdogankurds?_gl=1*1u4bdza*. mansfield, s. (2012, june 18). religious neutrality in 94% muslim iraqi kurdistan. huffpost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/religious-neutrality-iraqikurdistan_b_1587042?guccounter=1. mckernan, b. (2017, september 27). 93 per cent vote yes in kurdish independence referendum. the independent. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-kurds-independence-iran-syriaa7970241.html. menmy, d. t. (2020, september 20). iranian-turkish deal to fight pkk risks harming stability of iraq’s kurdish region. middle east eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkeyiran-joint-operation-kurdish-rebels-iraq-pkk-pjak. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 38 ministry of planning, kurdistan regional government. (2013, september). kurdistan region of iraq 2020 a vision for the future. http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/krg_2020_last_english.pdf. nitze, w. (1962, october 3). the kurdish rebellion. the harvard crimson. www.thecrimson.com/article/1962/10/3/the-kurdish-rebellion-pa-fierce-conflict/. noack, r. (2014, august 7). the long, winding history of american dealings with iraq's kurds. the washington post. www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/07/the-long-winding-historyof-american-dealings-with-iraqs-kurds/?utm_term=.1e552934ba11. sansal, b. (n.d.). treaties of sèvres and lausanne. all about turkey. www.allaboutturkey.com/treaty.htm. smith, j. y. (1979, march 3). gen. mustafa barzani, exiled kurdish chieftain, dies. the washington post. www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/03/03/gen-mustafabarzani-exiled-kurdish-chieftain-dies/d3982e1e-bb5f-4d13-8105f9ada7bac486/?utm_term=.7359061e20f7. sobelman, b. (2014, june 29). netanyahu expresses support for kurdish independence. los angeles times. https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-netanyahu-israel-iraqkurdistan-20140629-story.html. tabatabai, m. (2017, november 29). iran and the kurds. foreign affairs. www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-09-26/iran-and-kurds. taleblu, b., tahiroglu, m. (2017, november 15). kurd your enthusiasm. foreign affairs. www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-08/kurd-your-enthusiasm. ijois fall 2020, volume vii program in arms control & domestic and international security 39 the kurdish project. (n.d.) explore the kurdish diaspora map and history. the kurdish project. https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/kurdish-diaspora/. united states kurdistan business council. (n.d.) who we are. http://www.uskbizcouncil.org/who-we-are.html. van wilgenburg, w. (2018, september 13). new kurdistan survey shows high youth unemployment, low income. kurdistan24. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/12af610a-b0be-4ef1-9b06-cb9fb8ae31bb. ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the race for artificial intelligence anthony valiaveedu & peter f. rybinski university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract as witnessed in the 1927 film metropolis and in numerous novels before, the concept of the artificial intelligence threat is not new. however, the threat of artificial intelligence has not changed dramatically throughout the decades. instead, it is becoming a greater reality. in 2016, developers from google created an advancement that changed the world. upon showcasing their artificial intelligence name ‘deepmind’ in a public expo, governments and corporations around the world instantly became interested in the effects that this creation can bring. however, this zero-sum race to develop the first “strong ai” will have immense ramifications throughout the world. this paper will explore the geopolitical impact of artificial intelligence at both, the domestic and international, levels. furthermore, the paper explores the various nations leading in artificial development and the potential they have in their quest for artificial intelligence dominance. more specifically, as the united states and china are the current leaders in artificial intelligence research and development, the majority of this paper will analyze the effect artificial intelligence will have in the future between and within these two nations. 52 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security introduction “artificial intelligence is the future... for all humankind. it comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” russian president vladimir putin in 2016, google engineers pioneered the beginnings of modern artificial intelligence development. under the company called “deepmind”, the engineers constructed “alphago” to showcase the power artificial intelligence can have. through a process of machine learning, alphago was fed many go games and was able to compete at a competitive level. this was showcased in 2016 in the google deepmind challenge match where alphago won against 18 time world champion lee sodel. unlike former computers, alphago’s use of neural networks meant that it “learned” how the game was played and was able to out compute a human (xu). this testament began a shift in the global mindset towards artificial intelligence. the google deepmind challenge match became a landmark in artificial intelligence development. soon afterwards, many governments and corporations became interested in how such computational power can be put to use. thus began the race for artificial intelligence dominance. at the time of this paper, there are two clear leaders in artificial intelligence development, the first being the united states and the second china. these two counties have dedicated a significant amount of resources to develop artificial intelligence. this has fostered a new great-power competition that pits two very diverse ideologies against one another. with china posed to become an artificial intelligence superpower by 2030, the timeline is short between these two world powers (goujon). this will be explored in the later sections. potential for artificial intelligence within industries the race for completing the first real ai is a critical point in humanity’s societal and technological evolution, as it has the potential to redefine the structure of modern society by streamlining nearly every factor associated with modern society and governance. among the most recent developments of civilization stands mass surveillance, which currently revolves around networks of cameras and programs that collect keywords from calls, tweets, messages, and other forms of communications data. however, this data is normally analyzed by people to identify real and potential threats. ai promises to cut out the middle man, and bridges the gap between surveillance and action. already, corporations are pursuing the means towards minimizing costs through automation, but one company, anduril industries, promises ai for federal government use. anduril is currently working on numerous projects, but perhaps the most ambitious one is their virtual border wall. the virtual border wall is a project that has been in development since june, 2020, in cooperation between anduril and us customs and border protection. it is a project that has received bipartisan support, which only lends to its feasibility and efficiency. the project intends to create a large network of solar powered sensor towers that are managed by their proprietary lattice platform, a software that approaches true ai by utilizing a fusion of sensors, machine learning and a massive mesh network between all operating instances in order to create a single autonomous operating system capable not only of collecting surrounding thermal signatures, but also using its machine learning functions to differentiate between wildlife and people. with this 53 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security network established, the united states will be able to drastically reduce the operating cost of border protection, which will allow funds to be allocated elsewhere. furthermore, anduril has been contracted by the us air force and the uk royal navy to create automated surveillance mechanisms capable of maintaining constant watch over battlefield conditions and hostile territories 24/7, which frees up a great deal of already limited manpower that would have been wasted on patrolling vast quantities of land. already, “the artificial intelligence and isr systems from anduril are game changing technologies for the royal marines future commando force. anduril is now part of the uk navyx accelerator program to get battle winning technology straight into the hands of our warfighters,” said colonel dan cheeseman, royal navy chief technology officer (allison). ai promises to deliver war changing tactical information to deployed units in a matter of minutes, which allows whichever force that controls a suitable ai to counter any attempted hostile maneuvers. true ai systems could scout an entire country and map out ambushes, ieds, and hostile bases at rates faster than any human-only force could ever attain, which will reduce casualties and will make guerilla warfare almost obsolete in addition to the socio-political effects of artificial intelligence, ai has the potential to change the health and science sectors as well. in the biotech industry, artificial intelligence could be harnessed to detect various diseases. research done under cardiff university found that the potential for ai in detection can provide better risk assessments to patients and prolong patient lives. aside from the diagnosis and prognosis benefits, ai can help reduce hospital costs and reduce medicare costs (cardiff university). in addition, artificial intelligence can be uniquely used for disease mapping. this can help track a pandemic and provide essential data at hyper-speeds. artificial intelligence can also transform the process of how to fight pandemics too. instead of a passive approach, ai can predict future models for disease spread and analyze the effectiveness of various counter-measures (mahmoud aaf and pray la). with the ease of data mapping explained earlier, ai has the potential to revolutionize current climate sciences. machine learning can help understand the current state of the environment and predict weather patterns. this will provide effect tools necessary to stall the current climate trajectory. furthermore, the possibility of new products and services that ai brings to the table can help minimize humanity’s climate footprint and potentially reverse climate trajectories (marr). united states the united states has been seen as a forerunner in developing innovative technologies for a long time. in the context of artificial intelligence, it is no different. recent data shows that the united states still has the largest amount of ai startups in the world and is considered to have a far more nurturing economy for growth in ai development (barhat) (chun). furthermore, a recent stanford report recognized that the united states has more conference papers in artificial intelligence. in addition, a majority of ai ph.d. graduates in the united states are from abroad (zhang et al.). this creates an interesting dynamic of outside influence in ai development within the united states. in regards to social and political views about artificial intelligence, the united states has similar (if not the same) views about ai and ai development as other western nations. in terms of military capabilities, the united states primarily views ai as an enabler and as a means of data analysis. many reports on ai being used in the us military have been on tracking targets and 54 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security generally reconnaissance activities (siddiqui). furthermore, the current ecosystem of the united states economy fosters open dialogue and communication. this ecosystem not only provides clarity in ai development, but it also promotes discussion in ai ethics (kania). this is valuable because it can promote healthy ai development. during the trump administration, there were significant pushes for ai development. specifically, under a massive initiative by the administration, ai funding and development became more streamlined under the creation of the national artificial intelligence initiative office under the national defense authorization act for fiscal year 2021. the administration pushed to create a coalition between the private, public and academic sectors in order to develop ai faster. furthermore, under the administration, there was a large push for allocating more research and development spending towards ai (cordell). however, as mentioned earlier, most of the research done on ai has been by foreign graduates. given the administration's harsh rhetoric and actions on immigration policy, the administration potentially reduced its potential in achieving effective ai development by dissuading or barring potential experts from entering the nation and contributing to the united states’ intellectual capital. with the new administration illustrating new goals in regards to ai, a few steps would be beneficial for keeping the us at the forefront of ai development. the utmost priority should be on further development of ai ethics domestically and abroad. this could counter potentially unethical uses of artificial intelligence, such as mass surveillance that infringes on civil liberties or espionage against other nations, and promote safe development of ai. given the united states’s standing in international law and various multilateral institutions, the united states should promote its engagement in various institutions to enforce ethical uses of artificial intelligence. furthermore, developing pathlines to foster more domestic graduates can help the united states to be sustainable in this endeavour. the other option would be to ease immigration policy for these individuals. a streamlined and more attainable path to citizenship would provide a large incentive for attracting more of these high-skilled workers from abroad. however, the large dependency of foreign graduates puts the us in a dependent position in future ai development. in addition, the writing above indicates that the main aspect of the united states in being ahead in this race is because of its relatively democratic ecosystem. promoting that ecosystem can help promote further ai start-ups. also, it is paramount that the united states employs a massive effort to strengthen its cybersecurity capabilities. over the last decade, cyber attacks have steadily been rising internationally from nearly every direction. between russian hackers constantly probing and striking at us systems, terrorist groups attacking telecom companies, and chinese corporate espionage (csis), us research is far from safe. if the united states is to maintain its lead in ai, it needs to create active measures for monitoring any breaches in cybersecurity as the consequences of detecting them too late could be severe. some have put forward the idea of utilizing ai research to create automated defenses against cyberattacks; using ai to protect current ai research as well as the rest of the nation, which will strengthen current cybersecurity protocols if implemented correctly, but achieving a functional and secure implementation, especially while the us still has yet to develop a true ai, will be a great challenge. among the most glaring flaws of making a totally automated cybersecurity system is that the program will become a very clear target for hackers, and even one successful attack could cripple the nation’s cybersecurity capabilities, leaving a wealth of data and research unprotected. at the moment, the us has yet to create any meaningful solutions to this critical issue, with the national security 55 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security commision on artificial intelligence saying that ai processes, functions, and parameters need to be properly documented in a transparent and standardized manner so that all ais may be properly audited, however they have yet to indicate how this documentation should actually be used in order to improve cybersecurity. while the nscai has not elaborated on how detailed documentation aids in maintaining security, proper documentation is still key to maintaining the integrity of ai and preventing hacking. the best use of this documentation would be to pursue a policy of accountability where ai developers make the details of their programs readily available so as to facilitate third party stress testing and vulnerability probing (wolff). only if the us maintains a free and innovative sphere where ai security may constantly be challenged and advanced will it be able to preserve its lead in the current ai race. more physical threats also exist to the united states’ ai lead. history has shown that research that can be stolen in order to bolster the capabilities of a foreign actor. the most notable and pervasive threat of this comes from both the chinese government and their tech giants. for example, in 2019, the us justice department charged the company huawei with deliberately incentivising theft of foreign technology by offering employees a substantial bonus if they were able to procure foreign technologies; in this case the theft was of telecommunications technology from t-mobile. later, in 2020, it was found that charles lieber, head of harvard university’s chemistry department, lied about receiving money from the chinese government while receiving a federal grant. as a pioneer in the field of nanotechnology, lieber is the most prominent individual to date that the ccp has managed to buy out onto their side of the tech rivalry (holt). while there are not any known instances of ai espionage by the chinese government, their “whole of society” espionage strategy, as well as their dedication to rapid ai development and dominance, are strong indicators that the chinese government is attempting to to infiltrate and subvert us research programs. the “whole of society” approach focuses on accepting anyone as a field agent towards the goal of having an overwhelmingly high volume of implanted people throughout all strata of a target country pursuing their ends (eftimiades) in order to counter this program, the us government needs to either attempt its own infiltration of chinese intelligence operations in order to root out agents and compromised individuals, or closely monitor anyone across both the public and private sectors that is involved in critical ai research. also, a strong working relationship between the public and private sector is necessary to ensure that corporate entities do not misuse ai data. however, the us should take caution, as witch hunts and paranoia against researchers may prevent espionage but will ultimately hamper both the speed and quality of ai research, in a similar way to how mccarthyism led to a period of paranoia and ideological conformity that shook people’s ability to cooperate. china the chinese communist party rules with a focus on driving the nation forward in one direction, without deviation, that will ultimately result in the nation’s dominance of the international geopolitical stage. the ccp has historically viewed ai as a tool towards consolidating their power and as a weapon, where other nations focus on the benefits to scientific development. among the many tools of the ccp’s arsenal is the system of civil-military relations(cmr), which is based on the joint focus and cooperation of civilian and defense industries in order to advance one goal. this system is dangerous, as it promotes china’s development of an aggressive ai (allen). the cmr system also makes chinese ai development 56 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security unpredictable, because “[the] same facility might support testing of a luxury self-driving car one week, and a self-driving tank the next” (allen). in theory, all of chinese society operating towards one goal, in this case the development of a true ai, is a scientific and industrial machine that is poised to overtake the us in ai development within the next decade, should they meet the goals outlined in their 2017 ai development plan (aidp). that goal is to surpass the united states by 2025, and to become the uncontested primary center of ai innovation in the world by 2030. in the pursuit of this goal, china has taken several steps towards advancing their interests. first, the ccp adopted a “wish list” of ai technologies and functions that prompted 15 of 31 local provincial governments in china to establish their ai plans following the aidp’s announcement. this has created a massive flow of both local and national government funding towards ai. they have also created a “national team” of tech giants (baidu, alibaba, tencent) and innovative startups (iflytek) in 2017, with facial recognition startup sensetime being included in 2018 and 10 companies in 2019, including tech titans (huawei, jd.com, xiaomi and other) in order to coordinate ai development across china’s largest and most innovative hybrid firms (dai). while these companies still compete with each other in numerous fields, the ccp’s ownership of portions of these companies will ensure that they are still able to make joint headway in the future. second, the chinese government has opted to learn from past mistakes, such as their 2014 semiconductor plan, and has made the standardization of ai research a priority within the nation. on page six of the 2018 ai standardization white paper, a chinese document outlining standardized guidelines for domestic ai development, it states that “ai standardization is still in its infancy, and this white paper only serves as an initial link connecting ai technologies, ai industries, and standardization. it will be revised constantly in the future based on the developing requirements of technologies, industries, and standardization” (cesi), which illustrates the forward thinking and innovative approach that china is taking towards ai development, as they were already laying the groundwork for their coordinated development in 2018, while remaining cognizant of the constantly shifting demands and dilemmas that arise over the course of any project. this flexible approach stands in sharp contrast to the us which has yet to take any definitive steps towards creating a focused ai policy. third, china has recognized the human capital necessary to maintain pace with the us and has taken proactive steps to recruit and train ai specialists both domestically and abroad. the aidp focuses on both “gathering” manpower by establishing international research centers abroad in order to recruit foreign specialists that could spur innovation, while also establishing a “training” approach in the long term, which begins at the creation of the "intelligent science and technology major” that has been adopted by over 50 universities with the goal of cultivating environments that will eventually allow china to have a massive, highly skilled pool of domestic ai experts, which they currently severely lack (ding). these programs are already bearing fruit from 2017 to 2020, china surpassed the us in quantity of academic journals being published in regards to ai technologies (zhang). while some will be quick to point out that the quality of these journals is sub par, given that these papers are rarely cited while us papers are some of the most cited in the world, the chinese government is already trying to rectify this issue through their “gathering and training” approach. china is building a very large foundational infrastructure for future ai research that is ready to accommodate any experts they may recruit or train in the future. 57 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the chinese government has pursued ai development vigorously, though in their efforts towards being the first to develop ai, they have neglected dialogues on the ethical questions associated with ai development. the west has for the most part committed to avoiding the development of ai weaponry and promoting testing ai in a safe manner, while also thinking about the potential of ai sentience. no such dialogue has been popularized in china. its disregard for the ethical components of ai development has the potential for many unintended side effects. among these side effects is the threat of rogue ai, or an ai which has deviated from its directives and is instead a potential threat to all computerized systems, which would have the capabilities of compromising entire systems internationally due to the interconnected nature of the internet (the economist). in the past, china’s large technological projects have run into many pitfalls. as shown by their 2014 semiconductor fund, the ccp is more than capable of setting ambitious goals, though delivering on them has proven more difficult. the 2014 plan illustrated that the politicized nature of chinese research has prevented real progress, as fundings were typically allocated towards politically connected research institutions rather than those that have shown merit in r&d. also, they failed to allocate the promised funds towards research institutes, giving only a fraction of the $150 billion promised. finally, the local governments were also associated with this project, and the local projects often resulted in duplicates and shoddy works (ding). in order to succeed this time, the ccp will need to maintain accountability while also cracking down on local corruption. furthermore, they will need to deliver on the promised funds while also allocating the money to institutions that show the most potential, rewarding skill and innovation over party connections. also, a rogue ai could cripple a nation if they are incapable of containing it, so the ccp needs to ensure that ethical and safety questions are asked and answered throughout the entire development process. above all, the chinese government needs to be cautious about their “wishlist”, as groups rushing to curry favor will rush out these projects without proper testing. if the ccp could properly foster the cooperation that they are trying to build through the national team, it may avoid the issues of duplication and politically motivated rushed projects, which would set them on a steady path towards properly harnessing the powers of ai. areas of escalation as the race for creating artificial intelligence becomes the new cold war, this competition creates the situations for various potentials of conflict escalation to occur. four primary issues with the current race for ai supremacy are: hyper-war, nuclear deterrence, unipolarity, and rogue ai. as explained previously, china’s current vision of artificial intelligence is a view towards an integration of civilian and militaristic technology. this push changes how ai will be viewed. this push towards civil-military fusion changes warfare from informatized warfare to what pla thinkers call “intelligentized” warfare. not only would this type of artificial intelligence promote authoritarianism by offering ai as a means of militaristic control, but it also changes how future ai will be developed. by viewing ai as a militaristic tool, other nations will promote its use as the same. that would change ai from a tool of peaceful change to an offensive weapon (kania). this causes issues because the change in how other nations view ai can lead to full scale arms-race similar to the coldwar. only by disentangling military applications from ai and clearly separating those two can ai be developed safely. furthermore, 58 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security opening dialogues and providing deep engagement can provide engagements on the risks towards security applications that ai poses. however, this is not the case in the status-quo. as ai becomes more dual-use and entangled with militaristic applications, it risks sparking a new arms-race dynamic (kania). the issue of a strong militaristic approach towards artificial intelligence is that it risks removing the human factor in warfare and pushes for rapid response without evaluating consequences. this hyper-speed can accelerate war into a hyper-war. not only will this risk miscalculations that can lead to annihilation, but it also risks a world where there is no human safeguard as a fail safe. only by promoting safe democratic development of artificial intelligence can it be possible to slowly integrate its power to provide stability in the future (siddiqui). aside from the possibilities of hyper-war, artificial intelligence has the potential to change current nuclear deterrence policies and has the possibility to create shifts with the current unipolar system. in the aspect of nuclear deterrence, ai provides the chance for other nations to circumvent traditional modes of nuclear deterrence due to the diverse applications it can provide from automation to cybersecurity. ai cyberweapons can cripple key infrastructure through its fast computation and rapid response times. due to the effectiveness that ai provides, it may be possible that ai can guarantee nuclear and non-nuclear retaliation, and strengthen a nation’s deterrent capabilities (straub). this change in deterrence policy might shift how great-powers view each other and provide the rise of other powers. in addition to the change in deterrence policies, artificial intelligence has the potential to change the current unipolar order. not only through the economic means as explained earlier, but also through the militaristic means as well. ai is considered by many to be a conflict enabler, since it allows conflict to happen with increased effectiveness. by shifting through data at hyper-speeds, ai can provide speed and accuracy to planning wars. this can provide sustainability for military overreach for a unipole. by providing effective decision-making, this can help reduce costs and allow shifting resources to hotspots. furthermore, it allows change in command and control centers to exercise real time control and transform electronic warfare. however, this means of control and military power can disrupt the global order. if another nation develops ai first, it can disrupt and potentially upend the current united states military supremacy (horowitz) (valantin). another issue that might arise during the race for ai supremacy is the potential for rogue ai development to occur. the current lack of strict ethics in the current state of artificial intelligence development poses a risk for other nations to unintentionally create a rogue system that can develop ungoverned. this poses a risk to the global system. one scenario can potentially become a terminator-like plot (siddiqui). conclusion artificial intelligence will soon shift the international balance of power in favor of whichever nation is able to properly harness it first. it has the potential to revolutionize daily life if handled properly, however the advances that will likely develop in surveillance technology are vulnerable to being misused. in addition, the potential in data analysis by ai can reshape current biotech industries by developing solutions and promoting hospital efficiencies. the current status-quo showcases a race of ai supremacy between the united states and china. both nations have the same drive to develop ai, but they have different views of it. while the united states views ai primarily as a means of data processing, the current view of the chinese ai industry is 59 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the militaristic fusion of ai. this race can pose significant effects in the future. focused development of civil-military fused ai systems can spark a new arms-race for autonomous weapons, which can cause “hyper-war”. it can also shift the current unipolar system by upending traditional modes of deterrence and disrupting current united states military superiority. conversely, it can also strengthen the current geopolitical order and allow the united states a path to a sustainable hegemony. all in all, artificial intelligence will change the geopolitical landscape in the future. without a strong base for ethics, the race for ai runs the possibility of posing an existential risk. strong efforts need to be maintained among all parties interested in ai development in order to maintain the stable and safe growth of ai technology so that it may be used for humanity’s advancement in the future, instead of its regression. 60 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security references allen, gregory c. “china’s artificial intelligence strategy poses a credible threat to u.s. tech leadership.” council on foreign relations, council on foreign relations, 4 december 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-artificial-intelligence-strategy-poses-credible-threat-us-te ch-leadership. accessed 5 march 2021. allison, george. “royal navy partners with anduril industries.” uk defence journal, uk defence journal, 14 june 2019, 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defense, 22 october 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/10/the-5-faces-of-chinese-espionage-the-worlds-first-d igital-authoritarian-state/. accessed 7 march 2021. goujon, reva. “ai and the return of great power competition.” stratfor, stratfor, 2 august 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ai-and-return-great-power-competition. accessed 5 march 2021. holt, alexander. “a brief history of us-china espionage entanglements.” mit technology review, massachusetts institute of technology, 3 september 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/03/1007609/trade-secrets-china-us-espionag e-timeline/. accessed 7 march 2021. horowitz, michael c. “the promise and peril of military applications of artificial intelligence.” the bulletin of the atomic scientists, the bulletin, 23 april 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/the-promise-and-peril-of-military-applications-of-artificial -intelligence/. accessed 6 march 2018. 63 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security kania, elsa b. “china is on a whole-of-nation push for ai. the us must match it.” defense one, defense one, 8 december 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/12/us-china-artificial-intelligence/144414/. accessed 6 march 2021. kania, elsa b. “china’s ai giants can’t say no to the party.” foreign policy, foreign policy, 2 august 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/02/chinas-ai-giants-cant-say-no-to-the-party/. accessed 6 march 2021. kania, elsa b. “tech entanglement—china, the united states, and artificial intelligence.” bulletin of the atomic scientists, the bulletin, 6 feburary 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/02/tech-entanglement-china-the-united-states-and-artificial-in telligence/. accessed 6 march 2021. mahmoud aaf, and pray la. “scientific and policy tools for countering bioterrorism.” edited by knobler sl. biological threats and terrorism: assessing the science and response capabilities: workshop summary, national academies press (us), 2002. ncbi, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/nbk98397/#_ch6_s1_. accessed 6 march 2021. marr, bernard. “the amazing ways we can use ai to tackle climate change.” forbes, forbes, 21 feburary 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/21/the-amazing-ways-we-can-use-ai-t o-tackle-climate-change/?sh=44990ff4a357. accessed 6 march 2021. siddiqui, sabena. “artificial intelligence and the risks of a ‘hyper-war.’” asia times, asia times, 12 july 2018, 64 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security https://asiatimes.com/2018/07/artificial-intelligence-and-the-risks-of-a-hyper-war/. accessed 06 march 2021. straub, jeremy. “artificial intelligence is the weapon of the next cold war.” the conversation, the conversation, 29 janurary 2018, https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-is-the-weapon-of-the-next-cold-war-86 086. accessed 6 march 2021. valantin, dr. jean-michel. “militarizing artificial intelligence – china (1).” the red team analysis society, the red team analysis society, 23 april 2018, https://www.redanalysis.org/2018/04/23/militarizing-artificial-intelligence-china-1/. accessed 6 march 2021. wolff, josephine. “how to improve cybersecurity for artificial intelligence.” brookings institute, brookings institute, 9 june 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-improve-cybersecurity-for-artificial-intellige nce/. accessed 7 march 2021. xu, yiqing. “ai behind alphago: machine learning and neural network.” illumin, university of southern california, 7 march 2019, https://illumin.usc.edu/ai-behind-alphago-machine-learning-and-neural-network/. accessed 4 march 2021. zhang, daniel, et al. “the ai index 2021 annual report.” ai index steering committee, human-centered ai institute, stanford university, stanford, ca, march 2021. accessed 5 march 2021. 65 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security analysis of the effects of large-scale disasters on the behavior of non-state violent actors in countries already under duress dylan hyams university of illinois at urbana-champaign abstract over the course of human civilization, humanity has been exposed to major disruptions of normalcy due to the onset of naturally occurring large-scale disasters. in the midst of disaster, some societies have also dealt with intrastate conflicts that strain the already depleted resources necessary for the survival and support of established institutions and governance. at the forefront of my research is the ongoing covid-19 pandemic which established itself in the fourth quarter of 2019 and has since then taken hundreds of thousands of lives and deteriorated several economies around the world. for this paper, i will be analyzing the effects that disasters have with respect to the behavior of non-state violent actors (nsvas) and subsequent influence on conflict continuation, escalation, and de-escalation, as well as the nsvas ability to legitimize themselves in the view of the state and international community. i will be drawing on existing literature, including the ripe moment theory presented by joakim kreutz, to help explain behavior and conflict before, during, and after a disaster; will be utilizing the acled conflict database to track conflict intensity both before and during the pandemic; and will be providing case studies from multiple regions around the world to provide different contexts for distinct nsvas. at the end of this paper, i come to the conclusion that the behavior of the nsva and conflict continuation, escalation, and/or de-escalation, in the midst of a disaster, is both moderately dependent of the condition of the regime type, as well as the overall ambitions of the actors in question, whether that be political motivations or motivations of other interests. additionally, i argue that states and nsvas must come to a mutual agreement in the establishment of relief services, and that states should attempt to negotiate with the nsva in the facilitation of the appropriate resources and guidance. 67 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security introduction during the concluding months of the year 2019, a new deadly virus, covid-19, originating from wuhan, china, had begun to spread rapidly across the world, without borders . according to johns hopkins university, at the moment of writing this paper, nearly 63 million people have been infected, and about 1.5 million have died from the virus (“covid-19 map”, 2020). the consequences of the virus have been severe; from global economic recessions to widespread panic and strict enforcement of pandemic related restrictions, governments all over the world have been struggling to contain the proliferation of the virus and ‘flatten the curve’. while governments are busy fighting the virus and allocating extensive resources to its citizens, non-state violent actors have taken advantage of weakened governments and have started their own campaigns for the management of resources to populations in order to gain greater legitimacy and support, as well as cooperating with the government, and in some cases, continuing or escalating conflict. analysis of the behavior of non-state violent actors does not provide a concrete pattern in which all actors fall into. instead, the behavior relies on the past and current environments in which they operate help predict the behavior of actors in future events. the culmination of this paper cannot be applied to all situations; however, i hope to give a starting point to understand the conditions and series of events that causes nsvas and governments to either change or continue their behaviors in the midst of a disaster. defining disaster and definitional accommodations over the course of the research done for this paper, i have come across various definitions that both fit and do not fit both the scope of the independent variable, the covid-19 pandemic, that i am using to focus this research on. therefore, i have discarded the concrete definitions of natural disaster, epidemic, pandemic, and global health crisis for the broader and greater-encompassing definition of disaster. this definitional choice was made in order to allow for greater implementation of the results as well as the qualitative and quantitative data represented in this paper to other events outside of the norm of the local or global community and to allow myself to introduce significant features of kreutz’ research into the behavior of non-state violent actors in the midst of a natural disaster (2014) into this paper, where i focus on a global health crisis; a phenomenon which does not fall under the narrow category of natural disaster.40 to encompass a broader body of events that may occur around the world i have adopted two definitions of ‘disaster’ that closely relate to each other and mangle them; one from the world health organization (who), and the other from the international federation of the red cross and red crescent (ifrc). as defined by the ifrc, “[a] disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources” (“what is a disaster?”, 2020). in addition, the who defines disaster as “an occurrence disrupting the normal conditions of existence and causing a level of suffering that exceeds the capacity of adjustment of the affected community” (“disasters & emergencies”, 2002, p. 3). through the interlacing of both definitions, we can conclude that a disaster involves three 40 kreutz (2014) uses the term “armed separatist challengers” in place of my use of non-state violent actors (nsva). 68 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security key characteristics: the disruption of the condition of a community; the inability of a community to fully cope with the situation using its own resources; and the suffering of a community due to the destruction of human life, capital, and environment. this creation of an all-encompassing definition of ambiguous events allows it to be utilized in cases pertaining to earthquakes, hurricanes, pandemics, famine, drought, and others within the broad category. therefore, the use of this paper can be applied to different events that may take place or have already taken place in order to better understand the behaviors of certain actors. on the subject of the characterization of regime type and its polity, it is essential to define the main terms associated with the classification of regime types that will be used in this paper. for this, i will be using the “center for systemic peace’s” (creators of the polity iv project) definitions of democracy, anocracy, and autocracy. the center defines democracy along three elements: “the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” “the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and “the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (marshall et al., 2018, p. 14). furthermore, the center defines anocracy as systems of government that are in “’transitions’ from one mode of authority to another” and “’incomplete transitions’ and the appearance of ‘incoherent’ polities” (marshall et al., 2018, p. 9). this can be seen as a government stuck in the transition period in which the country utilizes policies seen in both democratic as well as autocratic countries. autocracy, as defined by the center, is “[sharply restricting] or [suppressing] competitive political participation,” “their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite”, and when “in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints” (marshall et al., 2018, p. 15). existing literature to be utilized in order to better understand how the different actors behave in the event of a disaster, we must pull theoretical approaches from existing literature which provides both qualitative and quantitative data supporting specific theories. the primary theoretical arguments that i will tie into this paper come from joakim kreutz’ paper “from tremors to talks: do natural disasters produce ripe moments for resolving separatist conflicts?” and kalyvas’ “a theory of selective violence.” additionally, i will be using the papers, “covid-19 and armed conflict,” by tobias ide, and “violent non-state actors and covid-19: challenge or opportunity.” each of these papers provides information pertinent to explaining behavior as well as understanding conflict continuity and legitimization of nsvas on the political level. the first, and most important, piece of research that i will be reviewing is joakim kruetz’, “from tremors to talks.” over the course of his paper, kreutz focuses primarily on the behavior of actors in indonesia in the time period from 1990 – 2004 and looks at how the 2004 tsunami has affected ceasefires, negotiations, and peace agreements. to do this, he introduces his argument that natural disasters create a “ripe moment for conflict resolution” since the government needs to allocate its resources towards disaster response at the given moment (2012, p. 482). over the course of his research, kreutz has come up with the ripe moment theory; the theory that external shocks to a state create incentives for the state to initiate conflict resolution actions for those it is fighting against (2012, p. 483). the ‘ripe moment theory’ has some restrictions and assumptions, however. it assumes that the actors engaged in the armed conflict are rational, in that they calculate the cost-benefit of their actions in the wake of a disaster 69 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security (kreutz, 2012, p. 484). additionally, it assumes that the government is trying to stay in power and that they are trying to maintain the public's support as well as keep a positive public opinion (kreutz, 2012, p. 485). finally, the theory argues that when a state government is experiencing an increase in demand for resources from the public, it is more willing to negotiate with non-state violent actors (kreutz, 2012, p. 483). utilizing the ‘ripe moment theory,’ and generating both qualitative and quantitative data into an empirical analysis, kreutz looks at 405 different disaster events in 21 different countries, between the years 1990-2004, and has 50 different rebel groups (2012, p. 484). looking at conflict data from 12 months prior, then 12 months after the disaster event, kreutz finds support for his ‘ripe moment theory.’ in his results, kreutz finds that the onset of a disaster is a catalyst for an increase in talks and ceasefires, and additionally finds that the onset of a disaster does not relevantly act as a catalyst for ceasefires (2012, p. 493). in addition to these results, kreutz also finds that a disaster that occurs outside of a conflict zone is more likely to be a catalyst for talks, ceasefires, and peace agreements (2012, p. 493). in addition to this study, kreutz also introduces a study on regime type with respect to the ‘ripe moment theory,’ and their likelihood to participate in either talks, ceasefire, or peace agreements. he finds that talks are probable in both democracies and non-democracies; ceasefires are more probable in democracies and have a significantly low probability in non-democracies; and finally, he finds that peace agreements have a very low probability in both democracies and non-democracies (2012, p. 494). in conclusion, kreutz paper highlights important data that i will be using to explain the behaviors of non-state violent actors during disaster events and their interactions with the standing government. as we can understand, the covid-19 pandemic has generated shocks to countries around the world, causing both governments and non-state actors alike to seek out terms to provide support to the populations; whether it be for popular support and legitimization, or because of political or social pressure. the second academic paper that is important to my research is “covid-19 and armed conflict” by tobias ide (2020). ide’s paper takes a look at how nsvas have reacted to the covid-19 pandemic and how they take advantage of grievance and opportunity structures, which influence armed conflict with respect to increasing or decreasing levels of violence and conflict onset (ide, 2020, p. 1). over the course of his paper, ide finds that three countries; afghanistan, colombia, and thailand, have experienced a decrease in violence by nsvas in order to increase their popular support through the provision of aid (2020, p. 8). ide also finds, however, that five countries have witnessed an increase in armed activity by nsvas in india, iraq, libya, pakistan, and the philippines (2020, pp. 9-10). ide adds “that high levels of disease prevalence and the associated loss in life expectancy reduces the relative risks of individuals for joining dangerous activities like rebellion” (2020, p. 4). this ties directly into the ‘collective action problem’ that ide introduces, where, based on individual cost-benefit analyses, it is less costly to join, in this case, a rebel group, than to not join. through the use of the collective action problem, ide argues that “high levels of disease prevalence and the associated loss in life expectancy reduces the relative risks of individuals for joining dangerous activities like rebellion” (2020, p. 4). attaching itself to the collective action problem, ide adds that “gdp decline and poor health are also among the established predictors of civil war” (2020, p. 2). through this, he is conveying the idea that poor government control 70 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security over economic and social services increases grievances against the state, providing a ripe moment for the collective action problem to play out among individuals, and increase the likelihood of conflict onset or escalation (2020, p. 2). while he finds that some countries have seen a decrease in violence, ide adds that although there may be a decline in violence, there is still the possibility of violence escalation in the future as groups regroup and recruit for larger scale conflict (2020, p. 11). this paper is useful in understanding the reasons in which individuals turn to non-state groups in order to provide personal protection and obtain sufficient resources for themselves when the government is unable to provide or isn’t providing. through the use of the collective action problem and the idea of grievances and opportunity, ide sets a foundation for understanding cost-benefit analysis during a pandemic, which can be broadly used in conjunction with the broad definition of disasters. in addition, ide presents and looks at specific case studies in the eight countries listed above, in which some will be expanded on later in this paper. the third significant research set that i will be using to explain the behavior of actors in the midst of a disaster is kalyvas’, “a theory of selective violence,” in his book “the logic of violence in civil war.” within this chapter, kalyvas explains many different approaches as to the behavior of the incumbent government, insurgent forces, and civilians. however, later in the chapter, kalyvas adds a theory and model of the use of violence (a behavior) by the incumbent and/or the insurgents, given certain environmental conditions. he starts on the idea that the “theory of selective violence [is] a joint process” and that “actors operating in a regime of fragmented sovereignty must rely on selective violence to deter defection” (kalyvas, 2011, p. 173). while much of this chapter looks at defection and denunciation during civil war, kalyvas introduces a theory with equal importance that looks at the use of violence based on territorial control. he assumes that “[p]olitical actors maximize territorial control” and “when one actor abandons a territory, the rival actor moves in” (kalyvas, 2011, p. 196). additionally, kalyvas notes that although his theory focuses on the aspect of civil wars, he notes that “the theory can be further refined and expanded… [allowing] the derivation of robust hypotheses about the variation of violence across wars, as well as across several types of violence – from organized crime to terrorism and genocide” (2011, p. 208). through the addition of this, kalyvas grants the use of this theory to be expanded on in other scenarios; which i plan on doing with relation to disasters and group behavior. turning our attention to his theory of the use of violence with respect to control, kalyvas notes that there are five levels of control and violence type behavior, and simplifies it on a two-dimensional graph (2011, p. 204). kalyvas’ theory revolving around control and violence says; when control by either an government/insurgent/criminal/or other violent group is high, then the violence will be low (zones 1 and 5); whereas, on the other hand, if the control is low, then he expects violence to be high (zones 2 and 4). in zone 3, where both actors have equal control, the level of violence is expected to be low due to both actors attempting to win over the populace, therefore not risking violence (2011, p. 204). 71 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security with relation to this paper and the behaviors of non-state violent actors, kalyvas’ theories can be applied to better understand the circumstances in which groups may agree to either conflict escalation or de-escalation through the control variable and how it is used to predict whether or not the actor will use violence. when looking at this through the scope of a disaster, i expect to see zones of control between the government and nsvas, in which resources help determine who the populace turns to for governance related purposes, thereby legitimizing an actor. research and hypotheses as shown in previous sections, the term, ‘disaster’ has a broad meaning and can act as a catalyst for the emergence of new events within the dimensions of conflict and legitimization of non-state violent actors. when a disaster has a significant effect on a country, it diverts resources, aid, money, and manpower to relief missions in order to mitigate the damage done to the state. through the union of the ripe moment theory, collective action problem, and the theory of selective violence, i come up with two main research questions: 1. how does the covid-19 pandemic affect the legitimization of non-state violent actors within countries whose governments have limited resources and outreach? 2. how does covid-19 affect conflict continuation, escalation, and/or de-escalation? while i focus on the covid-19 pandemic, i plan this paper to be applicable to disaster’s in general and am using the current state of the world as a primary example for proof of concept. for my hypotheses, i will be setting dependent and independent variables, as well as recognizing a control variable. the independent variable (iv) is the covid-19 pandemic and was chosen due to the fact that it is an international disaster that has had a great effect on the current status of a country and its systems. i assume that over the period of time that this paper is being written that the pandemic will be ongoing and not drastically change. for my dependent variables (dv), i have come up with four different variables that can change based on the current state of a disaster (ongoing or ended). the first dependent variable that i want to introduce is the response of groups. under this dv, the response of groups is characterized in a couple different ways. the first way in which the response of groups is characterized is in how they react. reactions can consist of doing nothing, increasing activity in the political landscape of the country, enforcing guidelines, along with many more. the response of the group will help in the determination of the group’s goals and their capabilities as 72 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security a non-state actor. another way in which response will be measured is whether or not they continue normal operations or divert their resources to providing relief and aid to the local population. the third, fourth, and fifth dependent variables each relate to one another and can occur concurrently with each other depending on the current state of the disaster. the first of the three is conflict continuation. in conflict continuation, nsvas can decide whether or not to continue their conflict with the state in the same capacity that they were prior to the onset of the disaster. the second of the three is conflict escalation and is when the nsva increases their fight with the state and allocates more resources to their fight in order to push the state into greater levels of distress. the third of the three is conflict de-escalation and can occur when the nsva eases their use of force against the state or ceases their force altogether . conflict de-escalation does not necessarily imply direct cooperation and an end to the conflict, but can include ceasefire agreements, disengagement of forces, or withdrawal from the conflict for a period of time. in addition to the iv and dvs presented, i have drawn up one conditional variable, regime type. the political stance of the regime, in many ways, can predict the type of behavior a country’s government and military would have to a disaster, as well as their likelihood of reacting in certain ways to the nsva. types of regimes range on the polity scale from -10 to 10, with -10 being fully autocratic and 10 being fully democratic. within and among the labels of autocratic and democratic lay different subsets of regime type that can include, but are not limited to; full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, and autocracy (marshall et al., 2018). with the variables now defined, i will turn to my first hypothesis, which states: h1: the onset of a disaster provides fertile ground for non-state violent actors to legitimize themselves among the international community and their local population. i predict that when a disaster occurs, nsvas, who have greater political ambitions, are more likely to try and win the hearts and minds of the population through different means. through winning the hearts and minds of the people, these groups will be able to effectively gain the support within the country’s political landscape and can secure their legitimacy in the international landscape through recognition by different countries for their relief efforts. the second hypothesis that i will turn to is: h2: the onset of a disaster de-escalates conflict and violent behavior of non-state violent actors. for this hypothesis, i predict that in the midst of a disaster, nsvas will, instead of escalating or continuing conflict with the state, they will de-escalate in order to allocate additional resources to local populations, as well as to keep local populations under control through the provision of their own rules and systems of governance. when a disaster hits a country, we have seen instances in which groups actively ask the government for help in order to provide necessary aid to their populations (“bringing within reach”, 2020, p. 1). in turn, this cooperation between actors actively de-escalates conflict through the mutual building of a relationship between the nsva and government around a similar cause (“bringing within reach”, 2020, p. 2). 73 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security even though disaster may positively impact conflict de-escalation, there are places in which nsvas already have the foothold they need on the population, and thus do not need to dis-engage from conflict. this leads to my third hypothesis: h3: the onset of a disaster does not deescalate conflict, but instead has an adverse effect and escalates the violent behavior of nsvas. when looking at the aspect of conflict escalation in the midst of a disaster, i take into account the goals of the nsva as well as the resources and the foothold they have in their space of influence. the final hypothesis that i will be presenting deals with the conditioning variable and the incumbent. in this i argue that: h4: in states below the democracy governance type polity score threshold, there should be an increase in conflict amid a disaster, and in states under democratic governance type, there should be a decrease in conflict amid disaster. i come across this assumption as democratic states should be more willing to listen to their populations as governments face re-election. autocratic governments, i predict, are more likely to increase their use of violence because they are less likely to have to answer to their populations, and are more likely to attempt to control dissent within their state. with these four hypotheses spelled out, i will turn to both qualitative and quantitative research to either prove or disprove them and provide current case studies through news articles and research papers in order to provide concrete support for my arguments. while my list is not exhaustive, i have picked out areas of the world with the most coverage and have plentiful data generated over the years, which help draw out a clear pattern. case studies mexico the situation, as it relates to the covid-19 pandemic, in mexico is complex and involves many nsvas which are characterized as cartels and fight both amongst each other as well as against the incumbent government. among the cartels in mexico, six separate cartels, the two most prominent being the gulf and sinaloa cartels, have started disaster relief and enforcement efforts in territories under their control. looking at mexico broadly, the acled database shows that for conflict events and fatalities between the months of january 2020 and may 2020, there have been spikes in both, reaching a new homicide record for the state in march 2020 (gutierrez et al., 2020). additionally, acled finds that in mexico, the states of baja california, sonora, nuevo leon, jalisco, colima, and mexico have seen an exponential increase in violence against civilians after march 2020. 74 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security even though mexico has been a hot spot with cartel violence for many years, the pandemic has created ways of the cartels to gain an upper hand on the government and to win social control over the populations (bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 12). according to bunker and sullivan, the mexican cartels have been engaged in activities that are seen as equivalent to the provision of humanitarian aid, and have been using this aid to gain the public support and to use it as propaganda, to further their claims that they are the “protector of the community” (2020, p. 1). additionally, bunker and sullivan recognize two other unique activities that cartels have started to engage in; “special taxing of businesses to provide that aid, and quarantine enforcement” (2020, p. 12). while some groups do not have the resources on hand to provide aid to their respective populations, jones and hale find that many have turned to “social banditry” and “robin hood” strategy (2020, p. 1; bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 12). the “robin hood” strategy is the taking of resources from the government and the rich and giving it to the poor or suffering communities in order to undermine government attempts to help the communities (bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 12). “social banditry” is when “cartels [publicize] their distribution of food via pantries to portray themselves as “robin hoods” (jones & hale, 2020, p. 1). by using these strategies to win over the population, the cartels are able to cement their legitimacy in which they operate and can then utilize the local populations to their advantage, whether it be as lookouts or as “a layer of protection when authorities target them” (de cordoba, 2020, p. 1; jones & hale, 2020, p. 2). over the past couple months, since the covid-19 pandemic started, as well as during instances of other disasters to hit mexico, drug cartels have been sending out aid packages to their local populace in order to help them make it through the pandemic. these aid packages often come in boxes that advertise the cartel and contain items such as: oil, sugar, rice, cereal, coffee, cookies, tuna, soups, milk, as well as household products such as “toilet paper… and soap” (bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 1; bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 5). so far, it is estimated that cartels have handed out aid packages in 11 of mexico’s states, and the provision of these is seen as a phenomenon of the mexican cartels (bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 12; de cordoba, 2020, p. 2). 75 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security in addition to providing aid to their local populace, mexican drug cartels have also been enforcing quarantine and curfews as well as imposing punishment on dissenters. this has been seen in use by the sinaloa cartel, who operate in and around the mexican state of jalisco (“sinaloa cartel”, 2019). bunker and sullivan note that both the sinaloa cartel and the los grandos cartel have been enforcing a quarantine and curfew, while the sinaloa cartel has been issuing punishment through the use of hitmen who are armed with a wooden paddle (2020, p. 6; 2020, p. 10). by enforcing these restrictions on movement, the cartels have been greatly increasing their legitimacy to the state of mexico to the point that the president is considering the possibility of amnesty to some members for their support (bunker & sullivan, 2020, p. 1). regime and polity according to the cia world factbook, the government of mexico is a federal presidential republic, with a national congress and judicial branch. the legal system is reportedly influenced by us constitutional law and involves judicial review (“the world factbook: mexico”, 2018). as of 2015, mexico’s federal presidential republic earned a polity iv score of 8, giving it the status of “democracy” (marshall et al., 2018). afghanistan similar to the drug trade in mexico, the taliban are a non-state violent actor that profits off of poppy in afghanistan in order to produce heroin. the taliban, however, are also designated as a terrorist organization and are working towards legitimacy on the international stage. in february 2020, the taliban and the united states signed a peace deal as the united states prepared to demobilize troops to the country. despite the deal, the economist finds that since the deal and since the pandemic started, taliban attacks have risen 70% (“the taliban”, 2020). although the taliban are seen as a terrorist network by many countries, they have been involved with the government of afghanistan for decades. after the september 11, 2001 attacks, the united states overthrew them from power. since then, however, they have been making a more legitimate comeback into power. in response to covid-19, they have opened up their territories to the afghanistan health ministry, as well as the who, who says it is directly working with the group on covid-19 related challenges. the taliban are also taking a direct approach to the utilization of their resources and have been seen deploying “hygiene workers dressed in white personal protective clothing and carrying spraying tanks” as well as converting schools into quarantine centers (marx et al., 2020, p. 2). given the impact of covid-19 on afghanistan and the response by the taliban to push themselves into a ‘for the people’ role, they have acknowledged the fact that because they have so little cases, they will continue fighting (marx et al., 2020, p. 1). when analyzing conflict data from afghanistan as it relates to the taliban, after the us-taliban peace agreement, there has been a decrease in overall conflict events that take place. prior to the peace agreement, events and fatalities were still occurring at a high rate despite the ongoing pandemic. these numbers are available below and show that while the peace agreement hasn’t shown a long-term positive effect, the onset of covid-19 has a correlative effect on the decrease of violence. 76 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security regime and polity 77 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security the cia world factbook characterizes the government of afghanistan as a presidential islamic republic with a national assembly and judicial branch of various court systems, the highest being the supreme court (“the world factbook: afghanistan”, 2018). as of the year 2015, afghanistan received a polity iv score of 1, up from -7 between 1996 to 2004. a score of 1 gives afghanistan the status of a “open anocracy,” however the polity iv project characterizes the country as a “failed state” (marshall et al., 2018) lebanon in lebanon, the country is uniquely divided into two regions, north and south, both under the same government, however the south is mainly under the control of the iranian-backed, anti-israel shiite hezbollah movement. due to the state support and resources that hezbollah has, “[t]he paramilitary group is marshalling its deep resources in the fight against coronavirus using a corps of volunteers, doctors and facilities to carve out a prominent role in the crisis-driven response” of the incumbent (knecht, 2020, p. 1). by allocating its own resources, while funding and providing support to the health ministry, hezbollah is “fill[ing] gaps in state services to gain influence” and is trying to further legitimize itself into state politics and on the international community by taking pressure off of the state (todman, 2020, p. 7; trew, 2020, p. 6). similar to the taliban in afghanistan, hezbollah is trying to show that only they can control the pandemic in lebanon and that they have the necessary resources to do so (todman, 2020, p. 6). hezbollah has also been taking a direct approach to fighting off the virus and providing relief aid to those under its control. reuters reported that “[hezbollah] rolled out one of two new testing centers, a fleet of ambulances – many equipped with ventilators – and an entire hospital repurposed for coronavirus patients” (knecht, 2020, p. 3). in addition to this they have been sending their own doctors to government run hospitals as well as setup a “call center, three quarantine centers with 170 beds and a capacity to scale up to 1,000, and 64 social committees to 78 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security monitor the needs of families hit by the economic fallout” (knecht, 2020, p. 7). due to the sharp increase of resources to the population under their control as well as to the populations under government control, hezbollah is further solidifying itself as being able to provide for the people and govern the people, thus setting itself up as a legitimate political actor. since november 2019, lebanon has experienced an increase in both peaceful and violent (riot) protests as well as a decrease in battles, violence against civilians, and explosions/remote violence with respect to previous years (carboni, 2020). the most prominent events that have been taking place in lebanon are primarily around the four cities of beirut, tripoli, saida, and zahle. regime and polity regarding the government of lebanon, the cia characterizes their system as a parliamentary republic with a national assembly and a judicial system consisting of courts at various levels, the highest being the supreme court (“the world factbook: lebanon”, 2018). the polity iv project, as of 2015, gives lebanon a polity score of 6, which characterizes it as a “democracy” (marshall et al., 2018). yemen the final country of interest that has been severely torn by civil war in the past decade and has been affected by the covid-19 pandemic is yemen. for many years, yemen has been struggling with famine and civil war, which has severely impacted the ability of the government to allocate necessary resources to key populations and is currently home to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in which “millions remain at risk of starvation” (aksoy, 2020, p. 1). this situation has allowed strong non-state violent actors to intervene in yemeni territorial sovereignty with the backing of the rogue regime in iran. 79 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security according to the acled data on yemen, the southern regions of the country have witnessed a sharp increase in conflict events and fatalities, one month after the country reported its first covid-19 case. in september 2020, there was an additional period of exponentially higher conflict events between the houthi’s and anti-houthi forces, as well as other nsvas operating in-country (carboni, 2020). in addition to the increase in conflict, yemen has experienced a decrease in drone and airstrikes since the beginning of the pandemic (carboni, 2020) in the far northwestern area of yemen, the iranian-backed houthi rebel movement holds tight control of major cities and populations, and currently exercises its own central control over its areas of influence. while the government is occupied with the ongoing conflict and famine, the houthi’s have taken it upon themselves to establish their own countermeasures to the covid-19 pandemic in order to increase their own narratives (alasrar, 2020, p. 2). according to alasrar, the houthi’s leadership is deflecting the blame for the spread of the pandemic onto their adversaries, primarily stating that the “spread of the epidemic is a result of ‘saudi-led aggression'’” (2020, p. 3). in response to the pandemic, the houthi leadership within yemen, in conjunction with iranian support, has begun to provide relief services and disaster resources within their sphere of influence. accordingly, the houthi movement has announced that they will be combatting the virus in many ways, including, “establishing a hotline to report cases and symptoms, training medical teams in districts under their control, opening medical quarantine units, and introducing testing for suspected cases” (alasrar, 2020, p. 4). while this seems like a legitimate plan, the houthi movement’s trust is relatively low among the population due to previous failures in mitigating relief efforts, however, if successful, this will help legitimize the movement under the influence of their controlled populations. regime and polity in yemen, the cia writes that the government is “in transition,” and consists of a parliament and a judicial system with various courts, the highest being the supreme court (“the world factbook: yemen”, 2018). as of 2015, the polity iv project gives yemen a polity score of 3, which marks it as a “open anocracy” (marshall et al., 2018). analysis and findings up until this point in the paper, i have provided concrete information on the nature of a disaster, have defined regime types, presented hypotheses based off of published theoretical papers, and have provided qualitative and quantitative data in case studies to show the affect that non-state violent actors have during situations involving disasters. in this next section, i will take each hypothesis and, using the information presented, show evidence as to whether or not the hypothesis holds or does not hold. the outcomes will not be a catch all, but instead be a starting point for understanding specific behaviors in certain areas of the world and regime types. through the use of the acled database as well as the polity iv project database, i was able to compare and contrast the different case studies involved and correlate that data with my hypotheses. in my first hypothesis, in which i hypothesize that disasters allow non-state violent actors to legitimize themselves among the international community as well as the local populations; from the data presented, i conclude that in three out of the four cases presented, this hypothesis holds. via the legitimization witnessed being attributed to the groups, the ripe moment theory helps explain hypothesis 1. 80 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security in mexico, the cartels have gained footholds within their respective communities in which they can then use to benefit themselves against the government. additionally, the mexican government has recognized the behaviors of the cartels and has considered offering amnesty in exchange for the humanitarian aid they are providing to the populace. in this case, the government is legitimizing them by recognizing their status as groups who hold territorial control, thus providing a pathway to the political sphere of mexico. in lebanon and afghanistan, both the taliban and hezbollah have similar approaches in the way they have responded and are both already involved in the political landscapes of their respective countries. however, as noted before, they have most recently taken advantage of the pandemic to further their own political ambitions with both the international community and the local populations under their territorial control. each has shown interest over the years of furthering their political power in their country’s government and have taken steps to increase their legitimacy during the pandemic. we have witnessed both providing healthcare assistance to their populations as well as providing the enforcement of safety measures to help mitigate the spread of covid-19. the taliban, a former government of afghanistan before the united states overthrew them after 9/11, has been working its way back up to power through international channels. the pandemic has allowed them to further solidify their position through their allowance of the world health organization into their territories as well as creating quarantine centers and administering personal protective equipment (marx et al., 2020, p. 2). hezbollah’s approach in lebanon, as mentioned previously, has taken a stance parallel with the lebanese government and health ministry, setting up new healthcare infrastructure and employing thousands of physicians (diwan & abi-rached, 2020, p. 4). while the group currently has 13 out of 128 seats in the lebanese parliament, their actions during the pandemic could help increase their influence, especially in the south. (“interior ministry”, 2018) in the case of the houthis in yemen, although they are attempting to provide aid to their local populations, many years of conflict has exponentially decreased their ability to gain public trust and support. prior to the pandemic, yemen was in the middle of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, and has only gotten worse (aksoy, 2020, p. 1). according to fatima alasrar, while the houthis have been setting up care services in areas under their control, their trust is exponentially low due to their failures in the past (2020, p. 4). because of this, it can be inferred that their position in politics is not considered legitimate and is degrading. therefore, given these four case studies and the information that comes with them, while not apparent in every situation, the onset of a disaster can and does have an effect of the legitimization of non-state violent actors as long as they manage their resources, cooperate with the state, and provide sufficient relief efforts to the population. the second set of hypotheses that i will be going over is the idea that disaster de-escalates conflict between non-state violent actors and the government or other groups, and that disaster increases conflict between non-state violent actors and the government or other groups. when going through the data on these hypotheses’, i find that the results given the case studies are inconclusive based on a number of factors. for this, the acled database will be my primary source of data, which shows conflict events in correlation with time, particularly in the time-period after the pandemic began. in yemen, the country experienced a sharp increase in conflict events and fatalities beginning in may 2020, one month after the pandemic was first declared within their borders 81 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security (carboni, 2020). since then there has been a relatively steady amount of conflict events within the country, however this number still exceeds pre-covid numbers (carboni, 2020). most of the ongoing fighting in yemen is most likely due to the low trust factor that the population has with the houthis, and over the control of aid resources, which are currently scarce as the houthi’s blame saudi arabia’s blockade, given the famine and pandemic are ongoing, (alasrar, 2020, pp. 3-4). much like yemen, mexico has seen an increase in violence among non-state violent actors, most notably with the cartels. in mexico, with the many cartels operating within the borders, the groups often claim territorial control over areas. while a disaster is ongoing, and resources and supplies become limited, there is not only an increase in fighting with the government, but among cartels with homicides increasing by about 2.2% “during the first quarter of 2020 (jones & hale, 2020, p. 1). duncan wood, the director of the mexico institute, supports that claim saying that “in mexico violence has gone up through the pandemic” (“violent non-state”, 2020, p. 2). in the previous hypothesis, i stated that there is a possibility to have less conflict between the government and the cartels while they provide for their populations and legitimize themselves within the state. however, among the cartels, there is an expected increase in violence due to the territorial claims and resources that come with them. as the groups look to provide greater resources to their ‘constituents,’ they are more likely to expand into rival group territories, thus sparking violence. in addition, jones & hale add that violence has not decreased in mexico during the pandemic because the disease is seen as having a 2% chance of death associated with it, whereas the cartels are seen as a greater threat than combating the disease (2020, p. 5). in lebanon, while there has been a rise in riots, violence against civilians and remote violence and explosions have dramatically decreased in comparison to the past three years. while riots are a type of violence, they can include a multitude of different groups or individuals; whereas, instances of explosions and other remote violence activity, which is more likely the work of a non-state violent actor group, have declined. therefore, lebanon’s case has mixed results and adds to the inconclusiveness of this hypothesis. the final piece of hypotheses 2 and 3 is the case of afghanistan, who despite the peace deal signed in february, has witnessed a fluctuation of political violence among non-state violent actors within the country. as shown in the table on page 18, there is a relative decrease in violence in the country with relation to the onset of the pandemic. acled states that most violence attributed to the taliban happens outside of taliban controlled territory, and is against the government, however, is lower compared to data of taliban violence in the previous year (kishi, 2020; mehvar, 2020). in conjunction with the data, i can conclude that covid-19 has caused violence by non-state violent actors, specifically the taliban, in afghanistan to decrease. concluding hypotheses 2 and 3, the data shows the covid-19 pandemic has had mixed effects on the violent behaviors of nsvas and that although the virus has an exponential effect on populations, each group is different with how they react. with mexico, some parts of kreutz’ ripe moment theory hold, with the government offering amnesty and concessions for further cartel cooperation. in other areas, such as afghanistan, even a peace deal hasn’t been able to stop the fighting, despite the ongoing pandemic; and in yemen, where the pandemic has been added to the backdrop of an already deteriorating country in the midst of a famine, fighting over territory continues between the government and non-state violent actors within the country with 82 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security no real end in sight. the final hypothesis in which i have presented and will now be analyzing with the data and theories presented is that states below the democratic polity score threshold should experience an increase in conflict amidst a disaster, while democratic states should see a decrease in conflict amidst a disaster. as shown earlier, mexico has a polity score of 8; afghanistan a 1; lebanon a 6, and yemen a 3. none of these dip below the -6 score which is a conditional of an autocracy, however two are autocracies (transitioning), while the other two are not-full democracies. despite this, the data can still show a pattern of behavior in correlation with disaster onset. mexico, considered a democracy by the polity iv project, has recently seen an increase in violence despite their score. with mexico, despite them being a democracy, the most likely factor in which conflict has risen instead of fallen is due to the ongoing drug war within the country as well as the fight for resources during the pandemic. another country that is considered a democracy (although riding the line) by the polity iv project is lebanon. as we saw earlier, the lebanese case is mixed, as there has been a decrease in certain forms of violence, while other forms have increased. therefore, with these two countries the first part of the hypothesis, that democracies yield less conflict in the midst of disaster, does not hold. starting with yemen, who has a polity score of 3, which according to the polity iv project is an anocracy, has experienced an increase in conflict. an anocracy is considered a government in transition, and conflict should be expected to increase during that time, therefore, this assumption is corroborated by the second part of the hypothesis. however, afghanistan has seen a relative decrease in violence, despite its polity score being the lowest out of the four cases, at 1. this also indicates that afghanistan is an anocracy and its government is in transition. with both yemen and afghanistan in mind, the second part of the hypothesis, that non-democratic states see a rise in conflict amidst disaster, does not hold. conclusion at the outset of this paper, i looked to show a correlation between the onset of disasters and its relationship with the behavior of governments and non-state violent actors amidst conflict. with the case studies, analyses, and hypotheses presented, i have shown that while disaster may not be causation, there is definitely correlation with behaviors. my hypotheses showed within the case studies presented; that onset of disasters correlate with nsvas progressing their legitimacy within their country of influence; disaster onset has had mixed outcomes with respect to conflict escalation or de-escalation; and democratic as well as non-democratic countries do not have a definitive correlation with conflict escalation or de-escalation amidst disaster. the conclusions that i have come to given the hypotheses presented are not exclusive to the case studies presented nor should they be used unilaterally to explain behaviors in other conflicts. the information presented in an analysis and collection of observations and studies of behavior during a specified time period under exceptional circumstances, the covid-19 pandemic. the ripe moment theory, presented by kreutz, is one of the most prevalent theories for providing an explanation to the behaviors of nsva behavior during a disaster. given the information presented, it is also possible that disaster may have an opposite effect on conflict than previously thought. disaster, may in fact, mitigate the onset of conflict and in many cases end or suspend violence between actors. 83 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security some ideas that i was unable to include in this paper, but suggest for future study and research include the post-disaster behaviors, such as the status of the conflict and levels of violence, as well as changes in the political atmospheres of the countries. additionally, future studies should look at countries outside of the limited regions that i have selected and look for correlation and differences between regions as well as a more in-depth analysis of regime type and conflict. 84 ijois spring 2021, volume viii program in arms control & domestic and international security references aksoy, h. a. 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