




































Disruptive Element: Frozen Conflicts and the CDRN 

Justin Tomczyk 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract 

 

The focus of this paper is on the four separatist territories that make up the Community 

for Democracy and Rights of Nations and how they derail the western integration efforts of their 

parent states. This piece touches on the major geopolitical players in the former Soviet Union, 

the origin of four frozen conflicts and the bureaucratic complications caused by the separatist 

regions. 

 



About the Author 

 

Justin Tomczyk is a junior at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign studying 

Political Science with minors in Russian Language and Informatics. He is a FLAS language 

fellowship recipient and has spent considerable time in Eastern Europe. 

 

 

Introduction 

 

 Relations between Russia and the western world have deteriorated rapidly over the past 

decade. Policy makers have found themselves at odds with the Russian Federation over 

numerous issues – from political developments in the middle east to concerns over human rights 

and civil liberties. Among the many topics that divide Russia and the western world, the eastern 

expansion of NATO and the European Union remains one of the largest. As of today, four 

countries within the former Soviet Union have expressed deep interest in joining both NATO and 

the EU. While different in culture, language and religion they share one common trait: the 

presence of frozen conflicts within their borders. In this piece I will be examining the way that 

frozen conflicts have complicated and delayed the EU and NATO integration procedure for these 

countries and the role that Russia plays in this process. 

           Bloc Politics 

 

When studying political developments in the former Soviet Union it’s critical to 

understand the role of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs are a vehicle for 

cooperation between independent states and can cover a wide variety of policy areas, from 

collective security to economic cooperation. Membership in an IGO also indicates a greater 

alignment to a set of ideas or practices.  



 

NATO/EU 

 

The European Union and NATO are important players in the former Soviet Union. The 

EU and NATO cover different policy areas but feature a large overlap in membership. NATO is 

a defensive alliance created during the Cold War. Over the past 20 years, NATO has gradually 

evolved its mission of collective security to include components of peacekeeping and counter 

terror operations. The European Union is the product of decades of cooperation between Western 

European countries. The EU functions as a monetary union, a single economic market and a tool 

for united European foreign policy. Membership in the EU or NATO shows a conformity to 

western values and cooperation with western leadership. As of now, the European Union and 

NATO have expanded to include almost all former members of the Warsaw Pact, three former 

members of the Soviet Union and several Yugoslav republics.  

EEU 

 

The Eurasian Economic Union is an organization similar to the European Union. Like the 

European Union, the EEU seeks to form a single market among its members and coordinate both 

economic activity and foreign policy. Where the EEU and EU differ is in their leadership and the 

dynamic between their members. The EEU is composed of four countries - Armenia, Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, and Russia. When looking at these four countries we can see Russia’s absolute 

advantage over the other members. Russia is not only the largest in terms of size and population 

but also in economic and military might. In comparison, power is much more evenly distributed 

throughout European Union -while Germany may lead the group in economic strength, France 

and the United Kingdom have a larger foreign policy influence.  

  

 

 



GUAM 

 

Officially known as the “GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic 

Development”, GUAM is a regional IGO of states aspiring for EU and NATO membership. The 

name is an acronym of its members - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. GUAM’s 

function is similar to the Visegrad 4 and Baltic Council - to promote regional cooperation during 

western integration. An example of GUAM cooperation would be the establishment of the 

Transcaspian trade route. All members of GUAM are pursuing EU-associate status. EU 

association is not full membership (nor is it a guarantee of future membership) but rather an 

elevated diplomatic status. EU associates are considered a component of the EU’s united foreign 

policy and are compatible with the EU customs standards and industry regulations.  

  

CDRN 

 

The CDRN is one of the lesser known IGOs in the former Soviet Union. It’s membership 

is made up of unrecognized breakaway states locked in frozen conflicts. Conflicts are deemed 

frozen when there is no discernible end in sight yet the intensity of combat has significantly 

decreased. Because the CDRN’s members are not recognized by the United Nations and have no 

formal diplomatic ties to any country the organization acts as the only avenue of international 

cooperation. Examples of cooperation between CDRN members includes the establishment of a 

visa regime for CDRN citizens and joint declarations of mutual defense in case of attack. It’s 

worth noting that all members of the CDRN are locked in frozen conflicts against GUAM 

members. 

Conflicts in Context 
 

The frozen conflicts that created the breakaway states of CDRN began during the 

turbulent years during the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main players in these frozen 



conflicts are the newly created post-Soviet states, the ethnic minorities within them and the 

Russian Federation. 

 

Abkhazia 

 

Abkhazia is located in the northwest part of Georgia. It is flush with the Russian 

Federation’s border and is on the eastern half of the Black Sea. Abkhazia is the home of the 

Abkhaz people and spent much of its time in the Soviet Union as an autonomous oblast. The first 

conflict between the Georgians and the Abkhazians began between 1992 and 1993. After years 

of tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians, Abkhaz separatists declared themselves 

independent and began organizing themselves for armed rebellion with the intent of creating an 

independent Abkhaz state. Georgia responded with a counter-attack and planned to retake the 

territory. Georgia struggled to regain the separatist lands and eventually called upon the OSCE 

and international community to mediate some sort of ceasefire. While officially neutral in the 

conflict, Human Rights Watch has found significant evidence that shows unofficial Russian 

support for Abkhaz separatists in the form of weapons and Russian irregular volunteers (HRW). 

As of now, Abkhazia is considered an autonomous region of Georgia with its own functioning 

government in Sukhumi.   

 

South Ossetia 

 

South Ossetia is located in the northernmost part of central Georgia. It is inhabited by 

native Ossetians and Russians. The territory known as “North Ossetia” is located in the Russian 

Federation. South Ossetia was considered an autonomous Oblast during the Soviet Union but 

was administered by the Georgian SSR. In 1990, South Ossetia declared it’s independence from 

Georgia. Georgia refused to recognize any sort of independence from the region and considered 



such a declaration to be an infringement of its sovereignty. While the USSR (and later Russian 

Federation) proclaimed neutrality during the conflict, some Georgian reports show overt signs of 

Russian intervention in support of the Ossetian separatists. Eventually, a ceasefire was brokered 

between the Georgians and South Ossetians with a status of semi-autonomy granted to the 

contested territory. Part of this deal included the creation and deployment of a multinational 

peacekeeping brigade in South Ossetia. During the 2008 surge of fighting between the Georgian 

military and Ossetian fighters, the Russian Federation intervened in support of the Ossetians and 

launched a counterattack against Georgia. 

 

Nagorno-Karabakh 

 

Unlike the other breakaway states of the CDRN, Nagorno-Karabakh does not border 

Russia nor does it contain a significant amount of Russian speakers. Nagorno-Karabakh was an 

autonomous oblast located within Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority. It’s separated from 

Armenia by a thin strip of Azeri territory. While autonomous the area was considered a part of 

Azerbaijan. During the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself 

independent from Azerbaijan and voiced its intent to integrate into Armenia-proper. Azerbaijan 

refused to recognize this declaration. After months of mounting tensions, the Armenian military 

launched an offensive to connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The following war between 

Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijan nearly escalated into an interstate conflict. 

Eventually, the OSCE brokered a tense ceasefire and a peacekeeping mission was established. 

While low-level skirmishes continue along the border with Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh 

enjoys limited autonomy and good relations with Armenia. 

 



Transnistria 

 

 Transnistria is a small strip of land located in Moldova’s eastern half. The area runs 

vertically along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and has a population of approximately 500,000 

people. Transnistria was part of a larger Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 

within the Soviet Union. This autonomous entity covered what is today Transnistria and parts of 

Moldova and Ukraine. During the collapse of the Soviet Union, many ethnic Russians within 

Moldova were concerned about the future of Russian language and identity in the newly formed 

republic. Russians living in Moldova felt threatened by the formal establishment of Romanian as 

the national language. After months of increasing tensions between Moldovan and Russians 

living in Moldova, the residents of Transnistria declared themselves the “Pridnestrovian 

Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic” (“PMR”) and established Tiraspol as their capital. Initially 

there was little response from the Moldovan government. It wasn’t until Moldovan authorities 

began clearing barricades and roadblocks set by the PMR that small-scale conflict between 

separatists and Moldovans. The conflict was mostly limited to skirmishes and minor clashes with 

police. While the official stance of the USSR was neutrality towards the conflict, extensive 

evidence and personal accounts attribute the 14th Soviet Guards Army to collaborating with the 

Transnistrian separatists. The 14th army was stationed near Odessa and provided material 

support and training to the separatists in addition to engaging Moldovan forces in combat. As of 

today, Transnistria remains in a state of limited sovereignty and contains a joint Ukrainian-

Russian-Transnistrian peacekeeping force.  

 

 

 



Methods of Disruption 
 

Border Uncertainties 

As a result of these separatist conflicts, Georgia and Moldova have had significant 

trouble in securing the integrity of their borders. This is a particular problem in areas along the 

Russian Federation. These separatists states have become conduits for human trafficking, arms 

smuggling and other black market trades (E.P 2006). This is due to the inability of proper 

authorities to enforce the law (C.E.U 2000). Many EU members have voiced concern that the 

inability for Moldova and Georgia to limit black market activity within their borders shows that 

they are unfit for EU associated status (E.C 2014). To further complicate things, recent events 

have shown that the borders of these areas are fluid. Separatists have gradually moved the 

Abkhazian and South Ossetian borders further and further southward since the ceasefire 

(Elleson). This past summer, sections of a BP pipeline in Georgia fell under control of separatist 

forces.   

Separatist Citizenship and Passports 

  

 Many GUAM members are in the process of negotiating a visa-liberalization plan with 

the European Union. This would minimize the need for visas and document checks when 

traveling to and from the EU. Such an agreement would also open the possibility of visa-free 

travel throughout the European Union. Unfortunately, the existence of separatist and semi-

autonomous states has complicated this process. This is due to the unclear citizenship status of 

people living in separatist areas and an ongoing debate whether or not the visa regime would 

apply to them. There are three types of passports held by CDRN residents: 

1: Soviet Passports 

It’s very common for elderly residents of separatist areas to hold documents issued by the 

Soviet Union. In many cases it is unclear which country their citizenship would be transferred to. 



If man living in Abkhazia holds a Soviet passport with “Georgian” marked as his nationality, 

who holds liability over him? It is worth noting that almost all Soviet passports are currency 

considered invalid. 

 

2: Separatist Passports 

All four members of the CDRN have issued their own form of passport. They are almost 

entirely invalid for international travel (Civil.ge). This is due to both the unrecognized status of 

the countries issuing the passports and the lack of counterfeiting prevention in the document. The 

main use for separatist passports is for travel within the CDRN. Many holders of separatist 

issued passports are considered stateless persons (Hewitt). 

 

3: Foreign passports 

It's very common for CDRN residents to hold passports issued by foreign countries. The 

most common foreign passport among CDRN residents is a Russian passport. Passports issued 

by GUAM members are also used by those living in separatist regions. The exception to this is 

Nagorno-Karabakh, where Armenian passports are the norm.  

  

 

Russian Media and influence 

 

 While Russia pledged neutrality during the separatist conflicts its support for the CDRN's 

break-away governments is undeniable. Russian influence is visible at many levels. The lowest 

level is in the day to day interactions of CDRN residents. Russian language is the mother tongue 

of a  majority of CDRN citizens. While this makes sense in a location like Transnistria, this trend 

is even visible in areas like South Ossetia where majority of the residents identify as “Ossetian”. 

Russian language is also used in schools and governments across the CDRN (including the 



CDRN Secretariat's website). The most accessible and available form of media in the CDRN 

comes from Russian sources like RT, Sputnik and TASS.  

 When we look towards the functions of governments within the CDRN, Russia's 

influence persists. Many politicians in the CDRN, such as former President Smirnov of 

Transnistria, have extensive ties to Russia's political system (Oleksy). This includes the financial 

operations of breakaway states. The Russian Federation's monetary support for the members of 

the CDRN ranges from financial assistance and loans to the subsidization of pension programs 

and social services (Puiu). 

 The most visceral display of Russia's influence over CDRN members is its military 

presence. While officially part of peacekeeping operations, Russia has used its peacekeeping 

brigades for its own gain. We've seen the mobilization of peacekeeping forces as a sort of 

deterrent towards Russia's neighbors. During the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, most of the 

Russian offensive was conducted by military units stationed in breakaway territories (Deibert). 

Over the past two years, Russia has issued mobilization and readiness drills to its forces stationed 

in Transnistria in response to the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict (Day). The usage of 

peacekeeping brigades in national defense policy questions the true motives of Russia's military 

presence in the CDRN. 

The Future 
 

The future of the CDRN is uncertain. There have not been any serious efforts to push for 

international recognition of separatist independence nor is there a strategy to reintegrate 

breakaway states. A recent surge in fighting between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan has 

raised questions about the long term sustainability of these frozen conflicts. Many predict that as 

the conflict in Eastern Ukraine gradually winds down that a semi-autonomous region may form 



in Donetsk and Luhansk. While it's difficult to say what the future holds for these pseudo states, 

it will be impossible for Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova to integrate into the EU or NATO as 

long as the current frozen conflicts continue. 

 

 

References 

 

Civil.Ge. Tskhinvali Begins Issuing South Ossetian Passports. Civil.ge. 2006 

 

Cooley, Alexander. “Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia   

and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States.” Washington Quarterly. 2010. 

 

Day, Matthew. "Pro-Russian 'republic' Transnistria Calls up Reservists as East-West Tensions 

Flare." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group. 22 June 2015. 

 

Deibert, Ronald. Cyclones in cyberspace: Information shaping and denial in the 2008  

Russia–Georgia war. Security Dialogue. 2012 

 

Elleson, Brian. Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War. Demokratizatsiya. 2011 

 

Hewitt, B.G. Abkhazia: A problem of identity and ownership. Central 

Asian Survey, 12:3, 267-323, DOI: 10.1080/02634939308400819. 1993 

 

Human Rights Watch. Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict. 

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Vol 7, No 7. 1995 

 

Oleksy, Piotr.  "Transnistria: It Is More Complicated than You Think." New Eastern Europe.  

N.p., 09 Dec. 2015 

 

Puiu, Victoria. "Can Russia Afford Transnistria?" EurasiaNet.org. N.p., 18 Feb. 2015 Web. 

 

Wolff, Stefan. A resolvable frozen conflict? Designing a settlement for Transnistria,  

Nationalities Papers, 863-870. 2011. 

 

The Council of the European Union. Implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP with a view  

to a European Union contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and  

spread of small arms and light weapons in South Ossetia ,Official Journal of the 

European Communities. 2000 

 

The European Commission. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the    

Republic of Moldova: Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action, SWD(2014) 93  

Final. 2014.  

 



The European Parliament. European Parliament resolution on the situation in South  

Ossetia, Official Journal of the European Union P6_TA(2006)0456. 2006.  

 

The European Parliament. European Parliament resolution on Moldova (Transnistria),  

Official Journal of the European Union P6_TA(2006)0455. 2006.  

 

 
 


