












































Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security


A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: 
The Islamic State’s transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it 
Zachary Cleary 
 

38 
 

 

 

 

 

A Return to Insurgency in Iraq: 

The Islamic State’s transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it 

Zachary Cleary 

University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign 

 
 
 
 

 

Abstract 

In response to the inevitable destruction of its territorial caliphate, the Islamic State (IS) has 
transitioned to an insurgency in Iraq. This insurgency is active and increasingly well entrenched. 
The Iraqi government has made a series of problematic decisions which have enabled IS and 
bolstered its narrative. However, if the Iraqi government were to rectify these mistakes it has an 
opportunity to significantly decrease support for the Islamic State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  



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Introduction 
Claims of the Islamic State’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. While IS’s territorial 

caliphate has been dismantled, it survives in its affiliate network and as an insurgency. In Iraq IS 
has successfully transitioned back to an insurgency. It is conducting attacks on a regular basis in 
several providences. The Iraqi insurgency is well established, and the Islamic State is prepared 
for a long war of attrition. The Iraqi government has enabled the Islamic State’s survival and 
recovery through four problematic decisions. The Iraqi government has pursued a policy of 
retributive justice and security forces have engaged in unpunished extrajudicial violence. The 
Iraqi government has created large internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and detention 
camps that are prime IS recruiting grounds. The Iraqi government has failed to provide adequate 
infrastructure and services to citizens. Finally, the Iraqi government has not invested in local 
security forces. If the Iraqi government continues these behaviors it is unlikely that it will be able 
to successfully destroy or contain IS. 

 
Return to Insurgency 
 The Islamic State’s conventional defeats have substantially weakened it. The 
organization has lost leaders, resources, fighters, and prestige. Waging open warfare exposed IS 
to the superior conventional forces of its foes. The loss of territory has reduced IS’s revenue 
streams and its ability to present itself as a state. At its peak IS commanded approximately 
45,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria (Mitchell, 2018). A report from the summer of 2018 stated that 
the US Department of Defense estimated that IS had 15,000-17,100 fighters in Iraq (Lead 
Inspector General). IS’s fighting force may have atrophied further but what remains still 
represents a significant threat due to IS’s decision to revert to insurgency. Insurgent warfare is an 
inherently asymmetric strategy and does not require IS to achieve military preponderance. It is 
important to remember that IS’s predecessor organization the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was once 
reduced to less than 700 fighters (Callimachi, 2019). Failure to capitalize on this weakness 
allowed ISI to regroup and lead directly to the rise of the Islamic State. The same mistake must 
not be repeated; IS cannot be allowed to recuperate and re-entrench itself. 
 In 2017 the Prime Minister of Iraq proclaimed victory over the Islamic State (Coker & 
Hassan). Although his statement was inaccurate, he was correct in asserting that IS’s ability to 
hold territory conventionally was at an end. However, IS had already begun to transition back to 
an insurgency. Islamic State leadership had long prepared for the inevitable destruction of its 
physical caliphate. Hassan (2018) argues that the group was discussing a desert-based insurgency 
as early as summer 2016. Evidence for this can be found in how IS moved to adjust its 
propaganda and prepare followers for the transition to insurgency. In a May 2016 address, the 
spokesman at the time Abu Muhammad al-Adnani publicly announced the organization’s 
expectation that it would lose all cities and its plan to return to insurgency (Hassan, 2018). This 
adjustment can also be seen in military behavior. After the fall of Mosul, the organization 
became significantly less willing to fight conventionally and repeatedly ceded territory. As IS 
demonstrated at Baghouz it still could mount significant defensive efforts when it chose to.  



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The Islamic State’s transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it 
Zachary Cleary 
 

40 
 

Instead, the leadership prioritized conserving men and material for insurgent operations (Hassan, 
2018). The Islamic State has also been preparing financially for insurgency. It smuggled up $400 
million out of Iraq and has transitioned to revenue streams which do not require territorial 
control such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and extortion (Clarke, 2018). Extortion is a 
particularly important source of revenue for IS as it also serves to assert a level of control over 
the local population. These extensive preparations indicate that the transition to insurgency was 
part of a planned decision and not purely due to degraded capability. 
 Today the Islamic State today has fully transitioned back to insurgency. By the end of 
October 2018 IS had launched at least 1,270 attacks (Knights, 2018). The organization has 
established itself in the rural areas of Iraq and the ungoverned zones near the Syrian border 
(Hassan, 2018). IS generally avoids hardened targets such as police stations instead choosing to 
strike unguarded targets (Knights, 2018). Even if IS cannot conventionally contest security 
forces it still exerts a significant degree of control over the regions it operates in. Night time 
checkpoints are common as well as targeted assassinations of problematic local leaders (Hassan, 
2018). Killing prominent opposition leaders is an essential element in IS’s attempt to reestablish 
itself as an insurgency. By doing so IS seeks to intimidate rural communities into compliance 
and deter cooperation with security forces. IS focuses such operations in the areas it seeks to 
establish strongholds in. According to Knight (2018) “In southern Nineveh, rural Kirkuk, and 
northern Diyala, there were 103 targeted assassinations in the first 10 months of 2018 (75% of all 
Islamic State assassinations during that period).” Furthermore, as an insurgency IS reach is 
greater than as a conventional force (Hassan, 2018). IS never conquered the Diyala Governorate 
but it is now one of the centers of the new insurgency (Knights, 2018). The Islamic State no 
longer seeks decisive confrontations but an extended war of attrition. The Iraqi government and 
its security forces must adapt to this new phase of the conflict.  
 
Counterproductive Iraqi Decisions 
 The Iraqi government has made several decisions which have aided the Islamic State. If 
these policies remain unchanged, they will significantly hinder anti-IS efforts. The Islamic State 
presents itself as the sole champion of the Iraqi Sunni population in a hostile world. According to 
this narrative, the central Iraqi government is a sectarian Shia intuition which conspires with dark 
foreign forces to keep the Sunni populace oppressed and powerless. Cooperation with the Iraqi 
government is impossible as it is fundamentally hostile to Sunnis and thus violent resistance is 
the only option. The problems described below each benefit IS in their own unique way, but the 
common link is that they strengthen IS’s narrative. The Iraqi government must not allow IS to 
brand it as a hostile out-group actor for that is the path to mass radicalization (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008). 

According to Munqith al-Dagher, one of Iraq’s premier pollsters, dissatisfaction and 
distrust of the central government have always been the Islamic State’s greatest sources of 
support in Iraq, not religious fervor (2015). This is fortunate as it means that it is within the Iraqi 
government’s ability to reduce IS’s domestic appeal. If IS’s support was truly religious in nature 



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the problem would be significantly more difficult to resolve. Instead, the Iraqi government has 
the ability and responsibility to restrict IS’s support base by resolving locals’ grievances. By 
addressing the problematic behaviors described below the Iraqi government can make significant 
progress in its struggle against IS. 

  
Cycle of Revenge 
 Iraqi military and paramilitary forces have engaged in widespread extrajudicial violence. 
Systematic executions of suspected IS members were especially common during the fall of 
Mosul. Human Rights Watch’s June 4, 2017 article reporting that the bodies of 26 blindfolded 
and handcuffed men had been found and that security forces had been implicated was typical for 
the period. According to a 2018 report from the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial 
summary or arbitrary executions many of these extrajudicial executions were conducted by 
popular mobilization forces (PMF). The popular mobilization forces are a paramilitary 
organization aligned with the Iraqi government comprised of numerous militias. Many of the 
PMF militias explicitly identify as Shia. Thus, their excesses are particularly inflammatory and 
likely to inflame sectarian tensions. Security forces have also “disappeared” large numbers of 
people (OHCHR, 2017). Some are released, often alleging abuses during their detentions, but 
many remain missing. Iraq currently has the largest number of missing persons in the world due 
largely to forced disappearances (Human Rights Council, 2018).  
 Extrajudicial violence creates a backlash effect that strengthens the Islamic State. There 
is a significant and expanding literature that supports the backlash thesis which holds that overly 
harsh counterterrorism policies can strengthen terrorist groups (Faria & Arce, 2012). 
Extrajudicial violence is extreme enough to provoke this effect as well as trigger more 
conventional routes of radicalization. Prior work has identified personal victimhood and political 
grievance as causes for individual radicalization in addition to mass radicalization due to conflict 
with an outgroup (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Extrajudicial violence by state forces 
facilitates all these paths to radicalization. When the relatives of those slain seek vengeance it is 
the Islamic State that they will turn to. Furthermore, every death widens the perceived gap 
between the local population and the central government. How can people trust the government 
that stood by as their relatives were killed by its security forces? Ultimately, in an insurgency the 
objective is the support of the local population. Abuses by the security forces alienate the 
contested population decreasing intelligence flow and increasing insurgent support. The 
massacres during and after the fall of Mosul are particularly problematic as research indicates 
that mass killings are strongly associated with increased terrorist violence (Avdan & Uzonyi, 
2017). These events polarize society and become a rallying cry for anti-government forces. 
 The Iraqi judicial system has also been the scene of significant abuses. The Iraqi 
government’s determination to hold members of IS accountable is laudable but its current course 
of action is not. Trials are perfunctory, evidence is optional and death by hanging common 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017a). The scale of the problem is daunting. From February to late 
August of 2017 the Nineveh counterterrorism court alone initiated the trials of 5,500 ISIS 



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The Islamic State’s transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it 
Zachary Cleary 
 

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suspects (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). The individuals brought to trial are frequently arrested 
in dragnet operations or due to unsubstantiated accusations. For instance, PMF forces separated 
out approximately 1,300 men and boys from a refugee caravan fleeing Falluja in June 2016 
(Human Rights Council, 2018). Of that number approximately half were later found to have been 
transferred to government custody and the other half remain missing (Human Rights Council, 
2018). The accused rarely have proper legal counsel, in part because the Iraqi government has 
harassed defense lawyers and threatened to charge them as terrorists (Human Rights Watch, 
2018).  

Treatment of detainees is also problematic. Due to the policy of mass internment the Iraqi 
judicial and detainment systems are overloaded. Even those found innocent frequently spend 
months in overcrowded prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). There is evidence of widespread 
torture of detainees (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). There is also the potential prison 
radicalization issue. It is true that the prison radicalization threat is often overstated (Jones, 
2014). However, the way Iraq is managing prisoners seems designed to facilitate prison 
radicalization. Large numbers of low threat detainees (those arrested in mass operations and 
those arrested for nonviolent crimes) are being held alongside hardened jihadis (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017a). The terrorist population is not so diluted as to be ineffective. The trauma of 
prison is amplified by the poor treatment of prisoners encouraging group bonding amongst 
prisoners as a support and coping mechanism. This increased cohesion due to isolation and 
external threats facilitates radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The torture of 
prisoners is liable to accelerate this process as it creates clear group grievances against the state 
and its security forces that IS adherents can exploit. 

The wanton abuse of the Iraqi judicial system is perhaps even more dangerous than 
extrajudicial violence. It clearly establishes the central government as an enemy of the Sunni 
population. There is no deniability or separation as with the instances of extrajudicial violence. 
The formal institutions of the central government are clearly unfairly executing Sunnis.  
Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the judicial process clearly signals that innocence is no 
protection. This disincentives loyalty to the central government as it is not rewarded and reduces 
the perceived price of supporting IS. The Sunni population was already primed to be distrustful 
of the Iraqi government before the latest excesses (al-Dagher, 2015). A populace that distrusts 
the judicial system is unlikely to cooperate with security services. Which means that 
counterinsurgency operations will lack crucial intelligence. In response, the Iraqi security forces 
may choose to utilize less discriminant methods which will only advance the cycle of distrust. 
 The Iraqi government must restore faith in the legitimacy of its judicial institutions. Trials 
of suspected IS members should continue but with proper rule of law and standards of evidence. 
Moreover, the Iraqi government should prosecute those responsible for some of the most extreme 
extrajudicial violence. Doing so may be costly politically but it demonstrates that the government 
is not a purely sectarian actor and is truly committed to achieving justice. If handled properly 
trials of IS members could be a potent weapon against the organization. The government should 
take the opportunity to publicize IS’s abuses of the community it claims to protect and drive a 



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wedge between the two. Additionally, credible trials present the Iraqi government to brand IS as 
criminals instead of martyrs. 
 
Displaced and Detained Populations 
 The devastation of the campaign against IS left many internally displaced. The internally 
displaced Sunni population could be fertile IS recruiting ground. During the battle of Mosul IS 
was already recruiting from displaced civilian populations (Hassan, 2018). Displaced persons 
camps are particularly attractive to IS recruiters as they provide a concentrated audience with 
few ties. Furthermore, conditions in the camps are often poor which leads to dissatisfaction with 
the central government. More problematic still are allegations that security forces are abusing the 
civilian populace in IDP camps (Mosul Eye, 2017). Such behavior guarantees that the populace 
sees security forces as enemies and jailors instead of liberators and protectors. The central 
government must prioritize getting displaced citizens back to their homes. If they fail to do so 
they present IS with concentrations of increasingly dissatisfied potential recruits with few ties 
that would prevent them from joining. 
 The Iraqi government has also established large-scale internment for supposedly Islamic 
State affiliated families. Although not officially imprisoned the families are forcibly relocated 
into IDP camps which security forces prevent them from leaving (Wille, 2018). Doing so creates 
a permanent support base for IS by inhibiting individuals’ ability to rejoin Iraqi society. Many of 
those detained in these camps are guilty only by association or of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time (Wille, 2018).  Furthermore, it is likely that these camps are vectors for large-scale 
radicalization. Just as Camp Bucca served to radicalize much of IS’s current leadership the new 
detention camps may create the next generation of insurgent leadership. This is especially likely 
as the Iraqi government has chosen to detain children in these camps (Wille, 2018). The decision 
to hold these families in IDP camps facilitates the radicalization of actually displaced individuals 
in addition to the families being detained. The Iraqi government has created a dilemma for itself. 
It must either indefinitely keep a large population detained on little evidence or it must release a 
population that it has alienated and radicalized. The only way to minimize the damage is to 
selectively release as many detainees as possible and leave only those whom the government is 
certain are clear danger. In particular, the children must be brought out of the camps before IS 
gains a new generation of aggrieved supporters. 
 
Failure to Provide Services 

The Islamic State and its predecessor organizations have long exploited the central 
government’s failure to provide reliable infrastructure and civil services. Prior research indicates 
that low state capacity and weak civil institutions correlate with increased terrorist activity 
(Hendrix & Young, 2014). Iraqi infrastructure has historically been poor as sanctions, economic 
mismanagement and wars have left lasting damage. In the 1980s Iraq was one of the most 
developed Middle East countries in terms of infrastructure and social services (Beeher, 2006). 
However, by 2006 the once proud nation was in disrepair. That year A US report found that only 



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The Islamic State’s transition to insurgency and the Iraqi mistakes that have aided it 
Zachary Cleary 
 

44 
 

a quarter of the Iraqi population had access to potable water (Beeher, 2006). Failure to provide 
reliable infrastructure and services reduces local faith in government, making IS a more 
attractive alternative. 

The Islamic State spent a significant amount of effort and money providing services to 
areas under their control. IS organized a DMV, ran a garbage collection system, and provided 
utilities (Callimachi, 2018). This behavior is not unique to the Islamic State criminal and 
insurgent organizations often fill the void when states fail to provide services. Doing so signals 
that the group is more capable than the government and allows it to co-opt locals. Since the Iraqi 
government has historically underperformed it is easier for IS to surpass it. 

IS often intentionally worsens problems seeking to further discredit the government. 
Supply of electricity provides an illustrative example. Iraq regularly experiences protests, of an 
often-violent nature, when insufficient electrical infrastructure leaves many without any cooling 
during Iraq’s brutally hot summer (Barnard 2015; Mohammed, 2018). The Islamic State has 
repeatedly attacked power plants and parts of the power distribution system (Al Jazeera, 2017; 
Ali, 2018). The IS attacks are focused on sections of the electricity infrastructure that supply 
Sunni communities. Although Shia communities also see similar issues and protests, IS has not 
sought to systematically attack their power infrastructure. This indicates that the attacks on the 
power infrastructure are not intended as a means of punishing the local population, but to further 
exploit an existing local grievance with the government. After these attacks IS can point the lack 
of power as proof of the government’s inability to provide basic services. More importantly, such 
attacks increase general discontent with the central government. It is this general feeling that the 
central government does not care for the local population that IS exploits. 

Of the problems listed this is the hardest to resolve. The Iraqi government claims that 
reconstruction will cost $88 billion, an already significant figure (Chmaytelli & Hagagy, 2018). 
However, others assert that actual cost is more likely around $198 billion (Gunter, 2018). 
Furthermore, the Iraqi government relies heavily on oil revenue to finance the rebuilding and oil 
prices are low (Gunter, 2018). Thus, a slow and difficult rebuilding process is inevitable. 
However, the Iraqi government can make positive changes. Firstly, it must increase 
infrastructure security in areas of IS activity. This signals commitment to the local populace and 
will reduce the Islamic States ability to worsen the situation. For IS the key is not that the 
infrastructure situation is poor but that the populace blames the government for the situation and 
believes IS can do better. Thus, the government should seek to invert IS’s narrative and position 
itself as the defender of infrastructure. Secondly, the Iraqi government must quickly make 
tangible improvements to citizens lives in contested areas. The liberation of IS held territory is an 
opportunity for the Iraqi government to reinvent itself as a positive force. Since this opportunity 
is fleeting speed is more important than scale. Finally, the Iraqi government should not let the 
rebuilding crisis go to waste. Rebuilding will require a great deal of unskilled labor. The Iraqi 
government would be wise to use this opportunity to employ idle youth who might otherwise be 
recruited by IS. 

  



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Failure to Rebuild Local Security Institutions 
 The Iraqi government has not significantly invested in rebuilding local security forces. 
Instead, it has preferred to use PMF paramilitaries as a holding force (Knights, 2016). This is a 
two-fold mistake. First, as previously mentioned IS greatest fear is local Sunnis joining the 
security forces. Security forces have been most successful when they have cooperated with and 
integrated the local Sunni population. Islamic State leadership largely attributes the defeat of its 
predecessor organization ISI in 2008-2009 to the Sahwat (Hassan, 2018). The Sahwat were 
Sunni tribal paramilitary forces that assisted in the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq. In 
many ways the story of Sahwat is prophetic. Incredibly successful against ISI forces they were 
ultimately disbanded by the Maliki government which refused to integrate them into the national 
security forces. This inevitably led to the security vacuum which IS exploited in its rise to power. 
Secondly relying upon non-local security forces creates a clear division between the populace 
and the security forces. Instead of the situation being the central government and locals fighting 
together against IS it becomes the central government sending its forces to police the locals. In 
this second narrative, it is easy for IS to insert itself as the representative of the local population 
and the vehicle of liberation. Using PMF fighters to provide security in contested territory is 
particularly problematic due to their tainted reputation. 
 The central government does not have enough security resources to fully control the rural 
areas which IS now bases itself. There are large ungoverned zones in Iraq that provide the 
Islamic State with a secure area to rest, train and store equipment (Hassan, 2018). Areas such as 
the Diyala delta are characterized by rough terrain, rural nature and potentially supportive Sunni 
populations (Knights, 2016).  By refusing to build up local security forces the central Iraqi 
government only worsens its manpower deficiency. Building local security forces engages locals 
in the security process and enhances their ability to defend themselves. IS’s insurgency is 
primarily rural in nature which means that targets are geographically dispersed. Equally 
dispersed local security forces are necessary to provide comprehensive security and compliment 
the more concentrated central government forces. IS has made targeting village leaders who do 
not support the group a priority (Knights, 2018). So far IS has been successful in this campaign 
of terror. Local security units would degrade IS’s ability to conduct such attacks and thus their 
ability to exert control over rural communities. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Islamic State has been injured but not destroyed. In Iraq it has successfully 
transitioned to insurgency and is rapidly re-establishing itself. The Iraqi government has enabled 
this by feeding the IS narrative that the central government is intrinsically hostile to the Sunni 
population and only IS can protect and care for them. Domestic Iraqi support for IS generally 
stems from the populace’s disappointment in and distrust of the central government and its 
security forces. Therefore, if the Iraqi government were to address the populace’s grievances it 
could significantly degrade IS support base. It is essential that foreign partners understand that 
the struggle against IS has not ended and provide the Iraqi government with the support it 



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Zachary Cleary 
 

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requires. Further research on how IS’s international affiliates interact with the Iraqi insurgency 
could help guide further suggestions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  



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