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The Nuclear Awakening of China 
 

Emma Hamel 
 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
 
 

Abstract 
 
The People’s Republic of China, one of the biggest military presences in the world, has been 
rapidly expanding its once modest nuclear arsenal. This article will explore these developments 
and attempt to explain why China may be expanding its arsenal by looking at motivations arising 
from international conflicts. The article discusses the history of China’s nuclear weapons 
program, the current efforts to modernize its warheads, and the possible factors that may have 
spurred this development. The findings in this article showcase how Chinese territorial disputes 
with its neighboring countries, as well as possible nuclear tensions with the United States, are 
likely motivating China to improve its nuclear weapons program. Additionally, there is evidence 
that they are broadening their nuclear capabilities to become a leading nuclear power like the 
United States and Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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Although widely seen as an international military superpower, The People’s Republic of 
China kept a notoriously small nuclear arsenal throughout most of its history. In recent decades, 
however, the country has been developing its land, air, and sea-based nuclear armaments. China 
is expanding its nuclear arsenal in response to recent advancements in American military 
technology and a need to project power around its neighboring countries. 

 
History of China’s Nuclear Arms Program 

Since its conception in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has kept a limited nuclear 
arsenal. To date, the country only possesses 290 nuclear bombs and no tactical weapons, making 
it one of the smallest nuclear arsenals of the major world powers (Davenport & Reif, 2019). 
China also keeps a relatively small collection of RAM-type launchers for land-based missiles 
and bombers for air-based missiles. Moreover, unlike the United States and Russia, China does 
not keep nuclear warheads on nuclear launchers during peacetime and has a No First Use Policy, 
which dictates that China will only use a nuclear bomb in response to a nuclear strike. These 
factors suggest that China created a nuclear weapons program merely to display the country’s 
military prowess and diplomatic credibility, as well as deter nuclear harassment from other 
countries. The size of China’s nuclear capabilities may also be attributed to its unending amount 
of manpower. Chairman Mao Zedong was confident that the size of his country could adequately 
defend from any possible nuclear attack, famously stating, “I’m not afraid of nuclear war. … 
China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million 
people left” (“China's nuclear”, 2019). In an interview with an American journalist, he further 
expounds upon this idea, saying “The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries 
use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of 
mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types 
of weapon..” (“Talk with American”, 1946). Since then, nearly every Chairman of the People’s 
Republic has kept a small nuclear force until Chairman Jinping. Under Jinping’s administration, 
the Chinese nuclear triad made significant growth in the past two decades.The following sections 
will detail China’s current plans to update its nuclear weapons and attempt to explain why China 
is developing its nuclear arsenal.  

 
Current Efforts to Modernize 

China is making strides in its ‘nuclear triad’ by diversifying its nuclear capabilities across 
land, sea, and air. Since the early 2000’s, China has been developing new land based inter-
continental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers.  
Solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles such as Dong Feng (DF) class missiles are the newest and 
most impressive addition to China’s land-based arsenal. The latest version of these silo-based 
missiles, the DF-41, has a range of 15,000 km, can hold up to eight warheads, and has 
survivability thanks to its mobility (“How”, 2019). The DF-41 could potentially release the 
equivalent of 1 Megaton of TNT (“Dong Feng-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-5)”, 2019). China has 
roughly between 60-200 DF-21 missiles (“Dong Feng-21 (Dong Feng-21 / CSS-5)”, 2019) and 
25 DF-31 missiles deployed (“Dong Feng-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-5)”, 2019).  

The Nation’s ballistic missile-equipped submarines (similar to American SSBNs) and 
attack submarines are also being modernized. The Xia, a Jin-class submarine, is the only 
operational Chinese SSBN currently in use and are considered to be technologically primitive, as 
they are relatively noisy and therefore can be located easily (Farnsworth & Tamerlani & Taylor 
& Timothy, 2013). The Chinese submarines currently deployed are equipped with JL-2 missiles, 



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at-sea ballistic missiles (SLBM) that have a range of 8,000-9,000 km and are generally seen as 
less capable than American and Russian SLBMs, which have a greater range (Goldstein & 
Erickson, 2019). However, China is building five new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines that 
can hold 24 Julang-3 (JL-3) missiles, which is comparable to American and Russian SLBMs 
(China makes, 2018). 

Furthermore, China plans to bolster its once low-priority air-based delivery systems. The 
Chinese Air Force is currently developing a new bomber plane, the H-6K. The H-6K bomber is 
able to carry up to ten cruise missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers, and deliver the payload to 
a total range of 5000 kilometers. Additionally, Beijing may be seeking to develop a stealth 
bomber called the H-20 (Mizokami, 2020). This bomber is similar in design to the American B-2 
bomber, and may be ready to deploy as early as 2025.  

 
Possible Factors for Expansion 

The Chinese government officially states that its efforts to increase its nuclear arsenal are 
to strengthen its security (“China's Military”, 2015). However, many other factors may have 
influenced the sudden expansion. In recent decades, China has found itself in various 
international disputes. Tensions between the United States and China may have incentivised the 
nation to match the nuclear prowess of America. Additionally, China is also attempting to 
expand its borders, which has resulted in a number of territorial conflicts with other countries, 
such as the South China Sea dispute with the Philippines. The nation may be building its nuclear 
arsenal to defend or dissuade an attack from one of its competitors. 

American defense behavior has clearly impacted China’s military desires. Chinese 
government officials were alarmed when President George W. Bush pulled out of the 30-year-
old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Once the United States withdrew from the agreement, 
the country could develop missiles that could overpower China’s nuclear arsenal. Their 
suspicions were correct; the Bush administration and the following presidential administrations 
continued to heavily invest in missile defense systems. Recently, Chinese experts have taken 
particular interest in new American long-range missiles that can hit any target across the globe 
within an hour  (China's nuclear, 2019). With such a weapon, American forces could easily 
decimate China’s collection of nuclear warheads and launchers. It is clear that China is aware of 
the nuclear climate and understands that the United States is fully capable of destroying its 
nuclear arsenals. Thus, American nuclear efforts may have motivated China to develop new 
long-range missiles so the nation can counter such an attack. The newest line of the DF missile, 
the DF-41, is capable of hitting American soil from China within an hour (China's nuclear, 
2019). China is also preparing for a possibility of a American-Chinese nuclear conflict in it’s 
own backyard: The South China Sea.  

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have incentivized China to expand its naval 
nuclear capabilities. Three countries currently claim large sections of the South China Sea: the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and China. In July of 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague ruled that China was operating illegally in Philippine territory in the South China Sea. In 
the court’s holding, they state that China has historically not had an exclusive claim to the region 
and that the country is actively “interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration” 
(“The South China Sea”, 2016, p.2). China has ignored the court’s ruling and continues to 
operate in the region. (Territorial, n.d.). This comes as no surprise, as absolute control of the 
South China Sea would come with a multitude of benefits.  



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The South China Sea is a resource-rich area and is estimated to hold around 190 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of untapped oil, worth around $6 trillion 
(Territorial, n.d.). The islands located in the Sea also contain fishing areas and other natural 
resources estimated at around. With the South China Sea, China can amass around $5 trillion 
from trade and control one third of the world’s cargo that passes through the South China Sea. 
With this trade advantage, China may also be able to restrict trade to countries. Additionally, 
control of the South China Sea holds a significant military advantage. Satellite imagery shows 
that China is creating and increasing the size of islands in the sea, as well as constructing ports, 
airstrips, and other military facilities on them (Territorial, n.d.). All of these factors suggest that 
the South China Sea is of great economic and strategic value to China.  

China is clearly ready to defend its claim in the South China Sea as the nation recently 
conducted naval exercises in the area in April of 2018. The United States also has a significant 
military presence in the South China Seas to protect its security, political, and economic interests 
(Territorial, n.d.). China clearly views American influence in the region as its biggest threat. 
Thus, the country has been developing the JL-3 missile, which supposedly rivals the capabilities 
of missiles carried by American submarines and surface ships deployed in the South China Sea 
(Chan & Huang, 2019). With these weapons, China will be ready to retaliate against or 
discourage an attack from America and the other nations who disagree with China’s illegal 
claims. The development of these weapons indicates a possible arms-race between China and the 
United States, and that China aims to achieve a strong nuclear triad in its effort to become a 
major nuclear power.  

America is not the only nuclear threat concerning China. China has played an active role 
in the India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. China sees India as a concern, as the two nations have a 
territorial dispute at the Indo-Sino border. This has led China to supply aid to Pakistan, India’s 
largest nuclear rival. China provided funding and weapon designs to Pakistan until the mid-
1990’s (Burr, 2004).  Today, they still sell nuclear delivery vessels, such as submarines, to 
Pakistan (Hundley, 2018). This alliance may also suggest that China would send military support 
to Pakistan if the nation were to go to war with India. 

China’s support of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions may be attributed to the territorial 
conflicts between China and India. Specifically, both countries claim a large land mass in eastern 
Kashmir called Aksai Chin. Despite being uninhabitable, Aksai Chin is strategically important to 
the Chinese occupation of Tibet. In the region, the Chinese have built a highway to transport 
troops from Xinjiang to Tibet (Basrur, 2019). The construction of this highway sparked a violent 
conflict between India and China in 1962 and since then, China has completed the highway with 
little interference. 

Tibet is a crucial component of Chinese imperialism. Like the South China Sea, China 
wants Tibet for its strategic geographical location. With Tibet under Chinese control, China can 
reach the rest of Eurasia more readily, especially India. Tibet also has a lucrative mining industry 
and plentiful water sources which may be of interest to China (Why, 2008). The emphasis on 
Chinese control of Tibet may be the reason they have been increasing their military presence in 
the region and growing their collection of land-based nuclear weapons. 

As China’s influence in Aksai Chin and Tibet grows, the more likely China will protect 
its claim on the territory. There is a possibility of nuclear conflict over the region as violent 
attacks between the two countries have plagued the region for decades. The most recent attack in 
2019 was a bombing conducted by Islamic Militants that sparked both sides to conduct a number 
of air strikes in Pakistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir (Yusuf, 2019). Both Pakistan and India 



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have been refining their nuclear weapons should the conflict in Kashmir become worse. China 
may be inclined to produce land-based missiles to defend its claim on Aksai Chin. As previously 
discussed, China is developing a number of powerful short-ranged land missiles, some of which 
were deployed in China’s western provinces as recently as 2010 (Kristensen, 2010). This may 
signify that China is anticipating the risk of going to nuclear war with India, or is planning to use 
nuclear weapons as a means of deterring India from attacking. 

 
Conclusion 

China’s territorial expansion and tense relationship with the United States and its 
neighboring countries have made the possibility of nuclear war a very real threat. In response to 
these perceived international threats, China has been substantially expanding its nuclear 
capabilities. Although this may seem like a reasonable response to the current international 
climate, China should be cautious of how other countries perceive their efforts to bolster its 
nuclear weapons program. China’s competitors, such as the United States and Russia, could 
interpret this development as a threat and act accordingly by developing weapons to counter the 
new Chinese nuclear weapons.   

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



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