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Analysis of the Effects of Large-Scale Disasters on the Behavior of Non-State Violent
Actors in Countries Already Under Duress

Dylan Hyams

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

Over the course of human civilization, humanity has been exposed to major disruptions of
normalcy due to the onset of naturally occurring large-scale disasters. In the midst of disaster,
some societies have also dealt  with intrastate conflicts that strain the already depleted resources
necessary for the survival and support of established institutions and governance. At the forefront
of my research is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which established itself in the fourth quarter
of 2019 and has since then taken hundreds of thousands of lives and deteriorated several
economies around the world. For this paper, I will be analyzing the effects  that disasters have
with respect to the behavior of non-state violent actors (NSVAs) and subsequent influence on
conflict continuation, escalation, and de-escalation, as well as the NSVAs ability to legitimize
themselves in the view of the state and international community. I will be drawing on existing
literature, including the Ripe Moment Theory presented by Joakim Kreutz, to help explain
behavior and conflict before, during, and after a disaster; will be utilizing the ACLED Conflict
Database to track conflict intensity both before and during the pandemic; and will be providing
case studies from multiple regions around the world to provide different contexts for distinct
NSVAs. At the end of this paper, I come to the conclusion that the behavior of the NSVA and
conflict continuation, escalation, and/or de-escalation, in the midst of a disaster, is both
moderately dependent of the condition of the regime type, as well as the overall ambitions of the
actors in question, whether that be political motivations or motivations of other interests.
Additionally, I argue that states and NSVAs must come to a mutual agreement in the
establishment of relief services, and that states should attempt to negotiate with the NSVA in the
facilitation of the appropriate resources and guidance.

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Introduction
During the concluding months of the year 2019, a new deadly virus, COVID-19,

originating from Wuhan, China, had begun to spread rapidly across the world, without borders .
According to Johns Hopkins University, at the moment of writing this paper, nearly 63 million
people have been infected, and about 1.5 million have died from the virus (“COVID-19 Map”,
2020). The consequences of the virus have been severe; from global economic recessions to
widespread panic and strict enforcement of pandemic related restrictions, governments all over
the world have been struggling to contain the proliferation of the virus and ‘flatten the curve’.
While governments are busy fighting the virus and allocating extensive resources to its citizens,
non-state violent actors have taken advantage of weakened governments and have started their
own campaigns for the management of resources to populations in order to gain greater
legitimacy and support, as well as cooperating with the government, and in some cases,
continuing or escalating conflict.

Analysis of the behavior of non-state violent actors does not provide a concrete pattern in
which all actors fall into. Instead, the behavior relies on the past and current environments in
which they operate help predict the behavior of actors in future events. The culmination of this
paper cannot be applied to all situations; however, I hope to give a starting point to understand
the conditions and series of events that causes NSVAs and governments to either change or
continue their behaviors in the midst of a disaster.

Defining Disaster and Definitional Accommodations
Over the course of the research done for this paper, I have come across various

definitions that both fit and do not fit both the scope of the independent variable, the COVID-19
pandemic, that I am using to focus this research on. Therefore, I have discarded the concrete
definitions of natural disaster, epidemic, pandemic, and global health crisis for the broader and
greater-encompassing definition of disaster. This definitional choice was made in order to allow
for greater implementation of the results as well as the qualitative and quantitative data
represented in this paper to other events outside of the norm of the local or global community
and to allow myself to introduce significant features of Kreutz’ research into the behavior of
non-state violent actors in the midst of a natural disaster (2014) into this paper, where I focus on
a global health crisis; a phenomenon which does not fall under the narrow category of natural
disaster.40

To encompass a broader body of events that may occur around the world I have adopted
two definitions of ‘disaster’ that closely relate to each other and mangle them; one from the
World Health Organization (WHO), and the other from the International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). As defined by the IFRC, “[a] disaster is a sudden, calamitous
event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human,
material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability
to cope using its own resources” (“What is a disaster?”, 2020). In addition, the WHO defines
disaster as “an occurrence disrupting the normal conditions of existence and causing a level of
suffering that exceeds the capacity of adjustment of the affected community” (“Disasters &
Emergencies”, 2002, p. 3).

Through the interlacing of both definitions, we can conclude that a disaster involves three

40 Kreutz (2014) uses the term “armed separatist challengers” in place of my use of non-state violent actors (NSVA).

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key characteristics: the disruption of the condition of a community; the inability of a community
to fully cope with the situation using its own resources; and the suffering of a community due to
the destruction of human life, capital, and environment. This creation of an all-encompassing
definition of ambiguous events allows it to be utilized in cases pertaining to earthquakes,
hurricanes, pandemics, famine, drought, and others within the broad category. Therefore, the use
of this paper can be applied to different events that may take place or have already taken place in
order to better understand the behaviors of certain actors.

On the subject of the characterization of regime type and its polity, it is essential to define
the main terms associated with the classification of regime types that will be used in this paper.
For this, I will be using the “Center for Systemic Peace’s” (creators of the Polity IV Project)
definitions of democracy, anocracy, and autocracy. The Center defines democracy along three
elements: “the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” “the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and “the guarantee of civil liberties to all
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall et al., 2018, p. 14).
Furthermore, the Center defines anocracy as systems of government that are in “’transitions’
from one mode of authority to another” and “’incomplete transitions’ and the appearance of
‘incoherent’ polities” (Marshall et al., 2018, p. 9). This can be seen as a government stuck in the
transition period in which the country utilizes policies seen in both democratic as well as
autocratic countries. Autocracy, as defined by the Center, is “[sharply restricting] or
[suppressing] competitive political participation,” “their chief executives are chosen in a
regularized process of selection within the political elite”, and when “in office they exercise
power with few institutional constraints” (Marshall et al., 2018, p. 15).

Existing Literature to Be Utilized
In order to better understand how the different actors behave in the event of a disaster, we

must pull theoretical approaches from existing literature which provides both qualitative and
quantitative data supporting specific theories. The primary theoretical arguments that I will tie
into this paper come from Joakim Kreutz’ paper “From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters
Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?” and Kalyvas’ “A Theory of
Selective Violence.” Additionally, I will be using the papers, “COVID-19 and Armed Conflict,”
by Tobias Ide, and “Violent Non-State Actors and COVID-19: Challenge or Opportunity.” Each
of these papers provides information pertinent to explaining behavior as well as understanding
conflict continuity and legitimization of NSVAs on the political level.

The first, and most important, piece of research that I will be reviewing is Joakim
Kruetz’, “From Tremors to Talks.” Over the course of his paper, Kreutz focuses primarily on the
behavior of actors in Indonesia in the time period from 1990 – 2004 and looks at how the 2004
tsunami has affected ceasefires, negotiations, and peace agreements. To do this, he introduces his
argument that natural disasters create a “ripe moment for conflict resolution” since the
government needs to allocate its resources towards disaster response at the given moment (2012,
p. 482). Over the course of his research, Kreutz has come up with the Ripe Moment Theory; the
theory that external shocks to a state create incentives for the State to initiate conflict resolution
actions for those it is fighting against (2012, p. 483). The ‘Ripe Moment Theory’ has some
restrictions and assumptions, however. It assumes that the actors engaged in the armed conflict
are rational, in that they calculate the cost-benefit of their actions in the wake of a disaster

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(Kreutz, 2012, p. 484). Additionally, it assumes that the government is trying to stay in power
and that they are trying to maintain the public's  support as well as keep a positive public opinion
(Kreutz, 2012, p. 485). Finally, the theory argues that when a state government is experiencing
an increase in demand for resources from the public, it is more willing to negotiate with
non-state violent actors (Kreutz, 2012, p. 483).

Utilizing the ‘Ripe Moment Theory,’ and generating both qualitative and quantitative
data into an empirical analysis, Kreutz looks at 405 different disaster events in 21 different
countries, between the years 1990-2004, and has 50 different rebel groups (2012, p. 484).
Looking at conflict data from 12 months prior, then 12 months after the disaster event, Kreutz
finds support for his ‘Ripe Moment Theory.’ In his results, Kreutz finds that the onset of a
disaster is a catalyst for an increase in talks and ceasefires, and additionally finds that the onset
of a disaster does not relevantly act as a catalyst for ceasefires (2012, p. 493). In addition to these
results, Kreutz also finds that a disaster that occurs outside of a conflict zone is more likely to be
a catalyst for talks, ceasefires, and peace agreements (2012, p. 493).

In addition to this study, Kreutz also introduces a study on regime type with respect to
the ‘Ripe Moment Theory,’ and their likelihood to participate in either talks, ceasefire, or peace
agreements. He finds that talks are probable in both democracies and non-democracies;
ceasefires are more probable in democracies and have a significantly low probability in
non-democracies; and finally, he finds that peace agreements have a very low probability in both
democracies and non-democracies (2012, p. 494).

In conclusion, Kreutz paper highlights important data that I will be using to explain the
behaviors of non-state violent actors during disaster events and their interactions with the
standing government. As we can understand, the COVID-19 pandemic has generated shocks to
countries around the world, causing both governments and non-state actors alike to seek out
terms to provide support to the populations; whether it be for popular support and legitimization,
or because of political or social pressure.

The second academic paper that is important to my research is “COVID-19 and Armed
Conflict” by Tobias Ide (2020). Ide’s paper takes a look at how NSVAs have reacted to the
COVID-19 pandemic and how they take advantage of grievance and opportunity structures,
which influence armed conflict with respect to increasing or decreasing levels of violence and
conflict onset (Ide, 2020, p. 1). Over the course of his paper, Ide finds that three countries;
Afghanistan, Colombia, and Thailand, have experienced a decrease in violence by NSVAs in
order to increase their popular support through the provision of aid (2020, p. 8). Ide also finds,
however, that five countries have witnessed an increase in armed activity by NSVAs in India,
Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and the Philippines (2020, pp. 9-10).

Ide adds “that high levels of disease prevalence and the associated loss in life expectancy
reduces the relative risks of individuals for joining dangerous activities like rebellion” (2020, p.
4). This ties directly into the ‘collective action problem’ that Ide introduces, where, based on
individual cost-benefit analyses, it is less costly to join, in this case, a rebel group, than to not
join.

Through the use of the collective action problem, Ide argues that “high levels of disease
prevalence and the associated loss in life expectancy reduces the relative risks of individuals for
joining dangerous activities like rebellion” (2020, p. 4). Attaching itself to the collective action
problem, Ide adds that “GDP decline and poor health are also among the established predictors
of civil war” (2020, p. 2). Through this, he is conveying the idea that poor government control

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over economic and social services increases grievances against the State, providing a ripe
moment for the collective action problem to play out among individuals, and increase the
likelihood of conflict onset or escalation (2020, p. 2). While he finds that some countries have
seen a decrease in violence, Ide adds that although there may be a decline in violence, there is
still the possibility of violence escalation in the future as groups regroup and recruit for larger
scale conflict (2020, p. 11).

This paper is useful in understanding the reasons in which individuals turn to non-state
groups in order to provide personal protection and obtain sufficient resources for themselves
when the government is unable to provide or isn’t providing. Through the use of the collective
action problem and the idea of grievances and opportunity, Ide sets a foundation for
understanding cost-benefit analysis during a pandemic, which can be broadly used in conjunction
with the broad definition of disasters. In addition, Ide presents and looks at specific case studies
in the eight countries listed above, in which some will be expanded on later in this paper.

The third significant research set that I will be using to explain the behavior of actors in
the midst of a disaster is Kalyvas’, “A Theory of Selective Violence,” in his book “The Logic of
Violence in Civil War.” Within this chapter, Kalyvas explains many different approaches as to
the behavior of the incumbent government, insurgent forces, and civilians. However, later in the
chapter, Kalyvas adds a theory and model of the use of violence (a behavior) by the incumbent
and/or the insurgents, given certain environmental conditions. He starts on the idea that the
“theory of selective violence [is] a joint process” and that “actors operating in a regime of
fragmented sovereignty must rely on selective violence to deter defection” (Kalyvas, 2011, p.
173).

While much of this chapter looks at defection and denunciation during civil war, Kalyvas
introduces a theory with equal importance that looks at the use of violence based on territorial
control. He assumes that “[p]olitical actors maximize territorial control” and “when one actor
abandons a territory, the rival actor moves in” (Kalyvas, 2011, p. 196). Additionally, Kalyvas
notes that although his theory focuses on the aspect of civil wars, he notes that “the theory can be
further refined and expanded… [allowing] the derivation of robust hypotheses about the
variation of violence across wars, as well as across several types of violence – from organized
crime to terrorism and genocide” (2011, p. 208). Through the addition of this, Kalyvas grants the
use of this theory to be expanded on in other scenarios; which I plan on doing with relation to
disasters and group behavior.

Turning our attention to his theory of the use of violence with respect to control, Kalyvas
notes that there are five levels of control and violence type behavior, and simplifies it on a
two-dimensional graph (2011, p. 204). Kalyvas’ theory revolving around control and violence
says; when control by either an government/insurgent/criminal/or other violent group is high,
then the violence will be low (zones 1 and 5); whereas, on the other hand, if the control is low,
then he expects violence to be high (zones 2 and 4). In zone 3, where both actors have equal
control, the level of violence is expected to be low due to both actors attempting to win over the
populace, therefore not risking violence (2011, p. 204).

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With relation to this paper and the behaviors of non-state violent actors, Kalyvas’ theories
can be applied to better understand the circumstances in which groups may agree to either
conflict escalation or de-escalation through the control variable and how it is used to predict
whether or not the actor will use violence. When looking at this through the scope of a disaster, I
expect to see zones of control between the government and NSVAs, in which resources help
determine who the populace turns to for governance related purposes, thereby legitimizing an
actor.

Research and Hypotheses
As shown in previous sections, the term, ‘disaster’ has a broad meaning and can act as a

catalyst for the emergence of new events within the dimensions of conflict and legitimization of
non-state violent actors. When a disaster has a significant effect on a country, it diverts resources,
aid, money, and manpower to relief missions in order to mitigate the damage done to the State.

Through the union of the ripe moment theory, collective action problem, and the theory
of selective violence, I come up with two main research questions:

1. How does the COVID-19 pandemic affect the legitimization of non-state violent actors
within countries whose governments have limited resources and outreach?
2. How does COVID-19 affect conflict continuation, escalation, and/or de-escalation?

While I focus on the COVID-19 pandemic, I plan this paper to be applicable to disaster’s in
general and am using the current state of the world as a primary example for proof of concept.

For my hypotheses, I will be setting dependent and independent variables, as well as
recognizing a control variable. The independent variable (IV) is the COVID-19 pandemic and
was chosen due to the fact that it is an international disaster that has had a great effect on the
current status of a country and its systems. I assume that over the period of time that this paper is
being written that the pandemic will be ongoing and not drastically change.

For my dependent variables (DV), I have come up with four different variables that can
change based on the current state of a disaster (ongoing or ended). The first dependent variable
that I want to introduce is the response of groups. Under this DV, the response of groups is
characterized in a couple different ways. The first way in which the response of groups is
characterized is in how they react. Reactions can consist of doing nothing, increasing activity in
the political landscape of the country, enforcing  guidelines, along with many more. The
response of the group will help in the determination of the group’s goals and their capabilities as

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a non-state actor. Another way in which response will be measured is whether or not they
continue normal operations or divert their resources to providing relief and aid to the local
population.

The third, fourth, and fifth dependent variables each relate to one another and can occur
concurrently with each other depending on the current state of the disaster. The first of the three
is conflict continuation. In conflict continuation, NSVAs can decide whether or not to continue
their conflict with the State in the same capacity that they were prior to the onset of the disaster.
The second of the three is conflict escalation and is when the NSVA increases their fight with the
State and allocates more resources to their fight in order to push the State into greater levels of
distress. The third of the three is conflict de-escalation and can occur when the NSVA eases their
use of force against the State or ceases their force altogether . Conflict de-escalation does not
necessarily imply direct cooperation and an end to the conflict, but can include ceasefire
agreements, disengagement of forces, or withdrawal from the conflict for a period of time.

In addition to the IV and DVs presented, I have drawn up one conditional variable,
regime type. The political stance of the regime, in many ways, can predict the type of behavior a
country’s government and military would have to a disaster, as well as their likelihood of
reacting in certain ways to the NSVA. Types of regimes range on the polity scale from -10 to 10,
with -10 being fully autocratic and 10 being fully democratic. Within and among the labels of
autocratic and democratic lay different subsets of regime type that can include, but are not
limited to; full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, and autocracy (Marshall
et al., 2018).

With the variables now defined, I will turn to my first hypothesis, which states:
H1: The onset of a disaster provides fertile ground for non-state violent actors to
legitimize themselves among the international community and their local
population.

I predict that when a disaster occurs, NSVAs, who have greater political ambitions, are more
likely to try and win the hearts and minds of the population through different means. Through
winning the hearts and minds of the people, these groups will be able to effectively gain the
support within the country’s political landscape and can secure their legitimacy in the
international landscape through recognition by different countries for their relief efforts.

The second hypothesis that I will turn to is:
H2: The onset of a disaster de-escalates conflict and violent behavior of non-state
violent actors.

For this hypothesis, I predict that in the midst of a disaster, NSVAs will, instead of escalating or
continuing conflict with the state, they will de-escalate in order to allocate additional resources to
local populations, as well as to keep local populations under control through the provision of
their own rules and systems of governance.

When a disaster hits a country, we have seen instances in which groups actively ask the
government for help in order to provide necessary aid to their populations (“Bringing Within
Reach”, 2020, p. 1). In turn, this cooperation between actors actively de-escalates conflict
through the mutual building of a relationship between the NSVA and government around a
similar cause (“Bringing Within Reach”, 2020, p. 2).

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Even though disaster may positively impact conflict de-escalation, there are places in
which NSVAs already have the foothold they need on the population, and thus do not need to
dis-engage from conflict. This leads to my third hypothesis:

H3: The onset of a disaster does not deescalate conflict, but instead has an
adverse effect and escalates the violent behavior of NSVAs.

When looking at the aspect of conflict escalation in the midst of a disaster, I take into account
the goals of the NSVA as well as the resources and the foothold they have in their space of
influence.

The final hypothesis that I will be presenting deals with the conditioning variable and the
incumbent. In this I argue that:

H4: In States below the democracy governance type polity score threshold, there
should be an increase in conflict amid a disaster, and in States under democratic
governance type, there should be a decrease in conflict amid disaster.

I come across this assumption as democratic states should be more willing to listen to their
populations as governments face re-election. Autocratic governments, I predict, are more likely
to increase  their use of violence because they are less likely to have to answer to their
populations, and are more likely to attempt to control dissent within their State.

With these four hypotheses spelled out, I will turn to both qualitative and quantitative
research to either prove or disprove them and provide current case studies through news articles
and research papers in order to provide concrete support for my arguments. While my list is not
exhaustive, I have picked out areas of the world with the most coverage and have plentiful data
generated over the years, which help draw out a clear pattern.

Case Studies

Mexico
The situation, as it relates to the COVID-19 pandemic, in Mexico is complex and

involves many NSVAs which are characterized as cartels and fight both amongst each other as
well as against the incumbent government. Among the cartels in Mexico, six separate cartels, the
two most prominent being the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels, have started disaster relief and
enforcement efforts in territories under their control. Looking at Mexico broadly, the ACLED
database shows that for conflict events and fatalities between the months of January 2020 and
May 2020, there have been spikes in both, reaching a new homicide record for the State in
March 2020 (Gutierrez et al., 2020). Additionally, ACLED finds that in Mexico, the states of
Baja California, Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Colima, and Mexico have seen an exponential
increase in violence against civilians after March 2020.

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Even though Mexico has been a hot spot with cartel violence for many years, the
pandemic has created ways of the cartels to gain an upper hand on the government and to win
social control over the populations (Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 12). According to Bunker and
Sullivan, the Mexican cartels have been engaged in activities that are seen as equivalent to the
provision of humanitarian aid, and have been using this aid to gain the public support and to use
it as propaganda, to further their claims that they are the “protector of the community” (2020, p.
1). Additionally, Bunker and Sullivan recognize two other unique activities that cartels have
started to engage in; “special taxing of businesses to provide that aid, and quarantine
enforcement” (2020, p. 12).

While some groups do not have the resources on hand to provide aid to their respective
populations, Jones and Hale find that many have turned to “Social Banditry” and “Robin Hood”
strategy (2020, p. 1; Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 12). The “Robin Hood” strategy is the taking of
resources from the government and the rich and giving it to the poor or suffering communities in
order to undermine government attempts to help the communities (Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p.
12).  “Social Banditry” is when “cartels [publicize] their distribution of food via pantries to
portray themselves as “Robin Hoods” (Jones & Hale, 2020, p. 1). By using these strategies to
win over the population, the cartels are able to cement their legitimacy in which they operate and
can then utilize the local populations to their advantage, whether it be as lookouts or as “a layer
of protection when authorities target them” (De Cordoba, 2020, p. 1; Jones & Hale, 2020, p. 2).

Over the past couple months, since the COVID-19 pandemic started, as well as during
instances of other disasters to hit Mexico, drug cartels have been sending out aid packages to
their local populace in order to help them make it through the pandemic. These aid packages
often come in boxes that advertise the cartel and contain items such as: oil, sugar, rice, cereal,
coffee, cookies, tuna, soups, milk, as well as household products such as “toilet paper… and
soap” (Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 1; Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 5). So far, it is estimated that
cartels have handed out aid packages in 11 of Mexico’s States, and the provision of these is seen
as a phenomenon of the Mexican cartels (Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 12; De Cordoba, 2020, p.
2).

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In addition to providing aid to their local populace, Mexican drug cartels have also been
enforcing quarantine and curfews as well as imposing punishment on dissenters. This has been
seen in use by the Sinaloa Cartel, who operate in and around the Mexican State of Jalisco
(“Sinaloa Cartel”, 2019). Bunker and Sullivan note that both the Sinaloa Cartel and the Los
Grandos Cartel have been enforcing a quarantine and curfew, while the Sinaloa Cartel has been
issuing punishment through the use of hitmen who are armed with a wooden paddle (2020, p. 6;
2020, p. 10). By enforcing these restrictions on movement, the Cartels have been greatly
increasing their legitimacy to the State of Mexico to the point that the President is considering
the possibility of amnesty to some members for their support (Bunker & Sullivan, 2020, p. 1).

Regime and Polity
According to the CIA World Factbook, the government of Mexico is a federal

presidential republic, with a national congress and judicial branch. The legal system is reportedly
influenced by US constitutional law and involves judicial review (“The World Factbook:
Mexico”, 2018). As of 2015, Mexico’s federal presidential republic earned a Polity IV score of 8,
giving it the status of “Democracy” (Marshall et al., 2018).

Afghanistan
Similar to the drug trade in Mexico, the Taliban are a non-state violent actor that profits

off of poppy in Afghanistan in order to produce heroin. The Taliban, however, are also
designated as a terrorist organization and are working towards legitimacy on the international
stage. In February 2020, the Taliban and the United States signed a peace deal as the United
States prepared to demobilize troops to the country. Despite the deal, The Economist finds that
since the deal and since the pandemic started, Taliban attacks have risen 70% (“The Taliban”,
2020).

Although the Taliban are seen as a terrorist network by many countries, they have been
involved with the government of Afghanistan for decades. After the September 11, 2001 attacks,
the United States overthrew them from power.  Since then, however, they have been making a
more legitimate comeback into power. In response to COVID-19, they have opened up their
territories to the Afghanistan Health Ministry, as well as the WHO, who says it is directly
working with the group on COVID-19 related challenges. The Taliban are also taking a direct
approach to the utilization of their resources and have been seen deploying “hygiene workers
dressed in white personal protective clothing and carrying spraying tanks” as well as converting
schools into quarantine centers (Marx et al., 2020, p. 2).

Given the impact of COVID-19 on Afghanistan and the response by the Taliban to push
themselves into a ‘for the people’ role, they have acknowledged the fact that because they have
so little cases, they will continue fighting (Marx et al., 2020, p. 1). When analyzing conflict data
from Afghanistan as it relates to the Taliban, after the US-Taliban Peace Agreement, there has
been a decrease in overall conflict events that take place. Prior to the Peace Agreement, events
and fatalities were still occurring at a high rate despite the ongoing pandemic. These numbers are
available below and show that while the Peace Agreement hasn’t shown a long-term
positive effect, the onset of COVID-19 has a correlative effect on the decrease of violence.

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Regime and Polity

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The CIA World Factbook characterizes the government of Afghanistan as a presidential
Islamic republic with a national assembly and judicial branch of various court systems, the
highest being the Supreme Court (“The World Factbook: Afghanistan”, 2018). As of the year
2015, Afghanistan received a Polity IV score of 1, up from -7 between 1996 to 2004. A score of
1 gives Afghanistan the status of a “Open Anocracy,” however the Polity IV Project
characterizes the country as a “Failed State” (Marshall et al., 2018)

Lebanon
In Lebanon, the country is uniquely divided into two regions, North and South, both

under the same government, however the South is mainly under the control of the
Iranian-backed, anti-Israel Shiite Hezbollah movement. Due to the State support and resources
that Hezbollah has, “[t]he paramilitary group is marshalling its deep resources in the fight against
coronavirus using a corps of volunteers, doctors and facilities to carve out a prominent role in the
crisis-driven response” of the incumbent (Knecht, 2020, p. 1). By allocating its own resources,
while funding and providing support to the health ministry, Hezbollah is “fill[ing] gaps in state
services to gain influence” and is trying to further legitimize itself into State politics and on the
international community by taking pressure off of the State (Todman, 2020, p. 7; Trew, 2020, p.
6). Similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah is trying to show that only they can control
the pandemic in Lebanon and that they have the necessary resources to do so (Todman, 2020, p.
6).

Hezbollah has also been taking a direct approach to fighting off the virus and providing
relief aid to those under its control. Reuters reported that “[Hezbollah] rolled out one of two new
testing centers, a fleet of ambulances – many equipped with ventilators – and an entire hospital
repurposed for coronavirus patients” (Knecht, 2020, p. 3). In addition to this they have been
sending their own doctors to government run hospitals as well as setup a “call center, three
quarantine centers with 170 beds and a capacity to scale up to 1,000, and 64 social committees to

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monitor the needs of families hit by the economic fallout” (Knecht, 2020, p. 7). Due to the sharp
increase of resources to the population under their control as well as to the populations under
government control, Hezbollah is further solidifying itself as being able to provide for the people
and govern the people, thus setting itself up as a legitimate political actor.

Since November 2019, Lebanon has experienced an increase in both peaceful and violent
(riot) protests as well as a decrease in battles, violence against civilians, and explosions/remote
violence with respect to previous years (Carboni, 2020). The most prominent events that have
been taking place in Lebanon are primarily around the four cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, and
Zahle.

Regime and Polity
Regarding the government of Lebanon, the CIA characterizes their system as a

parliamentary republic with a National Assembly and a judicial system consisting of courts at
various levels, the highest being the Supreme Court (“The World Factbook: Lebanon”, 2018).
The Polity IV Project, as of 2015, gives Lebanon a polity score of 6, which characterizes it as a
“Democracy” (Marshall et al., 2018).

Yemen
The final country of interest that has been severely torn by civil war in the past decade

and has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic is Yemen. For many years, Yemen has been
struggling with famine and civil war, which has severely impacted the ability of the government
to allocate necessary resources to key populations and is currently home to the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis in which “millions remain at risk of starvation” (Aksoy, 2020, p. 1). This
situation has allowed strong non-state violent actors to intervene in Yemeni territorial
sovereignty with the backing of the rogue regime in Iran.

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According to the ACLED data on Yemen, the southern regions of the country have
witnessed a sharp increase in conflict events and fatalities, one month after the country reported
its first COVID-19 case. In September 2020, there was an additional period of exponentially
higher conflict events between the Houthi’s and anti-Houthi forces, as well as other NSVAs
operating in-country (Carboni, 2020). In addition to the increase in conflict, Yemen has
experienced a decrease in drone and airstrikes since the beginning of the pandemic (Carboni,
2020)

In the far northwestern area of Yemen, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebel movement holds
tight control of major cities and populations, and currently exercises its own central control over
its areas of influence. While the government is occupied with the ongoing conflict and famine,
the Houthi’s have taken it upon themselves to establish their own countermeasures to the
COVID-19 pandemic in order to increase their own narratives (Alasrar, 2020, p. 2). According to
Alasrar, the Houthi’s leadership is deflecting the blame for the spread of the pandemic onto their
adversaries, primarily stating that the “spread of the epidemic is a result of ‘Saudi-led
aggression'’” (2020, p. 3).

In response to the pandemic, the Houthi leadership within Yemen, in conjunction with
Iranian support, has begun to provide relief services and disaster resources within their sphere of
influence. Accordingly, the Houthi movement has announced that they will be combatting the
virus in many ways, including, “establishing a hotline to report cases and symptoms, training
medical teams in districts under their control, opening medical quarantine units, and introducing
testing for suspected cases” (Alasrar, 2020, p. 4). While this seems like a legitimate plan, the
Houthi movement’s trust is relatively low among the population due to previous failures in
mitigating relief efforts, however, if successful, this will help legitimize the movement under the
influence of their controlled populations.

Regime and Polity
In Yemen, the CIA writes that the government is “in transition,” and consists of a

parliament and a judicial system with various courts, the highest being the Supreme Court (“The
World Factbook: Yemen”, 2018). As of 2015, the Polity IV Project gives Yemen a polity score of
3, which marks it as a “Open Anocracy” (Marshall et al., 2018).

Analysis and Findings
Up until this point in the paper, I have provided concrete information on the nature of a

disaster, have defined regime types, presented hypotheses based off of published theoretical
papers, and have provided qualitative and quantitative data in case studies to show the affect that
non-state violent actors have during situations involving disasters. In this next section, I will take
each hypothesis and, using the information presented, show evidence as to whether or not the
hypothesis holds or does not hold. The outcomes will not be a catch all, but instead be a starting
point for understanding specific behaviors in certain areas of the world and regime types.

Through the use of the ACLED database as well as the Polity IV Project database, I was
able to compare and contrast the different case studies involved and correlate that data with my
hypotheses. In my first hypothesis, in which I hypothesize that disasters allow non-state violent
actors to legitimize themselves among the international community as well as the local
populations; from the data presented, I conclude that in three out of the four cases presented, this
hypothesis holds. Via the legitimization witnessed being attributed to the groups, the Ripe
Moment Theory helps explain hypothesis 1.

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In Mexico, the Cartels have gained footholds within their respective communities in
which they can then use to benefit themselves against the government. Additionally, the Mexican
government has recognized the behaviors of the Cartels and has considered offering amnesty in
exchange for the humanitarian aid they are providing to the populace. In this case, the
government is legitimizing them by recognizing their status as groups who hold territorial
control, thus providing a pathway to the political sphere of Mexico.

In Lebanon and Afghanistan, both the Taliban and Hezbollah have similar approaches in
the way they have responded and are both already involved in the political landscapes of their
respective countries. However, as noted before, they have most recently taken advantage of the
pandemic to further their own political ambitions with both the international community and the
local populations under their territorial control. Each has  shown interest over the years of
furthering their political power in their country’s government and have taken steps to increase
their legitimacy during the pandemic. We have witnessed both providing healthcare assistance to
their populations as well as providing the enforcement of safety measures to help mitigate the
spread of COVID-19.

The Taliban, a former government of Afghanistan before the United States overthrew
them after 9/11, has been working its way back up to power through international channels. The
pandemic has allowed them to further solidify their position through their allowance of the
World Health Organization into their territories as well as creating quarantine centers and
administering personal protective equipment (Marx et al., 2020, p. 2).

Hezbollah’s approach in Lebanon, as mentioned previously, has taken a stance parallel
with the Lebanese government and health ministry, setting up new healthcare infrastructure and
employing thousands of physicians (Diwan & Abi-Rached, 2020, p. 4). While the group
currently has 13 out of 128 seats in the Lebanese Parliament, their actions during the pandemic
could help increase their influence, especially in the South. (“Interior Ministry”, 2018)

In the case of the Houthis in Yemen, although they are attempting to provide aid to their
local populations, many years of conflict has exponentially decreased their ability to gain public
trust and support. Prior to the pandemic, Yemen was in the middle of the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis, and has only gotten worse (Aksoy, 2020, p. 1). According to Fatima Alasrar,
while the Houthis have been setting up care services in areas under their control, their trust is
exponentially low due to their failures in the past (2020, p. 4). Because of this, it can be inferred
that their position in politics is not considered legitimate and is degrading.

Therefore, given these four case studies and the information that comes with them, while
not apparent in every situation, the onset of a disaster can and does have an effect of the
legitimization of non-state violent actors as long as they manage their resources, cooperate with
the State, and provide sufficient relief efforts to the population.

The second set of hypotheses that I will be going over is the idea that disaster
de-escalates conflict between non-state violent actors and the government or other groups, and
that disaster increases conflict between non-state violent actors and the government or other
groups. When going through the data on these hypotheses’, I find that the results given the case
studies are inconclusive based on a number of factors. For this, the ACLED database will be my
primary source of data, which shows conflict events in correlation with time, particularly in the
time-period after the pandemic began.

In Yemen, the country experienced a sharp increase in conflict events and fatalities
beginning in May 2020, one month after the pandemic was first declared within their borders

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(Carboni, 2020). Since then there has been a relatively steady amount of conflict events within
the country, however this number still exceeds pre-COVID numbers (Carboni, 2020). Most of
the ongoing fighting in Yemen is most likely due to the low trust factor that the population has
with the Houthis, and over the control of aid resources, which are currently scarce as the
Houthi’s blame Saudi Arabia’s blockade, given the famine and pandemic are ongoing, (Alasrar,
2020, pp. 3-4).

Much like Yemen, Mexico has seen an increase in violence among non-state violent
actors, most notably with the cartels. In Mexico, with the many cartels operating within the
borders, the groups often claim territorial control over areas. While a disaster is ongoing, and
resources and supplies become limited, there is not only an increase in fighting with the
government, but among cartels with homicides increasing by about 2.2% “during the first quarter
of 2020 (Jones & Hale, 2020, p. 1). Duncan Wood, the Director of the Mexico Institute, supports
that claim saying that “in Mexico violence has gone up through the pandemic” (“Violent
Non-State”, 2020, p. 2).

In the previous hypothesis, I stated that there is a possibility to have less conflict between
the government and the cartels while they provide for their populations and legitimize
themselves within the State. However, among the cartels, there is an expected increase in
violence due to the territorial claims and resources that come with them. As the groups look to
provide greater resources to their ‘constituents,’ they are more likely to expand into rival group
territories, thus sparking violence. In addition, Jones & Hale add that violence has not decreased
in Mexico during the pandemic because the disease is seen as having a 2% chance of death
associated with it, whereas the cartels are seen as a greater threat than combating the disease
(2020, p. 5).

In Lebanon, while there has been a rise in riots, violence against civilians and remote
violence and explosions have dramatically decreased in comparison to the past three years.
While riots are a type of violence, they can include a multitude of different groups or individuals;
whereas, instances of explosions and other remote violence activity, which is more likely the
work of a non-state violent actor group, have declined. Therefore, Lebanon’s case has mixed
results and adds to the inconclusiveness of this hypothesis.

The final piece of hypotheses 2 and 3 is the case of Afghanistan, who despite the peace
deal signed in February, has witnessed a fluctuation of political violence among non-state violent
actors within the country. As shown in the table on page 18, there is a relative decrease in
violence in the country with relation to the onset of the pandemic. ACLED states that most
violence attributed to the Taliban happens outside of Taliban controlled territory, and is against
the government, however, is lower compared to data of Taliban violence in the previous year
(Kishi, 2020; Mehvar, 2020). In conjunction with the data, I can conclude that COVID-19 has
caused violence by non-state violent actors, specifically the Taliban, in Afghanistan to decrease.

Concluding hypotheses 2 and 3, the data shows the COVID-19 pandemic has had mixed
effects on the violent behaviors of NSVAs and that although the virus has an exponential effect
on populations, each group is different with how they react. With Mexico, some parts of Kreutz’
Ripe Moment Theory hold, with the government offering amnesty and concessions for further
cartel cooperation. In other areas, such as Afghanistan, even a peace deal hasn’t been able to stop
the fighting, despite the ongoing pandemic; and in Yemen, where the pandemic has been added
to the backdrop of an already deteriorating country in the midst of a famine, fighting over
territory continues between the government and non-state violent actors within the country with

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no real end in sight.
The final hypothesis in which I have presented and will now be analyzing with the data

and theories presented is that states below the democratic polity score threshold should
experience an increase in conflict amidst a disaster, while democratic states should see a decrease
in conflict amidst a disaster. As shown earlier, Mexico has a polity score of 8; Afghanistan a 1;
Lebanon a 6, and Yemen a 3. None of these dip below the -6 score which is a conditional of an
autocracy, however two are autocracies (transitioning), while the other two are not-full
democracies. Despite this, the data can still show a pattern of behavior in correlation with
disaster onset.

Mexico, considered a democracy by the Polity IV Project, has recently seen an increase
in violence despite their score. With Mexico, despite them being a democracy, the most likely
factor in which conflict has risen instead of fallen is due to the ongoing drug war within the
country as well as the fight for resources during the pandemic. Another country that is
considered a democracy (although riding the line) by the Polity IV Project is Lebanon. As we
saw earlier, the Lebanese case is mixed, as there has been a decrease in certain forms of violence,
while other forms have increased. Therefore, with these two countries the first part of the
hypothesis, that democracies yield less conflict in the midst of disaster, does not hold.

Starting with Yemen, who has a polity score of 3, which according to the Polity IV
Project is an anocracy, has experienced an increase in conflict. An anocracy is considered a
government in transition, and conflict should be expected to increase during that time, therefore,
this assumption is corroborated by the second part of the hypothesis. However, Afghanistan has
seen a relative decrease in violence, despite its polity score being the lowest out of the four cases,
at 1. This also indicates that Afghanistan is an anocracy and its government is in transition. With
both Yemen and Afghanistan in mind, the second part of the hypothesis, that non-democratic
states see a rise in conflict amidst disaster, does not hold.

Conclusion
At the outset of this paper, I looked to show a correlation between the onset of disasters

and its relationship with the behavior of governments and non-state violent actors amidst
conflict. With the case studies, analyses, and hypotheses presented, I have shown that while
disaster may not be causation, there is definitely correlation with behaviors. My hypotheses
showed within the case studies presented; that onset of disasters correlate with NSVAs
progressing their legitimacy within their country of influence; disaster onset has had mixed
outcomes with respect to conflict escalation or de-escalation; and democratic as well as
non-democratic countries do not have a definitive correlation with conflict escalation or
de-escalation amidst disaster.

The conclusions that I have come to given the hypotheses presented are not exclusive to
the case studies presented nor should they be used unilaterally to explain behaviors in other
conflicts. The information presented in an analysis and collection of observations and studies of
behavior during a specified time period under exceptional circumstances, the COVID-19
Pandemic. The Ripe Moment Theory, presented by Kreutz, is one of the most prevalent theories
for providing an explanation to the behaviors of NSVA behavior during a disaster. Given the
information presented, it is also possible that disaster may have an opposite effect on conflict
than previously thought. Disaster, may in fact, mitigate the onset of conflict and in many cases
end or suspend violence between actors.

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Some ideas that I was unable to include in this paper, but suggest for future study and
research include the post-disaster behaviors, such as the status of the conflict and levels of
violence, as well as changes in the political atmospheres of the countries. Additionally, future
studies should look at countries outside of the limited regions that I have selected and look for
correlation and differences between regions as well as a more in-depth analysis of regime type
and conflict.

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