





































Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 

 Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

                                       ISSN 2574-6081   E-ISSN 2574-609X 

Published by CRIBFB, USA 

 

106 

THE SPILLOVER OF THE COFFEE: MATERIAL 

MISSTATEMENTS AT (UN) LUCKIN COFFEE INC. 
 

Dr. Gagan Kukreja 

Associate Professor 

Department of Accounting, Finance and Banking 

College of Business and Finance 

Ahlia University, Bahrain 

E-mail: gkukreja@ahlia.edu.bh 

 

ABSTRACT 

The research investigates alleged material misstatements in the financials of Luckin Coffee, a 

Chinese company listed in NASDAQ. The research is exploratory and based on publicly 

available information. The financial data has been obtained from their quarterly and annual 

reports submitted to Securities and Exchange Commission. The research shows the alleged 

corruption by inflating sales and profits by C-suite executives of the company. Nevertheless, 

before doing so, what failures in corporate governance led to this crisis? The admission of such 

material misstatements resulted in a massive loss to the investors and shaken the investment 

community’s trust once again. The research tried to determine what kind of audit procedures 

should have been implemented to earlier detection of fraud? What should have been done to 

protect stakeholders? What extra measures should the U.S. stock exchange take into 

consideration before listing foreign companies? What kind of ethical standards must be taught to 

the students/future executives to avoid such material misstatements? How can accounting bodies 

address such material misstatements? How can audit procedures be improved? This research 

will facilitate the policymakers, accounting and auditing regulators, board and various other 

stakeholders to deter, detect and mitigate such financial material misstatements and offers 

recommendations.  

Keywords: Accounting Scam, Analytical Procedures, Audit Procedures, Confirmation 

Procedure, Material Misstatements. 

JEL Classification Codes: M41, M42, M48, M148. 

 

INTRODUCTION 

In October 2017, the war of market share of coffee sales started in China after the foundation of 

Luckin Coffee, a new startup, by Jenny Qian Zhiya. Jenny wanted to introduce coffee as part of 

life to the Chinese people. She believed that tea drinkers dominated the Chinese market, yet there 

were ample opportunities in the untapped coffee market. Jenny always gave credit to caffeine for 

her ability to work overtime in her jobs. She was in the firm belief that there is space for another 

coffee selling company that can position itself in front of international coffee market players 

such as Starbucks and Costa. 

Along with Jenny, the CEO, Jian Lu, the COO, and Reinout Hendrik Schakel, the CFO 

pledged to write Luckin’s success story. However, on April 2, 2020, the announcement of the 



https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

107 

inflated sales by the COO was on every newspaper’s headline. The COO admitted a huge 

inflated sale of Q3 and Q4 of 2019 sales and overstated marketing expenses. It turned the super 

success story into a failed one.  

When introducing coffee to an audience bound to tea through religion, culture, and 

history and having competitors that took ground in the coffee industry for many years, it might 

be a tough job for many. However, Jenny, Jian, and Reinout made it look like a piece of cake 

when the number of stores jumped from 1,300 in October of 2018 to 4,507 at the end of 2019, 

which crushed Starbucks store number who entered the market in 1999 and had 4,200 stores (J. 

Wang, 2020). Surprisingly, that is a small ratio of the eye-watering growth demonstrated by 

Luckin coffee. 

The retail trader “Wall street bets” was a happy trader after placing a trade at $49, and he 

might have felt “Luckin” as the company was the greatest, and it was releasing astonishing 

numbers (Winck, 2020). Although Luckin stands for luck, Wall Street bets were not lucky when 

the stock took an 80% nosedive on April 2, 2020, which cost him $252,000 or, in other words, 

his whole life savings.   

 

Brief Profile of the Management 

Jenny Zhiya was the founder and CEO of Luckin Coffee. She served as a former Operations 

Executive at UCAR, an on-demand chauffeured car service.  

Jian Liu served as Head of Yield Management before taking on the positing of Chief 

Operating Officer at Luckin coffee.  

Reinout Hendrik Schakel was an Executive Director of Consumer & Retail at Standard 

Chartered Bank, before taking on the position of CFO at Luckin, and still has a job as CFO in 

Ruixing Coffee Bejing Co Ltd. Reinout, unlike the CEO and COO, was not terminated from his 

position at Luckin Coffee to date. 

 

Coffee Found a Home at China 

Emerging markets like China, Brazil, and India have witnessed changing demographics, cultural 

transformations, and economic growth (Javalgi & Grossman, 2016). In addition to a rising 

middle class, all those prospects combined make emerging markets attractive for international 

investors worldwide (Ferreira & Ferreira, 2018). According to the coffee market analysis, the 

growth rate of coffee consumption in China is 20% annually, which is 2% above the global 

growth rate (COFFEBI, 2019). The International Coffee Organization (ICO) also stated that “the 

rising popularity of coffee shops and coffee culture, in general, is promoting growth in fresh 

roast and ground coffee (Global Coffee Report, 2019). As the Chinese become more interested in 

coffee, coffee brands have become more involved in China. 

So why is coffee consumption growing? We have five simple answers: 

▪ Increasing interest from young professionals  

▪ Better standard of living and the rise of the middle class 

▪ Hundreds of coffee shop openings  

▪ An increase in the number of local coffee houses 

▪ An increased interest in professionalism in coffee service and ceremonies 

China has witnessed three waves of coffee; the first wave was through fast food and home 

outlets, the second was through dedicated coffee chains, and the third through speciality coffee 

shops (Ferreira & Ferreira, 2018). 



https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

108 

The Rise of Luckin Coffee and Significant Competitors 

0 to 4,500 locations in 2 years are one of many ways to describe this company. They defined 

themselves as the second-largest and fastest-growing coffee company in China in a short span. 

Luckin was highly technology-driven; their prospectus mentioned the word technology more 

than five times than the word bean. Their retail model built around mobile apps and store 

networks. The entire customer purchase process goes through on mobile apps, which facilitated a 

100% cashier-less environment. The store network operated three types of stores, and their 

strategic focus was their pick-up stores. These stores had limited seating and were in areas with a 

high demand for coffee, such as university campuses, office building, and commercial spaces. 

The company went public on May 17, 2019, on Nasdaq. The pricing for the shares it offered 

ranged between $15-$17 with the hopes of raising more than $500 million. 

The company witnessed rapid growth, and much of its growth resulted from its 

aggressive marketing strategy. After just one year in business, it was challenging, long term 

global coffee player, Starbucks, aiming for 4,500 outlets by the end of 2019. It exceeded the 

number of costa coffee stores by October 2018. The company had  4,260 locations on November 

11, 2019, equivalent to Starbucks (Fruhlinger, 2019). It reported 6,500 locations in China in 

April of 2020, which exceeded Starbucks by 2000 sites (Fruhlinger, 2020). The top 10 Luckin 

competitors were Starbucks, Mcdonalds, Costa Cofee, KFC, Burger King, Dunkin’ Donuts, 

Subway, Pizza Hut, Café Coffee Day, and Wendy’s. 

The coffee e-retailer had explosive growth. It labelled itself as a “coffee network” as it 

used its recent funding technology innovation and business development (Smith, 2019).  The 

CEO and founder had a straightforward goal of becoming the dominant coffee chain in China. 

Targeting the white collars young generation with cheap coffee and taste optimized for the 

Chinese consumer, Jenny Qian Zhiya focused on the two weak spots of the coffee industry in 

china “high prices and inconvenience”(Writers, 2018). 

The business model embraced can be described as “grab-and-go.” This aggressive model 

allowed to open over 4500 stores. The idea is to order via an app, and the customer will be 

directed to a location near them. The executives chose the cash-burning strategy, which they 

implied with CAR Inc. more than a decade ago; they burned money from investors to quickly 

grab market share from rivals.  

Luckin’s business model was the opposite of Starbucks, which based on social 

interaction. They adopted the idea that the customer wants their coffee, but social interaction not 

so much. Professor Jeffrey Toson described Starbuck’s strategy as being based on real estate, 

where Luckin’s based on smartphones. When customers signed up for the first time in the Luckin 

app, they got their first free coffee. Although free is always valued, it has its downfalls as well. 

Luckin suffered considerable losses in 2018 and 2019. The losses were even more significant in 

2018, with a revenue of 840.7 million yuan and a net loss of 1.619 billion yuan (Markoch, 2020). 

The Luckin Coffee earnings report included a net loss of -$74.41 million in 2019, which is 

7.78% worse than its third-quarter loss in 2018, $69.04. The 2019 results reported misleading, so 

it is difficult to estimate the losses of 2019 precisely.  

 

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 

Luckin’s stock had more than coronavirus to worry about when it was subjected to a sell-off on 

January 31, 2020, upon the release of an 89-page anonymous report by  Muddy Waters Research 

stating that the company has a “fundamentally broken business” and accused it of “fraud”(Aiden 

https://seekingalpha.com/author/aiden-research?source=content_type%3Areact%7Csection%3Aauthor%7Cbutton%3Aavatar%7Cfirst_level_url%3Aarticle


https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

109 

Research, 2020). The company’s stock sunk as much as 27% that day (Finman & Yang, 2020). 

However, that was only the beginning.  

Luckin found itself in the middle of a battle when Citron Research also claimed on 

Twitter that they had received the same anonymous report given to Muddy Waters Research. 

Still, they stated that “they are long LK” as research findings do not “mesh” with current data. 

They also stressed that they were waiting for LK’s management response”(Fineman, & Yang, 

2020). Luckin issued a response to the short thesis by Muddy Waters, stating that “the 

methodology of the report is flawed the evidence is unsubstantiated, and the allegations are 

unsupported speculations and malicious interpretations of events” this headline represented a 

catalyst to LK’s stock and kept it “moving”(Newdesk & Writer, 2020).  

Many lives changed on April 2, 2020. The CEO and COO were fired, and “Wall street 

bets” lost his life savings when the stock sunk as much as 81% when the fraud conducted by 

LK’s COO and other employees was on every financial headline.  

Their internal investigation found that 2.2 billion yuan inflated sales from the second 

quarter to the fourth of 2019 (Business News, 2020). Interestingly, this announcement was made 

shortly after appointing two new independent directors to the company’s board. The first was 

Tianruou, who had over 20 years of work experience. The second was Wai Yuen Chong, who 

had above 30 years (Luckin Coffee Inc., 2020).  

Initially, the COO accused of financial misconduct. Nasdaq exchange halted trading of 

Luckin Coffee’s stock for news pending on April 7, 2020, at 9:15 Eastern Time at the last price 

of $4.39. The company’s status changed to “additional information requested” by NASDAQ. 

What went wrong with Luckin coffee? Everything? The short research report released by 

Muddy Waters Research report covers it nicely and in great detail. The report split into two 

areas: Fraud and the fundamentally broken business. We discuss the five primary pieces of 

evidence mentioned in their report. 

Evidence #1: Sales figures were inflated by 69% in the Q3 of 2019 and by 88% in Q4 of 

2019, supported by 11,260 hours of traffic video. Muddy had employed 92 full-time staff and 

1,418 part-time staff to record store traffic for 981 store days covering 100% of the operating 

hours for 620. Luckin had 4,507 stores in 53 cities, and muddy waters covered 38 towns that had 

98% of Luckins stores. They also categorized the stores into malls, schools, residential, 

transportation, hotel, and others. The research company eliminated footage that missed more 

than 10 minutes and ended up with a success ratio of 54% with 100% integrity. For every 981 

days, they counted the number of customers picking up Luckin products and the number of 

orders picked y delivery personnel.  

In addition to that, they also found that Luckin inflated an average of 72% of online order 

volumes. All orders placed and paid online. When an order was placed, a three-digit number 

generated in addition to a QR code. Through the random selection of 151 offline tracking store 

days to track their online orders, they found out that the number of online orders inflated from a 

range of 34 to 232, and an average of 106 orders per day or 72% of the average of offline orders. 

Evidence #2: The research firm reported a decline in the items per order from 1.38 in 

2019 2Q to 1.14 in 2019 Q4. Muddy gathered 25,843 customer receipts from 10,119 in 2,213 

stores in 45 cities. The importance of delivery has also declined during the period. Cite research 

stated that transportation is roughly 10% of the business on January 14, 2020. 

Evidence #3: Muddy gathered 25,843 receipts and found that Luckin inflated their net 

selling price per item by 12.5%. 

https://seekingalpha.com/author/aiden-research?source=content_type%3Areact%7Csection%3Aauthor%7Cbutton%3Aavatar%7Cfirst_level_url%3Aarticle


https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

110 

Evidence #4: Muddy found that Luckin overstated its 3Q advertising expenses by 150% 

through third party media.  

Evidence #5: Muddy found nearly a 400% inflation on the revenue that Luckin labelled 

as other products. 

The following hypotheses are developed based on the literature review as follows: 

▪ The sales revenue misstatements have an impact on the performance disclosures of the 

firm. 

▪ The expenses misstatements have an impact on the performance disclosures of the firm. 

 

PROBLEM STATEMENT 

Luckin Coffee’s CEO’s first violation was the inflation of sales revenue, representing a violation 

of the revenue recognition principle. If the sales revenue has been overstated, it will overstate the 

profits. It seems there was negligence on the part of EY, the auditors. If auditors applied proper 

audit procedures (especially analytical procedures for purchase and sales), there was enough 

possibility of getting red flags. The misreporting could be detected earlier if the audit was done 

professionally. EY, the auditor from the beginning, refused to comment on any reporting matters 

due to the client’s confidentiality.  

 

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

Pressure  Overstatement 

of Sales 

Revenue and 

Expenses 

 Material 

Misstatement of 

Financial 

Statements 

Opportunity 

Rationalization 

Capacity 

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 

Source: Created by the author  

 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 

This research is exploratory and qualitative. The research information collected from various 

credible sources such as investigation reports of investigating agencies, whistleblower reports, 

financial data from the Securities and Exchange Commission, reputed newspapers, business 

magazines, etc. The information verified by corroborating evidence and comparing the 

information from other sources. 

 

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 

This research aims to examine and investigate the material misstatements done by the senior 

management of the company. It attempts to figure out the loopholes used in accounting and 

auditing standards and practices that the few senior executives exploited. It touches upon the 

failure of fiduciary duties of the board while performing their duties. It deals explicitly with the 

violation of revenue recognition and matching principles. It will further highlight such an alleged 

scam’s dominos effects on various stakeholders’ interest, especially shareholders.  



https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

111 

DISCUSSIONS 

Financial material misstatement is not new to the world of business. There are several material 

misstatement cases, but one or more of the four motives mentioned in diamond theory exist in all 

cases. Luckin is no exception to it. The high ambitions of senior management encourage them to 

indulge in a financial material misstatement.  

Trading for LK’s stock is currently going on over the counter. Investors had the option to 

either hold onto the ownership or sell the stock. Nasdaq issued the delisting notice for the reason 

of “public interest concerns as raised by the fabricated transactions disclosed by the company” 

and “the company’s past failure to publicly disclose material information, citing a business 

model through which the previously disclosed fabricated transactions executed”(Fantozzi, 2020). 

Chinese market regulators have also started an investigation into LK’s operations, and the 

company was said to be assisting their work (Y. Wang, 2020). 

The Chinese government is said to be shielding U.S. listed Chinese companies from 

complying with the SEC procedures of audit and disclosure. Senate Marco Rubio stressed that 

“of the Chinese companies want to be listed on the U.S. exchanges, they must comply with 

American laws and regulations for financial transparency and accountability. 

 

Table 1. Timeline of Significant Events 

Dates Major events  

October 2017 Luckin Coffee was incorporated. 

January 2018 It opened its first shops in Beijing and Shanghai (Yoon, 2018). 

May 2018 Luckin accused Starbucks of monopoly by signing exclusive contracts with 

suppliers and property owners. 

May 16, 2018 The case was put on file by Shenzen Intermediate People court. 

July 2018 The company announced the completion of Series A financing (International 

Finance News., 2018). 

September 2018 Tencent signed a partnership with Luckin (Chan, 2018). 

October 2018 Luckin Coffee opened 1300 stores and surpassed the number of Costa shops 

(Xinghua, 2018). 

November 2018 The company had its second fundraising. 

January 2019 Luckin announced its plan to open 2500 stores and become the most significant 

coffee brand in China. 

April 2019 The company had its Pre-IPO funding. 

May 2019 Luckin Coffee IPO announced in Nasdaq. 

May 29, 2019 The company released Q1 2019 earnings results. 

August 14, 2019 The company released Q2 2019 earnings results. 

October 2019 Luckin withdrew a monopoly case against Starbucks. 

November 13, 2019 The company released Q3 2019 earnings results. 

December 2019 The company was exceeded Starbucks by the number of stores.  

January 2020 Expansion to vending machines. 

January 31, 2020  Muddy Waters report published on Twitter. 

April 2020 The company admitted the fabrication of sales. 

April 7, 2020 Nasdaq halted LK shares trading. 

May 15, 2020 Delisting notice issued by Nasdaq. 

June 24, 2020 Luckin withdrew delisting hearing requests. 

June 29, 2020 The trading of shares suspended. 

 



https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

112 

CONCLUSION 

The Luckin scandal shook the investors again after a long series of scandals from across the 

world. This scandal brought governance issues in the centre stage. An overambitious attitude of 

the few people at executive management brought trouble to thousands of investors, employees, 

suppliers, etc. This case raised very pertinent questions on the ability and practices of the audit 

firm, EY. Again it is proved that tight regulations are also not sufficient unless they are executed 

in true spirit. Even the best internal controls can’t detect frauds if top management colludes.  

In addition to inflating sales, marketing costs and expenses were also overstated (Pisani, 

2020). Auditing procedures were a weak point in oversight. Jay Clayton and William Duhnke III, 

the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chairman, stressed that U.S. regulators were 

often prevented from inspecting Chinese firms’ audit work and practices. They have called for 

more cooperation from China. 

REFERENCES 

Aiden Research. (2020, February 6). Luckin Coffee: Muddy Waters' Short Thesis Will Fall 

Short. Seeking Alpha. Retrieved from https://seekingalpha.com/article/4321851-luckin-

coffee-muddy-waters-short-thesis-will-fall-short 

 

Chan, C. (2018, September 7). Tencent signs partnership deal with coffee startup Luckin in 

challenge to Alibaba-Starbucks tie-up. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from 

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/2163101/tencent-signs-partnership-deal-

coffee-startup-luckin-challenge-alibaba 

 

COFFEBI. (2019, November 2). China, 7 reasons why coffee consumption is growing. 

COFFEBI. Retrieved from https://coffeebi.com/2019/02/11/china-7-reasons-of-coffee-

consumption-grow/ 

 

Fantozzi, J. (2020, June 29). Luckin Coffee drops stock market delisting appeal following fraud 

scandal. Nationa Restaurant News. Retrieved from https://www.nrn.com/news/luckin-

coffee-drops-stock-market-delisting-appeal-following-fraud-scandal 

 

Ferreira, J., & Ferreira, C. (2018). Challenges and opportunities of new retail horizons in 

emerging markets: The case of rising coffee culture in China. Science Direct, 783-796. 

 

Fineman, J., & Yang, Y. (2020, February 1). Citron, Muddy Waters Clash on Twitter Over 

Chinese Coffee Chain. Twitter. Retrieved from 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-31/short-sellers-take-to-twitter-for-

spat-over-chinese-coffee-chain 

 

Fruhlinger, J. (2019, November 11). It's official: Luckin' Coffee now has as many Chinese 

locations as Starbucks. Thinknum. Retrieved from 

https://media.thinknum.com/articles/luckin-update/ 

 

Fruhlinger, J. (2020, April 8). Luckin Coffee now reports 6,500 locations in China, 2,000 more 

than Starbucks. Thinknum. Retrieved from https://media.thinknum.com/articles/luckin-

coffee-now-reports-that-it-has-more-than-6500-locations-in-china/ 

 

https://seekingalpha.com/author/aiden-research?source=content_type%3Areact%7Csection%3Aauthor%7Cbutton%3Aavatar%7Cfirst_level_url%3Aarticle


https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

113 

Global Coffee Report. (2019, April). Retrieved from Global Coffee Report: 

https://gcrmag.com/profile/view/coffee-finds-a-home-in-china 

 

International Finance News. (2018, July 11). Mobile Finance. Retrieved from 

http://m.jrj.com.cn/madapter/finance/2018/07/11221624801718.shtml 

 

Javalgi & Grossman. (2016). Aspirations and entrepreneurial motivations of middle-class 

consumers in emerging markets: The case of India. Elsevier, 657-667. 

 

Luckin Coffee Inc. (2020, March 27). Luckin Coffee Announces Appointments of Two 

Independent Directors. GlobeNewswire. Retrieved from 

https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/03/27/2007903/0/en/Luckin-

Coffee-Announces-Appointments-of-Two-Independent-Directors.html 

 

Markoch, C. (2020, March 3). It’s LK Stock’s Business Model That’s the Problem. 

Investorplace. Retrieved from Investorplace: https://investorplace.com/2020/03/lk-stock-

business-model-may-be-problem/ 

 

Newdesk, B., & Writer, B. S. (2020, February 3). Luckin Coffee Issues Response To Short 

Report By Muddy Waters; Says ' The methodology of the Report is flawed, the evidence 

is unsubstantiated, and the allegations are unsupported speculations and malicious 

interpretations of events'. Benzinga. Retrieved from https://www.benzinga.com/short-

sellers/20/02/15235304/luckin-coffee-issues-response-to-short-report-by-muddy-waters-

says-the-methodology-of-the-report-is 

 

Pisani, B. (2020, April 3). Luckin Coffee is a painful reminder of ‘the extreme fraud risk’ of 

some China-based companies. CNBC. Retrieved from 

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/03/luckin-coffee-debacle-is-a-painful-reminder-of-fraud-

risk.html 

 

Smith, K. H. (2019, May 17). Luckin Coffee and the New Retail Era. The startup. Retrieved 

from https://medium.com/swlh/luckin-coffee-and-the-new-retail-era-29124507acd1 

 

Wang, J. (2020, May 13). Fall From Grace: Luckin Coffee’s Former Billionaire CEO Fired 

Amid Fraud Scandal. Forbes. Retrieved from 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferwang/2020/05/13/fall-from-grace-luckin-coffees-

former-billionaire-ceo-fired-amid-fraud-scandal/#1b659df8572a 
 

Wang, Y. (2020, April 3). Chinese Regulators Target Luckin Coffee After Admission Of 

Fabricated Sales. Forbes. Retrieved from 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2020/04/27/chinese-regulators-target-luckin-

coffee-after-fabricating-sales/#34a05e8a5610 
 

Winck, B. (2020, June 4). MarketWatch. Retrieved from 

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/reddit-wallstreetbets-trader-lost-life-

savings-luckin-coffee-stock-decline-2020-6-1029281054# 

 



https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb                           Indian Journal of Finance and Banking                         Vol. 5, No. 2; 2021 

114 

Writers, K. (2018, February 26). Krasia. Retrieved from https://kr-asia.com/bringing-internet-

business-model-to-the-coffee-industry-will-luckin-coffee-threaten-starbucks 

 

Xinghua, C. (2018, September 9). Observer. Retrieved from 

https://m.guancha.cn/ChanJing/2018_09_07_471175.shtml 

 

Yoon, E. (2018, July 20). China’s Luckin Coffee takes on Starbucks. CNBC. Retrieved from 

https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/07/20/chinas-luckin-coffee-takes-on-starbucks.html 

 

 

Copyrights 

Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the 

journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative 

Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) 
 
 

 


