




































INDIAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND BANKING 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

38 

 

                       FINANCE AND BANKING 

                                                                  IJFB VOL 11 NO 1 (2022) P-ISSN 2574-6081  E-ISSN 2574-609X 
                                                  

        Available online at https://www.cribfb.com 

                                                                                                                                           Journal homepage: https://www.cribfb.com/journal/index.php/ijfb 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   Published by CRIBFB, USA 

BOARD MEETING FREQUENCY AND PERFORMANCE OF 

PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS IN INDIA      

 
 Shweta Taluka (a)    Suhasini Verma (b)1    Jeevesh Sharma (c)    

 

(a) Research Scholar, Department of Business Administration, Manipal University Jaipur, India; E-mail: staluka13@gmail.com 
(b) Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration, Manipal University Jaipur, India; E-mail: suhasini.verma@jaipur.manipal.edu 
(c) Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce, Manipal University Jaipur, India; E-mail: jeevesh.sharma@jaipur.manipal.edu      

 

 
A R T I C L E I N F O 

 
 

Article History: 
 

Received: 5th October 2022 

Accepted: 30th November  2022 

Online Publication: 5th December 2022 

 
Keywords: 

 

Agency Theory, Board Meetings,  

Board Committees, Bank Performance, 

Corporate Governance  

 
JEL Classification Codes: 

 

      G21, G34, G38 

 
 

  

 
A B S T R A C T 

 
This paper aims to analyze the effect of the frequency of board meetings on the performance of public 

sector banks in India. According to agency theory, frequent board meetings may lead to more 

concentrated monitoring, lowers the agency cost, contributes to more exchange of ideas among the 

board of directors, and assist them to be more equipped with the information, which ensures better 

financial performance. This paper investigates this assumption of agency theory on the performance of 

public sector banks in India. The number of committees, frequency of board meetings, and audit 
committee meetings are a proxy of corporate governance mechanisms. Return on Assets (ROA) is a 

proxy of financial performance. The duration of the study is 2015-2019, and secondary data is used. 

Panel regression is employed to analyze the impact of variables of corporate governance mechanisms 

on the performance of public sector banks. Our results find no significant impact of any governance 

variables used in the study on the ROA of the banks. The study makes an original contribution by 

providing a comprehensive study related to the process and activity of the board and its impact on the 

performance of banks. The findings of this paper will help examine the board's process and lead to 
improvement in concern. 

 
 

© 2022 by the authors. Licensee CRIBFB, USA. This article is an open-access article distributed 
under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).                           

 

INTRODUCTION 

Corporate governance and firm performance have been well-debated topics in developed countries. However, in recent 

years, this issue has also been widely discussed in the context of developing and emerging economies, like India, due to the 

emerging issues of corporate failures. The company's governance procedures aim to safeguard stakeholders and investors 

against management's and directors' poor corporate choices. The administration and directors of a firm, who make policy 

decisions, are not guaranteed to be doing so (Nizam et al., 2022). All the corporate governance theories suggest that the 

involvement and appointment of directors as both the executive and non-executive directors on the board is necessary for 

an effective governance structure (Arora & Sharma, 2016). So that a company's performance can be enhanced, corporate 

governance is required to reduce disagreements among the stakeholders, particularly shareholders and executives (Ali et al., 

2022). A board of directors' main functions include advising, evaluating top management's decisions, monitoring 

organizational efforts, and contracting. Directors also provide information about the company's activities and strategic 

planning. Each director of the board is likely to attend the board meeting. Normally, the board's activity intensity is measured 

by the frequency of meetings. It is taken as a proxy for the board's activity to measure its progress (Fernandes et al., 2018). 

The more the meetings represent, the more active boards with more management and supervision. More supervision 

indicates the more effective role of monitoring by top management, which might diminish the agency's cost and improve 

the firm's performance (Grove et al., 2011). The profitability, efficiency, effectiveness, and competitive advantage of the 

company are all increased by good corporate governance processes. The failure of a corporation is the outcome of weak 

corporate governance practices (Nizam et al., 2022). 

           According to agency theory, independent directors provide management with effective monitoring tools. These 

solutions can reduce managers' opportunistic behaviour and improve business performance (Al-Jalahma, 2022; Zaman et 

                                                      
1Corresponding author: ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7763-1375 

© 2022 by the authors. Hosting by CRIBFB. Peer review under responsibility of CRIBFB, USA.  

https://doi.org/10.46281/ijfb.v11i1.1851 
 

To cite this article: Taluka, S., Verma, S., & Sharma, J. (2022). BOARD MEETING FREQUENCY AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR 

BANKS IN INDIA. Indian Journal of Finance and Banking, 11(1), 38-44. https://doi.org/10.46281/ijfb.v11i1.1851 

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7451-1917
mailto:suhasini.verma@jaipur.manipal.edu
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
https://doi.org/10.46281/ijfb.v11i1.1851
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7763-1375
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3547-4260


Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

39 

al., 2022). According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the best B-SIZE (board 

size) includes five to nine core members. Mahmoudian and Jermias (2022) discovered that successful businesses had bigger 

boards than those that failed. Board meetings are very important to the efficiency and effective working of every company 

board. Board meeting frequency is ascertained by several meetings held yearly by top-level managers. Board meetings are 

set up to assemble directors on the board for discussion on the relevant matters and to address the issues with their previous 

experiences and forward-looking concern (Eluyela et al., 2018). Titova (2016) also considered the frequency of audit 

committee meetings per year as another important part of board activity. The major reasons they found for this consideration 

were the complex and opaque nature of banking operations, where audit committee meetings may help to provide specialized 

and relevant information and advice. However, in smaller banks, audit committees also perform risk monitoring functions. 

More frequency of audit committee meetings might result in better monitoring and control over decisions that influence the 

few parameters such as borrowings, loan amounts and earning assets of firms. Aljaaidi et al. (2021) stated in their results 

that companies with poor performance increase the number of board meetings due to the increasing pressure on the board 

to improve and address the performance challenges. The meetings help deal with the daily management, increase the 

opportunities to discuss and advise for the problems, and bring solutions. 

The remaining part of this paper is followed. The second section includes a review of the literature on attributes of 

the board and firm performance, with theoretical and empirical findings of previous research and hypothesis development. 

The third section will summarise the research methodology, including the methods to collect and analyze the data. Section 

four includes the analysis and discussion of the findings. Section five covers the conclusion and recommendation with the 

future scope of the study. 

 

LITERATURE REVIEW 

In the Indian financial system, among the real businesses of the banking sector, the majority are under the public sector 

undertakings (PSU) banks, which enjoy the inherent backing of the government. Public Sector Banks (PSBs0 in India are 

regulated by the Ministry of Finance and Government of India under the banking division of the Banking Companies Act, 

1955. Generally, the Government of India have the main role in the functioning and decision-making of PSU boards 

compared to private sector banks and needs to be more flexible in initiating a well-fitted board with the bank's operational 

strategy. Boards of Public sector banks are also large in comparison to other banks due to the appointment of large numbers 

of directors in different categories mentioned by the Government of India (Mayur & Saravanan, 2017). Reserve Bank of 

India (RBI), a banking sector regulator, also recommended constituting different committees to assess the decisions and 

make reforms required for better corporate governance practices. Based on the suggestions provided by these committees, 

detailed and various regulations regarding the basic components of the main architect of corporate governance were put into 

reformation. These basic components that make a corporate governance system important and strong include the 

composition of boards, appointment of directors, ownership concentration, management's quality, norms for disclosure and 

transparency, audit-related features etc. Thus, corporate governance is a system of laws, regulations, guidelines, and norms 

that affects how a company is governed and run to ensure fairness and openness in its interactions with shareholders. To 

prevent conflicts of interest, this framework, which is made up of both internal and external contracts between shareholders 

and employees, regulates how obligations, requirements, and rewards are allocated (Buallay, Hamdan, & Zureigat, 2017). 

Major corporate governance has been initiated in Indian banks from the early years of the millennium. All these initiatives 

were brought to provide the best governance practices for India's banking sector. 

 

Agency Theory 

This study is based on an agency theory for its theoretical background. Based on the fact that board meeting is an important 

variable of board attributes, we adopt agency theory in understanding the relationship between board attributes and firm 

performance as it is the theory that researchers mostly adopt in the financial and economic sector as a theoretical foundation 

(Hanh et al., 2018; Liang et al., 2013; Ali et al., 2022; Sobhan, 2021). Agency theory existed on the principle of the basic 

relationship of principals and agents or shareholders as principals and board members as agents too. This relationship took 

place due to the separation of ownership and control in any organization, in this manner that shareholders appoint board 

members for the effective management and control over performance and planning of the firm as well as to ensure the 

maximization of shareholder's wealth (Al-Jalahma, 2022; Zaman et al., 2022). The other reasons for the appointment of 

board members are to set achievable targets and strategic planning, to create a disciplined environment which will eventually 

lead to the enhancement of shareholders' value (Eluyela et al., 2018). It is important for board members to have frequent 

meetings to discuss and get advice to improve the firm's performance (Arora & Sharma, 2016; Zhou et al., 2018; Rahman 

et al., 2019). Generally, the board of directors fulfils their responsibilities well, ensures their involvement in attending 

meetings to get more information and maintains discipline in an organization (Ntim & Osei, 2011) as well, as it is determined 

that corporate decisions can be monitored effectively through frequent meetings in boards. With this background, our study 

mainly focuses to examine the impact of the frequency of board meetings, total number of committees, and audit committee 

meetings on the performance of public sector banks. 

 

Board Meetings 

The board of directors acts as an agent for the business. They are comprised of people who control a company's operations. 

The board's main responsibility is to oversee and provide guidance to senior management as they carry out their duties 

toward the owners (Oziegbe & Cy, 2021). Board characteristics have a significant impact on the performance of banks 

(Liang et al., 2013). Whether the board of directors is an important element of the governance system, the key to success 



Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

40 

for any firm is not only the existence of firms but rather their abilities and dedication to accomplish their duties and roles. 

As a result, the board of directors and managers are forced to operate in a much more complex environment where they are 

under increasing pressure to provide proper reporting on the state of the company and to the variety of stakeholders. 

The board meeting of an organization, which is presided over by its directors, provides a great forum for discussing 

operational concerns and making decisions with the unanimous support of the members. Executives can vote on effective 

decision-making plans where they are responsible for attending meetings (Sobhan, 2021). Frequent meetings and different 

committees play a considerable role in helping the directors in discussions and providing directions for resolving problems 

and guidance for future planning. The board meeting helps the directors be ready with the information and development of 

the company. Also, board meetings may help enhance the directors' role because of their well-informed decisions (Adams 

& Ferreira, 2007). Meetings allow directors to elaborate and exchange ideas (Andres & Vallelado, 2008). A higher frequency 

of meetings per year may enhance directors' monitoring and better decisions power with the ongoing market circumstances 

(Shrivastav, 2022; Rahman et al., 2006; Saleh et al., 2007; Nguyen, 2021). The frequency of board meetings leads to 

improving factors such as exchanging ideas, discussing future strategies and controlling managers and advisory roles that 

positively impact banks' performance (proactive boards). Another study (Al-Jalahma, 2022; Shrivastav, 2022; Rahman et 

al., 2006; Saleh et al., 2007; Oziegbe & Cy, 2021)concludes that the frequent board meetings may be a sign that top-level 

management is setting aside enough time to address problems and consider opportunities that they believe will improve 

performance (Shrivastav, 2022; Rahman et al., 2006; Saleh al., 2007). Additionally, due to the complexity of the banking 

business, they tend to behave larger boards and committees, and hence required to meet more frequently by the directors to 

be more effective and active in decision making. The initial way to get information about a company for a director is by 

attending meetings. Even regulators urged to attend board meetings, particularly the bank directors (Adams & Ferriera, 

2012). With the increasing complexity of banks' operations, an increased frequency of meetings is required. There is mixed 

empirical evidence available on the relationship between the frequency of meetings and performance. (Chou, Chung, & Yin, 

2013) suggested that ultimate and outside directors were less attracted to board meetings if there were highly concentrated 

ownership or whether ultimate and powerful shareholders tightly controlled them. However, if they were more likely to 

attend board meetings, it would beneficiate the firm positively. According to the study, more than board meeting frequency 

is needed.  

The effectiveness of board meetings is a crucial variable that can affect a company's performance (Hanh et al., 

2018). It is also found that attendance by directors in board meetings also enhances the firm performance. (Thiruvadi, 2012; 

Aljaaidi et al., 2021) Investigated the association between board size and board meetings with the frequency of audit 

committee meetings and failed to find an association between them. However, on another side (Aljaaidi et al., 2021; 

Maraghni & Nekhili, 2012; Thiruvadi, 2012) also found a significantly positive relationship between board meetings and 

the frequency of audit committee meetings and performance. In addition to it, the size of the audit committee also positively 

impacts the firm performance (Shrivastav, 2022). Due to a rise in high-profile bankruptcies brought on by financial 

accounting mistakes or fraud and made worse by poor corporate governance practices, attention to corporate governance 

has grown over the past few decades (Sobhan, 2021). Larger boards, more independent boards, dual CEOs, larger audit 

committees, and more frequent audit committee meetings negatively impact a company's performance. In contrast, board 

meeting frequency and ownership concentration have a positive impact (Boshnak, 2021). This led to the adoption of various 

accounting procedures, biased reporting, and the promotion of individual managerial interests over those of shareholders 

(Ioana, 2014). The relationship between firm performance and selected corporate governance measures is examined in a 

well-developed literature, including board size and independence, the presence of the duality of CEOs, insider-outsider 

ownership, and board duties (Alqatamin, 2018; Zhou et al., 2018; Rahman et al., 2019; Khalifa et al., 2020). 

According to a growing body of corporate governance literature, the boards of directors play a key role in 

decreasing agency issues and improving business performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). These results suggest that greater 

board effectiveness may lead to increased risk-taking. Because the audit committee rather than the board of directors directly 

oversees bank uncertainty activities (Nguyen, 2022). Effective audit committees can limit risk-taking in the banking 

industry. Additionally, although managers may not truly value these actions, a more effective audit committee may 

significantly reduce the amount of risk they take in the short term for their gain. -Increasing profits for shareholders (Nguyen 

& Dang, 2022; Nguyen, 2022) Prior research examining the connections between audit committee meetings and corporate 

performance has yielded comprehensive results (Aldamen et al., 2012). For instance, Al Farooque et al. (2020) discovered 

a strong and favourable relationship between the performance of Thai enterprises and the frequency of audit committee 

meetings. Additionally, it was discovered that the frequency of audit committee meetings was significantly and favourably 

correlated with the efficiency of Saudi banks (Almoneef & Samontaray, 2019). 

Based on reviewing past literature, the researcher formed the study's following objectives and proposed the study's 

hypothesis.  

 

The objective of the Study 

The study tried to identify the relationship between the frequency of meetings of various committees and the performance 

of public sector banks. The following are the objectives of the study: 

 To evaluate the impact of the frequency of meetings on the bank's performance. 

The hypothesis of the Study 

 Ha: The frequency of meetings impacts the financial performance of Indian public sector banks. 

 



Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

41 

MATERIALS AND METHODS 

The study is analytical and descriptive in nature. Here the public sector banks of India are the main population of the study. 

The final sample comprises 18 banks only from all 21 public sector banks in India, as 3 banks merged during data collection. 

The secondary type of data has been collected for the time of six years from F.Y. 2013 to F.Y. 2019. We are taking frequency 

or total several board meetings, audit committee meetings, and committees as variables for the diligence of the board while 

ROA for the performance of banks. Two control variables used here are the total size of the firm or assets and the firm's age 

or incorporation year. In this study, the main statistical tool used here is the Pooled OLS method with the other frequency 

measures tools such as mean, median, and standard deviation. The main Sources for data collection are the CMIE Prowess 

I.Q. database system, Annual Reports & Websites of the banks. 

 

Description of Variables 

The different variables collected for the study are categorized broadly into three main categories dependent, independent, 

and control variables. Performance measure variables are dependent, while governance variables are used as independent 

variables. 

 

Table 1. Summary of research variables 

 
Variables Measurement of variables Acronym Description 

Dependent variable Return on Assets ROA PBIT to Total assets (%) 

Independent variables Audit committee meetings AUDMEET The total number of audit committee meetings held in a particular year. 

 Board meetings BMEET The total number of board meetings held in a particular year. 

 Number of committees COMMITTEE The total number of committees in a particular year. 

Control variables Total assets ASSETS The total asset value of the bank. 

 Age AGE Total age of the bank from the year of its incarnation. 

 

Model Specification 

 

roait= α + β1auditcommitteeit+ β2boardmeetingsit+ β3noofcommitteeit +γ controlvariablesit+ εit 

 

In the above equation, i denotes individuals from 1 to 18, and t denotes the time from 2013-2019. The equation validates 

the relationship of ROA as a dependent variable on independent variables such as the total number of board meetings, audit 

committee meetings, and committees. The pooled OLS method has been used for analyzing the data as it is the most 

appropriate method. 

 

Where: 

roait=Return on Assets 

auditcommitteeit= Audit Committee 

boardmeetingsit=Board Meeting 

noofcommitteeit=Number of Committee 

controlvariables= Control variables 

 

RESULTS 

Descriptive statistics results are represented in table 2 for dependent and independent variables of the sample banks. We 

observe that the mean of audit committee meetings is 10.556 while the maximum is 17. The average score for board meetings 

is 14.056, the maximum is 22, while the minimum score for several committees is 15.796, and the maximum is 22. The 

average ROA is 0.313. 

 

Table 2. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum) 

 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 

ROA 108 .313 .918 -3.48 2.33 

Audit Committee 108 10.556 2.373 5 17 

Board meetings 108 14.056 2.922 8 22 

No of committees 108 15.796 3.754 5 22 

assets 108 462657.49 593433.38 94509.155 3680914.2 

age 108 100.111 21.791 65 154 

 

Table 3. Regression Results (Linear Regression) 

 
ROA Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf Interval] 

Audit Committee .012 .045 0.27 .791 -.077 .101 

Board meetings .015 .036 0.43 .671 -.056 .087 

no of Committee -.016 .027 -0.61 .545 -.07 .037 

assets 0 0 -0.20 .843 0 0 

Age -.004 .004 -0.79 .431 -.012 .005 

Constant .601 .637 0.94 .348 -.664 1.865 



Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

42 

      

Mean dependent var 0.313              SD dependent var 0.918   

R-squared 0.011              Number of observations 108.000   

F-test 0.233              Prob > F 0.947   

Akaike crit. (AIC) 297.684              Bayesian crit. (BIC) 313.777   

 

The regression result represents in table 3 for the dependent and independent variables of Pooled OLS. It reveals 

the impact of the total number of audit committee meetings, board meetings, and committees on the ROA of the selected 

banks. The results of table 2 fail to reject the null hypothesis that the quality of independent directors does not impact the 

performance of banks. It exhibits that our results support the tested hypothesis that the total number of audit committee 

meetings, board meetings, and committees had no significant impact on the performance [ROA] of the banks. 

 

DISCUSSIONS 

This study aimed to investigate the consequences of frequent board meetings and how they affected the performance of 

public sector banks in India. It thoroughly evaluates how the Indian Corporate Governance Regulations affect bank 

performance. By doing this, stakeholders may more accurately pinpoint the governance elements influencing performance 

and encourage investee companies to focus on enhancing those characteristics to achieve greater performance. The study 

applies multiple regression analysis on the annual reports of 18 public sector banks from 2013 to 2019. Our findings indicate 

a comprehensive study of the diligence of the board and banks' performance. The research contributes to the body of 

knowledge on the association between board meetings and bank performance and addresses one primary hypothesis. 

 

CONCLUSIONS 

An integrated theoretical framework built on agency theory is used in this study. The study's findings indicate that none of 

the chosen board diligence variables significantly affect performance indicators like banks' ROA. The phenomenon of 

corporate governance is familiar in developing countries, yet it might take time to impact effectively in the current scenario. 

While the board's diligence, as suggested by some previous studies, significantly impacts the performance of firms, our 

study needs to be supported. However, it must be noted here that several other factors cannot control and influence 

performance. The present study and its results may lead to future scope to wider the aspects for further improvements and 

explore more research areas with this aspect of corporate governance. The study is limited to the sample of public sector 

banks in India, which can be explored by comparing it with other sectors or aspects of the banking sector in India. 

 

 

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.T. and S.V.; Methodology, S.T.; Software, J.S.; Validation, S.V., S.T. and 

J.S.; Formal Analysis, S.T.; Investigation, S.V.; Resources, S.T.; Data Curation, S.T.; Writing – Original Draft Preparation, 

S.T.; Writing – Review & Editing, S.T., S.V. and J.S.; Visualization, S.T.; Supervision, S.V.; Project Administration, S.V.; 

Funding Acquisition, S.T., S.V. and J.S. The authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. 

Institutional Review Board Statement: Ethical review and approval were waived for this study because the research does 

not deal with vulnerable groups or sensitive issues. 

Funding: The authors received no direct funding for this research. 

Acknowledgements: N/A.  

Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study. 

Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The 

data are not publicly available due to restrictions. 

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.      

 

REFERENCES 

Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2012). Regulatory pressure and bank directors’ incentives to attend board 

meetings. International Review of Finance, 12(2), 227-248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2012.01149.x 

Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 217-250. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x 

Ali, A., Alim, W., Ahmed, J., & Nisar, S. (2022). Yoke of corporate governance and firm performance: A study of listed 

firms in Pakistan. Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, 13(1), 8-17. Retrieved from 

https://www.ijcms.in/index.php/ijcms/article/view/312 

Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., Mcnamara, R., & Nagel, S. (2012). Audit committee characteristics and firm 

performance during the global financial crisis. Accounting and Finance, 52(4), 971–1000. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00447.x 

Al Farooque, O., Buachoom, W., & Sun, L. (2020). Board, audit committee, ownership and financial performance – 

emerging trends from Thailand. Pacific Accounting Review, 32(1), 54-81. https://doi.org/10.1108/PAR-10-2018-

0079 

Almoneef, A., & Samontaray, D. P. (2019). Corporate governance and firm performance in the Saudi banking industry. 

Banks and Bank Systems, 14(1), 147- 158. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.14(1).2019.13 

Al-Jalahma, A. (2022). Impact of audit committee characteristics on firm performance: Evidence from 

Bahrain. Management, 20(1), 247-261. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.20(1).2022.21 



Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

43 

Aljaaidi, K. S., Bagais, O. A., & Adow, A. H. E. (2021). The Relationship between Firm-Specific Characteristics and Board 

of Directors' Diligence in Saudi Arabia. The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics, and Business, 8(1), 733-739. 
https://doi.org/10.13106/jafeb.2021.vol8.no1.733 

Aljaaidi, K., Sharma, R., & Bagais, O. (2021). The effect of board characteristics on the audit committee meeting 

frequency. Accounting, 7(4), 899-906. http://dx.doi.org/10.5267/j.ac.2021.1.018 

Alqatamin, R. M. (2018). Audit committee effectiveness and firm performance: Evidence from Jordan. Accounting and 

Finance Research, 7(2), 48-60. https://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v7n2p48 

Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries: evidence from India. 

Corporate governance, 16(2), 420-436. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-01-2016-0018 

Andrés, P. D., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: the role of the board of directors. Journal of 

Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570-2580. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008 

Boshnak, H. A. (2021). Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in Saudi Arabia. International Journal 

of Financial Research, 12(3), 446. https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n3p446 

Buallay, A., Hamdan, A., & Zureigat, Q. (2017). Corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from Saudi Arabia. 

Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(1), 78-98. https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v11i1.6 

Chou, H. I., Chung, H., & Yin, X. (2013). Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from 

Taiwan. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(11), 4157–4171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.028 

Eluyela, D. F., Akintimehin, O. O., Okere, W., Ozordi, E., Osuma, G. O., Ilogho, S. O., & Oladipo, O. A. (2018). Board 

meeting frequency and firm performance: examining the nexus in Nigerian deposit money banks. Heliyon, 4(10), 

e00850. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00850 

Fernandes, C., Farinha, J., Martins, F. V., & Mateus, C. (2018). Bank governance and performance: A survey of the 

literature. Journal of Banking Regulation, 19(3), 236-256. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-017-0045-0 

Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. (2011). Corporate governance and performance in the wake of the 

financial crisis: Evidence from U.S. commercial banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(5), 

418–436. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x 

Hanh, L. M., Ting, I. K., Kweh, Q. L., & Hoanh, L. H. (2018). Board Meeting Frequency and Financial Performance: A 

Case of Listed Firms in Vietnam. International Journal of Business and Society, 19(2), 464-472. Retrieved from 

http://www.ijbs.unimas.my/images/repository/pdf/Vol19-no2-paper14.pdf 

Ioana, A. N. G. H. E. L., & Mariana, M. A. N. (2014). Study regarding the impact of the audit committee characteristics 

on firm performance. Studies in Business and Economics, 9(2), 5-15. Retrieved from 

https://magazines.ulbsibiu.ro/eccsf/articole/vol92/921anghel&man.pdf 

Khalifa, H. A. M. G., Natoli, R., & Zuhair, S. (2020). The Impact of Board and Audit Characteristics on the Financial 

Performance of UAE Listed Firms. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 10(2), 60. 

https://doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v10i2.16481 

Liang, Q., Xu, P., & Jiraporn, P. (2013). Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance. Journal of Banking and 

Finance, 37(8), 2953-2968. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.018 

Mahmoudian, F., & Jermias, J. (2022). The influence of governance structure on the relationship between pay ratio and 

environmental and social performance. Business Strategy and the Environment, 31(7), 1-22. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.3060 

Maraghni, I., & Nekhili, M. (2014). Audit committee diligence in French companies: a question of independence or 

competence? Accounting Auditing Control, 20(2), 95-124. https://doi.org/10.3917/cca.202.0095  

Mayur, M., & Saravanan, P. (2017). Performance implications of board size, composition and activity: empirical evidence 

from the Indian banking sector. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 17(3), 

466-489. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-03-2016-0058 

Nguyen, Q. K. (2021). Audit committee structure, institutional quality, and bank stability: Evidence from ASEAN 

countries. Finance Research Letters, 46(A), 102369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021. 102369 

Nguyen, Q. K., & Dang, V. C. (2022). Does the country’s institutional quality enhance the role of risk governance in 

preventing bank risk? Applied Economics Letters, 1-4. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2022.2026868 

Nguyen, Q. K. (2022). Audit committee effectiveness, bank efficiency and risk-taking: Evidence in ASEAN 

countries. Cogent Business & Management, 9(1), 2080622. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2022.2080622 

Nizam, K., Nawaz, S., Haq, F. U., Saghir, W., & Khan, M. I. A. (2022). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in 

Emerging Markets in Pakistan. PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 19(3), 284-302. Retrieved 

from https://archives.palarch.nl/index.php/jae/article/view/11200 

Ntim, C. G., & Osei, K. A. (2011). The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance in South Africa. Afr. 

Rev. Econ. Finance, 2(2), 83e103. Retrieved from https://www. ajol.info/index.php/aref/article/view/86950 

Oziegbe, D. J., & Cy, O. O. (2021). Board attributes and firm performance of Nigerian quoted banks with international 

authorization. International Journal of Economics, Business and Management Research, 5(7), 302-317. . 

Retrieved from https://ijebmr.com/uploads/pdf/archivepdf/2021/IJEBMR_797.pdf 

Rahman, R. A., Ali, F. H. M., & Haniffa, R. (2006). Board, audit committee, culture and earnings management: Malaysian 

evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 783–804. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 02686900610680549  

Rahman, M. M., Meah, M. R., & Chaudhory, N. U. (2019). The impact of audit characteristics on firm performance: an 

empirical study from an emerging economy. Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business, 6(1), 59-69. 

https://doi.org/10.13106/jafeb.2019.vol6.no1.59 

https://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v7n2p48
https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v11i1.6
https://doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v10i2.16481
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.%20102369
https://doi.org/10.13106/jafeb.2019.vol6.no1.59


Taluka et al., Indian Journal of Finance and Banking 11(1) (2022), 38-44 

 

44 

Saleh, N. M., Iskandar, T. M., & Rahmat, M. M. (2007). Audit committee characteristics and earnings management: 

Evidence from Malaysia. Asian Review of Accounting, 15(2), 147–163. 

https://doi.org/10.1108/13217340710823369 

Shrivastav, S. M. (2022). Corporate Governance, Audit Committee Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from 

India. IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, 21(1), 22-36. Retrieved from 

https://www.proquest.com/openview/695ea2a592c7a6ddb5119cfc78630b92/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=54446 

Sobhan, R. (2021). Board characteristics and firm performance: Evidence from the listed non-banking financial institutions 

of Bangladesh. International Journal of Management, Accounting & Economics, 8(1), 25–41. 
https://dorl.net/dor/20.1001.1.23832126.2021.8.1.2.1 

Thiruvadi, S. (2012). Gender differences and audit committee diligence. Gender in Management, 27(6), 366-379. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17542411211269310 

Titova, Y. (2016). Are board characteristics relevant for banking efficiency? Evidence from the U.S. Corporate 

Governance, 16(4), 655–679. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-09-2015-0124 

Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative 

model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291–334. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920638901500208 

Zaman, R., Jain, T., Samara, G., & Jamali, D. (2022). Corporate governance meets corporate social responsibility: Mapping 

the interface. Business & Society, 61(3), 690-752. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650320973415 

Zhou, H., Owusu-Ansah, S., & Maggina, A. (2018). Board of directors, audit committee, and firm performance: Evidence 

from Greece. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 31, 20–36. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2018.03.002 

 

 
Publisher’s Note: CRIBFB stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 

 

 

© 2022 by the authors. Licensee CRIBFB, USA. This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 

Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
 

Indian Journal of Finance and Banking (P-ISSN 2574-6081 E-ISSN 2574-609X) by CRIBFB is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 

International License. 

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

