One Text, Two Tales: When Executive/Judicial Balances Diverged in Argentina and the United States


ONE TEXT, TWO TALES:

WHEN EXECUTIVE/JUDICIAL BALANCES
DIVERGED IN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED

STATES

Mitchell Gordon*

INTRODUCTION

Liberal democracy is hard work. Today we are quicker to spot the fallacy
of electoralism, the "faith that merely holding elections will channel political
action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the
winners. ... .", Experience has taught us that democratic transition and
consolidation depend on other institutions of liberal constitutionalism,
including free and independent courts.2 We are still learning, however, that
there is often a wide difference between what a constitution provides and how it
operates. "The gap between rules and practices highlights the need to focus on
informal patterns of power." 3

In evaluating judicial independence, for instance, "an analysis of formal
institutions - such as the text of the national constitution or the law on the
books,... - might suggest independence, but how political actors apply and
work around those formal institutions appears to be a much more important

* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis,

Minnesota. B.A., 1993, Tufts University; J.D., 1997, University of Minnesota; M.A. (Public
Affairs), 1997, University of Minnesota. For their comments and suggestions, I am indebted to
my colleagues at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, especially Jerry Organ and Robert
Kahn. Valuable research assistance was provided by Lars Nelson, Andrew Bonnington, Emily
Christiansen, and Lillian Monfort. I owe special debts to Karen T. Kiener, Jenny Weigel, and
Henry R. Bishop. Any mistakes are mine alone.

1. Christopher J. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme
Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 745, 752 (2006) (quoting
TERRY LYNN KARL, IMPOSING CONSENT? ELECTORALISM VERSUS DEMOCRATIZATION IN EL
SALVADOR, IN ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 34 (Paul W. Drake &

Eduardo Silva eds., 1986)).
2. See generally Mark Freeman, Constitutional Frameworks and Fragile Democracies:

Choosing Between Parliamentarianism, Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism, 12 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 253 (2000); William Maley, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict
Transitions, 6 C-lu. J. INT'L L. 683 (2006); Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra

note 1, at 750-65.
3. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 763 (quoting REBECCA

BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARGENTINA

23 (2004)).



IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

indicator[.]" 4 To evaluate whether a nation's highest court is independent,
"formal independence is a singularly unhelpful construct," particularly in
evaluating nations in Latin America, where formal rules and informal rules are
often separated by a wide gap. 5 As Rebecca Bill Chavez has noted, "[I]nformal
institutions and practices that allow Latin American presidents to control the
courts are often stronger than the formal constitutional guarantees of judicial
independence.'

6

Although the constitution of Argentina was heavily borrowed from the
U.S. Constitution, those constitutions operated in entirely different ways in the
1930s and 1940s, when each of those nations' presidents directly challenged
the autonomy and independence of their national supreme court. In the
twentieth century, Argentina, unlike the United States, experienced military
coups, dictatorships, human rights abuses, and corruItion - all of which
departed from the Argentine constitution's written text. "To understand the
role of the judiciary in Argentina, the constitutional text does not tell the entire
story. One has to look at how the text was applied and how the courts
responded."8

In this Article, I shall consider Argentina's experience with growing
executive power after the military coup of 1930 (Part 1), and the U.S.
experience during the rise and fall of Franklin Roosevelt's ill-fated Court-
packing proposal in 1937 (Part 2). In Part 3, I shall say more about the very
different outcomes of both episodes, with some thoughts on the wide variation
between these nations' constitutional histories. It is fascinating to consider
those histories at the same time because, taken together, they demonstrate the
severe limitations of the explanatory value of constitutional text. I shall close
with a few thoughts on the limitations of text and the importance of
understanding constitutional culture in seeking to understand how constitutions
actually operate.

I. ARGENTINA: THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE AND IMPEACHMENT

The men who drafted Argentina's original Constitution of 1853 borrowed
heavily from the Constitution of the United States, in the hope that copying the

4. Christopher J. Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: Lessons From
Post-Menem Argentina, 14 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 89, 114 (2007); Walker, TowardDemocratic
Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 763.

5. See Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The
Beginning of a New Millennium? 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 595, 597-98 (2005); Miguel Schor,
Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 5-7
(2006).

6. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 764-65 (citing CHAVEZ,
supra note 3, at 23-24).

7. Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, supranote 4, at 95-96; Walker,
Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 765.

8. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 749.

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

U.S. constitutional system would help Argentina copy U.S. prosperity.9 The
father of Argentine constitutionalism, Juan Bautista Alberdi, argued in Basesy
puntos de partida para la organizaci6n politica de la Repliblica Argentina
(Bases and Points ofDeparture for the Political Organization of the Argentine
Republic) that adopting the political liberties of the U.S. system would lead to
similar economic prosperity.'0 Alberdi and others in his intellectual circle,
known as the Generation of '37, embraced the cause of emulating the United
States.' 1 Most of the delegates to the 1853 constitutional convention approved
of Alberdi's vision of a new Argentina patterned after the United States. 12

As a result, the 1853 constitution borrowed heavily from the U.S.
Constitution of 1787.13 Like the U.S. Constitution, the Argentine constitution
established a republican and federalist form of government, designed according
to the separation-of-powers principle, with power divided between ajudiciary, a
president, and a bicameral congress. In the words of one of the convention's
most prominent delegates, Josd Benjamin Gorostiaga, the Constitution of
Argentina was "cast in the mold of the Constitution of the United States, the
only model of a true federation which exists in the world .... ,,15 Indeed, the
textual similarities were so close that many courts and commentators believed
later that the framers had adopted by implication U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, thereby giving decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court the status of

9. See Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S.
Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's
Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483, 1492, 1502-03 (1997); see also Raul Alfonsin, Address
on the Occasion of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution: June 19, 1987,60 TEMP.
L.Q. 971, 973 (1987).

10. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman, supra note 9, at 1501-03 (citing Juan
Bautista Alberdi, Bases y puntos de partida para la organizaci6n politica de la Reptblica
Argentina, in 3 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 371, 409,426-38,449-52, 456,
527 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886)); see also Alfonsin, supra note 9, at 973.

11. See NICOLAs SHUMWAY, THE INVENTION OF ARGENTINA 126-32 (1991); see generally
JEREMY ADELMAN, REPUBLIC OF CAPITAL: BuENOs AIREs AND THE LEGAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE ATLANTIC WORLD (1999).

12. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman, supra note 9, at 1512; see also Jonathan
M. Miller, Courts and the Creation of a "Spirit of Moderation ": Judicial Protection of
Revolutionaries in Argentina, 1863-1929, 20 HASTINGS INT L & COMP. L. REV. 231,239 (1997).

13. See Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
49 U. PITT. L. REv. 891, 892 (1988); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other
Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 270-71 (2003); Horacio
Spector, Constitutional Transplants andthe Mutation Effect, 83 CHL-KENTL. REV. 129, 132-33
(2008); Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 767-68; see also William
C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrio, Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in
Argentina and the United States, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (1993).

14. Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 12-13 (citing CONST. ARG. arts. 1-35); Manuel Jos6
Garcia-Mansilla, Separation of Powers Crisis: The Case ofArgentina, 32 GA. J. INT'L& COMP.
L. 307, 310 (2004) (citing CONST. ARG. art. 1); Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?,
supra note 1, at 767-68 (citing CONST. ARG. art. 2).

15. Rosenkrantz, supra note 13, at 270.

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IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv.

controlling authority in Argentine constitutional cases.16

Argentina's embrace of U.S. constitutional law and practice
accomplished many of its early goals: from 1860 to 1930, Argentina enjoyed
spectacular economic growth and unbroken constitutional rule - an impressive
record, particularly for a Latin American nation. 17 Notwithstanding this
constitutional stability and economic success, Argentina struggled to establish
broad-based democratic institutions and a culture of political participation.' 8

The balance of executive/judicial power in Argentina began to change in
the 1930s, in part because of the Supreme Court's recognition of de facto

19executive authority. Argentina's seven decades of unbroken constitutional
rule ended on September 6, 1930, when the government of President Hipolito
Yrigoyen was brought down in a military coup. The leader of the coup,
retired General Jos6 F. Uriburu, after declaring himself president and promising
"respect for the Constitution and basic laws in force," sent a message to the
Supreme Court, informing its members that he had established a provisional
government and seeking recognition of that government's de facto authority.21

The military regime's bid for legitimacy presented the Supreme Court
with a dilemma. In the words of William Banks and Alejandro Carrio:

If [the Court] declared the new government unconstitutional,
there was no mechanism to assure that its decree would be
obeyed. Nor was there any protection for the justices'
independence or, for that matter, their tenure. The Court
could risk losing whatever ability it had retained to control the
excesses of the military government. On the other hand, if it
upheld the government, it would legitimate an unconstitutional
seizure of power and thereby lessen the Court's independence

16. Barker, supra note 13, at 908 (citing Segundo V. Linares Quintana, Comparison of the
Constitutional Basis of the United States andArgentine Political Systems, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 641
(1948-49)).

17. Thomas H. Hill, Introduction to Law andEconomic Development in Latin America: A
Comparative Approach to Legal Reform, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 21 (2008) (citing Spector,
supra note 13, at 132-34); Edward C. Snyder, The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress
Towarda Hemispheric Free Trade Area, 29 TEx. INT'L L.J. 95 (1994) (citing DANIELPoNEMAN,
ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 155 (1987)).

18. Emilio Mignone, The Role ofPrivate Parties and the Media in Creating Accountability,
12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 317, 337-38 (1992).

19. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 28-29; Tim Dockery, The Rule of Law Over the
Law of Rulers: The Treatment of De Facto Laws in Argentina, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1578,
1594-98 (1996); Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 348-52.

20. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 25-27 (citing generally ROBERTD. CRASSWELLER,
PER6N AND THE ENIGMAS OF ARGENTINA, ch. 3 (1988)); Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 349-
50; Mignone, supra note 18, at 338-39.

21. Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 25 (quoting ROBERT POTASH, THE ARMY AND
PoLmcs IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945, at 58 (1969)); Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 349.

[Vol. 19:2



ONE TEXT, Two TALES

and the integrity of the legal system. 22

Faced with this dilemma, the Court chose the path of institutional self-
preservation, opting to grant constitutional authority to the military regime.
Four days after the coup, the Court issued a brief opinion, signed by all of the
Court's members, announcing that it would consider the new government to
possess de facto authority, beyond the power of courts to question.23

The Court's logic was not elaborate. The justices noted the longstanding
principle that the people have a right to revolution or insurrection. 24 They
reasoned that the regime enjoyed de facto authority because it possessed the
power and will to secure national peace and order; it had vowed to maintain the
supremacy of the constitution; and it was in a position to protect life, liberty,
and property.25 The Court justified recognizing the regime's de facto authority
due to "necessity," "public policy," and for the purpose of "protecting the
citizens, whose interests could be affected because it is not now possible for
them to question the legality of those now in power."26 By adopting the de
facto doctrine, the Court held that a de facto government can provisionally
exercise all national power as a result of its successful revolution against an
existing de jure authority.27

Whatever the merits of the Court's reasoning, the effect of the de facto
doctrine was apparent. As one commentator has written, "[T]he obvious
purpose [of the de facto doctrine was] . . . to give the new government a
semblance of regularity and legality . . . to invest, in other words, the
government with a colorable title to office, a plausible investiture and an
appearance of general acceptance by and support of the people. ' 28 At the same
time, it allowed the Court to avoid hearing challenges to the constitutional
legitimacy of the military authorities.

In light of these purposes, recognizing the de facto doctrine allowed the
Court to accomplish its goals in the short term: the Court was able to preserve
itself as an institution - the military regime did not remove the justices from
office - and the Court continued to rule on the constitutionality of government

22. Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 27; see also Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 349-
50; Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, supranote 4, at 98-99.

23. Decree of Sept. 10, 1930, 158 Fallos 290-91 (Arg.); see Dockery, supra note 19, at
1617; Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 349-50; Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule
of Law, supra note 4, at 98-99.

24. See Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 773; see also Decree
of Sept. 10, 1930, supra note 23.

25. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1596, 1609-10 (citing Decree of Sept. 10, 1930, supra
note 23, at 290).

26. Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 27-28 (citing Decree of Sept. 10, 1930, supra note
23, at 291).

27. Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 98-99 (citing
Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 350-51); see also Dockery, supra note 19, at 1596-98.

28. J. Irizarry y Puente, The Nature and Powers of a "De Facto" Government in Latin
America, 30 TUL. L. REv. 15, 33 (1955).

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

action (although not on the constitutionality of the government itself).29 But
while the Court was able to accomplish these short-term goals, in the long run it
paid a heavy price for departing from the established rules. "[O]nce the Court
started down that path, it gradually lost the ability to say 'no' to the Executive
in an authoritative fashion," Jonathan Miller wrote. "[I]t never developed the
authority to design new constitutional restrictions on executive authority." 31

In the de facto doctrine are "the origins of the decline of legal thought in
Argentina and the initial path to continuous destruction of separation of powers
by both action of the executive and omission by the Legislative and judicial
branches." 32 In 1930, the new government was itself illegitimate, having
asserted its right to rule without the benefit of elections and constitutional
processes. "The Supreme Court simply abdicated its responsibility to measure
official conduct against legal norms.

Whether or not the Court had foreseen all of these long-term
consequences, in the 1930s and 1940s it did make several attempts to limit the
scope of the de facto doctrine.34 Its recognition of the de facto doctrine in 1930
had recognized only the constitutional legitimacy of the military government as
a whole; it had not addressed the constitutional validity of specific exercises of
the de facto government's powers. The Court therefore continued to assert its
own role as the final arbiter of de facto authority.35

For instance, the Court initially maintained that the authority of a de facto
executive afforded no basis for powers that belonged rightfully to Congress or
to the courts.3 6 (The Court later modified this position.)T Moreover, the Court
held generally that a de facto law might have temporary legitimacy if it arose
from necessity and urgency, but that the de facto law would lose that legitimacy
later upon the return of democratic rule.3 8 This theory, known as caducidad,
was followed by the Court between 1933 and 1947, with some modifications in
1945. Taking the position that de facto authority was limited essentially to acts
required to keep the government operating, the Court was willing to strike
down many of the executive decrees issued by de facto governments. 39

29. See GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 63 (2005).

30. Jonathan M. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the
U.S. Model andlts Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 77, 176 (1997).

31. Id. at 176.
32. Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 350 (citing Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 28-

29).
33. Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 28; see also Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 349-

50.
34. Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 350.
35. Id. at 351.
36. Id. at 350-51; Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 773-74.
37. Dockery, supra note 19, at 1617-18; Irizarry y Puente, supra note 28, at 42-44; Walker,

Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 773-74.
38. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1610.
39. Id; Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 351.

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

An example of the Court's attempts to limit the scope of the de facto
doctrine was its decision in Administracion de Impuestos Internos v. Malmonge
Nebreda, decided in 1935. In Malmonge Nebreda, the Court reaffirmed the
position it had taken since 1930, that the Uriburu government had replaced only
the executive branch, not the entire national government; and that any de facto
authority exercised by that regime or its successors was therefore limited to
executive authority, and did not extend to legislative or judicial powers.41

But the Court also acknowledged that in instances of extraordinary
necessity, and when Congress was itself absent, a de facto executive might be
compelled to issue emergency decrees that amounted to de facto legislative
enactments. However, this was only permissible in cases of extreme urgency,
and such de facto laws would become ineffective upon the return of Congress
(unless Congress chose to ratify them). 42 By striking such balances between
legitimacy and exigency, the Court sought to close the "Pandora's Box" it had
opened in the wake of the 1930 coup.

While the Court in Malmonge Nebreda and other cases sought to limit
the scope of the de facto doctrine, the health of Argentine politics continued to
flag. As presidents began to rely more and more on emergency executive
decrees, Congress and the political parties failed to object, essentially
acquiescing in a dramatic shift of legislative power to the executive branch.
Rather than performing their constitutional functions as a check against the
abuse of executive powers, Congress and the courts largely stood aside.43 In
the words of a contemporary commentary in La Naci6n:

The facts reveal that Congress is planning its own ruin in
consenting to the usurpation of its privileges by the Executive
Power. Not only does it fail to stop the advance, but it does
not adopt measures designed to avoid it in the future. In its
indifference toward the alteration of the constitutional balance,
the chambers are permitting themselves to be despoiled even
of the traditional prerogatives of parliaments.44

Congressional acquiescence in the expansion of executive authority thus
was altering the traditional balance of power even before the advent of
Per6nism. The failure of the political parties - what Manuel Garcia-Mansilla
has called "the lack of seriousness of political parties" during this period -
made matters worse. Widespread electoral fraud and the corruption of the
political parties had been contributing factors in the 1930 coup, and democratic

40. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN],1935, "Administracion de Impuestos Internos v.
Malmonge Nebreda," Fallos (1935-172- 365) (Arg.).

41. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1610-11.
42. See Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 350-51.
43. Id. at 356; Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 176.
44. See Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 377 (citing Linares Quintana, supra note 16, at

656).

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IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.

dysfunction made it harder to prevent the post-1930 expansion of executive
power.45 As members of both the Radical and Conservative blocs increasingly
lost faith in the democratic process and sought instead to enlist the support from
outside the system, the military deepened its involvement in the nation's
politics.

46

These pressures on the Argentine political system, combined with the
military's continuing role in national politics, led to a second coup in June
1943. 47 The leaders of the new military regime, unlike those of the previous
coup, suspended constitutional rule; but the Supreme Court faced essentially
the same question as in 1930: whether to recognize the new government's de
facto authority in exchange for its own survival. Predictably, the Court made
the same choice, recognizing the new regime's authority in a resolution that
was an exact replica of the one the Court had issued in 1930. 49

But the Court also sought to preserve its independence during the next
few years: it continued to maintain its previous limitations on de facto
authority, and struck down enactments it deemed to exceed those limitations.50

Thus, while the justices had again conferred constitutional legitimacy on a
regime that had gained power through extra-constitutional means, they were
nevertheless unafraid to collide with that regime on specific questions arising
under the constitution.

In the mid- 1 940s the Court found itself increasingly at odds with the
person who - though he officially held the title of Vice President - was in fact
the military regime's most powerful figure: Colonel Juan Per6n.51 Per6n's
popularity and influence steadily grew; in February 1946 he won the presidency
in a democratic election and began to return the government to a civilian
footing.52 Meanwhile, the Court was growing increasingly unpopular, both for
its opposition to Per6n's social and economic programs and for its perceived
favoritism toward the Argentine oligarchy.53

45. See Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 377-79.
46. ROBERTA. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTiNA, 1928-1945 74,94,283-85

(1969); DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA: 1516-1987 FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO ALFONSIN 214-
17 (1987); Mugambi Jouet, The Failed Invigoration ofArgentina 's Constitution: Presidential
Omnipotence, Repression, Instability, and Lawlessness in Argentine History, 39 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 409, 421-22 (2008).

47. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1597-98; Jouet, supra note 46, at 421-22.
48. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 13, at 27-28, 28 n.138; Dockery, supra note 19, at

1598; Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 159-60; Walker,
Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 774.

49. Compare decree of June 1943, 196 Fallos 5 (1943) with decree of Sept. 10, 1930, 158
Fallos 290-91 (Arg.).

50. See Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 351.
51. POTASH, supra note 46, at 209-16,227-28,238-82; Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at

351-52; Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 153-62.
52. ROcK, supra note 46, at 262-63; Ramiro Salvochea, Clientelism in Argentina:

Piqueteros and Relief Payment Plans for the Unemployed- Misunderstanding the Role of Civil
Society, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 287, 293 (2008).

53. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

The Court responded to these challenges by rolling back some of its
earlier controls on de facto authority. Between 1945 and 1947, without
overruling the underlying doctrine of caducidad, the Court altered its stance on
the legislative powers of de facto regimes. The Court broadly held that de facto
governments require certain powers to function, and may therefore legitimately
exercise those powers if they also maintain a proper respect for the rights and
guarantees provided by the constitution. Under the existing doctrine of
caducidad, however, the Court held that de facto executives were barred from
enacting laws on criminal matters; interfering with the courts; or repealin,
suspending, or changing other laws that had been enacted constitutionally.
Yet neither the Court's new leniency toward de facto authority, nor Per6n's
efforts to return Argentina to civilian rule, alleviated the growing rift between
Per6n and the Court.

The Court suffered its most serious blow from 1946-47, when Per6n and
his supporters successfully sought to impeach and remove all but one of the
Court's members. 55 An ultimate showdown between Per6n and the Court was
probably inevitable, as Per6n and the Court had already found themselves at• • 56

cross purposes in 1945 and early 1946, before Per6n's election as president.

One of the essential elements of the Per6nist movement, organized labor, had
also been battling with the Court particularly since its decision in the Dock Sud
case in early 1946, a ruling that Per6n had openly attacked as part of his
presidential campaign. 57 (In Dock Sud, the Court struck down one of the
military regime's key programs, the Argentine version of the National Labor
Relations Board.)58 It was therefore unsurprising that Per6n moved against the
Court during the first months of his presidency.

While it was perhaps unavoidable that Per6n would challenge the Court
directly in some way, his decision to do so through the particular process of
impeachment proceedings was not a foregone conclusion. He appears to have
contemplated at least two other options. First, Per6n considered and rejected
the alternative of simply increasing the number ofjustices on the Court, thereby
allowing his government to name additional members who were sympathetic
with his political agenda - an Argentine version of Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan in the United States. It has been suggested that Per6n rejected this course

and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 870
(2003).

54. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 1945, "Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos

Aires v. Mayer," Fallos (1945-209-272) (Arg.); Dockery, supra note 19, at 1611; Irizarry y
Puente, supra note 28, at 41-43.

55. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1598-99; Becky L. Jacobs, Pesification and Economic

Crisis in Argentina: The Moral Hazard Posed by a Politicized Supreme Court, 34 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 391,407 (2003); Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra
note 30, at 80, 166-72.

56. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 157, 157 n.385.
57. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 1946, "Cia. Dock Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda."

Fallos(1946-204- 23) (Arg.); Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note
30, at 157-58, 161-62.

58. See Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 775.

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

because he sought to provoke a national debate about the Court's role, a goal
that was better served by the impeachment process. 59

A second option was to ignore the constitution and to simply replace the
justices themselves, without putting the nation through the ordeal of a formal
impeachment. Although such a step was unquestionably authoritarian, it
would have been characteristic in light of actions Per6n had already taken by
this time. Again, he may have rejected this option and chosen impeachment
instead to incite controversy over the Court's past actions. 6 1 Moreover, Per6n
did not operate in a political vacuum: surely he would have paid a price had he
attempted simply to work outside the constitution in his confrontation with the
Court.

Indeed, even the decision to formally impeach the Court - a step squarely
within the constitution's letter, if not its spirit - drew vigorous opposition.
Per6n of course faced the ire of his traditional political adversaries, who
included socialists, liberals, and some in the press. More interesting were the
complex crosswinds within his own coalition, particularly from the Catholic
Church. As Jonathan Miller has written, contemporary evidence suggests that
Catholics, a key segment of Per6n's base, were unenthusiastic about the
decision to impeach. Per6n might have settled on the formal impeachment
route because replacing the justices informally, or extra-constitutionally, would
have compounded his troubles with the organized church. 62

On Monday, July 8, 1946, the head of the Per6nist bloc, Rodolfo Decker,
introduced in the House of Deputies a bill to impeach most of the members of63

the Argentine Supreme Court. Broadly speaking, the charges against the
Court fell into two categories. 64 First, the Court was accused of oversteppin
the limits of its judicial role and of acting instead in a political role.

Ironically, two of the incidents cited to show that the Court had improperly
assumed a political role were its decisions to recognize the de facto regimes that
had come to power as a result of the 1930 and 1943 coups.66 The Court stood
accused of "mixing into political issues through the Pronouncements of 1930
and 1943, legitimizing the de facto governments," and was specifically
admonished for not enforcing the existing requirements for succession to the
presidency.

67

59. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 159.
60. Id. Per6n could have argued, for instance, that all constitutional appointments,

including judicial appointments, take on de facto status when a de facto government takes over
the executive and legislative branches - thus subjecting the justices to removal. Id. at 159
n.393.

61. Id. at 159.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 158.
64. See HELMKE, supra note 29, at 64.
65. Id.
66. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 159-61.
67. Id. Augmenting the irony, in both instances it had been the Court's own chiefjustice

who was constitutionally entitled to assume the presidency. Id.

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

Besides being improperly "political" in initially recognizing the de facto
regimes of 1930 and 1943, the Court was also admonished for its efforts to
limit the scope of those governments' authority.68 That is, in reviewing the
constitutionality of the acts of the de facto governments, the Court had
"assumed political powers outside of the judicial function by controlling and
impeding fulfillment of the social goals of the revolution of 1943 and writing
judgments with political designs." It had been overly political, for example,
for the Court to adhere to the position that the authority of a de facto
government was limited to necessary executive functions, and did not include
the power to issue legislative enactments with lasting effect.

The second set of charges accused the Court of demonstrating unfair and
improper prejudice against organized labor. Although the bill of impeachment
does mention several specific rulings, the real complaint against the Court was
not the inner workings of its jurisprudence; it was the Court's overall approach
to Per6n's social and economic agenda. The floor debates concerned mainly
whether the justices were in step with the times, that is, whether it "had been
sufficiently socially progressive during the 1930s and willing to reinterpret the
constitution in light of new social needs," in Miller's words.70

Thus, on one hand, the Court was accused of having been improperly
political when it recognized the de facto authority of the military governments
in the first place; but on the other hand, it was also accused of being improperly
political when it tried later to delineate the limits of what those governments
could constitutionally do. Moreover, as Miller has noted, it is hard to reconcile
the political charges with the labor charges: the Court was accused of being too
political in recognizing and shaping de facto authority, but in a sense it was also
accused of not being political enough, since it had neglected to consider social
and economic needs in its reading of the constitution.7 1 Put charitably, the
charges against the Court seem to come from different directions.

The impeachment proceedings lasted for more than nine months and
consumed the calendars of both houses of Congress. No less than thirty
sessions of the Senate were devoted at least in part to hearing the charges and
evidence against the Court, although the eventual outcome was beyond doubt.72

Few were surprised when, on Wednesday, April 30, 1947, Congress took the
unprecedented step of removing four of the five justices of the Argentine
Supreme Court.73

68. Id. at 161-62.
69. Id. at 160 (quoting Impeachment Proceedings, at 12 (House of Deputies accusation

presented to the Senate)).
70. Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 161.
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id. at 156. Per6nists controlled every seat in the Senate and two-thirds of the House of

Deputies.
73. Id.

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

II. UNITED STATES: ROOSEVELT AND THE COURT-PACKING PLAN

In the United States, although many observers had expected the New
Deal regulatory agenda to run aground upon reaching the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Court's decisions were more mixed and at times even encouraging for New
Deal partisans until 1935. 74 Especially encouraging were two cases in 1934
involving state legislative decisions, Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell and Nebbia v. New York.76 Blaisdell, Nebbia, and other early
decisions suggested that the Court might be willing to afford the New Deal a
wide berth in deference to dramatic changes in the economy and society.77

Moreover, the Court's initial treatment of the New Deal programs themselves
was either favorable or at least unalarming.78

But in May 1935, the Court appeared to start down a very different path.
The first sign of trouble was the Court's invalidation of the Railroad Retirement
Act on May 6, raising doubts about another program that was similar but far
more consequential: Social Security.79 The rail pension decision "sent shock
waves through the White House and the New Deal agencies [and] ... created
deep fissures between the executive branch and the Supreme Court," in the
words of a preeminent historian of the era, William Leuchtenburg. 80

Any remaining hopes of avoiding a collision between Roosevelt's
program and the Court were erased on May 27, 1935, a day that would be
remembered as Black Monday. 8 1 In a series of decisions announced that day,

74. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Dfficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 988 (2000); Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent
Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259,
280 (2000); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789 -1889 26 (1985); ROBERT McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
175-77 (1960).

75. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota
statute allowing foreclosure delays for debtors in distress).

76. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a state regulatory law regulating
the price of milk).

77. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 989;
see also Charles M. Freeland, The Political Process as Final Solution, 68 IND. L.J. 525,539-42,
569 (1993).

78. See generally United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (permitting the
government to repudiate "gold clauses" in private contracts, though not in public ones). In
Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), although the Court struck down a portion of the
National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the president to prohibit the interstate transport of
"hot oil," the Roosevelt administration thought the decision an anomaly, and was encouraged by
language in the opinion reaffirming that executive agencies were entitled to flexibility and
deference. See Stephen 0. Kline, Revisiting FDR 's Court Packing Plan: Are the Current
Attacks on Judicial Independence So Bad? 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 863, 875-76 (1999).

79. See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 360 (1935); Kline, supra note 78, at 879.
80. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL

REVOLUTON IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 27 (1995).
81. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421,421-

36 (1987); Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the NewDeal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237,245-

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

the Court restricted the President's power to remove members of independentS 82

regulatory commissions; struck down the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act
of 1934, which had placed a moratorium on farm mortgage payments; s3 and
held a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional for
giving the President excessive discretion. 84 New Dealers were stunned by the
Black Monday decisions: a few days later the President told reporters that the
Court had relegated the nation to the "horse-and-buggy" definition of interstate
commerce. 85 Organized labor was highly critical of the decisions, Congress
temporarily stopped work on New Deal legislation, and numerous proposals
were introduced in Congress to curb the power of the Court.86

The anti-Court animus that formed after Black Monday was aggravated
further the following January when the Court's Butler decision struck down the

87crop-control provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). The
AAA was a popular New Deal measure, and Butler became something of a
rallying cry -- the beginning of more organized efforts to "do something" to fix88
whatever was the matter with the Court. In Congress, more than a hundred
bills were introduced that proposed in some fashion to contain the Court's
power. 89 A flood of mail poured into the White House and the halls of
Congress, castigating the Supreme Court; many of the denunciations proposed
that the Court be brought into the twentieth century by requiring the justices to
retire upon reaching 65 or 70.90 Near Ames, Iowa, six of the justices were
hanged in effigy by a group of Iowa State students. 9 1

Any doubts about where the Court stood seemed to vanish completely in
the spring of 1936. In a two-week period, the Court repudiated the
administrative policies of the Securities and Exchange Commission;92 struckdown the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, known as the Guffey-

46 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995)); Michael E. Parrish, The Great
Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723, 731 (1984).

82. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
83. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
84. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
85. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 90; Devins, supra note 81, at 247 n.54; Richard D.

Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1891, 1932-33 (1994); William E.
Leuchtenburg, Charles Evans Hughes: The Center Holds, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (2005).

86. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201,210 (1994);
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 991-92; Kline,
supra note 78, at 884.

87. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT: THE POLmCS OF UPHEAVAL 488 (1960); Kline, supra note 78, at 886-89.

88. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 993-
94, 993 n.88; Kline, supra note 78, at 889; but see Cushman, supra note 86, at 242-43.

89. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 210.
90. See LEUCTENBURG, supra note 80, at 96-98.
91. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 87, at 488; but see Cushman, supra note 86, at 274.
92. Jones v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). The Court, speaking through

Justice Sutherland, compared the actions of the SEC with those of the Star Chamber in Stuart
England. Id.

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

Snyder Act (the so-called "little NLRA" that aimed to stabilize the coal
industry);93 invalidated the Municipal Bankruptcy Act;94 and struck down New
York's state minimum wage for women. 95 Even conservative defenders of the
Court were shocked by these decisions, which taken together looked like a
massive assault on the New Deal; the combination of all of them, especially the
minimum-wage case, galvanized popular resentment toward the Court.96

"Never before had the Court so severely frustrated an Administration's political
agenda during such a short time period," as William Ross has noted.97

Roosevelt had his own reasons for protesting that the Court had fallen behind
the times, but the American people agreed with his position.98

Roosevelt avoided attacking the Court as he campaigned for reelection in
the summer of 1936 against his Republican opponent, Governor AlfLandon of
Kansas.99 By any measure, Roosevelt's victory at the polls that November was
breathtaking: he received more than sixty percent of the popular vote and
carried the Electoral College by a margin of 523 to 8, winning every state but
Maine and Vermont. 100 The President's reelection mandate also seemed to
embrace the new congressional majorities. In the House of Representatives,
Democrats now outnumbered Republicans 328 to 127; in the Senate, 77 to
19.101 The magnitude of these gains understandably led Roosevelt to conclude
that most Americans favored his legislative program and would join him in now
opposing any obstacles to its speedy enactment. 102

Although his announcement of the Court-packing plan surprised almost
everyone in the country, Roosevelt had in fact been pondering such action
against the Court at least as early as 1935.103 Early on, he had concluded that

93. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
94. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1,298 U.S. 513 (1936).
95. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
96. William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time "Actually Occur? Re-Discovering the

Supreme Court's "Forgotten "Decisions of 1936-1937,37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1153, 1159-60(2005).
97. Id. at 1159 (but adding that "no previous Administration had so quickly generated laws

that so fundamentally altered the nation's social and economic system").
98. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L.

REv. 1, 19 (1998). In 1936 Roosevelt was especially frustrated to be the only 20th-century
president to complete his first four-year term without receiving a single opportunity to appoint a
justice to the Supreme Court. Id. See Kline, supra note 78, at 950.

99. See William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say? The
Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2085-87 (1999); William G.
Ross, The Role ofJudicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 391,419
(2002).

100. Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor
Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REv. 291, 310-11 (1994); Cushman, supra note 86, at 228-
29.

101. Kline, supra note 78, at 897.
102. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at

1023.
103. Id. at 1022-23; Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan

Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 248-49 (2007) (citing JAMES MACGREGOR
BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox (1956)); see also Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down

[Vol. 19:2



ONE TEXT, Two TALES

the problem had nothing to do with the Constitution, which Roosevelt
maintained was capacious enough to accommodate modem exigencies.
Roosevelt was convinced that the problem was the justices themselves and their
reactionary, almost cramped view of the world.

Roosevelt was also reminded of a constitutional crisis in Britain in 1911,
a situation that the President thought was analogous. As Roosevelt recalled the
case, the House of Lords had repeatedly refused to approve legislation that had
been forwarded by the House of Commons. Lloyd George, seeking to pass the
bill for Irish autonomy, broke the stalemate by announcing that if the Lords
rejected the bill again, the King would create several hundred additional peers,
enough to outvote the present House of Lords. Lloyd George's gambit had
succeeded, and in Roosevelt's mind was a handy analogue that presaged his
own eventual Court-packing plan.10 5

Several of Roosevelt's advisors, reflecting similar views in Congress and
the country, favored bold action against the Court but disfavored taking such a
step through statutory means; they thought a constitutional amendment more
appropriate to the task, perhaps one that amended the Constitution to expand106BuRosvlanhi
congressional authority in particular regulatory areas. But Roosevelt and his
attorney general, Homer Cummings, ultimately rejected such a course as
impractical. The process of amending the Constitution was (and still is)
complex, cumbersome, and time-consuming, and at any rate Roosevelt
concluded that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to craft a single
amendment that would anticipate all of the constitutional challenges that might
be brought against New Deal programs. 107

Practical considerations aside, Roosevelt, though bored by questions of
theory, did have a more philosophical objection to the amendment route.

Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 68 (2000).
104. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 978,

1022-23.
105. Kline, supra note 78, at 905. Roosevelt's secretary of the interior, Harold Ickes,

recorded in his diary:
The President's mind went back to the difficulty in England, where the House of
Lords repeatedly refused to adopt legislation sent up from the House of
Commons. He recalled that when Lloyd George came into power some years ago
under Edward VII, he went to the King and asked his consent to announce that if
the Lords refused again to accept the bill for Irish autonomy, which had been
pressed upon them several times since the days of Gladstone, he would create
several hundred new peers, enough to out-vote the existing House of Lords.
With this threat confronting them, the bill passed the Lords.

Id. at 905 (quoting 1 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES, THE FIRST

THousAND DAYS 1933-1936, at 468 (1953)). Roosevelt repeated the analogy at a Cabinet
meeting on December 27, and earlier in the year had recounted a similar story (this one
involving Gladstone and Queen Victoria) over lunch with Paul Block, the publisher of the
Toledo Blade. Id. at 905. Roosevelt's memory was inaccurate: he seems to have confused the
fight over the Irish home rule bill with Asquith's attempt to force the Lords to accept Lloyd
George's budget. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 94-95.

106. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at
1024-25.

107. Id.

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

Because he believed that the Constitution was already flexible enough to meet
the complicated needs of a modem industrial society, Roosevelt thought it
entirely unnecessary to change the Constitution in any way; he may even have
resisted pursuing an amendment because doing so could be taken as a tacit
acknowledgment that the Constitution was indeed inadequate to the present

108age.
Moreover, as Roosevelt and his advisors knew well, the final word rested

with the Court itself; even a well-crafted and swiftly enacted amendment would
ultimately be at the mercy of the justices' own interpretation. 109 For all of these
reasons, Roosevelt dismissed any proposal that depended on changing the
Constitution itself. By the end of January, 1937, he had developed a radical
alternative that he believed could preserve the New Deal not by rewriting the
Constitution but by remaking the Court.110

Because Roosevelt had (uncharacteristically) consulted only a few close
advisers before announcing his plan, he shocked almost everyone else when he
did so in a message to Congress on February 5, 1937. T1 Specifically,
Roosevelt proposed allowing the President to name an additional judge for each
federal judge who declined to retire upon reaching the age of seventy. Applied
to the Supreme Court, this would have let Roosevelt name up to six more
justices.I1

The President did not help the plan's cause when he disingenuously
mischaracterized the motivations that had led him to propose it. One of
Roosevelt's more sagacious advisors, Robert Jackson (who, like most, had been
unaware of the plan before it was announced), 113 wrote later that the plan at
first lacked "the simplicity and clarity which was the President's genius."' 114

108. Id. at 1025.
109. Id. at 1025-26. As Roosevelt told the nation in his March 9 Fireside Chat:

Even if an amendment were passed, and even if in the years to come it were to be
ratified, its meaning would depend upon the kind of Justices who would be
sitting on the Supreme Court bench. An amendment, like the rest of the
Constitution, is what the Justices say it is rather than what its framers or you
might hope it is.

Id. (noting Robert Jackson's statements to Congress that "[j]udges who resort to a tortured
construction of the Constitution may torture an amendment" and that "[e]xperience has shown
that it is difficult to amend a constitution to make it say what it already says").

110. See Kline, supra note 78, at 908.
111. See Neumann, supra note 103, at 248-49.
112. See Devins, supra note 81, at 246; Daniel A. Farber, Who KilledLochner? 90 GEO. L.J.

985, 990-91 (2002) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTrrUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
(2000)); G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal in Time, 94
MICH. L. REv. 1392, 1400 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: TaE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995)).

113. Jackson first learned of the plan when he read about it in the newspaper. Stephen R.
Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H. Jackson in Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Battle With the Supreme Court, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 543 (1997).

114. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OFA CRISIS IN

AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 189 (1941).

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Some might say, less charitably, that it was too clever for its own good.
Earlier that year Roosevelt had sent Congress a proposal to reorganize

and streamline the executive branch, and in his February 5, 1937 message he
first tried to present the Court-packing plan as simply a judicial version of his
executive streamlining proposal. Next, he claimed that it was primarily a
measure to alleviate the heavy workload of the Court. He cited the increase in
federal litigation and suggested that the Court was unable to keep pace with its
present docket of cases, largely because of the justices' advanced age.115

Because it was widely recognized that the President's true purpose had nothing
to do with the Court's workload but was aimed instead to reduce or undo the
damage being done to the New Deal, Roosevelt gave his proposal a needlessly
poor launch. 16

Roosevelt would later be more candid as to his real purpose, stating that
the plan would "bring to the decision of social and economic problems younger
men who have had personal experience and contact with modem facts and
circumstances."1 17 The idea that the proposal had been motivated by the
justices' advanced age was a misdirection suggested by the Attorney General,
Homer Cummings; of the few others who knew of the plan, most urged candor
about the plan's true aim. 118 Lawyers at the Department of Justice had
uncovered a similar age-based proposal made a quarter-century earlier in 1913
by Woodrow Wilson's first Attorney General. That the current Attorney
General was Justice James McReynolds - arguably the Court's most
reactionary member - delighted Roosevelt to no end. 119

Before judging the "age canard" too harshly, it is worth remembering that
this rationale was entirely in line with popular sentiment. In Friedman's words,
"no one expected the Justices to approve all [New Deal] legislation, but the
popular perception was that the current occupants of the highest bench were
particularly hostile to the needs of changing times, in no small part because of
their age." 120 Within a month, however, Roosevelt admitted what everyone
already knew: his real goal was to appoint new justices who would give a fair
hearing to the social and economic regulatory programs at the center of the New

115. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 133; Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 1023-24.

116. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 138; Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on
Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1154, 1163-64 (2006).

117. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat of March 9, 1937, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT 128 (1937). Among those offended by the administration's claims about the
justices' age was the Court's oldest member, Louis Brandeis. See C. Herman Pritchett, Book
Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1285 (1982) (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE
BRANDEIS / FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES (1982)).

118. See FRANK FREIDEL, ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZvOUS WITH DESTINY 227 (1990); Alton,
supra note 113, at 540-41; Kline, supra note 78, at 909.

119. See Alton, supra note 113, at 541; Neumann, supra note 103, at 239-40.
120. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at

1022.

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IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REV.

Deal.
Roosevelt's proposal immediately drew a wave of sharp attacks. 12 1 Many

members of Congress quickly announced that they would oppose the plan:
within a few days, every Republican in Congress, and more than a few
conservative Democrats, had come out against the plan. 122 The press coverage
was almost uniformly negative; editorial after editorial denounced the plan and
the highhanded way in which it had been announced. 123 The plan was called a
threat to civil liberties and judicial independence by civic ygoups, political
groups, and religious groups - notably the Catholic Church. Several state
legislatures debated resolutions opposing the plan, and the plan was opposed by
professional associations, including the American Bar Association. Even the
nation's law professors, who had historically avoided tangling openly in
partisan controversies, came out in large numbers to oppose Court-packing. 126

Notwithstanding Roosevelt's huge mandate the previous November (the
President repeatedly insisted that "the people are with me"), and despite
Americans' continuing dissatisfaction with the Court's own direction,
contemporary polls suggested that most opposed the President's plan. 127

Hostility from Roosevelt's longstanding political foes was unsurprising,
but the plan also drew unexpected fire from among the President's political
friends; few New Dealers or old-fashioned progressives embraced the plan. 128

Some of Roosevelt's closest advisors and allies were genuinely angry that the
President had neglected to consult them concerning such a monumental reform
proposal. 129 Some in Congress proposed alternatives to the President's plan,
many in the form of constitutional amendments. 130

121. See Devins, supra note 81, at 246-47; John M. Lawlor, Court Packing Revisited: A
Proposal for Rationalizing the Timing of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 967, 974-75 (1986).

122. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 213.
123. Id. at 210-11; Devins, supra note 81, at 247.
124. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 210-11; Kline, supra note 78, at 917.
125. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 210-11.
126. See generally Kyle Graham, A Moment in the Times: Law Professors and the Court-

Packing Plan, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151 (2002).
127. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, JudicialAccountability, and the Role of

Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 194 (2003)
("Despite Roosevelt's popularity and the Supreme Court's unpopularity, the Court-packing plan
lacked majority public approval, had the support of surprisingly few Court critics, and received
a tepid welcome in Congress."). One exception was a special election in Texas occasioned by
the death of Congressman James P. Buchanan (D-Brenham) in February 1937; the special
election, held in April, was the only congressional election to take place during the Court-
packing controversy. The surprising winner, an outspoken supporter both of Roosevelt and of
Court-packing, was a 28-year-old named Lyndon Johnson. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE
YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH To POWER 389-436 (1982).

128. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at
1049.

129. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 213. Among those the President had left out were
congressional leaders, Democratic Party officials, and almost everyone in his own Cabinet.

130. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at

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Among the many New Dealers who had openly criticized the Supreme
Court but who nevertheless broke with the President over Court-packing, no
voice was more surprising, or more effective, than that of Senator Burton
Wheeler of Montana. Wheeler was a liberal Democrat who had been
outspoken in his criticism of the Court. His decision to oppose the President
placed him at the forefront of the anti-Court-packing forces in Congress. 131

When Wheeler spoke forcefully against the plan in testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee in March, he dealt the President an astonishing
coup de grace by invoking the assistance of the Court itself: Wheeler released
an open letter from Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, offering a detailed
refutation of many of the claims the President had made in his February 5,
1937, message to Congress. 32 The Supreme Court was fully abreast of its
work, the Chief Justice informed the committee: "There is no congestion of
cases upon our calendar.... This gratifying condition has obtained for several
years." Adding new justices, moreover,

would not promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed
that it would impair that efficiency so long as the Court acts as
a unit. There would be more judges to hear, more judges to
confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be convinced
and to decide. The present number ofjustices is thought to be
large enough so far as the prompt, adequate, and efficient
conduct of the work of the Court is concerned. 134

Wheeler's release of the Chief Justice's letter terribly damaged the Court-
packing plan's prospects for passage; and those prospects grew even dimmer
the following week, when the Court announced several decisions that seemed to
make the plan unnecessary. On March 29, exactly one week after the release of
the Hughes letter, the Court upheld Washington State's minimum-wage law; 135

unanimously overruled its 1935 decision invalidating the Frazier-Lemke
Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act;136 and upheld the 1934 Railway Labor Act,
which gave Congress broad powers to regulate railroads in matters affecting
interstate commerce. 137 The rationale for Court-packing then crumpled further
on April 12, when the Court upheld one of the New Deal's legislative gems -
the Wagner Act138 - in several decisions, notably National Labor Relations

1024.
131. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 216; Brian M. Feldman, Evaluating Public

Endorsement of the Weak and Strong Forms ofJudicial Supremacy, 89 VA. L. REv. 979, 1029-
31 (2003).

132. See Cushman, supra note 86, at 218-21.
133. Id. at 219.
134. Id. at 219-20.
135. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
136. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
137. Va. R.R. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
138. Wagner Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 139

When the Senate Judiciary Committee ended its hearings in late April,
the President's proposal, at least in its present form, faced sure defeat. In its
report, the committee minced no words in expressing the majority view of the
bill: "This is far from the independence intended for the courts by the framers
of the Constitution. This is an unwarranted influence accorded the appointing
agency, contrary to the spirit of the Constitution":

Today it may be the Court which is charged with forgetting its
constitutional duties. Tomorrow it may be the Congress. The
next day it may be the Executive. If we yield to temptation
now to lay the lash upon the Court, we are only teaching
others how to apply it to ourselves and to the people when the
occasion seems to warrant. Manifestly, if we may force the
hand of the Court to secure our interpretation of the
Constitution, then some succeeding Congress may repeat the
process to secure another and a different interpretation and one
which may not sound so pleasant in our ears as that for which
we now contend. 140

The committee ended its report with a rebuke that must rank among the
starkest messages ever sent to a President by a Congress of his own party,
calling the proposal:

a needless, futile and utterly dangerous abandonment of
constitutional principle.., without precedent or justification..
. It would subjugate the courts to the will of Congress and

the President and thereby destroy the independence of the
judiciary, the only certain shield of individual rights.... It
stands now before the country, acknowledged by its
proponents as a plan to force judicial interpretation of the
Constitution, a proposal that violates every sacred tradition of
American democracy. Under the form of the Constitution it
seeks to do that which is unconstitutional. Its ultimate
operation would be to make this Government one of men
rather than one of law, and its practical operation would be to
make the Constitution what the executive or legislative
branches of the Government choose to say it is[,] an
interpretation to be changed with change of administration. It
is a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its
parallel will never again be presented to the free

139. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
140. Kline, supra note 78, at 943-44 (quoting S. Rep. No. 75-711, at 9-10, 15 (1937)).

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

representatives of the free people of America. 141

In July came the sad end. After Justice Van Devanter announced his
retirement in May, removing yet another argument that the plan was needed, the
legislative leader of the pro-Court-packing forces, Senate Majority Leader Joe• • • 142

Robinson of Arkansas, began working toward a compromise. In early July,
Robinson was securing votes for a watered-down version of the Court-packing
bill, a version that might actually have passed. 143 At first, Robinson's efforts
seemed to be succeeding; his proposed compromise appeared that it might pass.
But on July 14, after an especially heated legislative debate, and at the height of
an especially hot summer, Joe Robinson went back to his Washington
apartment and suffered a fatal heart attack.144

On July 20, returning to Washington from Robinson's funeral, Vice
President Jack Garner, who had never liked the Court-packing plan, informed
Roosevelt that the proposal was doomed. "You're licked, Cap'n," he told the
President. "You haven't got the votes." 145 Roosevelt finally abandoned the
plan. Two days later the Court-packing bill was sent back to committee to be
buried forever. 1

46

Ill. THE WORD Is NOT ENOUGH

In less than twenty years, the constitutional realities in Argentina and the
United States developed in two very different directions, directions not
reflected in the written texts of those nations' constitutions. In Argentina, the
Court that emerged from the impeachment fight - or, more accurately, the
Court that supplanted the earlier one - was in every respect the Per6n Court.1 4 7

From the impeachment proceedings of 1947 until the end of Per6n's term in
1955, the Court did not invalidate a single act taken by the Per6n government-
despite Per6n's increasingly authoritarian uses of executive decrees to punish
political opponents and repress dissent. 148

141. Kline, supra note 78, at 945 (quoting S. Rep. No. 75-711, at 23).
142. Difficulty, supra note 74, at 1053. Privately, Robinson thought Roosevelt should

withdraw the proposal while declaring victory.
143. Kline, supra note 78, at 946. The compromise would have allowed the President to

appoint no more than one additional justice per year.
144. Id.; but see Robert A. Schapiro, Must Joe Robinson Die? Reflections on the "'Success"

of Court-Packing, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 561 (1991).
145. Kline, supra note 78, at 948.
146. Id. at 948.
147. See Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 775 ("The Per6n

Court was exactly that; it did little to challenge Per6n's use of power even when used to harass
political opponents or to rule by presidential decree.").

148. See Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 150-51; see
also Jouet, supra note 46, at 434-35; Salvochea, supra note 52, at 293-94 (citing DAVID ROCK,
AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA: THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS IMPACT

(1993)).

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

Within a few months, moreover, the new Court rendered one of its most
far-reaching decisions when it rolled back the remaining controls on the scope
of the de facto doctrine. In Ziella v. Smiriglio, decided in October 1947, the
Court announced a new "plenary authority" doctrine, holding that a de facto
government enjoys all legislative powers that are necessary to govern.1 49 In
essence, the Court removed virtually all remaining limitations on a de facto
government's legislative authority; the only surviving limitation was that de
facto executives were prohibited from enacting laws that were
unconstitutional.150 In other words, the Court held that de facto laws passed by
the executive had the same effect and legitimacy as laws passed by Congress,
and could only be undone by future legislation. 5 1

Per6n's impeachment of the Court not only led to the pliant new
approach to de facto authority, it set a precedent for "court-swapping" (and
much shorter judicial tenures) that plagued the nation for decades to come.152

After 1947, when a President found a particular judge unsatisfactory, the judge
was simply replaced. 153  Virtually every incoming civilian President has
exercised the informal authority to name the majority of Supreme Court
justices, either by removing the justices that an earlier government had named,
or by "packing" the Court, that is, increasing the Court's size to create
additional seats for docile judges.1 54 The new balance of power between
President and Court also dramatically shortened the average judge's time on the
bench: during the eighty-five years of Argentine history before the Court was
impeached, only thirty-five men had served on the Court, averaging roughly
eleven years in office. In contrast, during the fifty years following the
impeachment, fiftsy-seven justices had served, and their average tenure was less
than five years.

The doctrinal shifts and informal power arrangements after 1947
transformed the Court into a subservient body, completely dependent upon (and
deferential to) the executive branch. The Court became, in Christopher
Walker's words, "at best, a dependent, weak institution that did little to
challenge the ruler or uphold the rule of law; at worst, it was a servant and
accomplice of an authoritarian regime that reinforced unconstitutional policies.- ,,156

and practices. Notwithstanding the written text of the constitution, after
1947 the Court barely resembled its former self and resembled the U.S.

149. "Ziella v. Smiriglio Hnos," Fallos (1947-209-27) (Arg.); see Dockery, supra note 19, at
1611-12; see also Irizarry y Puente, supra note 28, at 44-45.

150. See Dockery, supra note 19, at 1611-12.
151. Id.; Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 351-52; Linares Quintana, supra note 16, at 664.
152. See HELMXE, supra note 29, at 65 n.4; Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 352; Walker,

Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 775.
153. See Walker, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 99-100.
154. Id. at 99-100; Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 783-84.
155. Walker, TowardDemocratic Consolidation?, supra note 1 at 775 (citing Helnke, supra

note 29, at 65-68, tbls. 4.1 & 4.2).
156. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 775.

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

Supreme Court even less. Having ceded its autonomy and independence to the
executive branch, the Court had stoplped functioning as a genuine check on the
power of other constitutional actors. The Court's deterioration after 1947
also demolished thepeople's confidence in the judiciary and diminished respect
for the rule of law.15

Not incidentally, after 1947 the President effectively controlled the Court
in both procedural and substantive matters. The Court stopped blocking
presidential efforts to regulate the economy. 159 Per6n grew more authoritarian
and his government took more drastic steps to repress or punish his political
opponents. 160  The Constitution of 1949, initiated by the Per6n-controlled
Congress, permitted Per6n to run for a second term; and Per6n further
expanded his power by declaring an emergency "state of siege" shortly before
his overwhelming reelection victory in 1952 (amid charges of widespread
fraud). 161 Per6n maintained his unparalleled position until 1955, when he
himself was brought down in a coup, but that is another story.16 2

In the United States, considering that Roosevelt was seeking a far more
modest change than Per6n's decision to impeach most of the Court, the Court-
packing episode is puzzling. Roosevelt was a masterful politician, at the height
of his political power to judge from the size of his own reelection margins and
the level of support he enjoyed in Congress. Moreover, the public was
genuinely angry at the Court's repeated obstruction of New Deal programs. 163

Why was the outcome of this constitutional crisis such a stinging defeat for
such a strong executive?

Roosevelt badly misjudged how most people would see his plan, in part
because he misjudged how most people saw the Supreme Court. From the
outset the President was forced to defend the plan against charges that it would
undermine the Court's ability to protect civil liberties.164 Certainly the Court's

157. Id. at 804-05; see also Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 389.
158. Garcia-Mansilla, supra note 14, at 351; Jacobs, supra note 55, at 428-29; Walker,

Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, supra note 4, at 97-98.
159. See Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability, supra note 30, at 149-50 &

149 n.354.
160. See ARTHUR P. WHITAKER, ARGENTINA 139-43(1965); Dockery, supra note 19, at 1599-

1600.
161. Const. Arg. (1949); see ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND PoLmcs IN ARGENTINA,

1945 -1962 (1980); ROcK, supra note 46, at 306; see generally JostPH PAGE, PER6N: A
BIOGRAPHY 200-18 (1983).

162. See FELIX LuNA, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINIANS (Cynthia Mansfield & Ian
Barnett trans., 2000); ROcK, supra note 46, at 306-18. Per6n returned to power again briefly in
1973.

163. See Barry Friedman, Attacks on Judges: Why They Fail, 13 ME. B.J. 124, 127 (1998)
("FDR, elected in one of history's largest popular mandates, fell quickly to his lowest approval
when he proposed the Court-packing plan."); see also Kline, supra note 78, at 865.

164. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at
1038; Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the CivilRights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 46 (1996); William G. Ross, The Role of Religion in the Defeat of the 1937 Court-
Packing Plan, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 629, 633-34 (2007-08).

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

role as a defender of religious liberty was a concern for the religious
organizations that contributed to the defeat of the Court-packing proposal.165

Roosevelt also found himself defending the plan against charges that it would
seriously threaten judicial independence. 166

Besides overlooking how much the public valued both the Court's
independence and its role as a protector of civil liberties, Roosevelt committed
a more serious error: he failed to fathom the people's authentic fears of nascent
dictatorship. 167 The chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Henry Fountain
Ashurst, who supported the President's plan, confided to his diary that "[e]ven
many persons who believe in President Roosevelt opposed his bill because they
[are] haunted by the terrible fear that some future President might, by suddenly
enlarging the Supreme Court, suppress free speech, free assembly and invade
other Constitutional guarantees of citizens."1 68 Such fears seemed reasonable
in light of the rise of totalitarian governments abroad, even for those who had
staunchly supported the Roosevelt program. 169 It was widely believed that any
diminution ofjudicial independence could be the first step on a downward path
to tyranny. 170 Concerns about executive power were the one common belief
that united Roosevelt's traditional foes with his longtime allies. 171

Finally, while I do not propose to take sides in the historical controversy
over whether the Court did indeed "switch" in response to the Court-packing
plan, it is worth mentioning the "switch in time" here for a simple reason: the
public thought it happened, as did their elected representatives. Whether the
Court's change in direction had actually been foreordained months earlier, or
whether they were in any way influenced by the President's actions, is

165. For a fine discussion of the role of religion in defeating the plan, see generally Ross,
The Role of Religion in the Defeat of the 1937 Court-Packing Plan, supra note 164.

166. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, note 74, at 1038-44;
Ross, The Role of Religion in the Defeat of the 1937 Court-Packing Plan, supra note 164, at
670-7 1; see also JOStPH AEsOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 232,262 (1938); JAMES T.
PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL: THE GRowTi OF THE

CONSERVATIVE COALMON IN CONGRESS, 1933-1939 87 (1967); see generally Kline, supra note

78.
167. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 137; George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:

The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557,
1581 (1996).

168. LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT
47-48 (1967).

169. See Ross, The Role of Religion in the Defeat of the 1937 Court-Packing Plan, supra
note 164, at 663-64; see also Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1293 n. 17 (1982); see generally Reuel E. Schiller,
Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modem First
Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 75-95 (2000).

170. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L. J. 741, 746-52 (1981); Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 74, at 1037 n.302; Vermeule, supra
note 116, at 1166; see also Matthew Perry, Justice Stone and Footnote 4,6 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 35, 53-54 (1996).

171. See Devins, supra note 81, at 255; Feldman, supra note 131, at 1024-33.

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ONE TEXT, Two TALES

immaterial to why the public responded as it did. Clearly, contemporary
observers suspected a causal connection, and that suspicion did as much as
anything else to sink the President's proposal.172

Roosevelt himself claimed that the "switch in time" was not one of his
greatest political setbacks, but rather a great victory. 73 As a purely political
matter, it is hard not to see the plan's defeat as an unmitigated disaster.17 4 On
the other hand, although Roosevelt's lost-the-battle/won-the-war version of
history is unquestionably self-serving, it is nevertheless undeniable that
virtually all of the plan's aims were realized within a few years of its defeat:
the membership of the Court itself changed, Roosevelt ultimately appointed
more Supreme Court justices than any other President except George
Washington, and the Court's jurisprudence inexorably moved in far more
Rooseveltian directions. 175

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

On paper, Roosevelt and Per6n operated under constitutions that formally
were much the same; what differed dramatically were not the formal structures.
but the informal practices and environment of informal institutions. The
written word simply does not suffice to explain their true constitutions, because
words insufficiently describe the gap between formal institutions and informal
practices. As Avner Greif has written, "To study the impact of a legal system,
we must therefore also examine the rules, belief, and norms that generate
behavior among members of its constituting organizations and between them
and others."

176

The gap between formal and informal institutions is a gap not of structure
but of culture, of constitutional culture. Simply put, a constitutional democracy

172. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 143.
173. See id. at 157-6 1; Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L.

REV. 620, 665 n.226 (1994).
174. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 157-61. Among other things, the struggle over

the Court "helped blunt the most important drive for social reform in American history,"
squandering any advantage of Roosevelt's reelection triumph in 1936; deeply divided the
Democratic Party, leading conservative Democrats to join with Republicans in opposing the
New Deal; and alienated many middle-class voters who had been strong supporters of the
President. Id. Henry Wallace, a leading New Dealer and Roosevelt's vice president from 1941
to 1945, thought "[t]he whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme
Court fight." Id.

175. See LEuCHTENBURG, supra note 80, at 156; David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken:
FDR, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Amendment, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 463, 466 (1989);
William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 579, 595 (2004). In his
second term, Roosevelt named justices to succeed Van Devanter (Hugo Black); Sutherland
(Stanley Reed); and Butler (Frank Murphy); he also named justices to succeed Cardozo (Felix
Frankfurter) and Brandeis (William 0. Douglas). In his third term, he named three more
justices, and elevated Stone to chiefjustice.

176. AVNER GREW, INSTMTIONS AND THE PATH TO ECONOMIC MODERNITY: LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE 31 (2006).

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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

is in perpetual jeopardy in the absence of a supportive surrounding culture. 177

In Argentina, it seems clear in retrospect that the Supreme Court and its "U.S.-
style" constitution was insufficiently rooted in Argentine society and history,
and that unfortunate choices by judicial and political actors, in the face of
growing presidential influence, placed the judiciary at the mercy of the
executive branch. 178 Compare this history with that of the United States, where
even the severe strains of the Great Depression and the Second World War did
not persuade the Court to overlook constitutional limits on executive
authority. 

179

Without a sense of a nation's constitutional culture, it is impossible to
fully understand the relationship between that nation's judges and the choices
they make as democratic actors. By what they say and do, or refrain from
saying and doing, judges reflect the norms of the constitutional culture of which
they are a part; at the same time, they are also those norms' arbiters or
enforcers. If the constitutions of nations are illuminated at all by Oliver
Wendell Holmes's view of law as "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious,"' 180 then those constitutions' full meaning
will be forever beyond our grasp if we never reach beyond their mere words. A
people's true constitution can never be wholly committed to parchment.

177. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 794 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("A Constitution survives over time because the people share a common,
historic commitment to certain simple but fundamental principles."). On constitutionalism and
constitutional culture generally, see Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New
East-Central European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1 (2000).

178. Walker, Toward Democratic Consolidation?, supra note 1, at 771.
179. Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth-Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World,

48 ARK. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1994).
180. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173

(1920); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS
STUDY 3 (1930) ("What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.").

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