LETTING TIME SERVE YOU:  BOOT CAMPS AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS


WHAT IS AN INTERNATIONAL POST-BELLIGERENT 
ADMINISTRATION? 

Dr. Emmanuel Vianès 

I. INTRODUCTION

Academic experts use many approximate terms to describe the whole 
framework of territorial administrations, relying on the resurgence of old 
concepts such as “international protectorate” or “colonial rule,” associated 
with the idea of an international trusteeship (international authority).1 To 
refer to the subsequent practice, the terms of “benevolent autocracy”2 and 
“humanitarian occupation”3 are used frivolously. For specialists looking for 
“heritage” of territorial administrations, the neo-colonial context could be 
explained by the fact that “[c]olonialism lasted long enough to destroy the 
preexisting social and political institutions, but not long enough to put 
anything solid and lasting in their place.”4 Some others even justify a form 
of neo-imperialism to maintain international order:  

Those who imagine a world beyond empire imagine rightly, but they 
have not seen how prostrate societies actually are when nation-building fails, 
when civil war has torn them apart. Then and only then is there a case for 
temporary imperial rule, to provide the force and will necessary to bring order 
out of chaos.5 

1 Peter Lyon, The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship, 31 J. 
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL., 96, 107 (U.K.) (“UN trusteeship would almost certainly be an 
improvement on the anarchical condition of the several quasi-states the world has now.”). 
2 Simon Chesterman, Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations, in 
MAKING STATES WORK: STATE FAILURE AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 339 (Simon Chesterman, 
Michael Ignatieff & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2005). 
3 GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 3, 3–4 (2008) (“First their purpose has been to 
end human rights abuses, reform governmental institutions and restore peaceful coexistence among 
groups that had recently been engaged in vicious armed conflict. In this sense, they are 
humanitarian. The missions are social engineering projects that take international standards of 
human rights and governance as their blue prints. They may indeed be seen as the most far-reaching 
efforts at implementing those and other norms of social relations the international community has 
ever mounted. Second, the governing authority assumed by the international administrators is quite 
similar to the de facto authority of traditional belligerent occupiers. Both are outsiders to the territory 
they control, both assume ultimate legal authority and both are avowedly temporary. Just as 
occupiers under humanitarian law do not assume sovereign powers over the territory, the Security 
Council has consistently affirmed the sovereignty of the host state in creating humanitarian 
occupation missions. Humanitarian occupation, then, may be defined as the assumption of 
governing authority over a state or a portion thereof, by an international actor for the express purpose 
of creating a liberal democratic order.”). 
4 William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 1, Jan.–
Feb. 1995, at 2, 4. 
5 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, EMPIRE LITE: NATION-BUILDING IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND AFGHANISTAN 125 
(2003). 

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422 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 

However, while territorial administrations in international relations are 
a big family, including foreign territorial administrations (colonial 
trusteeship, occupation, etc.) as well as hybrid territorial administrations, 
such as the mandates of the League of Nations (LoN) or the United Nations 
Trusteeship System, there is still another modern kind of territorial 
administration: the international post-belligerent administration (IPBA). This 
notion could be defined as a management structure in a post-belligerency 
situation, formally constituted and locally-based, operating within a singular 
territorial unit, whether a state or sub-state unit.6 This is the exercise of all 
state regulatory functions (pouvoirs régaliens), without the enjoyment of the 
territorial sovereign title, which emphasizes the temporary nature of this tool 
of territorial dispute settlement and/or of conflict resolution. 

The use of the term “administration” refers to the management of la 
puissance publique (public power),7 whether in a plenary perspective, 
covering the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, or in a partial view 
where it is necessary to implement a program in a given territory.8 This 
practice is a political institution that performs many different functions: 
establishing and maintaining public order and internal security, providing 
humanitarian assistance after the conflict and supporting internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and refugees, ensuring civil administration operations, 
creating local political institutions including a civil society and the election 
process, and reconstructing the socioeconomic aspects. In addition, IPBA 
established by a U.N. resolution under Chapter VII beyond the scope of peace 
enforcement and peacebuilding is based on several components: 1) the 
powers of administration, including regulatory powers are transferred to 
international actors (i.e. the United Nations); 2) the international actors are 
engaged in the exercise of authority and administration in the interest of and 
for the benefit of the local population; 3) a superposition of several (at least 
two) legal orders is recognized, namely the domestic legal order and an 
international legal order, bringing some changes in the applicable law and 
imposing obligations on the domestic and international actors; 4) the 
institutional architecture of the territory is indirectly internationalized by the 
creation of international or mixed executive and/or judicial institutions (i.e. 
convergence of international and domestic staff ); 5) such territory has an 
international legal entity which is (very) limited by the international actors in 
charge of the international relations of the territory, which means that the two 
parts of the sovereignty, the exercise of jurisdiction and the sovereign 

 
                                                                                                                 
6 RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE 
CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY 47,  4748 (2008). 
7 Albane Geslin, Puissance publique et droit international, 5 TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION 
FRANÇAISE POUR LA RECHERCHE EN DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 269 (2012) (Fr.). 
8 ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN 
OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2009). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 423 
 
property, are separated.9 The first condition to establish an IPBA is the 
restoration of public order and internal security in the territory to organize 
civil rule: the monopoly of legitimate violence must be restored as a basis of 
the authority of the native state. In this context, violence is not only 
understood in its “positive” meaning, that it is not only physical and visible, 
but also it may comprise negative aspects such as intimidation, fear of 
reprisal, persecution, or servitude. In situations of governance vacuum, the 
lack of police force and the disuse of the judicial system are the roots 
promoting the resurgence of anarchy in a society. In this case, IPBAs are 
responsible for the safety of the environment to a much higher degree 
compared to peace operations.10 

Historically, IPBAs are not a new phenomenon. After the First World 
War, the international administration of the Saar11 or the international 
experimentation in the Leticia District12 in the early thirties under the 
responsibility of the LoN are good examples of the development of IPBAs in 
parallel to the creation of international institutions. Other examples can be 
considered as linked to the creation of IPBAs, such as the Free City of 
Danzig13 or the League’s engagement in Memel.14 During the decolonization 
process, other IPBAs were established—at least partially—such as the United 
Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo – 
ONUC)15 or the Temporary Executive Authority of the United Nations in 
West New Guinea (UNTEA).16 And after the Cold War, due to the 
systematization of international governance, this form of conflict resolution 
and dispute settlement was renewed with the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG),17 the United Nations Transitional 

 
                                                                                                                 
9 Carsten Stahn, The United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor: A 
First Analysis, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B.  UNITED NATIONS L. 105, 181 (2001) (Ger.). 
10 RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 45 (2005). 
11 FRANK M. RUSSELL, THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SAAR 134 (1926). See also 
SARAH WAMBAUGH, THE SAAR PLEBISCITE: WITH A COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 16–36 
(1940); FRANCIS P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 586–89 (1952). 
12 L. H. Woolsey, Editorial Comment, The Leticia Dispute between Colombia and Peru, 29 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 525 (1933). 
13 Julien Makowski, La situation juridique du territoire de la ville libre de Dantzig, 30 REVUE 
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 56 (1923) (Fr.). 
14 Convention Concerning the Territory of Memel, May 8, 1924, 1924 L.N.T.S. 87.  
15 William J. Durch, The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN 
PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 315, 316 (William J. Durch ed., 1993). 
16 Daniel Gruss, UNTEA and West New Guinea, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 97 (2005) 
(Ger.). 
17 Raymond Goy, L’indépendance de la Namibie, 37 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INT’L 387 
(1991) (Fr.). 

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424 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),18 and especially the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES),19 and most 
recently and fundamentally with the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as well as the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), although there are 
other partial experiences and non-implemented projects.20 

Faced with this terminological and historical complexity, it is necessary 
to outline what an IPBA is. This article defines the structures and purposes 
of IPBAs and it concludes by arguing for changes to the current international 
legal framework establishing IPBAs to improve their functionality regarding 
the contemporary subsequent practice. To fully understand this concept, it is 
firstly necessary to define this notion by its own characteristics. Secondly, 
the taxonomic criteria should be analyzed, and thirdly, the contemporary 
subsequent practice should be revealed in the light of the evolution of the 
international legal order in general, and in the light of the changes in peace 
operations doctrine in particular. 

II. NORMATIVE CONCEPTUAL CHARACTERISTICS 

It is difficult to separate definitional and taxonomic attributes, as some 
markers overlap, contributing both to the definition and classification. To 
grasp the concept of IPBA, it is necessary to differentiate the strict criteria 
from those which would be more flexible. 

 
                                                                                                                 
18 Paul Isoart, L’Autorité provisoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge, 39 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE 
DROIT INT’L 157 (1993) (Fr.). See also Lucy Keller, UNTAC in Cambodia – from Occupation, Civil 
War and Genocide to Peace, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B.  UNITED NATIONS L. 127 (2005) (Ger.). 
19 Johan Schoups, Peacekeeping and Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, in 
PEACEBUILDING: A FIELD GUIDE 389 (Luc Reychler & Thania Paffenholz eds., 2001). See also 
Derek Boothby, The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 37, 41 (2004). 
20 Other cases, such as Vilnius, High Silesia, Fiume (project non-implemented), Jerusalem (project 
non-implemented), the Free Territory of Trieste (project non-implemented), the U.N. Council for 
Namibia or the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO – project not 
really implemented), as well as the U.N. Operation In Somalia II (UNOSOM II). WALTERS, supra 
note 11, at 406–08, 447–48. See also S.C. Res. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/16 (Jan. 10, 1947); JAMES R. 
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 534–35 (2006); JOËLLE LE 
MORZELLEC, LA QUESTION DE JÉRUSALEM DEVANT L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES (1976); 
STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER 
THE COLD WAR 95–120 (1995); Jarat Chopra, Breaking the Stalemate in Western Sahara, 1 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING, 303, 307 (1994) (U.K.); Laurent Lucchini, La Namibie. Une construction des 
Nations unies, 15 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INT’L 355, 359 (1969) (Fr.); Christiane E. Philipp, 
Somalia – A Very Special Case, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 518 (2005) (Ger.). 

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2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 425 
 
A. Strict Criteria 

The strict criteria are those which are stable and rigid. Consequently, 
this means that they could not be changed to undermine what an IPBA is. 

1. International Exogenous Actor Versus Local Endogenous Actor 

First, it is important to focus on the identity of the actor, which refers 
to two kinds of actors: on the one hand, the international exogenous actor, 
and on the other hand, the endogenous actor, namely the local population and 
its elites. The link between the international actor and the activity of the 
administration is the “essence” of the relationship created by the exogenous 
actor. The functional international identity of the actor and the spatial identity 
of the territory should be connected: on the one hand the arrangements are 
local, insofar as they are based in a territory and they are determined on behalf 
of the population; on the other hand, the identity of the actor is international 
and functional, because it concerns international civil servants working for 
an international organization, which fulfills administrative functions in the 
field. The spatial identity of the international actor—although differentiated 
from the local identity of the population and territorial unit—is still shaped 
by the local society, because it influences the decision-making process 
developed by international actors.21 The IPBA is a distinctive activity 
because a dichotomy between the IPBA identity and the spatial identity of 
the territorial unit administered (population included) is acknowledged. 
International officials are staff seconded by Member States and owe their 
appointment to the selection procedures of international organizations.22 
These foreign government officials have political, administrative, or 
judiciary positions within a territorial unit that is not theirs and benefit from 
special status due to bodies created by an international organization. At the 
outset of the mission, these bodies are in the hands of international civil 
servants, but as the mission goes along, these structures evolve to a local or 
domestic framework (sub-state territorial unit or state).23 Therefore, 
international bodies take a hybrid form due to local interference within them, 
especially for electoral commissions, mixed international tribunals, truth and 
reconciliation Commissions, as well as other bodies dealing with human 

 
                                                                                                                 
21 WILDE, supra note 6, at 26–30. 
22 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 44 (2005) (“[I]nterests flow 
from a constructed identity and the identities of all actors in international relations fluctuate either 
through different association with others (as through participation in an IO) or through changing 
self-perceptions (which can also be influenced through the normative activity of IOs).”). 
23 See Regulation No. 64 on Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of 
Venue, UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000). See also Regulation No. 2000/1 on the 
Establishment of the Central Fiscal Authority of East Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/1 (Jan. 14, 
2000). 



426 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
rights or administrative structures. It seems that the international actor—the 
LoN, the United Nations, or another international ad hoc form—is the best 
guarantee of objective conditions when it comes to meeting the challenges of 
erosion of the social contract, in contrast to unilateral action.24 In this case, 
the international actor is responsible to the states it represents (external 
accountability) and is accountable to the local population (internal 
accountability). In theory, this would be its dual accountability.25 

2. Territory Status 

Secondly, the status of the territory should be investigated on the 
grounds that the notion of IPBA maintains close ties with sovereignty. 
Sovereignty has a double meaning: on the one hand, sovereignty means the 
rights of the owner—the sovereign—and therefore the state in a given 
territorial unit; on the other hand, sovereignty emphasizes the jurisdiction (in 
the sense of power) and control over a territory. This dualism generally leads 
to the union of the territorial unit (spatial) and the legal personality of the 
state, despite the original difference between land ownership and 
administration (control and jurisdiction).26 

For IPBAs, it happened that this concept was likened to that of 
“internationalized territory,” considering that property rights derive from the 
right of administration, making an illusory link between the administration 
exercised by international actors in post-belligerency and sovereignty. In 
concreto, internationalized territory is a territorial unit that is not an integral 
part of a state where sovereignty is partially or fully granted and exercised by 
a non-local actor. The condition par excellence of territory 
internationalization is its unlimited temporal nature,27 which contrasts with 
the delimited duration of an IPBA. In this sense, the idea of perpetual 
sovereignty of internationalized territories exists, but it cannot be applied to 
IPBAs, insofar as it is essential to take into account the nature of the exercised 
activity. On the one hand, the establishment of an IPBA never relies on the 
territorial sovereignty title, as the international actor is merely a temporary 

 
                                                                                                                 
24 FOX, supra note 3, at 118–21. 
25 Yves Daudet, L’action des Nations Unies en matière d’administration territoriale, 6 CURSOS 
EUROMEDITERRANEOS BANCAJA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 459, 507–09 (2002) (Spain). 
26 JEAN COMBACAU & SERGE SUR, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 426, 426–28 (2010). 
27 MEIR YDIT, INTERNATIONALIZED TERRITORIES FROM THE “FREE CITY OF CRACOW” TO THE “FREE 
CITY OF BERLIN” 11, 20–21, 320 (1961) (This thought focuses on the fact that the sovereign title is 
permanently granted to a non-local public actor, as a representative of the international society as 
well as of the internationalized territory. This theory seeks above all sustainable solutions to the 
territorial disputes with an internationalizing process: “populated areas established for an unlimited 
duration as special State entities in which supreme sovereignty is vested in (or de facto exercised 
by) a group of States or in the organized international community” and “[t]he local element in these 
territories is restricted in its sovereign powers by the provision of an International Statute (Charter, 
Constitution, etc.) imposed upon it by the Powers holding supreme sovereignty over the territory.”).  



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 427 
 
administrator, but in no case the territorial sovereign; and the other hand, 
although the establishment of an IPBA is legal and legitimate according to 
the terms of the involved international organization’s founding covenant (or 
charter), the exercise of administrative prerogatives over a territorial unit is 
not enough to enjoy the sovereign title. The international actor provides the 
right to administer a territory without prejudice to its status. It is likely the 
same distinction between the concept of “government” and that of “state”: 
the government does not have a legal personality, but is an agent acting on 
behalf of a legal entity, the state. For this reason, it seems more sensible to 
refer to a “framed” or “suspended” sovereignty, because the international 
actor responsible for an IPBA has sovereign prerogatives (prérogatives 
régaliennes) but does not have the title of sovereignty.28 When an IPBA is 
established, the legal status—the title of sovereignty—of a state or of a 
territorial unit is not altered, although the IPBA enjoys the exercise of 
administrative control, i.e. the international actor becomes an agent of the 
territorial sovereign respecting its sovereign title, while performing its 
duties.29 However, it is more complicated when it is neither a state nor a 
territorial state unit. The status of these non-state territories administered by 
an international actor does not lead to the development of international 
territorial sovereignty,30 because the international actor (the LoN or the 
United Nations) does not claim the title of sovereignty, and because this kind 
of territory—based on the principle of self-determination31—may have a 
legal personality at the international level in accordance with the right to self-

 
                                                                                                                 
28 Alexandros Yannis, The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and its 
Implications in International Politics, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1037 (2002) (U.K.). See also Robert O. 
Keohane, Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 275, 293–297 (J. L Holzgrefe. & Robert 
O. Keohane eds., 2003); DANIEL SVEN SMYREK, INTERNATIONALLY ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES – 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATES? AN ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER INTERNATIONALLY 
ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF POST-WAR 
KOSOVO 24, 24–27 (2006); Christian Tomuschat, Yugoslavia’s Damaged Sovereignty over the 
Province of Kosovo, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 323, 323–26 
(Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373 (2003); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to 
Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. AND POL’Y 387 (2003); Paul 
R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
29 WILDE, supra note 6, at 147–51. 
30 Jarat Chopra, The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor, 42 SURVIVAL (U.K.), Autumn 2000, at 27. 
31 U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2 (“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace.”); id. art. 22 (“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote.”).  

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428 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
determination.32 In this way, a population with the right to external self-
determination is often designated by the term “people” and its territory is 
identified as a “unit of self-determination”: this title is given to U.N. 
trusteeships as well as non-autonomous territories (covering also the colonial 
territories), as long as these territories are not independent states, to establish 
an ad hoc mechanism to resolve specific territorial disputes. According to 
Resolution 2625 of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), a “unit of self-
determination” is a separate legal entity. This type of territory—non-
internationalized non-state units—has a separate legal personality resulting 
from its right to self-determination. The international actor acts as an agent 
of a legal sui generis entity and the territorial unit of self-determination does 
not benefit from the sovereign title in accordance with the principle of self-
determination. It implies that such territorial units cannot be defined as a 
terra nullius and an international actor (or any other legal entity) may not 
enjoy the title of sovereignty over these territories only by exercising an 
administrative control.33 In fine, whether it is about a state, a state unit, or a 
non-autonomous territory, the IPBA does not establish an international 
territorial sovereignty. The international actor within the IPBA has plenary 
or partial administrative and political powers without enjoying the title of 
sovereignty over the territory. Therefore, the sovereignty of the territory is 
“suspended” or “framed” to the extent that the international actor performs 
the functions of the public authority. This type of territory has a very limited 
international personality, as the international actor/authority should be able 
to manage international relations of these territories on behalf of the peoples. 

3. Post-Belligerency 

Thirdly, the post-belligerency nature of an IPBA should be considered 
as a fundamental criterion, because international relations history teaches that 
wars traditionally end with negative peace, usually qualified as unjust. The 
victor determines everything without consideration and the defeated party 
loses everything. An IPBA plays an important role in building peace because 
it is a tool for developing an inclusive approach to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. It is a cornerstone of the modern practice of peacemaking by 
turning territories and peoples in a situation of anarchy toward the building 
of a society ordered by law, in which social peace reigns, as well as by 
reintegrating states excluded from international society. The vast majority of 

 
                                                                                                                 
32 The principle of self-determination has two distinct elements: the external characteristic entitles 
a people to choose the external status of its territory (international), either by forming a free 
association with another state, or by becoming an independent state, while that internal self-
determination is the right of peoples within states. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), princs. II, VI–IX, U.N. 
GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N Doc. A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
33 DE BRABANDERE, supra note 8, at 70–88. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 429 
 
IPBA experiments are closely related to different forms of conflict, whether 
responses to international conflicts (such as the experiences in the Saar, 
Leticia, former Yugoslavia, etc.) or to intra-state conflicts (such as the cases 
in Congo, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, etc.). Sometimes an IPBA 
unfolds in situations where civil war coexists with international armed 
conflict, especially in the case of BiH. It is therefore necessary either to 
manage as far as possible the consequences of a conflict or to put an end to 
violent conflict.34 Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council 
(UNSC) provides the legal basis for this type of mission through resolutions 
under Chapter VII of the Charter to respond to a threat against international 
peace and security.35 Contemporary IPBAs are a direct international response 
to territories that experience a more or less violent armed conflict. In this 
way, IPBAs are often imposed after an intra-state conflict, which is a 
reflection of disintegration of the state structures, meaning that this abstract 
notion is set up after the restoration of negative peace, after an agreement 
between the belligerents, after a U.N. peace operation, or after a military 
intervention by international society, to build positive peace. So, IPBAs are 
established after a conflict and are intended to manage the consequences of 
the latter.36 A priori, it appears that the designation of such international 
administrations under the label “post-belligerent” or “post-conflict” is the 
rule as evidenced by the different experiments.  

Nevertheless, there is an exception to the rule; it is the West New 
Guinea case, where the establishment of the international authority is 
preventive and not curative to resolve a territorial dispute. In this case, an 
IPBA was established by international society to avoid the exacerbation of 
tensions relating to the transfer of the territory from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia, which would probably have resulted in a conflict either internal or 
international. Ultimately, whether intra-state conflicts, international 
conflicts, or hybrid wars, history teaches that reference to post-belligerency 
is an essential criterion to resolve a territorial dispute or face governance 
issues. IPBAs are a direct response to the anarchy that results from physical, 
political, societal, legal, internal, or external disorder. Establishing an IPBA 
reflects a causal relationship with international peace and security. 

B. Flexible Criteria 

Having highlighted the strict features of an IPBA, some flexible 

 
                                                                                                                 
34 Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76 
(2001). 
35 U.N. Charter, art. 39. (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”).  
36 CAPLAN, supra note 10, at 2, 5–6, 45–67. 

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430 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
elements can refine the sense of the notion. By flexible characteristics, it is 
necessary to understand those that offer more possibilities and are not fixed, 
which allows the introduction of a discussion for the next step. 

C. Legality and Legitimacy 

First of all the question of legality and legitimacy is the most important 
flexible criterion to understand the normative concept of IPBA. Indeed, the 
exercise of public authority by an international actor in a territorial unit raises 
questions about its legality and legitimacy.37 It is obvious that an IPBA, 
which is le cas par excellence of the exercise of territorial jurisdiction without 
the sovereign title by a non-state actor, can cause problems related to the legal 
framework of its establishment and the legitimacy of such an undertaking. 
IPBAs are not a formal practice, and they are not institutionalized, as U.N. 
trusteeships may have been. The U.N. Charter makes no reference to this 
concept and there is no U.N. body addressing IPBA issues. Although, during 
the U.N. Charter drafting process, the proposal of the Norwegian delegation 
suggested a U.N. role in the administration of territory in the event of a threat 
against international peace and security,38 the only explicit prospect—so that 
the United Nations provides the executive ability—happens to be the U.N. 
Trusteeship System, which is never invoked when IPBAs are created39 
because a member state cannot be placed under the U.N. Trusteeships 
System.40 This is the reason why it is inconceivable to place territories or 
states under the U.N. Trusteeships System against their will. Thus, the 
implementation of an IPBA operates always on an ad hoc basis. An IPBA 
does not draw its legitimacy from an old standard of “sacred trust of 
civilization,” but it is related to normative developments in international law. 
It is no longer a moral responsibility but a legal responsibility relating to 
international security and peace: the development of several concepts such as 

 
                                                                                                                 
37 David Hartland, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, Jan-Mar. 2004, at 15–19. 
38 Commission III, Committee 3, at 353–55, UNCIO, Vol. XII, U.N. Doc. 539 III/3/24 (May 23, 
1945).  
39 U.N. Charter, art. 81. (“The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under 
which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the 
administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, 
may be one or more states or the Organization itself.”).  
40 U.N. Charter, arts. 77, 78. (“1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the 
following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: a. territories 
now held under mandate; b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the 
Second World War; and c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for 
their administration. 2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the 
foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms. . . . The 
trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, 
relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.”). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 431 
 
“failed state,”41 “[r]esponsibility to protect,”42 or intervention d’humanité 
(“humanity intervention”)43 paves the way towards the involvement of 
international organizations in matters relating to the establishment of IPBAs. 
Historically, the establishment of an IPBA is based on the consent of the host 
state, on a treaty, and/or on an international mandate (UNSC resolutions). 
Since the nineties, the UNSC has fully used its powers under Chapter VII to 
establish IPBAs.44 At the beginning, the establishment of an IPBA may be 
the product of an agreement between the international actor and the territorial 
sovereign—like ONUC, UNTEA, UNTAC, or UNTAES. The delegation of 
authority is therefore granted. The international actor must weave again the 
bonds of the social contract between rulers and citizens; that is why it 
substitutes the local rulers by replacing them, echoing the volunteer 
dimension which is at the heart of the raison d'être of international 
organizations. However, it can also be derived from a simple effectiveness, 
for example in the event of a total vacuum of governance or violent conflict 
that has destroyed any form of state organization, such as the experience in 
Somalia with UNOSOM II. After 1945, the legality is compounded by the 
international mandate and the role of the U.N. Secretary General (UNSG). 
From the start, in accordance with Article 2 of the UN Charter, the respect 
for national competence is essential, that is why the consent of the host state 
is logically required.45 However, there are several alternatives: the first one 
is the establishment of an IPBA when the sovereign authority has collapsed; 
the second one, lackluster, is identifiable with coercive consent, inducing 
strong international pressure and the use of military force. Even if it is still 
banned by Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, it empirically appears to be 
true.46 And the third one is related to UNSC Resolutions: Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter is considered as an obligation that surpasses the absence of state 
consent, which means that the UNSC has binding powers to interfere greater 
than the will of the state concerned. So, since the drafting of the Charter, 

 
                                                                                                                 
41 Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1992–
1993, at 3. 
42 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? 101 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 100 (2007). 
43 Antoine Rougier, La Théorie de l’intervention d’humanité, 17 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 486 (1910) (Fr.). 
44 ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 311–37, 
369–86 (2004). 
45 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7. (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).  
46 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 344 (entered 
into force Jan. 27, 1980) (“Coercion of a state by the threat or use of force: a treaty is void if its 
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”).  



432 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
consent is not legally a necessity, although it provides a superior legitimacy.47 
Another rare alternative for an IPBA legal basis is an UNGA Resolution, as 
evidenced by the creation of UNTEA.48 Ultimately, the range of legal options 
relating to the creation of an IPBA since the establishment of the United 
Nations depends in essence on the role of the executor, i.e. the UNSG. The 
latter is intended to implement the decisions taken in the field of 
peacekeeping by providing regulatory powers severely limited and 
supervised by Chapter XV of the U.N. Charter. It gives to the highest official 
of the Organization two major responsibilities in maintaining international 
peace and security: the power to perform the functions conferred on him by 
other U.N. bodies and the authority to draw the UNSC’s attention to any 
matter which constitutes in his view a threat to peace and security.49 In 
institutional practice, the UNSG is rather responsible for managing projects, 
from planning to implementation. For contemporary IPBAs, the UNSG plays 
a major role in the negotiations on the IPBA structure and on its institutional 
implementation.50 

Moreover, the legal basis (i.e. consent and mandate) contributes to 
creating legitimacy for the establishment of such institutions. In addition, the 
IPBA policy is perceived as legitimate to the extent that it tends to establish 
standards relating to human rights internationally recognized and universally 
applicable. This universalism refers directly to the general public interest, the 
symbol of an international society that aims to establish a global community 
for perpetual peace. Furthermore, the implantation of democratic governance 
in a territorial unit, onto which is grafted an IPBA, can also help to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the mission by giving “power to the people.” Finally, this 
legitimacy is also reinforced by the actor’s international identity which has 
the prerogatives over the territory: the international organization, by being 
impartial and neutral, is better able to defend the local population’s interests 
and the general interests in the international system than a special state 
actor.51 Today, the central issue is not knowing what the IPBA legitimacy or 
legality is, but rather what the legal limit facing the IPBA legitimacy and 
authority is.52 In this regard, the U.N. Charter is explicit: the administration 
must act in the interests of the local population (political and socioeconomic 
fields), contribute to local ownership of the political process in accordance 

 
                                                                                                                 
47 Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, ¶ 48, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 
(Aug. 21, 2000). 
48 G.A. Res. 1752 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., , U.N. Doc. A/RES/1752 (XVII) (Sept. 21, 
1962); U.N. Charter, arts. 11, 14. 
49 U.N. Charter, arts. 98, 99. 
50 Ioannis Prezas, L’administration de territoires par les Nations unies, THÈSE DE DROIT PUBLIC, 
Université Panthéon-Assas, 312-21 , Paris,Dec. 19 2007 (Fr.).  
51 WILDE, supra note 6, at 408–17. 
52 Edward Mortimer, International Administration of War-Torn Societies, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE, Jan-Mar. 2004, at 7. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 433 
 
with internal and external self-determination, as well as sustain human 
rights.53 Also, the United Nations must respect the notions of territorial 
integrity and political independence, while enjoying certain privileges within 
territories. 

D. Legal Timing Interpretation 

Besides the issues of legality and legitimacy, the criterion of 
temporality is essential because IPBAs are not intended to last. They are 
defined by qualifiers such as “temporary,” “transitional” or “interim.” 
However, this view is highly subjective due to the global indistinctness of the 
legal sources. The case of the Saar is a strong example, in so far as the 
administration of the territory by the LoN lasted fifteen years,54 and it is 
worse with the OHR experience in BiH,55 which started in 1995 and is not 
yet finished, as well as with the UNMIK in Kosovo that is still deployed in 
2014.56 In contrast, the IPBAs in Leticia, western New Guinea, Namibia, 
Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia and East Timor show that the international 
presence was established for periods ranging from six months to three years. 
The only exception that proves the rule in regard to the subjective temporal 
nature of IPBAs is the sui generis experience of the Free City of Danzig under 
the protection of the LoN, because its status, as a “Free City,” was supposed 
to be perpetual and this remained in practice until the Nazi invasion. 
Ultimately, the focal point of the IPBAs’ subjective temporal nature is that 
the reference to a temporary practice helps to legitimize IPBAs since it is not 
intended to last and should work towards a solution of ownership supported 
by the local population.57 

E. Territorial Size 

Among the flexible criteria, the last feature to consider is the size of the 
territory because almost all IPBAs have taken place in small or medium size 
territories, with the exception of ONUC. This criterion is reinforced by the 
difference initiated by another taxonomic criterion—revealed hereafter—
concerning the degree of authority: for the most intrusive international 
administrations, all cases show that direct plenary administrations are 
established on small territories (Saar, Leticia, Kosovo, and East Timor), 
while the less intrusive IPBAs are created on territories that can reach a 
medium size (Namibia, Cambodia, and BiH). And, finally, assistance 

 
                                                                                                                 
53 U.N. Charter, art. 1,¶ 3, art. 55. 
54 Alan James, The Peacekeeping Role of the League of Nations, 6 INT’L PEACEKEEPING, Spring 
1999, at 154, 155(U.K.). 
55 INT’L CRISIS GRP., BOSNIA: EUROPE’S TIME TO ACT (2011).  
56 INT’L CRISIS GRP., SERBIA AND KOSOVO: THE PATH TO NORMALISATION (2013).  
57 Daudet, supra note 25, at 509–12. 



434 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
missions occur over relatively large areas such as Afghanistan or South 
Sudan. In all cases, IPBA practice suggests that the intrusion of an 
international actor within a specific territorial unit can only succeed if the 
area is small or medium size (the experience of ONUC is not a real success). 
In addition, with the exception of ONUC and UNTAG, all IPBA experiments 
have been developed in Europe and Asia, reflecting a Eurocentric vision. To 
deal with long-term recognition problems or with geostrategic pitfalls (no 
man’s land), international institutions desert a certain kind of area because of 
a taboo on sovereignty or interference due to a long historical process to 
become a member of international society.58 

III. TAXONOMIC ELEMENTS 

Some key elements to define IPBAs can also be used to build a 
classification. The territorial status reflects a post-conflict situation or 
singular cases of self-determination. The legality of such particular missions 
can be divided between references to those relating to consent and those 
relating to coercive UNSC Resolutions in virtue of Chapter VII. However, 
although these definitional characteristics include light classification 
features, other criteria carry with them the seeds of a taxonomy, while 
contributing to a lesser degree to refining the definition of IPBA; this is why 
the primary taxonomic criteria differ from the secondary ones. 

A. PRIMARY CRITERIA 

The primary taxonomic criteria are those that mark a rigid IPBA 
classification. Their boundaries are not blurred. 

1. A Cure for a “Sovereignty Problem” and/or a Remedy for a 
Governance Vacuum 

First of all, an IPBA is introduced to cope with the pitfalls of 
sovereignty and/or weak governance: the Leviathan must be saved. IPBAs, 
therefore, have a common goal, namely the establishment of good 
governance. The state is the absolute finality, whether it is about a transfer of 
territory (Saar, Leticia, and Eastern Slavonia), the restructuring of a territory 
and the revision of a state (Congo and BiH) or the path to independence 
according to the principle of self-determination (West New Guinea, Namibia 
and East Timor).59 In fact, the establishment of an IPBA serves two distinct 
objectives: on the one hand, it should provide an answer to a governance 

 
                                                                                                                 
58 Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Jan.–Mar. 2004, at 99. 
59 RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW TRUSTEESHIP? THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF WAR-TORN 
TERRITORIES 17 (2002). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 435 
 
vacuum, a concept related to the bankruptcy of a state whose structures are 
deliquescent under the weight of a civil war or a spasmodic intra-state 
conflict;60 and, on the other hand, it involves finding a cure for the painful 
question of territorial status, which refers to the problem of the identity of the 
local actor.61 

In the first case, a response must be provided to the governance conduct 
(or the lack of conduct). It is essential to restore the Leviathan, as the public 
authority or the state apparatus has collapsed or is no longer able to exercise 
its governmental powers over the entire territory. The collapse of the state or 
its inability to perform its regulatory functions may be the source or the 
corollary of an alarming situation for international peace and security. In this 
case, the international actor in charge must re-imagine the state and conduct 
a particular type of consultation (elections), which aims to determine the 
actors who are to exercise governmental charges. In this regard two options 
are viewed. First, an IPBA faces the governance vacuum, which results in the 
inability of local actors to exercise authority control and administration of 
their territory (ONUC, UNTEA, UNTAC, and OHR). Second, IPBAs are 
also established as a direct response to a lack of quality governance within a 
territory. What is at stake is not the identity of the actor who has 
administrative control of the territory, but how to run the country: the 
assistance concerns political governance in the face of uncertainty about 
territorial status (the Saar, UNTAG, UNMIK, and UNTAET) and/or the 
effective functioning of the local institutions. All in all, an IPBA is generally 
established to address the governance vacuum resulting from internal 
anarchy or corresponding to the movement of the administrative authority. 
The exercise of the governance function is either reactive because the state 
structures have collapsed, leaving the state facing a vacuum (Congo, 
Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, BiH), or proactive as lawlessness in these 
areas demonstrates the absence of local governance; therefore, the need for 
an IPBA exercising a governance function appears from the outset (Eastern 
Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor). 

In the second case, a solution to the issue of status must be found, 
especially when it is required to settle a dispute over territorial status, which 
means that the identity of the “administrator” is at stake; while a state claims 
sovereignty over a territory, the local population requests its right to self-

 
                                                                                                                 
60 Helman & Ratner, supra note 41, at 3–5. This problem appears in the international system when 
a state is unable to maintain itself as a full member of the international society. Therefore, the state 
is paralyzed and ineffective: laws are not promulgated or applied; the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of violence in the enforcement of its order does not exist anymore in the territory and social 
cohesion flies into pieces. Public authority disappears: the state no longer represents the people and 
it loses all meaning of social action. Id.  
61 Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administration, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 586 (2001). 

http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2668494


436 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
determination.62 Anyway, whatever the situation, it may be perceived as a 
threat to international peace and security, leading therefore to establishing an 
IPBA (Trieste and Jerusalem projects, UNTEA, and UNTAG). In these 
circumstances, the international actor must conduct a special type of 
consultation (plebiscite or referendum), which involves the determination of 
territorial status (the Saar, Western Sahara, Kosovo, and East Timor), insofar 
as local actors want to enjoy the functions of government in their territory 
(the Saar, Leticia, West New Guinea, Namibia, Kosovo, and East Timor). 
The major question on sovereignty is “who exercises administrative control 
over the territory,” while linking this issue to the appropriation of sovereignty 
by local actors. Two declension patterns can be provided: the status has been 
decided and the establishment of an IPBA should implement a statute after 
the decision (UNTEA, UNTAES, OHR, and UNTAET); otherwise, the status 
is to be determined, and the IPBA should contribute to converging positions 
to build a compromise and finalize the territorial status (the Saar, Leticia, 
UNMIK). The latter model submits to the events because the IPBA must 
create a better climate in pending further developments that do not depend 
on the IPBA, namely the status settlement. In addition, another difficulty is 
added to know if the IPBA should address a matter of domestic or 
international sovereignty: either the international actor should focus on the 
settlement of an internal sovereignty dispute, as demonstrated by the case of 
UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia), when it comes to transferring the territory from 
the separatist forces to the governmental authority of the Croatian state or an 
IPBA is established to curb a dispute over national sovereignty (the Saar, 
Leticia, UNTEA, UNMIK, UNTAET).63 Ultimo, with respect to the 
settlement of a territorial sovereignty dispute, if IPBAs are in place to handle 
this type of problem, it means that they must provide a response to the 
defection of the normal model of sovereignty intersubjectively recognized by 
the international and local actors: IPBAs internally face the lack of a unified 
government, and they externally must provide a remedy for the sovereign 
states to resolve their dispute. In this perspective, IPBAs are used as a last 
resort, when all other diplomatic attempts have failed, and they provide 
administrative control over the territory, since control by local actors raises 
problems at the highest level.64 Last, but not least, one must keep in mind that 
situations are not static but evolving, that is to say that sometimes the reality 
on the ground can take many dimensions explaining the establishment of the 
IPBA. There may be a tangle of several causes, such as the vacuum of 
governance, the status issues, as well as isolating the territory, so that further 
 
                                                                                                                 
62 WILDE, supra note 6, at 226–29. The territorial dispute can take three forms: the status of the 
territory in question (Saarland, Kosovo, East Timor); isolating a territory to avoid the resurgence of 
disputes between rival states (Danzig, Leticia, BiH); or the facilitation of the transfer of a territory 
of one state to another (West New Guinea and Eastern Slavonia). Id.  
63 SERGE SUR, RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, 202–04 (2011). 
64 WILDE, supra note 6, at 198-203. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 437 
 
disputes between states do not recur. 

2. Direct Versus Indirect International Administration 

Furthermore, an IPBA is defined by its relation to the population and 
territory, especially by knowing whether the exercise of governance is direct 
or indirect. Indeed, territorial administrations in international relations have 
developed in two ways: either direct, when a foreign actor is directly involved 
in the internal affairs, or indirect, when a foreign actor lets a local political 
actor take over the governance of the territory. In this sense, it is essential to 
differentiate indirect IPBAs from direct IPBAs.65 The former are established 
when a local actor plays an intermediary role between the international actor 
and the final decision, i.e. from the outset a local governmental structure is 
in place and the IPBA is governed by a kind of cohabitation (UNTAG, 
UNTAC, OHR). The latter appear when the international actor is directly 
involved in the territory without any intermediary actor, which means that 
the international authority is the only legal and political source at the origin 
of the mission and no local structure governance interferes in its action 
(UNTEA, ONUSOM II, UNTAES, UNMIK, UNTAET). It should be noted 
that after the step of direct plenary authority, a co-governance phase is usually 
put in place once local institutions are built and political interlocutors are 
known. Therefore, this criterion does not encroach on the prospect of co-
administration that usually develops between the direct plenary phase and 
local ownership.66 Moreover, anomalous models can sometimes be revealed, 
as evidenced by ONUC and OHR experiences. Anomalies refer to a special 
form of international administration in which the first operational phase is 
indirect and the second phase becomes direct under the circumstances 
(political obstructionism, state failure, civil war, etc.). Establishing direct or 
indirect IPBAs at the beginning of the mission depends on the level of 
governance structure failure within the territory. In addition, the size of the 
territory and the number of inhabitants also influence this choice. 

3. The Degree of Authority 

At the operational level, one of the key criteria for organizing a 
classification is the degree of authority. Schematically, a continuum can be 

 
                                                                                                                 
65 Erika de Wet, The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and its Member 
States in the Post-Cold War Era: Legal Basis and Implications for National Law, 8 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 292 (2004) (Ger.). This criterion is detected by Erika de Wet, although 
she does not use it the same way. 
66 MICHAELA SALAMUN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS, 75–96 (2005). 



438 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
imagined with, on the one hand, indirect supervision and, on the other hand, 
plenary direct administration. Supervision is essentially based on the 
cooperation of local parties to implement the mandate. This type of partial 
IPBA is particularly vulnerable to obstructionist forces that manifest and 
attempt to oppose any actual implementation of the policy agenda set by the 
international actor.67 Between these two forms of authority, there is a 
multitude of degrees such as the “control” that approximates supervision or 
regulation and marks the midpoint between the two ends of this ideal type. 
For the most radical forms, the Saar, Leticia, UNTEA, UNMIK, and 
UNTAET are cases of plenary direct administrations, when an international 
actor has full executive, legislative, and judicial powers.68 However, 
significantly milder forms can be set up as evidenced by the experience of 
Danzig where the Commissioner of the League was to indirectly supervise 
and control the political process. Between these two extremes, namely 
indirect supervision and plenary direct administration, there is the case of an 
IPBA starting with supervision powers or indirect control and becoming a 
plenary direct model because of circumstances based on necessity (la 
nécessité). This type of evolutionary mission could be defined by the term 
“incrementalism/gradualism,” in particular with the ONUC and OHR 
experiences: it is a gradual extension of the representative of international 
society powers. However, the IPBA degree of authority faces three major 
challenges. First, the commonly prevalent image of a colonial or postcolonial 
power as a kind of proconsul or viceroy, but this dubious comparison does 
not make sense, since an IPBA adopts singular checks and balances control 
mechanisms and is based on the general interest of the local population and 
international society. The second is essentially linked to the notion of 
authority, which can lead to abuse as well as excesses towards domination. 
The third applies to partial IPBAs—with no plenary powers—which can see 
their room to maneuver hampered by opposition forces. In this sense, the 
challenge relative to the degree of authority derives from the notion of 
authority, the balance between authoritarian tendencies and political 
weakness must be found. In conclusion, on the one hand, there are some 
plenary IPBAs (the Saar, Leticia, UNTEA, UNTEAS, UNMIK, UNTAET), 
and on the other hand partial IPBAs (UNTAG, UNTAC, MINURSO). 
Occasionally, international society uses incremental IPBAs, as evidenced by 
the experience of ONUC or OHR. This means that situations are not static. 
Sometimes a partial IPBA can become plenary if the circumstances so 
require. Usually, a plenary IPBA evolves in practice to a partial form to 
gradually transmit the governance prerogatives to the new local constituted 
authorities. 

 
                                                                                                                 
67 JARAT CHOPRA, PEACE-MAINTENANCE: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY 13–18 (1999). 
68 CAPLAN, supra note 59, at 14–15. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 439 
 

4. The Legal and Practical Relationship Between International and 
Domestic Actors 

Finally, for a successful IPBA, the relationship between the 
international political institution and local level is essential: the international 
actor is no longer a guarantee of absolute legitimacy; the success of an 
international administration depends on the support and determination of 
local authorities including its representatives and its population.69 
Acceptance or systematic opposition from the domestic representatives or the 
local population is a crucial variable for the IPBA’s success or failure. 
Regarding plenary IPBAs facing conflict and/or governance vacuum, the 
local population is directly excluded from the outset of the mission, and 
depending on progress, international agents can involve local ones. For the 
local population, the IPBA, whose goal is to build or rebuild the state, seems 
useful at first because it can protect their rights by implementing the 
fundamental norms of international law. The democratic dimension of such 
a task provides the local population a right to be represented in the political 
decision-making sphere. An IPBA also supports mechanisms for the 
recognition of minorities within a territory defending their rights. However, 
this relationship is not without difficulty; it may be hampered by systematic 
opposition: at the beginning of the mission, local sidelining can cause deep 
resentment (critical neocolonial), which can be exploited by local political 
spoilers. Furthermore, when no parties are satisfied with the results imposed 
by the peace agreement and/or by the territorial status arrangement, local 
obstructionism may undermine the mission.70 At first glance, the relationship 
between international actors and local actors may be one-sided: either the 
population and local officials approve, like Herod, the function of the 
international administration when it is perceived as an instrument to put an 
end to injustice (Herodianism), or the territorial unit’s local population and 
leaders oppose it because they refuse to implement the adopted policy agenda 
(Zelotism).71 

However, the link between the international and the local is not so clear 
because IPBAs have conflicting duties: first, they assume public authority 
due to the governance vacuum while supporting political pressures of local 
representatives; secondly, they exercise their powers for the benefit of the 
relevant territorial unit population, while promoting local ownership. This 
tension between institutional independence and the duty to transfer authority 
increases during the mission. It is necessary to find a balance leading to 
harmony: if the international actor retains powers for too long, the operation 

 
                                                                                                                 
69 U.N. DEP’T. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 23 (2003). 
70 Edward Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 1999, at 36. 
71 ARNOLD TOYNBEE, LE MONDE ET L’OCCIDENT, 78–80 (1964); SUR, supra note 63, at 118–24. 



440 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
may fail due to the development of a deep resentment of local actors. A 
contrario, if the international actor does not fully use the powers entrusted 
and puts an end to the international public authority too quickly, the 
substantial progress may decline, and the territory can revert to its previous 
state. So the relationship between the international administrator and local 
actors may evolve: it is necessary to go beyond international governance and 
develop people governance.72 In other words, it is a “social construct” that 
takes place in three stages: firstly, the international actor has plenary or partial 
powers. In this phase, the involvement of local representatives is a 
prerequisite for stability, viability, and sustainability of the international 
administration. The difficulty appears in choosing the local interlocutors and 
in setting up the delegation of powers in the form of advisory bodies. The 
first pitfall is reinforced by the fact that giving a minimum of power to an 
unelected local actor may hinder future political participation. In addition, a 
partial IPBA can encounter major difficulties regarding the sharing of tasks 
with the local authorities, which initially may negatively influence the 
international/local relationship. This form of consultation, namely the 
building of structures of cooperation and power-sharing between 
international and local actors, appeared in the early IPBA experiments in the 
twentieth century. Second, in the era of technicians, a technique to achieve 
self-governance and political participation through this partnership is being 
established. It is necessary to contribute to local ownership of public power 
(la puissance publique). In this process, IPBAs generally use a bottom-up 
strategy, i.e. the international actor starts restoring public authority at the 
municipal level and, subsequently, it is the central institutions which take 
possession of public power.73 This approach is very useful in situations of 
post-belligerency: building institutions must begin at the local level, as 
uncertainty surrounds officials at the central level because they do not know 
if they are accepted and recognized by local communities and if they are able 
to implement the IPBA’s desired decision. In addition, after a conflict, 
premature centralization of power may affect the construction of the state: 
the bottom-up strategy offsets the desire of some ardent partisans to build a 
strong state with the obligation to develop local capacity (UNMIK and 

 
                                                                                                                 
72 RALPH ZACKLIN, RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [THE PROBLEM 
OF NAMIBIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] 225–88 (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Vol. 171, 
1981). (In the era of the LoN, self-determination is a way to prevent the resurgence of conflict 
between states and to defend human rights, as evidenced by the experiences of Danzig or Memel 
(and to a lesser extent Trieste). Thereafter, systemic changes due to decolonization reorient the 
notion of self-determination to its current direction based on the free choice of government, 
independence, sovereignty and democracy (see the case of Namibia in 1967)). 
73 CARSTEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
VERSAILLES TO IRAQ AND BEYOND 128–29 (2008) The case of post-surrender occupation of 
Germany is the legendary example of this process. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 441 
 
UNTAET).74 Although this approach corresponds somehow to an ideal type 
concerning the local ownership process, implementation is more difficult, as 
evidenced by the bad judgments on local actors, as well as the fact that 
sometimes the reverse approach is valued: the top-down strategy, where 
everything starts from the center to the local, which leads to frustration on 
the part of local actors, insofar as the results within central institutions are 
not necessarily visible from the outside, not to mention the lack of 
involvement and transparency problems (OHR).75 Thirdly, local institutions 
take full control of public authority after elections and/or the adoption of a 
constitutional architecture for the polity.76 This is the complete local 
ownership of the political process. Indeed, international institutions begin to 
consider an exit strategy, which starts to be implemented after elections or 
popular consultation. However, during this phase, the IPBA faces two 
difficulties: a) it is dangerous to hold elections prematurely;77 b) the elections 
are not enough because we must develop a democratic culture in the long 
term based on constitutional liberalism.78 The praxis shows that this phase is 
poorly negotiated by the international actor: the disengagement is so 
disorderly and the international actor forgets (or is unwilling) to establish an 
assistance mission to continue to support the territorial unit recovery, which 
creates postoperative instability (ONUC, UNOSOM II, UNTEA, and 
UNTAC). Monitoring is needed.79 

B. Secondary Criteria 

Following the analysis of the primary criteria, other less revealing 
elements are used to refine the classification. They are considered secondary, 
as their different specificities intermingle which reduces their scope in the 
context of a taxonomy. 

1. Administrare: Political and/or Policy Institution 

Basically, the term “institution” has a double meaning: on the one hand, 

 
                                                                                                                 
74 Regulation No. 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/45 (Aug. 11, 2000); Regulation No. 2000/13 on the Establishment of Village 
and Sub-District Development Councils for the Disbursement of Funds for Development Activities, 
UNTAET/REG/2000/13 (Mar. 10 2000). 
75 Karin Oellers-Frahm, Restructuring Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-Falls, 9 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 180, 194–204 (2005) (Ger.). 
76 ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WEAK STATES AND 
THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR 10–11 (2005). 
77 ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 187–88 (2004). 
78 FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 37–
51, 257–64 (2004). 
79 Mark Baskin, Between Exit and Engagement: On the Division of Authority in Transitional 
Administrations, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Jan.–Mar. 2004, at 119–37. 



442 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 

it includes a material and physical sense—it refers to an institutionalized 
entity such as an international organization; on the other hand, it has a non-
material and intangible value referring to a sui generis established practice,80 
as customary law may be in international relations. It is in this last sense that 
an IPBA is a political institution. By adopting a teleological vision, IPBA 
perceived as a political institution would be an established practice centered 
on political affairs, which means that it is an institution based on a collective 
purpose which is purely political. An IPBA is a political institution because 
it is intended to standardize a political, security, social, or conflict situation. 
It acts as a substitute for the local standard of territorial administration: it 
compensates for the failure of la puissance publique. In addition, this 
sovereign substitute (substitut régalien) may, as it progresses, involve the 
local actors, so that they take ownership of the political transition process.81 

Faced with a vacuum or qualitative governance failure, an IPBA can 
implement several types of policy divided into four categories. The first 
government policy of the IPBA is used to settle a territorial dispute and 
promote status (free city, state, sub-state territorial unit, or future status to be 
determined). The identity of the actor is not questioned, but it is the way of 
governing that is questionable. Concretely, it is a matter of governance either 
to reach an agreement on the future status (establishment of an international 
government to promote the future status),82 or to support the enactment of the 
statute,83 or to ensure the continuation of the status adopted by the agenda.84 
The second government policy of an IPBA is to give effect to the functioning 
of institutions according to the democratic model, respecting the rule of law 
and pursuing a liberal economic policy based on expertise.85 It is common to 
observe the blocking of the machinery of the liberal democracy model in 
ethnically heterogeneous societies; this is why the international neutral actor 
is best suited to promote the principle of impartiality compared to other forms 

80 ANDRÉ AKOUN & PIERRE ANSART, DICTIONNAIRE DE SOCIOLOGIE, 286–87 (1999). 
81 CAPLAN, supra note 59, at 10. 
82 Treaty of Versailles pt. III, § IV, arts. 45–50, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol T.S. 188; G.A. Res. 
A/RES/2248 (S-V), para. 1 (May 19, 1967); S.C. Res. 1244, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 
(June 10, 1999) (The establishment of the Saar IPBA and the wait for a final status in 1935, and 
the example of the creation of the United Nations Council for South West Africa in 1967.). 
83 S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) (Oct. 25, 1999); General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegoivina, in letter dated 29 Nov. 1995 from the 
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/50/790-S/1995/999  (Nov. 30, 1995). 
84 S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (Sept. 29, 1978); Final Act of the Paris Conference 
on Cambodia, in letter dated 30 Oct. 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and 
Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general, U.N. Doc. A/46/608-
S/23177 (Oct. 30, 1991). 
85 Susan L. Woodward, Construire l’Etat: légitimité internationale contre légitimité nationale?, 28 
CRITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 139 (July-Sept. 2005) (Fr.). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 443 
 
of territorial administration (trusteeship, occupation, etc.). The state 
construction policy can be sub-divided into three categories: the first one 
focuses on the effectiveness of the political institutions created (UNTAC and 
UNTAES); the second one applies to IPBAs, which ensure the establishment 
and the functioning of institutions and, thereafter, hold consultations on the 
territorial status (the Saar, UNMIK, and to a lesser extent UNTAET); the 
third one attends to the functioning of institutions and so elections must be 
held to give effect to the government of these territories (OHR and UNTAG). 
This policy approach based on the political concept of state building86 should 
promote the existence of the state and a particular model of governance 
organized around the concepts of democracy, rule of law, and market 
economy.87 It occurs in two scenarii: either when a territorial unit is separated 
from a state, or when a state is affected by decay and bankruptcy syndromes, 
plunging into anarchy. This political process implemented by an IPBA 
consecrates the state model of the West, based on the Westphalian state 
principles88 as well as political and economic liberalism. The third 
governance policy involves migration control: this government program is 
found in all cases, whether it is a matter of status (the Saar, West New Guinea, 
and Kosovo), which can lead to migration, or it is linked to a vacuum of 
governance and anarchy which lead inexorably to population movements.89 
Therefore, the IPBA supports security, political and socio-economic issues 
concerning refugees and IDPs. The fourth governance policy is rather 
marginal in terms of empirical verification, but it focuses on the exploitation 
of natural resources, as evidenced by the episode of the Saar (exploitation of 
natural resources by France as compensation for WWI) and by the agreement 
concerning the exploitation of Greater Sunrise during the UNTAET mandate 
on East Timor.90 

To cope with the pitfalls of sovereignty, IPBAs often must curb 
disputes: it is a mechanism for the implementation of dispute resolution. The 
International Commission of the Saar had at first to implement the Treaty of 
Versailles; then it had to avoid any resurgence of tension between the French 
and German positions. Concerning the implementation of the clauses of the 
 
                                                                                                                 
86 CAPLAN, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
87 FOX, supra note 3, at 142–73. 
88 AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AFTER KOSOVO: IRAQ, DARFUR AND THE RECORD 
OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 30 (2008); ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN 
CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES, 172–82 (2000); Outi Korhonen, International Governance in 
Post-Conflict Situations, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 495, 527–28 (2001) (Neth.). 
89 GIL LOESCHER & JAMES MILNER, PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 24–34 (2005). 
90 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 82, at art. 49; Ghislain Poissonnier, Le Timor oriental et l’espoir 
contrarié d’un grand soleil levant, 132 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 762, 763–66, 769–80 
(2005) (Fr.); Ralph Wilde & Barbara Delcourt, Le retour des protectorats. L’irrésistible attrait de 
l’administration de territoires étrangers, in LA GUERRE D’IRAK: PRÉLUDE D’UN NOUVEL ORDRE 
INTERNATIONAL? 224–27 (Barbara Delcourt, Denis Duez & Eric Remacle eds., 2004) (Brussels). 



444 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
Treaty of Versailles, it can also refer to the Free City of Danzig and Memel 
territory, insofar as it was necessary to ensure practical solutions to disputes 
in the aftermath of the First World War. The experience of the LoN 
Commission in Leticia is le cas par excellence of the resolution of both 
dispute and conflict: the functional mechanism of the LoN had to create a 
neutral space (Leticia), so that both parties would calm down and come to a 
compromise. In the Saar and Kosovo, the international mission had to strike 
a settlement on the future status. In Eastern Slavonia, the IPBA had to settle 
the territorial dispute between the Croatian government and the Serb militias 
ensuring full compliance with the 1995 Agreement.91 So it would seem that 
IPBAs are intended to implement (or to obtain) the agreements that provide 
a definitive solution to the question of the status of certain territories. 

However, limiting the IPBA’s action to this question overshadows 
another part concerning self-determination and sovereignty. It is obvious that 
external self-determination is the result of an agreement, but the analyst 
should not neglect the internal self-determination, which is identifiable as 
peoples’ rights in the territories, i.e. it concerns the rights of minorities, the 
right to free and fair elections, and the right to participate in public life. The 
principle of self-determination contributes to the justification of IPBAs. In 
this sense, the IPBA is a mechanism of synthesis of the two hallmarks of self-
determination, namely external self-determination on the status of the 
territory and internal self-determination on the rights of the people within the 
territory.92 In addition, IPBAs are also responsible for managing internal 
disputes between the local actors, international actors and neighboring states 
(UNTAG, UNTAC, OHR, UNMIK, UNTAET). 

Ultimately, an IPBA is a political response either to a governance 
problem, i.e. it is the conduct or lack of conduct of public power which is a 
source of difficulty (quality governance exercised), or to a sovereignty 
problem because it affects the identity of the actors who perform the 
functions of government in a territory. What characterizes all forms of IPBA 
is that they are, in essence, political: either they provide the political 
functioning of the territory (vacuum of governance), or they displace local 
actors in relation to the exercise of the sovereign prerogatives (prérogatives 
régaliennes) in a situation related to a sovereignty problem because it is the 
identity of the actor who has administrative control over the territory, which 
is a source of tension. Therefore, an IPBA fulfills the function of international 
public service, as an international actor provides a service to a state and a 
population of a territory acting in the interests of the inhabitants of the state 
 
                                                                                                                 
91 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, in letter 
dated 15 Nov. 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed 
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/50/757-S/1995/951 (Nov. 12, 1995). 
92 Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations 
and Other International Actors, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B.  UNITED NATIONS L., 649, 678–80 (2005) 
(Ger.). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 445 
 
concerned and, more broadly of international society, since it is about a threat 
to international peace and security. On the one hand, it ensures the survival, 
maintenance, and/or development of state units in the international system, 
to preserve international peace and security by defending the general interest 
of international society; on the other hand, it works for the interests of people 
in an area that experiences governance or sovereignty problems—a substitute 
for local actor governance emphasizing the obligations of the state under 
international law. In addition, an IPBA, whether plenary or partial, performs 
the functions of a public authority (puissance publique) in the territory for 
the local population; de facto, it is highly intrusive.93 The exercise of 
regulatory authority by IPBAs results in extensive legislative (law-making) 
and executive powers. Regulations adopted by IPBAs are applicable to the 
international actor in the territory as well as to the legal system of the 
territory, which means that the acts are directly applicable in the territory at 
the local level, while they are enacted within the international sphere.94 
However, the analysis of the IPBA structure as a political institution must be 
completed because even if the ultimate goal is political and legal, it is 
nevertheless a fact that a response to a form of latent insecurity should be 
given. So within an IPBA two components frequently coexist, one civil, the 
other military. 

2. Differentiations Between Ante and Post-Cold War 

Another secondary taxonomic criterion is the differentiation between 
experiences before the end of the Cold War and those that followed. 
Distinctions are based on the proliferation of international actors, 
multifunctionality, exceptionalism, or increased powers of the UNSC and the 
UNSG, as well as the exit strategy. The first characteristic that differentiates 
IPBAs pre- and post-Cold War is the proliferation of international actors 
involved in this type of project to respond to challenges of sovereignty or 
governance failure.95 First, it would be unthinkable in the postcolonial era to 
consider that a state can administer a territory in which it is not sovereign 
without referring to international humanitarian law, especially the law of 
occupation. Second, even for a single international institution, the cost of 

 
                                                                                                                 
93 ROBERT KOLB, GABRIELE PORRETTO & SYLVAIN VITE, L’APPLICATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITAIRE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME AUX ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES: FORCES DE PAIX 
ET ADMINISTRATIONS CIVILES TRANSITOIRES 111 (2005). 
94 Stahn, supra note 9, at 145–48, 156–58. See also Carsten Stahn, International Territorial 
Administration in the former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead, 61 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 107, 154–61 (Ger.) 
(“These legislative acts are international regulations that apply directly to the domestic sphere of a 
territorial unit, thereby becoming pseudo-national acts.”). 
95 Mats Berdal & Richard Caplan, The Politics of International Administration, 10 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 1, Jan.–Mar. 2004, at 1–5. 



446 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
providing a response to a sovereignty dispute and/or poor governance by the 
establishment of an IPBA would be exorbitant.96 Therefore, there is a 
multitude of international organizations working in favor of IPBAs since the 
burden-sharing is easier via different international institutions. Indeed, the 
United Nations is the great architect for international peace and security, but 
it can resort to regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the African Union, as well as the 
United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) to apply cosmopolitan law 
principles97 or provide assistance in the field of security sector reform 
(SSR)98 after an intervention. In order to provide an opinion on a question of 
international law or clarify massacres, the United Nations uses international 
institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the 
international criminal tribunals (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia - ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 
these areas, one must also take into account the activities of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Council of Europe and the role of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). To deal with socioeconomic 
issues after a humanitarian tragedy, the United Nations interacts with many 
agencies, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration, the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (Habitat), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), or the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Finally, in a 
globalized world, international society assistance depends on the support of 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to contribute to reconstruction and 
development: this is the function of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
regional or national organizations specializing in this sector, such as the 
European Agency for Reconstruction, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Development 

 
                                                                                                                 
96 CAPLAN, supra note 10, at 33–41. 
97 SIMON CHESTERMAN, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE-BUILDING AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 339 (2004); DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER. FROM THE MODERN 
STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 270–83 (2004); Carsten Stahn, Governance Beyond State: 
Issues of Legitimacy in International Territorial Administration, 2 INT’L. ORGANIZATIONS L. REV. 
9, 9–14, 50–56 (2005) (Neth.).  
98 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, 1–14 (Albrecht Schnabel & 
Hans-Georg Ehrhart eds., 2005). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 447 
 
Bank (ADB), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) or the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). 
In addition, post-Cold War IPBAs differ from previous experiences because 
they are more developed multi-functionally and are a practice of exceptional 
order, in particular for the plenary forms. IPBAs must establish and maintain 
public order and security, provide humanitarian assistance, resettle refugees 
and IDPs, ensure partial or plenary functions of civil administration, build an 
institutional system (including the creation of a civil society), organize free 
and fair elections, and rebuild the local economy according to liberal 
principles. Moreover, plenary IPBA practice in the post-Cold War correlates 
with the internationalization of the social contract,99 i.e. international society 
is particularly interested in how nations are governed and the relationship 
between the Leviathan and its population. This is particularly highlighted by 
the Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations (Brahimi Report).100 
Exceptionalism is a major feature of post-Cold War IPBAs, as IPBA 
implementations are not frequent. The post-Cold War exceptionalism is 
characterized by extreme powers given to international administrators, 
especially in the case of plenary international administration.101 This 
particular reading of post-Cold War IPBAs is reflected in the Brahimi Report, 
which focuses heavily on the uniqueness of these experiments after 1990102 
because IPBAs, whether partial or plenary, go far beyond the simple 
assistance mission—either supervising and controlling the political, social, 
and legal process in a situation of post-belligerency or directly conducting 
the puissance publique activities. Another feature that distinguishes IPBAs 
pre- and post-Cold War is identifiable with the increased role of the UNSC. 
Since the early nineties, there has been an increase of UNSC involvement, as 
evidenced by the growing references to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter in 
many different situations including massive flows of refugees in civil wars 
and human rights violations by a government against its own people within 
 
                                                                                                                 
99 FOX, supra note 3, at 72. 
100 Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, supra note 47, ¶¶ 18–19.  
101 WILDE, supra note 6, at 10–12. 
102 Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, supra note 47, ¶ 77 (“These operations face 
challenges and responsibilities that are unique among United Nations field operations. No other 
operations must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect 
business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities 
for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools 
and pay teachers and collect the garbage – in a war – damaged society, using voluntary 
contributions, because the assessed mission budget, even for such ‘transitional administration’ 
missions, does not fund local administration itself. In addition to such tasks, these missions must 
also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is 
widespread and grudges run deep”). 



448 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
its territory.103 This new posture has been accepted since An Agenda for 
Peace104 and the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.105 This broad 
interpretation of the UNSC powers of intervention is linked to the evolution 
of peacekeeping missions that no longer consist in classic peacekeeping 
(interposition) but correspond to multifunctional operations. In addition, the 
role of the UNSG is more and more important on operational and normative 
levels.106 A final distinction criterion is the international awareness regarding 
the exit strategy. The twentieth century reflects the classic case for IPBA 
termination, that is, at the end of the international mandate, no international 
mission takes over: either the territory becomes independent (Namibia), or it 
is attached or transferred to a sovereign state (Leticia, West New Guinea), or 
a state recovers its sovereign rights (the Saar, Congo). However, since the 
end of the Cold War, international actors have begun to consider the 
importance of postoperative follow-up, with the establishment of an 
assistance mission at the termination of the IPBA. In sum, the post-Cold War 
IPBAs are unique, insofar as they highlight the increasing role of the UNSC 
in the practice of these forms of international administration, in which the 
UNSG plays an important role concerning both normative and operational 
aspects. The highest official of the Organization is the synthesis between the 
mandate and the operation. He is also the link between the various 
international bodies involved in this type of multifunctional exceptional 
project. 

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF CONTEMPORARY SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 

Following the observation of different factors and elements specific to 
IPBAs, ataxonomy appears possible, although the pitfalls of systematisation 
are numerous. All these observations will be particularly interesting to 
understand the contemporary evolution of IPBAs. 

 
                                                                                                                 
103 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
104 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). 
105 U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-
S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 1995). 
106  KOLB, PORRETTO & VITE, supra note 93, at 102 (« La délégation de pouvoirs aux États, non 
prévue par la Charte, est contrecarrée, lors de la mise en œuvre d’une action “collective”, par un 
rôle directif et de contrôle assuré non seulement par le CSNU, mais aussi par le Secrétaire général. 
Ce dernier devient ainsi un organe de synthèse des pouvoirs de l’organisation » [“The delegation of 
powers to the states not covered by the Charter, is thwarted when the implementation of a 
"collective" action by a directive role and control ensured not only by the UNSC, but also by the 
Secretary General. It becomes an organ of synthetic powers of the organization”]). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 449 
 
A. The Pitfalls of Contemporary Taxonomy 

First of all, several scholars have attempted to draw the outlines of 
IPBA classification, but their attempts were unsuccessful, inasmuch as they 
encountered a fundamental obstacle, i.e. the natural tendency to over-extend 
the concept to promote each particular type and bring into the notion of IPBA 
the experience of peace operations, which do not belong to IPBAs.107 A first 
illustration of IPBA modelling which is too wide appears with a multi-
morphology developed by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner. These 
authors see three different types within this concept: (i) assistance missions, 
when the local government remains the legal authority and international 
agents support the domestic administration; (ii) co-administration, when the 
international administration has certain sovereign prerogatives in agreement 
with the central government of the territory that maintains its authority; (iii) 
intrusive international administrations, when the international actor has full 
authority over a territory.108 Another classification proposed by Carsten 
Stahn encounters the same weakness, i.e. broadening the concept too much 
to incorporate other models such as occupation, to deeply emphasize 
different categories within it. In this classification, the conceptualization of 
practice is overly broad because it includes assistance missions (thereby 
limiting the IPBA specificities to relative peace operations), international 
administrations, as well as the highly singular case of the occupation of Iraq 
in 2003.109 

Furthermore, the second major limitation to building a harmonious 
taxonomy comes from the specificity of each mission110 and the specific 
context of each case as taught by Aronian and Weberian interpretive 
sociology.111 In this context, it is clear that IPBA practice reflects a deep 
diversity of empirical settings. In other words, this reflects varying degrees 
of international administration depending on the duration, the period and the 
interest of the mission, and the major powers which seek to establish this kind 
of conflict resolution mechanism (context offers a multitude of 
opportunities), as well as depending on the configuration of the international 
system. Moreover, some criteria on the different forms of IPBA are difficult 
to use to create a classification since all the possibilities may be employed by 
the IPBA. As a demonstration, referring to the different policies pursued by 
an IPBA (status, state-building, migration or resources) is not necessarily 

 
                                                                                                                 
107 Michael W. Doyle, War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations Post-Cold War Record, 
in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 529, 546–54 
(Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall eds., 2001); Chopra, supra note 67, at 16. 
108 Helman & Ratner, supra note  41, at 13. 
109 STAHN, supra note 73, at 395–406. 
110 CAPLAN, supra note 59, at 10. 
111 BÉATRICE POULIGNY, ILS NOUS AVAIENT PROMIS LA PAIX: OPÉRATIONS DE L’ONU ET 
POPULATIONS LOCALES 18–24 (2004). 



450 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
relevant for classification because several IPBAs practice the above 
mentioned categories of public policy. 

Before building a taxonomy of IPBAs, it is necessary to emphasize that 
the boundaries between the definitional and taxonomic criteria are porous. 
Some of them globally contribute to defining an IPBA while they also 
contribute to a lesser extent to the classification of the notion, and others 
primarily participate in classifying the different morphologies of IPBAs but 
can also refine the definition of an IPBA. About the principles facilitating 
definition, they also serve for minor classification. Indeed, the “status of the 
territory” may refer either to a territorial unit within a state or to a territorial 
unit of self-determination. The “legality” regarding the IPBA’s deployment 
implies consent or a coercive action related to a resolution of a major 
international institution; sometimes both overlap and it is even referred to as 
coercive consent. The term “post-belligerency” can apply to setting up a 
mission in an interstate or an intrastate post-conflict situation or also after 
belligerency, which is simultaneously internal and external. The reference to 
a “temporary practice” is not sufficiently explicit insofar as it can be really 
short term (six months to two years), medium term (five years), or long term 
(more than ten years). The geopolitical criterion of the size of the territory is 
also variable: there are very small territories, others are medium-sized and 
some are exceptionally big, such as ONUC in Congo. 

B. An Empirical Classification: The Subsequent Practice 

To highlight the different types of IPBAs, major criteria have to be 
taken into consideration: the degree of authority (distinguishing plenary 
forms, gradual and partial forms) and direct or indirect administration. At the 
start, there are three major models for the powers granted to an international 
actor, starting with full powers or “emergency powers” to reach a 
compromise situation where prerogatives are shared. Between these two 
extremes, international society occasionally uses incremental IPBAs (from 
conciliation to authoritarian governance).112 However, it should be noted that 
the situations are not static.113 Furthermore, to determine the impact of the 
plenary or partial character, it is necessary to know if the international 
administration is direct or indirect: so there would be direct plenary, indirect 
plenary, direct incremental, indirect incremental, direct partial, and indirect 
partial IPBAs. 

Having underscored plenary/partial and direct/indirect IPBAs, it is 
necessary to look at both ends of the mission in terms of specific causes for 
the establishment of the IPBA. Firstly, to cope with the vacuum or 
 
                                                                                                                 
112 The result: Plenary (Saarland, Leticia, UNTEA, Namibia 1967 UNTAES but unused powers), 
gradual (ONUC and OHR in BiH), and partial (Danzig, Memel, UNTAG, UNTAC, MINURSO, 
UNOSOM II). 
113 CAPLAN, supra note 10, at 17–18. 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 451 
 
qualitatively weak governance, referring to “builder” IPBAs is possible, so 
as to order the international system by creating or reforging states.114 
Secondly, to address the problem of territorial sovereignty, one can speak of 
“mediation” IPBAs, insofar as they must either resolve a territorial dispute 
(resolution of territorial status, neutralization of status or territorial transfer) 
or work towards decolonization.115 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in 
some cases, the problems of sovereignty and governance can be linked (the 
Saar, BiH and Kosovo), which weakens the scope of this taxonomic criterion. 
So twelve major types of IPBA stand out:  

 
− direct plenary builder IPBAs (the Saar, the U.N. Council for 

Namibia and UNTAES, UNMIK), 
− indirect plenary builder IPBAs (OHR from 1998 when the High 

Representative obtained the “coercive” Bonn powers), 
− direct plenary mediation IPBAs (the Saar, Leticia, UNTEA, the 

U.N. Council for Namibia, UNTAET), 
− indirect plenary mediation IPBAs (none), 
− direct incremental builder IPBAs (ONUC), 
− indirect incremental builder IPBAs (OHR), 
− direct incremental mediation IPBAs (none), 
− indirect incremental mediation IPBAs (OHR), 
− direct partial builder IPBAs (UNOSOM II), 

− indirect partial builder IPBAs (UNTAG, UNTAC), 
− direct partial mediation IPBAs (none), 

− and indirect partial mediation IPBAs (MINURSO). 
 

The emphasis of these categories is now made from two key elements, 
namely the IPBA’s nature and objectives. Another additional key criterion to 
build a multi-morphology IPBA model would have been with no doubt the 
perception of the IPBA action by local actors, both officials and the local 
population (Zelotism versus Herodianism). However this factor is so human 
that it is difficult to build a taxonomy taking it into account, especially 
because the perception cannot be uniform according to the different local 
actors, and it also depends on the IPBA’s time scale. In addition, one could 
also add and complicate the different kinds of IPBA with other possibilities 
of model duplication by adding the distinction between forms ante and post-
Cold War, but it seems that the IPBA classification loses clarity and would 

 
                                                                                                                 
114 Armin von Bogdandy, Stefan Haubler, Felix Hanschmann & Raphael Utz, State-Building, 
Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications 
and an Appraisal of Different Approaches, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B.  UNITED NATIONS L., 579, 579–83 
(2005) (Ger.). 
115 WILDE, supra note 6, at 147–51, 188–89. 



452 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
not find empirical approbation.116 Besides, other elements used to define the 
concept could also help to boost the empirical taxonomy, but it is useless 
because the multiplication of taxonomic criteria imposes a heavier 
understanding of the concept and of the different forms without providing a 
better ranking of experiments. It is not advantageous to “clutter” the 
taxonomy with other characteristics such as international actors, legality, 
legitimacy, temporary practice, or the territorial size. However, a sensible 
observer might consider that two definitional criteria, post-belligerency 
(internal and external) and the temporary practice (short, medium, and long 
term) further sharpen the categorization process. This is true, but this 
accumulation of configurations does not necessarily find an echo in the 
subsequent practice. 

C. Cycles Theory of Plenary Forms of IPBA 

Beside all the features common to plenary or partial IPBAs in the post-
Cold War era, such as the proliferation of international actors, 
multifunctionality, the role of the UNSC and the Secretariat, the design of 
exit strategies, other features allow us to draw attention to the most intrusive 
plenary IPBAs. The first two distinctive signs of plenary IPBAs in the post-
Cold War have already been developed in advance: on the one hand there is 
the exceptionalism of this type of intervention in a territorial unit and the 
emergency powers117 conferred on an international actor who has to construct 
or reconstruct a state by engaging in all public decisions, and on the other 
hand, the exacerbated multifunctionality, which means that the involvement 
of international actors in the puissance publique affects all areas of public life 
(security, socioeconomic and institution-building, refugees and IDPs). 
Another element common to plenary IPBAs in the post-Cold War is their 
evolutionary character: originally, these international administrations are 
exclusive, then a system of shared responsibilities and prerogatives is set up 
to facilitate local ownership in the end. A final feature stems from the fact 
that these experiences are halfway between peacekeeping in the broad sense 
and a political process reflecting both the building of sustainable peace and 
the shape of a democratic state based on the rule of law. It is simply not a 
question of implanting state and administrative structures in regions subject 
to anarchy but of participating and ensuring the development of a liberal 
political system based on the norms of international law and human rights. In 
this perspective, radical IPBAs of the post-Cold War are a synthesis of peace-

 
                                                                                                                 
116 See the pitfall of Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman & James Wall, International 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications, 42 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 39-40 (1998). 
117 FRANÇOIS SAINT-BONNET, L’ETAT D’EXCEPTION (2001); Oren Gross, The Normless and 
Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the Norm-
exception Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825 (2000).  

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2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 453 
 
making and post-conflict peacebuilding; this is why, in regard to their 
respective legal framework, they are based on Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter.118 

Empirically, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the evolution 
towards a highly intrusive form of plenary IPBAs was achieved by 
pragmatism, depending on the difficulties of practice. The pivot is somehow 
the experience in BiH: after the Dayton Agreement, international society 
(marginalizing the United Nations) set up an indirect administration via the 
OHR, i.e. the international mission cohabits with the government of the host 
state perceived as unable to assume the exercise of public authority without 
international support. Originally, it was simply an indirect administration of 
supervision and control. However, to deal with latent obstructionism, powers 
of the High Representative (HR) were reinforced in 1998 to consolidate the 
Bosnian state; this is why the IPBA changed shape: it passed from a model 
of supervision and control to an intrusive one: the HR (international 
authority) became more and more involved in the decision-process as well as 
in the legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative process.119 So the 
juxtaposition of a state model and an international model is observed, which 
results in the intervention of an authority of an international legal system 
within a national legal system. The overlap between a national government 
and an IPBA is defined by the concept of functional duality.120 Pragmatism 
and directions toward a plenary model developed by the international society 
of states to deal with latent obstructionism in BiH close to the EU borders 
strongly influence the following experiences, particularly in Kosovo and East 
Timor from 1999. UNMIK experimentation in Kosovo is the model par 
excellence of a highly intrusive plenary IPBA, which is implanted after a 
dispute over control of the territory, leaving the future status pending for a 
while.121 For UNTAET in East Timor, the structure of the IPBA was similar 
to the one of UNMIK (although the civilian and military aspects are overseen 
by the same structure) and the international administration had to conduct the 
self-determination territorial unit to independence in accordance with the 
referendum of 1999, even if the territory fell into oblivion for twenty-five 
years.122 

In the early twenty-first century, international society abandons plenary 
IPBAs, and assistance missions are in the ascendant. This is partially due to 
a highly singular and problematic case, the occupation of Iraq after 2003. The 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a Coalition 

 
                                                                                                                 
118 KOLB, PORRETTO & VITE, supra note 93, at 108. 
119 Oellers-Frahm, supra note 75, at 207–12. 
120 ALVAREZ, supra note 22, at 634–35. 
121 Jürgen Friedrich, UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. 
UNITED NATIONS L. 225, 233–50 (2005) (Ger.).  
122 Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor, 
33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1101 (2001).  



454 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
Provisional Authority (CPA) by the United States and its allies led to the 
resurgence of old concepts in a postmodern form: the renaissance of Western 
colonialism.123 Following the intervention, a multinational operation was 
initially oriented through a conventional occupation respecting the Hague 
Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, then through a hybrid 
territorial administration, when it obtained some recognition by UNSC 
Resolutions 1483 and 1511, which also established a Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG) for humanitarian coordination and support 
of the U.N. mission.124 The major weakness resulting from Resolution 1483 
was the limit to converge the standards relating to the law of occupation with 
the principles of peacebuilding, which left considerable room for 
interpretation about what type of norm takes ascendancy over the other, 
thereby nurturing the idea of a transformative occupation law.125 Indeed, the 
occupying powers justified their extensive agenda of reforms by referring 
both to the law of occupation and UNSC Resolutions. In fact, the occupation 
lasted about eighteen months between April 9, 2003, when foreign forces 
entered Baghdad, and June 28, 2004, when the CPA was dismantled.126 The 
occupation of Iraq demonstrates the negative evolution of the regime of 
occupation because the occupying powers sought to integrate it within the 
U.N. framework. The occupying powers relied on the participation of a U.N. 
assistance mission and UNSC Resolutions, which a posteriori validated the 
occupation situation, as well as the rights and duties of occupying powers 
under the law of occupation. In this way, the Iraqi experience is found to be 
at a crossroads between occupation, international assistance mission, and 
affiliation with the U.N. Trusteeship System because the ground actor is a 
state but is looking for the remote support of an international institution 
(legitimacy and legality). 
 
                                                                                                                 
123 « Il s’agit d’un Etat souverain, dépourvu d’appareil étatique proprement dit, et qui est 
soumis à un régime d’occupation militaire et à une certaine règlementation internationale 
découlant de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité » [It is a sovereign state, devoid of state 
apparatus, and which is subjected to a military occupation regime and to a certain international 
regulation issued from UNSC resolutions]. Resolution 1511 creates the U.N. Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to assist the SRSG established by Resolution 1483. Parcelo G. 
Kohen, L’administration actuelle de l’Irak : vers une nouvelle forme de protectorat?, in 
KARINE BANNELIER, OLIVIER CORTEN, THÉODORE CHRISTAKIS & PIERRE KLEIN, 
L’INTERVENTION EN IRAK ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 300 (2004); ELAINE L. HALCHIN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32370, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGINS, 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES (2005).  
124 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2013); S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
125 Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and 
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 580 (2006); Rüdiger Wolfrum, Iraq – from Belligerent 
Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty: Foreign Power versus International Community 
Interference, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 16–20 (2005) (Ger.).  
126 James Dobbins, Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA, 51 SURVIVAL 131 (2009) 
(U.K.). 



2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 455 
 

Beyond this particular case, it is true that there are several difficulties 
inherent to IPBAs, despite their success in reading their mandate (BiH is a 
state on the road to EU membership, and Kosovo and East Timor became 
independent states): the need for a strong political will in international society 
to use this mechanism for dispute and/or conflict resolution; the burden-
sharing over the long term, which means that the financial efforts must be 
maintained, even when the territory is no longer at the heart of the 
international agenda; the authoritarian approach and the problem of timing, 
as regards the transfer of responsibilities to local representatives, which can 
slow down state-building; the question of the IPBA’s legality and legitimacy, 
and especially the limit to its authority, which refers to responsibility and 
accountability problems that the international actor meets in the field;127 the 
subjectivity of the appellation “temporary” in terms of duration; and the local 
perception (reformist trend or confrontation) or the clash between strategies 
bottom up and top down. Nevertheless, the worst pitfall, which explains the 
abandon of plenary IPBAs, is the exit strategy problem. Indeed, whether in 
BiH, Kosovo, or East Timor, it has always been a problem. Almost fifteen 
years later, OHR in BiH is expecting its upcoming closure, as soon as the “5 
objectives and 2 conditions” are met, while at the same time, a strong 
European delegation with a Special Representative of the European Union 
(EUSR) should guide the independent BiH into Europe.128 In Kosovo, despite 
a structured and strict application of Resolution 1244, there are still 
monitoring problems, especially about the legitimacy/legality of EULEX 
under the U.N. umbrella and nothing had been prepared to close UNMIK, 
even if Kosovo is today an independent state.129 In East Timor, express state-
building in less than three years has had serious consequences for the U.N. 
assistance missions that follow by virtue of the exit strategy adopted.130 These 
obstacles relate to the usual question in the international sphere “Who guards 
the guardians?”131 

Thus, criticism against intrusive plenary forms updates an old idea. It 
is about preserving local capacity and the internal decision-making process: 
the ownership concept (by locals) makes perfect sense and takes ascendancy 
over considerations related to the viability of a state.132 This is the return of 
 
                                                                                                                 
127 Since the law of occupation applies only to states, an international organization cannot be 
affected by these principles. IPBA specialists emphasize the need to strengthen the 
responsibility of the international actor and its accountability. Mortimer, supra note 52, at 7–
14. 
128 INT’L CRISIS GRP, BOSNIA’S GORDIAN KNOT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2012). 
129 INT’L CRISIS GRP, NORTH KOSOVO: DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE (2011). 
130 INT’L CRISIS GRP, RESOLVING TIMOR-LESTE’S CRISIS (2006). 
131 Richard Caplan, Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia, 12 
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 463 (2005) (U.K.). 
132 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW GLOBAL 
CONTEXT (1995); Simon Chesterman, Ownership in Theory and Practice: Transfer of 
Authority UN Statebuilding Operation, 1 J. INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 3 (2007) (U.K.). 

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456 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
assistance missions. The general idea is to focus on the responsibility of local 
representatives so that they exercise direct control over the internal affairs of 
the territorial unit concerned since the imposition of constitutional liberalism 
by external actors harms the democracy-building process.133 The perfect 
illustration is the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
introduced after the Bonn Agreement. In this case, the commitment of the 
United Nations is very limited, as desired by the representatives of various 
Afghan communities and interventionist powers. The structure of the mission 
is to support the local authority to resolve internal disputes.134 This model, 
which is strangely reminiscent of peace operations in the fifties (Libya and 
Eritrea), implements a “light approach” (light footprint). In this sense, the 
early twenty-first century is marked by a shift towards peace missions based 
exclusively on assistance as evidenced by the following experiments: United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),135 U.N. Mission for Stabilization in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH),136 United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB),137 
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),138 
the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI),139 as well as the 
political component of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) where it 
is “to consolidate peace and security and help create conditions for the 
development of the Republic of South Sudan, the idea being to give the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan means to govern the country 
effectively and democratically.”140 

So, faced with criticism about authoritarianism, the United Nations 
prefers not to exercise a governmental function and is satisfied with an 
assistance role, insofar as the ownership strategy strengthens assistance 
missions in the doctrine. After the 2005 World Summit, by setting out the 
prerogatives of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission and enhancing the 
concept of “responsibility to protect” (primarily by the states themselves), 
the UNSC and the UNGA stressed the importance of local ownership.141 

 
                                                                                                                 
133 James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, 28 
INT’L SECURITY 5 (2004).  
134 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, in letter dated 5 Dec. 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001). 
135 S.C. Res. 1509, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003). 
136 S.C. Res. 1542, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (April 30, 2004). 
137 In January 2007, it was replaced by the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi, which is in turn 
replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi. S.C. Res. 1545, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004); S.C. Res. 1959, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1959 (Dec. 16, 2010).  
138 S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004); S.C. Res. 1925, paras. 1–3, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010).  
139 S.C. Res. 1633, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1633 (Oct. 21, 2005).  
140 S.C. Res. 1996, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1996 (July 8, 2011).  
141 The Peacebuilding Commission, G.A. Res. 60/180, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 
30, 2005); 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 

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2015] POST-BELLIGERENT ADMINISTRATION 457 
 
Moreover, soft law documents produced in recent years by the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), whether the Capstone 
doctrine,142 documents relating to the “New Horizon” peace operations 
approach,143 or the Civil Affairs Handbook,144 are in total agreement with 
this, that is to say in favour of local ownership and a simple assistance of the 
United Nations. This shift is due to pragmatic reasons: a peace operation with 
strong powers is impossible to implement due to geopolitical and geostrategic 
criteria, the opposition of local representatives to the interference in local 
affairs, sacred classical legal principles crowning the Westphalian state 
(territorial integrity, sovereignty and state equality), and local 
obstructionism. The strong opposition to international action is found 
especially in transition countries formerly colonized or occupied. 

V. CONCLUSION 

To conclude, the analysis of IPBAs has been put forward both as a 
category within the large family of territorial administration in international 
relations (colonial trusteeship, protectorate, occupation, LoN mandates and 
U.N. Trusteeship System) and as a specific concept close to peace operations 
which can itself be broken down into several models. An IPBA is the exercise 
of administrative authority by an international actor for the benefit of the 
population of the territory that is temporarily placed under control and/or 
supervision or under plenary or partial administration to achieve common 
goals in the form of an international public service. It is a political institution 
established to manage a dispute related to governance vacuum and/or 
territorial status of a special territory. Several elements serve to emphasize 

 
                                                                                                                 
(Oct. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1645, 
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 
16–22,  U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 24, 2005); Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges & Change, transmitted by letter dated 1 Dec. 2004 from the Chair of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 201, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004); INT’L 
COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 17–19 
(2001); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 100–118 (2007). 
142 See the three fundamental principles (consent, impartiality, and non-excessive use of force). 
U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT, U.N. PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2008). 
143 DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, A NEW 
PARTNERSHIP AGENDA: CHARTING A NEW HORIZON FOR UN PEACEKEEPING (2009); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/64/573 (Dec. 22, 
2009).  
144 U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT, CIVIL AFFAIRS 
HANDBOOK (2012). 



458 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 25:3 
 
the particularity of the model of IPBAs compared to peace operations or other 
forms of territorial administration such as the status of the territory (entity 
attached to a state or territorial unit of self-determination), the legality and/or 
the legitimacy (consent, treaty agreement, international mandate, etc.), the 
function of post-belligerency (internal, external. or mixed), and the 
temporary duration or the size of territory (geopolitical criterion). Although 
the particularism of IPBA’s experiences is the axiomatic basis of the analysis 
due to its ad hoc nature, other criteria are used to outline a taxonomy while 
refining the definition of an IPBA. The specific causes for the establishment 
of an IPBA (problems of sovereignty and governance), the different policies 
implemented by international temporary political institutions, the degree of 
authority (partial, incremental and/or plenary), the local perception 
(Herodianism or Zealotism), and specificity of radical forms of IPBA in the 
post-Cold War promote the construction of a taxonomy. However, it is clear 
that this classification is non-exhaustive, as the consideration of all the 
criteria would result in the construction of a too heavy and unclear typology, 
even if the characteristics of post-Cold War plenary IPBAs, such as 
exceptionalism, multifunctionality, are highlighted in particular for the OHR, 
UNMIK, and UNTAET cases. Ultimately, although this analysis stresses the 
decline of IPBAs and underlines the return to the forefront of international 
assistance missions, it is too early to observe a guiding line in this change. 
This technocratic approach based on local capacity-building, partnership, and 
ownership badly masks political realities, where the Leviathan has collapsed. 
So, it would be elementary to predict a kind of calling into question of this 
type of mission in the next few years, in particular considering the failure in 
South Sudan. 

In this new century, the difficulty regarding IPBAs is to find the right 
equilibrium between the authority of an international actor exercising 
executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative powers in a territory with 
local ownership. Indeed, it is necessary to be more vigilant to allow this kind 
mechanism of conflict resolution (a cure for sovereign problem and/or a 
remedy for governance vacuum) in order to begin a new cycle, taking into 
account the new standards of international law. This will inevitably involve 
a multilateral commitment in a long-term perspective. In this way, this type 
of project would fully enjoy success in the international order, which 
oscillates between the Westphalian system and a cosmopolitan world. This 
long-term multilateral commitment of the whole international society must 
ensure that, beyond the central issue of accountability, each IPBA truly 
respects the timing of each stage (plenary administration, partnership, and 
ownership), without minimizing the exit strategy planning, in particular in 
the form of an assistance mission. Without this awareness, there will be no 
IPBAs renewal in territorial administrations within international relations. 
  



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