BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE AND THE DUTY TO PREVENT: OPPORTUNITIES LOST IN THE 2019-2021 UK TRADE BILL BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE AND THE DUTY TO PREVENT: OPPORTUNITIES LOST IN THE 2019-2021 UK TRADE BILL ** MARK KIELSGARD * & JOSHUA KEMBERO OGEGA INTRODUCTION Since the drafting of the Genocide Convention, the prevention of acts of genocide has taken on the status of an international norm, both under treaty obligation in the Convention and under customary international law in the Nuremberg Principles1 and progeny. 2 A non-exhaustive list of some of the models of prevention used by the international community in this regard includes diplomatic approaches,3 causal models,4 naming and shaming including official victim recognition,5 judicial intervention and deterrence,6 military interventions,7 and collective and unilateral economic sanctions.8 Exactly which sanctions must be applied as a state obligation, and under what circumstances, remains a thorny question. Prevention of genocide presents a complex and layered question as to when genocide will occur and how to reliably predict it. Professor Stanton has established a list of 10 non-linear warning signs for prediction9 and asserted suggested remedial sanctions at each stage. 10 Though an erudite and insightful ————————————————————————————— * Professor Kielsgard has resided in Hong Kong for 14 years and is tenured at City University of Hong Kong School of Law, where he has taught and researched in Human Rights Law, Criminal Law and International Law subjects. ** Dr. Joshua Kembero Ogega holds a PhD from the City University of Hong Kong’s School of Law. His PhD research focused on the interplay between Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights Law, and International Law. He is a licensed attorney in Kenya and teaches law in Kenya, at the Moi University’s School of Law. 1. See Report of the International Law Commission covering its second session, 5 June - 29 July 1950, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374-78, A/1316 (listing the principles of international law recognized in the charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries). 2. Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 29, A/56/10 (providing in Article 41(1) that states should cooperate in using “lawful means” to end the violation of preemptory norms of international law). 3. DAVID A. HAMBURG, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD EARLY DETECTION AND EFFECTIVE ACTION 101-04 (2015). 4. See Mark Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, Autocatalytic Models of Counter-terrorism in East and Southeast Asia: An International Comparative Analysis of China, Indonesia, and Thailand, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 461, 469 (2018). 5. See generally Mark D. Kielsgard, Restorative Justice for the Armenians, Resolved: It’s the Least We Can Do, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1-2 (2008). 6. See generally Saul Mendlovitz & John Fousek, Enforcing the Law on Genocide, 21(2) ALTS.: GLOB., LOC., POL. 237, 237-58 (1996). 7. See U.N. Charter, art. 42. 8. Id. art. 41. 9. GREGORY STANTON, THE TEN STAGES OF GENOCIDE (2016), http://www.genocidewatch. net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/The-Ten-Stages-of-Genocide-handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9QY-3QN5]. 10. Id. https://perma.cc/Q9QY-3QN5 http://www.genocidewatch https://stage.10 250 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 work, it does not specifically address state obligation under the Convention and/or customary international law. Putting aside the timing issue, the nature and limitations of state obligations remain murky and obscure. The Bosnian Genocide case 11 before the International Court of Justice endeavored to address the questions, inter alia, concerning both extraterritoriality12 and the preconditions of “effectively influencing”13 the course of the genocide as the legal standard for creating a state obligation.14 However, the decision arguably left more questions than answers.15 In the United Kingdom, there has recently been debate regarding heightened state-on-state unilateral economic sanctions.16 Legislation had been proposed in the 2019-21 Trade Bill to include provisions disqualifying countries engaged in acts of genocide or mass atrocities from entering into trade relations with the UK.17 Though the measures failed to pass Parliament,18 proponents argued that the binding effect of the Convention and customary international law obligates states to take such measures. 19 Among other issues, this raises the questions of the extraterritorial competence of obligation under the Convention, whether such a sanction is reasonable and whether trade sanctions against an offending ————————————————————————————— 11. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide case]. 12. Id. ¶ 183. 13. Id. ¶ 430. 14. Id. ¶ 432. 15. See generally David Turns, Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide: Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 398, 398 (2007); see also Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 669 (2007). 16. See Aditya Raj, Questioning the Legality of Unilateral Economic Sanctions, OBSERVER RSCH. FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2022), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/questioning-the-legality- of-unilateral-economic-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/CVK6-LUB8]; see also Idriss Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, International Law, and Human Rights 33 ETHICS & INT’L AFFS. 291, 291-302 (2019); see generally Chad Bray, British MPs Call for Government to Take Further Measures Against China over Treatment of Uyghurs, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3164154/british-mps-call-government-take-further- measures-against-china-over [https://perma.cc/VM2H-N4PH]; see also Hilary Clarke, Britain: Report Calls for Tougher Sanctions Against China over Treatment of Uygur Muslims, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 8, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/31402 35/ britain-report-calls-tougher-sanctions-against-china-over [https://perma.cc/JG5A-EJCB]. 17. See HL Deb (25 Nov. 2021) (816), https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-11- 25/debates/223D9BC0-8758-4DC5-A66D-D0E2753B62F9/ChinaGenocide [https://perma.cc/ M7MB-9SHU]. 18. See Patrick Wintour, UK free to make trade deals with genocidal regimes after Commons vote, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/19/uk-free- to-make-trade-deals-with-genocidal-regimes-after-commons-vote [https://perma.cc/2BW2-28 VU]. 19. See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N’S HUM. RTS. INST., Legal Considerations Arising from the Proposed Genocide Amendment to the UK Trade Bill Friday (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.leighday.co.uk/media/yvhby5yw/ibahri-briefing-note-on-uk-genocide-amendment- trade-bill-2021jan-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/66WC-YFT7]. https://perma.cc/66WC-YFT7 https://www.leighday.co.uk/media/yvhby5yw/ibahri-briefing-note-on-uk-genocide-amendment https://perma.cc/2BW2-28 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/19/uk-free https://perma.cc https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-11 https://perma.cc/JG5A-EJCB https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/31402 https://perma.cc/VM2H-N4PH https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3164154/british-mps-call-government-take-further https://perma.cc/CVK6-LUB8 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/questioning-the-legality https://sanctions.16 https://answers.15 https://obligation.14 251 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE state, as a model for prevention, can be obligatory as a matter of due diligence. Some scholars argue that economic sanctions are not effective measures in preventing genocide.20 They argue that sanctions make importation of food and medicine impossible and inadvertently lead to unnecessary collateral death.21 Lauterpacht argued that economic sanctions could have an opposite effect as in the Srebrenica Massacre, where sanctions purportedly made it easier for Bosnian Serbs and Croats to overrun and engage in genocide against Bosnian Muslims.22 Others point out the historically poor results of economic sanctions as a means of correcting certain state conduct because of the frequency with which state leaders ignore the suffering of their own people when juxtaposed with leadership interest.23 While these observations make a case against imposition of economic sanctions, this essay argues that when looked at from a contextual perspective, sanctions can be both effective and obligatory in the prevention of genocide. It also argues that the “effective influence” standard of the Bosnian Genocide ICJ case has been too narrowly construed24 and should receive a broader interpretation and not only be viewed as a standard for unilateral action, but also in the context of potential collective state action if the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is to be faithfully observed.25 This also presupposes that ————————————————————————————— 20. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 63, 63-79 (2002). 21. See arguments about sanctions on the Iraq government during Saddam Hussein’s reign in George Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 379, 379 (2001). See arguments regarding the effects of sanctions on Zimbabwe in Joshua Chakawa, Why sanctions have not worked: Zimbabwe’s experience from 2001-2021, 10 THIRD WORLD THEMATICS 205, 205-18 (2022). 22. See Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht’s observations in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. and Montenegro)), Order (Sept. 13, 1993), https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/ 91/091-19930913-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf; see generally RICHARD N. HAASS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 201 (1998); Peter Andreas, The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 29, 33-35 (2004). 23. See generally Özgür Özdamar & Evgeniia Shahin, Consequences of Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art and Paths Forward, 23 INT’L STUDS. REV. 1646, 1646-71 (2021). 24. See generally Mark Gibney, Universal Duties: The Responsibility to Protect, the Duty to Prevent (Genocide) and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations, 3 GLOB. RESP. TO PROTECT 123, 123-51 (2011); see also Abe Chauhan, A Causal Model for the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties OXFORD U. UNDERGRADUATE L.J. 107, 107-35 (2019); Sheri P. Rosenberg, Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention, 1 GLOB. RESP. TO PROTECT 442, 442-77 (2009); Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 669-94 (2007). 25. See generally Eyal Mayroz, The legal duty to ‘prevent’ after the onset of ‘genocide’, 14(1) J. GENOCIDE RSCH. 79, 79-98 (2012); see also Mohamed S. Helal’s comments on effectively influencing the prevention of genocide in Symposium: On Territoriality, Power, and Influence–A Review of John Heieck’s A Duty to Prevent Genocide: Due Diligence Obligations among the P5, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 12, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/12/12/symposium-on-territoriality- http://opiniojuris.org/2018/12/12/symposium-on-territoriality https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related https://observed.25 https://interest.23 https://Muslims.22 https://death.21 https://genocide.20 252 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 the influence probability is determinative of the economic situation of the target state and other states implementing similar sanctions. The sanctions leveled against Russia in its prosecution of the war in Ukraine are a poignant example of the potential effectiveness of trade sanctions because they are imposed collectively, pervasively applied, and on a vulnerable target with limited viable alternatives. This paper further argues: the failed 2019-21 UK Trade Bill amendment calling for imposing economic sanctions against states involved in alleged genocidal practices is in the character of a state obligation insofar as it applies to the treatment of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Province of China; such sanctions are likely to attract collective action among China’s most significant trade partners in the EU and other Western states; such sanctions are pervasive in character; and that China is a vulnerable state with few viable alternatives. This essay will begin by discussing the UK Trade Bill, followed by an analysis of the standards laid out in the Bosnian Genocide case. 26 It will discuss state obligation to prevent under the Convention, extraterritorial competence, and focus on the effective influence standard. It will thereafter address the issue of economic sanctions, historic effectiveness, reasonableness, and legality under international law. It will review potential application to China by reviewing Chinese vulnerabilities and the impact unilateral UK sanctions and/or collective sanctions from Western states would have, particularly in light of the success of the trade sanctions placed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. It concludes that in the contemporary international political economy, large states with massive trade can be most vulnerable to economic sanctions, and that the UK should have passed its amendment to the Trade Bill as a matter of due diligence to its obligations under the Genocide Convention. I. THE UK TRADE BILL According to the UN, China has developed a deliberate, large-scale policy targeting ethnic/religious minorities in Xinjiang.27 These policies include “enforced disappearances, torture, murder, sexual violence and so on.”28 There are credible reports that the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang is the ————————————————————————————— power-and-influence-a-review-of-john-heiecks-a-duty-to-prevent-genocide-due-diligence- obligations-among-the-p5/ [https://perma.cc/L46X-9FBU]. 25. See U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., China: UN experts deeply concerned by alleged detention, forced labour of Uyghurs (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press- releases/2021/03/china-un-experts-deeply-concerned-alleged-detention-forced-labour-uyghurs? LangID=E&NewsID=26957. 26. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11. 27. See U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 25. 28. Isaac Chotiner, Why Hasn’t the U.N. Accused China of Genocide in Xinjiang?, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 13, 2022) https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-hasnt-the-un-accused- china-of-genocide-in-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/U759-T7E4]. https://perma.cc/U759-T7E4 https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-hasnt-the-un-accused https://www.ohchr.org/en/press https://perma.cc/L46X-9FBU https://Xinjiang.27 253 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE largest incarceration of an ethno-religious minority since World War II.29 The Chinese government has subjected Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims to ‘re- education’ and ‘thought transformation’ and ‘forced labour.’30 In as much as some of the actions involve suppression of Uighur births, mandatory pregnancy checks and forcible contraception, sterilizations and abortions, this allegedly amounts to biological genocide or at least ‘cultural genocide.’31 Under Article V of the Genocide Convention, there is an obligation on State Parties to enact necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Convention regarding prevention.32 As a State Party to the Convention33 and consistent with the objective of genocide prevention, the UK considered sanctioning China34 (and Myanmar) with targeted economic sanctions35 for acts committed against the Uighurs and the Rohingya, respectively through the Trade Bill 2019-21.36 The Bill required trade agreements to reflect Britain’s international human rights obligations and proscribed the UK from entering into trade agreements with countries whose governments knowingly and systematically violate human rights.37 When introduced in the House of Commons, the original bill did not contain any provisions on genocide.38 An amendment dated 6 Jan. 2021 in HL Bill 160 ————————————————————————————— 29. See Colm Keena, Mass internment of Uighur people in camps laid bare in leaked documents, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/ china-cables-the-largest-incarceration-of-a-minority-since-the-holocaust-1.4089726 [https://perma.cc/Y2AN-TS5H]. 30. Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html [https://perma. cc/6FPB-T6E7]. 31. See generally Joanne Smith Finley, Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang 23 J. GENOCIDE RSCH. 348, 348 (2021). One argument that undercuts prevention of births as a basis for genocide in the PRC is the application of the so-called “one child policy” across all ethnic groups, negating the intent to single out any specific group for destruction. On a related note, the government in Myanmar has also engaged in systematic forced migration and illegalization, imposed marriage and birth restrictions to control the Rohingya population in its deliberate bid to destroy the social and physical foundations of the Rohingya’s ethnic and religious identity. See also MARK D. KIELSGARD, RESPONDING TO MODERN GENOCIDE: AT THE CONFLUENCE OF LAW AND POLITICS 5-6 (2016). 32. See generally Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 738, 738-46 (1949). See also George A. Finch, The Genocide Convention, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 732, 732-38 (1949). 33. Claire Brader, Genocide: bringing perpetrators to justice, HL LIBR. (May 21, 2021), https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/genocide-bringing-perpetrators-to-justice/ [https://perma.cc/5HGN-3BYB]. 34. HL Deb (25 Nov. 2021) (816) cols. 1014-55, supra note 17. 35. Id. 36. Id. 37. See Patrick Wintour, Rebels aim to insert genocide amendment in UK-China trade bill, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/18/rebels-aim-to- insert-genocide-amendment-in-uk-china-trade-bill [https://perma.cc/2WWP-9Z9A]. 38. See generally Trade Bill 2020, HC Bill [120] (UK). https://perma.cc/2WWP-9Z9A https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/18/rebels-aim-to https://perma.cc/5HGN-3BYB https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/genocide-bringing-perpetrators-to-justice https://perma https://nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html https://www https://perma.cc/Y2AN-TS5H https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific https://genocide.38 https://rights.37 https://2019-21.36 https://prevention.32 254 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 first introduced provisions concerning genocide.39 After HL Bill 160, there were two subsequent versions of the Bill, namely: Bill 239 2019-21 (18 Jan 2021) and HL Bill 164 (20 Jan 2021).40 The key requirement under the amendments consisted of the revocation of bilateral trade agreements if the High Court made an adverse determination regarding violations of human rights against UK’s trading partners. 41 On 22 March 2021, UK parliamentarians narrowly voted by 318 to 300 to reject the ‘genocide amendment’ to the Trade Bill 2019-2021.42 The Trade Bill received a royal assent on 29 April 2021.43 It is noteworthy that Lord Acton of Liverpool, the mover of the genocide amendment debate, subsequently introduced a private member’s Bill, Genocide Determination Bill [HL], to address matters concerning cases of genocide.44 II. OBLIGATION TO PREVENT IN THE BOSNIAN GENOCIDE CASE The obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide under Article I of the Genocide Convention was at the center of the Bosnian Genocide case 45 at the International Court of Justice in 2007. The court’s decision outlined the legal nature46 and scope 47 of the obligation to prevent. It also pronounced itself on the extraterritoriality of the obligation.48 A. Legal Nature of the Obligation to Prevent Despite the plain text of Article I of the Convention, there has been ————————————————————————————— 39. U.K. PARLIAMENT, Lord Alton of Liverpool’s amendment, After Clause 2, https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2729/stages/12454/amendments/72479 [https://perma.cc/32K3- S3M5] (last visited March 16 2023). 40. See UK PARLIAMENT, Lords Amendments to the Trade Bill, Bill 239 https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-01/0239/200239.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6MW-C5PR]; see also UK HOUSE OF LORDS, Trade Bill: Commons Reasons and Amendments to Certain Lords Amendments, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/58-01/164/5801164.pdf [https:// perma.cc/2GYU-8LHL]. 41. UK PARLIAMENT, Lords agrees to Commons Trade Bill compromise, https://www. parliament.uk/business/news/2020/september/lords-debates-trade-bill/ (last visited 11 March 2023). Please note that a subsequent amendment suggested that in addition to the preliminary determination made by the High Court, the government would carry out a risk assessment regarding the allegation before signing a bilateral trade agreement. 42. Id. 43. Under Section 3 of the Act, there is no requirement for a stoppage of trade relations because of reports of genocide. Where there are such reports, the House of Lords can debate on the reports and vote for or against the allegations made in the report. 44. Genocide Determination Bill 2022, HL Bill [23] (UK). 45. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 64. 46. Id. ¶ 430. 47. Id. 48. Id. ¶ 183. https://www https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/58-01/164/5801164.pdf https://perma.cc/W6MW-C5PR https://publications https://perma.cc/32K3 https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2729/stages/12454/amendments/72479 255 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE ambiguity on whether the duty is legal, social, or political.49 In particular, there is obscurity regarding the binding character of Article V obligating State Parties to enact laws50 and Article VIII enabling State Parties to call on the competent organs of the UN to take actions51 for, inter alia, the prevention of genocide. In its ruling on 8 April 1993, the ICJ observed that Yugoslavia and Bosnia- Herzegovina were under a “clear” obligation to prevent acts of genocide under Article I. In his Separate Opinion, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht stated that there was “no difficulty in declaring that all the parties to the Genocide Convention are under a duty to prevent genocide. This is merely a matter of reading the words of Article I.”52 Eventually, the majority of the Court decided to dispose of the question in the clearest terms possible in its Judgement of 26 February 2007.53 The Court first stated that “Article I does impose distinct obligations over and above those imposed by other Articles of the Convention.”54 It further elaborated that the obligation is both “normative” and “compelling,”55 and acts done by UN organs in preventing genocide do not relieve a State Party’s obligation under the Convention as long as those efforts accede to the UN Charter.56 Judge Kreća, in ————————————————————————————— 49. See generally Orie L. Phillips & Eberhard P. Deutsch, Pitfalls of the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A. J. 641, 641-46 (1970). 50. For instance, see the discussion on the application of Article V in Wenqi Zhu & Binxin Zhang, China in Expectation of Prosecuting the Crimes of Genocide in China, in CONFRONTING GENOCIDE, IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 7 (R. Provost, P. Akhavan eds., 2011); see also debates on the application of Article V in the United States in Myres S. McDougal and Richard Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683, 683-710 (1950); John M. Raymond, Genocide: An Unconstitutional Human Rights Convention, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 294, 294-318 (1972); Ben Saul, The Implementation of the Genocide Convention at the National Level, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 58 (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009). Saul argues that in “one sense, Article V of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the ‘Genocide Convention’ or ‘Convention’) is an unremarkable (or even superfluous) machinery provision which simply requires the incorporation of the Convention’s obligations into domestic law.” See Scott’s argument on why article V was not fully implemented in Australia in, Shirley Scott, Why Wasn’t Genocide A Crime in Australia?: Accounting for the Half-century Delay in Australia Implementing the Genocide Convention, 10 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 159, 159-78 (2004). 51. Polish argues that under Article VIII, “chances of the Council’s employing more than economic and diplomatic sanctions are negligible. The Council could have a genocide question referred to it in two ways. A State might bring a genocide accusation directly to the Council under Convention Article VIII; or a State disputing the Convention’s interpretation, application, or fulfilment might refer the matter to the Council from the International Court of Justice, as provided by Article 94(2) of the United Nations Charter. Following referral the Council might make recommendations, but plenary power could not be employed unless the Council found that the alleged acts threatened world peace.” O.F Polish, Genocide: A commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1148 (1949) (emphasis added). 52. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), Order, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 407, ¶ 113 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J. ad hoc) supra note 11. 53. See generally Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11. 54. Id. ¶ 165. 55. Id. ¶ 427. 56. Id. 256 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 a Separate Opinion, dissented stating that the duty to prevent genocide is a “social, moral, even metaphysical duty,”57 but when categorized as a legal duty, it violates the principle of impossibilium nulla obligatio est.58 He stated that Article I is a general principle and does not mandate a distinct legal duty. Likewise, Judge Skotnikov stated that the majority’s opinion was a “political statement” and “extraordinarily expansive” and violates the rules of treaty interpretation.59 B. Extraterritoriality Apart from the above, another issue was the extraterritoriality of the obligation to prevent genocide.60 Before the 2007 judgment, some of the Court’s judges found the question of extraterritoriality controversial.61 For instance, the ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht stated that if one argued the obligation was limited to a state’s territorial confines, then that meant a State Party had no obligation to prevent genocide in occupied or invaded territory.62 Therefore, a proper meaning of the obligation is that state parties, individually and collectively, are obligated to take positive measures to prevent a genocide wherever it occurs. 63 However, Judge Tarassov questioned this rationale, stating that “extraterritoriality” lacks balance and practicality.64 Once again, the Court, in its 2007 Judgment, did not share such a narrow view. The Court held that, contrary to the obligation to punish under Article VI, which is subject to an express territorial limit,65 the substantive obligation arising from Articles I and III are not limited by territory.66 The two articles apply to a State Party wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligation in question.67 Judge Tomka, in the Separate Opinion, also endorsed this view.68 He noted that State Parties could ————————————————————————————— 57. Id. at 457, ¶ 113 (separate opinion of Kreća, J. ad hoc). 58. Id. 59. Id. at 338, 340 (declaration of Skotnikov, J.). 60. See generally Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 631, 631-48 (2007). 61. See generally the Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca in Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Feb. 3, 2003), https://www.icj- cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/122/122-20030203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. 62. Bosnian Genocide Case (2007), Order, 1993 I.C.J. at 444, ̬¶ 114 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J. ad hoc). 63. Id. ¶ 115. 64. Bosnian Genocide Case (2007), Order, 1993 I.C.J. at 3, 27 (April 8) (declaration of Tarassov, J.). 65. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 184. 66. Id. ¶ 183. 67. Id. 68. Bosnian Genocide Case (2007), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. at 310, ¶ 40 (Feb. 26) (separate opinion of Tomka, J.). https://cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/122/122-20030203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf https://www.icj 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE 257 not extend the universality approach as a duty to punish.69 Judge Kreca differed and stated that only UN organs have the duty to prevent a genocide occurring outside a particular territory.70 C. Scope of Obligation Despite the expansive finding of a binding obligation to prevent and its extra territorial application by the Court, the finding is limited by the scope of the obligation. As observed by Schabas, “nothing in the debates about Article I provides the slightest clue as to the scope of the obligation to prevent”.71 Notwithstanding the absence of a dispute between the Parties on the interpretation of the obligation to prevent in Bosnian Genocide,72 the Court took the initiative to formulate not only the condition precedent for the obligation to arise,73 but also steps that State Parties have to take to discharge the obligation.74 The Court held that a violation occurs if a State Party was aware, or should normally have been aware that a genocide is about to occur but failed to act regardless of any certainty at the time regarding the genocide.75 While the court did not offer steps necessary to discharge the obligation, a State Party should employ “all means reasonably available” to contribute to the restraining in any degree the commission of genocide.76 The obligation varies from state to state and depends on the State Party’s effective capacity to influence, within the limits of international law, the action of persons committing or likely to commit genocide.77 Thus, states have a three-prong test:, (1) whether the measures are otherwise consistent with international law;78 (2) whether the measures are reasonable;79 and (3) whether the measures are calculated to effectively influence the course of the genocide.80 1. Consistent with International Law Firstly, the action taken by a state must correspond to international law, i.e., consistent with international law and, therefore, not an internationally wrongful ————————————————————————————— 69. Id. ¶ 40, 67-68. 70. Id. at 457, ¶ 135 (separate opinion of Kreca, J. ad hoc). 71. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 72 (2000). 72. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 159. 73. Id. ¶ 160-62. 74. Id. ¶ 428-32. 75. Id. ¶ 431-32 (emphasis added). 76. Id. ¶ 430. 77. Id. 78. See generally M. Shervin Majlessi, Use of Economic Sanctions under International Law: A Contemporary Assessment, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 253, 253-331 (2002). 79. See Enzo Cannizzaro, The role of proportionality in the law of international Countermeasures, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 889, 889-916 (2001). 80. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 430. 258 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 action. An internationally wrongful action is any act or omission attributable to a state under international law that constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.81 This is an act or omission that is injurious to the rights of other states.82 In that regard, an internationally wrongful action is an unlawful act between states in international law and not a dispute involving individuals of one country over the actions of another country. It is an act “contrary to the treaty right[s] of another State.”83 In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 84 ICJ held that it did not have jurisdiction over a complaint by the UK because there was no internationally wrongful act done by Iran regarding any treaty rights between the UK and Iran.85 In Greece v United Kingdom, the ICJ held that the UK had an obligation to enter into arbitration proceedings regarding a dispute arising out of the Greco-British Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1886).86 This is because there was an obligation under Article XV of the treaty, which stated that disputes concerning the treaty would be settled through arbitration.87 In Italy v France et al., the ICJ held that an internationally wrongful act has to be one in which one state directly breaches an international obligation concerning a treaty where both parties are parties. Both parties must directly be interested in the unlawful character of the impugned actions.88 In that regard, a violation of the Genocide Convention by a certain State Party amounts to an internationally wrongful action89 , and any State Party to the Convention can allege a violation of the obligations erga omnes by the offending State Party.90 It is noteworthy that there is no provision in the UN Charter that prohibits ————————————————————————————— 81. Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. On the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 82. See Marcela Barón Soto & Alejandro Gómez Velásquez, An approach to the state responsibility by an omission in The Inter–American Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence, 6 REV. CES DERECHO 3, 3-17 (2015). 83. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), Preliminary objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 14). 84. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22). 85. The court held that Iranian oil nationalization act of 1951 was not an internationally wrongful action. The reason for this was that inasmuch as the law was counter to a convention agreed upon by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP) and Iran in 1933. The convention allowed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company a 60-year licence to mine oil in 260,000 square kilometres (100,000 sq. mi.) of Iran in return for a percentage royalty. Therefore, Iran did not breach any treaty obligations between itself and the UK. Thus, ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the matter. Id. 86. Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 28 (July 1). 87. Id. at 35. 88. Case of the monetary gold removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. and U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15). 89. See Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 553- 604 (2006). 90. See INT’L L. COMM’N, Conclusion 17 of Draft conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N (2022). 259 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE the imposition of unilateral sanctions.91 While the UN General Assembly has passed several resolutions prohibiting such sanctions 92 , the resolutions are not binding.93 The resolutions also do not have the force of customary international law due to the many objections by persistent objectors.94 Indeed, the PCIJ, in Lotus, held that there are no presumptions or assumptions regarding restrictions related to the independence of states. 95 The only thing that is required under international law is that a state not violate international law restrictions when exercising its jurisdiction.96 The ICJ reiterated this in Nicaragua, where the Court stated that there is no expectation on a state to continue particular state relations, where it deems that they should not continue subsisting unless the basis for the relations is a treaty. 97 An economic sanction cannot be presumed as contrary to international law unless that sanction breaches either treaty obligations to which both states are parties 98 , or a violation of customary international law.99 In Nicaragua, the ICJ reiterated the existence of customary international law as prohibiting states from interfering in the affairs of other countries.100 The ICJ stated that a prohibition against states or groups of states from intervening directly (through military actions) or indirectly (through supporting subversive or terrorist armed activities) in a state’s internal and external affairs exists because states are sovereign and can make decisions freely.101 There is a prohibition on external interference seeking to tamper with those decisions.102 Therefore, economic sanctions imposed by the United States, including cessation of international aid, did not amount to an intervention.103 Moreover, the ICJ set up a two-prong test to determine if economic sanctions amounted to ————————————————————————————— 91. See Iryna Bogdanova, The Legality of Unilateral Economic Sanctions under Public International Law, in UNILATERAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 59-158 (2022). 92. See generally Rebecca Barber, An Exploration of the General Assembly’s Troubled Relationship with Unilateral Sanctions, 70 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 343, 343-78 (2021). 93. “No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.” G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 32 (Sept. 12, 1974). 94. See MATTHEW HAPPOLD, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2016). 95. See Hugh Handeyside, The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 71, 71-94 (2007). 96. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). 97. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 276 (June 27, 1986). 98. See generally Tom Ruys, Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International Legal Framework, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UN SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Larissa van den Herik ed., 2016). 99. See generally J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 167-96 (1986). 100. Id. ¶ 202. 101. Id. ¶ 205. 102. Id. ¶ 202. 103. Id. ¶ 245. 260 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 a violation of the principle of non-intervention. Firstly, the intervention must target matters that a state should freely determine without outside influence.104 Secondly, the intervention employed must use methods of coercion.105 However, if the matters in question concern jus cogens, international human rights, and touch on any erga omnes obligations, such matters will not be considered a domain reserved to a given state. 106 The principle of non- intervention will not apply.107 This is because all states have an interest in such 108 matters. In the context of sanctions that can effectively influence the prevention of genocide, the sanctions must not be contrary to international law regarding treaties state parties have ratified.109 For instance, the sanctions should not violate jus ad bellum as mandated by the UN Charter.110 This means that the sanctioning state should not use sanctions in a manner amounting to an act of aggression.111 Additionally, the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility clarify and refine the scope of a state’s right to deploy countermeasures, setting out a number of conditions.112 These conditions include, firstly, that the targeted states must have committed an internationally wrongful act. 113 Secondly, the sanctioning state must establish that it is an “injured state.”114 Thirdly, the measures should aim at inducing the targeted state to comply with its obligations.115 Fourthly, the measures must be proportionate.116 The measures ————————————————————————————— 104. See Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 345-81 (2009). 105. Id. ¶ 205. 106. Eirini-Erasmia Fasia, No Provision Left Behind – Law of the Sea Convention’s Dispute Settlement System and Obligations Erga Omnes, 20 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 519, 520 (2021). 107. Id. ¶ 194. 108. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 5). 109. See Julia Schmidt, The Legality of Unilateral Extra-territorial Sanctions under International Law, 27 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 53, 71 (2022). 110. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 111. See generally Martin Domb, Defining Economic Aggression in International Law: The Possibility of Regional Action by the Organization of American States, 11 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 85, 85-105 (1978). 112. See, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 75, arts. 49-54, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 113. See James Crawford, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 880-82 (2002). 114. See Kyoji Kawasaki, The “Injured State” In the International Law of State Responsibility, 28 HITOTSUBASHI J. L. & POL. 17, 17-20 (2000). 115. See Eliza Fitzgerald, Helping states help themselves: Rethinking the Doctrine of Countermeasures, 16 MACQUARIE L.J. 67, 71 (2016). 116. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 63, 77 (2002); see generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 715-67 (2008). 261 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE must not affect the enjoyment of fundamental human rights or jus cogens, including the due process rights of individuals or entities targeted by the sanctions.117 Lastly, once the wrongful act has stopped, the measures must be terminated.118 These pre-conditions can be easily met in a situation whereby economic sanctions are deployed against a state involved in genocide under blanket theories of jus cogens119 and erga omnes.120 2. Proportionality The principle of proportionality can be best understood if it is read through the principle of good faith and “reasonableness” as its criterion.121 The principle of proportionality requires an analytical procedure of balancing whereby a priority relation between conflicting arguments or interests and values is established.122 This is because the principle’s origin is Roman private law and is rooted in equity and distributive justice which later developed into principles of necessity and proportionality.123 In the context of international law, proportionality denotes the application of extra-legal considerations in making decisions. Thus, in the context of measures intended to effectively influence the prevention of a genocide, one ought to question whether they are proportional when competing interests and values are considered.124 The Roman roots of the principle are apparent in North Sea Continental Shelf, where the ICJ stated that reasonable and equitable measures rest on the circumstances present in that particular case or scenario.125 Under international law, there is no definition of what amounts to reasonable measures per se,126 but when looked at from the perspective in North Sea Continental Shelf, reasonableness denotes the factual element that parties take in their negotiations.127 These factual elements enable issues to be looked at from a fluid perspective128 by permitting a court to consider various principles or methods as ————————————————————————————— 117. Oscar Schachter, Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Commission, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 471, 471-77 (1994). 118. Id. 119. Barcelona Traction, supra note 108, ¶ 34. 120. Id. ¶ 33. 121. See Talya Ucaryilmaz, The Principle of Proportionality in Modern Ius Gentium, 36 UTRECHT J. INT’L EUR. L. 14, 16 (2021). 122. Id. 123. See Thomas Cottier, Roberto Echandi, Rachel Leichti-McKee, Tetyana Payosova & Charlotte Sieber, The Principle of Proportionality in International Law: Foundations and Variations, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 628, 629 (2017). 124. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25). 125. North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 60 (Feb. 20). 126. Oliver Corten, The Notion of ‘Reasonable’ in International Law: Legal Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, 48 INT’L COMPAR. L.Q. 613, 615 (1999). 127. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 125, ¶ 97. 128. Id. ¶ 41. 262 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 appropriate, or a combination of methods to come up with a solution instead of sticking to an imperative rule129 in situations the imperative rule did not envisage or take into account.130 Reasonableness and proportionality, while closely related, denote different scenarios under the law. Reasonableness covers a wider area compared to proportionality.131 A measure may be proportional but unreasonable.132 Reasonableness requires a test of rationality whereas proportionality requires a relationship test. Reasonableness requires the application of facts that are enough to induce a certain state of mind in a reasonable person. 133 The law assumes that where the basis of a decision are beliefs and actions one considers irrational, then the decision fails the reasonableness test. 134 These irrational beliefs include but are not limited to unfounded threats, emotions, and anxiety.135 An example of an irrational belief is that the red color attracts lightning strikes.136 These beliefs also include “superstitions, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs, conspiracy theories etc.”137 Proportionality requires a judgement of the relationship between “an end, amounting to a need, and a means to satisfy the end.”138 When determining the proportionality of a measure, one asks whether the end justifies the means. 139 There exists a relationship between proportionality and reasonableness. Hence, a decision will be reasonable if it meets the requirements related to a particular set of standards that may concern both the substance of the decision, or the process used to come up with the decision, and may also concern means-end efficiency.140 A decision is proportional if its basis is context-specific when looked at from the eyes of an ordinary reasonable person.141 ————————————————————————————— 129. Id. ¶ 90. 130. Id. ¶ 54. 131. See GARRY DOWNES, REASONABLENESS, PROPORTIONALITY AND MERITS REVIEW 12 (Sept. 24, 2008), https://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Speeches%20and%20Papers/ ReasonablenessSeptember2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V8K-VUZR]. 132. Id. 133. Id. 134. Giovanni Sartor, Giorgio Bongiovanni & Chiara Valentini, Reasonableness in international law, in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tony Carty ed., 2016). 135. See Nanaki J. Chadha, Martin J. Turner & Matthew J. Slater, Investigating Irrational Beliefs, Cognitive Appraisals, Challenge and Threat, and Affective States in Golfers Approaching Competitive Situations, 10 FRONTIERS PSYCH., Oct. 9, 2019, at 5 (2019). 136. See Scott Kraft, A Shocking Toll: In Kenya, Lightning Hits Hard, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 2, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-12-02-mn-17246-story.html [https://perma.cc/B6SC-VLPY]. 137. See Iris Žeželj & Ljiljana B. Lazarević, Irrational Beliefs, 15 EUR. J. PSYCH. 1, 1 (2019). 138. DOWNES, supra note 131 at 12. 139. See Martin Luterán, The Lost Meaning of Proportionality, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATIONS, REASONING 21-42 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014). 140. Sartor, Bongiovanni & Valentini, supra note 134. 141. See Janneke Gerards, How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 466, 470-73 (2013). https://perma.cc/B6SC-VLPY https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-12-02-mn-17246-story.html https://perma.cc/3V8K-VUZR https://www.aat.gov.au/AAT/media/AAT/Files/Speeches%20and%20Papers 263 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE To determine proportionality, the state actions ought to serve a legitimate purpose or objective.142 Secondly, there must be a causal link between the alleged purpose and the action.143 Thirdly, the actions must meet the proportionality criterion144 by comparing what is generally done or legally done with the present action.145 According to Hofer, this entails the balancing of conflicting interests by considering the suitability and necessity of the means used for the sanctions. If the measures curtail the enjoyment of rights or interests, the measures will be proportional and reasonable if one can determine that there are no other less intrusive measures. One will have to consider if there is a causal link between the sanctions adopted, the context of their adoption, and the matter of their effectiveness.146 In the context of unilateral sanctions, the measures taken to effectively prevent (or mitigate) the occurrence of genocide serve an obviously legitimate purpose or objective.147 This objective arises out of the obligation in Article I of the Genocide Convention148 and ICJ’s ruling in the Bosnian Genocide case. 149 There is a presumption that the measures taken from the presence of a causal link between the actions of a state and the crime of genocide.150 Proportionality of requirement presupposes that the measures undertaken by a state party to prevent the occurrence of genocide in another country should not be so extreme that they devastate the sanctioning state’s own national interest in order to live up to their obligation.151 An example given to affirm this position is the grain embargo on the Soviet Union over its incursion into Afghanistan in 1980.152 The embargo raised the cost of grain to the Russians by $225 million ($799,435,542 ————————————————————————————— 142. See Lori F. Damrosch, The Legitimacy of Economic Sanctions as Countermeasures for Wrongful Acts, 37 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 249, 255 (2019). 143. See Alexander Hofer, The Proportionality of Unilateral “Targeted” Sanctions: Whose Interests Should Count?, 89 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 399, 403 (2020). 144. Id. at 401. 145. Corten, supra note 126, at 623. 146. Hofer, supra note 143, at 401. 147. See Joshua M. Kayan, The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J., 461, 461-90 (2006); see also Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 445, 445-58 (2008). 148. See Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L., 631, 631-48 (2007). 149. Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 430. 150. In the case of China, there is a causal link between what the government in Xinjiang is doing and the persecution and cultural genocide of ethnoreligious minorities in Xinjiang. 151. See generally Farmer’s arguments regarding such sanctions. Richard D. Farmer, Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender, 23 WORLD ECON. 93, 93-117 (2002). 152. The measures included blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million metric tons already contracted. This meant withholding an additional 17 million metric tons, which the Soviets have already ordered. See generally AFG. TASK FORCE FOREIGN AFF. & NAT’L DEF. DIV., ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB80006, AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INVASION AND U.S. RESPONSE (1980). 264 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 in today’s money when adjusted for inflation153) leading the Soviets to turn to other sources such as Argentina.154 The embargo cost the United States an estimated $2.3 billion ($ 8,882,617,140 when adjusted for inflation155). It led American farmers to lose their dominant market share in grains imported by the Soviet Union,156 a position they did not recapture until 2003.157 Nonetheless, this did not affect the United States enough to qualify as disproportionate as the bar is set high with mass jus cogens violations158 such as military aggression and presumably mass genocide.159 Another example to buttress this contention is the current sanctions imposed on Russia by most of its trade partner nations around the world.160 The sanctions entail a degree of self-sacrifice by EU states in foregoing oil and natural gas supplied by Russia. For instance, at the outset of the Russian war in Ukraine, fuel prices in Germany rose by €0.03.161 Motorists paid €2.13 for a litre of gasoline at the pump and €2.225 per litre of diesel, which was an increase of €0.55.162 The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Russia, causing the price of fuel to rise by 20%, from £1.23 per litre of gasoline before the war to £1.54 after the war commenced.163 These prices ultimately normalized to rates below what they were before the imposition of sanctions against Russia. In the UK, there was a 41.8%-a-litre crash in the average pump price of petrol.164 In Germany and the EU, there was a drop of 16% with a litre of petrol selling at € ————————————————————————————— 153. FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Inflation Calculator, https://www.minneapolisfed. org/about-us/monetary-policy/inflation-calculator [https://perma.cc/QCN5-F9M6] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). 154. Animesh Ghoshal, The Effect of the Embargo on Grain Exports to the Soviet Union on the Exchange Rate, 20 NEB. J. ECON. & BUS. 37, 42 (1981). 155. FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 153. 156. ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BULL. NO. 503, EMBARGOES, SURPLUS DISPOSAL, AND U.S. AGRICULTURE: A SUMMARY 13-15 (1986). 157. Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace, 17 J. ECON. PERS. 187, 194 (2003). 158. See generally Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 72 (2005). 159. See generally Thomas Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715-67 (2008). 160. Minami Funakoshi, Hugh Lawson & Kannaki Deka, Tracking sanctions against Russia, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/ byvrjenzmve/ [https://perma.cc/94ZS-8Q3J]. 161. Tatjana Schweizer, What’s behind rising gas prices in Germany?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 20, 2022), https://www.dw.com/en/whats-behind-rising-gas-prices-in-germany/a- 61193549. 162. Germany sees ‘highest fuel prices on record’ in 2022, THE LOCAL (Nov. 7, 2022), https://www.thelocal.de/20221107/germany-sees-highest-fuel-prices-on-record-in-2022. 163. James Sillars, Ukraine war: Fuel prices hit new UK records with diesel averaging £1.61 amid warnings of worse to come, SKY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2022), https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine- war-fuel-prices-hit-new-uk-records-with-diesel-averaging-1-61-amid-warnings-of-worse-to- come-12559818 [https://perma.cc/AT9M-QRS8]. 164. Ben Clatworthy, Petrol prices fall below 150p a litre for first time since Ukraine invasion, THE TIMES (Jan. 10, 2023), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-petrol-fuel-price- falls-150p-litre-pump-nq69xzrw9 [https://perma.cc/HM5H-U58B]. https://perma.cc/HM5H-U58B https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-petrol-fuel-price https://perma.cc/AT9M-QRS8 https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine https://www.thelocal.de/20221107/germany-sees-highest-fuel-prices-on-record-in-2022 https://www.dw.com/en/whats-behind-rising-gas-prices-in-germany/a https://perma.cc/94ZS-8Q3J https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS https://perma.cc/QCN5-F9M6 https://www.minneapolisfed 265 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE 1.78 at the pump. 165 Therefore, if the proportionality test is applied, it is plausible to claim the sanctions are reasonable when looking at cost in the context of the larger picture, i.e., the effect they have on the sender country compared to the goal they intend to serve, i.e., preventing the hostile takeover of Ukraine. The sanctions emptied Russia’s coffers, thus reducing advances made by the Russian military in Ukraine.166 The embargo led to Russian tax income from oil and gas falling to $5.8 billion in January 2023, half its January 2022 level.167 Moreover, trade sanctions are a reasonable alternative compared to other alternatives.168 While sanctions have often not historically had a particularly good success rate,169 the United Nations Security Council170 or a member State acting unilaterally171 can use sanctions as a basis for coercion, to constrain, and for signaling.172 Even though UNSC sometimes uses sanctions for constraining and signaling, it mainly uses them for coercion.173 Nonetheless, UNSC sanctions have only been effective in coercing in 10% of the time174 and effective in constraining and signaling in 27% of the time.175 They were only effective 22% ————————————————————————————— 165.Average price for Super E10 fuel in Germany from January 2014 to March 2023 (in euro cents per liter, STATISTA, Mar. 7, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1292467/super- 10-fuel-average-price-germany/ [https://perma.cc/23FX-DT5U]. 166. See Jake Epstein, Putin’s army can’t figure out how to use tanks, and the battlefield in Ukraine is littered with burnt wrecks, INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2023), https://www.businessinsider.com/ russias-losing-armor-ukraine-because-cant-use-its-tanks-properly-2023-3 [https://perma.cc/VFL9-DAMD]; see also Mark Urban, The cost of the Ukraine war for one Russian regiment, BBC (Apr. 6, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65179074 [https://perma.cc/43DQ-7UAY]. 167. John Psaropoulos, Europe leaps towards energy autonomy as sanctions undercut Russia, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/28/europe-leaps- towards-energy-autonomy-as-sanctions-undercut-russia [https://perma.cc/9255-UMSR]. 168. David Baldwin, The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice, 24 INT’L SEC., no. 4, 2000, at 83-84. 169. Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliff, On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 608, 608-18 (1997); see also Asif Khan & Andrew Mack, The Efficacy of UN Sanctions, 31 SEC. DIALOGUE 279, 279- 92 (2000). 170. U.N. Charter art. 39. 171. R. Mohamad, Unilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Quest for Legality, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 71, 71-83 (Ali Marossi & Marisa Basset eds., 2015). 172. See generally id.; see also David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 415, 415-31 (2007); Taehee Whang, Elena McLean & Douglas W. Kuberski, Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 65, 65-81 (2013); Thomas Biersteker & Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, How and When do Sanctions Work? The Evidence, in ISS REPORT NO. 25, ON TARGET? EU SANCTIONS AS SECURITY POLICY TOOLS 19-20 (Iana Dreyer & José Luengo-Cabrera eds., 2015). 173. Thomas Biersteker, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho & Zuzana Hudáková, UN targeted sanctions datasets (1991-2013), 55 J. PEACE RSCH. 404, 404-12 (2018). 174. Dursun Peksen, When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature, 30 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 635, 637 (2019). 175. Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho & Hudáková, supra note 173, at 5. https://perma.cc/9255-UMSR https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/28/europe-leaps https://perma.cc/43DQ-7UAY https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65179074 https://perma.cc/VFL9-DAMD https://www.businessinsider.com https://perma.cc/23FX-DT5U https://www.statista.com/statistics/1292467/super 266 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 of the time, when looked at from all the three functions.176 Therefore, UNSC sanctions could be slightly more effective if used for the other non-coercive purposes. 177 Nevertheless, sanctions are the most preferred non-military mechanism used to enforce international law178 because they do not usually lead to more expensive and drastic military cost. 179 The costs on the sanctioning state are normally minimal.180 Moreover, sanctions can affect the target country’s economic progress at a greater cost compared to a sanctioning country. One way of visualizing this is to consider the effect of sanctions imposed on China, Iran, and Cuba. The 1989 arms embargo against China worked in America’s favor because Chinese military advancement relied on ‘copy and paste’ mechanisms. However, it was not easy to use the same mechanisms for advanced Western technologies, such as digital technologies reliant on silicon chips. Additionally, China accounted for only 0.5% of America’s military exports. Therefore, the arms embargo not only impeded Chinese technological advancement but also did not affect America’s military exports.181 This is also the case in the United States’ embargo on Cuba.182 The economic costs on Cuba has led some to say that because of the sanctions, “In Cuba, it sometimes seems time stopped in the 1960s.”183 In the case of Iran, the trade embargo following the Tehran Hostage Crisis in 1979184 wore down the Iranian economy and the country’s ability to repel Iraqi forces during the Iranian-Iraqi War.185 While the United States lifted the sanctions in January 1981 when Iran released the hostages,186 subsequent U.S. sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy. These include the 1987 sanctions over Iran’s support for Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group, 187 and the 1995 ————————————————————————————— 176. Id. 177. See Andrew Mack & Asif Khan, The Efficacy of UN Sanctions, 31 SEC. DIALOGUE 279, 290 (2000). 178. See generally George A. Lopez & David Cortright, The Sanctions Era: An Alternative to Military Intervention, 19 FLETCHER F WORLD AFFS. 65, 65 (1995). 179. Anu Bradford & Omri Ben-Shahar, Efficient Enforcement in International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 375, 380-81 (2012). 180. Ohyun Kwon, Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto Yotov, The Extraterritorial Effects of Sanctions 31 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 9578, 2022). 181. Id. 182. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091. 183. In Cuba, the pace of life continues to remain unhurried, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 17, 2017), https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201704/17/WS59bb8200a310d4d9ab7e932d.html [https:// perma.cc/3JGM-5U8V]. 184. Iran Hostage Crisis, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/ Iran-hostage-crisis [https://perma.cc/FY3V-3H9R] (last visited Feb. 8, 2024). 185. Id. 186. See Werner Wiskari, Allies Move to End Sanctions Against Iran, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/21/us/allies-move-to-end-sanctions-against-iran. html [https://perma.cc/48Z3-3PTF]. 187. GARY SAMORE, SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN: A GUIDE TO TARGETS, TERMS, AND TIMETABLES 3-5 (2015). https://perma.cc/48Z3-3PTF https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/21/us/allies-move-to-end-sanctions-against-iran https://perma.cc/FY3V-3H9R https://www.britannica.com/event https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201704/17/WS59bb8200a310d4d9ab7e932d.html 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE 267 extension of those sanctions to firms dealing with the Iranian government. 188 The United States imposed more sanctions after UNSC’s Resolution 1737 over Iran’s failure to cease its uranium enrichment program demanded in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1696.189 Other allied countries including Australia,190 Canada,191 and the EU, in pursuance of Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP of February 2007 imposed sanctions against Iran. The EU imposed other sanctions against Iran between 2007 and 2012.192 The sanctions negatively affected the Iranian economy leading to its adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 18 October 2015.193 Additionally, while sanctions may hamper the sanctioning country’s access to certain key resources, the sanctioning country may still access the resources elsewhere and not suffer significant economic harm. For instance, while fuel prices rose in the UK and Europe because of sanctions imposed on Russia,194 the prices eased as soon as Europe and the UK were able to access oil from sources other than Russia.195 The reason for the easing of the prices was Europe and the UK finding alternative energy sources such as the United States, Qatar, and Australia.196 It is noteworthy that sender countries, because of their power and influence, can often access alternative markets for their goods and services compared to receiver countries. As seen in the above discussion, economic sanctions are preferred because costs to the sender state are usually negligible and/or temporary, and thus a reasonable and proportionate approach, when compared to the effect of stopping or mitigating genocidal action in receiver states. 3. Effectively Influence the Course of the Genocide The third limb determines whether the sanctions are likely to effectively influence the prevention of genocide.197 To effectively influence does not ————————————————————————————— 188. Id. at 5. 189. S.C. Res. 1737, (Dec. 23, 2006). 190. AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE, SNAPSHOT IRAN SANCTIONS REGIME (2019). 191. Canadian Sanctions Related to Iran, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (Nov. 11, 2008), https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations- relations_internationales/sanctions/iran.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/GE9U-6KDE]. 192. SAMORE, supra note 187, at 9. 193. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is Commonly Known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015. 194. Sillars, supra note 163. 195. See Stanley Reed, Natural Gas Prices in Europe Fall to Pre-Invasion Levels, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/business/europe-natural-gas-prices. html [https://perma.cc/SS6W-3UYZ]. 196. See Stanley Reed, A Parade of Tankers Has Eased Europe’s Energy Crisis, THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/business/europe-energy-natural- gas.html [https://perma.cc/7P75-B6CA]. 197. Whitney K. Taylor & Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Sanctioning Genocide: To What Effect? 64 SOCIO. PERSP. 1081, 1083 (2021). https://perma.cc/7P75-B6CA https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/16/business/europe-energy-natural https://perma.cc/SS6W-3UYZ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/business/europe-natural-gas-prices https://perma.cc/GE9U-6KDE https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations 268 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 require a complete cessation of atrocities198 nor does it presuppose the degree of influence the sanction has on the cessation.199 Thus, this language should be considered in the context of degree of impact (effective) and the likelihood of achieving that impact (influence). What these words mean is a matter of legal construction. While the Bosnian Genocide case does not elaborate on a particular standard of proof,200 it follows that a common-sense approach should be applied201 such as a more-likely-than-not or the balance of probabilities standard.202 This is analogous to the reasonableness standard elucidated above203 and consistent with the plain meaning of the language in the decision.204 With regard to the term “influence” a common-sense approach implies that the sanctions taken would likely convince the target state to take some positive, compliant steps. The term “effective” applies to the degree of impact anticipated by the sanctions imposed.205 Most scholars agree that this only requires some anticipated diminution of harm, Gibney describes the “effective” prong as creating an obligation of conduct, not of result.206 Rosenberg similarly concluded that due diligence only created an obligation of conduct, not a ————————————————————————————— 198. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 430 (holding that “… a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide.”); see also J.S. McCormick, Effectiveness and Efficiency, 31 J. ROYAL COLL. GEN. PRACS. 299, 299 (1981) (stating that “effectiveness” denotes a measure of the success in achieving a clearly stated objective.) 199. The I.C.J. held that “this capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the event, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events.” Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 430 (emphasis added). 200. The I.C.J. stated that “it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question.” Id. (emphasis added). 201. The I.C.J. held, “. . . the notion of ‘due diligence’, [. . .] calls for an assessment in concreto.” Id. 202. Advaya Hari Singh Singh, A Clear Standard of Proof in Disputes Before the ICJ: Are We There Yet? CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. (Mar. 5, 2021), http://cilj.co.uk/2021/03/05/a-clear- standard-of-proof-in-disputes-before-the-icj-are-we-there-yet/ [https://perma.cc/YS9K-A3Q6]; see also Sharngan Aravindakshan, Cyberattacks: a look at evidentiary thresholds in International Law, 59 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 285, 285-99 (2021). 203. Corten, supra note 126. 204. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 431 (holding “if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent […] it is under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.” (emphasis added)). This denotes a common-sense approach regarding the means states can use to effectively influence the prevention of genocide and the impact anticipated by those means, i.e., those likely to deter. 205. Id. 206. See Mark Gibney, Universal Duties: The Responsibility to Protect, the Duty to Prevent (Genocide) and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations, 3 GLOB. RESP. TO PROTECT 123, 138- 39 (2011). https://perma.cc/YS9K-A3Q6 http://cilj.co.uk/2021/03/05/a-clear 269 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE result.207 Russell clarifies the duty as being only as contributing (emphasis added) to avoiding the damage (harm).208 The phrase “effectively influence,” while arguably vague, should be interpreted as persuading the target state to take some positive steps in correcting offending behavior.209 This doesn’t require a showing of complete cessation of offending conduct 210 but at least a reduction of same. 211 By logical implication, if the Court had intended for that state obligation to only arise when there was a guarantee of complete cessation of the offending behavior then it would have used considerably more affirmative language, and in any event, such a reading would unreasonably modify the affirmative language otherwise used elsewhere in the decision describing state responsibility to prevent.212 A residual consideration in the interpretation of the phrase ‘effective influence’ is capacity.213 The state obligation becomes operative only if the sanctioning state has the capacity to effectively influence the course of the genocide.214 In the context of economic sanctions, this duty only attaches if the sanctioning state has significant economic clout in terms of trade to use as a forceful enough argument to persuade the offending state into some measure of compliance.215 Despite growing international economic interdependence216 many states, standing alone, would not have the economic capacity to influence ————————————————————————————— 207. See Sheri Rosenberg, Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention, 1 GLOB. RESP. TO PROTECT 442, 468 (2016). 208. See Russell Buchan, Cyberspace, Non-State Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm, 21 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L., 429, 434 (2016). 209. See generally Serena Forlati, The Legal Obligation to Prevent Genocide: Bosnia v. Serbia and Beyond, 31 POL. Y.B. INT’L L. 189 (2011). 210. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 430. Considering that the obligation to prevent genocide is an obligation of conduct and not one of result, a complete cessation of offending conduct is not expected. Id. States only have an obligation to employ all means reasonably available to them, “so as to prevent genocide so far as possible.” Id. (emphasis added). Failure to achieve the desired result does not incur any responsibility. Id. 211. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 371, 380 (1999), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/2/587.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRD3-V4SK]. 212. See Bosnia Genocide case (2007), supra note 11, ¶ 431. The Court stated that “the obligation to prevent genocide only comes into being when perpetration of genocide commences . . . [f]rom that moment onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.” Id. (emphasis added). The obligation does not arise because of a guarantee that a state party will stop the genocide. See id. It only arises if the state party learns of a genocide but fails to employ the means available to it to stop the genocide. See id. 213. See JOHN HEIECK, A DUTY TO PREVENT GENOCIDE 13-71 (2018). 214. Id. at 28. 215. Michael Brzoska, The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions, E-INT’L RELS. (May 19, 2014), https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of- international-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/5V88-WMEQ]. 216. Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, 44 INT’L SEC. 42 (2019). https://perma.cc/5V88-WMEQ https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of https://perma.cc/ZRD3-V4SK http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/2/587.pdf 270 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 other states to halt conduct the other states regard as matters of national competence.217 However, in the course of the most significant jus cogens violations such as aggression218 or genocide,219 unilateral economic sanctions can gain traction amongst other states to impose similar sanctions or “collective economic sanctions.”220 Thus, even if a state doesn’t independently have the economic wherewithal to effectively influence an offending state, due diligence requires efforts at collective action.221 This creates a special duty on economically advantaged states because more states would join in economic sanctions if a major trade partner joined and the presumption of the duty is particularly strong if the target state is especially vulnerable to economic sanctions. Vulnerability of the target state along with economic stature of the sanctioning state(s) are key. The requirement of showing “capacity” creates a more obvious obligation on individual super-power economic states 222 and the likelihood of collective economic sanctions.223 Reference is made to other measures in place by the United States,224 EU,225 Australia,226 and Canada227 showing an openness to imposing sanctions on China but not in a pervasive way. Nonetheless these measures affirm a willingness to impose sanctions against China. It also provides the basis for a united face in the context of collective sanctions, thus establishing the groundwork for an international “will” to collectively impose pervasive sanctions. ————————————————————————————— 217. Obvious exceptions may include the US, PRC, India, UK, etc. See Emily Meierding & Rachel Sigman, Understanding the Mechanisms of International Influence in an Era of Great Power Competition, 6 J. GLOB. SEC. STUD., no. 4, 2021. 218. Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, its Elements and the Conditions for ICC Exercise of Jurisdiction Over It, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2009). 219. Rachel K. Fischer and Kelly Myer Polacek, Genocide, 52 REFERENCE & USER SERVS. Q. 291 (2013). 220. LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 40-43 (1992). 221. E. Ruvebana Brus and M. Brus, Before It’s Too Late: Preventing Genocide by Holding the Territorial State Responsible for Not Taking Preventive Action, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 25 (2015); see also JOHN HEIECK, supra note 213, at 1-12 (2018). 222. SeeMARTIN, supra note 220,. at 197-98. 223. See generally Özdamar & Shahin, supra note 23. 224. See infra note 407. 225. EU agrees first sanctions on China in more than 30 years, EURONEWS (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/03/22/eu-foreign-ministers-to-discuss-sanctions- on-china-and-myanmar [https://perma.cc/XV6V-Z4FA]; see also EUs plans to slap sanctions on Chinese firms aiding Russia’s war machine, REUTERS (May 8, 2023), https://www.reuters. com/world/brussels-plans-slap-sanctions-chinese-companies-aiding-russias-war-machine-ft- 2023-05-07/ [https://perma.cc/868W-BDGA]. 226. Chris Buckley and Damien Cave, Australia Took on China. Did It Get It Right?, THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/world/australia/australia-china- relations.html. 227. Ryan Patrick Jones, Canada sanctions 4 Chinese officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, CBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-sanctions- xinjiang-1.5959080 [https://perma.cc/9WJD-3AJR]. https://perma.cc/9WJD-3AJR https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-sanctions https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/world/australia/australia-china https://perma.cc/868W-BDGA https://www.reuters https://perma.cc/XV6V-Z4FA https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/03/22/eu-foreign-ministers-to-discuss-sanctions 271 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE Moreover, “capacity” can also be determined in the nature of the sanctions.228 Whether unilateral or collective, sanctions must be “pervasive” to be effective.229 Sanctions that target individuals or specific industries alone are usually not sufficiently pervasive to be effective.230 This was evident in sanctions imposed against Zimbabwean officials and their close associates and relatives231 in the early 2000’s.232 Despite these sanctions, the human rights situation in Zimbabwe remains dire.233 For instance, most individuals banned from visiting the United States under the auspices of those sanctions234 had little prospect of travelling to the United States even before the ban235 rendering the sanctions of little consequence. 236 Additionally, these sanctions are (were) ineffective because Zimbabwe is not tied into the global economy in a significant way so it was effectively immune from the effects of collective sanctions.237 States are considerably more vulnerable if they have a modern economy deeply embedded in the international trading system. 238 Therefore, the failure of the sanctions to effectively influence the government of Zimbabwe ————————————————————————————— 228. Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff, On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 608 (1997). 229. Elizabeth Rosenberg, Zachary K. Goldman, Daniel Drezner & Julia Solomon-Strauss, New Data on the Effects of Sanctions Targeting States, in THE NEW TOOLS OF ECONOMIC WARFARE 18-24 (2016). 230. Cynthia Chipanga & Torque Mude, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Sanctions as a Law Enforcement Tool in International Law: A Case Study of Zimbabwe from 2001 to 2013, 5 OPEN J. POL. SCI. 291, 300-02 (2015). 231.EU imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2002), https://www. theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/zimbabwe [https://perma.cc/ED55-BZ3Z]; see also Eric Oteng, SADC urges US, EU to lift Zimbabwe sanctions, AFRICA NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/18/sadc-urges-us-eu-to-lift-zimbabwe-sanction/ [https://perma.cc/3C8L-LF6F]; U.S. Zimbabwe, CNN (Feb. 22, 2002), https://edition.cnn.com/ 2002/WORLD/africa/02/22/us.zimbabwe/index.html [https://perma.cc/YV2G-AF4N]. 232. THE GUARDIAN, supra note 231. 233. See generally Joshua Chakawa, Why sanctions have not worked: Zimbabwe’s experience from 2001-2021, 8 THIRD WORLD THEMATICS 205 (2022). 234. See Zimbabwe sanctions: Sadc calls on US and EU to drop policy, BBC (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49386829 [https://perma.cc/MH23-VMJJ]. 235. See generally ISS Pretoria, The curious case of Zimbabwe sanctions, ISS TODAY (Oct. 25, 2022), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-curious-case-of-zimbabwe-sanctions [https://perma. cc/4QS4-QHRP]. 236. Jan Grebe, And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe, 45 AFRICA SPECTRUM 3 (2010). 237. In 2000, when Zimbabwe started receiving most of its sanctions, its GDP was USD 8,135,800,000. See Chidochashe L. Munangagwa, The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe, 3 GETTYSBURG ECON. REV. 113 (2009). Contrast this GDP with that of the US at the time which stood at USD 9.26 trillion. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s economic output was a negligible part of the world’s GDP. See Virginia H. Mannering, Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter 2000 “advance” estimate, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Jan. 31, 2001), https://www.bea.gov/news/ 2001/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-2000-advance-estimate [https://perma.cc/C2YB- N7YG]. 238. See generally Nicholas L. Miller, The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions, 68 INT’L ORG. 913 (2014). https://perma.cc/C2YB https://www.bea.gov/news https://perma https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-curious-case-of-zimbabwe-sanctions https://perma.cc/MH23-VMJJ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49386829 https://perma.cc/YV2G-AF4N https://edition.cnn.com https://perma.cc/3C8L-LF6F https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/18/sadc-urges-us-eu-to-lift-zimbabwe-sanction https://perma.cc/ED55-BZ3Z https://theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/zimbabwe https://www 272 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 was due, in part, to that government’s invulnerability to trade sanctions and the minimalist character of the sanctions imposed.239 In contrast, the sanctions currently imposed on Russia240 for its aggression against Ukraine241 are having significant effects in its war effort.242 The Russian economy is deeply embedded in the global economy. 243 It is the world’s 11th largest economy 244 and is the prime commodity exporter among emerging markets.245 Its footprint in global energy, metal markets and agriculture can only be compared to that of the United States, Canada, and Australia.246 Its trade-to- GDP ratio is 46%.247 In 2018, Russia was the world’s 12th largest exporter, 248 accounting for 2.3 percent of global exports. 249 It mainly exports its commodities to China and the EU,250 whereas its services exports are mostly to the EU and the US.251 This makes Russia vulnerable to measures that restrict its export market.252 It is for this reason that the economy shrank by over 2% after imposition of sanctions over its war in Ukraine.253 Considering that it is deeply embedded in the global economy, 254 the sanctions were pervasive enough to affect its economic output. 255 For instance, in February 2023, Russia cut its ————————————————————————————— 239. Jan Grebe, supra note 236. 240. Elaine Kurtenbach, Sanctions against Russia and what the G7 may do to fortify them, AP NEWS (May 20, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-sanctions-g7-eu-biden- f5edb7c1849548423e8442e69ef14767 [https://perma.cc/3TCT-QJWK]. 241. G.A. Res. A/RES/ES-11/1 (Mar. 2, 2022). 242. Jeanne Whalen, Sanctions forcing Russia to use appliance parts in military gear, U.S. says, THE WASH. POST (May 11, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 2022/05/11/russia-sanctions-effect-military/ [https://perma.cc/ZB25-SRZE]. 243. Mihail Nikolaevich Dudin, Russia’s Integration in the World Economy and its Economic Security, 21 EUR. RES. STUD. J. 624 (2018). 244. Id. at 628. 245. Nicholas Mulder, The Sanctions Weapon, INT’L MONETARY FUND FIN. & DEV. (June 2022), https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fandd/Article/2022/June/Mulder.ashx [https://perma.cc/S5CH-2WLE]. 246. Id. 247. Id. 248. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., GAIN REPORT NO. RS1911, RUSSIAN FEDERATION EXPORTER GUIDE ANNUAL 2018 at 2 (2019). 249. Id. 250. Id. 251. THE WORLD BANK, RUSSIA INTEGRATES: DEEPENING THE COUNTRY’S INTEGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11 (2020), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/92118160795 9469524/pdf/Russia-Integrates-Deepening-the-Country-s-Integration-in-the-Global- Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNT5-JKUL]. 252. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, Export Dependence and Export Concentration, in TOWARDS HUMAN RESILIENCE: SUSTAINING MDG PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY 20-21 (2011). 253. Infographic - Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy, EUR. COUNCIL, https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/ [https://perma.cc/R7BR-4LC8] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). 254. Dudin, supra note 243; see also Biersteker & van Bergeijk, supra note 172, at 19-20. 255. Miller, supra note 238. https://perma.cc/R7BR-4LC8 https://www https://perma.cc/ZNT5-JKUL https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/92118160795 https://perma.cc/S5CH-2WLE https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fandd/Article/2022/June/Mulder.ashx https://perma.cc/ZB25-SRZE https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology https://perma.cc/3TCT-QJWK https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-sanctions-g7-eu-biden 273 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE oil output by 5% due to price caps imposed on the country’s seaborne exports. 256 It is noteworthy that almost all of Russia export-oriented gas pipelines and other infrastructure was oriented towards selling the same to the European market.257 This market soaked in 2.5 million barrels a day of crude, another 1 million barrels of refined products and 155 billion cubic meters a year of natural gas. 258 This market is slowly disappearing. For instance, Russian gas exports via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline totaled a record-low 59.2 billion cubic meters in 2022. This is lower than Gazprom’s (Russia’s oil exporter) previous post-Soviet lows of gas exports at 117.4 billion cubic meters in 1995.259 The sanctions have led to Russia’s inability to access spare parts for its ageing military equipment, leading to what some call “Frankenstein tanks,” an effort by which the Russian military creates tanks by cannibalizing other tanks.260 Russia is also less capable of sourcing ammunitions261 with reports that it is sourcing weapons from as far as South Africa.262 Similarly, the Chinese economy is deeply embedded in the global economy 263 which makes it vulnerable to export sanctions.264 Pervasive sanctions can effectively influence its behavior considering that in 2022, China’s share of exports in gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to ————————————————————————————— 256. Anna Cooban & Radina Gigova, Russia to cut oil output by 5% as sanctions bite, CNN BUSINESS (Feb. 10, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/10/energy/russia-oil-output-cut/ index.html [https://perma.cc/ZE67-RL4N]. 257. Andrey Gurkov, How Putin’s war destroyed Russia’s business model, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Dec. 28, 2022) https://www.dw.com/en/how-putins-war-destroyed-russias-business- model/a-64224006 [https://perma.cc/ZZ7D-MLWA]. 258. Julian Lee, Russia Can’t Replace the Energy Market Putin Broke, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2023), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-29/russia-can-t-replace-the- energy-market-putin-broke?embedded-checkout=true [https://perma.cc/7QYS-PJPY]. 259. Vladimir Soldatkin, Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe collapse to a post-Soviet low, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-pipeline-gas- exports-europe-collapse-post-soviet-low-2022-12-28/. 260. Jon Jackson, Russia Forced to Create ‘Frankenstein’ Tanks from Spare Parts: Report, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2023), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-forced-frankenstein-tanks-spare- parts-1786430 [https://perma.cc/76L3-V39P]; see also Christiaan Hetzner, Russia’s largest tank manufacturer may have run out of parts, FORTUNE (Mar. 22, 2022), https://fortune.com/ 2022/03/22/russian-tank-manufacturer-sanctions-ukraine-war/ [https://perma.cc/VW7J-TJ7Z]. 261. Brad Lendon, Russia having difficulty making new weapons, but might have enough older ones, report says, CNN NEWS (Apr. 19, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/ 04/19/europe/russia-weapons-production-report-intl-hnk-ml/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XL4- EVUN]. 262. Kopano Gumbi, Wendell Roelf & Daphne Psaledakis, South Africa rejects U.S. accusations of arms shipment to Russia, REUTERS (May. 12, 2023), https://www.reuters. com/world/africa/south-african-minister-we-didnt-approve-any-arms-shipment-russia-2023-05- 12/ [https://perma.cc/Q7Z4-CXCL]. 263. Tianlei Huang & Nicholas R. Lardy, China is Too Tied to the Global Economy to Risk Helping Russia, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.piie.com/ blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/china-too-tied-global-economy-risk-helping-russia [https://perma.cc/7TJF-6RQU]. 264. Id. https://perma.cc/7TJF-6RQU https://www.piie.com https://perma.cc/Q7Z4-CXCL https://www.reuters https://perma.cc/3XL4 https://edition.cnn.com/2023 https://perma.cc/VW7J-TJ7Z https://fortune.com https://perma.cc/76L3-V39P https://www.newsweek.com/russia-forced-frankenstein-tanks-spare https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-pipeline-gas https://perma.cc/7QYS-PJPY https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-29/russia-can-t-replace-the https://perma.cc/ZZ7D-MLWA https://www.dw.com/en/how-putins-war-destroyed-russias-business https://perma.cc/ZE67-RL4N https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/10/energy/russia-oil-output-cut 274 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 265 266 approximately 19.8 percent, an increase of 0.8% from the previous year. When coupled with the fact that China takes up 14.7 percent of the global export market267 and has been leading the world for fourteen consecutive years, 268 collective sanctions can have a big footprint on its economic wellbeing.269 China’s overreliance on the export market for its growth270 makes the economy vulnerable to external shocks such as sanctions. An analysis of the above outlines what ‘effective influence’ means and entails. A state party possessing powerful economic and geopolitical muscle is unilaterally capable of effectively influencing the prevention of genocide occurring within the confines of another state party’s territory. However, the ability to effectively influence is amplified if the powerful state is able to convince other similarly situated states to impose collective sanctions on the target state. Additionally, if the target state is particularly vulnerable and the sanctions are pervasive, the sanctions are more likely than not to lead to measurable compliance. III. APPLYING THE ICJ’S JUDGEMENT TO THE UK’S TRADE BILL Provided that economic sanctions to prevent jus cogens offenses are consistent with international law,271 the determination remains as to whether the genocide amendment of the UK Trade bill is reasonable and has the capacity to effectively influence the actions of the Chinese government regarding Xinjiang. Arguably, the UK’s economic status as a developed economy 272 and one of the most powerful countries in the world273 means that it likely has the capacity to influence the actions of any state committing acts of genocide, even on a ————————————————————————————— 265. Yihan Ma, Share of exports in gross domestic product (GDP) in China in selected years from 2000 to 2022, STATISTA (Mar. 2, 2023), https://www.statista.com/statistics/256591/share- of-chinas-exports-in-gross-domestic-product/ [https://perma.cc/7YEE-PDHG]. 266. Id. 267. China’s Foreign Trade Hits Record High in Challenging Year, XINHUA (Jan. 14, 2023), https://english.news.cn/20230114/dd9d7df9d8a34d4caa0b9621494e3abd/c.html [https://perma.cc/RW7K-W9JR]. 268. Id. 269. See Matteo Pinna Pintor, Marc Suhrcke & Christoph Hamelmann, The impact of economic sanctions on health and health systems in low-income and middle-income countries: a systematic review and narrative synthesis, 8 BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH (2023), https://gh.bmj. com/content/bmjgh/8/2/e010968.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CGC-9AZU]. 270. Ellen Zhang & Ryan Woo, Chinese economy’s export pillar shows cracks from global slowdown, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-economys- export-pillar-shows-cracks-global-slowdown-2022-09-15/ [https://perma.cc/GAR6-C7CG]. 271. See Majlessi, supra note 78. 272. See High income, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/high- income?view=chart. 273. Power, US NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/rankings/power [https://perma.cc/298Q-3ZX4] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). https://perma.cc/298Q-3ZX4 https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/rankings/power https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/high https://perma.cc/GAR6-C7CG https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-economys https://perma.cc/8CGC-9AZU https://gh.bmj https://perma.cc/RW7K-W9JR https://english.news.cn/20230114/dd9d7df9d8a34d4caa0b9621494e3abd/c.html https://perma.cc/7YEE-PDHG https://www.statista.com/statistics/256591/share 275 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE standalone basis. As one of China’s biggest trade partners, 274 this influence is heightened. Additionally, China is particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions as they have recently suffered significant economic downturns275 and face potential, or even likely, serious threats to their future economic health.276 Furthermore, a UK trade embargo would be a genocide prevention measure that other developed nations would likely collectively join,277 further threatening the vulnerable Chinese economy. 278 British historical ties to Europe in fighting expansionism has implications for potential collective trade sanctions on China.279 Though the UK is no longer a member of the European Union,280 it has strong historical ties to Europe.281 These ties are even stronger in the context of fighting for human rights,282 counter-genocide,283 and international criminal law generally.284 A contemporary example of cooperation in imposing trade sanctions in response ————————————————————————————— 274. China trade balance, exports and imports by country 2020, WORLD INTEGRATED TRAD SOL., https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2020/TradeFlow/EXPI MP/Partner/by-country [https://perma.cc/WBK7-WSZL] (last visited Aug. 23, 2023). 275. See generally Milton Ezrati, China Is Suffering a Major Financial Crisis, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/10/03/china-is-suffering-a-major- financial-crisis/?sh=46403a864775 [https://perma.cc/B5GB-WSKP]; see also Five reasons why China’s economy is in trouble, BBC (Oct. 5, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china- 62830775 [https://perma.cc/L2FW-EZAN]. 276. Ji Siqi, China wary of Russia-type sanctions, but Beijing’s ‘financial nuclear bombs’ are a powerful deterrent, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 4, 2022, 12:00 AM), https://www. scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3176397/china-wary-russia-type-sanctions-beijings- financial-nuclear [https://perma.cc/7ESF-XDV2]; see also Frank Tang and Luna Sun, China’s Xi Jinping rails against ‘cold war mentality’ and US hegemony in call for global cooperation, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 21, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/ 3174990/chinas-xi-jinping-rails-against-cold-war-mentality-us [https://perma.cc/42ER-8ZRH]. 277. Joseph A. Keeler, Genocide: Prevention through Nonmilitary Measures, 171 MIL. L. REV. 135 (2002). 278. Huang & Lardy, supra note 263. 279. See generally Vernon Bogdanor, Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective, 18 INT’L AFFS. 689, 689-701 (2005). 280.The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, EUR. COMM’N, https://commission.europa.eu/ strategy-and-policy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-withdrawal- agreement_en [https://perma.cc/H7XX-R5UG]. 281. See generally O. V. Prikhodko, Brexit’s Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship, 92 HERALD RUSS. ACAD. SCIS. S133-41 (2022). 282. See ALFRED WILLIAM BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 19-47 (2004). 283. See Antony Grenville, The Kindertransports: An Introduction, in THE KINDERTRANSPORT TO BRITAIN 1938/39: NEW PERSPECTIVES 15-27 (2012); see also Alfred Traum, Britain’s Response, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www. ushmm.org/remember/holocaust-reflections-testimonies/echoes-of-memory/britains-response [https://perma.cc/82ZE-7A6S]. 284. See generally W.L. Cheah & Moritz Vormbaum, British War Crimes Trials in Europe and Asia, 1945-1949: A Comparative Study, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 669 (2018); for more on Britain’s role in the development and adoption of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, see also Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006). https://perma.cc/82ZE-7A6S https://ushmm.org/remember/holocaust-reflections-testimonies/echoes-of-memory/britains-response https://www https://perma.cc/H7XX-R5UG https://commission.europa.eu https://perma.cc/42ER-8ZRH https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article https://perma.cc/7ESF-XDV2 https://scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3176397/china-wary-russia-type-sanctions-beijings https://www https://perma.cc/L2FW-EZAN https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china https://perma.cc/B5GB-WSKP https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/10/03/china-is-suffering-a-major https://perma.cc/WBK7-WSZL https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2020/TradeFlow/EXPI 276 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 to international crimes (e.g., the crime of aggression) are those leveled against Russia over the Ukrainian invasion.285 China has shown its willingness to cooperate with the Russian leader286 in spite of the sanctions imposed by Western nations against Russia over its war of aggression in Ukraine.287 China’s dalliance with Russia has recently led to calls of ‘severe costs’ for countries helping Russia evade sanctions,288 with China’s role in Moscow’s war economy being the reason for those calls.289 Thus, this is an indication that other European nations may readily join the UK in imposing sanctions against China over alleged genocidal acts in Xinjiang. The UK has the ability to influence other Sino trade partners because of its economic clout290 and because many of China’s major trade partners have either already imposed non-pervasive sanctions,291 are currently considering imposing sanctions,292 or imposed (and subsequently lifted) sanctions in recent history.293 All measures exhibit a willingness to use trade sanctions against China.294 ————————————————————————————— 285. Foreign, Commonwealth & Dev. Off., Att’y Gen.’s Off., James Cleverly & Victoria Prentis, UK joins core group dedicated to achieving accountability for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (Jan. 20, 2023) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-uk-joins-core- group-dedicated-to-achieving-accountability-for-russias-aggression-against-ukraine [https://perma.cc/26EJ-KSB4]. 286. Karl Ritter, China’s Xi to meet Putin as Beijing seeks bolder global role, AP NEWS (Mar. 17, 2023, 12:39 PM EST), https://apnews.com/article/russia-china-xi-putin-ukraine-war-2f0d03 5942cfca14ae5a42d82f5e8627 [https://perma.cc/63RE-HBB9]. 287. Laura He, China is helping to prop up the Russian economy. Here’s how, CNN NEWS (Feb. 26, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/22/economy/china-russia-economic-ties- ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/P2V2-SCF2]. 288. Ana Swanson, China’s Economic Support for Russia Could Elicit More Sanctions, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/us/politics/china-russia- sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/WAM4-9L6P]. 289. Id. 290. Global Soft Power Index 2022: USA bounces back better to top of nation brand ranking, BRAND FIN. (Mar. 15, 2022), https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/global-soft-power-index- 2022-usa-bounces-back-better-to-top-of-nation-brand-ranking [https://perma.cc/4HGG-LXF4]; see also Aaron O’Neill, Countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP) 2022, STATISTA, (May 11, 2023), https://www.statista.com/statistics/268173/countries-with-the-largest- gross-domestic-product-gdp/ [https://perma.cc/3QHH-WN2D]. 291. See Robin Emmott & David Brunnstrom, West sanctions China over Xinjiang abuses, Beijing hits back at EU, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-china- eu-sanctions-idUSKBN2BE2LF [https://perma.cc/X5N5-ZX6T]. 292. See Yasuo Takeuchi & Ryo Nakamura, Transatlantic allies unite in sanctions on China over Xinjiang, NIKKEI ASIA (Mar. 22, 2021), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International- relations/Transatlantic-allies-unite-in-sanctions-on-China-over-Xinjiang [https://perma.cc/64VZ-UB8Z]. 293. See Legu Zhang & Adrianna Zhang, China Faces New Multi-Country Sanctions Over Xinjiang Policies, VOA (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china- faces-new-multi-country-sanctions-over-xinjiang-policies/6203666.html [https://perma.cc/5KWK-K5CT]. 294. See Jacob Fromer & Finbarr Bermingham, China’s support for Russia galvanises US, Europe as Washington examines once-unthinkable sanctions against Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 12, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3173916/chinas-support-russia- galvanises-us-europe-washington-examines-once [https://perma.cc/HF3B-A3DC]. https://perma.cc/HF3B-A3DC https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3173916/chinas-support-russia https://perma.cc/5KWK-K5CT https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china https://perma.cc/64VZ-UB8Z https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International https://perma.cc/X5N5-ZX6T https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-china https://perma.cc/3QHH-WN2D https://www.statista.com/statistics/268173/countries-with-the-largest https://perma.cc/4HGG-LXF4 https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/global-soft-power-index https://perma.cc/WAM4-9L6P https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/us/politics/china-russia https://perma.cc/P2V2-SCF2 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/22/economy/china-russia-economic-ties https://perma.cc/63RE-HBB9 https://apnews.com/article/russia-china-xi-putin-ukraine-war-2f0d03 https://perma.cc/26EJ-KSB4 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-uk-joins-core 277 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE Because these efforts have been fragmented in terms of design (non-pervasive) or grounded in differing causes (trade tit-for-tat, 295 Hong Kong296 and Xinjiang,297etc.) they have met with limited success. 298 However, given the implicit tendency of other trade partners to sanction China,299 their abhorrence of genocide,300 especially amongst European states, 301 and China’s continued recalcitrance,302 the groundwork is laid for collective action. The UK was named the world’s third most influential country in 2022303and the world’s fifth most powerful country in 2022.304 It has the world’s second largest financial center. 305 The London Stock Exchange has more than 1,000 companies from 100 countries listed306 which include many of the world’s largest, most successful and dynamic companies.307 The stock exchange market includes the so-called Shanghai-London Stock Connect308 which brings the ————————————————————————————— 295. See Amber Wang, Beijing sanctions 2 in US-China tit-for-tat over human rights in Tibet, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 3, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ article/3204347/beijing-sanctions-2-us-china-tit-tat-over-human-rights-tibet [https://perma.cc/EMP7-5AMM]. 296. See Press Release from US Department of Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Undermining Hong Kong’s Autonomy (Aug. 7, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press- releases/sm1088 [https://perma.cc/GH8Y-CC2T]. 297. Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 31, 2020), https://home.treasury. gov/news/press-releases/sm1073 [https://perma.cc/5YR8-ZGTB]. 298. Ian Talley & Laurence Norman, U.S. and Its Allies Sanction China Over Treatment of Uyghurs in a Collective Action, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/ articles/u-s-and-its-allies-sanction-china-over-treatment-of-uyghurs-in-collective-action- 11616440582 [https://perma.cc/A8HF-ZZLJ]. 299. See generally MARY E. LOVELY & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CAN CHINA BLUNT THE IMPACT OF NEW US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS? (2021). 300. See generally Ditte Marie Munch-Jurišić, Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign, 45 METAPHILOSOPHY 270 (2014). 301. Mark Swatek-Evenstein, Genocide and the Europeans, 13 J. GENOCIDE RSCH. 516 (2011). 302. See generally BRUCE JONES & ANDREW YEO, CHINA AND THE CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL ORDER (2022), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FP_20230214_china _global_order_jones_yeo.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJ2U-MEW3]. 303. Most Influential Countries, US NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/news/best- countries/most-influential-countries [https://perma.cc/H4KV-D9YR] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). 304. US NEWS, supra note 273. 305. Chad Bray, Hong Kong holds on to fourth spot in global financial centre rankings, while Singapore remains one place higher, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3214624/hong-kong-holds-fourth- place-global-financial-centre-rankings [https://perma.cc/Y7KQ-HEMU]. 306. Number of listed companies largest stock exchange operators globally 2023, STATISTA (Apr. 25, 2023), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1277750/largest-stock-exchange-operators- number-listed-companies-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/6TBT-BL5U]. 307. Main Market, LONDON STOCK EXCH., https://www.londonstockexchange.com/raise- finance/equity/main-market [https://perma.cc/7H6X-ZNAR] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). 308. London Stock Exchange Stock Connect, LONDON STOCK EXCH., https://www. londonstockexchange.com/discover/china/shanghai-london-stock-connect [https://perma.cc/VE6 F-TZ4C] (last visited Aug. 26, 2023). https://perma.cc/VE6 https://londonstockexchange.com/discover/china/shanghai-london-stock-connect https://www https://perma.cc/7H6X-ZNAR https://www.londonstockexchange.com/raise https://perma.cc/6TBT-BL5U https://www.statista.com/statistics/1277750/largest-stock-exchange-operators https://perma.cc/Y7KQ-HEMU https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3214624/hong-kong-holds-fourth https://perma.cc/H4KV-D9YR https://www.usnews.com/news/best https://perma.cc/LJ2U-MEW3 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FP_20230214_china https://perma.cc/A8HF-ZZLJ https://www.wsj.com https://perma.cc/5YR8-ZGTB https://home.treasury https://perma.cc/GH8Y-CC2T https://home.treasury.gov/news/press https://perma.cc/EMP7-5AMM https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy 278 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 Shanghai Stock Exchange together with London309 and allows global investors to benefit from China’s growth through London,310 and reciprocal allowances for the London Stock Exchange listed companies to access Chinese investors directly.311 The UK is the world’s foremost international center for legal services312 and business-related dispute resolution.313 While New York, the world’s largest financial center,314 has the largest domestic legal market,315 the UK leads the way as the world’s most international law center. 316 Indeed, the English Common Law is the most widespread legal system in the world,317 and many international contracts are drafted using English law,318 including syndicated credits,319 bond issues,320 and master derivatives contracts. 321 Therefore, because of its position as a global financial center, the UK is a powerful factor in international trade and capital exchange.322 Any restrictions in trade imposed by the United Kingdom can have far-reaching implications on ————————————————————————————— 309. Her Majesty’s Treasury & Philip Hammond, UK-China EFD sees launch of London- Shanghai Stock Connect GOV.UK (Jun. 17, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk- china-efd-sees-launch-of-london-shanghai-stock-connect [https://perma.cc/7ANM-3K33]. 310. Tom Daly, Shanghai-London Stock Connect to include Germany, Switzerland, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/china-securities-regulator-says-broaden- shanghai-london-stock-connect-2021-12-17/ [https://perma.cc/4SYB-9QL2]. 311. Shanghai London Stock Connect, LONDON STOCK EXCH., https://www. londonstockexchange.com/discover/china/shanghai-london-stock-connect [https://perma.cc/C9ST-P3LD] (last visited Apr. 30, 2023). 312. Legal services industry in the UK - statistics & facts, STATISTA (Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.statista.com/topics/8517/legal-services-industry-in-the-uk/#topicOverview [https://perma.cc/CE4M-653T]. 313. International arbitrations, mediations and adjudications in the UK 2009-2019, STATISTA (Jul. 6, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/611403/international-legal-services- activity-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/ [https://perma.cc/57RN-22NV]. 314. The UK remains global hub for international legal services, THECITYUK (Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.thecityuk.com/news/the-uk-remains-global-hub-for-international-legal- services/ [https://perma.cc/A6VH-AP3Z]. 315. Id. 316. Id. 317. English Common Law is the most widespread legal system in the world, SWEET & MAXWELL (Nov. 2008), https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/about-us/press-releases/061108. pdf [https://perma.cc/B6KE-Z9B8]. 318. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The law governing international commercial contracts and the actual role of the UNIDROIT Principles, 23 UNIF. L. REV. 15, 23 (2018); see also Melanie Gassler-Tischlinger & Georg Huber, English as a Contract Language, RECHTSANWÄLTE (Jun. 9, 2020), https://www.lawfirm.at/en/news/english-as-a-contract-language [https://perma.cc/LJB3- SHZN]; Tsedal Neeley, Global Business Speaks English, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/05/global-business-speaks-english [https://perma.cc/9BLL-HNJC]. 319. Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 502 (2014). 320. SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 317. 321. Id. 322. See generally Britta Klagge & Hans-Martin Zademach, International capital flows, stock markets, and uneven development: the case of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSEI), 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSGEOGRAPHIE 92 (2018). https://perma.cc/9BLL-HNJC https://hbr.org/2012/05/global-business-speaks-english https://perma.cc/LJB3 https://www.lawfirm.at/en/news/english-as-a-contract-language https://perma.cc/B6KE-Z9B8 https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/about-us/press-releases/061108 https://perma.cc/A6VH-AP3Z https://www.thecityuk.com/news/the-uk-remains-global-hub-for-international-legal https://perma.cc/57RN-22NV https://www.statista.com/statistics/611403/international-legal-services https://perma.cc/CE4M-653T https://www.statista.com/topics/8517/legal-services-industry-in-the-uk/#topicOverview https://perma.cc/C9ST-P3LD https://londonstockexchange.com/discover/china/shanghai-london-stock-connect https://www https://perma.cc/4SYB-9QL2 https://www.reuters.com/business/china-securities-regulator-says-broaden https://perma.cc/7ANM-3K33 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk 279 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE not just the target country, but also on the global economy. 323 In addition, because of the UK’s position as a major financial destination,324 its capacity to influence other similar minded countries to impose sanctions is significant.325 For instance, third-party countries whose companies want to continue listing on the London Stock Exchange, and who may want to access capital from the market, are obligated to follow financial sanctions imposed against certain countries, individuals and corporations.326 Moreover, the UK is one of the countries that oversees SWIFT, the global payment system. 327 Because most banks rely on SWIFT to conduct fast, seamless, secure communication, there is an incentive to remain in good standing with the organization and the EU.328 The latter is because SWIFT is incorporated under Belgian law and must comply with Belgian and EU laws, and follow EU and Belgian sanctions regimes.329 Hence, because of UK influence in Europe and its previous role as a leading EU nation, it plays a key role in how SWIFT operates and in using SWIFT as a sanctions tool.330 The UK’s influence was apparent when it convinced the EU ————————————————————————————— 323. The Russia-Ukraine Crisis: What Does It Mean for Markets?, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/current-events/russia- ukraine-crisis-market-impact [https://perma.cc/8WEQ-XHZD]. 324. Victoria Luttig, The UK remains Europe’s most attractive destination for financial services investment, but the gap with France narrows further, ERNST AND YOUNG (Jun. 13, 2022), https://www.ey.com/en_uk/news/2022/06/the-uk-remains-europe-s-most-attractive-destination- for-financial-services-investment-but-the-gap-with-france-narrows-further [https://perma.cc/N9KN-EV34]. 325. See generally Emily Meierding & Rachel Sigman, Understanding the Mechanisms of International Influence in an Era of Great Power Competition, 6 J. OF GLOB. SEC. STUD., no. 4, 2021. 326. For instance, under UK’s Regulations 10-15 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, there is a prohibition of all UK persons from dealing with the funds of these designated persons, as well as from providing them with funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly. See Ali Sallaway, Mark Austin, Ziyad Nassif & Benjamin Ng, Sanctions: What do they mean for listed companies in the UK in respect of their shareholders?, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Mar. 14, 2022), https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102hkmr/sanctions- what-do-they-mean-for-listed-companies-in-the-uk-in-respect-of-their-s [https://perma.cc/DB8P-PNEJ]. 327. Compliance, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance-0/swift-and- sanctions [https://perma.cc/FU7V-5G6D] (last visited May 4, 2023). 328. See generally Tara Rice, Goetz von Peter & Codruta Boar, On the global retreat of correspondent banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., Mar. 2020, at 37. 329. See Marco Cipriani, Linda S. Goldberg & Gabriele La Spada, Financial Sanctions, SWIFT, and the Architecture of the International Payments System, 37 J. ECON. PERSPS. 31 (2023). 330. It is noteworthy that the EU was the UK’s biggest trading partner, accounting for almost 50% of UK foreign trade in goods in 2019 (48.1%). The UK was the EU’s third biggest trading partner (12.6%), after the United States and China. See EU trade relations with the United Kingdom. Facts, figures and latest developments, EUR. COMM’N, https://policy.trade.ec.europa. eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-kingdom_en [https:// perma.cc/K8BN-4QCL] (last visited May 4, 2023). https://policy.trade.ec.europa https://perma.cc/FU7V-5G6D https://www.swift.com/about-us/legal/compliance-0/swift-and https://perma.cc/DB8P-PNEJ https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102hkmr/sanctions https://perma.cc/N9KN-EV34 https://www.ey.com/en_uk/news/2022/06/the-uk-remains-europe-s-most-attractive-destination https://perma.cc/8WEQ-XHZD https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/current-events/russia 280 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 to cut Russian banks from SWIFT.331 The EU acknowledged that “the decision has been closely coordinated with the EU’s international partners, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.”332 Indeed, in a 2017 report, the UK was “widely recognized as playing a leading role in developing the EU’s sanctions policy.”333 The UK played an important role in the development of EU sanctions on Russia over the crisis in Ukraine.334 It also helped shape the bloc’s chemical weapons and cyber sanctions regimes.335 The UK, as an EU member, played a key role in designing and shaping the EU’s regulatory rules.336 Therefore, the UK has the ability to marshal a coalition of states to impose collective sanctions for the prevention of genocide. Thus, the UK, as a standalone sanctioning entity and as an important European and global trading partner, has considerable influence on the Chinese 337 economy. A. UK/Chinese Trade: 1999 - 2019 In 2020, China was among the United Kingdom’s top five trading partners.338 This trade relationship has a long and significant history. In 1999, ————————————————————————————— 331. Patrick Wintour, UK says it will work ‘all day’ to persuade Europe to cut Russia off from Swift, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/uk- says-it-will-work-all-day-to-persuade-europe-to-cut-russia-off-from-swift-ukraine [https://perma.cc/CD5H-Y4SF]. 332. Ukraine: EU agrees to exclude key Russian banks from SWIFT, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 2, 2022), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1484 [https://perma.cc/V9U 3-ZYPW]. 333. European Union Committee Brexit: sanctions policy, 8th Report of Session 2017-19, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 17, 2017), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ ldeucom/50/5006.htm [https://perma.cc/9678-UYDX]. 334. Id. 335. Matthew Moran, UK Sanctions Policy, in BREXIT AND BEYOND 161 (Anand Menon ed., 2020), https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Brexit-and-Beyond-report-compress ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXT8-KJLE]. 336. See GEORGINA WRIGHT, ALEX STOJANOVIC, & DAVID KLEMPERER, INFLUENCING THE EU AFTER BREXIT 9 (2020), https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/ publications/influencing-EU-after-brexit_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZFW-68RB]; see also CHRISTY ANN PETIT & THORSTEN BECK, RECENT TRENDS IN UK FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU, INCLUDING ITS APPROACH TO EQUIVALENCE (2023), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740067/IPOL_STU(2023)740067 _EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HZ7-3AES]. 337. Justin Harper, How strong are Britain and China’s economic ties?, BBC (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53468925 [https://perma.cc/943W-YDB4]. 338. See generally Chris Goldsworthy, UK trading partners and trade relationships: 2020, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/ internationaltrade/articles/uktradingpartnersananalysisoftraderelationships/2020 [https://perma.cc/6Y62-DACN]. https://perma.cc/6Y62-DACN https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade https://perma.cc/943W-YDB4 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53468925 https://perma.cc/7HZ7-3AES https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740067/IPOL_STU(2023)740067 https://perma.cc/6ZFW-68RB https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files https://perma.cc/BXT8-KJLE https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Brexit-and-Beyond-report-compress https://perma.cc/9678-UYDX https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect https://perma.cc/V9U https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1484 https://perma.cc/CD5H-Y4SF https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/uk 281 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE the value of the trade between China and the UK reached $7.874 billion,339 a 19.6% increase from the previous year. 340 It was the second largest trading partner of China within the European Union.341 In 1999, British investment in China stood at $9.2 billion with over 2,500 British FDI projects.342 A decade later in 2009, the total value of exports from China to the rest of the world were valued at $1,201,647,000,000.343 In 1999, the UK imported goods worth $52 billion from China, about 11% of the total imports for that year. 344 In the same year, China exported goods and services worth $72 billion to the UK.345 In 2018, China was the third top consumer of British travel services, worth $845,050,500.346 Other services exported by the UK to China were legal services, accounting, advertising, research and development, engineering, and other technical and professional services.347 In the same period, the UK service imports from China were mainly transportation services, which accounted for just over 25% and worth about $557,590,110.348 These were mainly passenger and freight transport. 349 Travel services worth $375,314,800 made up 20% of service imports from China.350 These two categories accounted for around 46% of all service imports from China.351 In 2019, the UK’s single largest export to China was non-monetary gold ————————————————————————————— 339. All-round Partnership between China and UK, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_ 665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697891.html [https://perma.cc/49NU-J7LK] (last visited Aug. 25, 2023). 340. Id. 341. Id. 342. Id. 343. United Kingdom Trade Summary 2009 Data, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL., https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/GBR/Year/2009/Summary [https://perma.cc/QAZ6-TF47] (last visited Aug. 25, 2023). 344. United Kingdom Imports by country and region in US$ Thousand 2006-2010, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL., https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/GBR/StartYear/ 2006/EndYear/2010/TradeFlow/Import/Partner/ALL/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL [https://perma.cc/3MZ7-UVM9] (last visited Aug. 25, 2023). 345. China Export Share in Total Products to United Kingdom in percentage 2006-2010, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL., https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/ StartYear/2006/EndYear/2010/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/GBR/Indicator/XPRT-SHR-TTL- PRDCT [https://perma.cc/S37X-DKMB] (last visited on Aug. 25, 2023). 346. Hannah Donnarumma, UK trade with China: 2021, OFF. OF NAT’L STAT. (Jun. 1, 2022), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/uktradewithchin a2021/2022-06-01 [https://perma.cc/22W4-XJWV] (last visited Aug. 25, 2023). 347. Id. 348. Id. 349. MOHAN DELL, U.K. DEP’T FOR TRANSP., UK PORT FREIGHT STATISTICS: 2019 (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil e/908558/port-freight-statistics-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQE2-8M9S]. 350. Nathan Beck-Samuels, UK-China Post-Brexit Trade Relations, BRIT. CHAMBER OF COM. IN CHINA (Aug. 30, 2022), https://www.britishchamber.cn/en/uk-china-post-brexit-trade- relations/ [https://perma.cc/YQ2U-WVX4]. 351. Freya Lawrence & Anthony Myers, Trade and Investment Factsheets, UK DEP’T FOR BUS. & TRADE (Aug. 18, 2023). https://perma.cc/YQ2U-WVX4 https://www.britishchamber.cn/en/uk-china-post-brexit-trade https://perma.cc/NQE2-8M9S https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil https://perma.cc/22W4-XJWV https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/uktradewithchin https://perma.cc/S37X-DKMB https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN https://perma.cc/3MZ7-UVM9 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/GBR/StartYear https://perma.cc/QAZ6-TF47 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/GBR/Year/2009/Summary https://perma.cc/49NU-J7LK https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602 282 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 valued at $7,725,920,000,352 which accounted for 27% of all UK goods exported to China for that entire year. 353 Other goods the UK exported to China included petroleum valued at $6,036,250,000, 354accounting for 19% of all the goods exported to China.355 Additional goods included road vehicles worth $3,621,735,000356 that represented 13% of the total goods exported to China357 and medicinal and pharmaceutical products valued at $2,414,490,000,358 which was 7% of the export goods.359 These goods worth $19,798,395,000 represented 66% of all the goods exported to China in 2019.360 In 2019, the UK imported telecommunication equipment from China worth $8,450,225,000 accounting for 16% of all the goods the UK imported from China.361 In the same period, 11% of goods imported from China were miscellaneous manufactured goods such as toys, sporting goods, etc., worth $6,035,800,000.362 The UK also imported office machinery worth $6,035,800,000 accounting for 10% of its total Chinese imports.363 It also imported electrical machinery and equipment worth $4,828,840,000 accounting for 9% of Chinese goods.364 These goods, worth $19,314,865,000, comprised 46% of the total goods imported to the UK from China in 2019.365 In 2019, only two other countries and territories, North Macedonia and Gibraltar, imported more from the UK than China.366 Likewise, only three other countries and territories, the United States, Hong Kong and Japan, imported more from China ————————————————————————————— 352. Id. 353. Id. 354. Peter Holmes, Julia Magntorn Garrett, & Jim Rollo, Written submission from the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) (TWC0026), THE UK TRADE POL’Y OBSERVATORY (Oct. 2019), https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/105686/html/ [https://perma.cc/4S43- 8655]. 355. Id. 356. Id. 357. Id. 358. Id. 359. Id. 360. MATTHEW WARD, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 7379, STATISTICS ON UK TRADE WITH CHINA (2020), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP- 7379/CBP-7379.pdf [https://perma.cc/87ET-KA3V]. 361. Id. 362. Id. 363. Id. 364. Id. 365. Tugba Sabanoglu, Value of UK imports of trade goods from China from 2012 to 2020 (in million U.S. dollars), STATISTA (Sept. 6, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 477961/united-kingdom-uk-import-value-trade-goods-from-china/ [https://perma.cc/B7DB-42 YK]. 366. United Kingdom Exports: Telecommunication Equipment, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata. com/en/indicator/united-kingdom/exports-telecommunication-equipment [https://perma.cc/3X WD-RKM4] (last visited Mar. 2, 2024). https://perma.cc/3X https://www.ceicdata https://perma.cc/B7DB-42 https://www.statista.com/statistics https://perma.cc/87ET-KA3V https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP https://perma.cc/4S43 https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/105686/html 283 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE than the UK.367 In 2020, China’s goods exports to the UK were worth $72,561,343,000368 while its UK goods imports were worth $19,871,556,000.369 This represented a positive trade balance of about $52,689,787,000.370 The UK exported goods worth $18,512,671,000371 and imported goods worth $75,478,932,000 from China.372 This represented a negative trade balance worth $56,966,260,000.373 During the Covid-era in 2022, total exports from the UK to China amounted to $38,407,086,000, representing a 16.1% increase worth $5,330,732,000 from the previous year. 374 In 2022, China was the UK’s fourth largest trade partner with the two countries’ trade accounting for 6.3% of UK’s total trade.375 Foreign direct investment from the UK to China amounted to $12,953,473,500 accounting for about 0.6% of the total FDI from the UK in 2021.376 In the same period, the total stock of FDI from China to the United Kingdom was $6,074,800,000, which accounted for 0.3% of total FDI to the UK.377 These numbers represent a significant downward departure during the pandemic period. The inward/outward FDI for ASEAN countries generally from 2007 to 2015 presents a similar trend in FDI between China and the UK.378 There is a steady increase of outward FDI between the two countries.379 In 2007, the outward FDI to China from the UK amounted to $607,676,020.380 The amount dipped in 2008 ————————————————————————————— 367. United Kingdom / China, OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY (Apr. 2023), https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/gbr/partner/chn?dynamicProductBalanceYearSel ector=year2007&dynamicYearGeomapSelector=year2009&serviceCountry1Selector=2009 [https://perma.cc/5CW4-2RXZ]. 368. Hannah Donnarumma, supra note 346. 369. Id. 370. China trade balance, exports and imports by country and region 2020, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL., https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/ 2020/TradeFlow/EXPIMP [https://perma.cc/XVT7-5J7E]. 371. Id. 372. Id. 373. Id. 374. Hannah Donnarumma, UK trade: October 2022, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Dec. 12, 2022), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/uktrade/octobe r2022 [https://perma.cc/5XAY-7D7R]. 375. HL Deb (7 Nov. 2022) (825) col. 451 (U.K.). 376. Lawrence & Myers, supra note 351. 377. Id. 378. Doris Fung, The Growing China-ASEAN Economic Ties, H.K. TRADE DEV. COUNCIL RSCH. (Jan. 7, 2022), https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/OTUxMzk0NDE0 [https://perma.cc/ 9D6H-X8E7]. 379. C. Textor, Annual flow of foreign direct investments from China to the United Kingdom between 2011 and 2021 (in million U.S. dollars), STATISTA (Nov. 28, 2022), https://www.statista. com/statistics/720610/china-outward-fdi-flows-to-the-united-kindom/ [https://perma.cc/V9AE- 54JU]. 380. See generally Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) - China, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CN& https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CN https://perma.cc/V9AE https://www.statista https://perma.cc https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/OTUxMzk0NDE0 https://perma.cc/5XAY-7D7R https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/uktrade/octobe https://perma.cc/XVT7-5J7E https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year https://perma.cc/5CW4-2RXZ https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/gbr/partner/chn?dynamicProductBalanceYearSel 284 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 because of the global financial crisis of that year 381and then steadily increased to a high of $1,438,038,360 in 2015.382 On the other hand, the amount of inward FDI from China to the UK has followed a similar trend383 initially dipping in 2008. Outward FDI from China to the UK began at $26,631,638 in 2007384 and peaked at $610,558,009 in 2015.385 These numbers show that the Chinese economy has heavily relied on trade with the UK, that this reliance has persisted since the last century, and that breaks have only occurred during the global financial crisis of 2008386 and the more recent COVID pandemic.387 China has a positive trade balance with the UK.388 Therefore, sanctions against China can have far-reaching ramifications on Chinese manufacturers and its economy. 389 This translates to a balance of ————————————————————————————— most_recent_year_desc=false [https://perma.cc/5FEL-33WG] (last visited Apr. 19, 2023); see also Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) - United Kingdom, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=GB&most_recent_year _desc=false [https://perma.cc/XPK5-2QT8] (last visited Apr. 19, 2023). 381. Federico Carril-Caccia & Elena Pavlova, Foreign direct investment and its drivers: a global and EU perspective, EUR. CENT. BANK ECON. BULL., no. 4, 2018, https://www.ecb. europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201804_01.en.html [https://perma. cc/HW2B-84J7]. 382. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 380. 383. C. Textor, Annual outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China between 2012 and 2022 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA (July 13, 2023) https://www.statista. com/statistics/858019/china-outward-foreign-direct-investment-flows/ [https://perma.cc/DF8R- 832D]. 384. Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment for ASEAN countries, China and Japan for Earnings, Flows and Positions, 2007 to 2015, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/adhocs/006924inwardan doutwardforeigndirectinvestmentforaseancountrieschinaandjapanforearningsflowsandpositions2 007to2015 [https://perma.cc/Z893-E9XG]. 385. Id. 386. Linyue Li, Thomas D. Willett & Nan Zhang, The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on China’s Financial Market and Macroeconomy, ECON. RSCH. INT’L, 2012. 387. See David C. Wolf, To Secure a Convenience’: Britain Recognizes China - 1950, 18 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 299, 300-01 (1983); see generally Wolfgang Keller & Carol H. Shiue, China’s Foreign Trade and Investment, 1800-1950 (NAT’L BUR. ECON. RSCH. WORKING PAPER 27558, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27558/w27558.pdf [https://perma. cc/B7AL-FPR6]; Jürgen Osterhammel, British business in China, 1860s-1950s, in BRITISH BUSINESS IN ASIA SINCE 1860, at 189-216 (R.P.T. Davenport-Hines ed., 1989); British Business in China: Covid-19 Impact Report, BRITISH CHAMBER OF COM. IN CHINA (Apr. 2022), https://www.britishchamber.cn/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/British-Business-in-China-Impact- of-COVID-19-on-business.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QVZ-T2YZ]. 388. China / United Kingdom, OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/ en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/gbr [https://perma.cc/CDX2-3ULQ] (last visited June 1, 2023). 389. See Biersteker & van Bergeijk, supra note 172; see China protests US sanctioning of firms dealing with Russia, AP NEWS (Apr. 15, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-us- ukraine-sanctions-59fa76b79b69b7489039b4d0ee5dd14b [https://perma.cc/9DXZ-UQPJ]. https://perma.cc/9DXZ-UQPJ https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-us https://perma.cc/CDX2-3ULQ https://oec.world https://perma.cc/9QVZ-T2YZ https://www.britishchamber.cn/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/British-Business-in-China-Impact https://perma https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27558/w27558.pdf https://perma.cc/Z893-E9XG https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/adhocs/006924inwardan https://perma.cc/DF8R https://www.statista https://perma https://www.ecb https://perma.cc/XPK5-2QT8 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=GB&most_recent_year https://perma.cc/5FEL-33WG 285 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE trade tilting in favor of the Chinese390 but which puts China at a greater disadvantage if the UK imposes an embargo against Chinese goods and services. IV. ‘EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE’ REVISITED A. Historic Embargoes/Sanctions Against China Among Western States, there is a significant practice of economic sanctions specifically directed at China and individual sanctions directed against those held responsible for actions in Xinjiang.391 In 1949, the United States imposed sanctions against the sale of military equipment to China and blocked Chinese currency deposits held in American banks.392 When China intervened in the Korean War,393 the United States expanded its sanctions.394 The United States lifted the sanctions in 1972 pursuant to a joint communique and both countries instituted normal relations.395 Normal relations persisted until 1989.396 In retaliation of the Chinese quelling397 of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests,398 the United States imposed a new set of sanctions against China.399 The sanctions barred U.S.-origin satellites from launching on Chinese launch vehicles and included a ban on the sale of radios and radars, missiles, and other items ejusdem generis.400 Similarly, on June 26th, 1989, the European Union’s Council of Ministers ————————————————————————————— 390. William Barns-Graham, UK trade deficit with China triples prompting fears of becoming ‘heavily dependent’ on Chinese goods, INST. OF EXP. & INT’L TRADE (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.export.org.uk/news/591429/UK-trade-deficit-with-China-triples-prompting-fears- of-becoming-heavily-dependent-on-Chinese-goods.htm [https://perma.cc/8QJJ-QZMA]. 391. Pranshu Verma, U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctions- china-uighurs.html [https://perma.cc/J66A-2AV5]. 392. Frank Cain, America’s trade embargo against China and the East in the Cold War Years, 18 J. TRANSATLANTIC STUD. 23, 23-24 ( Mar. 2020). 393. Hao Yufan & Zhai Zhihai, China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited, 121 CHINA Q. 94 (1990). 394. Allan R. Millett, Korean War, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War [https://perma.cc/LSK6-RXKQ]. 395. Id. at 34. 396. See generally EZRA F. VAGEL, YUAN MING & TANAKA AKIHIKO, THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN TRIANGLE, 1972-1989, at 77-108 (2002). 397. See generally Jacob Kovalio, The 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident: Retrospective and Prospective Considerations, 15 ASIAN PERSP. 5 (1991). 398. See generally Damodar Panda, Sino-U.S. Relations After Tiananmen Incident, 8/9 INDIAN J. ASIAN AFFS. 80 (1995). 399. James D. Seymour, Sanctions or Subdued Relations: The International Response to the 1989 Massacre, 14 FLETCHER J. WORLD AFFS. 55 (1990). 400. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION ARMS SALES SINCE THE 1989 EMBARGOES (1998), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-NSIAD-98- 171/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-NSIAD-98-171.pdf [https://perma.cc/A33T-HWMX]. https://perma.cc/A33T-HWMX https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-NSIAD-98 https://perma.cc/LSK6-RXKQ https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War https://perma.cc/J66A-2AV5 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctions https://perma.cc/8QJJ-QZMA https://www.export.org.uk/news/591429/UK-trade-deficit-with-China-triples-prompting-fears 286 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 imposed a significant set of sanctions against China.401 These sanctions prohibited, inter alia, “trade in arms with China.”402 Though there was divergence on the exact application of the sanctions,403 it is noteworthy that the (arms) embargo imposed by the UK still persists.404 It was subsequently extended to Macao in 2000405 and to Hong Kong in July 2020.406 On July 9th, 2020, the United States announced sanctions against Chinese politicians it claimed were responsible for human rights violations in the Xinjiang Province.407 The sanctions targeted the financial interests of the Chinese Communist Party’s leaders in the province and their families.408 Those targeted included the regional party boss, Chen Quanguo,409 who also sat in the Party’s national Politburo.410 Other targeted officials were Wang Mingshan,411 the director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau412 and Zhu Hailun, a senior party member in Xinjiang,413 and former security official Huo Liujun.414 The ————————————————————————————— 401. See generally GREG AUSTIN, THE FOREIGN POL’Y CTR., THE 1989 CHINA ARMS BAN: PUTTING EUROPE’S POSITION TO CONGRESS (2005), https://www.fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 2006/09/444.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT5M-AFS3]. 402. Id. 403. UK interpretation of the arms embargo against China, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH. INST. (2016), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/UK-interpretation-of-the-arms- embargo-against-China.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8W-UNXS]. 404. UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Dev. Off. & Exp. Control Joint Unit, UK arms embargo on mainland China and Hong Kong, GOV.UK (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/uk-arms-embargo-on-mainland-china-and-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/ 2SA8-HPLS]. 405. Id. 406. Foreign & Commonwealth Off. & Dominic Raab, Hong Kong and China: Foreign Secretary’s statement in Parliament, GOV.UK (July 20, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/hong-kong-and-china-foreign-secretarys-statement-in-parliament [https://perma.cc/Q74J-QJHQ]. 407. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 297. 408. Id. 409. See generally Amber Wang, Sanctioned hardline former Xinjiang chief Chen Quanguo moves to rural affairs role for ‘last job before retirement’, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 15, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3181820/sanctioned-hardline-former- xinjiang-chief-chen-quanguo-moves [https://perma.cc/GT79-22BJ]. 410. Id. 411. William Zheng, China promotes Xinjiang police chief targeted by US human rights sanctions, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/ news/china/politics/article/3102424/china-promotes-xinjiang-police-chief-targeted-us-human- right [https://perma.cc/RB4K-S2XX]. 412. See generally James Millward & Dahlia Peterson, China’s System of Oppression in Xinjiang: How it Developed and How to Curb it, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_oppression_ xinjiang_millward_peterson.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TJR-N6RH]. 413. Sébastian Seibt, Zhu Hailun, the man behind China’s Uighur prison camps, FR. 24 (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.france24.com/en/20191126-zhu-hailun-the-man-behind-china-s- uighur-prison-camps [https://perma.cc/F4D6-AL9R]. 414. China trades sanctions with the West, THE ECONOMIST GRP. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1800854963&Country=Denmark&topic=Politics &subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations [https://perma.cc/9TXG-VWMQ]. https://perma.cc/9TXG-VWMQ https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1800854963&Country=Denmark&topic=Politics https://perma.cc/F4D6-AL9R https://www.france24.com/en/20191126-zhu-hailun-the-man-behind-china-s https://perma.cc/6TJR-N6RH https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_oppression https://perma.cc/RB4K-S2XX https://www.scmp.com https://perma.cc/GT79-22BJ https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3181820/sanctioned-hardline-former https://perma.cc/Q74J-QJHQ https://www.gov.uk https://perma.cc https://www.gov.uk https://perma.cc/KN8W-UNXS https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/UK-interpretation-of-the-arms https://perma.cc/AT5M-AFS3 https://www.fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads 287 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE United States designated any domestic transactions with these officials, criminal acts.415 The United States extended these sanctions to other officials on March 22nd , 2021 and designated Wang Junzheng,416 the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC),417 and Chen Mingguo,418 Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB)419 as perpetrators of serious human rights abuses under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.420 It is important to note that the sanctions imposed, at least since 1989, have been modest in character as compared to a complete trade embargo contemplated in the UK bill.421 Indeed, the sanctions imposed for China’s actions in Xinjiang (and Hong Kong)422 has been largely limited to individuals.423 Trade sanctions against China have arguably sparked change in the Chinese government’s behavior both domestically and internationally.424 The early ————————————————————————————— 415. Xinjiang: US sanctions on Chinese officials over ‘abuse’ of Muslims, BBC (July 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697 [https://perma.cc/2VK6-UBB7]. 416. Jun Mai, China promotes its most sanctioned official to Tibetan Communist Party chief, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/ article/3152821/china-promotes-its-most-sanctioned-official-tibetan-party-chief [https://perma. cc/RT7F-WEW5]. 417. See generally James D. Seymour, Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps, and the Sinification of Eastern Turkestan, 2 INNER ASIA 171 (2000). 418. Sanctions List Search, Chen Mingguo, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=31493 [https://perma.cc/84VN-XCFU] (last visited 23 April 2023). 419. Reinhard Bütikofer, Chair’s statement of 23 March 2021 on EU sanctions on human rights violations; Counter-sanctions by the PRC, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/chair-s-statement-of-23-march-2021-on-eu/ product-details/20210324DPU29209 [https://perma.cc/9BD6-Z3CQ]. 420. Treasury Sanctions Chinese Government Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Xinjiang, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 22, 2021), https://home.treasury. gov/news/press-releases/jy0070 [https://perma.cc/32PM-9FXU]. 421. Compare AUSTIN, supra note 401, with Patrick Wintour, Rebels aim to insert genocide amendment in UK-China trade bill, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www. theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/18/rebels-aim-to-insert-genocide-amendment-in-uk-china- trade-bill [https://perma.cc/992R-BGWZ]. 422. Jeffie Lam & Jun Mai, Washington imposes new sanctions against 24 officials over Hong Kong electoral overhaul, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www. scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3125749/washington-imposes-new-sanctions- against-14-officials-over [https://perma.cc/36T7-RPYN]. 423. See Miriam Berger, The U.S. sanctions against Hong Kong officials, explained, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/08/08/faq- us-sanctions-hong-kong-officials/ [https://perma.cc/HR74-D2B9]; see also Finbarr Bermingham, EU set to renew sanctions on Chinese officials accused of human rights violations in Xinjiang, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 22, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3200478/eu- set-renew-sanctions-chinese-officials-accused-human-rights-violations-xinjiang [https://perma. cc/Z6XU-N8XA]. 424. Yitan Li, US Economic Sanctions against China: A Cultural Explanation of Sanction Effectiveness, 38 ASIAN PERSP. 311, 321-28 (2014), https://www.jstor.org/stable/43738091 [https://perma.cc/TF25-R69D]. https://perma.cc/TF25-R69D https://www.jstor.org/stable/43738091 https://perma https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3200478/eu https://perma.cc/HR74-D2B9 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/08/08/faq https://perma.cc/36T7-RPYN https://scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3125749/washington-imposes-new-sanctions https://www https://perma.cc/992R-BGWZ https://theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/18/rebels-aim-to-insert-genocide-amendment-in-uk-china https://www https://perma.cc/32PM-9FXU https://home.treasury https://perma.cc/9BD6-Z3CQ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/chair-s-statement-of-23-march-2021-on-eu https://perma.cc/84VN-XCFU https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=31493 https://perma https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics https://perma.cc/2VK6-UBB7 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697 288 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 sanctions of 1949-50 stymied China’s domestic modernization425 and innovation,426 and therefore competitiveness in international trade.427 China remained reliant on USSR technicians until 1960.428 Reportedly, assistance from the USSR in their attempts to industrialize was modest429 as the USSR was still recovering from the effects of World War II.430 One of the key lessons from the embargo was that for an embargo to be successful and effective, it has to be collective.431 The West collectively imposed sanctions against China in 1989.432 Arguably, this was effective in altering the Chinese government’s behavior at home and abroad.433 China lost its bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games to Australia434 . 435 China clearly placed importance on hosting the games and had orchestrated a fierce lobbying campaign for the rights,436 but nonetheless, lost owing to its poor human rights record.437 During the selection process, China released political prisoners such as Wei Jingsheng,438 in jail since 1979, 439 and ————————————————————————————— 425. See generally Tao Peng, Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963, 8 J. COLD WAR STUD. 144 (2006). 426. SHIPING ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN POST-1949 CHINA: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 108 (1997). 427. Zhihua Shen & Guy Alitto, A Historical Examination of the Issue of Soviet Experts in China: Basic Situation and Policy Changes, 29 RUSS. HIST. 377, 381-85 (2002). 428. Deborah Kaple, Agents of Change: Soviet Advisers and High Stalinist Management in China, 1949-1960, 18 J. COLD WAR STUD. 5, 6-8 (2016). 429. See Tao Chen & Jan Zofka, The Economy of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: Die Ökonomie der sino-sowjetischen Allianz, 63 ECON. HIST. Y.B. 584 (2022); see also Baichun Zhang, Jiuchun Zhang, & Fang Yao, Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China 1949-1966, 4 COMPAR. TECH. TRANSFER & SOC’Y 105 (2006). 430. Xin-zhu J. Chen, China and the US Trade Embargo, 1950-1972, 13 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 169, 180 (2006). 431. Id. at 185. 432. See Kristin Archick, Richard F. Grimmett & Shirley Kan, European Union’s Arms Embargo On China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy, in THE EUROPEAN UNION: EXPAND, SHRINK OR STATUS QUO 17-20 (Bianca C. Hostetler ed., 2006). 433. Li, supra note 424 at 321-27. 434. Jinming Zheng, Shushu Chen, Tien-Chin Tan & Patrick Wing Chung Lau, Beijing’s two bids for the Olympics: the political games, 29(1) INT’L J. HIST. SPORTS 145, 147-49 (2012). 435. Patrick E. Tyler, Olympics; There’s no Joy in Beijing as Sydney gets Olympics, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-there-s-no- joy-in-beijing-as-sydney-gets-olympics.html [https://perma.cc/C34K-6V4M]. 436. Lena H. Sun, China pulls out stops in Olympic Bid, THE WASH. POST (Jul. 15, 1993), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1993/07/15/china-pulls-out-stops-in-olympic- bid/a83cc6c1-8563-4f52-b9be-d6ea09e083d2/ [https://perma.cc/Q32A-QZ4B]. 437. Alan Riding, 2000 Olympics Go to Sydney in Surprise Setback for China, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-2000-olympics- go-to-sydney-in-surprise-setback-for-china.html [https://perma.cc/9V75-PLDG]. 438. William C. Jones, Due Process in China: The Trial of Wei Jingsheng, 9 REV. SOCIALIST L. 55 (1983). 439. Rone Tempest, Longtime Prisoner Freed in China, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-14-mn-35002-story.html [https://perma.cc/ P8A4-CYWL]. https://perma.cc https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-14-mn-35002-story.html https://perma.cc/9V75-PLDG https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-2000-olympics https://perma.cc/Q32A-QZ4B https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1993/07/15/china-pulls-out-stops-in-olympic https://perma.cc/C34K-6V4M https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/24/sports/olympics-there-s-no 289 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE a prominent Tiananmen Square protestor, Dan Wang,440 to signal to the world that it respected individuals’ human rights. 441 In 1998, the Chinese government signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,442 but it has not ratified the treaty to date.443 Though reform was modest, China’s actions between 1989 and 2000 point to the pressure applied by the relatively modest sanctions collectively imposed on China by the United States and its allies. In addition, the sanctions slowed economic growth in China for a decade. In 1990 China’s economic growth sank to 3.9%444 due to international sanctions sparked by the Tiananmen crackdown.445 In 1988, China’s GDP growth rate was 11.3%.446 In 1989, the growth dropped to 4.21%.447 The numbers were dire in 1990 when China recorded an annual GDP growth of only 3.9%.448 There was a considerable drop in the years following China’s reopening to the world where in 1984, China reported a growth rate of 15.19%.449 While the growth rate rebounded in 1992,450 there was a continued drop in the growth numbers for the rest of the 1990s, an affirmation of the impact that the sanctions had on the Chinese economy.451 ————————————————————————————— 440. Sheryl Wudunn, A Portrait of a Young Man as a Beijing Student Leader, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 3, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/03/world/a-portrait-of-a-young-man-as- a-beijing-student-leader.html [https://perma.cc/5DKF-8FHP]. 441. Dan Wang, What I Learned Leading the Tiananmen Protests, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/opinion/sunday/tiananmen-protests-china-wang- dan.html [https://perma.cc/KG8Q-QQWG]. 442. The Signing of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights by the Chinese Government, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (last visited Apr. 24, 2023), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/ 200011/t20001117_697890.html [https://perma.cc/6GCA-ZCYX]. 443. Ming Wan, Human Rights Lawmaking in China: Domestic Politics, International Law, and International Politics, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 727, 741 (2007). 444. Joe McDonald, China’s 2018 economic growth sinks to 3-decade low, AP NEWS (Jan. 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/global-trade-government-spending-international-news- china-beijing-b79891ffe1e94bfca0573439a2b46e63 [https://perma.cc/XQ4X-6UV8]. 445. Reuters Staff, Timeline - China’s post-Tiananmen re-emergence onto the world, REUTERS (May 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-tiananmen-timeline-landmarks- idINKCN1SX0IP [https://perma.cc/5KSQ-RM7Z]. 446. LIBRARY OF CONG., CONG. RSCH SERV., China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, Implications for the United States 6 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7CL-JLYF]. 447. Id. at 5. 448. GDP growth (annual %) - China, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN [https://perma.cc/P4DQ-E3ED] (last visited Aug. 23, 2023). 449. Id. 450. Id. 451. China GDP Growth Rate 1961-2023, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends. net/countries/CHN/china/gdp-growth-rate [https://perma.cc/UZ5J-Y2SG] (last visited Aug. 23, 2023). https://perma.cc/UZ5J-Y2SG https://www.macrotrends https://perma.cc/P4DQ-E3ED https://data.worldbank.org https://perma.cc/Z7CL-JLYF https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33534.pdf https://perma.cc/5KSQ-RM7Z https://www.reuters.com/article/china-tiananmen-timeline-landmarks https://perma.cc/XQ4X-6UV8 https://apnews.com/article/global-trade-government-spending-international-news https://perma.cc/6GCA-ZCYX https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547 https://perma.cc/KG8Q-QQWG https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/opinion/sunday/tiananmen-protests-china-wang https://perma.cc/5DKF-8FHP https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/03/world/a-portrait-of-a-young-man-as 290 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 B. Ukraine-Based Sanctions as a Model Effectiveness of collective sanctions increasingly plays a vital role452 in correcting internationally wrongful acts, 453 particularly as states become more dependent on trade with other states. 454 While collective sanctions have been useful in recent history, such as in the former Yugoslavia,455 nowhere is this clearer than in relation to the contemporary situation with the Ukrainian War.456 In response to the international criminal act of aggression visited on Ukraine by Russia, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant of arrest against the Russian president.457 On 21 February 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on certain persons and certain transactions in respect to the Ukrainian War.458 Other allied nations followed suit.459 On 25 February 2022, the EU imposed ————————————————————————————— 452. Christopher C. Joyner, Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience, 16 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 243 (1995). 453. See generally Rüdiger Wolfrum, Internationally wrongful acts, 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DISPS. INSTALLMENT 271 (1987). 454. See generally Christian O. Fjäder, Interdependence as dependence: Economic security in the age of global interconnectedness, in GEO-ECONOMICS AND POWER POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (Mikael Wigell, Sören Scholvin & Mika Aaltola eds., 2018). 455. For instance, under UNSC Resolution 757 passed on 30 May 1992, UNSC banned all international trade, scientific and technical cooperation, and sports and cultural exchange and a ban on government officials in Yugoslavia from travelling abroad. UNSC imposed other sanctions such as Resolution 787 of 16 November 1992 imposing a blockade. The US and the EU imposed sanctions to buttress these sanctions. The sanctions led to a world record daily inflation rate of 65% in 1993 where prices went up by 116.5 thousand billion percent, and by 313 million percent in the first three weeks of 1994. By 1999, GDP had fallen to less than half of the country’s GDP in 1989. By 2000, there was a 50% rate of unemployment among the working population. Life savings disappeared and the average monthly salary dropped to about $7. The sanctions led to the Dayton agreements in which parties agreed to cease hostilities. See generally S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992); Milica Stojković, Hyperinflation in Yugoslavia: An Example in Monetary History, 2 OPEN J. FOR STUD. HIST. 43, 44-46 (2019); see also S.C. Res. 787 (Nov. 16, 1992); S.C. Res. 820 (Apr. 17, 1993); THE WORLD BANK, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO COUNTRY BRIEF (2003); IMF, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Membership and Use of Fund Resources— Request for Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance, Country Report No. 01/07 (Jan. 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0107.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X59-RKSL]. 456. Oscar Arce, Gerrit Koester & Christiane Nickel, One year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – the effects on euro area inflation, EUR. CENT. BANK (Feb. 24, 2023), https://www. ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2023/html/ecb.blog20230224~3b75362af3.en.html [https://perma. cc/B74B-LWBC]. 457. Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 17, 2023), https://www.icc- cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich- putin-and [https://perma.cc/KR8V-T5TJ]. 458. Executive Order 14065, 87 Fed. Reg. 10293 (Feb. 21, 2022). 459. Michael D. Shear, Richard Pérez-Peña, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Anton Troianovski, U.S. and Allies Impose Sanctions on Russia as Biden Condemns ‘Invasion’ of Ukraine, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/us/politics/us-russia-ukraine- sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/U3AV-WCSA]. https://perma.cc/U3AV-WCSA https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/us/politics/us-russia-ukraine https://perma.cc/KR8V-T5TJ https://www.icc https://perma https://www https://perma.cc/2X59-RKSL https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0107.pdf 291 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE sanctions on Russia.460 While Australia had initially imposed sanctions against Russia in 2014461 and extended them in 2015,462 it further enlarged them in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.463 Other allied countries such as Canada and the UK followed suit, citing a breach of international peace and security.464 . 465 These sanctions have had a significant impact on the Russian economy. 466 For instance, coal mines in Kemerovo, Russia’s main production region, only sold 50-60% of the mined coal in 2022.467 The output of the largest steelmaker in Russia collapsed by 15.4% in 2022.468 The Russian economy contracted by 2.1% in 2021469 and the ruble weakened by more than 20% in the second half of 2022.470 The production of cars fell by 59%.471 By far, Russia’s biggest exports, oil and natural gas, 472 have been massively ————————————————————————————— 460. Council Regulation 2023/427, 2023 O.J. (L 59) I,6 (EU). 461. Daniel Hurst, Australia imposes sanctions on Russia after it ‘steals’ Crimea from Ukraine, The Guardian (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/ australia-imposes-sanctions-on-russia-after-it-steals-crimea-from-ukraine [https://perma.cc/E5 C6-D24B]. 462. Autonomous Sanctions (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol) Specification 2015, AUSTL. GOV’T FED. REG. OF LEGIS., https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C00697 [https://perma. cc/XKJ6-BYJ3] (last visited 24 April 2023). 463. AUSTL. GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. & TRADE, SNAPSHOT: RUSSIA/UKRAINE SANCTIONS REGIME, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/sanctions-snapshot-russia- ukraine-regime.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T2M-7RE2] (last visited Mar. 13, 2024). 464. Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations: SOR/2022-27, C. Gaz. pt. 2, vol. 156, no. 6 (Can.). 465. CLAIRE MILLS, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA (2023), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9481/CBP-9481.pdf. 466. Gubad Ibadoghlu, What impact have EU sanctions had on the Russian economy?, THE LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI. (Mar. 13, 2023), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/ 2023/03/13/what-impact-have-eu-sanctions-had-on-the-russian-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Q5ZW-6FZD]. 467. András Tóth-Czifra, Political Implications of Looming Problems with Wages and Jobs in Russia, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH. INST. (Sept. 19, 2022), https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/ 09/political-implicaitons-of-loomming-problems-with-wages-and-jobs-in-russia/ [https://perma.cc/F6VM-LU9H]. 468. Novolipetsk Steel: Q3 & 9M 2022 NLMK Group Trading Update, LONDON STOCK EXCH. (Oct. 17, 2022), https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/NLMK/novolipetsk- steel-q3-9m-2022-nlmk-group-trading-update/15675395 [https://perma.cc/4JZW-YCWP]. 469. Russia’s economy contracted 2.1% in 2022, less than expected, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 21, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/21/russias-economy-contracted-2-1-in-2022 [https://perma.cc/QBM2-LEWH]. 470. Alexander Marrow, Rouble slumps to weakest vs dollar since May, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/rouble-slumps-past-70-vs-dollar-first-time- since-may-2022-12-21/ [https://perma.cc/7REV-8TQK]. 471. Sergey Aleksashenko, Russia after a year of sanctions: The Russian economy has fallen into a recession, but economic and political instability are not yet on the horizon, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/2/28/russia-after-a-year-of-sanctions [https://perma.cc/98BE-U5BK]. 472. Infographic: How much of your country’s gas comes from Russia?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/infographic-how-much-of-your-countrys- gas-comes-from-russia-interactive [https://perma.cc/9MPP-VZJQ]. https://perma.cc/9MPP-VZJQ https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/infographic-how-much-of-your-countrys https://perma.cc/98BE-U5BK https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/2/28/russia-after-a-year-of-sanctions https://perma.cc/7REV-8TQK https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/rouble-slumps-past-70-vs-dollar-first-time https://perma.cc/QBM2-LEWH https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/21/russias-economy-contracted-2-1-in-2022 https://perma.cc/4JZW-YCWP https://www.londonstockexchange.com/news-article/NLMK/novolipetsk https://perma.cc/F6VM-LU9H https://www.fpri.org/article/2022 https://perma.cc/Q5ZW-6FZD https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9481/CBP-9481.pdf https://perma.cc/8T2M-7RE2 https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/sanctions-snapshot-russia https://perma https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C00697 https://perma.cc/E5 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19 292 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 cut as sanctions, particularly from EU States,473 have forced Russia to trade almost exclusively with China474 and India.475 Russia’s natural gas and oil energy sector accounts for approximately 70% of all its exports 476 and 18% of its total GDP.477 Since the loss of its European markets,478 Russia’s exports in the energy sector have seen a gross decline by nearly 50%.479 Moreover, due to its desperation to recoup losses480 Russia has reportedly been selling at a discount of $33.28, or 39%, to Brent crude,481 thus devastating its foreign trade482 and its economy generally.483 It has been observed that only Russia’s impressive capital reserves at the start of the war484 has economically sustained ————————————————————————————— 473. Jake Horton & Daniele Palumbo, Russia sanctions: What impact have they had on its oil and gas exports?, BBC (Jan. 26, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/58888451 [https:// perma.cc/QWT2-4QSA]. 474. China’s 2022 trade with Russia hit record $190 bln – customs, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/china-customs-says-trade-with-russia-hit-new-high-2022-2023- 01-13/ [https://perma.cc/S4UP-BFUA]. 475. Kiran Sharma, India’s Russian imports soar 400% as U.S. offers little resistance, NIKKEI ASIA (Feb. 17, 2023), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/India-s-Russian-imports- soar-400-as-U.S.-offers-little-resistance [https://perma.cc/YW63-AFGJ]. 476. Angelina Davydova, Will Russia ever leave fossil fuels behind?, BBC (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20211115-climate-change-can-russia-leave-fossil-fuels- behind [https://perma.cc/8YSN-HXET]. 477. Share of the oil and gas industry in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Russia from 1st quarter 2017 to 3rd quarter 2022, STATISTA (Mar. 23, 2023), https://www.statista.com/ statistics/1322102/gdp-share-oil-gas-sector-russia/ [https://perma.cc/FL4C-VHL7]. 478. Jorge Liboreiro, Russia is losing €160 million per day due to Western sanctions on oil, new report says, EURONEWS (Jan. 11, 2023), https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/ 2023/01/11/russia-is-losing-160-million-per-day-due-to-western-sanctions-on-oil-new-report- says [https://perma.cc/SF35-MTSL]; see also CTR. FOR RSCH FOR ENERGY AND CLEAN AIR, EU OIL BAN AND PRICE CAP ARE COSTING RUSSIA EUR 160 MN/DAY, BUT FURTHER MEASURES CAN MULTIPLY THE IMPACT (2023), https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/eu-oil-ban-and-price- cap-are-costing-russia-eur160-mn-day-but-further-measures-can-multiply-the-impact/ [https:// perma.cc/RPC5-TB9N]. 479. Julian Lee, Russia Loses 90% of Its Key European Oil Market Before Sanctions, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2023), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-21/russia- loses-90-of-its-key-european-market-before-sanctions#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/T7WV-JR DG]. 480. Julia Horowitz, Russia needs to sell oil. It’s running out of options, CNN BUSINESS (May. 9, 2022), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/09/business/europe-g7-russia-oil-embargo/ index.html [https://perma.cc/T9JF-QRXD]. 481. Julian Lee, Putin’s Few Oil Buyers Demand Deep Discounts, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-11-27/china-india-squeeze-big-oil- discounts-out-of-putin [https://perma.cc/E6ED-2BTW]. 482. EU trade with Russia continues to decline, EUROSTAT (Mar. 3, 2023), https://ec. europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230303-1 [https://perma.cc/9TRY-5P GM]. 483. EUR. COUNCIL, supra note 253. 484. Charles Riley, Sanctions will put Russia’s ‘fortress’ economy to the test, CNN BUSINESS (Feb. 27, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/business/russia-economy-sanctions/index. html [https://perma.cc/7QLS-HCLQ]. https://perma.cc/7QLS-HCLQ https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/business/russia-economy-sanctions/index https://perma.cc/9TRY-5P https://ec https://perma.cc/E6ED-2BTW https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-11-27/china-india-squeeze-big-oil https://perma.cc/T9JF-QRXD https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/09/business/europe-g7-russia-oil-embargo https://perma.cc/T7WV-JR https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-21/russia https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/eu-oil-ban-and-price https://perma.cc/SF35-MTSL https://www.euronews.com/my-europe https://perma.cc/FL4C-VHL7 https://www.statista.com https://perma.cc/8YSN-HXET https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20211115-climate-change-can-russia-leave-fossil-fuels https://perma.cc/YW63-AFGJ https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/India-s-Russian-imports https://perma.cc/S4UP-BFUA https://www.reuters.com/world/china-customs-says-trade-with-russia-hit-new-high-2022-2023 https://www.bbc.com/news/58888451 293 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE it during the conflict.485 Additionally, the sanctions have directly impeded Russia’s ability to prosecute its war in Ukraine because much needed military spare parts, 486 ammunition,487 and access to high-tech components needed for its military sector488 have been denied to Russia. Thus, Russia has not only been devastated economically by the sanctions,489 it has also been denied the means by which it can engage in the internationally wrongful act. 490 These sanctions and Western assistance,491 along with the fighting capabilities of the Ukrainian people,492 have thwarted Russian ambitions493 and utterly changed the nature of this conflict.494 As states in the modern era increasingly rely on foreign trade as a bulwark of domestic economic security,495 collective economic sanctions become a more effective and feared tool. This increased state reliance should have an important impact in determining the “effective influence” standard, increasing even in the ————————————————————————————— 485. Russia built an economy like a fortress but the pain is real, AP NEWS (Mar. 10, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-global-trade-economy- cd99ba45b1e36bb2ab80574eeaa69e4c [https://perma.cc/KHR5-R5SM]. 486. Alberto Nardelli, Putin Tried for Years to Stop His Military From Using Western Parts — And Mostly Failed, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2022-10-14/putin-tried-for-years-to-stop-his-military-using-western-parts-and-mostly-failed [https://perma.cc/U8UZ-AWZ8]. 487. Giulia Carbonaro, Russia Is Running Out Of Ammo: How Much Longer Can It Keep Fighting?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-running-out-ammo- how-much-longer-can-keep-fighting-1762346 [https://perma.cc/GTG7-57G8]. 488. What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy?, BBC (Sept. 30, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659 [https://perma.cc/LK9F-9K25]. 489. Jeremy Diamond & Sam Fossum, US-led sanctions campaign weakened Russia’s economy in first year of Ukraine war. Year 2 is about sealing the cracks, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 24, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/24/politics/sanctions-russia-ukraine-us-biden-putin/ index.html [https://perma.cc/7A9L-V3SW]. 490. General Assembly Adopts Text Recommending Creation of Register to Document Damages Caused by Russian Federation Aggression against Ukraine, Resuming Emergency Special Session, U.N. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Nov. 14, 2022), https://press.un.org/en/2022/ ga12470.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/LY55-R3Y7]. 491. Christoph Trebesch, Foreign support to Ukraine: Evidence from a database of military, financial, and humanitarian aid, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RSCH. (Feb. 21, 2023), https:// cepr.org/voxeu/columns/foreign-support-ukraine-evidence-database-military-financial-and- humanitarian-aid [https://perma.cc/SGH7-C7X3]. 492. Sam Mednick, Russia-Ukraine: The civilians fighting on Kyiv’s front lines, Al Jazeera (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/23/the-civilian-fighters-taking-up- arms-on-ukraines-front-lines [https://perma.cc/9LZS-NH3X]. 493. Frederick W. Kagan & Mark Polyak, Ukraine’s Resilience Transcends the Battlefield, TIME (Oct. 7, 2022), https://time.com/6220447/ukraines-resilience-transcends-the-battlefield/ [https://perma.cc/M4AY-LVNW]. 494. FT Visual Storytelling Team, How Russia’s mistakes and Ukrainian resistance altered Putin’s war, THE FIN. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2022) https://ig.ft.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-mapped/ [https://perma.cc/6D5X-UZLH]. 495. Fjäder, supra note 454. https://perma.cc/6D5X-UZLH https://ig.ft.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-mapped https://perma.cc/M4AY-LVNW https://time.com/6220447/ukraines-resilience-transcends-the-battlefield https://perma.cc/9LZS-NH3X https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/23/the-civilian-fighters-taking-up https://perma.cc/SGH7-C7X3 https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/foreign-support-ukraine-evidence-database-military-financial-and https://perma.cc/LY55-R3Y7 https://press.un.org/en/2022 https://perma.cc/7A9L-V3SW https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/24/politics/sanctions-russia-ukraine-us-biden-putin https://perma.cc/LK9F-9K25 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659 https://perma.cc/GTG7-57G8 https://www.newsweek.com/russia-running-out-ammo https://perma.cc/U8UZ-AWZ8 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles https://perma.cc/KHR5-R5SM https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-global-trade-economy 294 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 years since the Bosnian Genocide case was decided.496 As seen from the sanctions imposed on Russia, a country’s vulnerability to external shocks such as sanctions increases if the country’s economy is deeply embedded in the global economy. Parallels abound between the Russian situation and China’s. Historically, Western governments have imposed sanctions against China; for instance, after it supported North Korea’s invasion of South Korea during the Korean War.497 The sanctions had a limited impact on the Chinese economy because, at the time, China was an economic backwater, heavily reliant upon the Soviet Union even for its scientific and technological advancement.498 However, upon China’s reopening following Mao Zedong’s death,499 the Chinese economy has grown significantly500 and has heavily embraced foreign trade. Unlike China of the 1950s, contemporary China is deeply embedded in the global economy, and its survival is deeply dependent on foreign trade. Therefore, sanctions against China can effectively influence its conduct regarding Uighur people in Xinjiang. Judging from China’s conduct towards human rights following imposition of Western sanctions after its crackdown on Tiananmen Square protesters, it is likely that pervasive sanctions against China can help prevent genocidal conduct in the Xinjiang region. In addition, several other economic factors militate against China, making it particularly vulnerable to sanctions at this time. C. Chinese Vulnerability: Structure, Political Economy and Historic Factors That Make Economic Sanctions Against China More Effective This section briefly discusses some illustrative countervailing economic factors in China that make it particularly vulnerable and would likely reinforce the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed by the UK and other likeminded countries. None of these factors are offered as dispositive, nor are they intended as harbingers of economic collapse, but in reviewing Chinese ————————————————————————————— 496. See generally Neil R. Richardson & Charles W. Kegley, Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 24 INT’L STUD. Q. 191 (1980). See also, “A loss of trade can also result in the loss of an important market. Consequently, new outlets for exports must be sought or else the factors involved in the production of the export must be relocated. A nation whose exports are concentrated around a limited number of commodities will face the most severe adjustments should trade cease. With the loss of an export market, a nation must either divert its product to a new partner or else consume the export domestically.” Adrienne Armstrong, The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 401 (1981). 497. Hao & Zhihai, supra note 393. 498. Peng, supra note 425. 499. JOHN W. GARVER, Opening to the Outside World, in CHINA’S QUEST: THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2016). 500. Philip Arestis, Nikolaos Karagiannis & Sangkwon Lee, The economic growth of China: enabling politico-institutional and socio-cultural factors, 2 REV. EVOLUTIONARY POL. ECON. 339 (2021). 295 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE vulnerability these factors are relevant as part of the calculus in determining the effective influence trade sanctions would have. 1. Chinese Reliance on the Export Market The Chinese economy relies extensively on trade for its economic growth and survival.501 Its biggest trading partner is the European Union,502 and China runs a huge trade surplus with the economic bloc.503 Additionally, Europe’s leading companies are among the biggest foreign investors in China.504 Significantly, China has a relatively weak domestic consumer class compared to countries in the EU,505 the United States506 or the UK.507 Despite a large ————————————————————————————— 501. See generally Frank Tang, China’s new economic strategy to rely on domestic market is not a closed-door policy, Beijing advisers say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3096941/chinas-new-economic- strategy-rely-domestic-market-not-closed [https://perma.cc/9UYP-HT9H]; see also LI CUI, CHANG SHU & XIAOJING SU, HONG KONG MONETARY AUTH., CHINA ECONOMIC ISSUES, NO. 1/09, HOW MUCH DO EXPORTS MATTER FOR CHINA’S GROWTH? (2009), https://www.hkma.gov. hk/media/eng/publication-and-research/research/china-economic-issues/CEI_200901.pdf [https://perma.cc/W52V-VG9G]. 502. See Eric Chu, Economic and Trade Information on China, H.K. TRADE DEV. COUNCIL RSCH. (Apr. 18, 2023), https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/MzIwNjcyMDYx [https://perma.cc/ 5CR3-JQJL]. 503. China-EU - international trade in goods statistics, EUROSTAT (February 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_- _international_trade_in_goods_statistics#EU_and_China_in_world_trade_in_goods [https://perma.cc/2UD3-8FWW]; see also Kinling Lo, China is now EU’s biggest trading partner, an exchange complicated by labour rights and transatlantic tactics, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121929/china-now-eus- biggest-trading-partner-exchange-complicated [https://perma.cc/QN8G-5HEF]. 504. James Kynge, Sun Yu & Xinning Liu, Xi Jinping’s plan to reset China’s economy and win back friends, THE FIN. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/e592033b-9e34- 4e3d-ae53-17fa34c16009 [https://perma.cc/9T3D-XXFH]. 505. HOMI KHARAS & MEAGAN DOOLEY, GLOBAL CHINA, CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON THE GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ fp_20201012_china_middle_class_kharas_dooley.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7UV-58U7]. 506. America’s middle-class families—those with an income that is two-thirds to double the U.S. median household income—had incomes ranging from about USD 48,500 to USD 145,500 in 2018. See Jesse Bennett, Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, Are you in the American middle class? Find out with our income calculator, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jul. 23, 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/07/23/are-you-in-the-american-middle-class/ [https://perma.cc/PB28-R6NJ]. In China, a typical Chinese middle-income family of three earns between 100,000 yuan (USD 14,772) and 500,000 yuan (USD 74,000) per year. See Ralph Jennings & He Huifeng, Middle-class Chinese, Americans differ in plans for a tough 2023 as some dump property while others cut holidays, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 31, 2023), https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3208466/middle-class-chinese- americans-differ-plans-tough-2023-some-dump-property-while-others-cut-holidays [https://perma.cc/76LJ-AB8A]. 507. UK’s middle-class earns between GBP 26,800 (USD 33,325) and GBP 54,000 (USD 67,148) annually. This is comparatively a larger amount compared to China’s middle-class https://perma.cc/76LJ-AB8A https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3208466/middle-class-chinese https://perma.cc/PB28-R6NJ https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/07/23/are-you-in-the-american-middle-class https://perma.cc/R7UV-58U7 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10 https://perma.cc/9T3D-XXFH https://www.ft.com/content/e592033b-9e34 https://perma.cc/QN8G-5HEF https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121929/china-now-eus https://perma.cc/2UD3-8FWW https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU https://perma.cc https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/MzIwNjcyMDYx https://perma.cc/W52V-VG9G https://www.hkma.gov https://perma.cc/9UYP-HT9H https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3096941/chinas-new-economic 296 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 population,508 household consumption is still low relative to Western States509 and insufficient to drive its own economy. 510 China relies on external investment and consumerism to sustain its economic growth.511 Low domestic consumption is exacerbated by rising household debt occasioned by property investment, which has further reduced consumption abilities.512 In 2021, the Chinese household debt as a percentage of disposable income had reached a record high of 130.9 per cent. 513 Though its middle-class consists of 29% of the population, China lacks the robust domestic consumption enjoyed by many Western states, particularly the United States.514 This means that China is heavily reliant on income from foreign trade for its economic survival.515 ————————————————————————————— income. See Income distribution, GOV.UK (May. 26, 2023), https://www.ethnicity-facts- figures.service.gov.uk/work-pay-and-benefits/pay-and-income/income-distribution/latest [https://perma.cc/7CRF-CDAE]. 508. China’s middle-class stands at 400 million people, which represents 27.9% of China’s population, compared with 55.9 percent in the United States and more than 70 percent in Britain, Germany, France and other Western countries. See Middle-income group’s quality matters, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 12, 2022), https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/12/WS6254bf80a310fd 2b29e5651e.html [https://perma.cc/3BGF-82VF]. 509. Orange Wang, China wants its middle class to spend big … but they have bills to pay, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china- economy/article/2168184/china-wants-its-middle-class-spend-big-they-have-bills-pay [https://perma.cc/FUA2-PG5B]; see also Orange Wang, Why China cannot rely on consumers to spend their way out of the trade war, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2159225/why-china-cannot-rely- consumers-spend-their-way-out-trade-war?module=hard_link&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/3UNH-N9FB]. 510. Frank Tang, China’s post-coronavirus consumer spending ‘not enough’ to drive growth, says prominent economist, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www. scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3129184/chinas-post-coronavirus-consumer- spending-not-enough-drive [https://perma.cc/5FB9-NWCR]. 511. China’s consumers shake the (retail) world, OXFORD ECON., https://blog. oxfordeconomics.com/chinas-consumers-shake-the-retail-world (last visited May 1, 2023). 512. Frank Tang, China to overtake US to become world’s top consumer goods market ‘very soon’, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china- economy/article/3111954/china-overtake-us-become-worlds-top-consumer-goods-market [https://perma.cc/KU5G-6GGQ]. 513. He Huifeng, Could China’s rising household debt threaten Beijing’s consumer-led growth vision?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 7, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china- economy/article/3144125/could-chinas-rising-household-debt-threaten-beijings- consumer?module=inline&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/N7F4-9RR4]. 514. Lina Batarags, China’s middle class is starting to look a lot like America’s, and that’s not a good thing, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/china- middle-class-starting-to-look-like-americas-2021-12 [https://perma.cc/8K2Q-H9GY]. 515. See Li Cui, China’s Growing External Dependence, 44 FIN. & DEV., no. 3, 2007; see also China is trying to protect its economy from Western pressure: The results are mixed, THE ECONOMIST (May. 26, 2022), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/05/26/china-is-trying- to-protect-its-economy-from-western-pressure [https://perma.cc/3HEF-AV6M]. https://perma.cc/3HEF-AV6M https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/05/26/china-is-trying https://perma.cc/8K2Q-H9GY https://www.businessinsider.com/china https://perma.cc/N7F4-9RR4 https://www.scmp.com/economy/china https://perma.cc/KU5G-6GGQ https://www.scmp.com/economy/china https://oxfordeconomics.com/chinas-consumers-shake-the-retail-world https://blog https://perma.cc/5FB9-NWCR https://scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3129184/chinas-post-coronavirus-consumer https://www https://perma.cc/3UNH-N9FB https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2159225/why-china-cannot-rely https://perma.cc/FUA2-PG5B https://www.scmp.com/economy/china https://perma.cc/3BGF-82VF https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/12/WS6254bf80a310fd https://perma.cc/7CRF-CDAE https://www.ethnicity-facts 297 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE 2. China’s Foreign Debt Crisis Another factor that makes China vulnerable is its foreign debt crisis. In the 2010s, China embarked on the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative intended to shape ocean and land trade through the funding of ports, highways, airports and railways in developing countries without the annoying conditions that Western and multilateral lenders demand.516 For instance, in Kenya, pundits refer to a Chinese-funded railway as the ‘Railroad to Nowhere’ as it is incomplete and unviable.517 There are fears that most of China’s debtor states will default on their loans.518 For instance, China repossessed a seaport in Sri Lanka over the country’s inability to service the port’s construction loan.519 These occurrences have had an impact over the Chinese economy since Chinese banks were the principal lenders. By 2017, China Development Bank lent an estimated $100 billion while Bank of China committed $20 billion to the initiative.520 China lent Pakistan $23.3 billion making it the highest of Beijing’s borrowers.521 Currently, Pakistan’s falling currency rate and a current-account deficit are pushing Islamabad closer to default.522 Since 2013, the value of BRI projects and transactions has reached $838 billion. Reportedly, many of China’s debtor states are unlikely to make payment with high chances of default.523 In 2020 and 2021, China had to renegotiate loans worth $52 billion, which was ————————————————————————————— 516. Faced with an overseas debt crisis, will China change its ways?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2022), https://www.economist.com/china/2022/08/24/faced-with-an-overseas-debt-crisis- will-china-change-its-ways [https://perma.cc/43QU-BYUB]. 517. Al Dahir, Jewel in the Crown of Corruption’: The Troubles of Kenya’s China-Funded Train, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/07/world/africa/ kenya-election-train.html [https://perma.cc/8P8F-4MJ4]. 518. Jonathan Wheatley, China’s foreign loans are becoming a US burden, THE FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/e08cf77d-0106-4272-968e-aa0c203b19cc [https:// perma.cc/2SY7-MM4J]. 519. Maria Abi-Habib, How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough up a Port, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html [https:// perma.cc/CN6P-VGQB]. 520. ALICIA GARCIA-HERRERO, THE H.K. UNIV. OF SCI. & TECH., INST. FOR EMERGING MKTG. STUD. THOUGHT LEADERSHIP BRIEF NO. 17, CHINA CANNOT FINANCE THE BELT AND ROAD ALONE, https://iems.ust.hk/publications/thought-leadership-briefs/alicia-china-cannot-finance-the-belt- and-road-alone [https://perma.cc/HR3Q-CGUR]. 521. Shin Watanabe & Ryosuke Hanada, China slows foreign lending as Belt and Road problem loans triple, NIKKEI (Sept. 20, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and- Road/China-slows-foreign-lending-as-Belt-and-Road-problem-loans-triple [https://perma.cc/4NUW-V3LF]. 522. Id. 523. See Marcello Estevão, Are we ready for the coming spate of debt crises?, VOICES (Mar. 28, 2022), https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/are-we-ready-coming-spate-debt-crises [https:// perma.cc/R44H-4LVJ]. https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/are-we-ready-coming-spate-debt-crises https://perma.cc/4NUW-V3LF https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and https://perma.cc/HR3Q-CGUR https://iems.ust.hk/publications/thought-leadership-briefs/alicia-china-cannot-finance-the-belt https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html https://www.ft.com/content/e08cf77d-0106-4272-968e-aa0c203b19cc https://perma.cc/8P8F-4MJ4 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/07/world/africa https://perma.cc/43QU-BYUB https://www.economist.com/china/2022/08/24/faced-with-an-overseas-debt-crisis 298 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 more than thrice the sum in 2018.524 As of 2022, the world’s seventy-four lowest-income countries had debt-service obligations totaling $35 billion, with $13.1 billion of that amount (37% of the total) owed to China.525 As of 2022, China accounted for over 50% of all debt owed by poor countries to official creditors.526 Some of these countries such as Zambia, Sri Lanka, and Ghana have had to restructure the loans owed to Western multilateral lenders to avoid default, which Western lenders blame on China’s predatory lending.527 To stave off defaults, China issued Pakistan with a fresh $700 million to help it weather its worst economic crisis in a generation.528 Major defaults would negatively affect the Chinese economy. 529 Thus, if sanctions exacerbate China’s current precarious situation, they may precipitate a collapse of the Chinese financial 530 sector. 3. Chinese Reliance on the Real Estate Market for Revenue China has relied heavily on the real estate sector for its rapid growth in recent years. 531 Indeed, much of China’s government revenue comes from the sale of land.532 Local governments lease land parcels to companies for a period ————————————————————————————— 524. Yang Wen & Donald Low, How China’s hubris led to a double debt crisis, despite the benefits of forging its own path, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 14, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3188664/how-chinas-hubris-led-double-debt- crisis-despite-benefits-forging [https://perma.cc/P7NM-Z8XV]. 525. MARTIN CHORZEMPA & ADNAN MAZAREI, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POL’Y BRIEF 21-10, IMPROVING CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN RESOLVING DEVELOPING-COUNTRY DEBT PROBLEMS 3 (2021), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb21-10.pdf [https:// perma.cc/2PSJ-8CLY]. 526. Anne O. Krueger, China and the Sovereign-Debt Bomb, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 13, 2023), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-china-paris-club-imf- by-anne-o-krueger-2023-01 [https://perma.cc/3H9F-KFH3]. 527. Alan Rappeport, Defaults Loom as Poor Countries Face an Economic Storm, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/03/business/developing-countries-debt- defaults.html [https://perma.cc/EC5W-YBZE]. 528. Amy Hawkins, Pakistan’s fresh £580m loan from China intensifies debt burden fears, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/23/pakistan-loan- china-intensifies-debt-burden-fears [https://perma.cc/CB2L-YK2C]. 529. See generally JOHN HURLEY, SCOTT MORRIS & GAILYN PORTELANCE, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., POLICY PAPER 121, EXAMINING THE DEBT IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (2018), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt- implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/69M6-FLQR]. 530. Apostolos Apostolou, Alexander Al-Haschimi & Martino Ricci, Financial risks in China’s corporate sector: real estate and beyond, EUR. CENT. BANK ECON. BULL., no. 2, 2022, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202202_01~4804 1a563f.en.html [https://perma.cc/C2AW-R36X]. 531. Id. 532. 29% of Chinese Fiscal Revenues Derived from Land Sales, CHINA BANKING NEWS (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.chinabankingnews.com/2019/01/21/29-of-chinese-fiscal-revenues- derived-from-land-sales/ [https://perma.cc/N5ZG-DG8A]. https://perma.cc/N5ZG-DG8A https://www.chinabankingnews.com/2019/01/21/29-of-chinese-fiscal-revenues https://perma.cc/C2AW-R36X https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202202_01~4804 https://perma.cc/69M6-FLQR https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt https://perma.cc/CB2L-YK2C https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/23/pakistan-loan https://perma.cc/EC5W-YBZE https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/03/business/developing-countries-debt https://perma.cc/3H9F-KFH3 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-china-paris-club-imf https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb21-10.pdf https://perma.cc/P7NM-Z8XV https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3188664/how-chinas-hubris-led-double-debt 299 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE of years. 533 These leases accounted for about 41.6% of local governments’ revenues in 2021.534 When coupled with taxes generated from the land, this forms a sizeable chunk of the government’s revenue. 535 State-owned companies use land value as collateral for loans,536 which provide revenue to fund, inter alia, public welfare projects.537 In the first six months of 2022, the government sold land worth only $211.8 billion, a 55% drop from the land sold in 2021.538 The slump on land prices followed a crackdown by the government, beginning in 2020, on developers’ high reliance on debt539 despite the sector accounting for 25% of China’s GDP.540 Consequently, residential floor space prices fell by 27% in 2022 and investments in the sector fell by 10%.541 This situation negatively affects the Chinese economy.542 Since the real estate market is tied to debt,543 the market’s volatility places the banking industry at risk.544 Concerns related to the Evergrande Group and ————————————————————————————— 533. Major Tian, The Role of Land Sales in Local Government Financing in China, CKGSB KNOWLEDGE (Sep. 3, 2014), https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledges/the-role-of-land-sales-in- local-government-financing-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/R3DJ-KX94]; see also Rebecca Feng & Cao Li, To Boost Land Sales, Local Chinese Governments Set Up New Companies to Buy Plots, THE WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-boost-land-sales-local- chinese-governments-set-up-new-companies-to-buy-plots-11668681002 [https://perma.cc/V9RH-X2DV]. 534. Liu Jing, China’s Real Estate Problem: Land Finance and Local Government Revenue Structures, CKGSB KNOWLEDGE (Jul 05, 2022), https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/blog/land-finance- and-local-government-revenue-structures/ [https://perma.cc/M6VY-NHYN]. 535. Frank Tang, China property: tax authorities’ enhanced oversight of land-sale revenue seen as ‘mixed bag’, and runaway prices may drop, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 8, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3136504/china-property-tax- authorities-enhanced-oversight-land-sale [https://perma.cc/9QHF-QLKS]. 536. Sun Yu, China’s local governments boost revenue by selling land to their own entities, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/f68a301a-cdd5-4d9b-aca2-492c6561ebbf [https://perma.cc/ZAJ3-VLH3]. 537. China’s Ponzi-like property market is eroding faith in the government, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 12, 2022), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/09/12/chinas-ponzi- like-property-market-is-eroding-faith-in-the-government [https://perma.cc/W9GV-PPW6]. 538. Guo Yingzhe, China’s plunging land sales threaten local governments, NIKKEI ASIA (Jul. 7, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-s-plunging-land-sales-threaten- local-governments [https://perma.cc/5EYW-CJGN]. 539. Evelyn Cheng, Why China won’t bail out its real estate sector, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/25/china-property-why-beijing-wont-bail-out-its-real-estate- sector.html [https://perma.cc/HG89-9WP6]. 540. Evelyn Cheng, China’s real estate crisis isn’t over yet, IMF says, CNBC (Feb. 3, 2023), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/03/chinas-real-estate-crisis-isnt-over-yet-imf-says.html [https:// perma.cc/L2DU-2B6U]. 541. Id. 542. Daisuke Wakabayashi, As China’s Economy Stumbles, Homeowners Boycott Mortgage Payments, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/business/ china-economy-real-estate-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/S6UX-F8HT]. 543. Yingzhe, supra note 538. 544. See generally Chee Seng Cheong, Anna Olshansky & Ralf Zurbruegg, The influence of real estate risk on market volatility, 29 J. PROP. INV. & FIN. 145 (2011). https://perma.cc/S6UX-F8HT https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/business https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/03/chinas-real-estate-crisis-isnt-over-yet-imf-says.html https://perma.cc/HG89-9WP6 https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/25/china-property-why-beijing-wont-bail-out-its-real-estate https://perma.cc/5EYW-CJGN https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-s-plunging-land-sales-threaten https://perma.cc/W9GV-PPW6 https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/09/12/chinas-ponzi https://perma.cc/ZAJ3-VLH3 https://www.ft.com/content/f68a301a-cdd5-4d9b-aca2-492c6561ebbf https://perma.cc/9QHF-QLKS https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3136504/china-property-tax https://perma.cc/M6VY-NHYN https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/blog/land-finance https://perma.cc/V9RH-X2DV https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-boost-land-sales-local https://perma.cc/R3DJ-KX94 https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledges/the-role-of-land-sales-in 300 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 other Chinese real estate companies’ default on loans in 2022545 have had an impact on the housing sector, leading to a fall in home prices.546 This has had a domino effect on real estate companies and a knock-on effect on the entire economy. 547 Additionally, in China, home buyers often purchase homes and begin paying mortgages even prior to the home’s construction.548 In many large developments where builders have failed to begin construction even after a long delay,549 home buyers are refusing to pay mortgages, 550 impacting both the construction and lending sectors.551 4. The West’s Technological War with China These challenges come at a time when the West has restricted Chinese access to some of its technologies.552 In August 2022, the United States passed the Chips and Science Act.553 The law offers a significant subsidy for semiconductor manufacturers to establish and expand operations in the United States.554At the same time, the law bans the export of advanced chips and chip- ————————————————————————————— 545. Martin Farrer, A Ponzi scheme by any other name: the bursting of China’s property bubble, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 25, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/ sep/25/china-property-bubble-evergrande-group [https://perma.cc/Y2UB-BMMV]. 546. David Ren, China home prices fall for 11th straight month as suspended construction, mortgage boycott and weak economy hit sales, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 15, 2022), https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3188925/china-home-prices-fall-11th-straight-month- suspended-construction-mortgage [https://perma.cc/V3DM-XTWR]. 547. Arendse Huld, Explainer: What is going on in China’s Property Market? CHINA BRIEFING (Jan. 14, 2022), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/explainer-whats-going-on-in- chinas-property-market/ [https://perma.cc/77J6-LEMT]. 548. Laura He, Chinese homebuyers refuse to pay mortgages on unfinished apartments, CNN BUSINESS (Jul. 14, 2022), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/14/economy/china-property-crisis- homebuyers-bad-debt-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/MY4N-3648]. 549. Mortgage Boycott Shows How Deep China’s Property Crisis Goes, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 19, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-19/china-mortgage-boycott- reveals-housing-uncertainty#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/B564-S44W]. 550. Id. 551. Simon Leplâtre, Thousands join mortgage payment strike in China amid abandoned construction, LE MONDE (Jul. 28, 2022), https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/ 2022/07/28/in-china-the-boycott-of-real-estate-loan-repayments-worries-authorities_5991689_ 19.html [https://perma.cc/2CWM-KFES]. 552. Agathe Demarais, How the U.S.-Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 19, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire- sanctions-us-china-technology-war-semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ [https://perma.cc/ G4ZZ-UDTB]. 553. Lamar Johnson, Biden ends slog on semiconductor bill with signature, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/09/biden-ends-slog-on-semiconductor-bill- with-signature-00050530 [https://perma.cc/DM3N-8Z9R]. 554. Ana Swanson, Biden Administration Releases Plan for $50 Billion Investment in Chips, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/06/business/economy/biden- tech-chips.html [https://perma.cc/2TPL-KY8K]. https://perma.cc/2TPL-KY8K https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/06/business/economy/biden https://perma.cc/DM3N-8Z9R https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/09/biden-ends-slog-on-semiconductor-bill https://perma.cc https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire https://perma.cc/2CWM-KFES https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article https://perma.cc/B564-S44W https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-19/china-mortgage-boycott https://perma.cc/MY4N-3648 https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/14/economy/china-property-crisis https://perma.cc/77J6-LEMT https://www.china-briefing.com/news/explainer-whats-going-on-in https://perma.cc/V3DM-XTWR https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3188925/china-home-prices-fall-11th-straight-month https://perma.cc/Y2UB-BMMV https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022 301 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE making equipment to China.555 The Netherlands followed the American ban and restricted the overseas sale of semiconductor technology to China in order to protect its national security.556 The Netherlands is the home base of ASML Holdings (ASML),557 Europe’s biggest tech firm,558 which produces the most advanced chip making machines in the world,559 including those used in China.560 Taiwan is the largest manufacturer of the most advanced microchips561 and they zealously guard their intellectual property attempting to keep mainland China out of the market.562 5. Geopolitical Tensions over Taiwan China continues to be mired in a geopolitical contest over the independence of Taiwan, which has heated up in recent years. 563 This has resulted in an economic decoupling of Taiwan from China. According to Taiwan’s Investment Commission, Taiwanese FDI in China dropped from a high of $9 billion in 2017 ————————————————————————————— 555. Milton Ezrati, The Chip War with China Escalates, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2023/03/06/the-chip-war-with-china- escalates/?sh=48c681e91eea [https://perma.cc/7S2D-GYAP]. 556. Toby Sterling, Karen Freifeld & Alexandra Alper, Dutch to restrict semiconductor tech exports to China, joining US effort, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2023), https://www.reuters. com/technology/dutch-responds-us-china-policy-with-plan-curb-semiconductor-tech-exports- 2023-03-08/ [https://perma.cc/UM5C-5F7M]. 557. Sam Shead, Investors are going wild over a Dutch chip firm. And you’ve probably never heard of it, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/24/asml-the-biggest- company-in-europe-youve-probably-never-heard-of.html [https://perma.cc/Z8XE-H38S]. 558. Cagan Koc, Ian King & Jillian Deutsch, ASML, Europe’s Most Valuable Tech Firm, Is at the Heart of the US-China Chip War, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2023), https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/asml-europe-s-most-valuable-tech-firm-to-define-us- china-chip-war#xj4y7vzkg [https://perma.cc/MU6X-U7X4]. 559. Shead, supra note 557. 560. Juliana Liu & Wayne Chang, Europe joins the US in its chip war with China, CNN (Mar. 9, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/09/tech/china-us-netherlands-chips-curbs- response-hnk-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/34HC-AJK9]; see also Don Clark, The Tech Cold War’s ‘Most Complicated Machine’ That’s Out of China’s Reach, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/04/technology/tech-cold-war-chips.html [https://perma.cc/ NVD6-3UEZ]. 561. Taiwan’s dominance of the chip industry makes it more important, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 6, 2023) https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of- the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important# [https://perma.cc/8DG6-G8FE]. 562. Clark, supra note 560. 563. Yimou Lee & Ben Blanchard, ‘Provocative’ China pressures Taiwan with fighters, fake news amid virus outbreak, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/health- coronavirus-taiwan-china-idINKBN20Q08Q [https://perma.cc/LX95-3MNE]; see also THE TAIWAN AFFS. OFF. OF THE STATE COUNCIL & THE STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND CHINA’S REUNIFICATION IN THE NEW ERA (2022), http://pl.china-embassy.gov.cn/pol/zglc/202208/t20220810_10739290.htm [https:// perma.cc/P25B-HYUX]. http://pl.china-embassy.gov.cn/pol/zglc/202208/t20220810_10739290.htm https://perma.cc/LX95-3MNE https://www.reuters.com/article/health https://perma.cc/8DG6-G8FE https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of https://perma.cc https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/04/technology/tech-cold-war-chips.html https://perma.cc/34HC-AJK9 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/09/tech/china-us-netherlands-chips-curbs https://perma.cc/MU6X-U7X4 https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/asml-europe-s-most-valuable-tech-firm-to-define-us https://www https://perma.cc/Z8XE-H38S https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/24/asml-the-biggest https://perma.cc/UM5C-5F7M https://www.reuters https://perma.cc/7S2D-GYAP https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2023/03/06/the-chip-war-with-china 302 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 to a low of $1.7 billion in 2022.564 Thus, China’s importance in the economic fortunes of Taiwan has increasingly diminished.565 6. Effects of Zero-COVID Measures Taken by China China continues to reel from a long, self-imposed isolation over the COVID-19 pandemic.566 The isolation has had immense effect on Chinese economic growth.567 In 2022, the Chinese GDP only grew by 3%,568 which is a figure significantly below the official target of 5.5%.569 These figures may have informed China’s willingness to open up the country without taking any phased measures regarding the COVID-19 pandemic as continued isolation would have led to more GDP hemorrhage.570 7. Reduced Domestic Growth Another factor that makes China vulnerable is its reduced domestic growth.571 The reduction in the growth has been linked to increased household ————————————————————————————— 564. Min-Hua Chiang, Taiwan’s Economy is Breaking Away From China’s, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2023), https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwans-economy-breaking- away-chinas [https://perma.cc/GPT8-WERG]. 565. Id. 566. Cf. Laura He, China’s economic recovery loses steam as factory production contracts further, CNN BUSINESS (May 31, 2023) (stating that although China ended its zero-covid policy at the end of 2022, its economy was still struggling to recover for various reasons) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/economy/china-pmi-economy-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/3PXG-C2F9]. 567. Cf. Laura He, China’s economy is growing again. So why are investors getting out?, CNN BUSINESS (May 19, 2023) (citing several reasons for China’s slow recovery coming out of the zero-covid policy era) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/investing/china-stock-market- decline-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/HV8R-877K]. 568. Evelyn Cheng, China takes a cautious approach to its economy in 2023, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2023) https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/06/china-takes-a-cautious-approach-to-its-economy-in- 2023.html [https://perma.cc/429D-39R9]. 569. Laura He, China sets lowest GDP growth target in decades as Beijing tightens its belt, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 6, 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/06/economy/china-two-sessions- lowest-gdp-target-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7E6-XFTY]. 570. Dake Kang, Ignoring experts, China’s sudden zero-COVID exit cost lives, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 24, 2023) https://apnews.com/article/zero-covid-exit-china-reopening-investigation- abridged-d7e7cf42b8f4b97e2744b640f431a7df [https://perma.cc/YL5H-LJUY]. Indeed, when looked at from another perspective, the reopening was influence by unprecedented anti- government protests over China’s draconian pandemic control measures in December 2022. The Chinese government’s willingness to give in to protestors’ demands indicates the tenuous position China is now, both at home and abroad. See Li Yuan, China’s Protest Prophet, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/briefing/china-protest-peng-lifa.html [https://perma.cc/3CJW-TNJZ]. 571. Meaghan Tobin, China’s economic recovery hinges on consumers. They’re not spending, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/20/ china-economy-recovery-spending/ [https://perma.cc/AL4F-79Z8]. https://perma.cc/AL4F-79Z8 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/20 https://perma.cc/3CJW-TNJZ https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/briefing/china-protest-peng-lifa.html https://perma.cc/YL5H-LJUY https://apnews.com/article/zero-covid-exit-china-reopening-investigation https://perma.cc/H7E6-XFTY https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/06/economy/china-two-sessions https://perma.cc/429D-39R9 https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/06/china-takes-a-cautious-approach-to-its-economy-in https://perma.cc/HV8R-877K https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/investing/china-stock-market https://perma.cc/3PXG-C2F9 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/30/economy/china-pmi-economy-intl-hnk/index.html https://perma.cc/GPT8-WERG https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/taiwans-economy-breaking 303 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE debt in China.572 In 2020, for instance, household debt as a percentage of GDP was 62% at the end of the year’s second quarter. 573 This was a reduction of 0.1% at the end of 2019.574 By the end of 2020, household debts as a percentage of disposable income had reached a record level of 130.9 percent. 575 This has led to a cash crunch that reduces spending and thus impedes consumer-led growth from consumption of goods and services within China.576 While Chinese authorities recognize that consumption is key in driving the economy in the face of external shocks,577 the behavioral responses of households and businesses pose a risk to the long-term stabilization of economic growth through domestic consumption.578 8. Demographic Crisis Perhaps the most challenging and long-term issue bedeviling the Chinese economy is its demographic crisis.579 In 2022, China’s population declined for the first time in 60 years.580 The government announced that 9.56 million people were born in China in 2022,581 while 10.41 million people died.582 This was the first time that deaths outnumbered births in China since the “Great Leap Forward.”583 In addition, the birth rate fell to a record low while the number of ————————————————————————————— 572. He Huifeng, Could China’s rising household debt threaten Beijing’s consumer-led growth vision?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 7, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china- economy/article/3144125/could-chinas-rising-household-debt-threaten-beijings-consumer [https://perma.cc/R36P-G5HP]. 573. Id. 574. Id. 575. Id. 576. Sarah Chan, China’s Rising Household Debt: A New Debt Trap?, ECON. ALTS. 567 (2020). 577. Fan Feifei, Consumption upgrade promises growth momentum, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 20, 2023), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202302/20/WS63f2a7c3a31057c47ebaf9d4.html [https://perma.cc/6455-ZKDL]. 578. China: Domestic and External Conditions are leading to a Weakened Economic Outlook, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 20, 2022), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- release/2022/12/20/china-domestic-and-external-conditions-are-leading-to-a-weakened- economic-outlook [https://perma.cc/9JDF-CZEA]. 579. Helen Davidson, China’s first population fall since 1961 creates ‘bleaker’ outlook for country, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/ 17/chinas-population-falls-for-first-time-in-more-than-60-years [https://perma.cc/A7SK-FD5Q]. 580. Alexandra Stevenson & Zixu Wang, China’s Population Falls, Heralding a Demographic Crisis, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/ business/china-birth-rate.html [https://perma.cc/7PG4-BJAX]. 581. Id. 582. Id. 583. Christian Shepherd, China’s first population decline in 60 years sounds demographic alarm, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2023/01/17/china-population-shrinking-decline-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/VH7Q-Q28V]. https://perma.cc/VH7Q-Q28V https://www.washingtonpost.com/world https://perma.cc/7PG4-BJAX https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16 https://perma.cc/A7SK-FD5Q https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan https://perma.cc/9JDF-CZEA https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press https://perma.cc/6455-ZKDL https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202302/20/WS63f2a7c3a31057c47ebaf9d4.html https://perma.cc/R36P-G5HP https://www.scmp.com/economy/china 304 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 the elderly continues to rise.584 This situation has the potential of overburdening healthcare infrastructure and destabilizing the pension system. 585 The state pension pool amounts to less than 10 percent of the country’s gross domestic product,586 a rate that is below the 50 to 100 per cent of GDP in “most countries”. 587 In the past, Chinese economic development relied on the high proportion of working age citizens for its growth.588 The aging population slows growth because of structural constraints of a shrinking workforce,589 increased government spending590 and a strained pension system. 591 It also fuels shortages in labor supply driving increases in labor costs. 592 Moreover, this will likely lead to an encroachment of the Chinese markets in offshore manufacturing to other Southeast Asian countries like Viet Nam and India.593 There are also fears that an aging population will lead to a path, similar to that of Japan,594 where the economy will enter decades of economic stagnation.595 ————————————————————————————— 584. Zhou Xin, China’s deepening demographic crisis calls for stronger, more coherent course of action from Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3211712/chinas-deepening-demographic-crisis-calls- stronger-more-coherent-course-action-beijing [https://perma.cc/5RUW-R56T]. 585. Luna Sun, China’s ageing population a ‘long-term reality’, and its silver economy needs to catch up, State Council says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 26, 2021), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3157385/chinas-ageing-population- long-term-reality-and-its-silver [https://perma.cc/6NFZ-9HYB]. 586. Cyril Ip, China population: former central bank chief sounds alarm over pension dangers, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 26, 2023), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china- economy/article/3211590/chinas-former-central-bank-chief-sounds-alarm-over-pension-dangers [https://perma.cc/P9B7-G7YN]. 587. Id. 588. Mitali Das & Papa N’Diaye, The End of Cheap Labor: China’s working-age population is poised to decline, with big implications for China and the rest of the world, FIN. & DEV., June 2013, at 34 (2013) https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0050/002/article-A013- en.xml [https://perma.cc/5XD3-RMKD]. 589. Ronald Lee & Andrew Mason, Cost of Aging, 54 FIN. & DEV., no. 1, at 7 (2017). 590. Id. 591. Id. 592. Id. 593. Business Insider, Chinese companies are moving supply chains out of China to manage risks, with India, Malaysia and Indonesia benefiting, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 23, 2023), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3218025/chinese-companies-are-moving- supply-chains-out-china-manage-risks-india-malaysia-and-indonesia [https://perma.cc/DVL3- 35K6]. 594. See Cheryl Arcibal, Is China heading for stagnation as property slump goes Japan’s way in a deja vu crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sep. 7, 2022), https://www. scmp.com/business/article/3191423/china-heading-stagnation-property-slump-goes-japans-way- deja-vu-crisis [https://perma.cc/MF9B-XK6L]. 595. Jessie Yeung, China’s population is shrinking. The impact will be felt around the world, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 19, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/18/china/china-population-drop- explainer-intl-hnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/XWL6-NV4H]. https://perma.cc/XWL6-NV4H https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/18/china/china-population-drop https://perma.cc/MF9B-XK6L https://scmp.com/business/article/3191423/china-heading-stagnation-property-slump-goes-japans-way https://www https://perma.cc/DVL3 https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3218025/chinese-companies-are-moving https://perma.cc/5XD3-RMKD https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0050/002/article-A013 https://perma.cc/P9B7-G7YN https://www.scmp.com/economy/china https://perma.cc/6NFZ-9HYB https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3157385/chinas-ageing-population https://perma.cc/5RUW-R56T https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3211712/chinas-deepening-demographic-crisis-calls 305 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE CONCLUSION The question posed is whether unilateral economic sanctions, and enabling legislation, can amount to a binding state obligation under international law as a matter of due diligence in respect to the Genocide Convention. Relying on the Bosnian Genocide case and general principles of international law this essay argues that such sanctions are binding obligations or should be so interpreted. In this respect the UK Parliament was incorrect in not passing the amendment to its trade bill, and other similarly situated states are likewise failing to meet their state obligations under the Convention. Such a reading of the Bosnian Genocide case and the articulation, or even expansion, of state obligation is not lightly offered but rather only binding under certain contextual conditions. Such conditions are foreseeably extant in the scenario proffered in the UK Trade Bill amendment. They include jus cogens protections,596 binding treaty 597 and customary international law norms, 598 state capacity to influence,599 the likelihood of collective economic sanctions600 and the vulnerability of the offending state.601 As an initial observation, economic sanctions are a preferred tool as they are easier to carry out, 602 do not involve military engagement or direct violence603 and are reasonable and proportionate such that the sanctioning state need not make sacrifices beyond its capacity. Economic sanctions are usually temporary.604 The elasticity of the international marketplace can offset short- term imbalances and resume eventual economic stasis.605 This has become evident in the sanctions placed on Russia and the relatively minimal consequences for the sanctioning states. 606 Moreover, imposition of economic sanctions is consistent with the principles of international law when they are imposed upon states for violating jus cogens norms, 607 particularly considering states obligations to prevent genocide in the Convention as confirmed in the ————————————————————————————— 596. See MARTIN, supra note 220. 597. Kunz, supra note 32. 598. Kayan, supra note 147. 599. Heieck, supra note 213. 600. Özdamar & Shahin, supra note 23. 601. Miller, supra note 238. 602. See ETHAN KESSLER, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOB. AFFS., WORKING PAPER: HOW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE USED IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 2 (2022). 603. Id. at 20. 604. See Drew Christiansen & Gerard F. Powers, Economic Sanctions and Just War Doctrine, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING? 107 (David Cortright & George Lopez eds., 1995). 605. See Özdamar & Shahin, supra note 23 at 1649-52. 606. See T. Clifton Morgan, Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto V. Yotov, Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges, 37 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13-14 (2023). 607. See Julia Schmidt, The Legality of Unilateral Extra-territorial Sanctions under International Law, 27 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 53, 75 (2022). 306 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:249 Bosnian Genocide case. 608 Thus, such an obligation is reasonable and consistent with international law norms. The heart of this issue is the “effective influence” test. Under the Bosnian Genocide case such an obligation can only arise if the state has the capacity to impact the offending conduct.609 It is not required to be a complete cure, but only have some effect, and that it would be more likely than not to impact the behavior.610 When viewed from a contextual analysis the UK Trade Bill amendment should have been passed. The abundant context in this case includes a significant trade relationship between the UK and China611 meaning that UK sanctions would have evident impact even as a standalone initiative. Moreover, as with the pervasive Russian sanctions, also in response to violation of a jus cogens norm, such legislation would eventually lead to collective sanctions, which would greatly magnify the consequences for China.612 The measure of their effectiveness would be based on the scope of the sanctions, but the amendment to the UK Trade Bill, as drafted, was pervasive and widespread – targeting trade per se, not just individuals or certain industries. Pervasive action of this order would have a great effect and not bear the same barren fruit that sanctions imposed on individuals in Hong Kong after the National Security Law613 effectively ended the “one country, two systems” principles previously set out.614 Such sanctions would also be effective in influencing the offending conduct because historically China has responded to sanctions, such as after the Tiananmen Square event, and eventually moderated its human rights stance. 615 Thus, there is precedent for economic sanctions influencing Chinese policy. Moreover, China is particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions, more than during the time of Tiananmen because it is now an economically engaged nascent superpower. 616 Its economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and foreign investment617 with lagging domestic earning and spending.618 Dependence on foreign trade and investment make China more vulnerable than many other states and more so than at the time of Tiananmen Square.619 Additionally, while many states face economic challenges, China faces a virtual Pandora’s box of economic woe in the near future. Most of these issues are ————————————————————————————— 608. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11. 609. Id. 610. See Dupuy, supra note 211. 611. See HL Deb (7 Nov. 2022) (825) col. 451, supra note 375. 612. See MARTIN, supra note 220. 613. Justine Yu, The United States’ Ineffective Response Towards Hong Kong’s National Security Law, 73 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 179-80 (2022). 614. Id. at 171. 615. See Rana Siu Inboden & Titus C. Chen, China’s Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights, 47 INT’L SPECTATOR 45, 51-53 (2012). 616. See Huang & Lardy, supra note 263. 617. See XINHUA, supra note 267. 618. Tobin, supra note 571. 619. See generally Hong Bo, Implications of the Ukraine war for China: can China survive secondary sanctions?, 21 J. CHINESE ECON. & BUS. STUD. 311 (2023). 307 2024] BOYCOTTING CHINESE GENOCIDE publicly available but include structural vulnerability,620 poor financial management,621 endangered real estate markets and lending institutions,622 failed foreign policy initiatives with the debacle of ill-advised massive foreign loans,623 the arguably failed Belt and Road Initiative,624 lagging access to technology,625 etc. Perhaps its most serious problem is the demographic perils it faces with a disproportionately aging population and too few young workers, the product of the multi-generational one child policy.626 Considering the relatively low bar for effective influence as an obligation of conduct and not result627 and viewed under the lens of the UK’s continued economic significance to China,628 China’s economic vulnerability,629 the likelihood the trade bill would lead to collective sanctions,630 and the lessons learned from the sanctions of Russia, this essay postulates that this satisfies the mandates of the Bosnian Genocide case and that the UK was under a state obligation to pass the legislation or otherwise impose similar executive measures. Any other conclusion renders the state obligations under the Genocide Convention as nothing more than a paper tiger, or as Judge Kreca stated in his dissenting opinion as only a “metaphysical duty.”631 ————————————————————————————— 620. See generally Tamim Bayoumi & Yunhui Zhao, Incomplete Financial Markets and the Booming Housing Sector in China (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 2020/265, 2020). 621. Id. 622. See Edward White & Cheng Leng, ‘Financial monsters’: China’s bad banks complicate property crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/261b87c3-2eba-42d5- ac7a-f7c3f8bbd7d8 [https://perma.cc/PD3B-6W52]. 623. See Hal Brands & Michael Beckley, China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 24, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great- power-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/LAS9-JD4L]; see also, Chi Wang, China’s failing foreign policy needs a reboot to avert a US Cold War, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 18, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3089399/chinas-failing-foreign-policy-needs- reboot-avert-us-cold-war [https://perma.cc/2YA9-X9HM]. 624. See Christina Lu, China’s Belt and Road to Nowhere, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 13, 2023), https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/china-belt-and-road-initiative-infrastructure-development- geopolitics/ [https://perma.cc/R2S6-KB37]. 625. Longmei Zhang & Sally Chen, China’s Digital Economy: Opportunities and Risks 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/19/16, 2019), https://www.imf.org/-/media/ Files/Publications/WP/2019/wp1916.ashx. 626. See generally Junsen Zhang, The Evolution of China’s One-Child Policy and Its Effects on Family Outcomes, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 141-59 (2017); see also Bryan Walsh, How China came to regret its one-child policy, VOX (Jan. 18, 2023), https://www.vox.com/future- perfect/23558772/china-population-overpopulation-one-child-policy-demographics-aging- beijing-xi-jinping [https://perma.cc/75UU-9RXY]. 627. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11. 628. See OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, supra note 388. 629. See Huang & Lardy, supra note 263. 630. See Özdamar & Shahin, supra note 23. 631. See Bosnian Genocide case (2007), supra note 11. https://perma.cc/75UU-9RXY https://www.vox.com/future https://www.imf.org/-/media https://perma.cc/R2S6-KB37 https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/china-belt-and-road-initiative-infrastructure-development https://perma.cc/2YA9-X9HM https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3089399/chinas-failing-foreign-policy-needs https://perma.cc/LAS9-JD4L https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great https://perma.cc/PD3B-6W52 https://www.ft.com/content/261b87c3-2eba-42d5 Structure Bookmarks OYCOTTING HINESE ENOCIDE AND THE UTY TO REVENTPPORTUNITIES OST IN THE RADE ILL