id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
inlawrev-18041	Kuhner, Timothy K.	Consumer Sovereignty Trumps Popular Sovereignty: The Economic Explanation for Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett	2013	39	.pdf	application/pdf	19537	1040	57	If a candidate spent more than $350,000 of her personal wealth on her own campaign, this triggered an “asymmetrical regulatory scheme” that benefitted her non-self-financing opponents.47 Her opponents could then legally obtain unlimited coordinated party expenditures and individual contributions up to $6900 until they equaled, individually, the amount of personal funds spent by the self-financing candidate.48 Meanwhile, the self-financing candidate remained subject to the usual limits.49 In contrast to Bennett, the mechanism in Davis did not give public candidates a cash subsidy pegged to the gains achieved by private candidates; rather, it gave public candidates a legal subsidy, to wit, the benefit of an asymmetrical regulatory regime that might enable them to collect additional funds more easily. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer had a similar response, dissenting in Davis.63 Thus, the riddle of how speech can be ‘abridged’ without being limited breaks apart into a series of questions: How could the provision of increased funds for public candidates constitute a violation of private candidates’ right to political speech?	cache/inlawrev-18041.pdf	txt/inlawrev-18041.txt