id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
inlawrev-18350	Fairfax, Lisa M	Separation Anxiety: A Cautious Endorsement of the Independent Board Chair	2015	34	.pdf	application/pdf	16080	748	52	The one study (a 2013 study) that focuses specifically on truly independent board chairs found a much stronger connection between such board chairs and corporate performance.101 Importantly, that study found that there was virtually no impact on firm performance when the CEO and board chair roles were split, but the board chair had some connection to the corporation, thereby making him non-independent.102 However, a significant connection emerged for board chairs who were truly independent.103 The authors of the study concluded that separating the CEO and board chair positions can be beneficial when there is true independence of the board chair, but they also emphasized that even with a truly independent board chair, the benefits could be realized only under the right circumstances.104 With respect to this data on truly independent board chairs, it is important to point out that, outside of this study, none of the empirical evidence seeks to distinguish between the impact of non-independent board chairs and truly independent chairs. ”9 Activist shareholders, institutional investors, and regulators alike, believe that separating such roles increases the board’s independence from management, thereby enhancing the board’s monitoring and oversight functions while simultaneously reducing the potential for managerial misconduct.10 Propelled by these sentiments, the percentage of companies that have separated the CEO and board chair roles has steadily climbed since the financial crisis.11 In 2007, 65% of board chairs at S&P 500 companies also held the office about the board’s oversight); JPMorgan 2012 Proxy Statement, supra note 1, at 39 (noting that an independent board chair would be “particularly constructive” in light of federal and state investigations aimed at JPMorgan).	cache/inlawrev-18350.pdf	txt/inlawrev-18350.txt