id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
inlawrev-23371	Steiner-Dillon, James R.	Epistemic Exceptionalism	2019	50	.pdf	application/pdf	27102	1213	47	The overconfidence to which I refer is an emergent property of formal legal decisions, taken in the aggregate and expressed in the doctrine of appellate courts186 and in the discretionary practices of trial judges; it is a characteristic of the institution of the judiciary, not of any individual judge.187 Individual judges may well be aware of their personal epistemic limitations; acting collectively and in their official capacities, however, they create a body of doctrine characterized by epistemic exceptionalism. I believe this explains the disparity between courts’ willingness to acknowledge that limiting instructions to jurors represent something of a fiction insofar as we do not believe that juries literally refrain from drawing all forbidden inferences from evidence admitted for a particular purpose, but maintain a strong pretense that trial judges are in fact capable of that feat.	cache/inlawrev-23371.pdf	txt/inlawrev-23371.txt